INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ENGINEERS - TRANSPORT PROCEEDINGS

NORTH WEST EDITION

Written 27 September 1999

Revised 12 June 2000

METROLINK - BUILDING ON SUCCESS

William James Tyson, OBE, M.A. (Econ), FCIT, FILT, FRSA

Chairman and Managing Director, Transport Management Group, Greater

Manchester Passenger Transport Executive

9 Portland Street, MANCHESTER, M60 1HX

Tel: 0161 242 6201
Fax: 0161 242 6209

Keywords Transport Planning

Railway Systems
 SYNOPSIS

The paper begins by giving the background to the

successful Metrolink light rail system in Greater

Manchester. It then analyses the reasons for this

success which stem from the fact that it has been able to

offer passengers a faster and higher quality journey than

both the car and bus. This success as a transport

system has led to both social and economic benefits for

the community as a whole, including the reduction of

road traffic. Next, the development of the plans for the

expansion of the network are examined showing how

the factors which have led to the success of the first

phase have been built into the plans for future lines.

The paper concludes by looking at three specific

aspects which are crucial to the delivery of an expanded

system - the implications of the Transport and Works

Act, procurement and funding, and the development of

integrated transport networks under the Government's

transport policies.

1. BACKGROUND

Metrolink is the name given to Greater Manchester's light rail system which - when it

was opened in 1992 - was the first modern light railway to incorporate both street and

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segregated track running. By taking over the routes of two suburban railway lines

and linking them with on-street track in central Manchester it was developed as the

most cost-effective solution to the structural problems of Manchester's local rail

network. The route of the first phase is shown in Figure 1. The planning and

development of the project has already been the subject of a paper to the Institution
(1)
.

Since its opening, the first phase has been highly successful in attracting patronage.

This very quickly established a "virtuous circle" of higher service levels leading to

even higher patronage levels. This is in stark contrast to the "vicious circle" of

declining service levels and higher fares leading to even lower patronage levels which

has characterised much of public transport in the United Kingdom since the mid

1950s. As a result, Metrolink has also enjoyed considerable financial success - with

revenues comfortably exceeding operating costs - although it required a substantial

initial injection of public sector capital to build the system.

Metrolink was procured using an innovative design-build-operate-maintain contract

which combined a conventional design and build approach with a concession

agreement under which the contractor obtained the rights to run the service for a 15

year period. As a result of the payment for the concession, the private sector

contributed to the initial costs of the system.

The system is owned by the public sector in its entirety - track, structures, rolling

stock. It is operated by the private sector under a concession agreement. This gives

Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive (GMPTE) the right to specify

minimum levels of service and performance standards but gives the operator the right

to run higher levels of service and the freedom to set fares. The operator takes both
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 the cost and the revenue risks on the operation of the system but has some protection

against the consequences of major legislative change affecting the operation of the

system. The contract could be terminated in the event of GMPTE obtaining powers

and funding to expand the system. This provision was used as part of the process

leading to the first extension and will be used again in the forthcoming network

expansion.

2. THE REASONS FOR SUCCESS

Since its opening the service has evolved in response to passenger demand. The first

section to open was the former rail line between Manchester Victoria and Bury which

replicated the former rail service. After four weeks this was extended across the

centre of Manchester and a few weeks later a through service to Altrincham was

established. At this stage the service ran every 12 minutes.

In July 1992 the branch to Piccadilly Station opened and the service pattern changed

to one in which there was a tram every 12 minutes from both Bury and Altrincham to

Piccadilly Station and, during the peaks, this was supplemented by a service from

Bury to Altrincham direct which did not call at Piccadilly. This provided a through,

cross-Manchester connection.

From this time, passengers in the off-peak who wanted to make cross-Manchester

journeys had to change in Manchester. This gave rise to considerable complaint and

over the course of the next few months a revised timetable was devised. In effect,

this involved running the peak service throughout the day, so that besides a 12 minute

through service between the two lines, each line got a 6 minute service to Manchester

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from 0700 to 1830 hours on weekdays and from 0800 to 1800 hours on Saturdays.

