SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 60033. April 4, 1984.]

TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., ANTONIO I. MARTIN, and TERESITA

SANTOS , petitioners, vs. THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, HON. JOSE B.
FLAMINIANO, ASST. CITY FISCAL FELIZARDO N. LOTA and
CLEMENT DAVID , respondents.

Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioners.

Asuncion, Gomez & de Leon for private respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; SIMPLE LOAN; FAILURE OF

BANK TO RETURN THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED, NOT A CASE OF ESTAFA. — When private
respondent David invested his money on time and savings deposits with the aforesaid
bank, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not
a contract of deposit governed by the provisions concerning simple loan (Article 1980,
Civil Code). Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation
Savings and Loan Association is that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the
ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of
the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking operations,
such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While the Bank has the
obligation to return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or
deliver the same money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the
amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable
under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil
liability over which the public respondents have no jurisdiction.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBLIGATION OF BANK UNDER ORIGINAL TIME AND SAVINGS
DEPOSIT IN CASE AT BAR DEEMED NOVATED. — But even granting that the failure of
the bank to pay the time and savings deposits of private respondent David would
constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
nevertheless any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided, because when the
aforesaid bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, petitioners
Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent David,
thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual obligation arising from
deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust relation between the
bank and private respondent David into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between
the petitioners and private respondent. Consequently, the failure of the bank or
petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of private respondent would not
constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay the obligation as a
debtor.
3. ID.; ID.; NOVATION; EFFECTS; MAY PREVENT RISE OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY; CASE AT BAR. — While it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal
liability, it may however, prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to
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 the ling of the criminal information in court. (Gonzales vs. Serrano ( 25 SCRA 64, 69
[1968]; Ong vs. Court of Appeals, L-058476, 124 SCRA 578, 580-581 [1983]; People vs.
Nery, 10 SCRA 244 [1964]. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners
Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note on June 17, 1981 assuming the
obligation of the bank to private respondent David; while the criminal complaint for
estafa was led on December 23, 1981 with the O ce of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is
clear that novation occurred long before the ling of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Fiscal.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AS A RULE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION MAY NOT BE SUBJECT OF PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION;
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — Considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely
civil in nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange
transactions, We hold that the public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they
investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public respondents
should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the
case to continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice,
would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper
administration of justice.

DECISION

MAKASIAR , J : p

This is a petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the immediate
issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction led by petitioners on
March 26, 1982.
On March 31, 1982, by virtue of a court resolution issued by this Court on the
same date, a temporary restraining order was duly issued ordering the respondents,
their o cers, agents, representatives and/or person or persons acting upon their
(respondents') orders or in their place or stead to refrain from proceeding with the
preliminary investigation in Case No. 81-31938 of the O ce of the City Fiscal of Manila
(pp. 47-48, rec.). On January 24, 1983, private respondent Clement David led a motion
to lift restraining order which was denied in the resolution of this Court dated May 18,
1983.
As can be gleaned from the above, the instant petition seeks to prohibit public
respondents from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 81-31938, in
which petitioners were charged by private respondent Clement David, with estafa and
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding foreign
exchange transactions principally, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in that the
allegations of the charged, as well as the testimony of private respondent's principal
witness and the evidence through said witness, showed that petitioners' obligation is
civil in nature.
For purposes of brevity, We hereby adopt the antecedent facts narrated by the
Solicitor General in its Comment dated June 28, 1982, as follows:
"On December 23, 1981, private respondent David led I.S. No. 81-31938 in
the O ce of the City Fiscal of Manila, which case was assigned to respondent
Lota for preliminary investigation (Petition, p. 8).
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 "In I.S. No. 81-31938, David charged petitioners (together with one Robert
Marshall and the following directors of the Nation Savings and Loan Association,
Inc., namely Homero Gonzales, Juan Merino, Flavio Macasaet, Victor Gomez, Jr.,
Perfecto Mañalac, Jaime V. Paz, Paulino B. Dionisio, and one John Doe) with
estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related Central Bank
regulations on foreign exchange transactions, allegedly committed as follows
(Petition, Annex 'A'):

