1.

Duration of Liability
a. Waiting for a carrier or Boarding a carrier

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. and THEODORE LARDIZABAL y MALECDAN, Petitioners, -versus
- COURT OF APPEALS, INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT, EMILIA CUDIAMAT BANDOY, FERNANDO CUDLAMAT,
MARRIETA CUDIAMAT, NORMA CUDIAMAT, DANTE CUDIAMAT, SAMUEL CUDIAMAT and LIGAYA
CUDIAMAT, ALL HEIRS OF THE LATE PEDRITO CUDIAMAT REPRESENTED BY INOCENCIA CUDIAMAT,
Respondents.

FACTS:

 It was alleged that Pedrito fell from the platform of the petitioner’s bus when it suddenly
accelerated forward. He was then run over by the rear right tires of the vehicle.
 Instead of bringing him immediately to the nearest hospital, Theodore Lardizabal, the driver of
the bus, first brought the other passengers and the cargo to their respective destinations.
o He expired in the hospital.
 For the death of Pedrito Cudiamat, his heirs filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa
Transportation
 Dangwa Transportation alleged that it had observed the extraordinary diligence required in the
operation of the company and in the supervision of its employees although they are not
absolute insurers of the safety of the public at large.
o Further, it was alleged that it was Pedrito’s own carelessness and negligence which gave
rise to the incident.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Dangwa
o CA reversed trial court’s decision

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are negligent and are liable for the damages claimed. (YES)

RULING:

 Pedrito, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already considered a passenger
and is thus entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to their contractual relation.
o The duty which the carrier owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well
as to those alighting therefrom.
 The contention of Dangwa Transportation that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge
that Pedrito would ride on the bus since the latter had not manifested his intention to board the
same does not merit consideration.
o When the bus is not in motion, there is no necessity for a person who wants to ride the
same to signal his intention to board.
o A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders .
o Hence, it is the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus stops, to do no
act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a passenger while he was
attempting to board the same.
 b. Arrival at Destination

LA MALLORCA, Petitioner, -versus - HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIANO BELTRAN, ET AL.,

Respondents. G.R. No. L-20761, EN BANC, July 27, 1966, BARRERA, J

FACTS:

 Mariano Beltran and his family boarded the Pambusco Bus owned and operated by La Mallorca in
order to go to Mexico, Pampanga. .
o 3 tickets were issued covering the full fares of Mariano, his wife and their eldest child,
Milagros. No fare was charged on the 2 other children since both were below the height
requirement.
 The bus eventually reached Mexico, Pampanga.
 The Beltran Family, then carrying some of the baggages, got down the bus and went to a shaded
spot on the left pedestrians’ side of the road about 4 or 5 meters away from the bus.
 Mariano then returned to the bus to get his other bayong.
o Unnoticed, one of his daughters, Raquel, followed him.
 While he was on the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand him his bayong, the
bus suddenly started moving forward, evidently to resume its trip, even though the conductor has
not given the driver the customary signal to start.
o Sensing that the bus was again in motion, he immediately jumped from the running board
without getting his bayong.
 He then saw that the bus ran over Raquel.
 Consequently, he filed the present suit against La Mallorca seeking for damages.
o La Mallorca claimed that there could not be a breach of contract in the case because the
child was no longer a passenger when she died. The contract of carriage was already
terminated

ISSUE: Whether La Mallorca is liable for breach of contract of carriage. (YES)

RULING:

 The relation of a carrier and a passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from
the vehicle at a place selected by the former at the point of destination.
o It continues until the passenger had a reasonable time or opportunity to leave the carrier’s
premises.
o What is a reasonable time is to be determined from all the circumstances of the case.
 In the present case, it cannot be concluded that the carrier exercised the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person
o The driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine.
o He also started to run the bus even before the conductor gave him the signal to go and
while the latter was still unloading some of the baggages of the passengers.
 It must be noted that the presence of Mariano and Raquel near the bus was not unreasonable and
they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers who entitled to the protection under their
contract of carriage.
 Considering the foregoing, La Mallorca should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage. Even
assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, La Mallorca can be held
liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 The inclusion of this averment for quasi-delict while incompatible with the other claim under the
contract of carriage is permissible under Section 2 of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH

DIVISION, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING
CORPORATION, Respondents

FACTS:

 Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia which is owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation and
is bound for Manila.
 When it arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila, Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the
exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on the said vessel.
o An hour after the passengers had disembarked , the crane operated by Figueroa started
unloading the cargoes.
 During the said operation, Anacleto who had already disembarked went back to the vessel when
remembered that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the vessel.
o It was while he was pointing to the place where his cargoes were loaded to the crew that
the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane.
o He was brought to the hospital where he expired 3 days after
 The Vianas filed a complaint for damages against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.
 Aboitiz, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Pioneer.
o It contends that since 1 hour had already elapsed from the time Anacleto disembarked from
the vessel and that he was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes prior
to the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer reasonable and he
consequently ceased to be a passenger
 Pioneer raised the defense that Aboitiz had no cause of action against it considering that the former
is being sued for breach of contract of carriage to which it is not a party.
o It also observed the diligence of a good father of a family both in the selection and
supervision of its employees as well as in the prevention of damage.
o In any case, Anacleto’s gross negligence was the direct and proximate cause of his death.

