Brigido SIMON, JR vs.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

GR No. 100150 – January 5, 1994

FACTS:
In July 1990, a “Demolition Notice” was signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners), in his capacity as an
Executive Officer of the QC Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor and was
sent and received by the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors
Association, Incorporated).

In said Notice, the respondents were given a grace period of 3 days within which to vacate the premises of North
EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the PRs were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the “People’s Park.”

On July 12 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Ferno, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the
petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr., of QC to stop the demolition.

On July 23 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North Edsa pending resolution of the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the Commission” and
ordered said petitioners to appear before the CHR.

On Aug. 1, 1990, the CHR, in its resolution, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than
P200k in favor of PRs to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission’s supervision and again
directed the petitioners to “desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead
to a citation for contempt and arrest.”

On Sept. 10, 1990, a motion to dismiss (MD) filed by the petitioners before the CHR questioned CHR’s jurisdiction.
It was stated that the CHR’s authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that “the rights allegedly violated not such rights but privilege to engage
in business.”

On Sept. 25 1990, in an order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the “order to desist.” Also, petitioners’ MD was denied. It opined “it
was not the intention of the Constitutional Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating
civil and political rights, but it should be considered a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the PH.”
Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: WON the CHR’s jurisdiction is confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights.

HELD: Yes. The CHR is prohibited from further proceeding with the case filed before it and from implementing the
penalty for contempt.

The CHR was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then Pres. C. Aquino via EO 163, in
the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on
Human Rights.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase “human rights” is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit
not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual’s social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted
traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable
rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring:

“to those rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and
are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. It may also refer, in its general sense,
to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.”

Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship.

In the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it apparent that the delegates envisioned a CHR that would
focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. One of the delegates, for instance,
mentioned such areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoner and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvaging and hamletting, and (6)
other crimes committed against the religious.” In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR’s scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus
seen it fit to resolve, instead, that “Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation.”

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sarisari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private persons a land which is planned to be developed
into a “People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of QC which, this Court can take judicial
notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb cannot thus to be likewise simply
ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first
place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards discoursed vis-à-vis
the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of
the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia of the private person can fall within the compartment of “human rights
violations involving civil and political rights” intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to “adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court.” Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power “to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court.” That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only
to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like,
in pursuing its investigative work.
 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION V. CITY OF MANILA 20 SCRA 849

Facts: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is violating of due process clause. It was
alleged that Sec. 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violate of due process insofar as it would impose P6T fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500 for
second class motels, that Sec. 2, prohibiting a person less than 18 years from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours
runs counter to due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process clause?

Held: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police
measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of
nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would
be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public needs.

Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be
imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from
imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a
municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an  abduction of
the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.

The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or
the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso
that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears
a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative
attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amount to curtailment of liberty, which
cannot be absolute.
Pichay vs. Ochoa
G.R. No. 196425
July 24, 2012
Facts: On April 16, 2001,
then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No.
12 (E.O. 12) creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and
vesting it with the
power to investigate or
hear administrative cases
or complaints for possible
graft and corruption,
among others, against
presidential appointees and
to submit its report and
recommendations to
the President. However on
November 15, 2010,
President Benigno Simeon
Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13
(E.O. 13), abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its
functions to the
Office of the Deputy
Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA),
more particularly to its
newly-established
Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011,
respondent Finance
Secretary Cesar V. Purisima
filed before the IAD-
ODESLA a complaint
affidavit for grave
misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water
Utilities Administration
(LWUA), as well
as the incumbent members
of the LWUA Board of
Trustees (BOT), which arose
from the
purchase by the LWUA of
445,377 shares of stock of
Express Savings Bank, Inc.
Petitioner,
along with the other
members of the BOT of
LWUA, was required to
submit their respective
written explanations and in
compliance, petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the
complaint as a
case involving the same
transaction was already
pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not
Executive Order No. 13
violates the equal
protection clause insofar as
limiting the IAD-ODESLA’s
investigation only to
presidential appointees
occupying upper-level
positions in the
government?
Ruling: No. The equal
protection of the laws is a
guaranty against any form
of undue favoritism
or hostility from the
government. It is embraced
under the due process
concept and simply
requires that, in the
application of the law, “all
persons or things similarly
situated should be
treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.”
The equal protection
clause, however, is not
absolute but subject to
reasonable classification so
that aggrupation
bearing substantial
distinctions may be treated
differently from each other.
There are substantial
distinctions that set apart
presidential appointees
occupying upper-
level positions in
government from non-
presidential appointees and
those that occupy the lower
positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the
Ombudsman, the Court
ruled on the
substantial distinctions
between elective and
appointive public officials:
The former occupy their
office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate,
with a definite term and
may be removed only
upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand,
appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by
an appointing authority.
Some hold their office in a
permanent
capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure
of the
appointing authority.
Considering that elected
officials are put in office by
their constituents for a
definite term, complete
deference is accorded to
the will of the electorate
that they be served
until the end of the term for
which they were elected. In
contrast, there is no such
expectation
insofar as appointed
officials are concerne
Pichay vs. Ochoa G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012