"'From March 20, 1979 to March, 1981, David invested with the
Nation Savings and Loan Association, (hereinafter called NSLA) the sum
of P1,145,546.20 on time deposits, P13,531.94 on savings account
deposits (jointly with his sister, Denise Kuhne), US$10,000.00 on time
deposit, US$15,000.00 under a receipt and guarantee of payment and
US$50,000.00 under a receipt dated June 8, 1980 (all jointly with Denise
Kuhne), that David was induced into making the aforestated investments
by Robert Marshall, an Australian national who was allegedly a close
associate of petitioner Guingona Jr., then NSLA President, petitioner
Martin, then NSLA Executive Vice-President and petitioner Santos, then
NSLA General Manager; that on March 21, 1981 NSLA was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank, so that David led claims therewith for
his investments and those of his sister; that on July 22, 1981 David
received a report from the Central Bank that only P305,821.92 of those
investments were entered in the records of NSLA; that, therefore, the
respondents in I.S. No. 81-31938 misappropriated the balance of the
investments, at the same time violating Central Bank Circular No. 364 and
related Central Bank regulations on foreign exchange transactions; that
after demands, petitioner Guingona Jr. paid only P200,000.00, thereby
reducing the amounts misappropriated to P959,078.14 and US$75,000.00.

"Petitioners, Martin and Santos, led a joint counter-a davit (Petition,

Annex 'B') in which they stated the following:

"'That Martin became President of NSLA in March 1978 (after the

resignation of Guingona, Jr.) and served as such until October 30, 1980,
while Santos was General Manager up to November 1980; that because
NSLA was urgently in need of funds and at David's insistence, his
investments were treated as special accounts with interests above the
legal rate, and recorded in separate con dential documents only a portion
of which were to be reported because he did not want the Australian
government to tax his total earnings (nor) to know his total investments;
that all transactions with David were recorded except the sum of
US$15,000.00 which was a personal loan of Santos; that David's check for
US$50,000.00 was cleared through Guingona, Jr.'s dollar account because
NSLA did not have one, that a draft of US$30,000.00 was placed in the
name of one Paz Roces because of a pending transaction with her; that the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation had already reimbursed David
within the legal limits; that majority of the stockholders of NSLA had led
Special Proceedings No. 82-1695 in the Court of First Instance to contest
its (NSLA's) closure; that after NSLA was placed under receivership, Martin
executed a promissory note in David's favor and caused the transfer to him
of a nine and one half (9 1/2) carat diamond ring with a net value of
P510,000.00; and, that the liabilities of NSLA to David were civil in nature.'
"Petitioner, Guingona, Jr., in his counter-a davit (Petition, Annex 'C') stated
the following:
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 "'That he had no hand whatsoever in the transactions between
David and NSLA since he (Guingona Jr.) had resigned as NSLA president
in March 1978, or prior to those transactions; that he assumed a portion of
the liabilities of NSLA to David because of the latter's insistence that he
placed his investments with NSLA because of his faith in Guingona, Jr.;
that in a Promissory Note dated June 17, 1981 (Petition, Annex "D") he
(Guingona, Jr.) bound himself to pay David the sums of P668.307.01 and
US$37,500.00 in stated installments; that he (Guingona, Jr.) secured
payment of those amounts with second mortgages over two (2) parcels of
land under a deed of Second Real Estate Mortgage (Petition, Annex" E") in
which it was provided that the mortgage over one (1) parcel shall be
cancelled upon payment of one half of the obligation to David; that he
(Guingona, Jr.) paid P200,000.00 and tendered another P300,000.00 which
David refused to accept, hence, he (Guingona, Jr.) led Civil Case No. Q-
33865 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City, to effect the
release of the mortgage over one (1) of the two parcels of land conveyed to
David under second mortgages.'

"At the inception of the preliminary investigation before respondent Lota,

petitioners moved to dismiss the charges against them for lack of jurisdiction
because David's claims allegedly comprised a purely civil obligation which was
itself novated. Fiscal Lota denied the motion to dismiss (Petition, p. 8)

"But, after the presentation of David's principal witness, petitioners led the
instant petition because: (a) the production of the Promissory Notes, Banker's
Acceptance, Certi cates of Time Deposits and Savings Account allegedly showed
that the transactions between David and NSLA were simple loans, i.e., civil
obligations on the part of NSLA which were novated when Guingona, Jr. and
Martin assumed them; and (b) David's principal witness allegedly testi ed that
the duplicate originals of the aforesaid instruments of indebtedness were all on
le with NSLA, contrary to David's claim that some of his investments were not
recorded (Petition, pp. 8-9).

