Under Article 2180, who is responsible for whose acts? Enumerate each and briefly discuss each one.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,

the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company

The civil law assumes

that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent
in the performance of their legal and natural duty
closely to supervise the child who is in their custody
and control.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by

the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company

There are three kinds of guardians under the

law: (a) the legal guardian, the
guardian ad litem, the
guardian ad litem, the judicial guardian,

The owners and managers of an establishment

or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches
in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions

Employers shall
be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
Take note, the liability in this pargraph entails that there is an employer employee relationship and
the damage done must be within the scope of his duties assigned to him.

The Government of the Philippine Islands is

not liable in damages for the negligent acts of its regular
officers or employees in the performance of their ordinary
functions

The liability of the State has two aspects,

namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is
liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its
private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer.
The government may be
held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to
be sued through any of the accepted forms of consent.
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is
not a special agent even if he is so denominated,

Teachers or heads of establishments of arts

and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody

teachers or directors of arts

and trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody,
but this provision only applies to an institution of
arts and trades and not to any academic educational
institution.”
Discuss the wisdom behind the doctrine of vicarious liability.

“[w]ith respect to extra-contractual obligation arising

from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent
for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature
has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which
the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is
morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the
lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility
for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions
are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are
in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control
over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code
has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with
certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which
moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons
to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in
having failed to exercise due care in one’s own acts, or
in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and
control of one’s agents or servants, or in the control of
persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position
of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct

SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-10134
June 29, 1957
Facts:
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of Balintawak
Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed by the school’s supervisor to attend a
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and other students boarded the jeep that
was going to take them to the parade. Dante then drove the jeep, while the driver sat by his side.
They have not gone too far when the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi.
Issue:
Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally liable with his son Dante
Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous act?
Held:
Yes.
Under Art 1903, of the Spanish Civil Code paragraph 1, and 5 which provides: the
father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by
the minor children who live with them. xxx Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
But the provision applies only to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic
educational institution. Dante was then a student of Balintawak Elem School and as part of his
extra-curricular activity; he attended the parade upon instruction of City school’s supervisor. It
was in connection with the parade that the accident took place
Clear that neither the head of the school nor the city supervisor could be held liable for the
negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades
Civil liability of father (in case of death or incapacity, the mother) for any damages
caused by minor children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over
them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while on the other
hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way they could
relieve themselves of liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent the damage.

In relation to the vicarious liability of parents and guardians, discuss briefly the relevance of the
following:

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of

AgapitoElcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of
said minor, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-24803 [May 26, 1977]

Facts of the Case:

Respondent Reginald Hill killed the son of the plaintiffs named Agapito Elcano. A
criminal complaint was instituted against him but he was acquitted on the ground that his act
was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, couple with mistake. Subsequently, plaintiffs
filed a complaint for recovery of damages against defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with who he was living
and getting subsistence, for the same killing. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion. Nevertheless, the civil case was
finally dismissed upon motion for reconsideration.

Issues:

1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case.

2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied against Atty.
Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of.
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already
legally married.

Ruling of the Court:

1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in a criminal case and a
civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. Furthermore, a civil case for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is
independently instituted from a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar
to the instant action against him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill. Although
parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child, emancipation by marriage is
not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian. As in the present case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus,
making Article 2180 apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.

Bahia vs Litonjua

Ramon Ramirez was the owner and manager of a garage in the city of Manila, His mother
purchased an automobile and turned it over to the garage to assist her son in the business in
which he was engaged. Ramirez rented the automobile so purchased and donated by his
mother to the defendant Mariano Leynes, together with a chauffeur and a machinist.  while
passing from Balayan to Tuy, the automobile, by reason of a defect in the steering gear, refused
to obey the direction of the driver in turning a corner in the streets of Balayan, and, as a
consequence, ran across the street and into the wall of a house against which the daughter of
plaintiff was leaning at the time. The font of the machine struck the child in the center of the
body and crushed her to death.

Issue: whether or not Leynes should be solidarily liable with Ramirez

Held: No, We are of the opinion that the judgment against Leynes must be reversed and the
complaint dismissed as to him. While it may be said that, at the time of the accident, the
chauffeur who was driving the machine was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits
derived from the trips of the automobile belonged to him and the automobile was operated
under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him responsible for the
negligence of the chauffeur or for defects in the automobile itself. In the case before us the
death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear of the automobile immediately raised
the presumption that Leynes was negligent in selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to
maintain it in good condition after selection, and the burden of proof was on him to show that he
had exercised the care of a good father of a family. As to selection, the defendant has clearly
shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the
machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition.