Facts: On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit
its report and recommendations to the President. However, on November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon
Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit
for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees (BOT),
which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Petitioner,
along with the other members of the BOT of LWUA, was required to submit their respective written explanations
and in compliance, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as a case involving the same transaction was
already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates the equal protection clause insofar as limiting the IAD-
ODESLA’s investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government?

Ruling: No. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the
law, “all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.” The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that
aggrupation bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.

There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled on the substantial distinctions between elective and
appointive public officials: The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate, with a
definite term and may be removed only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some hold their office in a permanent
capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served until the end of the term for which they were elected. In
contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the
formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In... administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to explain... one's side. Hence, as long as
petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be... heard. The
records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with
respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite
notice defeats his... subsequent claim of denial of due process.

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

G.R. No. 122846          January 20, 2009

Facts: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila”.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the
said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the
Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that
the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of
the City.

Issue: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

Ruling: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure.
The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are
really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up.
Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of
people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity
of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at
stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but
is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from
needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an
arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their
patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than
twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Addition: "procedural due process" and "substantive due process."

The purpose of the guaranty of due process is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment
against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The 　 due process guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and 　 partnerships are
protected　by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government,　"procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must 　follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering 　to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere.

Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has 　 sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.

Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to

governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, 　 especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is
possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious,
less drastic means to promote morality.
 Silahis v. Soluta Silahis v. Soluta

The Court, through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, once again upheld the inviolable right of persons
against warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures. This case involved a search conducted by
the management of Silahis Hotel in the employees’ union office, located at the hotel basement.

Facts: According to petitioner, the search was conducted due to reports concerning the sale and/or use
of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution in the union office; and the existence of a theft
syndicate. After some surveillance and with the permission of union officer Henry Babay, who had been
apprised about the suspected illegal activities, respondents conducted a search that yielded a plastic bag
containing dry leaves of marijuana.

On the other hand, respondents averred that on the morning of January 11, 1988, union officer Soluta
tried in vain to open the door of the office. Loida, a laundrywoman of the hotel, narrated to him that she
had seen five men in barong Tagalog, forcibly opening the door of the office at dawn. He immediately
lodged a Complaint at the security office and fetched a locksmith who, together with other co-
employees, assisted petitioner in opening the door. At that instant, men wearing barong Tagalog and
armed with clubs arrived and started hitting them. The latter ran away and called for police assistance.

While awaiting the arrival of the police, Petitioner Panlilio told Babay that they would proceed to the
union office to settle the mauling incident. When Babay replied that the office door could not be
opened, petitioner instructed a security guard to force it open. Once inside, Panlilio and his men began
searching the office, over the objection of Babay who asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic
bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops; thus, a Complaint was filed against 13 union officers
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Eventually, the trial court acquitted the accused. It held that, “with the specimen x x x not admissible in
evidence, coupled with the suspicious circumstance of confiscation,” there was lack of sufficient
evidence to convict the accused. Respondents subsequently filed a Complaint against the malicious
prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. The trial court held the
present petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s Decision with modification.

Issue: The petitioners came to the Supreme Court, arguing mainly that the constitutional protection
against illegal searches and seizures was not meant to be invoked against private individuals.
Ruling: The Court’s Third Division denied the Petition. It reiterated the doctrine that “constitutional
rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
search[es] and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and democratic community.” Hence,
“their violation, whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against.”

Our lawmakers have deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers, but also private individuals,
civilly liable for violation of these rights. Thus, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:

“ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxxxxxxx

“(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
xxxxxxxxx

“The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.” (Emphases
supplied.)