ISSUE: Whether Aboitiz should be held solely liable for the death of Anacleto Viana. (YES)

RULING:
 Observing the rule laid down in La Mallorca, It is thus of no moment whether there was no
appreciable interregnum for the passenger to leave the carrier's premises or whether an interval of
1 hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident as in the case at bar.
o The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the
presence of the victim on or near the vessel.
o The Court believes there exists such a justifiable cause in the present case.
 Such passenger will need at least an hour to disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage.
o In the case at bar, when the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his
cargoes which he had every right to do.
 The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only 1 hour after the vessel arrived.
o As such, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in the carrier’s
premises was not without cause.
o It was admitted that it is Aboitiz’s standard procedure that the unloading operations shall
start only at such time.
o Consequently, Anacleto is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic
death.
 There is also no showing that the petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in seeing to it that said
precautionary measures were strictly and actually enforced.
 As for Pioneer, the Court found it not negligent both on grounds of estoppel and of lack of evidence.
o Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary diligence and the corresponding
presumption of negligence foisted on common carriers like Aboitiz.
 1. Liability for Action of Others
a. Employees

ANTONIA MARANAN, Petitioner, -versus - PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., Respondents.

FACTS:

 Rogelio Corachea was stabbed and killed by driver Simeon Valenzuela while the former was riding
as a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez.
o Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide and was found guilty.
 While the appeal was pending, Antonia Maranan, Corachea's mother, filed an action to recover
damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son.
 In response, Perez and Valenzuela asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense since he
first assaulted the driver by stabbing the latter from behind.
o Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier like him was
not liable.
 The trial court ruled against Perez and dismissed the claim against Valenzuela.

ISSUE: Whether Perez is liable for the crime committed by Valenzuela while the latter is in the
performance of his duty as driver of the taxicab. (YES)

RULING:

 The killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands
the carrier had entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage.
o The incident took place in the course of the duty of the guilty employee.
o As such, Perez is liable under Article 1759 of the Civil Code.
 Article 1759 of the New Civil Code expressly makes a common carrier liable for intentional assaults
committed by its employees upon its passengers.
o To be liable, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty.
o It is not a defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of its orders.
o Such liability is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from all
assaults committed by its own employees.
 It is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely that is the principle behind this. At
least three reasons underlie the above rule.
o First, the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full
measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the
law from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all,
from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety.
o Second, the result of the carrier confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his
contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the
passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law.
 o Third, as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful
acts or negligence of its employees against the passengers since it, and not the passengers,
has power to select and remove them.
 Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and other employees with due
regard not only to their technical competence and physical ability but also to their total personality,
including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
 The dismissal of the claim against Valenzuela is correct as well.
o Maranan's action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was
not a party thereto.
o His civil liability is covered in the criminal case.
 4. Jurisdictional Rules
a. Liability to Passengers
54. LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO V.
ANTIPORDA, SR., respondents.

FACTS:
 Tirso V. Antiporda, Sr. was, contracted by Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co. (SGV) to be the institutional
financial specialist for the agricultural credit institution project of the Investment and Development
Bank of Malawi in Africa.
o For the engagement, Antiporda would be provided one round-trip economy ticket from
Manila to Blantyre and back with a maximum travel time of four days per round-trip.
 On September 17, 1984, Lufthansa, through SGV, issued the ticket for Antiporda's confirmed flights
to Malawi, Africa.
o The ticket particularized his itinerary: Manila -BombayNairobi- Lilongwe - Blantyre.
 Antiporda took the Lufthansa flight to Singapore from where he proceeded to Bombay on board the
same airline.
 Lufthansa, informed Antiporda that his seat in Air Kenya Flight 203 to Nairobi had been given to a
very important person of Bombay who was attending a religious function in Nairobi.
o Antiporda protested but Air Kenya Flight 203 left for Nairobi without him on board.
Stranded in Bombay, Antiporda was booked for Nairobi via Addis Ababa only on September
27, 1984.
o He finally arrived in Blantyre more than a couple of days late for his appointment with
people from the institution he was to work with in Malawi.
 Antiporda filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint against Lufthansa.
o RTC ruled in favour of Antiporda and awared moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees
 Lufthansa argued that it cannot be held liable for the acts committed by Air Kenya on the basis of
the following:
o (a) it merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in behalf of Air Kenya;
o (b) under sections (1) and (2) Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention, an airline carrier is liable
only to untoward occurrences on its own line;
o (c) the award of moral and exemplary damages in addition to attorney's fees by the trial
court is without basis in fact and in law.

ISSUE: Whether there a breach of obligation by the defendant in failing to transport the
Antiporda from Manila to Blantyre, Malawi, Africa? (YES)

RULING:
 Although the contract of carriage was to be performed by several air carriers, the same is to be
treated as a single operation conducted by Lufthansa because Antiporda dealt exclusively with it
which issued him a Lufthansa ticket for the entire trip.
o By issuing a confirmed ticket, Lufthansa in effect guaranteed Antiporda a sure seat with
Air Kenya.
 This case is one of a contract of carriage and the ticket issued by the defendant to the plaintiff is
the written agreement between the parties herein.
o From the ticket, therefore, it is indubitably clear that it was the duty and responsibility
of the defendant Lufthansa to transport the plaintiff from Manila to Blantyre, on a trip
of five legs.
 Secs. 1 and 2, Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention is inapplicable
 SECTION 2. In the case of transportation of this nature(to be performed by various successive
carriers), the passenger or his representative can take action only against the carrier who
performed the transportation during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in the case
where, by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey.
o Antiporda's cause of action is not premised on the occurrence of an accident or delay as
contemplated under Section 2 of said Article but on Air Kenya's refusal to transport him
in order to accommodate another.
o The provision does not contemplate the instance of "bumping-off" but merely of simple
delay, it cannot provide a handy excuse for Lufthansa as to exculpate it from any liability
to Antiporda.