Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ww DANO-L10 19 July 1972 aot UG Cote MEMORANDUM THRU: -CHIEF,~ SECURITY OPERATIONS DIVISION, 0 FOR: DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS SUBJECT: Urban Insurgency 1, Introduction, 4. In your 10 Jul 72 memorandum to me, subject: “Project for Active Duty Training," you directed me: (1) To determine what changes, if any, are necessary in US Army doctrine respecting urban insurgency, and (2) To outline a study effort to effect appropriate changes. bi I have conferred with the individuals Listed in your memorandum, have reviewed thé selected references and study work similarly recommended, and have held informal discussions with knowledgeable CIA associates. c, The short answers to the two tasks listed above are: (1) Existing US Army doctrine respecting insurgency is sound; it needs to be supplemented by detailed doctrinal stagements particularized for the urban situation, and by tactical principles to provide guidance for the conduct of operations to identify, prevent and counter urban insurgency. (2) The above task can best be performed by the creation, in the FM Sl-series, of an authoritative text. This effort can be successfully undertaken by in-house Army assets pursuing allocated sub-taske as suggested hereinafter. . 2, Discussion. a. Basic US Army doctrine pertinent to urban insurgency is contained in © FH 100-20, "Field Service Regulations: Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)," May 1967. Although dated in sone respects (revisions needed aremainly those to update changes over the past five years in US organization - Chapter 5 - and in national policy - the Nixon Doctrine), FA 100-20 remains entirely valid in its general statements of overall policy and broad doctrine, viz ¢ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 5 , w w~ ~ (1) "Strengthening of police agencies, the first line of defense, and reorientation or increased emphasis on certain basic police control techniques to diminish the insurgent threat, are prerequisite to the conduct of successful government operations..." (3-7b) (2) “the police should be expanded and reorganized as required to support « the increased populace and resources control effort, the intelligence ! effort, and restoration of law and order to planned priority areas Paramilitary forces may be organized or expanded to supplement the police or regular military forces.” (3-8b) (3) "CIA 1s responsibleSicother activities as directed." (5-2b) plans and implements programs...to maximize the capability (S-4b) G)_ "arp, of civil police. (5) "DOD develops friendly paramilitary or police forces...or strengthens existing organizations.” (5-6) (6) "DOD...develops military doctrine for stability operation: (5-6e) (7) "Specific: responsi bility of the Army in stability operations: develop...the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques, and equipment to be used...." (6-26) . (8) "The Army...supports AID through direct Liaison at national and field level. Army personnel support AID operations by administering the aspects of the MAP program that bearay..military and paramilitary, police activity." (6-3g) : (9) “US support of civil police forces normally will be accomplished through AID, Paramilitary police forces may be supported through MAP." (6-7e) | ("AID has primary responsibility for coordinating US suppdrt to | civil and some paramtlitary police. DOD also provides training, when ! appropriate, for paramilitary and.military forces which support police i operations." (6-11¢) i (11) "Local and regional police are used to assist in establishing and maintaining order in urban areas." (7-6e) b. Necessarily broad, these and similar doctrines set forth in FM 100-20 do not particularize the urban situation, the only specific allusion to which is contained in the passage quoted in (11) above. Nevertheless, FM 100-20 constitutes a sufficient broad framework for development of detailed doctrine, and indeed invites such development in the passages quoted in (6) and (7) above. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 - CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 ClA-RDP8S.00671000300290003-7 . ~ ~ ~ ee There have been at least two abortive attempts in recent years fo produce authoritative doctrine on urban insurgency. One, described tn Jour memorandum, attempted the external research route, which was deemed ; Ynappropriate. The other, launched in 1968, attempted to have USACDC : seeetspea single FM on the subject. This latter effort has had a pathetically {nconelusive history. A year wae first consumed in approving a USACDG seecter-proposal that specified existing M's be revised, rather than treating a schon facurgeney in a separate FH. Three more years have now elapsed and weno of the proposed revisions have yet been published. A June 72 "Final ' Deaft Manuseript"of FM 31-23, incorporating some agreed changes does exist, bot "does not reflect final approval of DA." Nor does it cover much of f the material outlined in the original CDC proposal. i 4. Tt is ny firm opinion that the initial DCSOPS concept of a single FA devoted to urban insurgency was sound. I feel ODCSOPS erred in its 4 gun 69 acceptance of USACDC's alternative, and specifically that the following ODCSOPS comment was in error: ' “pye to the relevancy of urban warfare doctrine for counterguerrilla and stability operations, and for combat in fortified and built-up areas, de de felt that the multiple manual approach would provide a broader exposure of the desired doctrine and facilitate its availability to user! ‘This formula assumes two errors. It accepts the notion that the single FM and the multiple approach are mutually exclusive, which they of course are fot. It also adopts the phrase urban warfare, as substituted by USACDC for the initial charge to get on with urban insurgency, and thus sets the tone for all which followed, in which process the problem became diffused : into the whole field of combat in towns. e. It is now time to return tothe original 1968 proposition. If, meanwhile, USACDC ever does get around to inserting urban insurgency matters {ato other related F¥s, all to the good. But a separate integral manual on urban insurgency 16 every bit as needed now as it ever has been, and should be produced forthwith. £. There is ao lack of pertinent material. In fact the problem | de rather one of culling the available literature to extract the best. A good start in this direction has been made: | (1) “Gurrent Urban Guerrilla Tactics: . A.Bibliography," Francis M. Watson, Jr. (CRESS/CINFAC), Sep 1970. (2) “Army Doctrine on Urban Counterinsyrgency," a May 72 Active Duty training Froject by MOBDES VAJ Sellers, with Anx A, "Collected References ‘and Comments as to Relevance to Urban Counterinsurgency Doctrine." 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 7 . ~ ~ a (3) “A Selected Annotated Bibliography on Urban Low-Intensity Conflict," Battelle, 12 Jan 72 (C)+ causative factors. : g- What is more difficult to come by is source material on the Arny's role in countering urban insurgency. Available reports on the Vietnam Orban aspects of TET 68 and "MINI-TET" (May 68) should be reviewed. Army contributions to PHOENIX, with special reference to PHOENIX in the major Vietnam cities, should also be culled. The POL's worked up at USARSA for the Seminar on Urban Watfare (0-7) and the old Irregular Warfare Orientation Course (06-A) offer leads to preventive measures. hh. What te most difficult of all is to achieve AID and CIA input designed to flesh out the generalized statements in FM 100-20 such as those quotes in 2a (3) and (4) above. Here it would seem desirable to seek drafting seeistance from those two agencies, perhaps best done after all other sections of the new FM have been drafted and are available. i 4. A word should be said at this point about the real, or at least alledged sensitivity of this subject. Concern that the Aray's interest thereia would be misconstrued asa domestic concern seems to have conditioned the 1970 turn-down of the proposal to contract out a study of the problem and is probably still a factor. Whether or not such concern is justified, the Hecision was all to the good, for yet another "study" would probably not ; have filled the bill. The production of an FM would,even if it were classified "Confidential," and 1 meaningful input from CIA is to be obtained, {it will probably be necessary to resort to classification anyway. So for both purposes, protection from domestic outcry and inclusion of somewhat sensitive information, it is prudent to think in terms of a classified FM, in order to get on with a meaningful production. J. Another word 1e in order on nomenclature. It has been noted above that the phrase-turn from “urban insurgency" to "urban warfare" badly side tracked the first Fi proposal. Wow that "IDADYhas become a term of art, it might be weil to think of the new FMS title as a take~off from FM 31-22, "Internal Defense/Development Operations, US Army Doctrine." Perhaps what we are striving for could be entitled: (C) FM 31-224, "Internal Defense/Development Operations ~ Urban Areas” (UJ). On the other hand if FM 31-23, "Stability Operations - US Army Doctrine” even achieves DA approval, it would supersede FM 31622, 12 Nov 63 and (8) FA 31-22A, 22 Nov 63. Alternatively, a supplement to FA i 31-16, "Counterguerrilla Operations," could be produced as (C) FM 31-16h, “Counterguerrilla Operations ~ Urban Areas Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 \Declassified in Part’- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : ClA-RDP85-0067 1R000300290003-7 ' w~ - w~ 3. Study Effort and Allocation of Sub-Tasks. a. On-going Efforts (1) ARPA 4s grinding out a study of "Military Operations in Built up Areas," originated 1 Oct 71. This title etiphemistically covers some material on urban insurgency,and hence the effort should be kept under review for whatever use can be made of the relevant materials it generates. But it will be long in gestation, will be somewhat broad brush and theoretical in content, and (most importantly) will lack the authenticity implicit in an approved FM. It should not therefore, be viewed as an answer to the problem. (2) AIR has produced some police studies (typical is a May 72 pamphlet on the police of India, Guatamala, Bolivia and Thatland).which should be reviewed for possible relevance to the required FM. AIR also made @ presenta~ tion to the recent MORS Symposium's panel on urban insurgency. The results of that panel's effort should shortly be available to JCS J3 DOCSA (COL Norman or COL Birch), and should be reviewed. (3) Carlisle's Strategic Studies Institute will be assigning a 2/4 man team to a project "Service Roles in Providing Assistance to Allies Under the Nixon Doctrine" in December. This effort may be a vehicle for additional broad-brush treatment of urban insurgency. (4) Individual authors continue to produce works bearing on the problem. One such, better than most, is "Urban Guerrillas, the New Face of Political Violence," by Robert Moss (Loddon: Temple Smith, 1972). Such productions should be reviewed while the FM is in process to assure inclusion of up-to-date information and example! b. Proposed Study Effort. Since none of the above ongoing efforts bids fair to solve the need an in-house DA effort is proposed, with allocation of sub-tasks as follows: (1) ODCSOPS MOBDES. A forthcoming MOBDES to IA should be assigned a project for Active Duty training which would require him to: (a) Pull together in one location the full texts of the better works listed in the bibliographies above. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-0067 1R000300280003-7 . ~ w ~ (b) Research available DA histories and accounts bearing upon MACV activities in Vietnam urban areas 1965 to date, with special emphasis on TET and MINI-TET 68. (2) TM Drafting Team. Realizing that 1/0 manpower available to IA is so sufficiently engaged in current business as to prevent undertaking the task of drafting the required FM, it is suggested that a two-man team, consisting of a junior active duty officer at Ft Bragg and a senior retired : officer be formed. The model would be the comparable group which created the FARSEA "Guerrilla Handbook." The materials collected as a result of (1) above should be gathered at Bragg, where the junior member of the team could commence drafting. The contract retiree, available for up to 90 days, could review drafte and improve them on the basis of his experience. : (3) When a semi-finished draft is at hand, IA SO UW could make it available to AID/PSD and CIA for addition of material pertinent to those two agencies. 25X1 (4) The final IA draft could then be vetted through ODCSOPS for forwarding to GDC with an updated version of the initial 1968 request for the prompt completion of a finished FM on urban insurgency. 4, Recommendation, That ‘the above be approved as a method of proceeding to produce an Army Field Manual on Urban Insurgency. Dyn ‘RD, DRATY COL, 'AR-USAR 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ ~~ THE PROBLEM OF URBAN INSURGENCY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY SECTION I; INTRODUCTION 1, Purpose of Study. The study of urban insurgency was undertaken for the following purposes: a. To identify the characteristics of urban insurgency and the military aspects of its containment. b. To determine whether or not revolutionary conflict is shifting from rural guerrilla warfare to urban insurgency. c. To determine whether or not current US Army doctrine will be adequate for coping with urban insurgency. 2, Assumptions and Restraints. The study does not examine the containment of urban insurgency within the US. Nor does it consider the possible conduct of urban insurgency operations by US forces within the context of an unconventional warfare mission, 3. Methodology. The study is based on the examination of revolutionary texts, the analysis of current revolutionary doctrine and a case-study survey of 43 recent examples of urban insurgency, such as Algiers (1956- 59), Montevideo (1963-70) and Belfast (1967-73). Approximately 100 books, articles and films are cited in the bibliography. 4. Organization of Study Results. The study is organized into three sections of three chapters each. Section I deals with revolutionary theory, modern urbanization and current revolutionary doctrine. Section II outlines the organ{zational and operational characteristics of an urban underground. Section III examines US defense policy, identifies the tactical principles necessary for success in urban counterinsurgency operations, and provides solutions to the problems associated with the conduct of such operations. A detailed table of contents 1s provided at Tab A, / / y SECTION II: MAJOR CONCLUSIONS . 1, The Nature of the Problem. The study yields six major conclusions with regard to the problem of urban insurgency: Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ ~ ~~ 4, Because of the rapid urbanization of the modern world and because of the political unrest associated with such urbanization, insurgency within metropolitan areas is likely to increase. Subversive literature currently being circulated throughout the world emphasizes the vulnerability of the urban area. Urban insurgency differs from rural insurgency in its emphasis upon techniques of provocation, It concentrates on tactics which will Provoke overreaction by the government and arouse public opinion against the government. Emphasizing terrorism, it does not rely upon the development and maintenance of large guerrilla bands to achieve revolution. ¢. The impact of media television will have a cructal effect on US public opinion regarding Army involvement in urban cointerinsurgency operations. Because of this impact, and because of the traditions which govern its role in national defense, the Army will be vulnerable to a loss of public support and the consequent erosion of its own stability when tt becomes involved in urban counterinsurgency operations. 5 4, The cities of the US can be seriously affected by urban insurgency occurring within selected foreign cities. Because the major cities of the world are netted technologically in terms of such functions as trade, finance, communications and transportation, the stability of the US is dependent on the stability of these functions within many cities external to its own boundaries, and hence the US itself may be affected indirectly by interference with these functions. e. Because of this technological extension, and because US armed forces are vulnerable to the erosion described above, if dravn into counterinsurgency operations, urban insurgency lends itself to strategic employment against the US, carried out by a third power sponsoring conflict within selected foreign cities under the guise of revolutionary insurgency. f£. US Army tactical doctrine is generally inadequate for urban counterinsurgency operations and could result in an escalation of conflict if employed in such operations. Because it is oriented toward rural guerrilla warfare, this doctrine fails to emphasize the techniques of non-provocation essential for an urban environment. + 2, Responses to the Problen. The study also yields five conclusions with regard to how the Army may respond to the problem of urban insurgency. 4. A separate urban counterinsurgency manual should be prepared. Thie manual would indicate how provocation may be avoided in urban counter- insurgency warfare by the incorporation of certain basic principles (the principles of patience, discrimination and restraint) in tactical doctrine. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Deciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ w~ ad b. A training program should be developed for utilization by US Army personnel prior to engagement in urban counterinsurgency operations as either advisors or unit members. This training would clarity the way in which urban insurgency differs from rural insurgency and would emphasize practical exercises which stress the principles cited above. €. An urban counterinsurgency CPX format should be developed. This CPX would train personnel in the techniques of integrating military action with civic action in an urban environment, and would stress reliance on non-military agencies in the containment and elimination of urban in- surgency. 4. The Army should avoid involvement in the containment of sporadic urban terrorism. Since the containment of such terrorism does not appear to be a proper military mission, other Federal agencies should be employed for this purpose and should be utilized in an advisory assistance role to strengthen foreign police agencies as necessary. e€. Although not directly confronted with domestic problems concerning urban insurgency, the active Arny should develop more effective ways of assisting the National Guard in executing two essentially conflicting missions, i,e,, domestic disturbance and mobilization readine: | SECTION III: OUTLINE OF STUDY 1, Background Considerations. Section I of the study provides a definition of urban insurgency, an examination of the way’ in which the urban environ- ment {¢ susceptible to insurgency, and a survey of how current revolution- ary techniques seek to exploit this vulnerability. a. Urban insurgency is defined as systematic low-intensity aggression i against the technological, economic and political structure of an urbanized | nation, occurring within its own boundaries or within those metropolitan areas to which it is linked via this structure, undertaken for either revolutionary purposes ot for purposes of diverting its military strength. b. The urban environment is shown to be extremely vulnerable to subversion because of its technological complexity and because of the political unrest associated with modern urbanization. It is also shown to be compatible with the sustained conduct of insurgency operations. c. Revolutionary doctrine currently available is shown to advocate terrorism, hijacking, assassination and “propaganda by violence" in the conduct of urban insurgency. Carlos Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla is examined in detail, and is shown to advocate tactics which — e adaptable to both revolutionary urban insurgency and strategically- motivated urban insurgency. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ ~ 2. The Characteristics of Urban Insurgency. Based on case-studies, Section II shows that: 4, The urban underground is usually organized in small, highly compartmentalized cells which operate on a sustained basis without their members departing from normal civilian routine. These cells are readily adapted to the exploitation of larger elements, such as mass protest movements. b. The recruiting, training and logistical procedures employed by an urban insurgency apparatus are extremely efficient within the metro- politan environment. The techniques of ambush, raid and terrorism employed by such an apparatus are all based on the exploitation of the environment 's physical and social characteristics. d, The Battle for Algiers and other case-studies indicate that the principal military problem in coping with urban insurgency is the danger of over-reaction, the use of excessive military force and the consequent escalation of violence. As a result, military action often succeeds in the momentary containment of an insurgency while provoking a mass reaction which will cause resumption of revolt. 