The extent of Metrolink's success can be judged from the figures in Table 1. These

figures compare with a patronage level on the two rail lines which it replaced of 7.5

million trips per year. There are many reasons for this continuing growth in

patronage. First, Metrolink started from a sound patronage base built up over the

years by the rail services. Both rail lines - to Altrincham and to Bury - were built as

commuter lines and are well located in relation to surrounding developments. In

consequence, access to the system at the home end of the journey is good – the

system as a whole over 60% of passengers live within walking distance of the station.

Monitoring Study(3) found that, at most stations, over 60% of passengers walked to

Metrolink.

Second, by extending on-street through central Manchester, equally good access is

given to the major shopping and employment areas in the city. As well as this,

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Metrolink has three interchanges with the national rail network at Piccadilly (which is

the main station for inter-regional and long-distance trains), Victoria and at Deansgate

which is linked by a footbridge to the adjacent G-Mex Metrolink station.

Third, the service has created a new link across central Manchester which does not

involve passengers in having to change. About 5% of passengers, 0.7 million per

year - travel across the city centre. Very few of these journeys would have been

made on public transport before Metrolink as they would have involved two train

journeys and a bus or walk across central Manchester.

Fourth, it offers journey times which are competitive with the car and much faster

than the bus, as Table 2 shows, for journeys between Altrincham - Manchester and

Bury - Manchester. Thus, in the peak, Metrolink is quicker than the car and the bus.

In the off-peak it is at least competitive with the car and is again faster than the bus.

There are many journeys between other pairs of stops for which these conclusions

apply.

Fifth, the operation has been extremely reliable with very few initial teething troubles

and, since then, operating over 99% of scheduled mileage. This has helped to retain

passengers who have been persuaded to try the service.

Sixth, the service is very frequent and can run on a 'no need to know the timetable'

basis. Throughout most of the day there is a tram every 6 minutes to and from

central Manchester. Even in the evenings the service runs every 12 minutes. The

service runs between 0600 and 2330 on weekdays, and even later on Friday and

Saturday nights.

Seventh, the line links three major traffic ‘sources’, central Manchester, Bury and
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Altrincham. There are high traffic flows to both Bury and Altrincham as well as to

central Manchester. Even in the peaks, there is a good balance of loads in both

directions and load factors are maintained throughout the length of the line. On a

tram travelling from Manchester to Bury, passengers getting off at intermediate stops

en route are replaced by those travelling from these shops to Bury. Again, as they get

off they are replaced by others travelling from the intermediate stations into Bury.

This has had a beneficial impact on the good financial performance of the system and

has been a material factor in its success.

Finally, whilst fares are not cheap, they are related to market demand with many off-

peak return fares at the same level, or lower than, bus fares.

In summary, Metrolink has been a success as a public transport system. It has met

passenger demand for many journeys more effectively than other modes. As a result,

it has captured a high market share of trips to central Manchester from areas within

the catchment of its stations. This is illustrated by the figures in Table 3 which

compares the situation before and after Metrolink opened. They are based on

household surveys carried out as part of the monitoring exercise(3). This shows

clearly that public transport is capable of capturing a high market share for trips for

which it has a competitive advantage over other modes. The challenge for transport

planning is to create the circumstances in which this can happen.

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3. ATTRACTING CAR JOURNEYS

During the time when the government funding for Metrolink was being justified and

negotiated, the criteria for funding changed. Emphasis switched towards basing

grants on the extent to which public transport investments could benefit non-users in

the form of:

• reduced traffic congestion

• reduced road accident costs, and

• environmental improvements.

Of these, reduced traffic congestion was the most important in quantitative terms

although all are important objectives of transport policy. These benefits will only be

achieved, clearly, if public transport attracts trips which would otherwise have been

made by car.

In this respect, Metrolink has also been a success. However, measurement of the

extent to which trips have switched from car to Metrolink is far from straightforward.

Two monitoring studies of Metrolink have been carried out by the University of

Salford (2) and Oscar Faber TPA (3) . They adopted different methods of approach to

this question and came up with a range of results which probably represent the upper

and lower limits of the true figure. Taking the mean of these studies gives an

estimate that about 19 % of Metrolink trips would otherwise have been made by car.