The present petitioners admitted that, in late 1987, they had already received reports alleging the
occurrence of illegal activities in the union office that they had surveilled. Yet, they barged into it
without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one. The course they took, said the
Court, “stinks in illegality” for not being “under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless
search is allowed by law.” The violation of respondents’ constitutional right against an unreasonable
search thus formed the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

The Court further rejected petitioners’ contention that the search of the union office was reasonable,
because the hotel owned the room. It held that respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office,
still had the right to question the validity of the search and seizure.

Neither did the Court believe petitioners’ claim that Babay had consented to the search. It held that, by
implication of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, a waiver could not be presumed.
There must be clear and convincing evidence that (a) the right exists; (b) the person involved had either
actual or constructive knowledge of its existence; and (c) this person had an actual intention to
relinquish it. In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily and must have been knowingly and
intelligently made, a fact that was not shown in this case.

The Court pointed out that Article 32 spoke of an officer, an employee, or a person “directly or
indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it was
not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible
also had to answer for the damages or injury inflicted on the aggrieved party. Thus, petitioners, together
with the security personnel who had orchestrated the illegal search, were held jointly and severally
liable to the individual respondents for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
 Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro (G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919)

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized
tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under
section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be
selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of
Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's
place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days,
in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within
the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally
deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on
the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus,
WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Ruling: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of
abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude.

The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province;
and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of
the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. “Liberty
regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of society and the general well-being.

No man can do exactly as he pleases. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of
law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. To go back to our definition
of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as
a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said,
for their own good and the good of the country. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

BAPTISTA V. VILLANUEVA (G.R. NO. 194709; JULY 31, 2013)

FACTS: Petitioners were former union members of Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU), a
legitimate labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of Radio
Philippines Network (RPN), a government-sequestered corporation involved in commercial radio and television
broadcasting affairs, while the respondents were the unions elected officers and members.

On April 26, 2005, on suspicion of union mismanagement, petitioners, together with some other union members,
filed a complaint for impeachment of their union president, Reynato Siozon, before the executive board of RPN,
which was eventually abandoned. They later re-lodged the impeachment complaint, this time, against all the union
officers and members of RPNEU before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). They likewise filed
various petitions for audit covering the period from 2000 to 2004.

Thereafter, two (2) written complaints were filed against petitioners and several others for alleged violation of the
unions Constitution and By-Laws. Months later, a different group of union members filed a third complaint against
petitioners and 12 others, before the Chairman of RPNEUs Committee on Grievance and Investigation (the
Committee) citing as grounds the "commission of an act which violates RPNEU Constitution and By-Laws,
specifically, Article IX, Section 2.2 for joining or forming a union outside the sixty (60) days period and Article IX,
Section 2.5 for urging or advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice or external investigative
body against the Union or its officer without first exhausting all internal remedies open to him or available in
accordance with the CBL. "These complaints were, later on, consolidated.

Thereafter, petitioners received a memorandum notice from Jeric Salinas, Chairman of the Committee, requesting
them to answer the complaint and attend a hearing. Petitioners and their group, through an exchange of
communications with the Committee, denied the charges imputed against them and contested the procedure
adopted by the Committee in its investigation. The Committee submitted their recommendation of expulsion from
the union to RPNEUs Board of Directors, the RPNEUs Board of Directors affirmed the recommendation of expulsion
of petitioners and the 12 others from union membership. Through a Memorandum, petitioners were served an
expulsion notice from the union. On January 2, 2006, petitioners with the 12 others wrote to RPNEUs President
and Board of Directors that their expulsion from the union was an ultra vires act because the Committee failed to
observe the basic elements of due process because they were not given the chance to physically confront and
examine their complainants.

In a letter, dated January 24, 2006, RPNEUs officers informed their company of the expulsion of petitioners and the
12 others from the union and requested the management to serve them notices of termination from employment
in compliance with their CBAs union security clause. Petitioners and the 12 others are terminated. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed three (3) separate complaints for ULP against the respondents, questioning the legality of their
expulsion from the union and their subsequent termination from employment.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the petitioners, the LA clarified that only the union officers of RPNEU could
be held responsible for ULP, so they exonerated six (6) of the original defendants who were mere union members.
The LA also ordered the reinstatement of petitioners as bona fide members of RPNEU. Undaunted, the
respondents appealed to the NLRC, the NLRC vacated and set aside the LA decision and dismissed the complaint
for ULP for lack of merit. The NLRC found that petitioners filed a suit calling for the impeachment of the officers
and members of the Executive Board of RPNEU without first resorting to internal remedies available under its own
Constitution and By-Laws.

