Vicente Dela Cruz, et.al. v. Hon. Edgardo Paras, et.al.

G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983

FACTS: The Local Government of Bocaue, Bulacan enacted Ordinance No. 82 which sought to prohibit
the operation of night clubs and the employment of hostesses in such night clubs. The Petitioners filed
with the Court of First Instance a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction alleging that (1) the
ordinance is null and void as the municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, (2) it
violated the petitioners’ right to due process and equal protection of the law as their permits were
withdrawn without judicial hearing, and (3) that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, the
power to license and regulate tourist oriented business including night clubs has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism.

In answer, the municipality responded that (1) it has been authorized by law to prohibit the
establishment and operation of night clubs under Section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) it
was not violative of their rights as property rights are subordinate to public interests because night clubs
has been the principal cause of decadence of morality and has adverse effects to the community, and (3)
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive municipal councils to regulate or prohibit
night clubs.

Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord
84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general
welfare.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 84 as enacted is a valid exercise of police power by the local
government unit.

HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. According to the Court, police power is granted to
municipal corporations, which may enact such ordinances and make regulations as may be necessary to
carry out its powers and duties to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order and convenience of the municipality. However, citing Justice Moreland,
an ordinance is valid unless contravenes the fundamental law of the land, an act of national legislature,
or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, discriminating, or in derogation of
common right. Hence, an ordinance passed must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be
pronounced invalid. The general rule found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant
with the general powers of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the law of the State. In the
present case, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They
may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. All the petitioners would have to
do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. The purpose sought to be
achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.

RULING: Petition is granted. Decision of the RTC is reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 84, series of
1976 is declared unconstitutional.
 G.R. No. L-18841             January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant

Facts: The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its
branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.

The defendant, Philippine Long-Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service corporation
holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines.

BOT soon after its creation set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting the trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. The
Bureau has extended its services to the general public. Through these trunk lines, a Government Telephone System
(GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the
former.

BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (an American Co. party not in interest of the case), Inc.
for a joint telephone service whereby the BOT would convey radio-telephone overseas call received by RCA to and
from local residents.

PLDT complained that BOT violated conditions since BOT had used the trunk lines not only for government offices
but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. PLDT sever the
telephone connections of BOT resulting to isolation of the Philippines on telephone services from the rest of the
world except the US.

The BOT had proposed that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call
basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the GTS to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that
it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided
that the BOT would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission and in
consideration sharing of the gross revenues. The proposals were not accepted by either party.

The plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant, praying in its complaint for judgment; (1) commanding the
PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the BOT, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone
system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and;
(2) for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing
telephone connections and/or restore those severed.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with
the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; Both parties appealed.

Issue: Whether or not interconnection of Government Telephone System and PLDT can be subject for
expropriation.

Ruling: Yes

The Republic of the Philippines through Bureau of Telecommunications may in the exercise of the sovereign power
of eminent domain, require the Telephone Company to permit interconnection of the Government Telephone
System and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may required, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.

The Republic’s cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the BOT facilities from the
outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby preventing the BOT
from properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. The case should be for the
compulsory rendering of interconnection of services by the telephone company upon such terms and conditions as
the court may determine to be just.

Since the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of such services
independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same,
instead of dismissing the petition.

Under Section 79 of EO 94 paragraph (b)

To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio telephone
communication service throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and
provinces as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or arrangements with the present
owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned.
Under Section 6 Article XIII 1935 Constitution “Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources.”
The State may, in the exercise of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership,
utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government.
Charter of PLDT expressly provides that Section 14.
The rights therein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation,
association or person other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of message or
signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise.
PLDT’s right to just compensation for the services rendered to the GTS and its users is herein recognized and
preserved. To uphold PLDT’s contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT
to deprive profit from the future expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise.

The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended
the use of the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the defendant to
such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both
telephone systems, and their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim
misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.

There is high authority for the position that, when such physical connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair
and workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line has come to be patronized and
established as a great public convenience, such connection shall not in breach of the agreement be severed by one
of the parties. In that case, the public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its rights must
receive due consideration.

"Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by contract, as
is here alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires an interest in its continuance, the act of the parties in
making such connection is equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of independence,
and it imposes upon the property such a public status that it may not be disregarded"

"Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit
of the public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it subject to the right of
the public in the exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit.
 JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION VS. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG
G.R. NO. 152230 August 09, 2005
DOCTRINES:

An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a contract;
The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended and
definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.

A property that is intended for the construction of a place of religious worship and a school for its
members may still be expropriated.

