China Myanmar Foreign Policy

Introduction;
Myanmar has undergone significant shifts in policy governance and bilateral relations with
China over the past 22 years. The party was officially known as the Burma Socialist Party
Program (BSPP) after the military took control of the government under Ne Win in 1962 and
later became known as the National Unity Party until Ne Win retired in 1988. Internationally,
The self-imposed isolation saw the adoption with its neighbors of a general policy of non-
interference.

Nevertheless, there was a military government's' left turn' with the announcement of the Burmese
Way to Socialism in 1962 and its adoption of a central command economy was unforeseen. This
can be concluded by Brig. Tin Pe, who became the philosophy adviser to Ne Win, created the
manifesto in a ' matter of days '

During the early post-independence years, however, the ebbs and flows of the Sino-Myanmar
relationship included conflict around Kuomintang troops in Myanmar during the 1950's Chinese
Civil War. Despite the arrival of the forces, the subsequent sponsorship of the Communist Party
of Burma (CPB) by the People's Republic of China was directly opposed. However, the mid- and
late 1980s signalled a turning-point in Sino-Myanmar relations as in 1985 China concluded its funding
and support for the CPB. This was followed in 1988 by the opening up of cross-border trade between the
two countries. However, in August 1988 the 8/8/88 Protests broke out as a result of Ne Win’s decision
to reconfigure currency denominations with many people losing their savings overnight as a result and
many of whom were amongst a large number of people opposing one-party rule. This was just part of
the economy's larger issue of financial mismanagement. As a result, Ne Win subsequently' retired' and
was eventually replaced by Than Shwe, heading a new government called the SLORC. Under Than Shwe,
Burma was renamed as Myanmar and its economic course moved away from the Burmese Way, without
consulting the people. After the mass protests in Myanmar, it was less than a year later that China
witnessed mass protests following the death of Hu Yaobang, a prominent reformer of the Communist
Party. In the international media, both China and Myanmar have been strongly criticized. All countries
felt the international criticism and history of mass protests in their relationship, pushing the two
countries together. r. Nevertheless, as a result of its crackdown on demonstrators, several states in the
West had imposed sanctions on the government, and in an attempt to encourage democratic reforms,
Western involvement in Myanmar was declining rather than increasing. As a result of this policy and the
sanctions imposed by the West, the balance of influence shifted to Asian states. This saw the rise of the
democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, founded as the National League for Democracy (NLD).
Although the NLD won the 1990 general election convincingly, the military refused to recognize the
result. After the election, many opposition politicians, including Aung San Suu Kyi, were arrested and
imprisoned by the military.

Myanmar external relations:

Myanmar has been following an' independent' and' non-aligned' foreign policy since
independence and as described on the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs website (MOFA
2009). Although China has a comparatively more important relationship with Myanmar than
other nations, Naypyidaw suspects that China will use Myanmar as a bargaining chip in China's
US relationshipWe are not engaged in the business of other peoples ' (Koh 2011: 197). This
indicates that Myanmar has paradoxical external relations with its neighbors where, on the one
hand, it supports the principle of non-inference while, on the other hand, it does not trust other
states to follow the same normative interpretation.
Overall, though relations between China and Myanmar have improved since 1988, Myanm's
governmentThat said, China has provided a channel of communication in Myanmar's relations
with the US and the EU, and sees Myanmar as an equal partner in dialog and rejects a structure
in which other major powers are in control (Li 2010: 121).

While this channel of communication is remarkable, it is offset by Myanmar's unaware caught

the Chinese. When Myanmar's Prime Minister, Khin Nyunt, was rejected,For instance, the
Chinese did not know in advance when Myanmar's Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was dismissed in
October 2004.

Foreign media again found out in May 2007 that China had no knowledge of Myanmar's
November 2005 move from its capital to Naypyidaw (Li and Lye 2009: 278). That said, China
too has competing geopolitical interests, and it is unlikely that too much diplomatic resources
will be spent on it.

