1. Cayetano vs. Monsod Sept.

3, 1991 GR 1000113
a. Facts :
i. Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years.
b. Issue:
i. Whether or not the appointment of Monsod is legal considering that he
has not been practicing his legal profession?
c. Ruling:
i. The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years."

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what

constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105
Phil. 173, 176-177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions."
(5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts.
No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
 at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys."

ii. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a
grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has
been clearly shown

2. Phil. Lawyers Assoc. vs. Agrava 105 Phils 773

a. Facts
i. This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for
prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as
Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On May 27, 1957, Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice. He has been doing it
before. It will require lawyers and others to pass the exam so that they
may practice under the patent office.
Petitioner from the Philippine lawyers association argued that those
who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the Philippines is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office, and that, the act of the respondent
Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to
take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as
representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
 applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General,
maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a
matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be
handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed
examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court
do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from
requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish
to handle cases before such bodies, as in the prosecution of patent
cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding
paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical
knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the
action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No.
165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which is
similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the
United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as
what prescribed by respondent. . . . ."
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United
States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe
examinations to determine as to who may practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by
our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

b. Issue
i. Whether or not the director of the patent office has the authority to
impose examinations for the practice of law in the patent office
c. Ruling
i. The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with
respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines 1 and any
member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative, in the Philippines.
ii. The nature of the patent office concerns the practice of law. Another
aspect is that should a question arise from the decisions of the patent
office, it can be appealed to the Supreme Court therefore it follows that
the nature and jurisdiction of such office is under the Supreme Court and
not that of a quasijudicial body.

The contention of respondent that the laws of the united states should
be followed because our laws are patterned to them does not hold
water. Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act
No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he
is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that
persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:
"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the
Patent Office."
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different
from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards
authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an
express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to
require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it
before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then
there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of
Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area
are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of
accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation,
these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification
of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as
regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer
practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on
behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of
the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in
good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
 for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme
Court.

3. People vs. Villanueva 121 Phils 894

a. Facts
i. On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged
Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the
Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de
parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City
Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance
as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official
leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services.
The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino,
et al., vs. Blanco, et al., 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled that "when an
attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial
Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased
to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP is in
a violation of the above ruling.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a
"Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this
Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel
claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation.
This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961,
the pertinent portions of which read:
"Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court
of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
 person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he
was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he
had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna,
because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos
are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended
party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
"In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney
Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court
in Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as
an agent or a friend of the offended party.
"WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the
Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the appearance of
Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs."

b. Issue
i. Whether or not Fule is violating Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules when he
acted as counsel for the accused.
c. Ruling
i. Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which
provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients."
ii. He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in
the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than
 an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following
observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
iii. "Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one
must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services."
iv. For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

4. Cui vs. Cui 11 SCRA 758

a. Facts
i. This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of
the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili.
ii. The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don
Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and
support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation and
endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series
of donations, principally the deed of donation.
iii. Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders
jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed by them."
iv. Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration
passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May
1931 and the second, on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only
son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in
1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning
 the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to
the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.
v. Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being
the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro
Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui
pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a
notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his
oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the
"convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
vi. Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be
turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having
been complied with, the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo
Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a
grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the
founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
vii. As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the
two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred,
pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test
of age may be applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the
legitimate descendants of the nephews.
b. Issue
i. Who among the parties should hold office as administrator of the
institution
c. Ruling
i. The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de
abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the
University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar,
not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma.
Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar, and although disbarred
by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was
reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two
weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio
de Barili.
ii. The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that
the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged
 lawyer, but that "as used in the deed of donation and considering the
function of purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or
diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by
the defendant and by intervenor.
iii. We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in context the term
"titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone,
conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession.
The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney- at-law. This
term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class
of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a consequence.
iv. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under
the authority of the Supreme Court. Such admission requires passing the
Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate
from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the
profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to
do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the
requirement that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully
completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university,
officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose,
however, possession of the law degree itself is not indispensable:
v. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established
the foregoing test advisedly, and provided in the deed of donation that if
not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays
the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.
vi. Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as
against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that
although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified
by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed, on the ground, among others, of
ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral
character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was
 disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and
unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated
on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no
less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
vii. As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one
seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting
than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite
for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting
from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
viii. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed
from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the
complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against
plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

5. Inre: Almacen 31 SCRA 562

a. Facts

i. Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case.
They lost in said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said motion but he
failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his
motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied
his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before
the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to
surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
continue practicing his profession when members of the high court are
men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons
their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute
resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the
reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the
 present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf
and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as  the
Court wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate.
Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s certificate though as he now
argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he
preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.

b. Issue
i. Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
c. Ruling

i. Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full
opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be
unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of
the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
ii. On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded
said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.  His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as
of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
 iii. In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer,
he should have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to
notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of
paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended
indefinitely.

6. Inre: De Guzman 55 SCRA 139

a. Facts
i. Ernesto Cendana was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal
in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap
material, respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He
utilized (2) two six-wheeler trucks which he owned for the purpose. Upon
returning to Pangasinan, he would load his vehicle with cargo belonging
to different merchants to different establishments in Pangasisnan which
respondents charged a freight fee for. Sometime in November 1970,
herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and dealer of General
Milk Company Inc. in Pangasinan contracted with respondent for hauling
750 cartons of milk. Unfortunately, only 150 cartons made it, as the other
600 cartons were intercepted by hijackers along Marcos Highway. Hence,
petitioners commenced an action against private respondent. In his
defense, respondent argued that he cannot be held liable due to force
majuere, and that he is not a common carrier and hence is not required
to exercise extraordinary diligence. On appeal before the Court of
Appeals, Cendana urged that the trial court had erred in considering him
a common carrier; in finding that he had habitually offered trucking
services to the public; in not exempting him from liability on the ground
of force majeure; and in ordering him to pay damages and attorney’s
fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and
held that Cendana had been engaged in transporting return loads of
freight “as a casual occupation — a sideline to his scrap iron business”
and not as a common carrier. De Guzman came to the Supreme Court by
way of a Petition for Review.

b. Issue
i. Is respondent a common carrier?
ii. Is the respondent liable for the loss of the cartons of milk due to force
majeure?
 c. Ruling
i. The Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 3 August 1977 is AFFIRMED.

ii. The occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond
the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous
event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made
absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and
are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are
inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.

iii. We, therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that
private respondent Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered
merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private
respondent's control.