Where property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road, the expropriator is not
mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil
Code—case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent
domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is
capricious and wantonly injurious

FACTS: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were
located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could
pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical
outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT).

On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to
initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use
as an access road but they rejected the offer.

On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for the
expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to
construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff
appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. 

The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax declaration
covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be
expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of  lis pendens at the dorsal
portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated
(JILCSFI) which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a
width of three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.

In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI
as evidenced by a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.
When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-in-intervention,
which motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994. 

In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the plaintiff’s
exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It
alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome
to it. The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for reimbursement in case the subject property is
expropriated. In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its
property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-
interest. The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims against the plaintiff for moral damages and attorney’s
fees.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a
valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the complaint; (NO)

(2) WON the property which is already intended to be used for public purposes (i.e., building of a church and
school) may still be expropriated by the respondent; (YES)

(3) WON the requisites for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be
dispensed with. (YES)

(4) WON respondent was able to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the petitioner’s
property and not elsewhere. (NO)

RULING:

(1)

The respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to
acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its
compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the
signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.

This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig, Metro Manila embraced
in and covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of which with an area of fiftyone (51) square meters is needed by the
Municipal Government of Pasig for conversion into a roadright of way for the benefit of several residents living in
the vicinity of your property. Attached herewith is the sketch plan for your information. In this connection, may we
respectfully request your presence in our office to discuss this project and the price that may be mutually agreed
upon by you and the Municipality of Pasig. Thank you.

The RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof.
The respondent, likewise, failed to adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the
co-owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Kho.

Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a
specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both
parties.
There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal
portion of petitioner’s TCT No. PT92579 is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer.

Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that “the property owners were already
notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road,” a substantial
compliance with the requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Presumably, the
Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the
property.

(2)

We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent
because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school for its members. The
requirement is that the expropriation must be for a public purpose.

As aptly explained by this Court in Manosca v. Court of Appeals, thus:

It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: A historical research discloses the meaning of
the term “public use” to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual
increases and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted for “whatever is
beneficially employed for the community is a public use.

(3)

We also reject the petitioner’s assertion that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the
establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point least
prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The subject
property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with
the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code.

Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may
determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly
injurious.

(4)

The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as the best
possible ingress and egress.

However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims. There is no showing in
the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. The petitioner was, there fore, deprived of its
right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received
and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. The findings of the trial court based on the
conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
 G.R. No. 177611. April 18, 2012.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner, vs. RODOLFO L. LEGASPI,
SR., QUEROBIN L. LEGASPI, OFELIA LEGASPI-MUELA, PURISIMA LEGASPI VDA. DE MONDEJAR, VICENTE LEGASPI,
RODOLFO LEGASPI II, and SPOUSES ROSALINA LIBO-ON and DOMINADOR LIBO-ON, respondents.

Nature of the Case: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is the Decision dated 26 April 2007 rendered by the Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 85735, denying for lack of merit the Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, thru the University of the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV), for the nullification of the orders dated
17 November 2003 and 31 May 2004 issued by the Hon. Roger B. Patricio, Presiding Judge of Branch 38 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, in the expropriation case docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 19921.

FACTS:

In December 1978, Rosalina Libo-on accomplished a letter of intent signifying her willingness to sell to
UPV Lot No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd., situated at Miag-ao, Iloilo registered in her name under OCT No. F-20020 of the
Iloilo provincial registry. A Deed of Definite Sale was executed by the parties whereby Rosalina, with the
conformity of her then tenant, Vicente Libo-on, sold the subject parcel of land to UPV for P56,479.50. UPV
immediately took possession of the property and, in line with its educational development plan, started building
thereon road networks, infrastructure and school facilities. The record shows further use and development of the
property was subsequently taken up at the 1093 rd meeting of the UP Board of Regents held in Quezon City on
December 15, 1995.

On January 4, 1980, Rosalina wrote a letter informing UPV that she was rescinding the sale on the ground
that she was no longer the owner of the property. That she had conveyed the property on September 5, 1978 by
way of barter or exchange in favor of the respondents. UPV learned that Lot 1 was subdivided into ten lots
denominated and registered in the name of respondents.

The Solicitor General filed against the respondents the complaint for eminent domain before the Regional
Trial Court. Petitioner alleged, among other matters, that the subject parcel is within the approved and delineated
campus of the UPV which had well-established its presence in the area by building its laboratories, classrooms,
faculty and student centers, among other facilities; and, that it had been constrained to resort to expropriation in
view of the failure of its efforts to negotiate with respondents for the retention of the property on which it
constructed considerable improvements already being used for academic purposes. Maintaining that the fair
market value of the property at the time of its entry was P49,298.00, UPV sought confirmation of its right of
condemnation as well as the fixing of the just compensation for the property.