3, National Defense Against Urban Insurgency, In Section III, the examination of national defense policy and national tradition indicates that: 4, The Army's role in national defense requires the maintenance of Public support and the accomodation of public opinion. In the execution of the FID program, its involvement in urban counterinsurgency operations calls therefore for the recognition of three traditions which underlie public opinion: the respect for efficiency, the tendency to reduce complex foreign problems to moral issues, and the non-glorification of war. * b. In order to accomodate these attitudes, in order to guard against the revolutionary principle that conventional forces are best destroyed piece-meal by erosion of public support, and in order to guard against the escalation of an insurgent situation, the Army must incorporate in ite counterinsurgency tactical doctrine three princples via which all this may be accomplished: GQ) Patience in the containment and elimination of an insurgent movement, in order to prevent escalation and involvement of US forces beyond the advisory role envisioned in the FID program. (2) Discrimination in target selection within the urban environment, 80 that public opinion 1s not ‘aggravated by counterinsurgency operations. (3) Extreme restraint in the use of firepower and explosives, so that Provocation and escalation of the insurgent situation are avoided to the maximum extent possible. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Deciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ w ~ ¢. To maintain preparedness to cope with urban insurgency as it might occur within a foreign environment, and to maintain a capability of executing those roles it might play within the framework of the FID program, the Army does not need to establish and maintain specially trained units. A more Teasonable response would be those measures indicated in Par 2, Sect II above. | j | i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ Chapter 1, “ ~ CONTENTS SECTION I: BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS 1; Urban Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare... 2+. +++ 2 The Analysis of Urban Insurgency Definitional Problems in the Analysis of Urban Insurgency Revolution and the Dual-Warfare Nature of Modern Conflict The Nature of Subversion From Subversion to Insurgency Rural Guerrilla Warfare as an Aspect of Insurgency A Definition of Urban Insurgency 2: The Urban Complex as an Insurgent Environment... 4+. + + 20 The City in History The Process of Modefa Urbanization The Vulnerability of the Urban Complex Strategic Subversion and the World-City Urban Complex Strategic Principles Bearing Upon Urban Insurgency ‘The Impact of Urbanization Upon Insurgent Warfare Insurgency in a Technological Environment 3: Insurgent Doctrine and Revolutionary Thought... . +... +. 38 Revolutionary Doctrine and Urban Insurgency The History of Revolutionary Doctrine ” Lenin's Concept of Partisan Warfare Revolutionary Insurgency and the Principle of Erosion The Popularization of Revolutionary Doctrine Urban Insurgency and Its Strategic Implementation SECTION IZ: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY 4: Organization of the Urban Underground... 2... + 1 se es 56 The Persistence of the Underground The Objectives of the Underground The Cellular Princple of Underground Organization Communications and Security Within the Urban Underground The Organization of Demonstrations 5: Administration and Operation of the Urban Underground... . . 72 Recruiting Procedures Within the Underground Training Within the Urban Underground / Free Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7’ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ow ~ 3. Logistical Considerations Within the Urban Underground 4. Intelligence Collection Within the Urban Underground 5. Raids, Ambushes and Terrorism in the Urban Environment Chapter 6: Recent Trends in Urban Insurgency... - eee ee ee + 89 1, The Battle for Algiers: Its Background and Development. 2. FLN Operations in the Battle for Algiers 3. French Army Operations Against the FLN 4. The IRA and the Battle for Ireland 5. The Tupamaros and the Battle for Montevideo 6. The Operations of the Black September Organization SECTION III: NATIONAL DEFENSE AGAINST URBAN INSURGENCY Chapter 7: US Defense Policy and the National Tradition, ...... +. -104 . National Policy and Dual-Warfare Preparedness The Army's Role and the National Tradition The National Guard and the Strategic Problem The Military Assistance Program and the FID Program Political Awareness and National Tradition vrene Chapter 8: Political Awareness and Tacticai Doctrine... +. +++ + + +122 The Need for a Separate Doctrine Factors Influencing Political Awareness Tactical Efficiency and the Principle df Patience : Target Selection and the Principle of Discrimination 5. Tactical Violence and the Principle of Restraint 6. Urban Counterinsurgency Tactics and the Principles of War Pere Chapter 9: Problems and Solutions. . 6. eee ee ee ee ee HO 1. The Development of a Separate Urban Counterinsurgency Manual 2. The Need for a Special Program of Instruction 3, Training for Urban Counterinsurgency via the CPK Method 4. The Need to Develop Non-Military Counterterror Capabilities Problems for the Future Bibliography, 6 ee ee ee ee 16 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ w - ‘THE PROBLEM OF URBAN INSURGENCY APRIL 1973 PREPARED BY INTRRNATLONAL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE (RM | | | | i ( _ | | 4 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7,Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ i PREFACE ww The study which follows was initially undertaken as an effort to determine the nature of wban insurgency, with its primary objective boing tho identifi- cation of current trends in revolutionary warfare. . In the boginning, its specific orientation was based on two questions: Is rewlutionary conflict shifting from rural guerrilla warfare to a new and dif- ferent kind of insurgency Kithin the confines of ths metropolitan area? And if 80, what are tte characteristics of this new form of revolutionary action? As the study indicates, the attompt to answor these questions led to the discovery that a far more complicated threat lies hidden in the nature of urban insurgency. This threat is essentially strategic, and not revolutionary. What this means is that for the United Stetes, the perils of urban in- surgoncy are to be identified in two forms: the diversion and erosion of its armed forces, and the crippling of its technology. These thenes are addressed throughout the study. . The study recognizes that domestic disturbances are not the proper con- cern of tho US Army. Indeed, in Chapter Seven this zestraint and tho national traditions which underlie 1 are examined in detail, for they have indirect im- pact upon the way in which the Army may prepare for missions outside the nat- dona boundaries. The study is divided into three sections. In Section I, it examines the nature of revolutionary warfare, the growth of urbanization and the character~ istics of modern rewlutionary doctrine. In Section II, it summarizes the organizational and operational techniques of an illegal urban underground, and sie identifies cortain recent ineidents == particularly the struggles within Meters, Belfast and Montevideo, a0 well as the activities of the Black Sept- ember movement -- as being most indicative of what arban insurgency may amount a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ ~ ~~ to. Section III i devoted to an examination of current US defenso policy, the ways in which the Army may cope with the problems which underlie urban insurgency, and the opectfic actions it may take to prepare itself for an urban counterinsurgency role outside the United States. One of the primary conclusions ect forth in the final section 4s that successful urbm counterinsurgency operations roquire unusual political avare- ness on tho part of tho personnel involved. ‘Exactly how such awareness may be integrated with tactical doctrine is set forth in Chapter Bight. A second major conclusion is that the Army may best prepare for such operations by de= veloping @ separate field manual, by creating special instructional packages, and by vmploying OPX's designed to orient its porsonnel to the comploxities of urban counterineurgency warfare, A third and porhape nore surprising con- clusion is that in order te guard against ite own over-commitment (as well as the threat of erosion) the Army would be well advised to encourage the develop= ment of non-military police forces capable of bearing the burden of the urban insurgency threat. These matters are examinod in Chapter Nino. Source materials are set forth in the bibliography at tho end of the study. The study was completed in April 1973, and was done by COL Seale R. Doss (USAR) and CPT Ronald Hiett (USAR), under the direction of the Security Operations Division, International and Civil Affairs Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, ah Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7 - Chapter le ~ CONTENTS E : ¥ SECTION IT: BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS: 1: Urban Ingurgency and Revolutionary Warfare. . 6 4 1 The Analysis of Urban Insurgency Nefinitioml Problems in the Analysis of Urban Insurgoncy Revolution and the Dual-Warfare Nature of Modern Conflict The Nature of Subversion From Subversion to Insurgency Rural Guerrilla Warfare as an Aspect of Insurgency A Definition of Urban Insurgency 2: The Urban Complex as an Insurgent Enviroment . «. « 20 The City in Mistory The Process of Modern Urbanization Tho Vulnerability of the Urbsn Complex Strategic Subversion and the World-City Urban Complex Strategic Principles Bearing Upon Urban Insurgency The Impact of Urbanization Upon Insurgent Warfare Insurgency in a Technologieal Environment, 3: Insurgent Doctrins and Revolutionary Thought . + « 38 Revolutionary Doctrine and Urban Insurgency The History of Revolutionary Doctrine Lenin's Concept of Portisan Warfare Revolutionary Insurgency and tin Principle of Frosion The Populavization of Revolutionary Doctrine Urban Insufgency and Its Strategic Implomontation SECTION II: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY Us Organization of the Urban Underground . « « < 56 The Persistence of the Underground The Objectives of the Underground The Cellular Principle of Underground Organization Communications and Security Within the Urban Underground The Organization of Demonstrations 5: Administration and Operation of the Urban Underground . « 72 Recrviting Procodures Within the Underground Training Within the Urban Underground Logistical Considerations within the Urban Underground Intelligence Collection within the Urban Underground ° Raids, Ambushen md Terrorism In the Urban Ewironment 6 Recent Trends in Urban Insurgency « . . . . 89 The Battle for Algiers: Its Background and Development aih Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 —Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ : ~~ 2, FIN Operations Tn the Rattle For Algiers 3. French Amy Operations Against tho FLN i. The TRA and the Battle for Bolfast 5. The Tupamaros and tho Battle for Montevideo 6. The Operations of the Black September Organization SECTION ITT: NATIONAL’ DEFENSE AGAINST URBAN INSURGENCY Chapter 7: US Defense Policy and the National Tradition . + « 104 1, Nationel Policy and Dual-Warfare Preparedness 2, Tho Army's Role and the National Tradition 3. The National Guard and tho Strategic Problem 4, The Military Assistance Program and the FID Problem 5. Political Awareness and National Tradition Chapter 8r Political Awarencss and Tactical Doctrine . . ¢ 122 1, The Need for a Separate Doctrine 2, Factors Influencing Political Awareness 3. Tactical Efficiency and the Frinciple of Patience ! 4, Target Selection ani the Principle of Discrimination j 5. Tactical Violence ant the Principle of Restraint i 6. Urban Counterinsurgency Tactics and the Principles of War Chapter 9: Problems md Solutims 4 » « «6 » «© «6 IO 1, The Development of a Separate Urban Counterinsurgency Manual 2, The Need for a Spectol Frogram of Instruction Training for Urban Counterinsurgency via the CPX Method 4, The Noed to Develop Non-Military Counterterrer Capabilities 5. Problems for the Future Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . 156 iv Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 SECTION T BACKGROUND CONSIDERATIONS All warfare is based on deception. Henee, when able to attack, we mst seem unable; whon using our forces, we mst scem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy belicve + that’we are away; when far away, we must make him believe we ore nezr. / Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. i Sun Tau, Ths _Art of War Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ww HAPTER ONE ww i - URDAN INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE The Analysis of Urban Insurgency Violence in the streets is not a strictly modern phenomenon. Almost all the major cities of the world have been subjected at one time or snothe: to crippling outbursts of rebellion or agitation, usually in the wake of economic or social disorder. In the 20th Century, however, such disorder hag been eccompanied by the announced determination of various revolutionary movements to bring about political upheaval through urban violence, It is \ not surprising, therefore, thet urban violence is now the subject of in- creasing attention on the part of political and militery analyats,. The term "urban insurgency" has thus crept into the vocabulary of those con- corned with violence in the modern city. Certain fundamental questions dominate this concern: (1) What are the distinguishing characteristics of urban insurgency, a8 opposed to random fyiolence in the city? (2) What 48 the relationship between urban insurgency and other forms of revolutionary activity, such as a rutal-based guerrilla movement? (3) What are the countermeasures which have proven successful in pre- venting, controlling or conbatting urban insurgéncy in actus) instances of its occurrence? In short, the effort to analyse urban insurgency revolves around an | + attempt to define it first, and then determine its characteristics, This attempt requires an examination of the various forms of revolutionary act- ivity, the purpose of this examination being the development of distinctions by meons of which urban insurgency may be identified and studied. This pro= cess of analysis permits the isolation of urban insurgency as @ phenomenon 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ "separate from (although, on occasion, related to) other forms of violence and subversion, Additdonally, it permits the dissection of identified in- otences of urban insurgency on @ case-study basis. This case-study procedure facilitates the determination of the causes, as well as the stages, of urban Ansurgency. Finally, the case-study identification of the causes of urban insurcency permits exomination of the role of politial doctrine and political agitation | in the creation of urban unrest and the transformation of such unrest into : actual insurgency. The widespread use of political propaganda in the 20th Century has frequently resulted in the misidentification of random violence as true insurgency, with this confision sometimes even encouraged for the sake of political provocation. Therefore the exact determination of the re~ lationship between agitation and insurgency 4s of central importance in under~ standing the latter. There 4s no shortage of insurgent doctrine as such. Set forth in the works of revolutionary writers ranging from Lenin to Carlos Marighellay blueprints for insurgency are readily available, Nor is there a shortage of historical instances of urban violence, although many such instances prove upon closer scrutiny to be considerably less than actual insurgency. The systematic analysis of urban insurgency thus permits concentration upon a selection of representative revolutionary works and their relationship to specific instances of such insurgency. Despite the availability of both doctrine and exaniples, the enslysia | +1 of their relationship reveals a gereral unawareness that detailed blueprints for urban insurgency have existed since the turn of the century. More modern revolutionary writing han lergely concentrated on thi central role played by 2 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ Sd rural guerrilla warfare, with only peripheral attention to the details of urban warfare, However, the recent increase in urban terrorism suggests a shift back to the metropolitan area 2s the center of insurgency, and thus suggests the resurrection of the earlier, urban-oriented revolutionary doctrine, This doctrine is elaborated upon 4h Chapter Three following the analysis, in Chapter Two, of the social and cultural forces which underlie this renewed emphasis upon urban revolutions The definition of key words and phrases is of considerable importance in the study of urban insurgency. ‘Since the shift from guerrilla warfare to urban insurgency reflocts @ shift in revolutionary thought -- as outlined in Chapter Three -= it is not,surprising that the key terms employed in dis~ cussing, describing and analysing this process are also subject to change. A case in point is the meaning of the word "guerrilla", In the language of the rurel-oriented discussion of revolutionary conflict, the word owes its meaning to a concept of unconventional warfare within which armed revolution- aries operate a9 militerily-organized units engaged in raids, ambushes and sinilar assaults upon conventional military forces, In the more recent shift within revolutionary doctrine, "guerrilla" takes on a different mean- ing, as is reflected in Marighella's Minimanval For the Urban Guerrilla. Conmitted to terrorism and "propaganda by violence", Marighella's urban rebel becomes a puerrilla only 2s the word itself undergoes a change in usage. Definitions are nevertheless important, for they provide the theoretical framework necessary for an examination of the problem of urban insurgoncy. Within the present study, seven key terms require definition before urban 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 = nt had ~~ — anourgoncy itself can be defined and examined, They arer Subversion: ‘Action designed te undermine the military, economic, pay- chological, morelo, or political otrength of a regimo. Inourrection: An ebrupt, arnod uprising against the military and secur- ‘Aty forces of a constituted governrent. Rovolution: The offert to seize power via the violent everthrow of the prevailing political authority. | Civil War: A military struggle which takes place when revolutionary i forces adopt the organization and tactics of conventional military forces. | Internal Wart A fom ef conflict within which the prevailing government ; is challenged by a process ef subversion and insurgency. Urban Society: An environnont whose technolcpicsl, economic and political characteristics are predominantly those of a modern metropolitan area, | Insurgency: Systematic, lew-intensity aggression against the political i structure of a nation, falling short of civil war. Of these sovla, tho first definition is provided by AR 310-25 and JCS i Pub 1, The next five are definitions derived from conmon usage. The dof= inition ef insurgency is, however, a departure from tho uosge specified by AR 310-25, which defines insurgency as follows: "A condition: resulting from a revelt or incurrection egainst @ constituted government which falla short of civil war. In the present context, subversive insurgency 1e primarily i Communist inspired, supported or exploited." This departure is predicated on throe factors, First, sinco insurgency falls short of civil war, it actually amounts to low-intensity aggression, in centrast to the relatively high-intensity cenflict/which would characterize conbat botwoen conventionally organized ferces. So¢ond, insurgency may be undortsken by forcos whose 4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7, ~ w Adeolopical persuasion is net necessarily Cormunist, Third, while insurgency may well reoult from rovelt er insurrection, At may also result morely from the deliberate intensification of intemal argrossion underteken for purposes other than the actual overthrow ef a government, Evon thon 4t would be systematic, of course, ainco insurgency 1s not merely random vielence but is violence undertaken for some specific purpose. Cortain points follow immediately from these definitions. Internal \ war may be seon a9 soncthing distinguishable from revolutionary war; as | * ghown in Chapter Three, this distinction is of primary importance because 4t permits awareness of tho possible otrateric utilization of urban in- surgency, as when such insurgoncy 4s fomented not so much for the sake of revolution as for the sake of diversion. Additionslly, the other definit= done permit the recognition that insurgency may grow out of subversion with or without being initiated by or resulting in insurrection. This enhances understanding of the current disagrooment among revolutionary theorists themselves. Finally, the definitions permit suspension ef those revolution~ ary theories which focus upon subversion, insurgency and insurrection as distinct phases in revolutionary warfare, thus forcing their enslysis to { obey models and theories which may prove misleading with rogard to urban Ansurgency. ‘The definition ef urban insurgency, as developed in the pages which : follow, is set forth at the ond of this chepter, 3s Revolution and the Dual-Warfare Nature of Modern Conflict While definitions are important in the study of urban insurgency, | equal importance mat be accorded te the way in which tho US Army is drawn ! 