7. In the matter of petition for disbarment of Telesforo Diao AC # 244 March 29, 1962
a. Facts

i. After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,

Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.

ii. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred
to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the
following particulars:

iii. (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

iv. (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A.
diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted
 in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein
of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

v. Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically

admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high
school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed
the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life,
the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent
of 3rd and 4th year high school.

vi. Respondent failed to exhibit any certification to that effect (the

equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never
obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.

b. Issue
i. Whether or not Diao should be removed as a lawyer due to his material
misrepresentation of an essential requirement.
c. Ruling

i. This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous
to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").

ii. Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to
 take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential..

iii. The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the
name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his
lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
8. Khan vs Simbilio Aug 19, 2003 AC 5299
Advertising
FACTS
Atty. Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services
for advertising himself in several leading newspapers as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist.”
He claimed that he can guarantee a court decree within 4 to 6 months and that the fee was P
48,000.00.
Atty. Khan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
Atty. Simbillo answered the charges against him and he prayed that he be exonerated
from all the charges and the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services
offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.
The case was referred to the IBP and they found the respondent guilty. Simbillo was
then suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with warning. Respondent filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and was denied.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUES
Whether or not the advertisement of Atty. Simbillo was against the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rules of Court
RULING
Yes, it has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. The gaining
of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate
their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one(1) year and was sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely.

9. Canoy vs Ortiz March 16, 2005 AC 5485

Misconduct and malpractice
FACTS
Canoy filed with the Office of Bar Confidant accusing Atty. Ortiz of misconduct and
malpractice. Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his former employer where
Atty. Ortiz appeared as counsel for Canoy.
 After several unfruitful visits,Canoy decided to follow-up the case himself with the NLRC
in 2000. He was shocked to learn that his complaint was actually dismissed way back in 1998,
for failure to prosecute because the parties did not submit position papers. Canoy alleged that
Atty. Ortiz had never communicated with him about the status of the case.
Atty. Ortiz answered the allegations saying that Canoy was among the low-income
clients he represented.Atty. Ortiz admits that the period to file the position paper had already
lapsed and attributes it to the fact that he ran as Councilor of Bacolod City. He said he was
preoccupied with both this functions in the local government and his private practice so, he
withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services.
The matter was referred to the IBP and Canoy eventually moved to withdraw the
complaint but was denied in view of the rule that investigation of the case shall not be
interrupted by reason of withdrawal. The IBP concluded that Atty. Ortiz should be warned that
a repetition of the same negligence shall be dealt with more severely.
ISSUES
Whether or not there was grave misconduct and malpractice on the part of Atty. Ortiz
RULING
Yes, the relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the
need for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and
should not be left in the dark as to the mode and manner in which his/her interests are being
defended.
Neither is the Court mollified by the circumstance of Atty. Ortiz's election as a City
Councilor of Bacolod City, as his adoption of these additional duties does not exonerate him of
his negligent behavior. The Code of Professional Responsibility does allow a lawyer to withdraw
his legal services if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office.
Atty. Ortiz is guilty and ordered suspended for one (1) month and was sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely.

10. Borja vs Sulyap March 26, 2003 AC 150119

Private practice
FACTS
Borja, the petitioner lessor, entered into a contract of lease with Sulyap Inc., the
respondent lessee. Sulyap paid among others, advance rentals, association dues and deposit for
electrical and telephone expenses. Upon the expiration, the respondent demanded the return
of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but the petitioner refused to do so. Sulyap filed a
complaint for sum of money against the petitioner but subsequently, they entered into a
Compromise Agreement submitted to and approved by the RTC.
Petitioner, however, failed to pay the P 30,575.00 and P 50,000.00 stated in the judicial
compromise. Hence, the respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution for the
aforesaid amounts or a total of P 102,733.12, inclusive of 2% interest and 25% attorney’s fees.
The RTC granted the motion, then the petitioner moved to quash the writ of execution and
modification of the decision contending that there was fraud in the execution of the
compromise agreement. He claimed that the agreement that he signed did not contain any
penalty stipulation. He further alleged that his former counsel Atty. Cruz, who assisted him in
the agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he signed and
attached the same to the agreement submitted to the court in order to make it appear that he
agreed to the penalties.
Both the RTC and the CA denied the petitioner’s motion and gave credence to the
testimony of Atty. Cruz that the petitioner consented to the penalty clause.
ISSUES
Whether or not the compromise contract is void due to the alleged fraud in the
insertion of the penalty clause by Atty. Cruz
Whether or not Atty. Cruz exceeded his authority when he assisted Borja in a
compromise agreement in his private practice when he was a public official at that time
RULING
Even assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty
clause, the status of the said clause is not void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being
ratified. Indeed, petitioner's failure to question the inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and
25% attorney's fees in the judicial compromise despite several opportunities to do so was
tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from assailing the validity thereof.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention that the compromise agreement should be
annulled because Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering into such agreement, was
then an employee of the Quezon City government, and is thus prohibited from engaging in the
private practice of his profession. Suffice it to state that the isolated assistance provided by
Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreement does not constitute a
prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a profession,
specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's
self.

11. Schulz vs Flores Dec. 8, 2003 AC 4219

Negligence and Incompetence
FACTS
Shulz filed a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Flores. Schulz engaged the
services of Atty. Flores to file a complaint for revocation of contract and damages against
Wilson Ong for his failure to deliver the jeep he sold to Schulz within the stipulated period.
Schulz argued that the Atty. Flores’ inordinate delay in acting on his case resulting in his being
defendant rather than a complainant against Ong.
Schulz also charged the respondent with collecting excessive and unreasonable fees and
of not returning his files. Complainant also alleged that he refused the respondent’s offer to
return his files if he signs a statement acknowledging that the respondent does not owe him
anything. Furthermore, the complainant pointed out that the respondent was a former Judge
who was dismissed from service at the end of the Marcos regime and the judicial order cited
nine instances of anomalous, illegal and unethical acts.
The IBP found Atty. Flores guilty and was ordered to be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months with stern warning and to return the P 12,000.00 and the respondent’s
files.
ISSUES
Whether or not Atty. Flores is guilty of negligence and incompetence
RULING
Yes. He committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning
and ability to give entire devotion to his client's cause. His client had relied upon him to file the
complaint with dispatch so that he would not be preempted by the adverse party. But he failed
him. As a consequence of respondent's indolence, his client was hailed to court as a party-
defendant.
The failure of an attorney to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of
the trust reposed in him by the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as
well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the IBP and the respondent was found guilty of
negligence and incompetence and is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately. He was ordered to return to complainant the amount of P12,000.00with
legal interest and is sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar act in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

