Arsenio Valdez v. CA

3/18/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 538
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 611

Valdez vs. People
*
G.R. No. 170180. November 23, 2007.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests; The legality of an

arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person—his
warrantless arrest cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.—
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find
any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before
his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in
the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest
affects only the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdez vs. People
jurisdiction of the court over his person. Petitioner’s warrantless

arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
Same; Same; Arrests in Flagrante Delicto; Elements.—For the

exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000170ed09ad3776386fca003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/24
view of the arresting officer. Here, petitioner’s act of looking

around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding
his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run
away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal
knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually
engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away
but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they approached
him.
Same; Criminal Law; Evidence; Flight; Flight alone is not a

reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because
flight alone is inherently ambiguous.—Even taking the
prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in line with our
assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any
different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking
the street at night, after being closely observed and then later
tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their
approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Of persuasion
was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v.
Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W. 2d 451 (1985), that “[f]light alone
is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances
because flight alone is inherently ambiguous.” Alone, and under
the circumstances of this case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just
as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Same; Same; StopandFrisk Searches; A stopandfrisk

situation, following Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889
(1968), must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the
person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine
reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about
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Valdez vs. People
him.—The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they

appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to
conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stopand
frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on

petitioner’s behavior. However, a stopandfrisk situation,
following Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 (1968), must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer
clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light
of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
Same; Same; Waivers; A waiver of an illegal warrantless

arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.—Petitioner’s
waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the
marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be
admitted in evidence against him as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful. As we pronounced in
People v. Lapitaje, 397 SCRA 674 (2003)—A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are
deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving
vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver
or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search)
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a
valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of
Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and,
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
Same; Same; Consented Searches; Burden of Proof; The

consent to a warrantless search must be voluntary, that is, it must
be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion; Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence; It is
the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and volun
614
Valdez vs. People
tarily given.—In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General

posits that apart from the warrantless search being incidental to
his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are
not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,
373 SCRA 221 (2002)—Doubtless, the constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and
search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment
in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8)
the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody; The

existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for
conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very
corpus delicti of the crime; There can be no crime of illegal
possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on
whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and
established to be the prohibited drug.—In all prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements
must concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2)
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua
non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being
the very corpus delicti of the crime. In a line of cases, we have
ruled as fatal to the prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one
allegedly seized from the accused. There can
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VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 615
Valdez vs. People
be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when

nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the
same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited
drug.
Same; Same; The law enforcers and public officers who take
possession of the specimen is dutybound to detail how it was cared
for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to
prevent alteration or replacement while in custody.—The onus of
proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In
conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have
the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized
drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit
handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the
time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
Each person who takes possession of the specimen is dutybound
to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in
his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in
custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used
against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental
rights.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of

Regularity; The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.—
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the
constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial
yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This
elementary principle accords every accused the right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests
upon the prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; The prosecution’s evidence must stand or

fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.—The evidence of the defense is
weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this “[c]annot be used to
advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or
fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense.” Moreover, where the
circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one

inconsistent with the presump
616
Valdez vs. People
tion of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of

guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the
evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is
inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.
Same; Same; Same; In the rightfully vigorous campaign of the

government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug
trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an
accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven to the
contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to
establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.—Drug addiction has
been invariably denounced as “an especially vicious crime,” and
“one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our
society,” for those who become addicted to it “not only slide into
the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave
menace to the safety of lawabiding members of society,” whereas
“peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction.” Indeed, the
havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the
moral fiber of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in
the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate
the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be
permitted to run roughshod over an accused’s right to be
presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it
shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Courts; Courts are dutybound to be extra

vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses—the Court
is not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers
resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or
even harass civilians.—We find it fitting to take this occasion to
remind the courts to exercise the highest degree of diligence and
prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons
brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights
at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give
more serious consideration to certain material issues in the
determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to
the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the

practice of planting evidence to extract information or even harass
civilians. Accordingly, courts are dutybound to be “[e]xtra
vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.” In
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Valdez vs. People
the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers

and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with
commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and
respect for the law.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure

without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also
zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and
1
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times
be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance 2to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.
3
On appeal is the Decision of the Court4 of Appeals dated
28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31
March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of
Republic Act No.
_______________
1 1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 2.