"Petitioners alleged that they did not exhaust available administrative

remedies because to do so would be futile (Petition, p. 9)" [pp. 153-157, rec.]

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the sole issue for resolution is
whether public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the
charges (estafa and violation of CB Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding
foreign exchange transactions) subject matter of I.S. No. 81-31938.
There is merit in the contention of the petitioners that their liability is civil in
nature and therefore, public respondents have no jurisdiction over the charge of estafa.
prLL

A casual perusal of the December 23, 1981 a davit-complaint led in the O ce

of the City Fiscal of Manila by private respondent David against petitioners Teo sto
Guingona, Jr., Antonio I. Martin and Teresita G. Santos, together with one Robert
Marshall and the other directors of the Nation Savings and Loan Association, will show
that from March 20, 1979 to March, 1981, private respondent David, together with his
sister, Denise Kuhne, invested with the Nation Savings and Loan Association the sum of
P1,145,546.20 on time deposits covered by Bankers Acceptances and Certi cates of
Time Deposits and the sum of P13,531.94 on savings account deposits covered by
passbook nos. 6-632 and 29-742, or a total of P1,159,078.14 (pp. 15-16, rec.). It
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 appears further that private respondent David, together with his sister, made
investments in the aforesaid bank in the amount of US$75,000.00 (p. 17, rec.).
Moreover, the records reveal that when the aforesaid bank was placed under
receivership on March 21, 1981, petitioners Guingona and Martin, upon the request of
private respondent David, assumed the obligation of the bank to private respondent
David by executing on June 17, 1981 a joint promissory note in favor of private
respondent acknowledging an indebtedness of P1,336,614.02 and US$75,000.00 (p.
80, rec.). This promissory note was based on the statement of account as of June 30,
1981 prepared by the private respondent (p. 81, rec.). The amount of indebtedness
assumed appears to be bigger than the original claim because of the added interest
and the inclusion of other deposits of private respondent's sister in the amount of
P116,613.20.
Thereafter, or on July 17, 1981, petitioners Guingona and Martin agreed to divide
the said indebtedness, and petitioner Guingona executed another promissory note
antedated to June 17, 1981 whereby he personally acknowledged an indebtedness of
P668,307.01 (1/2 of P1,336,614.02) and US$37,500.00 (1/2 of US$75,000.00) in favor
of private respondent (p. 25, rec.). The aforesaid promissory notes were executed as a
result of deposits made by Clement David and Denise Kuhne with the Nation Savings
and Loan Association.
Furthermore, the various pleadings and documents led by private respondent
David before this Court indisputably show that he has indeed invested his money on
time and savings deposits with the Nation Savings and Loan Association.
It must be pointed out that when private respondent David invested his money on
time and savings deposits with the aforesaid bank, the contract that was perfected
was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of deposit. Thus, Article
1980 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan."

In the case of Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Morfe (63 SCRA 114, 119
[1975], We said:
"It should be noted that xed, savings, and current deposits of money in
banks and similar institutions are not true deposits. They are considered simple
loans and, as such, are not preferred credits (Art. 1980 Civil Code: In re Liquidation
of Mercantile Bank of China: Tan Tiong Tick vs. American Apothecaries Co., 65
Phil. 414; Paci c Coast Biscuit Co. vs. Chinese Grocers Association, 65 Phil. 375;
Fletcher American National Bank vs. Ang Cheng Lian, 65 Phil. 385; Paci c
Commercial Co. vs. American Apothecaries Co., 65 Phil. 429; Gopoco Grocery vs.
Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 65 Phil. 443)."