A Strategic and functional relationship:

Chinese President Hu Jintao's meeting on May 27, 2011 with his Myanmar counterpart U Thein
Sein ended with the two countries agreeing to upgrade bilateral ties to a' comprehensive strategic
cooperation relationship.' This proposed partnership will grow in four fields, according to
President Hu. These include strategic partnerships at all levels to promote mutual undevelopment
in all areasFurther pragmatic cooperation is the third area mentioned, most notably on economic
growth.

The final area is through border protection cooperation to maintain border security between the
two countries (Myanmar Beijing Embassy 2011). The relationship between the national capitals
will be discussed in this section to highlight the key areas of the government-to-governm
relationships. China's inward investment in Myanmar is notable in several key areas, including
economic aid, coal, hydropower, mining, and oil. Chinese foreign direct investment in Myanmar
in the year up to March 2011 amounted to US$ 8.27 billion, or 41 percent of the total, compared
to less than US$ 2 billion the previous year (Back 2011), according to Associated Press and local
media reports. For energy purposes, China has not established close relations with Myanmar but
has become a strategic problem. Nonetheless, Myanmar's observers perceive China's
commitment as a' strategic alliance' to secure economic development and energy security (Koh
2011: 207).

Before becoming a net importer of oil in 1993, China paid relatively little attention to coal. In
2008, however, it imported 50% of the total. There are significant reasons for the current state of
affairs in the relationship between Sino-Myanmar.
Provincial and Cross Border relations:

ProMyanmar has eight major national races of ethnic origin, including Bamar,
Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine and Shan. The other ethnic nationalities, though
Bamar forms the majority, form an array of states along its international borders.
Such regions, however, are home to numerous ongoing conflicts between the
government and individual ethnic armed groups that pursue greater recognition and
political influencevincial and Cross Border RelationsSuch arrangements, however,
remain shaky and the absence of a ceasefire agreement between the government
and the Kachin Independence Army continues to ensure that multiple players are
involved in the cross-border relationship. Therefore, the cross-border trade
relationship between those on both sides of the conflict in Yunnan province and
Myanmar necessarily involves several stakeholders. As a result of the war, armed
groups are dominated by different areas either by the government or by ethnic
nationality. The Chinese government signed ceasefire agreements with some of the
ethnic nationalities in Myanmar in return for economic access to their natural
resources. Although these ceasefires have been signed, there are still skirmishes
between the military in Myanmar and numerous others. The multi-track partnership
between China and Myanmar shows that while the government in Beijing offers grant assistance
to Myanmar, local governments and businesses are much more self-interested and exploit the
natural resources of Myanmar through agreements with ethnic groups (Li 2010: 120, 127). This
highlights the challenges faced by policies employed in Sino-Myanmar relationsAnother
important factor in ties between Sino and Myanmar is the impact of China on the world stage.
Although China maintains the formal standards of non-interference in the state's domestic affairs,
it has also increasingly recognized its position in the international system as an effective
mediation mechanism as shown above in its negotiations with the Myanmar military and ethnic
group. Officials in the Yunnan province frequently express frustration at the Myanmar
government's delay or non-enforcementof cross-border cooperation agreements. This shows the
low-level governance potential of Naypyidaw as talks on special economic zones are stalled due
to' a lack of understanding of the SEZ concept and economic skills than any
politicalconsideration' (ICG 2009: 22)