5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 -_ w~ |. Indeed, eno of the most Ante a concern fer insurgency in tho first pla Amportant characteristics of urban insurgency will turn out to be its potential Ampact on the Army's concept of itself, and thus one of the most important obstacles to understanding tho deepor threat of urban insurgency is tho recognition of what, this concept anounts to. Traditionally, the Army's role in nattonal defense has been envisioned in terms of conventional conflict -- that is, defenso of tho US against a foreign power whose armed forces threaten the security of the nation. ‘The various public attitudes which underlio this tradition are examined in Chapter Seven, where their impact on tho problem of urban insurgency is developed in detail. Most important, however, is the concopt of conventional war which results from this heritage. In response to the American political tradition and its own role in national defense, the Army's concept of itself is ono which calls for conflict against a foreign force organized and operated along lines similar to its own, with the conflict ideally initiated by an abrupt outbreak of hostilities and a declaration of war. In this sense, World War II provides a model which governs the Army's modern organization, Because World War II was accompanied by internal conflict behind the boundaries of ‘tho Axis powers, the Army's modern organization also includes a capacity te exploit such conflict in the event of any future war -- in effect, a capacity to bring about insurgency behind the lines of the eneny in conjunction with and in support of conventional eperations, Thus, even with its capacity to oupport insurgency in conjunction with orthodox operations, tho Army's con- copt of itself ++ and hence its concept of how war should be waged == remains essentially conventionale ‘The emergence of an alternative concept of war results, therefore, in a 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 w~ / ~ ~ sorious threat te the Army's concept of itself and its concopt of how war is to be waged. But it 4s just such an alternative which undorlies modern revolutionary theofy. The scenarie is Lenin's: a gradual increase in unrest, protest and dissatisfaction within a given country, leading to subversion and violence, culminating in insurgency or insurrection, resulting only thon 4n civil war and tho emergence of relatively conventional conflict between opposing military forces, Successful in Russia, China and Guba, the scenario lends itself to continuation elsewhere, In those arcas where its own inter= cote would be threatened by revolution, the US mst thorefere protect its Anterests accordingly. {™ effect, it mot respond to thie alternative form of war while maintaining its propatedness for conventional war. Thus the Arny is confronted with what amounts to a dual-warfare mission: : given the task of maintaining readiness for land warfare on its own terms, At 49 similtaneously confronted with proventing war on opposing terms and, consequontly, with interdicting the process envisioned by Lenin, This interdiction effopt was undertaken with varied success in Lebanon, in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnan, Refined now in the Foreign Internal Defense program (whose implications are examined in Chapter Seven) the Anterdiction effort leads to a concern for how insurgency may be contained and eliminated -- and hence leads to special consideration for the inter- diction of urban insurgency within a friendly foreign nation. Tho strategic merit of the interdictia effort is, of course, its capacity to abort the process envisioned by Lenin. Its strategic danger, however, is the risk of diversion, for the strategy of interdiction invites ite own counteratrategyt tho fementing ef subversion and insurgency for the more sake of proveking Anterdiction and thoreby diverting the military strength of tho US. The most crucial discovery te be made about urban insurgoncy is its adaptability : Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ ~~ te such strateric utilization, Revolution 4s easily understood: its ultimate geal 4s tho overthrow of a govornment. But since strategic diversion would be most effective if disrulsed as revolution, and sinco the dual-warfare mission invites such diversion, the recognition of how urban insurgency lends itself to this threat will require reconsideration of hy subversion, insurgency and revolution are interrelated. The Nature of Subversion In the sense in which it ie defined here, revolution requires the erosion of incumbent political authority. Unless this condition is met, and unless those powers in authority can be effectively challenged as a result of this erosion, the attempt to seize power cannot be significant enovgh to merit the status of revolution, The classic example of erosion of suthority is provided by Gzariet Russia An the period preceding the revolution of 1917. Wits the gradual decline of the Czar's capacity to control events, the opportunity to seize power becane a real possibility for the Czar's opponents and revotution resulted. In turn, German history of the same period provides the classic example of a relatively stable government being subjected to an usrising which failed to materialize as revolution, Hitler's unsuccessful putsch of 1923 failed primarily because the governnent in power had not, af this point, lost its capacity to sustain itself. Quickly aborted, the Murich putsch was not even an unsuccessful revolutions - The erosion of governnental authority follows o:rtain general patterns. Initially it involves the development of opposition elements inspired by some basic inadequacy on the part of tho goverment. Such opposition groups may 8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 | t ~ ~ remain dormant for a prolonged period -- or they may, as in Crarist Rus ie, engage in acts of violence designed to aggravate the rovernnent!s position, Asskasination and sabotare ere typical efforts to subvert the government. The deliberate and systematic undermining of political authority is thua a stage in the revolutionary process, and its objective 4s to establish those conditions under which power may be seized from the government. This undermining process may consume years of effort, culminsting in an abrupt collepye of the government, as in the case of the Carts abdication in 1917. Or it may involve an accelerated offort to subvert the government, followed by ansurgency, or insurrection, or even civil war. The transition fron un~ rest and disaffection to subversich and rebellion 4s thus varied and is al- ways quite complicated. But its ‘end reoult, if 4t So to accomodate rev olution, is the crippling of governrental power. Subversion in ite earliest stages may involve relatively uncoordinated acts of rebellion on the part of groups which differ radically in their oun goals. Such was the case in Germany during the 1920's, when both Fascist ‘and Communist elements sought’ the collapse of the Weimar governments In turn, subversion may involve only a single, highly coordinated organizstion determined to bring about the collapse and overthrew of the ruling powers, as in the Algerian insurgency of the 1950's. What is crucial about the process of subversion 4s not so mich a unity of ultimate goals as a unity of immediate purpose -- which is the Keakening of the government in power. Organized in increasingly complicated structures, modern governments are winerable to more and more diverse fos of such subversion, Given {ts many responsibilities for maintaining law and order, insuring economic stability, managing its own agencies and retaining the consent of the pop- 7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 .~ w ‘ wlace, the typical governnent presents an array of targets against which ~~ subversion may bé directed, Its failure to execute any of these responsi- bilities will weaken its own status and provide monentum to a revolutionary movement. "Im the economic sphere, subversion may involve the instigation of strikes, acts of industrial sabotage, efforts at production slow-down, inter- ference with methods of distribution, and similar activities directed at re- ducing the efficiency of the economic system, and hence at reducing the ace ceptability of the government in power. In the strictly political sphere, { the dissemination of pfopagenda and the development of anti-government protests and demonstrations 2lso sérve to undermine authority. The infil~ tration of various governnental agencies, particularly its police and mil~ \ itary forces, can be a significant form of subversion if it succeeds in undermining the allegiance of these agencies, Additionally, acte of overt violence and terror -- particulerly in the form of kidnapping and assassi- | nation of key officials ~~ may succeed in reducing the government's strength. When such acts of terror cause the government to over-react in a repréasive -* way, thus alienating previously sympathetic elements of the population, the subversive's cause is strengthened even further. . What fe most significant about these forms of subversion is that they are often a prelude to, and then a complement of, armed inevrgency against the government. They may even culminate in insurrection, In the earliest stages of subversion, however, insurrection would be premature since the government's position has’ not been sufficiently weakened. Being premature An thd; sense, it is doomed to failure, as was the case with the 1905 rev- olution in Russia end the 1923 uprisings in Germany. When insurrection is 10 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 we. delayed until tho government's position hes been sufffciently weakened by subversion, it stands a grestly improved chance of success. Again, the classic example is provided by the Russian revolution of 19175 when the Provisional Government established after the Cyar's overthrow had reached the point it covld no longor resist Bolshevist subversion, the Bolshevist Ansurrection proved both swift and insurmountable. 5. From Subversion to Insurgency Because it is ideally launched only after subversion has weakened the government, insurrection is described by Lenin ond others.as @ phase in the revolutionary process: But.4f insurrection leads te civil war, as was the case in Spain in 1935, At will normally be accompanied by 2 continuation and even acceleration of those subversive acts of sabotage, terror and propaganda which preceded it, To identify subversion and in- surrection.as mutually exclusive phases in a revolution would therefore be { mistaken, Insurrection has not only led to the overthrow of the governnent or the commencement of protracted civil war, In other cases, when it has failed to achieve either of these results, its failure has brought about ' the complete collapse of the revolutionary movenent (as with Budapest in 1986), or haa resulted in the revolutionary movement reverting to subversion (as with the St. Petersburg uprisings of 1905), or has ied to protracted in- surgency along the lines of querrilla war (a9 with the. Chinese Communists following the Canton and Shanghai uprisings of the 1920's). Moreover, not all instences of insurgency have been initiated by insurrection, As in Vietnam, in which the gradual escalation of subversion led finally to in surgency, guerrilla warfare can emerge through raids and anbushes which grow / n Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 - ~ ww + dn frequency and intensity until a state of insurgency exists without an abrupt armed uprining ever having occurred. In turn, insurgency in the rvral énvironment can lead to urban insurrection, as was the design of the 1968 Tet offensive upon the part of the Vietcong. But this outcone is not Atself a necessary condition for revolutionary success, since Castro's Cuban insurgency triumphed without significant urban insurrection. Obviously, ‘then, the variations on the revolutionary theme are great, and these var- dations have led to doctrinal disagreements among revolutionsries them- selves, as described in Chopter Three. They have also led to disagreenent about the moaning of the terms involved in describing revolution. In general, however, insurgenty has been described aa a relatively open attack upon governmental. agencies and installations by organized groups of revolutionary forces. These forces have been distinguished from the earlier agents of subversion by three factors: (1) unlike the subversive underground, they are generally organized into military or para-militery structures which continue to exist through the duration of the insurgency, (2) they are committed to direct and systematic assault upon the government not so mech for the sake of weakening the governnent as for the sake of forcing its collapse, and (3) they require, for the continuation of their own operations, logistical resources similar to those available to convent~ donal military forces. Modern history has een the popularization of a distinct and flenboyant, label for such forcest they are not rebels but guerrillas. The use of such terminology permits distinction between the military forces of the government 4n power and the military or para-military forces of the revolutionary move~ ment =- or, in the international sense, batween those conventional forces of 12 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 1 ~ ~ a foreign power which may constitute an external threat and those forces of 2 revolutionary movement which constitute an internal threat, This distinct- don between conventional forces and guerrilla forces has generated 2 vast amount of guerrilla warfare literature in the post-World War IT era, with particular emphasis upon the operations of guerrilla forces as "a new form of warfare". ‘The tendency to identify querrilla insurgency as 2 significantly dif- ferent form of war is due largely to the objectives of insurgency and the oper- ation of the insurgent forces amid the continuation of subversion, Con- ventional warfare ordinarily involves the battlefield confrontation of opposing military forces -- accompanied, vince the advent of military av- lation, by the bonbardnent! of the various industrial end urban bases which support those forces, Traditionally, such warfare has been dedicated to | the destruction of opposing military forces and the removal of their capacity to threaten the ndtion opposed by them; only rarely (as in World War TI) hae Lt been accompanied by the ebjective ef everthrewing the governmant of tha opposing nation. Insofar as werrilla warfare is an aspect of revolution, and is thus dedicated to the overthrow of the fovernrent, it differs from conventional warfare in its final objectives, Ins6fer as it in combined with subversion anainst the political apparatus of the state, it also dif~ fers in its overall methods. Whot ie crveial about guerrilla war is this dependence upon the con- tinued impact of subversion, Guerrilla operations my or may not be accompa nied by conventional warfare: in dugoSlevia, the World War IT partisan cam- paign was an adjunct of the total war against Nacd Germany -- but in Castro's Guban insurgency, the government was not confronted simultaneously with an 13 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 - i | | \ ~ ~ external military threat, In either case, susteined querrilla activity mst be accompanied by a significant degree of subrersion, for it is sub- version which weakena and diverts the government, waking it vulnerable to guerrilla war. ‘The various forms of subversion -= such 28 propaganda, terrorism, in- filtration, assassination and sabotage =~ are thus activities which prepore the way for insurgency Cor insurrection) and then eomplenent it in the more advanced stages of revolution. In this sense, insurgency involves a broad spectrum of opposition to the covernment. In a formla senso, insurgency is a combination of subversion plus armed resistance, and the emergence of open Karfare as 2 product of this combination marks the revolutionary shift from mere subversion to actual insurgency. 6. Rural Guerrilla Warfare as_an Aspect of Insurgency. Once the momentum of the revolutionary effort tas readhed a level of violence ouffietent to inspire arned resistance against the governnent, the shift from subversion to insurgency may result in either sn sbrupt collapse of the government or a long and sustained struggle tetween the insurgent forces and those of the government. Those short-rus cases which have pro- duced relatively owift revolutionary success have mst often involved urban insurrections the overthrow of the frovisional Government of Russia was largely a matter of warfare in the streets, as was the case with the rev- olution which hed earlicr ‘toppled the French menarcly, “As a result, urban Anovrrection hus been characterised by brevity. It has not always been suce cennfvl, of course, and in thone instances when it tus failed it has usually been described as an uprieing -- as with the Shanghsl uprising of 1927 and the Budapest uprising of 1956. Nor has insurrection always been revolutionery a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Deciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : ClA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 jn Antent; the Werstepuprising of 19h was essentiamg dedicated to resistance a ‘against German occupation forces. When such urban insurrection does fail, and when it is an aspect of rov~ olution, the revolution itself may collapse in defeat or, if sufficient forces survive, result in protracted insurgency within the countryside external to the urban environment, In the 20th Century, this shift to rural insurgency in the wake of urban defeat has been largely due to the fact that it is only in a rural environment that insurgent forces have been able to manage the security and mobility necessary for their own survival, Thus it is in the rural context that the modern guerrilla has flourished, os with Mao's campaign in China and the Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam, When rural insurgency has not been accompanied by urbar subversion it has generally failed, however, a9 with Gueverra's abortive Bolivian expedition. In such cases, freedom from distraction by subversion permits a government to concentrate its security forces upon the elimination of the guerrilla. The relationship between: rural guerrilla warfare and urban subversion has therefore been a complementary one in the history of 20th Century rev~ olution, While the rural environment provides the security necessary for the sustained existence of an insurgent force, the rural operations of such a force have rarely been sufficient to topple a government, however. In the case of Mao's 20-year campaign against the Nationalist Chinese, the combined impact of Japanese invasion and Communist insurgency were necessary to bring the revolution to @ successful ends in Castro's case, substantial urban sub- version was a necessary complement to the operations conducted in the Sierra Moestras. The balance between rural guerrilla warfare and urban subversion has been 15 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 .