Applying this to a patronage of 13.5 million gives a total of 2.6 million trips saved per

year.

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The studies also estimated how much traffic had reduced on the corridors most

affected by Metrolink. Because traffic levels fluctuate in any case, estimating the

impact of Metrolink was subject to even more uncertainty. The best estimates were

that:

• on the Altrincham corridor peak traffic flows had reduced by between

4.5% and 6.2% and off-peak flows by between 0.9% and 1.4%;

• on the Bury corridor the reductions were between 2.5% and 5.1% and

1.4% and 1.8% respectively.

Whilst these reductions were relatively small, they reflect the diverse use of these

corridors which reduces the proportion of traffic making journeys that could be

switched to Metrolink.

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 The net result is that Metrolink has delivered a wide range of benefits to the

community as a whole, including:

• reduced congestion costs;

• reduced road accidents;

• reduced pollution.

This success reinforced the policy of the Passenger Transport Authority and GMPTE

to expand the system from a single line into a network.

4. EXPANDING THE SYSTEM

The original plans for Metrolink, reported later, always envisaged that there would be

a network of six lines. The Bury and Altrincham lines were the first phase. They

were chosen because:

• they had the most acute problems of the old electric rolling stock which

would need to be replaced in the early 1990s at the latest;

• the power supply system and much of the signalling on the Bury line was

obsolete and life expired; and

• they carried the highest volumes of passengers and would therefore have

the highest benefits on which to justify the cost of the central area section.

The other four lines comprised:

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 • three existing suburban rail lines (from Manchester to Rochdale (via

Oldham), Glossop and Marple); and

• an abandoned rail line from Manchester to East Didsbury.

However, even before it was built, the potential of flexibility of Metrolink to operate

on rail lines as well as:

• on street with other traffic;

• on new alignments which would be less expensive than a conventional

railway to build; and

• segregated from other traffic but basically on-street;

was starting to be exploited in planning future extensions to the network.

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In particular it was appreciated that there could be considerable benefit in extending

Metrolink into areas which had not, hitherto, been served by rail. In doing so,

however, it was appreciated that potential extensions would have to have at least

some of the characteristics which have made the first phase successful.

The original six line network was planned in the mid 1980s. Since then there have

been major changes in the economy and land-use of Greater Manchester which have

had implications for transport. Manufacturing has declined and been replaced with a

more dispersed employment pattern. The result is that many areas of the conurbation

declined and have been the subject of regeneration initiatives. At the same time new

employment centres, like Manchester Airport, have developed and many of the towns

in the conurbation which surround Manchester have developed their shopping and

leisure facilities.

Another factor which shaped the direction of the Metrolink extensions programme

was the development of the local rail network. In 1987 two new short rail links

opened which enabled trains from the north and west of Manchester to reach

Piccadilly station and beyond to lines to the east and south. As a result of this and

other developments within the rail network Manchester has developed as a hub for a

network of inter-regional services which complement its local and inter-city

networks. This development was helped by the opening of Metrolink which released

some track capacity in central Manchester which formerly used the Altrincham rail

line.

Partly as a result of this, the conversion of the Glossop and Marple lines to Metrolink,

whilst still feasible, would be much more expensive. The costs of segregating the

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lines from the rest of the rail network (which, at that time, was necessary to meet

British Rail requirements as well as to provide the capacity needed for both services)

would be much greater because of the much larger number of other services which

now use these lines.

At the same time the potential of Metrolink to serve new areas by a combination of

on-highway and segregated running became more important and powers were sought

for lines which were not in the original programme. The first group of powers were

for the following lines which are illustrated in Figure 1:

• Conversion of the Rochdale (via Oldham) line which was in the

original programme. However, when converted to Metrolink it would

be diverted through the centre of Oldham and extended from the

railway station in Rochdale to the town centre and the bus station. The

existing rail line fails to serve either of these town centres, but by

serving them directly, significant new sources of traffic can be obtained

thus applying the lessons from Phase 1's success. The line would link

with buses at Oldham and Rochdale.

• Conversion of the former rail line to Didsbury - again from the original

programme.