12. Ledesma vs Climaco June 28, 1974 GR-L 23815

Counsel de oficio v. Election Registrar job
FACTS
Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar and was also a counsel de parte for one of
the accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent Judge Climaco. The petitioner filed a
motion to withdraw but not only did the Judge deny his motion, he also appointed him counsel
de oficio for the two defendants.
 Ledesma filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw because of the policy of
COMELEC to require full time service as well as his heavy workload which could prevent him
from handling the defense adequately. This and a motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the
petitioner to withdraw as counsel
RULING
The principal reason behind respondent’s denial of the motion to withdraw of petitioner
is because of its effect to delay the case further. The criminal proceeding had already been
postponed eight (8) times, and to grant the petitioner’s motion would have been tantamount to
a denial of the accused’s rights. The fact that the respondent already appointed the petitioner
as counsel de oficio other than the de parte, renders the latter’s excuse of the demand of his
job as registrar inutile. There is no reason for him to compromise the accused; defense for want
of time with the demands on the time of counsel de oficio is less than that of de parte. It is
thus, clear that petitioner is merely reluctant to represent the accused, membership in the Bar
requires the responsibility to live up to its exacting standard, which includes assisting the state
when called upon to administer justice, the law is not a trade or a craft, but a profession.
As such, the facts that petitioner will not be compensated for his trouble should not
hinder him from defending the accused to the best of his ability. The right of the accused to
counsel is a constitutionally protected right, such that any frustration thereof by petitioner
amounts to a serious affront to the profession.
Petition is dismissed. Petitioner is admonished.

13. Reyes vs Vitan April 15, 2005 AC 5835

Negligence
Failure to act on case after payment
FACTS
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty.
Vitan for gross negligence. Complainant hired the service of the respondent Atty. For the
purpose of filing the appropriate complaint or charge against the complainant’s sister-in-law
and its niece. The respondent after receiving the amount of P17,000.00 did not take any action
on the complainant’s case.
The IBP issued several orders to the respondent directing him to file his answer but he
failed to do so and he only sent his secretary to represent him during proceedings. The IBP
ruled that the respondent be suspended for two (2) years and that he should refund the client
P17,000.00.
ISSUES
 Whether or not respondent violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING
Yes. When respondent accepted the amount of P17,000.00 from complainant, it was
understood that he agreed to take up the latter's case and that an attorney-client relationship
between them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve his client, herein
complainant, with competence and attend to his cause with fidelity, care and devotion.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling
complainant's case and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. More specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
"Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
However, the SC modified the penalty and ordered the respondent to be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Decision. He
is ordered to return to complainant within five (5) days from notice the sum of P17, 000.00 with
interest of 12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of this Decision until the full
amount shall have been returned.

14. Olbes vs Deciembre April 27, 2005 AC 5365

Gross misconduct/Disbarment
Estafa
BP 22
FACTS
This is a verified petition for disbarment of Atty. Deciembre filed by spouses Obles due
to charges of willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
Through the respondent, Lourdes Obles renewed her application for a loan and as a
security for a loan, she issued and delivered to the respondent five (5) blank cheques for
collateral.
Lourdes was able to pay the amount of her loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests
and Atty. Deciembre issued her a receipt. Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan,
respondent filled up four of the five blank cheques for P50,000.00 with different dates of
maturity.
However, the respondent filed two separate complaints for estafa and BP 22 against the
spouses Obles because he alleged that they personally approached him and requested that he
exchange with their cash their postdated cheques. The herein complainants denied this.
The IBP ruled that the respondent be suspended for two (2) years.
ISSUES
 Whether or not Atty. Deciembre should be disbarred for gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING
Yes. It is glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously
transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had
not been agreed upon at all and despite respondent's full knowledge that the loan supposed to
be secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon presentment,
respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits against petitioners, thereby
exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the
criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners
(Franklin) was detained for three months because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly
guilty of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of
moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the bar.
Respondent was found guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
 Case No. 22
Pedro Oparel, Sr. vs Atty. Dominador Abaria
A.C. No. 959
July 30, 1971
FACTS:
Complainant Pedro Oparel, who allegedly claimed that he was a pauper, filed a
complaint against Dominador Abaria, a member of the Philippine Bar, for the reason that the
respondent acted with dishonesty in handling the case of complainant regarding for the
recovery of damages from his employer for the injuries he suffered. Oparel complained that he
only received the amount of P500.00 while Atty. Abaria got the larger amount of P5,000.00. The
respondent answered to his complaint and he admitted that he received the alleged sum of
P5,000.00 by stating that P3,500.00 was spent by the employer for plaintiffs operation and
medical bills, another P1,000.00 for his family during his confinement in the hospital and then
the P500 received in cash by way of additional settlement. Respondent then prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent acted with dishonesty in handling the case of the
complainant?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court said that it was just a misunderstanding between him and his
client since the client happens to be poor and unlettered, seeking to enforce what he considers
his just demands against an employer, it is even more imperative that matters be explained to
him with all precision and clarity. The Supreme Court said that he should not invite loss of trust
by inadvertence or even by failure to use the simplest and most understandable language in
communicating matters. For he may lend himself to the suspicion that he is lacking in candor
and may be taking undue advantage of his client for his own profit and advantage in any dealing
with the adverse party. Hence, the administrative case that was filed against Abaria is
dismissed.

Case No. 23
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.
 B.M. No. 810
January 27, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas recently passed the 1996 BAR Examination but he was not
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath because he was under probation due to his previous
conviction for the crime Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide for his participation in the
initiation rites of the LEX TALLONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the San Beda College of Law,
which resulted to the death of the neophyte Raul I. Camaligan due to the personal violence
inflicted upon him. Cuevas was discharged from the probation on May 16, 1995 and then filed a
petition that he be allowed to take lawyer’s oath at the court’s most convenient time. The
Court then requires the comment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, the father of the deceased
before acting on petitioner’s application. The father of the deceased then said that he has
already forgiven the petitioner in the criminal case for the death of his son and he now let the
Hon. Court decide on the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is morally fit to be admitted to the noble profession of
the law and be allowed to take lawyer’s oath?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. is discharge from
probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefore and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has
taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the
unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating. Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer’s oath is not a mere
formality recited but a conduct to himself to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a lawyer, he will now be in better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society. Accordingly, the Court hereby
resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath and to sign the Roll
of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court.