The CA sustained the NLRC decision. The CA stated that the termination of employment by virtue of a union
security clause was recognized in our jurisdiction. It explained that the said practice fortified the union and averted
disunity in the bargaining unit within the duration of the CBA. The CA declared that petitioners were accorded due
process before they were removed from office. In fact, petitioners were given the opportunity to explain their case
and they actually availed of said opportunity by submitting letters containing their arguments. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration, but the CA likewise denied the same.

The importance of a unions constitution and bylaws cannot be overemphasized. They embody a covenant between
a union and its members and constitute the fundamental law governing the members rights and obligations. As
such, the unions constitution and bylaws should be upheld, as long as they are not contrary to law, good morals or
public policy.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners denied substantive and procedural due process of law when they were expelled from
the RPNEU?

RULING:  In essence, ULP relates to the commission of acts that transgress the workers right to organize. As
specified in Articles 248 and 249 of the Labor Code, the prohibited acts must necessarily relate to the workers'
right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Absent the said vital elements, the acts complained,
although seemingly unjust, would not constitute ULP.

Petitioners posit that the procedure that should have been followed by the respondents in resolving the charges
against them was Article XVII, Settlement of Internal Disputes of their Constitution and By-Laws, specifically,
Section 2 thereof, requiring members to put their grievance in writing to be submitted to their union president,
who shall strive to have the parties settle their differences amicably. Petitioners maintain that any form of
grievance would be referred only to the committee upon failure of the parties to settle amicably.

Based on RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws, the charges against petitioners were not mere internal squabbles, but
violations that demand proper investigation because, if proven, would constitute grounds for their expulsion from
the union.

Besides, any supposed procedural flaw in the proceedings before the Committee was deemed cured when
petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard. Due process, as a constitutional precept, is satisfied when a
person was notified of the charge against him and was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.It cannot be denied that petitioners
were properly notified of the charges filed against them and were equally afforded the opportunity to present
their side.

Next, petitioners point out that they were not given the opportunity to personally face and confront their accusers,
which were violative of their right to examine the complainants and the supposed charges against them.
Petitioners contention is without merit. Mere absence of a one-on-one confrontation between the petitioners and
their complainants does not automatically affect the validity of the proceedings before the Committee. Not all
cases necessitate a trial-type hearing. As in this case, what is indispensable is that a party be given the right to
explain ones side, which was adequately afforded to the petitioners.

It is well-settled that workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and
rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to formulate
their programs. In this case, RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the internal remedies
within the organization. Petitioners were found to have violated the provisions of the unions Constitution and By-
Laws when they filed petitions for impeachment against their union officers and for audit before the DOLE without
first exhausting all internal remedies available within their organization. Thus, petitioner’s expulsion from the
union was not a deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict their right to organize, but was triggered by the
commission of an act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of Article IX of the unions Constitution and By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Orquiola vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141463, August 06, 2002, 386 SCRA 301.
Topic: JUDGMENT; WRIT OF EXECUTION MAY ISSUE ONLY AGAINST A PARTY AND NOTAGAINST ONE
WHO DID NOT HAVE HIS DAY IN COURT
 
 Facts: Petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, purchased a registered parcel of land from
Mariano Lising. Subsequently, private respondent, Pura Kalaw Ledesma, the registered owner of
Lot 689, filed Civil Case No. Q-12918 against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon her lot. The trial court adjudged Pedro and Lising to pay damages, remove all
constructions and relocate the boundaries. As a result, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed
petitioners, through an Alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land  they
were occupying. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to prohibit the judge from issuing
a writ of demolition and the sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution against their property.
Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they
were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918, the writ of demolition
issued in connection there with cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to
deprivation of property without due process of law. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of
Mariano Lising, petitioners were privies and could be reached by the execution order.

Issue: Whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners.

Ruling: No.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject
property and hence are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private
respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do  so,
petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.
In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did
not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment therein
and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto. In our view, the spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own
titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.