~ influenced by such variables as the physical strength Sf the guerrilla elenent, the extent of external support provided by foreign interests and the capacity of the government to endure a prolonged revolutionary challenge. Despito these variables, the patterns of modern revolutionary warfare reveal the necessity “for such @ balance, They also indicate that revolutionsry success requires an increase in the intensity of rural guerrilla operations to balence any decrease in the impact of urban subversion (as in South Vietnam prior to ths Tot uprisings), 29 well ae requiring an increase in urban violence to balance any decrease in the impact of rural operations (as in South Vietnam during the Tet uprisings). Gifon this necessity, and given the increasing vulner- ability of the modern city, any decrease in the potential effectiveness of roral guerrilla varfare is thus Likely to produce # ¥chetied concern for urban Anourgency as a primary vehicle of revolution, This is, in fact, the thrust of the revolutionary doctrine examined in Chapter Three. A Definition of Urban Insurgency ° A tentative definition of urban insurgency would bogin with envhasis upon tho revelutienary seizure ef political power and the dissolution ef the prevailing system of government, In terms of the relationship between sub version and insurgency, and in view of the modern emphasis upon rural guerrilla warfare, 2 more refined definition might characterize urban insurgency #5 highly intensified subversion carried ovt in support of rural insurgency. However, the analysis of those current military, social, politicsl and technological trends which will inevitably influence the nature of revolutionary warfare sugedst that urban insurgency may well be emerging an fer more than an aux- Allary form of ouch war, Urban insurgency may well be destined to become 16 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Deciassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ ~ the primary fora of revolutionary otrugele. ~~ Several factors provide » hint of this possibility. In terms of military technology, the advént of the helicopter provides the governmental security force with a mobility so great that the rural guerrillas esrlier advantage of refuge and security is neriously diminished. Tn terms of social structure, one may note the accelerating urbanization of those areas of the world which are most susceptible to revolutionary unrest to begin with; this urbanization is generally accempanied by a decrease in the rura) population base from which the guerrilla movenent might otherwise draw its strength, Moreover, the rap- Adly changing relations}fip brtween the ct ty and the countryside, essentially a product of modern industrial technology, makes the city less dependent upon the political stability of the rural area, and hence réduces the rural guerrillas chance of toppling the government froma rural stronghold, At the same time, however, the complexity of the modern city, with its intricate technological structure, makes it extremely vulnerable to subversion by sabotage. And, per- haps most el the process of urbanization haa meant, in many of the major c'ties of the world, 2 concentration of masses of dissatisfied people readily subject to revolutionary temptation. In effect, then, the modern city grove nore vulnerable to subversion as 1t grows more powerful in political and technoloricsl atgnificance, Whether or not the modern city provides conditions which would permit sus~ tained insurgency remains to be examined, As indicatsd earlier, the ocovrrence of insurrection within the confines of the city hao generally resulted in either swift revolutionary triumph (or defeat), or a transfer of the revolution's ; focal point to 2 rural environnent. But it is entirely possible that tho changing nature of the city may result in conditions which would perm{t pre- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7 _/~ — — traced urban guerrilla war instead. Such war would be properly described as urban insurgenty, If it is to encompass this possibility, and thereby permit an understaring of the increasing potential for such warfare, the definition of urban insurgency must allow for these conditions. In thie sense, then, the definition must incorporate the following major points, as developed in the preceding pageet (1) Urban insurgency 1s 2 form of violence against the prevailing government, ordinarily undertaken fer revolutionary purposes by armed and i organized enemies of the government. (2) As a revolutiofary activity, urban insurgency has as its objectives the sei,ure- of political power and ‘the dissolutien and replacement of the prevailing political system. (3) Urban dnaurgency is preceded by subversive acts, such as sabotage, ! ‘error and propaganda, which weaken the government in power and vnich, are continued during the insurgency itself. (h) Urban insprgency may be initiated by armed uprising of an insurrection- ist nature, or may be the result of subversion which has been intensified until it has flared into open insurgency. (5) Amounting to guerrilla warfare within the city, urban insurgency may or may not be accompanied by rural guerrilla warfare. In capsule form, then, urban insurgency is low-intensity ageression within the environnent of the city. Its historical characteristics suggest its categorization as a form of revolutionary war. But the examination of its potential will result, in Chapters Two ond Three, in the recognition that urban Ansurgency my be provoked fer other purposes than actual revolution, insofar aa revolution involves the overthrow of 2 political system. In terms of modern 18 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 O ~ @) i of its cities for an industrialized nation, dt is conceivable that urban in~ revolutionary doctrine, international strategy and tle accelerating importance surgercy may be fomented for strategic purposes, rather than strictly rev- olvtionary purposes. To permit the analysis of these possibilities, the i | following definition 1s employed in the pages which follow: : Urban Insurrency is” systematic low-intensity aggresoien, against the Urban Insurgency. 2 0 technological, ‘economic and political structure of an urbanized nation, eccurring within its own boundaries or within those metropolitan areas to which 4t 4s linked via this strugturp, undertaken for oithor revolutionary Purposes er fer purpeses of diverting its military strength. toe Javea eacee Perea reas eo Cl sae ee Le : fy ‘ = 1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Re Py Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : ClA-RDPES-0067 1R000300290003-7 ~ —) — THE URBAN COMPLEX AS AN INSURGENT ENVIRONMENT 1 1. The City in History To understand the envirennont within which urban insurgency may occur, 4t ig necessary to understand the complex nature of the modern city and its relationship to the rural countryside, Ordinsrily the distinction between 1 the two is conceived in terms of population density, with the city being thovght ef as an area in which that density is extremely great while the rural ceuntryside is an area in which dt is relatively low. In fact, the crucial difference is an agriculturel matter: traditionally, the city has consisted of people whe do net grow their ewn food and who can therefore be assorbied” for tho sake of carrying out other functions, while the rural countryside consists of poople who grow food for all. | Ao a revit, tho history of the city is parallel to the history of sgri- “iilture and technology. Thus the advent of iron not only permitted the dovolopment of the plow and the hoo which made agriculture more efficient; tt also, as a result, permitted the growth of great cities like Rone and the development of the weapons via which these cities could dominate the countryside, In the noaden world, the advent of machine technology has resulted in tractors ard reapers which have further increased agricultural effictoncy, thereby accelerating the growth of cities; at the sane tine, this technology hes resulted in a factory system via which the city could achieve even greater domination ovor the countryside. What is most ronarkable about the modern world is that its technelogy has not enly brovght unprecedented agricultural efficioncy; it has alse virtually erased the qualitative differ- gnoes which have long distinguished the city from the countryside. 20 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7De \eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ — ~ Historically, 1ife within the city has differed from that ef tho country- sido not only in rogard te tho types of labor performed, but aloo with regard i to its intellectual end political atmosphere. It is the city whore ideas. have fleurished and books have been written, where intel lectual and political unrest have been centered, where styles have been determined. Teolated frem 1 all this, the rural countryside has been characterized by moral and relig- i fous traditions far less subject to change. ‘It is trus, ef course, that \ revoluticn has sometines erupted in the countryside, often in response 6 a sonse of exploitation -- just as rebellion has often erupted within the cities in respense te meee or tyranny. But throughout the world, the pace’ of life within the rural area has been essenticlly different from that of the city += until the advent ef modern Bechnclogy. With the ad- vont of the truck and the automobile, the gap between the two has disappeared; with tho advent of radio and television, differences in thought and attitude { have diminished; with the introduction of machine technology, the farm itself has become a factory. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of modern civilisation -- North Amorica, Japan, Wostern Europe ~~ is that: the country- pide Ateolf has boon urbaitized in the qualitative acase. Except for poP= ulation density, the difference between tho city md the rural aroa has vanished in these urbanized regions. | Meanwhile, tochnelegy has accelorated tho process of change. Yost Amportant, poychological changes have been brought sbout by the nase conmuni= cations techniques nade possible by medorn technelory} bombarded aaily by io books, nowapapers, magazines, television programs, #11 conpoting for its attentien, the population of an urbanized area is now subject to what “amounts te urban stress. .Within this climate of unrest, propaganda feeds en confusien a Hl eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7,—_—_—_—— Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ wo and political agitation 4s commonplace. Of all those’ forcen, the television canera is most pewersul, Its pros- ence hae not only {nfluonced the nsture of urban civilizatin; it has iter- ally sltored tho nature and meaning of revelutionary warfare. For, ao the Fronch Army found in Alrerie, the. most impertant corsequence of military action arainst an insurgent force may not be its impact on that ferce but its Ampact on a population far reneved from ths scono of tho insurgoncy. If that population 1 able to moniter such action through tho mediun of tel- evieion, and 1f the vielence of the counterinsurgency effort provekes neg- ative reaction on ite prt, the populace may voll withdraw ite suppert of thie effert, The renk that "we von the battle in Algiers, but we lost the war An Parist 1e merely one index of this phenonenens guarding againat At may well be the most critical espoct of counterinsurrency eporations within an urban onvirennent. Success in such operations thorefere requires recognition that. the vrban onvtronnert [yiotde a new kind of battlefield, The historical dis- tinction betweon the city and the rure countryside having boon erased whorover modern tochnolegy hae beon introduced, solving the problem of urban insurgency 48 thus dependent on understanding thie new.onvironnent. 2. Tho Process of Modern Urbanization With nore workers nooded in facteries and fever workers needed on farms, the urbanizatien procoss has been accelerated with each new techno= Logical step along the path of modorn induatrialization. Only 2.4 per cent of the world's population resided in cities ef 20,000 or more at the beginning 22 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ a . ~ — of the 19th Contury. By 1950 that fipure had ineressed almost ten-folds” The rapid urbanizatien of man contimies, snd has been described an "perhaps tho mort spectacular sacial phenenenen of medorn tines", In turn, the dovelep- mont of radically new means of communication and transportation has resulted in somthing equally spectacular: the cities themselres have becons netted with each ether, As complex as this growth process has been, it io nevertheless charac terized by certain basic features which prove relevant in the analysis of urban insurgenc} % The industrislization of Nerth America and Western Europe is now being followed by the effort to bring absut industrialization in other major regions of the world. Japan and Russia have become industrialized in the past two generations, and much of Asia and Latin america are now moving rapidly in thie direction. \ % This" process of industrislization is resulting in the rapid grewth of urban complexes in regions of the world which had remained predominantly rural up to the very recent past. In certain Latin American countries -~ par- ticvlerly Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador and Veneauela =~ the current urban pop~ ‘ ulation is now almost four times what it was in 1950, 4 Inevitably causing change in social values, the industrialization/urban- ization process has been accompanied by rising expectations of prosperity, re- sulting in concentrated masses of people vulnerable to political agitation und revolutionary provocation when these expectations tecome frustrated. % Because of the intricate relationship between the urban complexes of ! the world, instabllity in one major city will have impact in those other cities with which it 1s economically related. The interruption of the shipping facilities of a large port through which petroleum is processed can, for example, | 23 eee ete iee hoo iee act cin 2o-ae'o0e 7 Roonspeeoongs,Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~~ ~\ paralyze tie industry of another city dependent on potroleum enerry. % Despite the unprecedented status of the urban complex as the nerve- center of industrialized civilization, those factors which make it powerful ~~ dts size, ite organization and its function =~ are else factors which make it Ancreasinply vulnerable to political unrest and revolutionary agitation. These factors apply in different degrees to the various major citdes of the world, ‘They indicate why otbursts of urban unrest are of paramount concern half-way around the lobe. If the world is shifting rapidly to an urbsnized status, and if the control of the major cities of @ region will. result in political and military domination of that region, then the rev- olutiouary instinct will inevitably direct itself to such control, seeking to convert unrest inte the subversion which would make’ the seizure of such control possible. ¢ Vulnérability of the Urban Complex The pelitical and military importance of a particular city is more a matter of the given city's function than it is a matter of mere size. Recent: | population figures indicate Shanghai is the world's largest city, totalling | 10,000,000 ) people. In terms of its potential for revolutionary significance | Shanghsd may be, however, far less important than other, smaller cities which serve as centers of conmmication, transportation and political influence. What is most important is the way in which each such center of powor is vul- | erable to subversion. . | ‘AML cities are vulnerable in one way or another, in that the interruption | of electrical power, water supply.or food transportation can disturb the pre- i carious balance of goods and services upon which urban life 4s based. The typical city is, of course, dependent upon the countryside and the world be~ 2h o— eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7,Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ ww ~— yond for a steady flow of foodstuffs; it is estimated that Now York City, re~ quiring a deily input of some 5000 tons of food, has in its warehouses and on its store shelves enly enough food at any given time for some ‘1h days. Depending on the complexity of the city, it is also dependent upon the effectiveness of its internal services; interference with a city's water- works, followed by the collapse of its fire-fighting agencies, can lead awiftly to a city's devastation, As a@ rule, the more elaborate the city's organizational structure, the more fragile is its stability. With regard to subversion, the important vulnerabilities of a given urban area are a function of two factors: the specific character of the city and the particular objectives’ of the subversive movement. A given, city may be a gigantic industrial complex whose paraiysis would undermine the stability of the national government; for the purposes 6f revolutionary subversion, the city's moat importent vulnerability night therefore be the hydroelectric plants tpon which its factories are dependent. But for the purposes of strategically-oriented, externally-inspised subversion, the same city's most important vulnerability might be its shipping facilities instead’ -- especially if the collapse of these facilities would subvert a nation's capacity to transport troops and supplies to some distant force. Since the estimate of any given city's vulnerability te subversion would require attention to the subversive motives involved, defense against urban subversion -- and, ultimately, against urban insurgency -- might appear to demand urorthodox principles of intelligence. Whether or not these prin= ciples would be applicable to military intelligence fie examined in Chapter Eight, at which point the moro gonéral queéstion’of a US military role in urban insurgency 4s dealé with, It is obvious, howerer, that whatever security 25 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 - CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 agency 1s involved IW’defonse against subversion and insurgency, the oxocut= of Ats role will demand attertion to motives, since these motives will dictate target selection within the urban environment. Not all the targets involved will bear directly on the stability of a city. The robbery of a benk for the sake of obtwining funds and the looting of on arms depot for the sake of obtaining weapons are acts stressed by both Tenin and'Marighella, but these acto will not be directly subvorsive unless accompanied by propaganda, The more direct acts of subversion are those which create unrest, arouse popular opinion againat the government, inter- fere with the city's various functions, or otherwise undermine the prevail- ing political structure and its military/security forces. The more import~ ant a city is to the stability of a nation, the more deciaive’ this subvers- ion will bo; if ib de permitted to flere into open insurgency, the stability of the entire nation may be threatened, The most striking hint of this possi- bility was provided by tho 1968 Paris disorders which monentarily. arrested the economy of France and threatened the overthrow of the French government. As with Paris, the typical modern urban complex is made fragile by the vulner- ability of the industrial system upon which it is based and from which it de~ vives its importance, Lu, Strategic Subversion and the World-city Urban Complex Since a projection of current world strategies is outside tho scope of this study, it is not possible to classify any given urban complex as being nore strategically significant than some other complex, That characterization would be a function of a particule strategy. It is nevertheless possible to identify a number of modern urban configurations which havo attained "world- city" status of ouch magnitude that thotr potential strategic significance 26Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 7 w we caste Light upon the stratepic possibilities for urban insurgency. By definition, a world-city -is an urban complex which has attained political and economic influence of such scope that its stability hos direct Ampact upon the stability of the ront of the world. In contrast, a region- elly important city may bo extremely important to the politics) and economic stability of a riven geographic area vithont having direct influence upon the { rest of the world. This contrast would result in the cateporization of London as a world-city, leaving Shanghai to be classified as a city of only regional significance even though its population is roughly equal to that of London. The world-citios gfe charsctortsticelty contre of trade ard government, They are great ports which distribite imported goods to all parts of their oun nations and receive goods for export to other nat{ons; within the nations within which they are located, roads and railways focus upon them, and they are the sites of the great international airports, such as Heathrow, Kennedy, Orly, Schiphol and Sheremotyevo. They aro also the banking and financial centers of the wofld, housing the trading banks ‘ana insurance organizations vpon which world-wide trade and industry are dependent. They are not always identified by # single city-nomes in several cases, they ere actually inter- connected complexes of previously distinct cities now merged -into one gigantic configuration through the impact of transportation and communication. One such product of this, grovth process is the so-called Rhine-Ruhr world-city, | actually an agglomeration of ten cities of over 200,000 people apiece and an- other ten cities of between 100,000 and 200,000 apiece, all located in a h0-mile radius. Included in it are Bonn, Cologne, Dusseldorf and an autobahn net which Link more then 10,000,000 residents of this world-city complex. A { similar ring of citios -- actually referred to by the Dutch themsclvos ag is the complex containing Rotterdam, Ansterdam, [et Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 - CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ Randstand HellandDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 Qa Utrecht and The Hap¥¥. Althovgh it contains only L¥@00,000 people, its in flvence upon world cause the Randutand to be identified as one of the seven true world-cities. Tho otters, besides Rendstand and Rhino-Rubr, are Now York, London, Paris, Moscow and Tokyo-Yokohama. Not only are these seven the dominant metropolitan centers within their own geographic areas; they are Linked torether throughout the world as a result of modem communication, transportation ond the industril-economic system which has made them depend- ent upon one anothor. It is this international influence which makes the world-city @ potent dally important target of strateric subversion, Subversion intense enough to paralyze the industrial activities of the Tokyo-Yokohama complex vould have sovere consequences throurhout that part of the world which hes grown dependent upon Japanese technology. Interference with the factorics of the Rhine-Ruhr complex would effect industry thousands of miles away. This sudden ripplo-effect is both oubtle and substantial; it is illustrated by the way in which a Late 1960's snowstorm which vaused serious delays in air traffic in and out of New York also caused, a3 a direct consequence, unpree= edented surface traffic snarle in citics as far away as Los Angeles. In a world dominated by @ few/sigantic metropolitan complexes, a serious disturb- ance in one can have grave (and possibly predictable) impact elsewhera, Hence their strategic potentiel: # foreign power seeking to strike at the economic heart of another power might well elect to do so indirectly, by subverting within a given world-city those particular functions upon which the attacked power is dependent, with the targeted world-city not even being inside the national boundaries of the nation being attacked. Similarly, a nation may be attacked indirectly vis the subversion of certain functions within the network of its own citics: the hijacking of 268 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7,“Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7 conrercial aircraftwithin the United States has haSconomic and political effects which hint at the range of possibilities open for abratogic exploit ation. 