Case No. 24
Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. 553
June 17, 1993
FACTS:
The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales in 1984 with an aim to move
toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.
Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s
advertisements which contain the following:

 Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE.ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT.VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce.Annulment of Marriage.Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &

Special Retiree's Visa.Declaration of Absence.Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees.Adoption.Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.  Tel. 521-
7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is
even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors
and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the
US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
RULING: 
YES. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation
to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law.  Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use
only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards
of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods.  Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to
promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which
their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right
and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.  The Supreme Court also enumerated the
following as allowed forms of advertisement as enumerated: Advertisement in a reputable law
list, use of ordinary simple professional card and listing in a phone directory but without
designation as to his specialization.

Case No. 25
Tolosa vs Cargo
A.M. No. 2385
March 8, 1989
FACTS:

Complainant filed a disbarment case towards respondent claiming immorality. Alleging

further that Atty. Alfredo Cargo has been seeing the wife of the complainant and is having an
affair, his wife even left their conjugal home to live and rent in a place paid by the respondent.

Several issues were also raised alleging immorality and altercations between the complainant
and the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Cargo be disbarred.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of the Solicitor General in not
finding the respondent guilty of immorality due to lack of sufficient evidence. However, the
court ruled further to warn Atty. Alfredo Cargo and reprimand him of conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court.

Case No. 26
Aguirre vs Rana
B.M. 1036
June 10, 2003
FACTS:
Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign
the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an
election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate
before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he
only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was
tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of
the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as
counsel for the candidate. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is fit for admission to the bar?

RULING:
NO. The court held that respondent did engage in unauthorized practice of law. It held
that all the activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the
fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege
extended to those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict
regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds
respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already
took his oath, he was denied for admission to the bar. 

Case No. 27
Monson vs Reyes
A.C. 1056
October 27, 1975
 
FACTS:
Complainant Saturnino S. Monzon charged the respondent Atty. Arsenio Reyes with:
violation of lawyer’s oath in that the lawyer shall do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court, and corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without
proper authority. The antecedent facts of this case is based on Monzon vs CFI, Manila CA-GR.
No. 42375. Accordingly, an intestate proceeding with CFI Manila was filed by Catalino C. Fausto,
surviving spouse of Ramona Rono who died on July 31, 1962. The decedent left 5 heirs, her
husband, Catalino and 4 children. On March 1, 1965, Catalino Fausto executed a deed of
absolute sale whereby he sold unto Gertrudes Francisco his ½ share, interest, and participation
on two parcel of land in the estate of Ramona Rono for P 65,000.00. The thermos fax copy of
the deed of sale which was ratified before the Notary Pubic Arsenio Reyes does not bear the
signature of the vendor and the vendee but the same bears the signatures of the 2 witness
thereto. Atty. Reyes filed a petition with the probate court for the approval of the said deed of
sale which was given due course on February 18, 1966. However, pending that petition Mr.
Fausto died on October 10, 1965. His second wife filed an intestate proceedings to settle the
estate of fausto, with the herein defendant as her counsel. On October 7, 1967, Fe Fausto-
Monzon, one of the children and heirs of spouses Ramona and Catalino also died and her
surviving spouse, the complainant was appointed to substitute for her in both intestate estate
of her mother and father. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for relief alleging the
absence of vendors and vendee’s signature in the deed of absolute sale. Court of appeals
dismissed the petition citing the answer of Atty. Reyes where he represented that the subject
deed of sale bears the signature of both buyer and seller, and that there was also a final deed of
sale executed on July 5, 1965 bearing the signature of buyer and seller. He stated further that
the original of the two documents were filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila. The
disbarment was based on the alleged false statement made by respondent in pleadings filed
where he stated that the original documents of the deeds of sale were filed with Register of
Deeds in Manila, when in truth what he filed was only a certified true copy thereof.  In the
disbarment proceeding, respondent in his answer stated that he had the original of the same
deed and that he did not file the same with Register of Deed Manila. What he did file according
to him was a certified true copy which he attached to the adverse claim he filed there with.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent be disbarred for violating the attorney’s oath.

RULING:
NO. The respondent’s conduct is a careless and reckless behavior in making inaccurate
or untruthful statements before the Court of Appeals as well as before the office of Solicitor
General, among others. As it does not appear that substantial prejudice has been actually
caused the complainant or the forum to whom the statements have been addressed, the truth
or falsity of the statement or representation in question being irrelevant in the resolution of the
cases at hand, the same does not justify disbarment. Respondent is reprimanded for being
reckless in making statement of fact in his pleadings and admonished that a repetition of such
offense would be dealt with more severely.

Case No. 28
Santos vs Beltran
A.C. 5858
December 11, 2003

FACTS:
Rogelio R. Santos filed an administrative complaint of disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo
C. Beltran on the grounds of gross misconduct and malpractice. It was somehow in November
9, 1999 where the complainant filed a verified complaint against the respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline alleging that when respondent
notarized the subject Deed of Donation, his siblings did not personally appear before him.
Complainant further said that his siblings signed the Deed of Donation not in the law office of
the respondent but in their houses at Villa Benita Subdivision, it has been said that respondent
disregard Article 904 of the Civil Code which said that an alien cannot own real properties in the
Philippines, which refers to the siblings of the complainant who are already an American
citizens. Alleging further that the respondent appeared as private investigator for falsification of
public document and that respondent represented a conflicting interest when he entered his
appearance as defense counsel in an ejectment case of his former client Erlinda Santos-
Crawford. Respondent denied all the allegations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Beltran be disbarred.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Rodolfo Beltran from the practice of law
for a period of one year effective immediately for being guilty of representing conflicting
interests and is sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt more severely. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. There is a conflict of interest when a
lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or
not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.
 Case No. 22
Pedro Oparel, Sr. vs Atty. Dominador Abaria
A.C. No. 959
July 30, 1971
FACTS:
Complainant Pedro Oparel, who allegedly claimed that he was a pauper, filed a
complaint against Dominador Abaria, a member of the Philippine Bar, for the reason that the
respondent acted with dishonesty in handling the case of complainant regarding for the
recovery of damages from his employer for the injuries he suffered. Oparel complained that he
only received the amount of P500.00 while Atty. Abaria got the larger amount of P5,000.00. The
respondent answered to his complaint and he admitted that he received the alleged sum of
P5,000.00 by stating that P3,500.00 was spent by the employer for plaintiffs operation and
medical bills, another P1,000.00 for his family during his confinement in the hospital and then
the P500 received in cash by way of additional settlement. Respondent then prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent acted with dishonesty in handling the case of the
complainant?
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court said that it was just a misunderstanding between him and his
client since the client happens to be poor and unlettered, seeking to enforce what he considers
his just demands against an employer, it is even more imperative that matters be explained to
him with all precision and clarity. The Supreme Court said that he should not invite loss of trust
by inadvertence or even by failure to use the simplest and most understandable language in
communicating matters. For he may lend himself to the suspicion that he is lacking in candor
and may be taking undue advantage of his client for his own profit and advantage in any dealing
with the adverse party. Hence, the administrative case that was filed against Abaria is
dismissed.