China impressively growing military power often poses a challenge to China’s attentive diplomacy and
economic interchange stressing mutual benefit. On the one hand, authoritative Chinese statements
make clear China’s military need to prepare for contingencies with the United States, especially over
Taiwan, to protect Chinese territorial claims from intrusions by neighbours and to insure safe supplies of
energy and secure maritime tradeOn the other hand, China's neighbors perceive the military build-up
backed by over 20 years of double-digit annual growth in China's defense budget as threatening and
posing a serious challenge to the US.
Chinese diplomacy also seeks to persuade neighbors, the United States and other important forces by
playing down the importance of Chinese military achievements. Other prominent aspects of China's
post-Cold War foreign policy included an intense rivalry with Taiwan for international recognition, at
least until recently, and a strong opposition to international contact with leaders such as Tibet's Dalai
Lama, perceived as a threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Focusing China on economic
development needs stability. Among Myanmar's military, UWSA's contacts with various Chinese
authorities and other ceasefire groups contributed to the belief that the PRC' keeps a balance of power
between border ethnic groups and the military government to ensure that neither side gains the upper
hand' (ICG 2009: 10). Chinese analysts (Li and Lye 2009; Li 2010) indicated that the military in Myanmar
was concernedChina's common ground is often focused on economic growth, which in the post-Cold
War era was the most prominent feature of China's growing international profile. China is driven by its
highly resource-dependent and globally integrated economic growth to pursue money, technology,
services and marketsAs a country that has frequently been subjected to international sanctions, most
notably following the crackdown on Chinese protesters during the 1989 Tiananmen incident, China
often seeks common ground with nations and organizations that have been the objects of international
sanctions and external pressure seen in China being unconstitutional and unjustified intervention in the
internal affairs of other countries. China rarely sees its interests well served by standing in the way of
the imposition of international punishments broadly supported by world opinion, but it uses its
international position, notably as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to impede or slow
the imposition of punishments on countries seen as outliers to world norms by Western nations but not
by others. Myanmar has always been a source of domestic political concern to appreciate the
importance of China as a large neighbor with overwhelming power and influence in Asia and its
immediate regional climate. Past Chinese forays into the country and its BCP help have been used in the
modern period to bring this fact home. The fact that its major ethnic armed groups representingChina
has, on a number of occasions, brought this situation to bear by reminding Myanmar that its own border
security and security are inextricably linked to how Myanmar deals with conflicts near its border. The
simple reason for this is that instability in border areas invariably leads to a flood of refugees across the
border into China's Yunnan province. From the Chinese point of view, because of its long coastline along
the Indian Ocean, Myanmar also has significant strategic importance (Ganesan 2007).

4 Access to the coast gives China leverage over India, one of its traditional Asian rivals, and offers a
second route away from the South China Sea, constantly challenged by other regional countries such as
Japan, ASEAN and the United States. China is currently trying to persuade the government of Myanmar
to examine the area around the port city of Kyaukphyu that it is establishing as a Special Economic Zone
(SEZ).5 Since May 2017, the port itself has been built to facilitate the flow of oil and gas from Made
Island off Rakhine State directly to Kunming in China and is also part of China's wider Belt and Road
Initiative. Extractive industries that are strongly represented by Chinese companies include oil and gas.
Most of these firms are involved in discovery and exploitation of offshore oil and gas.