7 What 4s perhaps most important about these possibilities is their subtlety. Given the way in which the cities of an industrislized nation are netted internally, just as the world-cities are netted internationally, subversion against a nation covld involve selected ects so widespread through= out this net that their local frequency is slight and their interconnection is unnoticed. The technological process which has trenoformed their cities into such a net of urban/complexes is only vaguely recognized by the induet= rialized nations of the world, to begin with. Conditioned to think of their cities as distinct entities because of their peographic separation, and pre- pared to recognize insurgency only when a sustained outburst of violence is concentrated in particular places, industrialized nations may be most vulner- able where they are most easily blinded. Indeed, it is not inconceivable that subversion of high-level intensity, so predt that it is actually in- surgency, covld be undertaken throughout a network of cities, with its acts of violence so penerélly widespread thet their intensity 19 not locally nob- iceable and their cumilative force is not nationally recopnized. By enalory, one might imagine 2 battleship whose commander has been trained to think an attack mesns oneny bombs and torpedoes, but whoss ship is about to go under without warning because its hull has been rusted away by come chemical intro- duced into the ocean within which 4t floats. If surprise is a principlo of war, unconventional war lends itself to new forms of surprise through the in- creased potential for urban Angurgency. It is in thie sense that the functional interconnection of the great. world-cities casts lipht upon the strateric aspects of urban insurgency: to 29 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 the oxtent that ite wm cities are similarly intercegpicted, and to the ex- tent that ite mejor elties are connected to the world cities, an industrisl— ined natdon 49 to thel extent wineruble to attack by strategically-notivated subversion -- with the atteck being undertsken at a selected level of intens- ity, against selected functions, at selected points within the national and international network of cities. 5, _Stratogte Principles Dearing Upon Urtan Insurgency The external sponsorship of subversion, insurgency and even revelution is 2 well-recornized phenomenon. It is exemplified in the Vietnam War. Subversion need not befexternally sponsored, of course, for it may grow out of local unrest amid the failure of the prevailing government to satissy sone given element of the populetion. Such subversion may be motivated by Conmun= ist ideology, or motivated by different idcolories and merely influenced by Commimist techniques which are copied. It may or may not involve @ clarity of objectives; mich violence against the modern state is prompted by 2 spirit of vengeance and Townson resulting in deliderete, sustained sabotage of the prevailing political system for the mere sekn of destruction, Regardless of ite oripin, 2-foreign power interested in diverting the strength of another nation may weil fen the flames of such subversion for the sake of achieving OF——r—e—C“=C=EE"™s—=—='ée. over; their intensity is finally dependent upon the availability of arns and | munitions, and a foreign power hoping to profit from the subversion of another nation can be expected to follow the principles of economy in fanning these flames. Presumably, then, it will provide support only to the extent that {and the places where) its onn objectives can be satisfied. liven within the context of Commmist ideclogy,and the worldwide sponsorship of revolution to 30 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 which that Adcology Way the economic limitations upw such sponsorship have beon pronounced. Besides this principle of economic constraint, certain other general principles enorge fron the distinction between revolutionary insurgency and strategically sponsored Anwurgency, the distinction between urban Anournoncy and rural Anourgency, and the distinction between low-intensity subversion and outright insurgency. Considered within the context of modern industrial urbanization, these principles indicate thats . * The strategic significance of a given urban complox is not dependent upon Ate population total or even its geographic location but te largely @ matter of its economic and political functions and thor relationship toy as well as their influcnce upon, similar functions in other, arcase * The strategic significance of urban subversion (or, possibly, urban Ansurgency) in any given metropolitan area will depend on the extent to which such subversion assists a given power in tho yurault of its own ob- Joctivess. * Tho oxtent to which support of subversion is provided by a foreisn power W1 be dopendont upon the strateric objectives of that power, and will fall short of extensive material assistance unless highvintensity sub- yorsion and insurgency are in the interests of the foreign powers # In the absence of external support nd the limitation of » revolut~ donary ‘novenent to its own resources, the selection of tarzots for eubversion wl bo dictatel by local political objectives and my result in events which have no international or strategic significances © the relationship betweon urban and rural activities on the part of & given subversive novonent will be determined by tho overall environnent with= in which the movenent occurs, by the particular objectives of the movenonty a Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7, and by tho oxtent tapihich the movonent is influoncygsby & foreign powers ~ * Successful resistance to subversion of either a low-intensity or high-intonsity nature will depond largely upon the capacity of the pre~ veiling governnent to Adentify the movenont, to ascortain 1ts objectives, and to anticipate its solection of targotse Although abstract, these principles pornit the furthor analysis of the relationship between sponsored subversion and locally inspired rev olution, This 1s undertaken in Chapter Three, Additionally, tha bring Anto focus cortain tasic questions which arise in the attempt to under= 1 stand urban insurgency within the context of modern Andustrial technology t and its impact upon urbanization, Precipitated by the emergence of the world-citles and other enornously influential metropolitan centers, as well as ty the increasing frequency of politically-notivated “vlotence within these centers, these questions aro arrived at in the attonpt to acconodate the future with the pasts’ For the recent past reveals @ sequence of rev olutionary movenents which were nurtured through insurgency that was essont- dally ruralj and not urban, Thust j (1) Are urban subversion and insurgency likely to bo engaged in only | as a complenent of rural insurgency, so that significant urban insurgency j 4s not possible except in support of or ‘in conjunction with rural insurgency? (2) When and 4f uxban insurgency could be undertaken as tho primary \ vehicle of revolution == or strategie insurgency dismitised as revolution ~~ / are its characteristics Likely to differ from those of en essentially rural Anawrgency? Both. questions require attention to revolutionary thought, which is the subject of Chapter Three. However, the impact of modern urbanization upon euch thought indicates that the answers to toth questions are a def- 32 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 Anites though comple®y noe ~ + Gt The Inpact of Urhant Upon Insurgent Warfare Contemporary theories atout revolutionary warfare moot often stress the cructel role of rival Anourgency, olevating 1¢ to a position of central i Amportance in the revolutionary process. In this asserenent and in the ; various forms of training doctrine which follow from it, the rural guerrilla | 4s characterized 4n terns of his ability to strike decisive blows against @ conventional military force while relying on the countryside and its pop- ulaco for support and security, In the oft-quoted vinton of Mao, the peasant countryside 4s/an ocean within which the guerrilla fich swim. And 4n the oxtension of this metaphor, it 41s tempting to think of the city as 8 mero cpawning ground for such fishs ‘This emphasis upon the rural Insurgent is due to a sories of relatively recent events in revolutionary warfare, Forenost anong these events 1s the success of the Chinese Communist revolution, which survived through rurel Anourgency after a series of atortive urban uprisings in such cities as Shanghai and Canton The succoss of the Cuban revolution, in which Castro's rural ingurgeney echoed and reinforced Mao's conclustons about guerrilla i warfare, has been alnost equally influcntial; Indeed, the propagandization | of Che’s role in that revolution has served -~ despite his subsequent defeat \ An Bolivia -- to popularize the inage of the rural guerrilla as the ultimate ) agent of revolutions And the rural operations of the Vietcong, carried out in tho wake of lio's victory over the French, have had 6 similar effect do~ | spite the anbiquous nature of the Indochinese-Vietnanoso wars; In shorty the net impact of these Ancurgoncies has been to magnify the role of rural Angurgency in modern revolution, evon to the extent of equating revolution { . 33 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7, with rural guorctliwarfares Nad ‘The theoretical justification for this emphasis rests upon three prin~ ciples drawn from the success of such revolutions. First, it 4s generally maintained that the city provides @ sanctuary for governmental security forces; within this sanctuary they cannot be challenged successfully, and 60 At is the countryside, and not the city, which ie the appropriate choice of tattlefields for tho guerrillas Second, 1t 46 maintoined that the urban complex does not provide the environment necessary for organizing, training, manouvering and securing a guerrilla organization, while the countryside { does,’ Finallyy 1t 4s maintained that the enployment of a guerrilla force over a sustained period 1s 6 virtual prerequisite for revolutionary triumphy since 4 1s only through a process of erosion that tho governnent's secur- Aty forces nay be brought to their knees, This final conclusion no doubt reflecte tho failure of literally thousands of urban incurrections and up- rAsings which ended in abrupt suffocation,’ Step-by-step, the three prin= : ciples lead to the currgnt Identification of revolution with rural insurgency! since guerrilla war is necessary, and sinco the guerrilla can neithor flour- Ash in the city nor triumph in tho city, revolution nust anchor itself in the countryside. Hence the conventional revolutionary sconarlor political i unrost; then urban and rural subversion, then rurel guorrilla warfare, and i finally the collapse of the governnent’s security forces and the overthrow | of the govornnent itself \ However relovant in terns of recent revolutionary events, this scenario | may prove inappropriate for @ world within which the modern city is changing ‘ rapidly, and within which the relationship of the city to the countryside 1s changing as a results’ The revolutions which most influenced the modern vision mn Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ of quorrilla var vorS*waged in areas which voro rela@ely tndoveloped fron tho standpoint of industrial growth and industrial urbanization, For those parts of the world which have achieved a high Jovel of industriali~ zation, the conclusions drawn from these rocent revolutions ~= and the rural guerrilla sconario based on these conclusions =~ would appear to be Anappropriate already, As the rest of the world moves toward industrial~ Azation, the scenario may/prove to be essentially anachronistic: Mao's ocean may, indeed, be drying ups 2k_Insurreney An a Technological. Environnent Since the threo principles supporting the rural guerrilla concopt are based on insurgency which succeedéd in industrially wndeyeloped areas (or 4n an environnent within which the complex nature of modern urbanizattion had not yet emerged) the Ampact of industrialization upon revolutionary methods of operation wi11 depond upon the extent to which the three prin- ciples remain valid or prove invalid for’an industrialized environnents While the projection of this impact is necessarily speculative, the rad~ Aca transformation of certain national or regional areas by modern in- dustrlalization already underminos those princlples. Specifically, the najor portion of Japan, most of Western Europe, and the northeastern part of the Wostorn Henisphore have beon so altered ty industrial growth that ‘tho combined offects of population density and technological change havo produced an urban/rural form of clvilization to witch the principles now appear Anapplicables ‘Thin forn of civilization reflects the most advonced features of tho industrial growth process described earlior in Sections 2-3 of this chapters Among then are cortain features which weigh heavily ogainst the rural guor- 35 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7, rill ~ w ~ * HWiebly efficient forns of air and eurfaco transportation which make possible the rapid deploynent of sccurity forces; The helicopter 1s of particular significance in this regard, sinco its availability increases ‘the challenge to the guerrilla's rural sanctuary; In tum, the advent of mass automotive transportation has resulted in ever-oxpanding liighway nets which slice the countryside into snaller and snaller plecéss * Highly effective forms of communication, survolllance and intelli- gence collection which marry tho rural countryside to the urban complex in { a way previously unknowns Modern telephonic and tolovision nets virtually erase tho urban/rural information gap and, among other things, make possible ‘the alnost inctant avaroness of guerrilla activitlese.. % Tho introduction of agricultural technology which accelerates the | decreasing need for agricultural workers and thus reduces the rural pop- ulation vithin which the rural guerrilla night otherwise flourish -~ co ‘thaty 4in the sense alluded to earlier, Mao's ocean hardly exists in the Andustrialized world! * The developnent of agricultural specialization, which changes the countryside in qualitative ways virtually eliminating the rural area as @ support base for guerrills warfare. Wod more and more to modern processing and manufacturing techniques, tho rural farner is not only loss capable of providing staple_support to a guerrilla movenent but 4s himself more depend ent on and nore a captive of the urban complexs 5 While such developments spell a vanishing frontier for tho rural guer- rillay they are accompanied ty other, equally significant, implications for Anourgent warfare; For there are certain features in the process of modern urbanization which weigh heavilyon the side of urban insurgency as an al- ' 36 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 - CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003.7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 - ternative to rural Wiefares' They aret ~ * Tho Ancrensed availability of automatic weapons and Bophisticated ox plosive devices which increase the rebel's capacity to confront and challenge security forces in an urtan complex == as exenplified by recent incidents in which a handful of insurgents have been able to hold at bay the security forces massed against: thems . * Tho availability of telephonic systens which give an urban under ground the connunications necessary to permit rapld assembly as an insurgent force, and which pormit coordination of insurgent actions within the nidst of the urban comploxs * The availability of automotive transportation, which permits both rapid assembly of and Ancreased mobility for an urban revolutionary organ= vation, thus permitting 1t to-strike and disperse with eases * The emergence,’ fthin' the growth pattern 6f large motropolitan con= plexes; of urban areas which are virtually inaccessable to governmental secur~ Aty forcos and vtafon provide resulting sanctuary for an insurgent fore, ‘Taken as a wholes those factors indicate that the modern city’s in- austrializstion has produced technological and demographic consequences: which weigh against the rural ‘guerrilla tut which, dronically, Increase the potential for Urban guerrilla war.’ In effect, thon, the three principles upon which guerrilla warfare has becn based may well be replaced by newly energing principles of insurgent warfares* 3 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-0067 1R000300290003-7 ~ sure DOCTRINE AND REVOLUTTONARY THOUOHT 1, Revolutinnary Doctrine and Urban Ingurgency, ‘Tho examination of the urban complex as an insurgent environment leads to thros conclusions: (1) The emphasis upen rural guorrilla operations in recent revolution~ ary doctrine is largely a result’ of insurgent success in underdevelopod areas. (2) In the more industrialized urban regions of the world, technological i growth is creating an environment which lends itself to urban insurgency as tho preferred alternative to rural guerrilla warfare, (3) Urban insurgency conductod within cortain world-city complexes and i motropolitan areas could have strategic significance sufficient to justify Ate sponsorship and support by 2 foreign power. ‘Tho three conclusiors lead quickly to a concern for the doctrine in terms of which revolutionary action 49 carried out, with particular attention to the way in which revolutionary doctrine mey be adapted to a changing urban environment. If some sort of blueprint is nacessary to provide direction and guidance to a subversive movement, the emergence of serious urban insurgency would evidently require both the developmont and dissemination of an urban- oriented revolutionary doctrine, The question is: dos such a dectrine even exist? ‘The role which printed material plays in such matters can hardly be ox- aggerated. Revolutionary teachings serve not only to influence the potential rebel in propagandistic ways; thoy also previde instruction in how to achieve * revolution, Such teachings range from instruction in the manufacture of ex- 38 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 — ~ ~ iver to the outline of techniques for organizing mass protests; on the plos: nore theoretical level, as in Ienin's work, they provide the revolutionary with an understanding of how the various stages of a revolution are to be put topnthers The oxtent to which the printing press has made possible the mass dissemination of such instruction is a central factor in modern ) revolutionary action, Tt 4s estimated that more than ten million copies of Mao'a teachings have appeared in English alone. i ‘Tits reliance upon printed doctrine is not surprising, considering the role which printed materiel plays in modern civilization. Ranging from cookbooks to medical journals, 2 never-ending list of publications provides the flow of ideas which make expertise possible, Revolutionary Literature follows much the sane pattern es that of ‘ny other activity the test of an idea begins with its widespread dissemination amon those interested in ite subject matter. The exchange of ideas among revolutionary thinkers 19 therefore much like the exchange of ideas among engineers or botaniatas it involves conferences, letters, critiques, seminars, conventions and publications, In turn, while revolution itself may be a matter requiring i the utnost secrecy, the spread of revolutionary ideas and techniques cannot be kept secret, for just as the poet seeks on audience, the revolutionary seeks a following. The history of the Comminist movement end its various Ansurgencies is paralleled by the publications of Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, i Mao, Ho and other, lesser-lnoyn, Communist thinkers. Given this necessity for the open distribution of subversive doctrine, | 4t 4s not surprising that such publications are equally available to those who are merely curious about -- or even opposed to == the revolutiomry's announced goals, Thus the possession and study of subversive literature is | i 39 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 | | | | | | | | | | | \ | | | | | \ i i ~ ~ herdly evidence of x revolutionary tendency. On the other hand, since the existence of even a moderately sophisticated subversive movenent 1s depend- ent upon the availability of skills and techniques of » fairly hich order, the absence of revolutionary Mterature will have the offect of limiting the tactical and technical expertise of a subversive organization. The ends to which ® subversive movement may pub cuch expertise are not necessarily the ends envisioned by the authors of any given revolution ary text. Mao's teachings may influence the thought end action of a rev- olutionary movement whose govls are so nationalistic as to entail ultimate opposition to Chiness interests. It is even conceivable that, anti-Communist subversion against an established Communist government could be inspired by and executed along tactical lines “Leta down originally” by Communist rev- olutionsry theory and doctrine, What is important is whether the modern potentis! for significant urban ineurgency 4s accompanied by both the theor- etical and technical Literature necessary to generate such insurgency ~~ independent of any question as to whether such insurgency would satisfy the notives originally underlying the Literature. The remarkable fact is that the Literature not only exists, but has ex- Asted throughout most of the 20th Century. 