The defendant Leynes having shown to the satisfaction of the court that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family is relieved of responsibility with respect to the death of
plaintiff's child.

Tamargo vs CA
ACTS:

In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a
complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of
the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition
was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.

ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual
custody was lodged with the biological parents.

HELD:

Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar,
during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural
parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. “Parents and
guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil code”.

Spouses Libi vs IAC

FACTS:

Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with
the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic.  Wendell
wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to
threats.  One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming
from the same gun.  The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages.  Trial court dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.

HELD:

The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children
imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code
covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.  The court
held that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is
primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can
prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.  However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which
he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.  Each of the
spouses had their own key.  She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun
was no longer in the safety deposit box.  Wendell could not have gotten hold of the
gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of
the mother’s bag where the key was kept.  The spouses failed to observe and
exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage.

SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody
over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody
however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time
of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto.

In relation to the vicarious liabilities of owners and managers of establishments, discuss briefly
the relevance of the following:

Cangco vs Manila Railroad

CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918

FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where he was an
employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat. When he was about to alight
from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice because
it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. As a result, he slipped and fell violently on the
platform. His right arm was badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated.

Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
alighting from the company’s trains.

The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an obstruction
upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own
contributing negligence.

Issue: Whether or not the company can be held solidarily liable under article 1903

Held:. the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the
obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that
contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. note that the
defense of “exercise of due carein their selection and supervision . . . is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form of
expression, [the defense] relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual”

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS,

ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT, and FERNANDO PINEDA

1975 / Aquino / Appeal from CFI order

FACTS

Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders] along the national highway
at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus driven by Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan
suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of
earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.

PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American Forwarders, Balingit, and
Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda’s employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against
him be dismissed on the ground that PRBL and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI
dismissed the complaint against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager of an establishment
as contemplated in NCC 2180.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise” embrace
the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose. NO.

RATIO

Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of NCC
2180 that the term “manager” (“director” in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of “employer”.
Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, in connection with the vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded
as an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.

CFI AFFIRMED

Filipinas Broadcasting Network vs AMEC-BCCM

“Exposé” is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo ‘Mel’ Rima (“Rima”) and Hermogenes ‘Jun’
Alegre (“Alegre”). Exposé is aired every Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from
students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine (“AMEC”) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and
Angelita Ago (“Ago”), as Dean of AMEC’s College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against
FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (“FBNI”)

Issue: Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for moral damages, attorney’s fees and
costs of suit

Held: The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit.52 Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve
of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. 53 Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action
against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. FBNI claims that it "has taken all the
1a\^/phi1

precaution in the selection of Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications."
However, no clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNI’s
"regimented process" of application. 
 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INST. VS. IAC
Kapunan, Sr. an 82 year old retired teacher, was struck by a jeepney owned by Filamer Christian Institute
and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. Kapunan was hospitalized for 20 days. He thus instituted a
criminal case against Funtecha alone, who was convicted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence.

hereafter, pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan instituted a civil case for damages against Funtecha and
Filamer and its president. The RTC and the CA found Filamer, the school, liable for damages. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Is Funtecha an employee of Filamer

RULING: YES. It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a
scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to
clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan’s house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a
“frolic of his own” but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the
steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school
cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors
its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of
administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly,
Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be
exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion
of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as
compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned.

In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court,
thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive
law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a
working student of a school and against the school itself.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged
employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by
the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the
reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an
employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.

Jayme vs Apostol
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck
driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered
under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano
borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to
catch his Manila flight.

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National
Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50 meters away from the
point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the
accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days
after the accident.

ISSUE:

MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him

MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.

RULING:

1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently
assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. The Municipality of
Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano,
he still cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There existed no
causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for
Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident

2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental
functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal corporations are suable because their charters
grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if
it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the
State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the

exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule
that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred
by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said
vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be
the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily
responsible for the consequences incident to its operation.

The petition is DENIED.