Case No. 23
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.
B.M. No. 810
 January 27, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas recently passed the 1996 BAR Examination but he was not
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath because he was under probation due to his previous
conviction for the crime Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide for his participation in the
initiation rites of the LEX TALLONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the San Beda College of Law,
which resulted to the death of the neophyte Raul I. Camaligan due to the personal violence
inflicted upon him. Cuevas was discharged from the probation on May 16, 1995 and then filed a
petition that he be allowed to take lawyer’s oath at the court’s most convenient time. The
Court then requires the comment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, the father of the deceased
before acting on petitioner’s application. The father of the deceased then said that he has
already forgiven the petitioner in the criminal case for the death of his son and he now let the
Hon. Court decide on the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is morally fit to be admitted to the noble profession of
the law and be allowed to take lawyer’s oath?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. is discharge from
probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions therefore and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has
taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the
unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating. Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the lawyer’s oath is not a mere
formality recited but a conduct to himself to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a lawyer, he will now be in better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society. Accordingly, the Court hereby
resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath and to sign the Roll
of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court.

Case No. 24
Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic, Inc.
 B.M. 553
June 17, 1993

FACTS:
The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales in 1984 with an aim to move
toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.
Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s
advertisements which contain the following:

 Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE.ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT.VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce.Annulment of Marriage.Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &

Special Retiree's Visa.Declaration of Absence.Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees.Adoption.Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.  Tel. 521-
7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is
even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors
and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the
US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
RULING: 
YES. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation
to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law.  Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar and  who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use
only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards
of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods.  Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to
promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which
their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right
and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.  The Supreme Court also enumerated the
following as allowed forms of advertisement as enumerated: Advertisement in a reputable law
list, use of ordinary simple professional card and listing in a phone directory but without
designation as to his specialization.

Case No. 25
Tolosa vs Cargo
A.M. No. 2385
March 8, 1989
FACTS:

Complainant filed a disbarment case towards respondent claiming immorality. Alleging

further that Atty. Alfredo Cargo has been seeing the wife of the complainant and is having an
affair, his wife even left their conjugal home to live and rent in a place paid by the respondent.

Several issues were also raised alleging immorality and altercations between the complainant
and the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Cargo be disbarred.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of the Solicitor General in not
finding the respondent guilty of immorality due to lack of sufficient evidence. However, the
court ruled further to warn Atty. Alfredo Cargo and reprimand him of conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court.
 Case No. 26
Aguirre vs Rana
B.M. 1036
June 10, 2003

FACTS:
Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign
the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an
election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate
before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he
only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was
tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of
the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as
counsel for the candidate. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is fit for admission to the bar?

RULING:
NO. The court held that respondent did engage in unauthorized practice of law. It held
that all the activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the
fact that he is not yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege
extended to those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict
regulation, one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds
respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already
took his oath, he was denied for admission to the bar. 

Case No. 27
Monson vs Reyes
A.C. 1056
October 27, 1975
 
FACTS:
Complainant Saturnino S. Monzon charged the respondent Atty. Arsenio Reyes with:
violation of lawyers oath in that the lawyer shall do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in court, and corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without
proper authority. The antecedent facts of this case is based on Monzon vs CFI, Manila CA-GR.
No. 42375. Accordingly, an intestate proceeding with CFI Manila was filed by Catalino C. Fausto,
surviving spouse of Ramona Rono who died on July 31, 1962. The decedent left 5 heirs, her
husband, Catalino and 4 children. On March 1, 1965, CatalinoFausto executed a deed of
absolute sale whereby he sold unto Gertrudes Francisco his ½ share, interest, and participation
on two parcel of land in the estate of Ramona Rono for P 65,000.00. The thermos fax copy of
the deed of sale which was ratified before the Notary Pubic Arsenio Reyes does not bear the
signature of the vendor and the vendee but the same bears the signatures of the 2 witness
thereto. Atty. Reyes filed a petition with the probate court for the approval of the said deed of
sale which was given due course on February 18, 1966. However, pending that petition Mr.
Fausto died on October 10, 1965. His second wife filed an intestate proceedings to settle the
estate of fausto, with the herein defendant as her counsel. On October 7, 1967, Fe Fausto-
Monzon, one of the children and heirs of spouses Ramona and Catalino also died and her
surviving spouse, the complainant was appointed to substitute for her in both intestate estate
of her mother and father. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petitionfor relief alleging the
absence of vendors and vendee’s signature in the deed of absolute sale. Court of appeals
dismissed the petition citing the answer of Atty. Reyes where he represented that the subject
deed of sale bears the signature of both buyer and seller, and that there was also a final deed of
sale executed on July 5, 1965 bearing the signature of buyer and seller. He stated further that
the original of the two documents were filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila. The
disbarment was based on the alleged false statement made by respondent in pleadings filed
where he stated that the original documents of the deeds of sale were filed with Register of
Deeds in Manila, when in truth what he filed was only a certified true copy thereof.  In the
disbarment proceeding, respondent in his answer stated that he had the original of the same
deed and that he did not file the same with Register of Deed Manila. What he did file according
to him was a certified true copy which he attached to the adverse claim he filed there with.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent be disbarred for violating the attorney’s oath.

RULING:
NO. The respondent’s conduct is a careless and reckless behavior in making inaccurate
or untruthful statements before the Court of Appeals as well as before the office of Solicitor
General, among others. As it does not appear that substantial prejudice has been actually
caused the complainant or the forum to whom the statements have been addressed, the truth
or falsity of the statement or representation in question being irrelevant in the resolution of the
cases at hand, the same does not justify disbarment. Respondent is reprimanded for being
reckless in making statement of fact in his pleadings and admonished that a repetition of such
offense would be dealt with more severely.