2. The History of Revolutionary Doctrine Certain major works of revolutionary writing reveal the history of Anourgent thought. They also reflect the changing tides of such thought, indicating how this thought has proceeded from an essentially urban orient= ation ot the beginning of the century to a rural orientation which may now be shifting back to the original emphasis upon revolution in the city. If ho Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7——————————— Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ——— ~ ~ such a shift does transpire in the wake of the urban tendencies described An Chapter Tio, the eerlier Literature can only regain tho. significance Which 1t hed lost in the intervening period, for it had stressed the key role of urban insurgency in tt® revolutionary proceca. Forenost among tho early works of revolutionary writing which stressed urtan insurgency were those of Lenin, an exemplified in Partisan Warfare, Written dn 1906, it was produced against the background of a decade of strikes and uprisings which had failed to unseat the Czarist governnent. In it, Lenin restates the goals of Marxism, reviews the historical process ; of revolution and emphasizes the central role of arned terror a3 a prelude to insurrection, Lenin did not restrict insurrection to urban warfare indeed, "Marxism does not tie the movement to ony particular ‘combat method", he wrote == but he did foresee the cruciel function pf-the city as the v1ti- nate revolutionary battlefield, Like slmost oll early Marxists, Lenin ins Atdally saw the highly industrialized Western European countries as more vulnerable to Marxist revolution than less developed nations such as Czarist Russia, His outline for the pursuit of revolution nevertheless influenced the cutcome of the Russian revolution, and proves relevant again as set forth in the pages which follow. Equally revealing is Trotsky's subsequent thought, widely circulated in ‘the Istory of The Russian Revolution. In the examination of thet revolution, Trotsky observes that “only maso insurrection has ever brought the victory of one sociel regime over another" and then argues that such insurrection can only succeed when t io organized corefully end coordinsted with » con- spiratorial movenent which prepares for ite emergence. In a brief chapter entitled "fhe Art of Insurrection", Trotsky provides an outline for this a. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ w process of subversion and insurrection which, as an outline, beare remark- able relevance to the current potehtiel for urban warfore. ‘Tho tactics 1t advocates aro readily adaptable to urban insurgency in the modern world, nin and Trotsky are not the only Conmunist thinkers to influence the patterns of Inourpency, of course. During the period innedtately following the Russian revolution, @ series of lesser-known thtorists developed in de~ tail the lessons of that revolution, ‘adapting then to the urban environment | of the as yet unsubverted West Buropsan conplex of netions. Much of their work was directed by the Soviet Union's various agencies, and some of it -- as vet forth in Section § = is virtually anonymous. But it reveals how the initial revolutionary vision off urban warfare could be worked out in 1 the detail necessary to make such warfare @ widespread phenonchon. ‘The gradual submergence of these early writings if the flow of reve olutionary literature 4a due, at least in part, to what may prove to be Idstorical ‘accident, Between the Russian Revolution end the presont were certain upheavals which served, at least monentariiy, to redirect the ener- gies of revolutionary thought from urban insurgency to rural insurgency. One of these upheavals was the momentary triumph of Fascism in certain regions, accompanied by the ruthless externination of West European revolutionaries; another was the occurrence of World War Two, which forced the Sovict Union to direct its attention to self defense while relenting in the effort to foment foreign revolution; still another was the success of the Chinese Communist struggle which, in the aftermath of World var Two, finally suc- ceeded in the seizure of China end the popularization of a rural guerrilla blueprint. And, fAndlly, the varied success of Ho, Castro and other rev- olutionaries working in an industrially undeveloped environment: has not only be Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ma ~ served to reinforce the monentun of the rural guerrilla doctrine but has ~ nerved to obliterate the earlier emphasis upon the urban complex ea the actual revolutionary battlefield. Recently published works indicate, however, that revolutionary theory == ; kept, as slways, in Line with revolutionary opportunity -~ ir once agsin shifting to the context of the city. Most typical of this work is the so~ esiled Yinimenval of the Urban Guerrilla, suthored by Carlos Marighelie, an Uruguan terrorist killed in 1969. As outlined in Section 5, his emp- hasis upon terrorism and the techniques of urban violence involves what amounts to a recipe for insurrection within the city. Coupled with the eorlier, more theoretical views of’Lenin and Trotsky, the ‘writings of Mari- ghella thos provide a blueprint for insurgency quits Gnlike that outlined by such rural-oriented advocates 28 Hao and Che. The Mininanual has found, in torn, a widespread audience and has been published in several Lengvares. The extracts which follow are not meant to characterize these writings a3 the key docurents of revolutionary theory. Such documents do not exist, in the sense thst no single text can be identified as, say, the history of Burope or the key to French cooking. In such things there are no Bibleas But these documents do indicate that the doctrine and techniques necessery | for urban insurgency do exist -= and their widespread dissemination indi- ates that the opportunity for revolution in en urbanized environment need not await the arrival of such teachings. j J. Lenin's Concept of Partioon Warfare Much of Lenin's early commentary is devoted to justifying the use of ! violence and insurrection as a necessary part of the revolutionary process. 43 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-0067 1R000300280003-7 ~ w This justification is provided as arrument ax-inst the position maintained by many turn-of-the-century critics, who held that the employment: of viel- ence wes neither compatible with the sims of a social revolutionery nor feonible in the face of a powerful overnmental force. Confronted with these cleins, Lenin provided ccunter-clains which emounted to the insist- ence thst violence was inevitable, Thus Partisan Warfare attempted to ano~ wer what was then, for the revolutionsry, on urgent question: what is arned strugrle? In answering that question Lenin set forth a series of observat- jong which bear relevance to the study of modern insurgency: (1) The ‘revolutionary mst reject abstract principles and undertake ‘a careful study of the mass struggle actually teking place. In this sense, 4b ds necessary to accept and employ "ever new and different methods of defense and attack”. Moreover, it must te concluded that "due to changes in social conditions, new forms of battle will srise inevitably", although no one can see what the character of these future encounters will be. (2) Given that @ revolutionery technique mst reflect historical con- ditions, the fatlure of one tactic, must be followed by the introduction of alternate tactics. The general strike is only one means of forcing the overthrow ‘of the government, just as the erection of barricsdes and their enployment a9 focal points of resistance may be another, Just as the rev~ clutionary mst be committed to actions, he must be flexible in the choice of tactics. (3) Armed struggle in the process of revolution in waged by small groups which have two goals requiring sharp distinction, "The first, ob- jective is to kill individuals such ao high officiels end lower-ranking members of the police and the ermy. ‘The second objective is th confiscate money fron the covernnent as well ao from private persons." Lenin estab- Lb Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7———— ee Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 —— ~ — shed the importance of this latter objective by arguing for the need to obtain finds in order to purchase arms, bribe officials, and cerry out the revolution. (4) The £zilure of such actions will generally reflect not so much the failure of a revolutionary tactic a3 the failure of revolutionary org- anization, "Our complaints about partisan warfare", Lenin wrote, "are nothing birt complaints about the weakness of our party...uhich ie incapable... of organizinr the uprising". To key to successful revolution is organizstion, & point Lenin stresses repestedly. : (5) Since partisan warfare -~ that is, revolutionary insurrection == is merely a "form of civil war", 4t 13 best fought by what Lénin called a "combat party", prepered to agitate, demonstrate or terrorizé“as’ the ‘nted arises. Aa Lenin puts it such revolutionary elements "must lears;how to wage war, That is all there is to it.” : (6) Such action must be executed in strict accordance with the revol~ vtion's ultimate goals. They must not be allowed to develop spontaneously, in such 2 way that they degenerate into inconclusive violence. And, most. important, they must be executed in such a way that they widen the pap be= teen the covernnent and the people, so 28 to sustain the revolution. (7) The battles of the revolution must be conceived of in terms of a protracted war, "a series of a few big battles, sepsrated by comparatively Jong intervals, and a large number of small engagements which take place As Lenin puts it, "the uprising cannot i during these interim periods assume the traditional form of a single blow". ‘ ‘These major pointe/ rettersted elsewhere in Lenin's other work, do not preclude the development of @ rural guerrilla war, of course -- for to do so us Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7aes Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Releas 1073/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ Kould violate Lenin's Biphaois upon flexibility in thowshoico of techniques and tactics, Dut thoy do reflect his awareness that ovccessful revolution requires concentration upon urban violence, "Organize fighting brigades among students, and particularly among werkoro", Lenin wrote, "Let the. somo can undertake te assassinate a spy or blew squads begin te train, up 2 police statien, others can attack a bank to expropriate funds for an insurrection, Let every squad learn, if only by beating up pelice", In the revolution ef 1917 which thrust Lenin inte power, it was the + force of such urban violence that proved decisive. / | 4, Revolutionary Insurgency and the Principle of Erosion What 19 most striking about revolutionary doctrine 4s not merely the way in which 4t 1s adaptable to modern urban insurgency; what ie equally sig- nificant 49 the underlying concept of how an epposing military force is to br doalt with, for thie concept -- which aneunte to- the concept of erosion -- io what makes the revolutionary throat so serious in the context of modern urbanization. In hie study of the Russian Revolution, Trotsky identified the esacntial condition for revolutionary success 2s being the elimination of military opposition by indirect means. "The first task of every insurrection is to bring the troops over to its side", he wrote, "and tho chief means of accomp- Ushing are the general strike, mass processions, street oncounters, battles at the barricades", ‘Trotsky's interpretation of the Russian Revolution can : bo reduced to the recognition that successful revolution mst be predicated | not on the physical defeat of tho government's security forces -- for that i is, after all, a most difficult undertaking -= but on the erosion of those ~ — Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ : fercea through propaganda, confusion, creation of disorder and a gradual elimination of their will te resist inourgency, ‘The tactics of the barricade aro essential psychological: to create in the context of the urban environment and on the part of tho government's security forces a widespread distaste for the Kind of conflict vhich characterizes revolution, If that distaste can and only if that be cultivated, the army's will to resist can be eroded happens can a revolution succeed. It is this insight vhich underlies the real threat of urban insurgency, for as it is carried over into the modern urban onvironnent it feeds en conditions of stress which make erosion an ‘even greater danger than it was in 1917. , It is tree, of coures, that in’ the aftermath of the Russian experience revolutionary thought has beon entangled in disagreement over’both goals and tactics. Lenin's emphasis upon the city as the focal point of revolution Jed to tho developnent of tactical blueprints for the conduct of urban war- fare, as oxomplified in the remarkably detailed Rend to Victory (1927) and ita successor, Arned Insurrection (1528). Based on the scrutiny of specific vrben uprisings == particularly these in Hanburg (1923), Shangha (1926) and canten (1927) == these Communist works were elrovlated througheut Europe end Asia, and oven todsy bear relevance to the conduct of vrban insurrection; Andoed, they have been revived and republished in several Languages during the past. decade, But their significance has been overshadowed by the energence of a revolutionary doctrine which did net focus upon the city as the focal point of revolution. As Mao's thought superseded Lexin's, as the goals of the Russian Revolution shifted, as Communist success in the rural arene of China led to a different attitude about revolution, revolutionary thought hao concentrated on the tactice ef rural inourgency omid deep disagroemente ‘ever the nature of revolution itself. ur Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 Hence the difference between Mao's emphasis upot™tho peasant 25 the vohicle of revolution, in contrast to Lenin's emphasis upon tho factory workers Hence, also, the deeper disagreement: anong Connuniots as to the relative virtve of urban insurgency 29 opposed to rural inourgency, resulting An ideological disagreement evor the identification of targots appropriate for rovelution. It can be no coincidence that the most significant revol- utionary events in recent history -- the Cuban revolution and the Indechinese wars <- were thus carried out along lines dictated by Mao's thought, since those vere revolutions which occurred within underdevoleped areas that lent thomselvos to rurel guerrilla warfare, Nor ia it any coineidonco that 90 the world beconss more urbanized, and as revolution 4s directed more stead- Ay against these urbanized regioris, Lenin's thovght, =z, aleng with the tn- sights of Trotaky and otter carly acherants of urban warfare -- receivos ro~ noved attention. But the differences in ideology, in goals, in tactics and dn techniques are nevertheless accompanied by azrrencnt ‘dn terms of funda- mental principles, Ard in both Lenin's and Mao's thought, the fundanental principle renains the sane. It 49 the principle identified by Trotsky: rev- elution succeeds only with the erosion of the opposing arned forces. the erosion of armed resistance is essentially a matter of morale: once the will te resist has disappeared, revolution may cucceed. Since Lenin and Mao are in accordance on this principle, differences in tactical emphasis with regard to urban insurgency versus rural insurgency is really only aocondary matter. The crucisl quostion for a revolutionary mst be: where niy this erosion process be exploited most effectively? In tho modern world, the anower is that At is most effective within an uxban complex -- for it is there that the various influences of technology, mags conmunications, political unrest and ideological stross result in a condition ideally ouited for rev- 4B Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ‘ws olutionary action, Ag™Sutlinod in Chapter Two, it 1a ‘wile condition which makes tho urban onvironnant most vulnerable, and 1t 4o this vulnerability which guarantees increasing revolutionary attention to urban insurgency. In Chapters Seven and Bight the dotatls of the erosion process are furthor ex- | amined. What is immediately obvious is that since revolutionary thought is opportunistic, since revolution feods on the psychological orosion of oppos- Ation, and since urbanization means increasing vulnersbility to psychological | erosion, ‘urban insurgency 19 undoubtedly Gestined to play a central role in future revolutionary thinking. Porhaps most important 4s the inevitable recognition that this principle ef erosion may be exploited for strategic purposes, as well: if an urban on- vironment lends itself to revolutionary action because it is vulnerable to erosion, it also lends itself to strategic action carricd out merely to erode a nation's military otrength, Given the dual-varfare wission described in i Chapter One, and given the impact which urban insurgency can have on the morale of an army, the US Arny provides an ideal target-for strategically-inspired urban insurgency -~ that 4s, insurgency whose objectives aro not revolutionary, | but diversionary, Moreover, urban insurgency may have strategie impact beyond even the erosion and diversion of an army: given the technical vulnerability of an industrialized nation, such insurgency provides a readily available woapon for eroding a nation's ability to function effectively in an industrially | compotitive world, Few of these implications are likely to be everlooked. | | | _ Ba The Popularization of Revolutionary Doctrine | ‘The complex events of the post World War Two era may be understood in terms of shifting strategies and alliances, tho gradu) rovision of certain i i | Conmnist beliefs and the emergence of so-called "third world" nationalistic ug Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7eee Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~~ ~ _movenents which have adopted the techniques of the eorly Communist revolution- aries without necessarily identifying themselves es Communists, In the un- developed areas of the world, the application of these techniques hes re: sulted in rural ruerrilla warfare, slong the lines exploited by Mzo, Ho and j Castro. In more devoloped areas, the resvlt has been urban violence. And amid that violence, a modernized revolutionary literature has been circulated, with emphasis upon the techniques of urban terror, Almost all of it rein- forées the earlier doctrine, which called for terrorism-as a prelude to urb- an insurrections Marighella's Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla is typical of this recent Literature. In it, Marighella identifies the task of the urban subversive: "to distract, to wear out, to denoralice” through kiiindpping, ‘doszesination, sabotage and the proparandizetion of violence. What if, most striking about the Minimanual is its detailed adaptation of the earlier revolutionary con- cepts to the modern urban environmnt: in it occur specific instructions on such things as the hijacking of commercial sircraft for proparanda curposes, the "kidnapping of a politicel personality....to exchange or Liberate im- prisored revolutionary comrades", the use of the telephone and postal system | to spread folse information on the planting of bonbs, and the employmant of the automobile in anbushes against local police. Recent events reveal how effective this adaptation has been, not only in Latin American but in those | urban areas Linked together through the growth of modern technology. Mari- ghells himself stresses the impact which subversion in one city can have upon the political climate in another city a hemisphere away. Throughout the