Nevertheless, the government of Myanmar has given incentives for such research to many international
companies and therefore the involvement of China is not as evident and less important. On the other
side, of course. D, China has historically been awarded major infrastructure projects, especially when the
government of Myanmar was subjected to international sanctions and isolation prior to 2010. During
that time, it was a source of great comfort and prestige for the then-powered military junta that China
pursued bilateral relations and projects without any conditions whatsoever. IMyanmar's New Light,
frequently reported on the oversight and commissioning of such large projects by the junta elite. Wide
bridges and new roads in particular were given prominence, and Chinese companies and often through
government-to-government agreements undertook many of these ventures. Those ventures at that time
did not receive local advertising because they appeared to support the residuePresident Thein Sein
finally relented in 2011 when he was still in office and, in view of the enormous amount of negative
advertisements created at the time by Chinese business activities in Myanmar and in order to signal
improvements in the approach of the new government in dealing with economic issues, brought the
project to a halt, much to China's grief. It was also important to note that this was the timeIn order to
become more involved and assertive in Myanmar's peace process, China has set aside its previous
commitment to the principle of non-interference. It has made attempts to be directly involved in the key
dispute issues facing Myanmar and has tried to influence Myanmar's various players ' decisions and
choices. It has offered itself as a mediator in the conflict and pressured nonsignaMyanmar considers the
overall commitment of China to be constructive. All government-affiliated and unofficial interlocutors,
including ethnic groups, stated that China's role in peace has not, to date, been unduly obstructive or
damaging to the phase. They note that the government of Myanmar has resisted and welcomed the
involvement of China. China showed no interest in organizing efforts to support peace with others.
Successive Governments in Myanmar have sought to ensure coordinated support for the peace process
by the international community. Ethnic groups have also sought common solidarity with justice for the
aim of peace. Although many mechanisms for such coordination have been developed, China has
beenThe Rohingya crisis has provided an opportunity for China to restore its primacy in Myanmar's
foreign relations, gain popular support in Myanmar, and claim its regional leadership. Since the handling
of the Rohingya crisis by Naypyidaw has strained its relations with the United States and other Western
countries, China has shocked Myanmar from international pressure and taken steps. Over the past
decade, China has strengthened the central course of Myanmar's government, ensuring better
coordination and control of its relationship with Myanmar's political, military and economic aspects. In
the past, actors from Yunnan have attempted to manipulate ambiguous orders from central government
on cross-border operation. Beijing, however, has put Yunnan provincial authorities on a tighter leash,
largelEven as Beijing strengthens relations with the government and military of Myanmar, a number of
domestic factors will continue to restrict Chinese influence in the country. Like other countries in
Southeast Asia, Myanmar seeks to avoid unnecessary dependency on any single country and to maintain
a balance of power between large countries in order to optimize its strength and protect against undue
external influence. At the same time, Myanmar admires the rapid economic growth of China, wants to
benefit from Chinese trade and investment, and understands that geography is destiny and therefore
Myanmar needs to maintain a positive relationship with its neighbor in order to secure its own long-
term stability and development.

Conclusion:
Ultimately, in Myanmar, China is a low-level interventionist (Holliday 2009: 491), where its
intervention is limited to inter-state diplomatic operations and sub-national and non-state
lobbying efforts. Myanmar's China policy has evolved as one that recognizes its shared history
and culture and is tempered by it. Nonetheless, Myanmar sees China as a stable economic
example. The sub-national relations, however, are much more closely linked to the
policies of the Yunnan government, being more complex with its border regions
and associated with higher likelihood of cross-border disputes. Nevertheless, a
series of abductions documented in the international media in early 2009 exposed
the kidnapping, torture or murder of gamblers unable to pay their debts. The
relationship between Sino-Myanmar at the national and sub-national levels is far
from cohesive and more resembles a combination of low-level provincial
expediency and a mixture of the broad strategic goal of access to the Indian Ocean
tempered with low political interest in BeijingMyanmar's China policy is one of
suspicion through' equal distance diplomacy,' mainly due to China's interaction
with ethnic nationalities in addition to its stronger global position. Meanwhile,
China's Myanmar policy is one of strategic necessities combined with multiple
governance-wide interests. These two positions thus reach a level of consensus and
interactionEven if Myanmar looks elsewhere at 280 Alistair D. B. Cook China
Report 48, 3 (2012): 269–281 counterbalance this impact, it remains the least
intrusive political relationship when compared against its relationship with other
neighbours. As a result, the leadership looked further to establish relations that
would counterbalance China's participation in the process. Although Myanmar's
leadership continues to attempt to stabilize its external ties, China is undeniably the
most important neighbor and power. Another ongoing challenge facing the
relationship between Sino-Myanmar is Myanmar's lack of state capacity to enforce
economic agreements and resolve its people's concerns. Without the former, the
ability of the Chinese or any other party to conduct business in Myanmar will be
limited, minimizing the economic benefits of the relationship; and without the
latter, tensions will remain over increased migration to Myanmar in the border
regions coupled with the marginalized nature of its population. In the meantime,
both oil and Chinese access to the Indian Ocean.