This Court also declared in the recent case of Serrano vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines (96 SCRA 96, 102 [1980]) that: prLL

"Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans
because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether xed, savings, or
current are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans (Art.
1980, Civil Code; Gullas vs. Phil. National Bank, 62 Phil. 519). Current and savings
deposits are loans to a bank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in
making time deposits that earn interests with respondent Overseas Bank of
Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a depositor. The
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 respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of the respondent Bank
to honor the time deposit is failure to pay its obligation as a debtor and not a
breach of trust arising from a depository's failure to return the subject matter of
the deposit" (emphasis supplied).
Hence, the relationship between the private respondent and the Nation Savings
and Loan Association is that of creditor and debtor; consequently, the ownership of the
amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and
it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay
interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals. While the Bank has the obligation to
return the amount deposited, it has, however, no obligation to return or deliver the same
money that was deposited. And, the failure of the Bank to return the amount deposited
will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par.
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the
public respondents have no jurisdiction.
WE have already laid down the rule that:
"In order that a person can be convicted under the above-quoted provision,
it must be proven that he has the obligation to deliver or return the same money,
goods or personal property that he received. Petitioners had no such obligation to
return the same money, i.e., the bills or coins, which they received from private
respondents. This is so because as clearly stated in criminal complaints, the
related civil complaints and the supporting sworn statements, the sums of money
that petitioners received were loans.

"The nature of simple loan is de ned in Articles 1933 and 1953 of the Civil
Code.

"'Art. 1933. — By the contract of loan, one of the parties delivers to

another, either something not consumable so that the latter may use the
same for a certain time and return it, in which case the contract is called a
commodatum; or money or other consumable thing, upon the condition
that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid in which
case the contract is simply called a loan or mutuum.
"'Commodatum is essentially gratuitous.

"'Simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest.

"'In commodatum the bailor retains the ownership of the thing
loaned, while in simple loan, ownership passes to the borrower.
"'Art. 1953. — A person who receives a loan of money or any other
fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the
creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.'
"It can be readily noted from the above quoted provisions that in simple
loan (mutuum), as contrasted to commodatum, the borrower acquires ownership
of the money, goods or personal property borrowed. Being the owner, the borrower
can dispose of the thing borrowed (Article 248, Civil Code) and his act will not be
considered misappropriation thereof" (Yam vs. Malik, 94 SCRA 30, 34 [1979];
emphasis supplied).

But even granting that the failure of the bank to pay the time and savings
deposits of private respondent David would constitute a violation of paragraph 1(b) of
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 Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, nevertheless any incipient criminal liability was
deemed avoided, because when the aforesaid bank was placed under receivership by
the Central Bank, petitioners Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation of the bank
to private respondent David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual
obligation arising from deposit into a contract of loan and converting the original trust
relation between the bank and private respondent David into an ordinary debtor-
creditor relation between the petitioners and private respondent. Consequently, the
failure of the bank or petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the deposits of private
respondent would not constitute a breach of trust but would merely be a failure to pay
the obligation as a debtor.
Moreover, while it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it
may however, prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the ling
of the criminal information in court. Thus, in Gonzales vs. Serrano ( 25 SCRA 64, 69
[1968]) We held that: LexLib

"As pointed out in People vs. Nery, novation prior to the ling of the
criminal information — as in the case at bar — may convert the relation between
the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor relation, and place the complainant in
estoppel to insist on the original transaction or 'cast doubt on the true nature'
thereof."

Again, in the latest case of Ong vs. Court of Appeals (L-58476, 124 SCRA 578,
580-581 [1983]), this Court reiterated the ruling in People vs. Nery ( 10 SCRA 244
[1964]), declaring that:
"The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the ling of the criminal
information in court by the state prosecutors because up to that time the original
trust relation may be converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor
situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original
trust. But after the justice authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and
instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer divest the prosecution
of its power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil. The
crime being an offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it (People
vs. Gervacio, 54 Off. Gaz. 2898; People vs. Velasco, 42 Phil. 76; U.S. vs. Montañes,
8 Phil. 620).
"It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means
recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished;
hence, the role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal
liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction,
whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other
similar disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto vs. People, 90 Phil. 581; U.S. vs. Villareal,
27 Phil. 481)."