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 • A new line to serve the regeneration area of Salford Quays. This was

the site of the Manchester Docks which had declined in the 1970s and

closed in the 1980s. Salford City Council produced ambitious plans to

develop both housing and offices on the former quays, which have

largely been realised. However, Salford Quays are about 15 to 20

minutes drive from central Manchester and employers there have had

difficulties in attracting staff, as the location is off the main public

transport network.

• A new line to serve the Trafford Park industrial estate, which had also

seen decline and regeneration. This will terminate at a major out-of-

town shopping development which opened in 1998 – the Trafford

Centre.

Powers for the above were obtained in the late 1980s and early 1990s using the

Parliamentary Private Bill Procedure which has now been replaced by the 1992

Transport and Works Act.

The second set of extensions has been granted powers much more recently. These are

for three new lines, again shown in Figure 1:

• An extension of the Salford Quays line to the nearby centre of Eccles.

This is largely on highway and will provide links between Eccles and

Salford Quays and central Manchester. It will also help to reduce traffic

congestion on one of the motorway links to central Manchester (M602)

with a major park and ride site being to be provided just outside Eccles

close to a motorway intersection. Eccles is also a focal point of the local

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 bus network.

• An extension from the proposed Didsbury line at Chorlton to

Manchester Airport via Sale Moor and Wythenshawe. This creates an

entirely new public transport route in the area. It would also create a

new crossing of the river Mersey and provide a route between areas

which are not easily linked on the road network. Besides the Airport, it

would serve a large hospital at Wythenshawe and several major

employment centres in the area. Its principal role in respect of the

Airport is to help it expand its staff catchment area and to improve

public transport access for staff. The latter is a key component of the

Airport's Ground Transportation Strategy which has the objective of

getting at least 25% of ground access trips to the Airport by non-car

modes by 2005. It would terminate in a multi-modal interchange which

would also be served by buses, coaches and trains.

• A new line from Manchester to Ashton-under-Lyne partly on new

alignments through regeneration areas to the east of Manchester and the

west of Ashton-under-Lyne and partly on highway in the middle. This

Relief Road and Intermediate Relief Road. The line would serve the

new Commonwealth Games Stadium in east Manchester.

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 These lines were granted powers under the Transport and Works Act, following

Public Inquiries in 1995 (Airport and Eccles) and 1997 (Ashton-under-Lyne).

As a result of this, GMPTE has an extensive portfolio of powers to expand the

Metrolink system. All the extensions have a number of characteristics in common

which can be related back to the factors which have contributed to Metrolink's

success. In particular all the extensions will:

• serve centres other than Manchester itself which will generate demand for

the service - replicating the impact of Bury and Altrincham in this respect;

• provide journey times which will be a major improvement over

existing modes;

• be capable of operating at frequencies which will not result in long

waiting times;

• give direct access to major centres;

• connect at key points with other modes; and

• contribute to the economic regeneration of the areas they serve.

Section 6 of the paper explains the strategy for funding and building these lines whilst

the next section discusses some of the issues relating to the new procedure for getting

powers for public transport schemes under the Transport and Works Act.

5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSPORT AND WORKS ACT

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The second set of extensions described above were authorised under the Transport

and Works Act procedures. This replaced the Parliamentary Private Bills, with

Orders made by Secretary of State for the Environment Transport and the Regions.

The main difference affecting the promoters of a scheme is that, instead of a narrowly

defined group of people affected by the proposals having the right to petition

Parliament with their objections, objections are made to the Secretary of State. This

means that almost any person or organisation can object to the proposals.

Having considered the objections the Secretary of State has to decide if the issues can

be dealt with by written representation of the parties’ cases or whether a public

inquiry should be held. All three of GMPTE's extensions authorised under the TWA

procedures have been the subject of public inquiries.

In many ways the public inquiry is a more appropriate forum than Parliament for

dealing with what can be specific local issues. However, GMPTE experience has

been that the process is more complex than the Parliamentary procedures were. In

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 particular, it has proved necessary to have carried out a lot more of the detailed

planning, engineering, economic and financial analyses for the proposals than was the

case with the Private Bill procedure.