2 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868; 288 SCRA 626 (1998).
3 Rollo, pp. 7689. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar
Fernando, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang
and Monina ArevaloZenarosa.
4 Id., at pp. 2845. Penned by Executive Judge Clifton U. Ganaya.
618

Valdez vs. People
5
9165 (R.A. No. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporal medium 6as maximum and
ordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of7

Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information
which reads:
“That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality

of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or
less twentyfive (25) grams, without first securing the necessary
permit, license or prescription from the proper government
agency.
8
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,

trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting
the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte,
Aringay, La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista),
Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who
arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17
March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the
National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay,
La Union together with Aratas and Ordoño when they
noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a minibus.
The tanods
_______________
5 Entitled Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
6 Id., at pp. 4445.
7 Records, p. 1.
8 Id.
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VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 619

Valdez vs. People
observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,

seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached
him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away.
They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter
brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio
Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was
ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s bag
allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces
of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner 9
was
taken to the police station for further investigation.
Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on
most material points. On crossexamination, however,
Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents
of petitioner’s
10
bag before petitioner was taken to the house
of Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercado’s
house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the
contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part,
Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered by
Mercado to open petitioner’s bag and that 11
it was then that
they saw the purported contents thereof.
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector
Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who
conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the
specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the
substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic
bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross
examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of
how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how
the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he
could not identify whose marking was
_______________
9 TSN, 24 February 2004, pp. 35, 7, 1112. See also Records, p. 2.

10 TSN, 3 March 2004, p. 11.
11 Id., at p. 16.
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Valdez vs. People
on the12inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana

leaves.
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s
sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17
March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro
oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus,
petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to
drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s
house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoño, a
cousin of his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and
asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was
going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly
requested to see the contents of his bag and appellant
acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas
joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag,
petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and
taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas 13
who carried
the bag until they reached their destination.
Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag
was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took
out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out
to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership
thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with
imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the
prohibited drugs to someone from the east in order for
them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he
was brought to the police station and charged with the
instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he
who opened and took out the contents of his bag at his
friend’s house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who
did so at Mercado’s house and that it was 14
only there that
they saw the marijuana for the first time.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
against
_______________
12 TSN, 16 March 2004, pp. 47.

13 TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 39.
14 Id., at pp. 1012, 1617.
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Valdez vs. People
him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate

imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal medium as 15
maximum and ordered
him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC
to the Court of Appeals. On 28 July 2005, the appellate
court affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of
Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the
presumption of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in
the absence of evidence of illmotive on their part, agreed
with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest
petitioner. It observed further:
“That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of

the seized marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance finds
prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drugs
is denied. In this case, accusedappellant himself testified that the
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his bag. The
corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana
and his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused
16
appellant Valdez’s own testimony.”
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts

that his guilt of the crime charged had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first
time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against
him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the
warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise
contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the
marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are
inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous
tree.
Wellsettled is the rule that the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of
any clear
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 4445.

16 Id., at p. 87.
622

Valdez vs. People
showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or

substance which could have affected the result of the
17
case
have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.
After meticulous examination of the records and
evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and so holds
that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in
order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can

we find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his
active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence
dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in
his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects 18
only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. Petitioner’s
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis
of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized
drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether
or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, 19
is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.
Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier
intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of
petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was
approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents of
his
_______________
17 People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 746; 397 SCRA 674, 687 (2003),
citing People v. Mendoza, 327 SCRA 695 (2000). See also People v. Sevilla,
394 Phil. 125; 339 SCRA 625 (2000).
18 See People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 748; 397 SCRA 674, 690 (2003)
citing People v. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693 (2000) and People v. Nitcha, 240
SCRA 283 (1995). See also People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April
2004, 428 SCRA 51.
19 People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642; 399 SCRA 503 (2003).
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Valdez vs. People
bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken

to the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it
was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over
the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that
he saw it for the first time at the barangay captain’s house.
Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the
resolution of this case on the general thrust of the
prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s
arrest stands out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides the only occasions on which a person may be
arrested without a warrant, to wit:
“Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer

or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting

barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was
obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the
time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
commit
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Valdez vs. People
20
ting an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause
either to justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate,

this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.21 Here, petitioner’s act of looking
around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was
finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is
irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to
charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner
had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was
attempting to engage in criminal activity. More
importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away
but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the
truth, in line with our assumption from the start, the
conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable
to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after
being closely observed and then later tailed by three
unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must22 not
always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Of
persuasion was the Michigan
23
Supreme Court when it ruled
in People v. Shabaz that “[f]light alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because
flight alone is inherently ambiguous.” Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitioner’s
_______________
20 TSN, 24 February 2004, p. 11; TSN, 3 March 2004, pp. 9, 19.

21 People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775; 412 SCRA 142, 157 (2003),
citing People v. Chua, G.R. Nos. 13606667, 4 February 2003, 396 SCRA
657.
22 People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 862; 313 SCRA 114, 122 (1999), citing
People v. Bawar, 262 SCRA 325 (1999).
23 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985).
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VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 625

Valdez vs. People
flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation

as it does to a nefarious one.
24
24
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud, “[t]he
phrase ‘in his presence’ therein, connot[es] penal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of
the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches
on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his
liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute
or rule that allows exception to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application
cannot be25
extended beyond the cases specifically provided
by law.”
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming
that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient
to incite suspicion of criminal
26
activity enough to validate
his warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most
permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stopandfrisk to allay any
suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioner’s
behavior. However,
27
a stopandfrisk situation, following
Terry v. Ohio, must precede a warrantless arrest, be
limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be
grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant
the belief that
28
the person detained has weapons concealed
about him.
Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question
his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly
taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence
against him
_______________
24 458 Phil. 752; 412 SCRA 142 (2003).