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners Guingona and Martin
executed a promissory note on June 17, 1981 assuming the obligation of the bank to
private respondent David; while the criminal complaint for estafa was led on
December 23, 1981 with the O ce of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is clear that novation
occurred long before the ling of the criminal complaint with the O ce of the City
Fiscal.
Consequently, as aforestated, any incipient criminal liability would be avoided but
there will still be a civil liability on the part of petitioners Guingona and Martin to pay the
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 assumed obligation.
Petitioners herein were likewise charged with violation of Section 3 of Central
Bank Circular No. 364 and other related regulations regarding foreign exchange
transactions by accepting foreign currency deposit in the amount of US$75,000.00
without authority from the Central Bank. They contend however, that the US dollars
intended by respondent David for deposit were all converted into Philippine currency
before acceptance and deposit into Nation Savings and Loan Association. LLphil

Petitioners' contention is worthy of belief for the following reasons:

1. It appears from the records that when respondent David was about to
make a deposit of bank draft issued in his name in the amount of US$50,000.00 with
the Nation Savings and Loan Association, the same had to be cleared rst and
converted into Philippine currency. Accordingly, the bank draft was endorsed by
respondent David to petitioner Guingona, who in turn deposited it to his dollar account
with the Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner Guingona merely accommodated
the request of the Nation Savings and Loan Association in order to clear the bank draft
through his dollar account because the bank did not have a dollar account. Immediately
after the bank draft was cleared, petitioner Guingona authorized Nation Savings and
Loan Association to withdraw the same in order to be utilized by the bank for its
operations.
2. It is safe to assume that the U.S. dollars were converted rst into
Philippine pesos before they were accepted and deposited in Nation Savings and Loan
Association, because the bank is presumed to have followed the ordinary course of the
business which is to accept deposits in Philippine currency only, and that the
transaction was regular and fair, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary (see paragraphs p and q, Sec. 5, Rule 131, Rules of Court).
3. Respondent David has not denied the aforesaid contention of herein
petitioners despite the fact that it was raised in petitioners' reply led on May 7, 1982
to private respondent's comment and in the July 27, 1982 reply to public respondents'
comment and reiterated in petitioners' memorandum led on October 30, 1982,
thereby adding more support to the conclusion that the US$75,000.00 were really
converted into Philippine currency before they were accepted and deposited into
Nation Savings and Loan Association. Considering that this might adversely affect his
case, respondent David should have promptly denied petitioners' allegation.
In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil in
nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange
transactions, We hold that the public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they
investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public respondents
should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the
case to continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice,
would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper
administration of justice.
While as a rule, the prosecution in a criminal offense cannot be the subject of
prohibition and injunction, this court has recognized the resort to the extraordinary
writs of prohibition and injunction in extreme cases, thus:
"On the issue of whether a writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 3140, the general rule is that 'ordinarily, criminal prosecution
may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.' Exceptions, however, are
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 allowed in the following instances:
"'1. for the orderly administration of justice;
"'2. to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner;
"'3. to avoid multiplicity of actions;

"'4. to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights;

"'5. in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is
unconstitutional or was held invalid'" (Primicias vs. Municipality of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, 93 SCRA 462, 469-470 [1979]; citing Ramos vs.
Torres, 25 SCRA 557 [1968]; and Hernandez vs. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 96
[1967]).

Likewise, in Lopez vs. The City Judge, et al. (18 SCRA 616, 621-622 [1966]), We
held that: cdll

"The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, are

in the ultimate analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the
unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and
orderly administration of justice. Thus, in Yu Kong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385,
We took cognizance of a petition for certiorari and prohibition although the
accused in the case could have appealed in due time from the order complained
of, our action in the premises being based on the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo, 43 Phil. 304, We also
admitted a petition to restrain the prosecution of certain chiropractors although, if
convicted, they could have appealed. We gave due course to their petition for the
orderly administration of justice and to avoid possible oppression by the strong
arm of the law. And in Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627, the petition for
certiorari challenging the trial court's action admitting an amended information
was sustained despite the availability of appeal at the proper time."

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED; THE TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER PREVIOUSLY ISSUED IS MADE PERMANENT. COSTS AGAINST
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ ., concur.
Aquino, J ., took no part.
Abad Santos, J ., concurs in the result.

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