On 2 September 1991, the RTC issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to allow UPV to continue its
possession of the subject parcel upon deposit with the Iloilo Provincial Treasurer of the sum of P50,070.00,
representing the provisional valuation of the property.

In their answer the respondents averred that petitioner’s right of expropriation should only be limited to
the three lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-8193, 8194 and 8196, finding no opposition, the
RTC issued an order of condemnation upholding UPV’s right to expropriate said three parcels of land.

Petitioner moved for the continuation of the condemnation proceeding insofar as the remaining seven
parcels of land were concerned.

On April 13, 1998, the Office of the UPV Chancellor sent respondent Rodolfo Legaspi a letter, protesting
against the latter’s occupation of a portion of the property in litigation. Calling the RTC’s attention to its September
2, 1991 Order which allowed UPV’s continued possession of the property, petitioner also filed its 7 July 1998
manifestation and motion praying for the grant of a writ of possession over the entirety of Lot 1. Without resolving
the motion, however, the RTC went on to issue the June 16, 2000 order, fixing the just compensation for Lot Nos.
21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E, based on the evidence adduced by the parties and the report submitted by the
commissioners.

On November 17, 2003, the RTC further issued the condemnation order of the same date, upholding
petitioner’s authority to expropriate the remaining seven lots comprising the property. Excluding the area
occupied by the Villa Marina Beach Resort which respondent Rodolfo Legaspi Sr. operated in the premises.

On December 19, 2003, petitioner and UPV filed motions for reconsideration of the foregoing order on
the ground that the exclusion of the Villa Marina Beach Resort from the condemned lots is bereft of legal basis and
contrary to the evidence presented in the case which showed that the same is an integral part of the UPV’s
developmental plan for research and educational use. On which the court granted. On 22 December 2003,
respondents also filed their manifestation and partial motion for reconsideration of the same order alleging,
among other matters, that Lot Nos. 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J comprise the area occupied
by Villa Marina Beach Resort; that Lot No. 21609-A is the area where respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. operates a
business called Omp’s Corner; that UPV has no intended use for Lot No. 21609-D which is being used for residential
purposes by respondent Vicente Legaspi; and, that the foregoing lots, together with the portion of Lot No. 1 of
Psu-193912 Amd. utilized by the Municipality of Miag-ao as a public cemetery should be excluded from petitioner’s
exercise of its right of expropriation.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed on 16 August 2004 the Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus docketed before
the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 85735, assailing the RTC’s order dated 31 May 2004 on the ground that grave abuse of
discretion attended the denial of the expropriation of the subject lots after the right to expropriate the same was
earlier upheld in the likewise assailed order dated 17 November 2003.CA ruled that the RTC’s issuance of said
assailed orders was well within its power and duty to review, amend or reverse its findings and conclusions if it
deems it necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: The court of appeals erred on a question of law in denying the petition for  certiorari and affirming the order
dated May 31, 2004 of branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo city which did not state the facts and the law
on which it is based.

RULING: Expropriation or the exercise of the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state and of
those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated to condemn private property to public use upon
payment of just compensation. Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings therefor consist of two
(2) stages: (a) the condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public
purpose or public use; and, (b) the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property
to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.  The nature of these two stages
was discussed in the following wise in the case of Municipality of Biñan vs. Judge Garcia, to wit:

There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally disposes of
the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court,
"no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings
of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe
the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a
dissatisfied party may seek a reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.

It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings – be it an order
of expropriation or an order of dismissal – finally disposes of the case and is, for said reason, final. The same is true
of the second phase that ends with an order determining the amount of just compensation which, while essential
for the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, is but the last stage of the expropriation proceedings and the
outcome of the initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint. In the same manner that the order of
expropriation may be appealed by any party by filing a record on appeal, a second and separate appeal may
likewise be taken from the order fixing the just compensation. Indeed, jurisprudence recognizes the existence of
multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation because of said two stages in every action for expropriation.