25 Id., at p. 777; p. 158.
26 See People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA 174.
27 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 [1968].
28 See People v. Chua, 444 Phil. 757; 396 SCRA 657 (2003).
626

Valdez vs. People
as they were
29
seized during a warrantless search which was
not lawful. As we pronounced in People v. Lapitaje—
“A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also

mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches
and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search

of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches
(4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest,
the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to
wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
30
pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.”
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was

neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor
was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits
that apart from the warrantless search being incidental to
his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search.
We are not31convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court
of Appeals —
“Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable

searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.
The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an
otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent
to a search is not to be lightly
_______________
29 See People v. Lapitaje, supra note 17, citing People v. Chua Ho San,
308 SCRA 42 (1999).
30 Id., at pp. 748749; p. 690.
31 424 Phil. 263; 373 SCRA 221 (2002).
627
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 627

Valdez vs. People
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.

The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment
in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he

objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education
and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating
evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8)
the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it
32
was freely and voluntarily given.”
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution—

albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when petitioner’s
bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was
already under the coercive control of the public officials
who had custody of him when the search of his bag was
demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any
specific statement as to how the consent was asked and
how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by
petitioner indicating his alleged “consent.” Even granting
that petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño
asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
hence, is considered no consent at all within 33
the
contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. As a
result, petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional
right
_______________
32 Id., at p. 286; pp. 239240.

33 People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 788; 412 SCRA 142, 168 (2003),
citing People v. Compacion, 414 Phil. 68; 361 SCRA 540 (2001).
628

Valdez vs. People
or a voluntary
34
submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized

marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search
is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the
prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to
convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves
purportedly taken from petitioner’s bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, the following elements must concur: (1) proof that the
transaction took place; and (2) presentation35in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence
of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for
conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous
36
drugs, it being
the very corpus delicti of the crime.
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the
prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination 37
was the same one
allegedly seized from the accused. There can be no crime
of illegal possession
_______________
34 Id.
35 People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295; 399 SCRA 188, 197 (2003).
36 People v. Almeida, 463 Phil. 637, 648; 418 SCRA 254, 263 (2003),
citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116 (1994). See also People v.
Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 61, citing People v.
Mendiola, supra, People v. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762 (1989), People v.
Vocente, 188 SCRA 100 (1990) and People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136
(1990).
37 See People v. Mapa, G.R. No. 91014, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 670
(1993), People v. Dismuke, G.R. No. 108453, 11 July 1994, 234 SCRA 51,
People v. Casimiro, 383 SCRA 400 (2002), People v. Pedronan, 452 Phil.
226; 404 SCRA 183 (2003), People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April
2004, 428 SCRA 51, People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, 21 June 2004, 432
SCRA 470.
629
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 629

Valdez vs. People
of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on

whether the item confiscated was the same specimen 38
examined and established to be the39
prohibited drug. As
we discussed in People v. Orteza, where we deemed the
prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements
necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of
shabu—
“First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police

officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of
seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending
team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia
should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same
physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement
raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory
examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buybust team failed to mark the
confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the
accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard
procedure in antinarcotics operations produced doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where
the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe
the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the
material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on
the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the
corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the
prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu.”
_______________
38 See People v. Ong, supra at p. 488.

39 G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007, 528 SCRA 750.
630

Valdez vs. People
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the

barangay tanod, the records only show that he was taken
to the house of the barangay captain
40
and thereafter to the
police station. The Joint Affidavit executed by the tanod
merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves
which they brought to the police station together with
41
41
petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt issued by the Aringay
Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the
suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on
the matter of when petitioner’s bag was opened, they also
gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the
same. The prosecution, despite these material
inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies.
Even more damning to its cause was the admission by
Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the
specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the
police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane
wrapping of the marijuana. The nonpresentation, without
justifiable reason, of the police officers who conducted the
inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such
was the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution
neglected to establish the crucial link in the chain of
custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time they
were first allegedly discovered until they were brought for
examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of
the prosecution to establish the chain of custody over the
seized marijuana as such “[f]inds prominence only when 42
the existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied.” We
cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court
narrowed on petitioner’s testimony that the marijuana was
taken from
_______________
40 Records, p. 2.
41 Id., at p. 5.
42 Rollo, p. 87.
631
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 631

