Auten v.

Auten
Highlight Text
New York
Case Summary
In Auten v. Auten (308 NY 155, 160-161) the Court of Appeals developed a "center of gravity" or
"grouping of contacts" approach which gave controlling effect to the law of the state that has "the most
significant relationship to the transaction and the parties" (see, Restatement [Second] of Conflict of
Laws 188 [1]).

In addition to the traditional determinative factor of the place of contracting, the places of negotiation
and performance, the location of the subject matter, and the domicile or place of business of the
contracting parties are also to be considered (see, Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws 188 [2]).

Aznar vs Garcia
Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and
consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period
of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural
daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be
applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable,
that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under
Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16
(2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law
of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said
in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if there is no law to
the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its
owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be
followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions
that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.

Aznar v. Garcia
Facts
Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen from California and domiciled in the Philippines, left a will
executed in the Philippines in which he bequeathed Php 3,600.00 to Maria Helen Christensen ("Helen")
and the remainder of his estate to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney. The laws of California
allows the testator to dispose of his estate in any manner he pleases. However, California law also
provides that the personal property of a person is governed by the laws of his domicile. The executor,
Adolfo C. Aznar, drew a project of partition in conformity with the will. Helen opposed the project of
partition arguing that Philippine laws govern the distribution of the estate and manner proposed in the
project deprived her of her legitime.

Issue
Whether or not the succession is governed by Philippine laws.

Held
Yes. Philippine law governs.

Ratio
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the intrinsic validity of testamentary dispositions are governed
by the national law of the decedent, in this case, California law. The provision in the laws of California
giving a testator absolute freedom in disposing of his estate is the internal law which applies only to
persons domiciled within the said estate. On the other hand, the provision in the laws of California
stating that personal property is governed by the laws of the domicile of its owner is the conflict of laws
rule that applies to persons not domicile in the said state. Accordingly, the laws of the Philippines, in
which the testator is domiciled governs the succession and the regime of legitimes must be respected.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA

G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to
the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his
estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears
to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his
California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
“national law” is used therein.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But
HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

It is argued on executor’s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California,
the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of
the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen’s will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946
should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question
of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent’s domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In
re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the
domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow
the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law
is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

It is argued on appellees’ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause “if there is no law to the contrary in
the place where the property is situated” in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained.

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only
within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
private law of the State of California.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S

BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In his first wife whom he divorced,
he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children.
Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his
Philippine Properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they
should be entitled if Philippine law were to apply.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the sucessional rights of the
illegitimate children.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under the Texas Law,
being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. Further, even if the deceased had given
them share, such would be invalid because the law governing the deceased does not allow such.

Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd
wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.

Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should
be divided in trust in the following order and manner:

a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;

b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate
in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire
bequest therein.

Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies
of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project
partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.

Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition
to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate
children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.

RULING:
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.

Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitioner

vs. VENICIO ESCOLIN, ET AL., respondent
56 S 266

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at
the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions, she had made
a will in favor of her husband. A question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter
at the precise moment of her death (for while one group, contended that Texan Law should result to
renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Texas law should apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that what the Texas law contains at the time of Jane Hodges’ death is a
question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. At the
time of her death, Texas law governs, thus, it would be the law to be applied (and not said law at any
other time).

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin

G.R. Nos. L-27936 and L-27937, 29 March 1974, 56 SCRA 266

FACTS:

Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in 1952.
Unfortunately, she passed away in 1957 while she was domiciled in Iloilo City.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie, however, also
stated in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and
sister.

In 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled in the Philippines).
While the probate proceeding on the will of Linnie was pending, Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of
Charles, filed a motion before the probate court so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as
the administratrix of the estate. The latter was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were
alive.

Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’
office. Hence, in the meantime, he would like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. The said
motion was approved by Judge Venicio Escolin.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition.

Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother
and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected.

Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death (an alien testator); that under
Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas
law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled
outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE:

WON Texas Law should apply.

HELD:

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court since both parties failed to adduce proof
as to the law of Texas.

The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved
by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court further emphasized
that Texas law is the applicable law at the time of Linnie’s death.

Wolton vs Arabian

Facts.
Walton (Plaintiff), a resident of Arkansas, was traveling by car in Saudi Arabia when he was struck by a
truck owned and operated by Arabian American Oil (Defendant), a Delaware corporation. Walton
(Plaintiff) brought suit in federal district court in New York. At trial, Plaintiff did not plead or offer to
prove Arabian “law” on torts. Neither did Arabian American (Defendant). The trial judge
refused to take judicial notice of Arabian ⠀œlaw⠀ on his own motion and refused dismissal of the
suit.