In the case at bench, the RTC split the determination of UPV’s right of expropriation over the ten lots into which
Lot No. 1 of Psu-193912 Amd. had been subdivided. Considering the lack of opposition on the part of respondents,
the RTC issued the order dated 1 April 1996, upholding UPV’s right to expropriate the three (3) lots denominated
as Lot Nos. 21609-B, 21609-C and 21609-E, with an aggregate area of 8,516 square meters. Without any appeal
having been perfected therefrom, the RTC’s 1 April 1996 order attained finality and left no more question as to the
propriety of the acquisition of said lots for the public purpose alleged in the complaint from which the instant suit
originated. Accordingly, the RTC correctly went on to issue the order dated 16 June 2000, fixing the just
compensation for Lot Nos. 21609-B, 21609-D and 21609-E at ₱51,096.00, less the ₱50,070.00 UPV appears to have
already deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Iloilo.

On the other hand, with respect to Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J,
the record shows that the RTC issued the herein assailed 17 November 2003 order which, while likewise upholding
UPV’s right of expropriation over said lots, ordered the exclusion of the portion occupied by Villa Marina Beach
Resort from the 31,617 square meters comprising said lots. Acting on the motions for reconsideration of said order
filed by petitioner, UPV and respondents, however, the RTC issued the second assailed 31 May 2004 order,
altogether denying said right of expropriation, upon the following succinct findings and conclusions:

It bears stressing that even before the filing of the original complaint, [respondent] Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. was
already operating as his business establishment the Villa Marina Resort and this must be the reason why
[petitioner] had expressly excluded this area from the area it intended to expropriate, the amended complaint
notwithstanding, and must also be the reason why former UP President Angara wrote a letter to defendant
Legaspi, Sr. conveying a ‘happy compromise acceptable to all’.

It likewise bears stressing the fact that insofar as Lot No. 21609-A, a portion thereof has been utilized by defendant
Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr.’s "Omp’s Corner" and the rest of the said lot has been utilized by the Municipality of Miag-ao,
Iloilo as a public cemetery.

The total area covered by Lots Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J is only
31,617 sq. meters. Based on the locations of these lots, acquisition by [UPV] would not impair or defeat the
purpose of its campus site. In other words, without including in the expropriation the Villa Marina Resort, the
"Omp’s Corner" and the public cemetery and the residential land where [respondent] Vicente Legaspi’s family is
residing, [UPV’s] operation as a university would not be adversely affected.

As to the Villa Marina Resort and the "Omp’s Corner" these places have been utilized by defendant Rodolfo
Legaspi, Sr. for his business even before the filing of the instant complaint. As to [respondent] Vicente Legaspi’s lot,
including this in the expropriation would force his family to go astray as they have no place where to live.
As to the portion being utilized as public cemetery, this Court believes and so holds that allowing the plaintiff to
expropriate the same would be bordering to the long cherished and revered customs and tradition of respecting
the dead. x x x

The order of denial of UPV’s right to expropriate Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I
and 21609-J, is final in nature and not merely interlocutory. However, instead of perfecting an appeal from said
order which it received on 16 June 2004, petitioner filed on 16 August 2004 the Rule 65 petition for certiorari
docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 85735, on the ground that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying the expropriation of the subject lots after its right to expropriate the same had been earlier determined.
Narrow in scope and unflexible in character, a petition for certiorari is, concededly, intended to correct errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and lies only when there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hence, the CA denied the
petition filed by petitioner on the principle that certiorari cannot be used as substitute for an appeal that has been
lost.

Petitioner has more than amply demonstrated that the RTC’s issuance of the assailed orders dated 17 November
2003 and 31 May 2004 was attended with grave abuse of discretion. In the context of a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. It has been ruled that the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. To
our mind, the grave abuse of discretion imputable against the RTC was manifest as early in the assailed 17
November 2003 order where, without giving any rationale therefor, and while it upheld petitioner’s right of
expropriation over Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F, 21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J, it excluded the
area occupied by the Villa Marina Beach Resort owned and operated by respondent Rodolfo Legaspi, Sr. No less
than the Constitution mandates that "(n)o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."

Since it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court, the rule is settled that a
decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and
deemed legally inexistent.

Thus, the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless
disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes-cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial
responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution.

The RTC compounded its error when, acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by the parties, it issued the
assailed 31 May 2004 Order, denying petitioner’s right of expropriation over Lot Nos. 21609-A, 21609-D, 21609-F,
21609-G, 21609-H, 21609-I and 21609-J, on the ground that the same were already used by respondents for their
businesses and/or residences. Subject to the direct constitutional qualification that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation," the power of eminent domain is, after all, the ultimate right of
the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose thru a
method that partakes the nature of a compulsory sale. The fact that said lots are being utilized by respondents
Legaspi’s for their own private purposes is, consequently, not a valid reason to deny exercise of the right of
expropriation, for as long as the taking is for a public purpose and just compensation is paid.

Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, CA’s Decision dated 26 April 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.