Case No. 28
Santos vs Beltran
A.C. 5858
December 11, 2003

FACTS:
Rogelio R. Santos filed an administrative complaint of disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo
C. Beltran on the grounds of gross misconduct and malpractice. It was somehow in November
9, 1999 where the complainant filed a verified complaint against the respondent before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline alleging that when respondent
notarized the subject Deed of Donation, his siblings did not personally appear before him.
Complainant further said that his siblings signed the Deed of Donation not in the law office of
the respondent but in their houses at Villa Benita Subdivision, it has been said that respondent
disregard Article 904 of the Civil Code which said that an alien cannot own real properties in the
Philippines, which refers to the siblings of the complainant who are already an American
citizens. Alleging further that the respondent appeared as private investigator for falsification of
public document and that respondent represented a conflicting interest when he entered his
appearance as defense counsel in an ejectment case of his former client Erlinda Santos-
Crawford. Respondent denied all the allegations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Beltran be disbarred.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Rodolfo Beltran from the practice of law
for a period of one year effective immediately for being guilty of representing conflicting
interests and is sternly warned that a commission of the same or similar act in the future will be
dealt more severely. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. There is a conflict of interest when a
lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or
not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has
been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.
UY VS GONZALES
AC 5280
MARCH 30, 2004

FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances
surrounding the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and
submitted to him a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a
certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after
reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later
that instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a
letter-complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public
Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer
certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to
have filed.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is
withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the
petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that
there was no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the
letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in
the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office
of the Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

RULING:
No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his
personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance
of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was no
attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the
proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in
his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased
son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant,
which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in
any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint
against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
To hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to
protect his personal or proprietary interests.

PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.

GAMILLA VS ATTY EDUARDO MARINO

AC 4763
MARCH 20, 2004

FACTS:
Atty. Eduardo Mario Jr.
was the president of UST faculty union. In 1988 they had a collective bargaining agreement for
the management of the Php 35million economic benefits to the members of the faculty union.
The said collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 however, the respondent failed to
come up with a new agreement which resulted to the termination of 16 employees including
respondent Atty. Eduardo Marino. In 1990 the secretary of labor made a five year contract
between the UST and the terminated employees providing their reinstatement and a
compromise agreement providing the payment of php 7 million with the reinstatement. However,
records show that only php5 million was only given. The UST and the union arranged an
agreement for the salary increase and benefits for a total of 42 million. From the last agreement,
the UST took care of the disbursment of the 20million from the 42 million agreed amount.
Complainants questioned the lack of transparency among the leaders and directors of the union
in the disbursement processes since they have not revived the agreed amount. The
complainants filed for the disbarment of Atty. Mario and accusing him of compromising the
entitlements under the memorandum of agreement without the knowledge of the members of
the union, failing to account the 7million, lack of transparency and the refusal to remit the money
to the union.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Eduardo Marino can be disbarred.

RULING:
He is hereby reprimanded for his misconduct with a warning that a more drastic punsihment will
be imposed on him upon the repitition of the act. The law punishing an attorney is confined in
the failure to serve justice and being unable to shelter the judiciary, in the case at bar, Atty.
Eduardo must only be reprimanded for his misconduct and such punishment is enough and he
is reminded of his actions to be in accordance with that of a member of the bar.
BOLIVAR VS SIMBOL
AC 377
APRIL 29, 1966

FACTS:
Concepcion Bolivar lived and financially supported respondent Simbol of his studies in law
school with the promise that he would marry her after finishing his studies. However, after
Simbol graduated law, he secretly married another woman without the knowledge of Bolivar.
When Miss Bolivar had this to her knowledge, Atty. Simbol still asked her to continue assisting
him financially and continue their relationship. Miss Bolivar filed a civil case against him but did
not prosper since they had a compromise agreement for it. But the Solicitor General filed for the
disbarment of Atty. Simbol on moral grounds. However, after several notices, the respondent
still failed to appear before the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for the disbarment may prosper.

RULING:
Yes. Since sufficient notices were sent to Atty. Simbol, he still failed to appear and defend his
side. Therefore, the disbarment case against him may prosper on moral grounds. Since he
unjustly enriched himself at the expense of Miss Bolivar. Although he made himself benefited
from the effort of Miss Bolivar and that the complaint was withdrawn, it does not take away the
offensiveness of his actions and constituting a grossly immoral conduct.

ARCIGA VS MANIWANG
AM 1608
AUGUST 4, 1981

FACTS:
In 1970, when Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with Arciga, then a
medical technology student. They started having a sexual relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga
got pregnant. The two then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent about the
pregnancy. They also made Arciga’s parents believe that they were already married but they
would have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams.
Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage license.
In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped communicating with
Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that Maniwang married
another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang’s wife and this irked Maniwang so he inflicted
physical injuries against Arciga.

Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry Arciga
many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because apparently
Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Maniwang should be disbarred.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs
Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga
was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment (though not much discussion was
provided by the ponente as to why). But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state
with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the
straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has
been defined as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”.

IN RE: EDILLON
AM 1928
AUGUST 3, 19778

FACTS:
Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to non-payment of his IBP dues, hence the petitioner on
this case. He claimed that the provisions of Sec. 10 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is
unconstitutional as he is being compelled, as a precondition in maintaining his good standing as
a lawyer, to pay and settle his dues to the IBP. Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take and
refused to admit full competence of the court in this matter. But after some time in realization,
his recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his subsequent communication with the court. He
appealed that his health, advanced age, and concern to his former clients’ welfare be
considered in his prayer so that he can again practice law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the bar.

RULING:
YES. Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure to abide entails loss of
such privilege. Considered in addition was the two (2) years Atty. Edillon was barred to practice
law, and the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban that “the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised in a preservative and not on the
vindictive principle”. After contrition on the part of the petitioner, the court finds reinstatement
in order.

HERNANDEZ VS GO
AC 1526
JANUARY 31, 2005

FACTS:
Complainant engaged respondent’s services, she entrusted to him her land titles and allowed
him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her creditors.
Respondent abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her properties to others but
to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations. Obviously, had he sold the lots to
other buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any
amount from respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Go should be disbarred

RULING:
DISBARRED. “A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.”

Such conduct on the part of respondent degrades not only himself but also the name and honor
of the legal profession. He violated this Court’s mandate that lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealing with their clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.

“A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.”

Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. When it appears that an attorney is no longer
worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right
but also the duty of this Court to withdraw the privilege. Respondent, by his conduct,
blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession.

Public interest requires that an attorney should exert his best efforts and ability to protect the
interests of his clients. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects his client’s cause; he also serves the ends of justice and does honor to the bar and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.