Issue
May a court decide a tort suit, based on an injury sustained in a foreign country, based on the law of the
forum, where neither party pleads or proves the applicable foreign law?

Held
(Frank, J.) No. A court may not decide a tort suit, based on an injury sustained in a foreign country,
based on the law of the forum, where neither party pleads or proves the applicable foreign law. Since
this case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction, the New York conflict of laws rule is applicable and it
holds that the law of the place of the tort is controlling. While New York procedures allow a judge to
take judicial notice of foreign law even though neither party proves it, the judge would be abusing his
discretion if he were to take notice of a foreign system of laws unfamiliar to our own. Walton (Plaintiff)
claims that the facts of the incident establish liability under the most ⠀œrudimentary⠀ principle of
tort law. But there can be no ⠀œrudimentary⠀ elements of negligence in the sense they are
universally recognized and without proof of Saudi law no decision should have been rendered. New
York law requires the plaintiff to go forward to establish the foreign law, which he intentionally failed to
do. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Saudi Arabia has no system of laws and that these types of claims are
decided at the whim of a dictatorial monarch. The claim that a foreign country is uncivilized or has no
system of laws that a civilized country would recognize as adequate must be supported by substantial
proof before it will be accepted. The majority of the court feels that since Walton (Plaintiff)
deliberately refused to prove Saudi law, his complaint should be dismissed. Affirmed.

Discussion
Historically, the presumption was that courts did not know foreign law and if a party wanted to rely on
foreign law, the party must prove it as an issue of fact to the jury. In modern days, the tendency is to
view the recognition of foreign law as an issue for the judge.

Pennoyer v. Neff
Facts:
Marcus Neff ("Neff"), a resident of California, hired John H. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), an Oregon lawyer.
Mitchell subsequently sued Neff before a state court in Oregon to collect $300.00 in unpaid attorney's
fees. Summons were served upon Neff by publication in an Oregon newspaper. Neff failed to appear in
court to defend his interests. Consequently, the court rendered a default judgment against Neff. At the
time the judgment was rendered, Neff did not own any property in Oregon. However, he was eventually
granted a landholding in the said state. To satisfy the judgment, the court ordered the seizure and
auction of the landholding owned by Neff. Sylvester Pennoyer won in the auction. Neff then instituted
an action to recover his property before a federal court in Oregon on the ground that the state court did
not acquire jurisdiction over him.

Issue:
Whether or not the state court acquired jurisdiction over Neff.
Held:
No. Since the suit is one in personam, the service of summons upon the defendant through publication
is not enough for the state court to acquire jurisdiction over him. Moreover, the defendant's property
must have been brought under court custody at the commencement of the suit.

Ratio Decidendi:
In rem and in personam suits distinguished; Substituted service by publication ineffective in actions in
personam. Substituted service by publication is valid only in suits which are in rem in character, or those
actions in which the jurisdiction pertains to the property. However, in suits which are in personam, or
those actions which seek to determine only the personal rights and obligations of the defendant,
substituted service by publication is ineffectual for any purpose. Legal processes within one state cannot
be effective in another state. Neither service by publication within the state nor extra-territorial service
will cure this.
Jurisdiction over a non-resident dependent on the presence of his or her property within the forum
state. A state does not have jurisdiction over a non-resident who does not have any property within its
territorial jurisdiction since the court's jurisdiction over the defendant is only incidental to its jurisdiction
over the property. Hence, for a suit against a non-resident to prosper, he or she must have property
within the forum state which must brought under the control of the court at the beginning of the suit.
Otherwise, the judgment is void and cannot be rendered valid thought the subsequent acquisition of
property within the forum state by the defendant. Furthermore, if the n0n-resident's property is not
immediately seized, the defendant could easily frustrate the suit by disposing of the said property.

Case Summary of Pennoyer v. Neff:

An attorney, Mitchell, sued Neff in Oregon state court. Neff did not live in Oregon. Mitchell served
notice of the suit by publication, not by personal service.
Once Mitchell received a default judgment against Neff, Mitchell sold property Neff owned in Oregon to
Pennoyer to satisfy the judgment.
Neff sued Pennoyer over the land and won in federal circuit court.
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Mitchell’s judgment and the subsequent land sale were invalid
because he did not personally serve the non-resident Neff.
Pennoyer v. Neff Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:

In 1866, an Oregon attorney named John Mitchell sued his client, Marcus Neff, in Oregon state court for
unpaid legal fees. Neff was not a resident of Oregon. Mitchell did not personally serve Neff with notice
of the suit. Rather, Mitchell published notice of the suit in an Oregon newspaper pursuant to Oregon
law. Neff did not respond, and a default judgment was entered in Mitchell’s favor.