Mercury Drug vs Huang

Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a sixwheeler truck with.
It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver. Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen
Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.
These two vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30 p.m. within the
municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila. The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent
Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of
operations, respondent Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous
medical and rehabilitation treatment. Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing gross
negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug for failing to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.

Whether or not the persumption of negligence was properly rebutted by Mercury Drug
Held: no,To be relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties.

In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure.
however, Mrs. Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests and psychological examination when he
applied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man. tests
were conducted on the motor skills development, perceptual speed, visual attention, depth
visualization, eye and hand coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police
clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only three driving seminars.
Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on the supervision and
discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving
without a license.

The general rule is that their State cannot be sued without its consent. In relation
to the vicarious liability of the State, focusing on the instances when State can be
sued, discuss briefly the relevance of the following:

MErrit vs government

FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the
ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to
return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the
Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence
of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same. 

ISSUES: 

1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it
also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. (Merritt vs Government of
the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)

NOTE:

■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180
par. 6, Civil Code)

■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands)

■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except
when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would
involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)

Rosete vs auditor general

Fire destroyed the house belonging to the complainant, allegedly due to the negligence of officials of a
government agency, the ECA. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General, finding
that the Government could not be held liable under Art. 1903 (now 2180) because the negligent
officials did not fall under the term special agents.

Issues/Ratio I. W/N the government can be held liable for the negligence of the ECA officials (NO)

Held: the ECA officers did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning
of that word in Art. 1903 (now 2180) in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA. The government is not
responsible for the damages caused through such negligence. this was probably because storing the
gasoline was inherent in their responsibilities to the warehouse; It was warehouse for storing oils and
gasoline and not
Fontanillas vs Maliamanm

FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially by its regular
driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's
death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's
employer. After trial, the court awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla.
NIA appealed. The Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily
proprietary functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is
therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.

ISSUE:

May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its
driver who was not its special agent?

HELD:

Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct
from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate
body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the
damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.
while it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and
purely a "government-function" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
including all communal and pump irrigation projects." 

In relation to the vicarious liabilities of

teachers & heads of academic establishments,
discuss briefly the relevance of the following:
madora vs. CA

GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and
2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the
defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school
was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in
the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of
the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of
the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was
under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation
(submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding
classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed
in-charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on
his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher
of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student.
Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death.

Petition was denied.

Palisoc vs Brilliantes

Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics

students at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during
recess, an altercation transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the
incident, Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was
working on a machine with Dominador looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to
remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on
the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which caused
the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter died,

Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the defendant?

The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and
severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI
board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded as
party defendant. The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody”
means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There
is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortuous act must live and board in the school. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight
between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants complied with
their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the
school premises to protect their students from harm.

St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos

GR No. 143363, 6 February 2002
FACTS:

Herein petitioner conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools
from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along
with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on
their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old
student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which
resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada
Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

RULING:

No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be
held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code
where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In order that there
may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening
efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For,
negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate
cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Also, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Hence, the registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for
injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of
the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Wherefore, the case
was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein
petitioner.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS. CA

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic. His parents, respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short
notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However, because of persuasion of
the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers
was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the
process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He died. Respondent spouses filed a civil case against
petitioner and some of their teachers. Trial court found teachers liable but dismissed complaint against
the school.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner school and teachers are liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned
tasks. What was held was a purely private affair, a picnic, which did not have permit from the school
since it was not a school sanctioned activity. Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal of the planning of
the picnic does not in any way consent to the holding of the same.

No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. The class adviser of the section where Ferdinand belonged did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the
students who joined the picnic.

PSBA v. CA (G.R. No. 84698)

acts:

Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable for the death of Carlitos
Bautista, a third year commerce student who was stabbed while on the premises of PSBA by elements
from outside the school. Private respondents are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the school
and its officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during, and after the
attack on the victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied by the trial court. CA
affirmed.
Issue:

Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.

Ruling: NO.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only
between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and
order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former’s negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.

Discuss diligence of a good father of a family in relation to employers as a valid defense against liability.
Proof required when invoking such defense.

In the case of employer held vicariously liable, the proper defense is the exercise of all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. Based therefore on
jurisprudential law, the employer must not merely present testimonial evidence to prove that he
observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee, but
he must also support such testimonial evidence with concrete or documentary evidence. The reason for
this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that of his witnesses.