BEL-AIR TRANSIT SERVICE CORP. vs ATTY. ESTEBAN Y. MENDOZA, AC No. 6107

Facts:
On September 19, 2001 and September 28, 2001, respondent Atty. Mendoza rented a
car from the complainant which the terms of the Rental Agreement was personally signed by
the respondent. The statements of account were, thereafter, sent to the respondent at his
office and business address at Martinez & Mendoza Law Office, Cityland Show Tower,
Mandaluyong City. Despite repeated demands for payment, the respondent refused to pay his
account, which constrained the complainant to send a formal and final demand for payment
through counsel. This formal demand was, likewise, ignored by the respondent, further
compelling the complainant to resort to filing a complaint for recovery of money before the
MTC of Makati City, Branch 65.
Despite all allegations, the respondent denied and even averred that it was the law firm
of Martinez & Mendoza which engaged the services of the complainant. Respondent also
alleged that the driver assigned to him by the complainant during the trip did not exercise
extraordinary diligence. They almost figured an accident according to the respondent and
reasoned out that he chose not to report the incident to the complainant thinking that it was
going to be the first and last incident.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of respondent Atty. Mendoza constitute deceit and grossly
immoral and unethical conduct, which violates the Canons of Professional Ethics and Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Ruling:
Yes. The IBP reiterate the decision of the MTC that respondent was liable for the
obligation to the complainant. He cannot avoid the obligation and pass it on to his law firm and
just make a complete denial considering that he is a name partner in the firm and law
partnership of Martinez and Mendoza. There is nothing on record to show that the law firm
questioned the billings of the complainant or that the respondent referred the same to the law
firm for proper disposition.
As to respondent's reason of almost figuring an accident due to the alleged non-
observance of extraordinary diligence by the driver, he admitted that there was no written
demand made for the complainant to account and answer for the said accidents. They find the
absence of a written demand from the respondent quite odd especially in the case of a lawyer
who is seeking to exercise his right to contest complainants questionable billings or otherwise
hold complainant accountable for the said near accidents. It would perhaps understandable if
the omission was made by a layman; but for a lawyer not to put his demand in writing, it would
be uncharacteristic to say the least.
The reason offered by respondent for not paying complainant particularly the alleged
near accident is therefore, not justifiable. They find respondent lacking in probity and
forthrightness in dealing with the complaint and quite simply negligent in the handling of this
particular obligation to complainant. It is settled that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court. A lawyer must at all times, uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. Indeed, a lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, a member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity in the legal profession.
Thus, a lawyer must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must always reflect
the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent Atty. Mendoza is sternly warned that similar conduct in the future shall be
dealt with more severly.
RASMUS ANDERSON, JR. vs ATTY. REYNALDO A. CARDEO, AC No. 3523, January 17, 2005
Facts:
Complainant Rasmus G. Anderson. Jr., and American citizen from Kodiak, Alaska, USA,
filed an action before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), to recover title and
possession of a parcel of land againts the spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario Cerrado, and
Fernando Ramos. The case was dismissed by the trial court, which declared the defendants the
true and lawful owners of their respective portion of the land in question. An appeal was filed
before the CA and the CA rendered a decision. The CA decision was not appealed, and,
thereafter, it was duly entered. Anderson's counsel, Atty. de Guzman filed an Amended
Compliant before the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. 0110-B and it was
during this stage of proceedings that Atty. de Guzman died and Anderson was left without a
counsel to represent his case. Now, through referral by a friend, he engaged the services of the
respondent Atty. Reynaldo Cardeo.
On February 16, 1985, Anderson filed an administrative complaint before the Court
alleging that respondent caused the loss or the adverse ruling against him in the
aforementioned case before the RTC Civil Case No. 0110-B. It was alleged that when there was
Demurrer to Evidence filed, respondent did not file an opposition and did not appear at the
hearing. He did not even file a Motion for Reconsideration when the trial court issued an Order
finding the demurrer meritorious and which caused this Order final and executory. Anderson
even verbally told respondent to withdraw as his counsel but the latter allegedly insisted on
continuing as the case was already in its closing stage.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Cardeo's acts constitute an abused of his client's trust and
confidence and violated his oath as a lawyer in failing to defend his client's cause to the very
end.
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent has indubitably failed to perform an obligation which he owed to
his client. The respondent was guilty of neglect of duty when he allowed three other persons to
take over in the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration and did not even bother to check with
the Court if the same has been filed. This is a violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Ethics, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
particularly, Rule 18.03 thereof which states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. He likewise
breached his duty to the Honorable Supreme Court to report corrupt judges for approriate
disciplinary action with the aim of improving the quality of justice and in helping the people
faith in our judicial system.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his case that once he agreed
to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. A lawyer must also
accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle, otherwise his client's interest will suffer.
It is enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter. He must also
give adequate attention to his legal work. The lawyer owes it to his client to exercise his utmost
learning and ability in handling his case. A license to practice law is a guarantee by the courts to
the public that the license possess sufficient skill, knowledge and diligence to manage his case.
The legal profession demands from a lawyer the vigilance and attention expected of a good
father of a family.
 Atty. Cardeo is found guilty of violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his lawyer's oath. He is suspended from practice of law for 6 months from
notice.
ALEX CUETO vs ATTY. JOSE JIMENEZ, AC No. 5798, January 20, 2005
Facts:
Sometime in October 1999, petitioner engaged the services of respondent as notary
public, the latter being the father of the owner of the building subject of the Construction
Agreement to be notarized. He was then accompanied by a certain Val Rivera, the building
administrator of repondent's son Jose Jimenez.
Respondent demanded P50,000.00 as notarial fee. Despite his surprise as to the cost of
the notarial service, complainant informed respondent that he only had P30,000.00 in cash.
Respondent persuaded complainant to pay P30,000.00 and to issue a check for the remaining
P20,000.00. Complainant paid all his cash and issued a check dated December 28, 1999 for the
balance. Before the maturity date of the check, complainant requested respondent not to
deposit the same for lack of sufficient funds, but still respondent deposited the check which
was consequently dishonored for insufficient funds. Atty. Jimenez lodged a complaint for
violation of BP 22 against Cueto before the City Prosecutors Office in Angeles City and the case
was heared in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Angeles City. In the meantime, Cueto filed also an
administrative complaint against Jimenez and alleged that Jimenez violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Canons of Professional Ethics when he filed the criminal case
against Cueto so he could collect the balance of his notarial fee.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Canons of Professional Ethics when he filed the criminal case against Cueto so he could
collect the balance of his notarial fee.
Ruling:
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent guilty of violating Canon 20,
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional and Responsibility and recommended that Atty. Jose
Jimenez be reprimanded. As to the notarial fee demanded by Atty. Jimenez to the complainant,
as confirmed by the IBP, it is a recognized legal practice in real estate transactions and
construction projects to base the amount of notarial fees on the contract price. Based on the
amount demanded by the respondent, the fee represented only 1% of the contract price of
P5,000,000.00. It cannot be said therefore that respondent notary demanded more than a
reasonable recompense for his service. Canon 20, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that (a) lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Likewise, in Canon 14 of the Canons of Professional Ethics it states that, controversies with