Following the judgment, Neff obtained a tract of land in Oregon worth approximately $15,000. Mitchell
attached that land in order to satisfy his judgment against Neff. Mitchell then sold that land at an
auction to Sylvester Pennoyer. Neff later sued Pennoyer for the land in federal court.

Procedural History:

Neff won in federal court. Pennoyer appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue and Holding:

Can a state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident when the service of process was
effectuated only by publication in a newspaper, not by personal service? No.

Judgment:

The federal court’s decision in favor of Neff was affirmed.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

A state court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the non-resident is (i) personally
served with process while in the state, or (ii) has property in the state and that property is attached
before the lawsuit begins.

Reasoning:

A lawsuit against a person must be effectuated by personal service if that person resides outside the
state where the lawsuit was filed.
A state has exclusive jurisdiction over people and property within the state’s borders. Conversely, a
state does not have jurisdiction over people or property outside its borders. Accordingly, a lawsuit
against a person who is a non-resident must be served personally. Service by publication is insufficient.

Here, Mitchell’s initial lawsuit against Neff was invalid because Neff (a non-resident) was not personally
served. The subsequent sale of Neff’s property to Pennoyer was similarly invalid. The Court, therefore,
affirmed the federal court’s decision in favor of Neff.

A lawsuit against property, even where the property owner is a non-resident, can be effectuated with
service by publication.
The Court found that the case may have been different if Mitchell filed his lawsuit against Neff’s in-state
property at the beginning of the litigation. Because a state has jurisdiction over property within its
borders, the Court recognized that service by publication would be sufficient notice for a suit against in-
state property owned by a non-resident. Notice by publication is sufficient in such an action because
property is always in possession of the owner. Thus, any legal challenge to the property will inform its
owner (regardless of place of residence) of the existence of a legal action against him.

Dissenting Opinion (Hunt):

The Court requires personal service for a suit against a person who is a non-resident. That holding
renders invalid Oregon’s law regarding service of process. Oregon’s law should stand because, similar to
other state statutes, service by publication is reasonable means of notifying a litigant of a lawsuit.

Significance:

Pennoyer v. Neff is significant because it distinguishes between lawsuits against a person (in personam
suits) and lawsuits against property (in rem suits). It found that Oregon’s court did not have in
personam jurisdiction over Neff absent personal service. However, it also notes that a state does have
in rem jurisdiction over property within its borders even if the property owner is a non-resident.
IDONAH PERKINS vs. ROXAS ET AL.
GRN 47517, June 27, 1941

FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed a complaint in the CFI- Manila against the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of a sum consisting of dividends which have been
declared and made payable on shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being
withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares
to the exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by way of defense that the withholding of plaintiff’s
right to the disposal and control of the shares was due to certain demands made with respect to said
shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins, and by one Engelhard.

Eugene Perkins included in his modified complaint as parties defendants petitioner, Idonah Perkins, and
Engelhard. Eugene Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins and H. Engelhard be adjudged without
interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Summons
by publication were served upon the nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. Engelhard
filed his answer. Petitioner filed her answer with a crosscomplaint in which she sets up a judgment
allegedly obtained by her against respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the State of New York,
wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the
shares of stock in question with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company.

Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that “the court has no jurisdiction of the subject
of the action,” because the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York is res judicata.
Petitioner’s demurrer was overruled, thus this petition.

ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the SC of New York and which
is claimed by her to be res judicata on all questions raised by the respondent, Eugene Perkins, the local
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief
sought, and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and is to be sought
for in general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred. In the present case, the amended
complaint filed by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls for the adjudication of title to certain
shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs,
which fall within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is empowered to
adjudicate the several demands contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.

Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated
Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New York and asked the court
below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a
form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules
of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to adjudicate, settle and
determine.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the respondent judge may render judgment “annulling the final,
subsisting, valid judgment rendered and entered in this petitioner’s favor by the courts of the State of
New York, which decision is res judicata on all the questions constituting the subject matter of civil case”
and argues on the assumption that the respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the cause. Whether or not the respondent judge in the course of the proceedings will give validity and
efficacy to the New York judgment set up by the petitioner in her cross-complaint is a question that goes
to the merits of the controversy and relates to the rights of the parties as between each other, and not
to the jurisdiction or power of the court. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power
to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is
erroneous, its judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the
petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise by that court and the rightful exercise of
its jurisdiction.

Petition denied.