Inquiries involve Counsel and a wide range of professional and expert witnesses. All

of this adds to the time and cost involved in promoting Metrolink extension or other

Light Rapid Transit schemes. There is also considerably more uncertainty and

variation in the time between the inquiry Inspector reporting and a decision being

made. Overall, from initial planing to decision takes longer under the TWA than it

did through Parliament.

6 CREATING THE EXPANDED NETWORK

Nevertheless, Greater Manchester has been successful in getting powers to build

Metrolink extensions. It has been argued that there is little point in getting powers to

build the whole network of extensions, as it is unlikely that there would ever be

funding to build them all. GMPTE's policy has been based on the principles that:

• without powers it is impossible to take advantage of any opportunity to

build a line which may arise; and

• having powers available is crucial to getting serious private sector

involvement in funding.

The policy has therefore been that if there is a line which can be justified in policy

and financial terms, then powers which are initially granted for 5 or 10 years should

be obtained and maintained. In this way maximum advantage can be taken of any

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funding opportunities which arise. The fact that the TWA procedures involve such a

lot of preparatory work and can involve a public inquiry emphasises the point that

new powers are unlikely to be obtained quickly.

This is illustrated by the events which led to the building of the Salford Quays and

Eccles line as the first extension of the Metrolink system. In 1995 the Passenger

Transport Authority was forced by government to dispose of its bus operations. It

received over £40 million from this sale and resolved to allocate £25 million to

funding Metrolink extensions. However, this would not have been sufficient in

itself to build any of the extensions and partnership funding was needed.

Of the extensions for which powers were available, the Salford Quays extension was

assessed as most likely to attract private sector and European Regional Development

Fund funding. Private sector property interests in the area had expressed willingness

in principle to contribute to the costs of bringing Metrolink to Salford Quays.

Discussions with potential private sector operators identified that a short (3 kilometre)

extension to Eccles would improve the attractiveness of the line to them ,by providing

a further source of traffic, particularly in the off-peak.

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A combination of the Authority's resources, contributions from the private sector and

ERDF was sufficient to reduce the funding gap on the line to the point where it could

be feasible to bridge it by:

• payments for the concession for operating the expanded system;

• central government Grant.

It is not possible, in this paper, to relate the details of the funding process. However,

the end result was that a new tendering process was entered into for:

• the design and build of the Eccles extension; and

• operation and maintenance of the full expanded network (which would

comprise the Bury and Altrincham lines and the Eccles extension when it

was completed).

This was made possible by the provision in the original contract which provided for

expansion of the system and, if necessary to bring this about, the termination of the

existing operating concession - with appropriate compensation being payable.

After a competitive bidding process the contract was awarded to Altram (Manchester)

Limited - a consortium comprising, Laing Construction, Ansaldo Trasporti, Serco and

Investors in Industry. The payment for the operating concession has been sufficient

to fund over half of the £160 million cost of building the Eccles extension. The

remainder was funded from property interests, the PTA, ERDF and Capital Challenge

funding from central government.

The new consortium took over the operation of the existing network in May 1997.
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Construction of the Eccles line is now well under way and the Salford Quays section

was opened by the Prime Minister in December 1999 and the full line to Eccles in

Spring 2000. Six new trams have been acquired for the extension. They are similar

to the existing fleet but incorporate a number of modifications and improvements and

will meet the requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act.

When fully opened the line will bring Salford Quays within 10 to 15 minutes of

central Manchester and will be served by a tram with at least a 12 minute frequency.

Patronage is expected to be 6 million journeys per year of which 1 million will be

attracted from the car.

Having got the construction of the first extension underway the PTA's next priority is

to build the extension to Oldham and Rochdale. However, in the Provisional Local

Transport Plan which was submitted to Government in July 1999, the Authority and

the ten District Councils submitted a proposal for a single contract to build the

Oldham-Rochdale, Airport and Ashton-under-Lyne extensions. This will cost about

£520 million, of which almost £160 million would come from the private sector. To

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help fund the public sector contribution, the Passenger Transport Authority and the

ten District Councils in Greater Manchester have indicated their willingness to

explore the implications of becoming a pilot area for road user and/or workplace

parking charges.

The principal benefits of this approach are three fold:

• First, it will eliminate the need to terminate the operating concession every

time that a new extension is added to the network.