clients concerning with clients concerning compensation are to be avoided by the lawyer so far
as shall be compatible with his self-respect and with his right to receive reasonable recompense
for his service and lawsuits with the clients should be resorted to only prevent injustice,
imposition or fraud. "Although we acknowledge that every lawyer must be paid what is due to
him, he must never resort to judicial action to recover his fees, in a manner that detracts from
the dignity of the profession.
JAYNE YU vs RENATO BONDAL, AC No. 5534, January 17, 2005
Facts:
On March 30, 2000, herein complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel
in five cases (one for Rescission with Damages filed before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, another for Estafa, and three cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 (5).
Complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of P200,000.00 as Acceptance Fee for the
five cases, with an Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per hearing; and in the event that
damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10% thereof as success fee. Complainant
later issued checks in the amount of P30,000.00 and P21,716.54, respectively. Despite receipt
of the said amounts, respondent failed to file a case against Swire Realty and Development
Corp., due to respondent's negligence, the case for Estafa against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon was
dismissed; respondent negligently failed to inform complainant, before she left for abroad, to
leave the necessary documents for purposes of the preliminary investigation of the case filed
against Julie Teh which case was eventually dismissed; and respondent compelled her to settle
the two cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 against Mona Lisa San Juan and Elizabeth Chan Ong
under unfair and un reasonable terms.
Complainant thus demanded from respondent, by letter of June 14, 2001, for the return
of all records she had entrusted him bearing on the subject cases. Respondent did not return
but only the records bearing on the Estafa case against Lourdes Fresnoza Boon and the BP Blg.
22 against Mona Lisa San Juan. Complainant also demanded the refund of the amounts covered
by the above-said two BPI Family Bank Checks amounting to P51,716.54. Respondent failed and
continues to refuse to comply with complainant's valid demands evident bad faith and to her
prejudice, she filed complaint charging him with flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should return the money paid by the complainant.
Ruling:
The only payment given to the complainant is the amount of P51,716.54, then
complainant still owes respondent more, as respondent rendered his legal services in 4 out of
the 5 cases. An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement
which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the
above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of
complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or "magicians" who
can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how
passionate the litigants may feel about their cause. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
Respondent is, however, hereby directed to return all the records in his possession relative to
the cases he handled for complainant.
ATTY. LUIS ARTIAGA vs ATTY. ENRIQUE VILLANUEVA, AM NO. 1892, July 29, 1988
Facts:
This is a complaint that sought the disbarment of Atty. Enrique C. Villanueva for alleged
unethical practice. This complaint for disbarment arose from four separate cases and several
cases with Juliano Estolano, client of complainant Atty. Artiaga, Jr. and Gliceria Aquino and/or
Florentina Guanzon, clients of respondent Atty. Villanueva, as adversaries in all of these cases
involving the same property.
The following are the alleged acts committed by the respondent: (1) Respondent filed a
complaint and amended complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 192 which are clear proofs
that he indeed caused his client Glicerio Aquino to perjure himself as to the date he lost
possession of the subject property so as to place the case within the jurisdiction of the court,
(2) In Civil Case No. 192, respondent's clients were restored to possession of the 2-1/2 hectares
of the untitled portion of subject property by virtue of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
the court on May 21, 1974 upon filing of a property bond by respondent. Upon the dismissal of
the case on January 5, 1977, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was dissolved and
respondent's clients were ordered to restore possession of subject property to complainant's
client Estolano. However, respondent blocked the order by filing an urgent ex-parte motion
seeking clarification as to whether the dispositive portion of the order of January 5, 1977 was
immediately executory and asking the court to allow his clients to remain in the meantime in
the premises. The decision of the CFI came and it became final because respondent failed to
appeal. His clients refused to abide by the Order of Execution issued by the Municipal Court.
When Estolano filed an ex-parte motion asking that the Provincial Sheriff be authorized to
forcibly evict respondent's clients. On the date set for the hearing of the motion, respondent
did not appear and instead filed his "Opposition/Manifestation" informing the court of a
petition for certiorari filed against the presiding judge before the court. (3) respondent filed
another case and was dismissed on the ground of res judicata and prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty with the following unethical practices: That
respondent had caused his client to perjure himself; That he lacks candor and respect toward
his adversary and the courts; and that he had been abusive of the right of recourse to the
courts.
Ruling:
First act - such action of respondent counsel is a clear violation of his oath that "he will
do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court." A legal counsel is of course expected
to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth. The duty of an
attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him,
such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overemphasized. His high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violated his oath of office when he resorted
to deception. Worse, he had caused his client to perjure himself thus subjecting the latter to
criminal prosecution for perjury brought before the Municipal Court of Los Banos, Laguna.
nstead of safeguarding the interests of his client as his responsibility dictates, he did exactly the
opposite by causing his client to commit a felony.
Second act - A lawyer should obey all lawful orders and rulings of the court. He should
have counseled his clients to submit to the order of the court instead of encouraging them to
resist such order. The actuations of respondent of employing dilatory tactics by filing a clearly
frivolous case amounts to obstruction of the administration of justice which constitutes
misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
Third act - The cause of respondent's clients is obviously bereft of merit. Respondent
was aware of this fact so he resorted to forum shopping, continuously seeking the court where
he may possibly obtain favorable judgment, thereby adding to the already clogged dockets of
the courts with the unmeritorious cases he filed. He grossly abused his right of recourse to the
courts by filing multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that had been previously rejected in
the false hope of getting some favorable action, somehow, thus, obstructing the administration
of justice. He was derelict in his duty as counsel to maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appears to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law. 12 He had thus prostituted his office at the expense of justice.
The respondent is hereby suspended indefinitely from the practice of law from date of
notice until such time that he can demonstrate to the court that he has rehabilitated himself
and deserves to resume the practice of law.
MARTELINO vs ALEJANDRO, 32 SCRA 106
Facts:
Mayor Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
On August 12, 1969, Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the
general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the
Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of
publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political
purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his
right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.
 Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has
been presented showing that the court-martial 's president's fairness and impartiality have
been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence
in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial
Ruling:
No. The spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but
rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of
Muslim trainees.
If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused
from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a
failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to
postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say
that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the
observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with
due process.
Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners
here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they
might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court -martial
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has
since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated we
believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.