Valdez vs. People
43
his bag, without taking the statement in full context.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ findings, although
petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his 44
bag, he consistently denied ownership thereof.
Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership
of the seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody
comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment

falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers
and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve
the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of
evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage,
labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the
evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty
bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and
preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration
or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the
integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes
to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by
the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption
of innocence
45
nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an
accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the
presumption of innocence. This elementary principle
accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests
upon the prosecution.
_______________
43 Id.
44 TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 1113.
45 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 158; 339 SCRA 625, 652 (2000),
citing People v. Pagaura, 267 SCRA 17 (1997), People v. De los Santos, 314
SCRA 303 (1999).
632

Valdez vs. People
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this “[c]annot be used to
advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must
stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to 46
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.”
Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two
or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption
of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of
guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that
the evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty

47
and
is inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.
Drug addiction has been
48
invariably denounced as “an
especially vicious crime,” and “one of the 49most pernicious
evils that has ever crept into our society,” for those who
become addicted to it “not only slide into the ranks of the
living dead, what is worse, they become a grave 50menace to
the safety of lawabiding members of society,” whereas 51
“peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction.”
Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of
prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be
underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous
campaign of the government to eradicate the hazards of
drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run
roughshod over an accused’s right to be presumed innocent
until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk
_______________
46 People v. Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 175593, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA
489, citing People v. Samson, 421 Phil. 104; 369 SCRA 229 (2001).
47 People v. Sapal, 385 Phil. 109, 126; 328 SCRA 417, 432 (2000), citing
People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 126998, 14 September 1999, 314 SCRA
303 and People v. Fider, 223 SCRA 117 (1993).
48 Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, 329 Phil. 432, 435; 260
SCRA 624, 628 (1996), citing People v. Nario, 224 SCRA 647 (1993).
49 Id., citing People v. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85 (1988).
50 Id., at p. 436, citing People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 95 (1990), citing People
v. Lamug, 172 SCRA 349 (1989).
51 Id., citing People v. Policarpio, supra.
633
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 633

Valdez vs. People
from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented
utterly fails to overcome the presumption of innocence
which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to
prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable
doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s exoneration from
criminal liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to

remind the courts to exercise the highest degree of
diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of
accused persons brought before them, especially in light of
the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the
courts a quo neglected to give more serious consideration to
certain material issues in the determination of the merits
of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some
instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information or even harass civilians.
Accordingly, courts are dutybound to be “[e]xtra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made 52 to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.” In the
same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers
and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties
with commitment to the highest degree of diligence,
righteousness and respect for the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held
for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his
release, or
_______________
52 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 159; 339 SCRA 625, 653 (2000),
citing People v. Pagaura, supra. See also People v. Sapal, supra.
634

LCK Industries Inc. vs. Planters Development Bank
the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10)

days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, CarpioMorales

and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Assailed decision reversed and set aside. Petitioner

Arsenio Vergara Valdez acquitted.
Notes.—When the prosecution itself says it failed to

prove a person’s guilt, the Court should listen and listen
hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
(People vs. Que Ming Kha alias Alfonso Go, 382 SCRA 480
[2002])
The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
(Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 221 [2002])
The person who is the subject of the search must be the
one who should give the consent to a search, not anybody
else present. (People vs. Asis, 391 SCRA 108 [2002])
——o0o——
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3/18/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 538

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 611

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests; The legality of an

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdez vs. People

jurisdiction of the court over his person. Petitioner’s warrantless

Same; Same; Arrests in Flagrante Delicto; Elements.—For the

view of the arresting officer. Here, petitioner’s act of looking

Same; Criminal Law; Evidence; Flight; Flight alone is not a

Same; Same; Stop­and­Frisk Searches; A stop­and­frisk

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 613

Valdez vs. People

him.—The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they

frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on

Same; Same; Waivers; A waiver of an illegal warrantless

Same; Same; Consented Searches; Burden of Proof; The

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdez vs. People

tarily given.—In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody; The

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 615

Valdez vs. People

be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when

Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of

Same; Same; Same; The prosecution’s evidence must stand or

circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdez vs. People

tion of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of

Same; Same; Same; In the rightfully vigorous campaign of the

Same; Same; Courts; Courts are duty­bound to be extra

the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 617

Valdez vs. People

the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure

1 1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 2.

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of7

“That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 619

observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,

9 TSN, 24 February 2004, pp. 3­5, 7, 11­12. See also Records, p. 2.

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

on the12inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana

12 TSN, 16 March 2004, pp. 4­7.

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 621

him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate

“That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of

In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts

15 Rollo, pp. 44­45.

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdez vs. People

showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 623

Valdez vs. People

bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken

“Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

Same; Same; StopandFrisk Searches; A stopandfrisk

Same; Same; Courts; Courts are dutybound to be extra

9 TSN, 24 February 2004, pp. 35, 7, 1112. See also Records, p. 2.

12 TSN, 16 March 2004, pp. 47.

15 Rollo, pp. 4445.

32 Id., at p. 286; pp. 239240.

Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, CarpioMorales