• Second, a single contract would benefit from scale economies (for

example in vehicle purchase) and give the operator a longer term revenue

stream. This will result in a higher contribution from the private sector

and a lower cost to the public sector.

• Third it will bring the benefits of a full network much sooner at a time

when Government policy is to provide attractive alternatives to the car as

a means of reducing traffic growth.

In summary, the single contract would enable Government transport policy to be

delivered in Greater Manchester much more quickly.

This was accepted by Government. Following the opening of the Salford Quays line,

intensive discussions to validate the economic appraisal of the single contract, and to

finalise the funding arrangements, took place. This involved GMPTE, DETR and the

Treasury. In March 2000 the Deputy Prime Minister announced that the case for

building the Airport, Oldham-Rochdale and Ashton-under-Lyne extensions had been

accepted and that funding would be made available from the extra transport resources

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 announced in the Budget. An immediate allocation of £15m was made to enable

advanced works to include land acquisition and diversion of underground services to

take place.

Meanwhile, a separate agreement has been reached between GMPTE and Peel

Holdings – the owners of the Trafford Centre. This will mean that the Trafford park

line will be included as an option within the single contract and would be built if the

private sector, including peel Holdings, were prepared to cover the funding gap.

The estimated benefits of the full network are shown in Table 4.

7 CONCLUSIONS - TOWARDS INTEGRATED TRANSPORT

In conclusion, it is appropriate to say something about the role of Metrolink in an

integrated transport network. Even in competition with other modes, Metrolink has

been a success for the reasons outlined in this paper. The other major public

transport development in Greater Manchester at the time of writing is the Integration

Project. This is seeking, through a series of Quality Partnership Agreements, to

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improve the quality of the whole of the public transport network and to promote it as

an integrated network and not a collection of individual services. In this way it is

hoped that it can become an acceptable alternative to the car for many journeys.

A major effort is being made to upgrade the quality of bus services, by bus priority,

investment in new vehicles and infrastructure, and attracting more journeys to the

network as a whole, through better quality passenger information and better facilities

for connections and interchange.

Metrolink has a key role to play in this. It has already demonstrated that high quality

public transport can attract trips from the car. As the backbone of a congestion free

high frequency network it will have a major role to play in the integrated transport

network of the future. The Integration Project is already removing some of the

barriers faced by passengers who want to use bus for part of their journey and

Metrolink for the rest of the trip. Integration will increase the whole public transport

market and in this way help to underpin the future expansion of the Metrolink

network.

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 TABLE 1

GREATER MANCHESTER METROLINK

ANNUAL PATRONAGE 1992-1997

Year Patronage
(million trips)
1992 3.75*
1993 10.36
1994 12.29
1995 12.58
1996 13.41
1997 13.87
1998 13.20
1999 12.62

* Part year only

Source: GMPTE - Data supplied by operator

TABLE 2

COMPARATIVE JOURNEY TIMES (MINUTES)

Peak Off Peak

Bury to Manchester

Metrolink 20.0 20.0

Car 22.1 18.2
Bus 37.3 34.0

Altrincham To Manchester

Metrolink 18.0 18.0

Car 26.1 20.0
Bus 40.0 37.6

Source: GMPTE

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 TABLE 3

COMPARATIVE MODE SHARES FOR JOURNEYS

TO CENTRAL MANCHESTER FROM CATCHMENT AREAS OF STATIONS

Before After
Metrolink Metrolink

Car 55% 33%

Bus 28% 9%
Train 17% --
Metrolink -- 58%

Source: OSCAR FABER (3)

TABLE 4
FULL METROLINK NETWORK

Length 98km

Total Cost £875 million

Permanent Jobs Created 9,500

Patronage 50 million p.a.

Reduction in car journeys 10 million p.a.

Source: GMPTE

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REFERENCES

(1) TYSON W J, Planning and Financing Manchester Metrolink,

Proc ICE, Transp 1992 Vol 95 p 141-150.

(2) LAW C M, et al, Metrolink Impact Study, University of Salford, 1996.

(3) OSCAR FABER, Metrolink Monitoring Study, 2 vols, GMPTE 1996.

12.6.00
WJT542

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