Minimenval, he proclains the effect which terrorion at distance can have upon the United States in particular, i ° 50 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 - ~ = | Marighs}1a"s politicel motivation remains unclesr, and the Hinimanual confines itself to scorn for "Yankee imperialinm and fasciat capitalism", jon of the existing revealing no political objectives beyond ths destruct: system, Even so, the Minimanval echoes the insurgency doctrine of the early Communist theorists. With its emphasis vpon the robbery of banka for the sake of obtaining revolutionary funds, its stress upon proper timing ond careful organization, and its concern for the’ infiltration and neutralizat- ion of governmental security forces, the Kinimanual is clearly influenced by the writings of Lenin ard Trotsky. Its primary effect, however, has been not only the resurrection of Lenin's emphasis upon urban insurgency, but the popularization of such insurgency 3s the focal point of revolution. ‘The Minimanual does not address itself to the relationship between ‘tine governmentad the terrorist movenent and the developnent, of 2 cland: apparatus which would assume power once it is ready to be seized; in this sense, Narichella's published thought 4s typical of many contemporary pamphlets which emphasize revolution for its own sake, Nor does the Mini. anual theorize about the phases of he revolutionary process; instesd, it provides a scenario for intensifying organized terrorism to such a point that the governnent in power finally collapses, Marichella, unlike Lenin, mekes no distinction between subversion and insurrection, In the absence of this distinction, the subject of mass uprising goes untreated, and what Ao left te 2 forma via which increased violence mey become incipiont, urban insurgency. What 19 Important in auch work de therefore not only its popularization of urban insurgency, but its advocacy of a form of violence and terroriem ainost perfectly suited to the purposes of strategic insurgency. As with Bl q Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ we ainilar revolutionary treatises which have appeared in the past decade, it is Uhis adaptability which makes the urban insurgency proclamations of the Mintnanvel most importante) Urban Insurgency and Its Strategic Inplenentation Not all revolution is Communist inspired, nor is all revolutionary in- surgency devoted to the establishment of a Cormuniat government. Oppression by the povernnent in power nay provoke opposition from dissident groups who disagree with each other a9 to alternative forms of government, who nevertheless ‘join together in revolution, and who then struggle among thanselves Tor power -- es in the period following the Caar's abdication in 1917. Amid such struggle, the superior organizution of 2 Conmunist minority may well result in its triumph, of course -- asd presumably, in its ewift profession of alliance with other Communist powers. But in the sense in which At was conceived by Lenin and advocated by Trotsky, world- wide Commnist revolution as 2 single, coherent thrust for power my be de= | seribed 29 an abandoned goal. Interns] conflict anong the major Communist powers, plus the continued survival of the Soviet Union without such vorld- wide revolution, heve been the principle factors in this revision of Commn= i ist theory. In its place may be emerging the reliance upon revolution not i for ideological purposes but for strategic purposes. Several major factors underlie this possibility, The advent of nuclear i weapons having compromised their willingness to risk total wor in the settling of conflict, the major powers of the world have sought lterative strategies ‘ and techniques; the US doctrine of Limited war was initially for just thie purpose. Whether or not the success of this alternative strategy in the Korean War served to inspire 2 deliberate counter-stratecy io a matter of se Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 | | . | i | ~ speculation. Perhaps more important is the way in wirich urban insurgency reflects the availability of such a counter-strategy. . This counter-atratecy is made available by the emergence of three factors, First, the advent of technology has resulted in an unprecedented concentration of eccnomic and political power in the metropolitan areas of those nations which have become modernized, The stability of such a nation 4s thus dependent on the stability of its major cities. Second, the source of its economic and political strength has ironically become the greatest vulnerability of the modern industrialized state, since its cities offer auch concentrated targets. Third, the widespread dissemination of & thoroughly tested and highly effective blueprint for urban insurgency, avail- able to dissident elements of varied political persvasich, ‘ha's' resulted in a volatile mixture of revolutionary technique and revolutionary motivation, This mixture has already resulted in thousands of urban, explosions, of varying Yorce and varying impact. The manipulation 6f this mixture being possible, the cities being vulnerable, and the strength of an industrialized nation being dependent on its cities, such a nation may be readily attacked by the fonenting of urban insurgency within its cities -- or, indeed, by the fomenting of urban insurgency within cities upon which its own economy Ag dependent although the cities themselves are thousands of miles away. ‘The strataric variations available are enormous, The actual seizure of power need not be the objective of such a counter-strategy. Rather, its objective could be to divert the energies and resources of the attacked nation, forcing it to concentrate upon its own internal problems at the expense of external matters. Moreover, the attacking nation neod not expose itsolf in the process. Relying on clan- 53 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7 — ~ destine means to manipulete unrest it could, theoret Wally, orchestrate” that verest in such a way it is maintained at whetever level desired. An With Limited war, Limited inourcent war is also posoible. And for the purposse of strategic diversion, limited insurgency may be more suitable than insurpency broupht to a fever pitch. For the lettcr runs the risk of culminating in insurrection, with the consequent risk of an abrupt ex- while limited insurgency, marked by tUnction of the insurgent movenent extreme terrorism but not accompanied by seriove plans for the revolutionary seiaure of power, offers Ltself to continuation over a sustained period and hence offers the greatest prospect of diverting the strength of a tion. Since it is in this senze that urban insurgency involves strategic potential, it 1s also in this sende that the sbsence-af any, serious comment about revolutionsry objectives ia noot siriking in Hanjghellats treatige and similar works of modern revolutionsry advocstes, Nor must insurgency be confined to the cities within an attacked notion, Given the interreluticnship of the modern industrial cities 2s desoribed in Chepter Two, @ nation may find its economic system interrupted, its internal stability undermined and its foreign alLiances challenred by the impact of urban insurcency executed in cities which are well outside its oun geonraphic boundaries. If the attacked nation can be drawn into diverting its energies to the solutdon of urban ineurgency in sone ouch third-country target, the compound effect of this strategy vould be even crester, : Because of these posaibilities, the response to urban insurgency re~ quires careful sssessnent of not only the motives but also the objectives of an insurgent movement. Tn the sense set forth in Chepter Two, it sls roquires recognition thet insurgency may be widespread, concentrated on a 5h Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 = a ~ particular urban function and yet not even apparant to the attacked nation because of its relative dispersion throughout a network of-'internal and The variations on such insurgency are therefore endless, externa) cities. as the case studies of Section II illustrate. Exactly what role the US Arny might play in the reeistence of such insurgency is the subject of Section III. : “55 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ = ~ SECTION IT ” THE CHARACTIRISTICS OF URBAN INSURGENCY The secret for the success of any operation, simplo or complicated, easy or difficult, 1s to rely on determined men, Strictly speaking, there are no easy oporations. AL must be carricd out with the sane care oxercised in the case of the most difficult, beginning with the choice of the human element, which meens relying on leadership and capacity for decision in every test. Carlos Marighelia, Minimanval of y+. The Urban 4 duerrilla | Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 a CHAPTER FOUR ~~ - ORGANIZATION OF THE URRAN UNDERGROUND ence of the Underground Zealot resistance to the Ronan occupation of Palestine, Spartans working within the Denocratic institutions of Athens to develop dissension and distrust of the governnont, Assassins enploying selective murder in ote to influence politics in the Near East during the eruadess Committees of Correspondance tranonitting information and propaganda anong the Britt sh colonies of Worth Anorica, Reclatance to the Gorman and Japanese occupation forces, Political murders of athletes in Munich and US» officials in Montevido and Khartoun, Rioting demonstrators attacking British troops in An the atreots of Belfast. Abductions of Aneriean and British businessmen in Argentina, Lingering low-intensity political conflicts and disputes throuch= out the world which are increasingly evident 4n netropolitan areas in the form of aircraft hijackings letter bombs, Kddnappings, political murders, bank robberies, demonstrations and riots. Whether local or international in inpact, all these activities were, or are, based upon the extatdnce of an underground organization, ‘This organiza don nay be sophisticated or simple, large or small, but recardless of these aspects At will be generally organized along the traditional Mnes of the Antegal underground apparatus which has existed throughout the history of mantdnds ‘ | The A1legal underground apparatus ard most of Ats techniques have teen exposed because of Stn increasing enploynent during the lant three decadesy as voll, as a vast body of litcrature which oxists doseribing 1t, As a result 56 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Santzed Copy Approved for Release ZOTSTOATOS CIA-ROP8S.00671R000300280008-7 =——- i — ante aspect of revolutionary warfare 1s now in uso thrdwfhout the vorld by ‘ 1 nmerous minority groups necking to inplenent their ow partiovlar social or : pol4#teal changes: Enploynont of AU1cpal underground techniques by these groups will continue as Jong as they hold prontae of Amposing tho vill of a ninortty upon a nafority in a chort pertod of tei! Nost of their succes i has boon due to the misunderstanding of, and Anproper reaction to these tech= ' niques by governments and security forces throughout tho world.’ i The {Lege underground apparatus; often a creation of cone secret 50 — | chetyy has formed tho basis for resistance or revolt throughout history, and this type of organtzation 4s nelther new nor zare.' This typo of organiza ton has also often existed as the "other olde of tho coin" for many oxgan- Azations which appear,’ or have appeared to participate Jegally,and openly in the affairs of soctetyy a | The AUegal underground apparatus 4s not the product of any one group or i of any particular period in hiatorys! However; 4t can be raid that during the ' latter half of the 19th century and most of the Zt contury; the Conmunist { Party developed and used this form of organization and 4ts operational tech= i niques more successfully than any othor group in the history of the worlds ‘Tho Increased oppearance of rovolutionary warfaro in the mid and lato 20th century; particularly the use of the AJlegal underground apparatus and its operational techniquess 4s clearly a rosponsetoy and conaistant wth the ! ‘three major ntrategie and tactieal considerations which charactorize the i; conduct of modern varfarey’ The first 4n tho rlso of total wx == a process which has evolved from mass conscription of mans amalesy to the conplete i Anvolvenont of all monbers of a population in a aituation where two opposing forces are attempting to organize and control the samo popitiation,: The 57 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7—eeeeeeeSFsSsF Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 second As the desire oF participants to eacapo the ef Mts of ever-inereas~ Ang flre-povors! The thind 46 tho wish of partictrants to keep tho conflict at a level of intensity low enough to preclude the introduction of nuclear weasons;! Today 4t may be possible to add a fourth general consideration: the desire ' of partictpantay whother oné or all aro engaged An clandestine operations, to keep the conflict at a level of intensSty low enough to preclude any particirant fron having to introduce conventional main force units and/or | weapons systensi! : | Detection, of tho 41legal underground apparatus 4s usurlly difficulty especially 1n more open societienss and especially during 4s formative perlod,! This often holds true wntil the tine that tho mndercronnd inttotes enough overt actions to produce a pattern which may revedl ‘Sts extstences’ This 1s duc to the fact that nost notroroliten recurity forces Aces! poldecy custons; federal investigative agencies; in the more oper societies spend the najority of their tine} and focus noct of their activities upon crime and erininals Otviously) many of the carly activittes of the 411eral wndergromd apparatus such as expropriations, theft of arma; and even murder, will be confused with non-political eriminal Fehavior and activities, It nay be only after the "crine wave" ceases to abate thé security forces cone ‘to realize that they have a politically motivated 42legal element to deal wthy ‘Todays in cortedn rockettesy Anvolvencnt in the formation and develomment i of an {legal underground apparatus may easily fall within the tounds of what { han been denoribed as "dincrotionary behavior"; Discretionary behavior te that behavior which the majority of the popillation docs not really believe threatens the otatus quo = avon though 1t nay te quite violent or anti-social 58 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7, ag An tho contoxt of urfan Anmurgencys Obviously. Af Bf could keep tho | number of Allegal underground organizations & a particular country or region Jinited An nunbery and tholx operations at such a low evel of Antensity an to permit then to be viewed as Ndiscretionary" by nost of the populace one could thon engage in a systematic attack upon 8 govornnenty syateny or group for a considerable porlod of time without eliciting a vigorous re= sponse fron security forcos:' 2g The Objectives of the Undemrround , Offenatve operations of tho L1lecal wnierground apparatus are usually short in duration and executed by small teans using offensive tactics and following corefully nade plans which enphasizey detatled Antetlgence collec tion and reconnassiance, surprises violence, end robhlitys’ "Keep in mind that 4n the conduct of its operations the underground mist: obey the principles of war FIUS the principle of Deliberate Delays" Deliberate delay has been acncribed as the "provention of disclosure and defeat in premature hostile contacts"! In other words: "pick your fight"; and "Af tho fight looks falxy bug outs Many of these operations will be carried out dturing the hours of dark nosst hovever, due to tho ease of evading dixect fire of small axms An an urban environnenty as ty merely tuxning a corners daylight operations are quite feasible; The objectives of these operations aro the lowering of | tho morale of the underground capturing exms; materlily fundsy ox hosta~ gens ville proving the ineffectiveness of the governments! A11 will provide training for nenbers of the underrxound apparatuns These eporations are 59 | | | | Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7_ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~» |“ unlikely to produce any stunning defents of the security forces and evon' Jenn Lkoly to result in the total overthrow of a governmenty however, thoy do support the conplete spectmm of actions and techniques noei by the anprxotun to funetton in an urban environnents! Mega. unanegrom: Unfortumatelyy auc to thelr naturey those offensive operations are often the rost obvious rortion of the actiora of an S1lecal underground apparatus and as such attract the bulk of publicity and covernnent attentions! Far more Amportant and far more dangerous in the Jong run 4s the actual underground apparatus itself and the political causes that drive tte / ‘The actual operation of an underground apparatun is muh more dangerous and conplicated in an urban environnont thon in a rurel environnents ‘The i urban envinonnent offers far greater tenptations and. conforts to, menbers of | the ongantration than doon the rural envizonsents Many opportunities ¥41 bo available for menbors of tho underground apparatus to take dangerous short- i cuts and chort-clroult the more tedious but essential socurtty neasumes required ‘to reduce the risk to personnel, equipment, and opcrations in the city, The density of the urban population may offor more potential reerults to tho urtan Anguxgentsy but At also hartors nore potential informers; As a conse= quence, At 4s vital that the organization be made up of dedicated personnel and that 1% conducts constant detailed training for ell nenbersy whether thelr positions are sdninistrative or operational. In addiisony a very high level Of Aiscipline mst be maintained in onder to insure a satisfactory level of participation and performance by 4s menberss All of these conditions and factors are recognized in the traditional techniques of tho 411egal underground apparatus and a creat deal of attention 4a pald to then, Sone rodern underground organizations have tended to akin 60 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassfiod in Part- Sanitzed Gopy Approved for Release ZOTSIOAIOBCIA-RDPBS.00671R000300260003.7 over these realttton na tno conountng and wieconsarys focusting Anatend upon offensive operations in hopes of short-run remultss Usually they have gold heavily for theso attenpted short cuts. The Tupanarosy operating in and '+ around Montevideo, Uruguay; came clone to dentruction pursuing a course consist - | ang of spontaneous,’ uncoordinated, decentralized armed actions; and have been 4n tho process of attenpting to rebuild their organization along tho lines | of the traditional A1legal. underground apparatusy ‘The experiences of both our allies and ourselves during tho last two decades should have proved to us that the design and Anplenentation of effoc~ tive countermeasures to Ansurgency whether mum or urbany must be predicated ‘upon a mich nore thorough understaning of the 12legal underground apparatus and Ats operations coupled with increased political armucness op, the part of our represenatives closest to the situations’ oT ° Tt follows that there Le a definate need for developing the attity of selected officers; vhethor serving as advisors, staff officers; or connan- dersy to recognize the involvement and mantplation of various social and political activities in foreign areas by underground oxgantsations and toch~ niques,! To accomplish thisy 4t must be insured that those personnel under i | stand nore than just the taste terms and conponents dencribing revolutionary | vary They must apmreciate the rolitical significance of thene activities | and thelr very sensitive nature in an wrban environnont, where each act of tho yartiotpanta An raphaly tranonttted through the rotation and readdly omplifieds They must understand not only the traditional A2eqal underground appaxatun tut alco sone of the nodexn varlations of those organtzationay op orationsy and techniquens' What follows 4s a contination outline and thunb= nail ketch of the traditional {Legal underground apporatue which forms the { 61 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7.—— Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-0067 1R000300290003-7 “tase for any activity in any phase of revolutionary war” Coliiny Principle of Underrronnd_Oxranization ‘The traditional underground apparatus operating in nn urtan environment 4s “oeanizned hlerarchtally; and rioes from a base of cells, through butldings, neichtorhoodsy and @ntricts to tho urtan or metropolitan headquarters.’ However, sone of the current Allopal undercround organizations; yarticularly those which are operating Anternationnityy have a mich smaller structume than the traditional oxenntzationj and thot cols may be oxcantzed more along func Monal Unes for a spectfie pertod of tines or for a spoct fie minions: The coors of the undomcround aypretus are {Tega}, and tho prinary means tuned to reach those coals are A1Jerals! For these reasons’ the underground wil1 alwoys try to conceal the identity of its menberchip and ‘tho structure of ite organirations’ a ‘The A2egal underground apparatus ean be apres throlighout ths metropoliten envizoments! Its menbers cone fron,all over the urkan aren and nay well hold a wide variety of rocial and econte ponttions within the axeay consequently a well organized underground han access almost everywheres! It performs the normal tesks of any orgenization in addition to those specialized tasks re~ quired to keep 4¢ in business and to accomplish Ate on particular ends Tt may be that the 421eral underground aproratu: f traditionally organized, may perform nore functions itself than any other single orrantzation. known to man == except a governnenty whlchy of courses Jt 1s designed to replaces Menbership may be divided into leaders; nembersy auxiliaries and cympa~ ‘thizers;) The leadership 1s composnd of the dedicated full-time personnel / 62 f Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7eae Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ iho axe dovoting all thelr timo and effort to the undere@6und ond to ttn objectives? Tho regular nonbera normally maintain thetx normal role in the ‘urbon area while performing organizational duties and attending underground nectings and receiving trainings Auxtiierfes aro part-time workers avallatle utilized for the por to the underground only for particular periods of tin formance of certain tanks or special assfqmentss' Synpathtzers are non-nenbers who aro not.apt to acolet tHe government and who are generally woll-dleposed tovanl the undereround and its alms) They may Involve themselves 1n denon strattons and occastonelly provide other ald to the appartusé! The prinary cell 19 tho aslo building block of tho 41cgal underground apparatus and 4s usually composed of a leader and two menbers, This composition may vary greatly and will be dealt with later, The leader will supervine the activities of the menbers and he will be the only one to reecive ana tronmlt orders; Anfornationy snd material vertically or horizontally as required by tho role of his cell in the underground apperatus,' The ways 4n which the primary cells nay be arranged in order to build an underground apparatus are limited only vy Amagination after carefwl evaluation of the overall slivation and your omm objectives,’ Obviously the density of the population will have an 4nfluence upon the munbor of eel that are, or can bo formed: ‘The cells 4n on underground organization nay or may not be highly compartmentalized “= usually this w111 depend uron rovernnent actions toward ‘the underground,’ Compartnontation Lintts or prevents contact and knowledge of one menber ty another ani of one coll ty anothory so on through the apparay ‘tues If the apparatus 4a conpartnontired apprehension of ono many or even one cell; 411 not normally either ham tho apparstus or pornit security 63 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7———————————— Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ ~ © forces to "roll-up" any nore personnol, or colic, simply becaune of lack of Anfornatton about other members and other cells on the part of thore An covornment handai! 7 A further feature of. tho erll wold be uhether At was orgenized functionally o= geograptentys Tt might be the explosives manufacturing, { cell for the entire underground or rinply a cell in u neighborhood that may have to perform a wide variety of finctionss' Often the two are combined ana the cell vill porfom as tho AntelHgonce coll for a neichtorhood ory let us say; the reconnaissance ecll for targets in Western Europes’ : The typos of cells are broadly divided into adninistrative cells and operational cells: Specific exanples of administrative eclls would boy re= pong etes) Ex eruiting, training, finance, transport, manufacturingy,.14: anples of opexntional. cells would bey Antellicenco; sabotagey psychological oporations; assassination; amed teans; eto; During times of nang xecruit= Ang and mass organtzingy awdlaty cells are sonotimes formed as an ald in handling largo numbers of personne] and in omer to provide a vehicle for testing and evaluating prospective menbers for the underground apporatns Atself, Azrangenent of the cells in the organization wil] be based upon con= Aitions in the operational area and upon the inaghnxtiony trainings and experience of the leaderss' However the general overall arrangenent will. usually be etthor 4n parallel or in sorles. In a parallel axrangenent of cells} communications and conmand and control xun vertically and thore 1s littley 1f any, contact anong the nenbera or cells horizontelly, This arrangement 4s particularly useful, ! 4n tinea of danger to tho apmratus and in the conduct of Antellience 6h Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : ClIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7ee Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7 ~ collection operations where tho necd to double check twornation and to maintain a back-up source of information are important taskss hj Conmmications and Seomeity Within the Urlon Underrround Cells arranged in series run horirontally end ere most useful in activition. requtring a division of lator such as manufacturing (material each cell performing its task upon At in omer moves fron cell to cel: to produce a finished tem much like an assembly lino in a factory). Production of'an underground newspaper would be another exanpile of eolls An serles (one cell collects infornption; one cell edits it, one cell yublishes At, and another mikes the distribution). 7. 0, Conmunteation anong the cells may bo chther techniéal or non-technical, formal or informals In a notropoliten area it 4s possible that ‘the abundant technical communications factlitics available to the urban Ancurgent- nay greatly influence his operations by Improving his communications == eves» telephones, small connerclal two-way radios, end rato and TeV. acts to receive hts appeals and messages to the populations ‘The urban environnent also offers easy procurenent of chonicaln for production of invislhle inks and for the conponente required to build a varloty of communtcations equipment, Ify howevery the underground makes use of technical conmunt= cations avatlable to 4t in the clty At runs the risk of compromise by governnent security forces using wire~tapping and other forns of electronic surviellances For ‘thie reason most underground oxcanizations vill rely upon tra~ ditional non-technical cormunication methods; These non-technical means 65 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ of commmnication may range from vistal nignals (emps hung in a bell tower) to use of both live and dead “drops".s’ A drop 1s simply a place or percon where messages or materials are left for another’to pick up — thus preventing both members of the underground from being in one location at the same time and even from knoving one anothers It could be a clerk 4n a shop (a live drop) or beneath o rock in a park (a dead drop),’ The formality for communication within the organization depends largely upon the size of the cells ~~ 4f they are large, informal connunication with few written messages or records will be provelants' If colls are snall the reverse 4s true —- more writing and records will be necessary.’ In underground communications messageq are normally sent by two routes ‘to Ansure delivery and great enphacia placed upon acknoyedgement of message receipt -= otherwise conpronise must be assuneds* a” In general; most 41legal undergromas solve their problens of neans and methods used to coordinate over long periods of tine (connand and control) by centralizing their administretive functions end decentralizing their operational functions,’ Too nuch centralization requires too much coordination, Too much coordinatien requires too much conmuntentions Too nuch conmenication in terns of frequent meetings, production of docunentsy and written messages helps the secw:ty forces attacking the apraratuss In onder to prevent thin condition the traditional apparatus will issue an many minsion typo orders a possible and leave the details to the Tower echelons: Security te olenxly 6 vital factor in overy anpect of overy activity of ‘the {1logal underground apparatus. Basically the menber of an 41lecal underground apparatus is eafert when he apecars to be most like every : 66 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~~ other member of the populace and doer nothing to aroune nvspicions Thin Wl] recuire training and self-discipline and cere wit), have to be taken to prevent accidental divilgerice of information or tosntings’ MarighelInts Minimannal stresses that the urban insurgent must take care to blend with tho Fop.lace An the arca of the olty that he An operating Ans Docinents must often be stolen, forged, or purchased in order for menbera to exist or conduct operations. This is DMeger problem for the urban Ansurgent because he 1s apt to face nore papervork and contre] measures based upon paperwork than for the rural ineurgenté*" Interrational operations of an i2egal underground apparatus vill requize even mere in the way of rophistieated doouentations: ose attention 4s pald to the security of necting and rendesvous nitess ‘These sites are changed frequently and, tho tines of arrival and dovarture of underground menbers 1s varied. In public, signals and passwords are used to insure that the axea is clear and that toth members recognize each others Other security measures include Anvestigation of tackgrounds of recruit sj loyalty osths to impress members with security, liniting personal, contact anong nenbers of the underground, etrict regulation of aison, nininization of records, and use of codes and cover identities and storieas In case of capture of a member cf the illegal underground apparatus, rost orcantvations will exfiltrate ell menters the captured individual could Sdentify. If posslbles all fentures and activities of the organtza~ tion that the captured member could xeveal are Ammediately alteredy Because of this, the French Army in Algiers often collected Arabs at ranfony knowing a given group would protably contain sone cell menberss whose cells would - thereby be exfiltrated from Alglerss’ 6 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ ~ 5__The Oreanization of Denonstrations Tho denonstration 1s one of the rost usefuly and most usedy tech- niques of Answmgeneyi’ Tn the wetan netting the denonstration takes on added significance because it serves the functions of attracting publicity, Anvolving minbers of the population in a connon activity, previding a training vehicle for menbers of the underground organization,’ And it may produce a situation where over-rerction on the part of the government, wil] elionate menters of the populations! ‘The underground oxganization will carefully examine the groups Anvolved in a particular denonstration in order to insure, that there is really a chance for them to control the demonstration and turn its use to their ow enisi! Large, planned ‘demonstrations almost always, possess the potential for transformation into mass violence of, euch size and dyra- ton that tho government nay te forced Anto connttting errors and into acting in a fashion which may further aggravate tho situation In come cases the underground organization may plan and execute ‘small demonstrations which appear to te spontaneous. Because they use a United nunber of yartetpants and depend a great deal upon surprises these tyres of demonstrations require detailed planning and a high degree of discipline, If violent, this tyre of denonstration reduces the nunber of unnecessary castalities while providing training and experience for nenbora of the underground apparatus, It may also provide an outlet for nore vinlont menbers of the organtration short of out and out terroist actions! Tho gener techniques used to oxganize and control a denonstrution do not vary significantly with the. rethods used to take over or "stiffen" 68 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ a an on roing denonstration which the urtan Insurgents have determined will nerve their purpones.’ In the najority of cases these techniques are simple avd depend nore upon discipline and training than upon sheer nunbers of underground partictranta; . Even quite large masses of yeople can be controlled by # snail nunber of personnel using the following techniques’ ‘The senior nenbers of the underground responsible for the control of the demonstration will generally keep themselves some distance from the demonstration and any action occurring as a result of the denonstrations ‘These leaders constitrte what 1s known as the exterior command and they transmit their orders to other menters of the underground apparatus Anside the demonstration via hand and arn signals; messengeray, and todayy with the advent of small, inexpensive two-way radio sets, even use ef radloy ‘The second level of leadership 1s usually located inside the deron- stration and has the mission of transmitting and supervising the orders of the exterior connands Due to the csliviar forn of the underground apparatus these may be the only underground menbers who know the identity of the exterior command, It is possitle that the operation might be “eut= out" thre use of mensengers and/or pre-arranged signala 50 elatorately that very few of the underground eolis or individual members participating would actually know how many members of the undexground apparatus were actually particlpatings’ Tho second level of leadership will usally remain elono to any sicnificant actiona that the denoastration beetmes ine volved 4n and as a result wll usually require some phynieal protection An the fom of todyguands to perrit them to devote their attention to supervision of the denonstration:’ The body guimis will also usually have 69 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7 ~~ ~ ~ 2 secondary mission of insuring the escapo of this interlor leadership, even at thelr own expense, from government security forces or from other elenents within the denonstration itself.’ Another elenent of the underground within the denonstration are the !'standard bearers" who may be carrying signsy banners, etc.’ Initially the standard may reflect popular 1esues or denands; but as the devonstra= tion Antensifiesthe Jeaderg may direct that these standaiis be changed for standards which are more aggressive in nature, thus contributing to a change in the tone of the denonstration, Many times important menhers of the underground apparatus involved in the demonstration may locate thenselves 4n the vicinity of specific standards in order that they gan be casty located ty messengers and other underground participants during the course of the demonstration? V Sone operational cells may have highly specialized missions. One of these would to thet of "cheerleaders" who have carefiilly rehearsed a variety of slogans; again varying in content and aggressiveness in order 40 alter mood and actions of the masses’ These slogans will be changed. uron direction of the leaders thru the use of prearranged signals e.ciy change in standards; etc;' As in the case of the standards the slogans may becone mote aggressive es the denonstrations become more Antences Other cells nay sexve to “heni" the fronty flanky reary er seperate section of the denonstration in order to give it shape and physical direction and, as a result, better control ty the underground. Sone cols may serve as attack groups who take offensive action / against governnent representatives, other groups in or near the demonstration, or facilities which-nay be targetss These operational cells are normally ~ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~~ eal armed in some fashion (clubs, rockny molotov cocktails -- and in none canes knives; grenadeny and even fireams:) These cells aleo provide an organized violent response 1f the denonstration 40 attackedy thus Antenstfying the demonstration. nm Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 | i i | ~ ww CHAPTER FIVE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF THE URBAN UNDERGROUND 1y_Reerulting Procedures Within the Underrround In order to develop an effective organizations the illegal under ground apparatus must perforn certain baste administrative acts such as recruiting, training, obtaining funds, and procuring suppliess The under~ ground in a netropolitan area does not have as great a need for material and equipment as does the {2legal apparatus supporting a rural insurgency wth its large military unites! However, the need for recruiting and training 1g just as vital to 1ts continued existence as are these functions for tho continued existence of the rurel arparatuss! The urben apparatun wil usually usa the simplest and eastest techniques to necompish § these cocentiat hovsekeoying activithes: Withow'-continvous Zecruitingy the under ground, Uke ali organizations; vould cease to grow and’perhaps cease do exiati’ tovover; the 12legel underground apparatus does not norrally need really great numbers to accomplish its eims. A large organization makes cone operations easter, but in the metropolitan area personnel are not necescattly as important as technical skills, dedications and tight or ganizations the techniques used in recruiting will vary with the organizations stage of doveloment and with the needs of the organizations Initially, enpheste yA21 be upon selective recrultings and then laters when the lenders are trained, ‘emphasis is shifted to nase recruiting efforts 4f the general situation in the notrdpolitan area permite 4t)° During and after recrult= nent tho prospective nenber of the apparatus is usuelly subjected to 5 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7,__ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ll ~~ variety of tests to insure that he 1s not a penetration agent or an Anformess Tn sone casen a procean of rrvdual connittnent 19 used to recruit a menber or a group of nenbers,' The target 1s led into helping ‘the organization and as a result either conpronises hinself in the , process; or the recrulter leads hin to believe that he 4s conproriised as far as the government 4s concorned,' He will be led to believe there ts No way out of becoming a momber of the organization, In some cases; coer clon will be used to deliterately conpronice a specific individual who would be very valuable to the underground,’ He will be led into some act that wi21 make 1t impossible for hin to betray the apparatus without Anerininating hinselfy' . Recruiters generally seck pedple with the type of grievances and vulnerabilities which are most likely to cause them to agree with the ends and means of the organization, At times recruiters have been in- atructed to specifically neck those who have. tasted fatty or poverty at sone tines in their Ives; or sinply to look for unhappy and ugly per- sons = all those being characteristics which breed generalized discontent or hostility toward society and which may be channeled by the underground tovard its own ends.’ Thus the recruiter for the urban underground offers ‘to many persons living in our modern urban complexes an opportunity for comradeship in a common cause, like that of a secret society or group in danger.’ Indeed; comradeship 1s one of the things which appeals most to many socially alienated persons in ucban areas; Social pressure and fashions within a sub-culture may iced many into secking; or accepting menbership in the urban underground.’ Whatever the individual reasons for Joining; the recruiter must Ansure that his appesis coinalde with the 73 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00871R000300290003-7ee Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Releas 3/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7 ~ ~ value systen of his targets’ Selective recrultnent focunes upon persons who would be useful to the ayparatua because of their social or occupational situation and : who covld te transformed into dedicated menbers of the apparatuss These axe tho type of persons who are sought to f111 leadership, intelligence, i and other special positions within the apparatus,’ Selective recruttnent 2 nakes maxinen use of the fail-safe principle of maxinun conpartnentation An Ats operations because 4t exposes nenbers of the apparatus to the danger of identification and betrayal,’ A epotter identifies a prospective recruit who would be useful. to the underground and who appears to bo approachable.’ ‘The spotter then drops fron the ploture and his Anfomation 46 yoosed to 8 bj recruiter who makes hin appronch<' If he sees fit he, 111 make direct offers £F noty he will attenpt to gradually lead the Andividval into the 4 organization, The recruit 4s then tested ty having him perform some task which is uninportant to the underground to see 1f he wifl carry it out faithivity without superviston, The recruit may thon take a loyalty oath ana receive training necessary for hin to perform hie duties in the appara~ | tus, Throughout this entire period he is kept under observation and continuously testeds When reeruiting leaders; the 41iegal undercround apparatus will seek persons with an ability to deal with poorles Since nost operations are decentralized the undercround must donend upon leaders at the lowest level ‘to give directions, enforce disciplines and to sustain morale; Persons from the local connunity with leaderchip experience are prime taryots: Intelligence gathering is one of the major activities of the apparatus 0 Persons are nought for recruitment into intelligence duties who have | 7 rd Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/08 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300290003-7