(EVENING PROGRAMME)

INDUS WATERS TREATY-FUTURE PROSPECTS

BY
AZHAR AHMAD
(PHD CANDIDATE)

SUBJECT: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

SUPERVISOR: PROF DR PERVAIZ IQBAL CHEEMA
SUBMITTED ON: 02 DEC 2009

DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

FACULTY OF CONTEMPORARY STUDIES
NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
ISLAMABAD
INTRODUCTION

After air water is perhaps the most crucial element for sustenance of life on this planet.
Despite the fact that two thirds of earth’s surface is water, only a fraction (0.007%) of that is
available for human consumption. Fresh water is a depletable commodity and is distributed
unevenly around the globe; therefore, its availability is uncertain and difficult for some. The
increase in population and industrial growth has placed tremendous pressure on this precious
resource. It is said that about 25 million people are migrating annually around the world due to
water scarcity, much higher than those migrating for any other cause including violence or
terrorism This has caused the humans to be possessive and protective about water.

The demand for fresh water continues to grow with the growth in human population.
With approximately 90 million people born each year, 95% of population increase takes place in
the developing countries. Increase in population proportionately increases the demand for food
and other commodities which places additional strain on water for agriculture, industry and
house hold uses1. There are many drivers of human development, but water is the most
important. According to UNESCO a billion people in the developing countries have inadequate
access to water and 2.4 billion lack basic sanitation. A child born in the under developed world
consumes 30-50 times less water than one born in the developed countries. Global water
consumption has raised six fold during the last 100 years, at more than double the rate of
population growth and is estimated to cross the 9 billion mark by 2050. Water tables are
dropping steadily in several major food producing regions and ground water is being pumped out
at a rate faster than the rate at which nature can recharge it2. This has led to a competition for
water resources and consequently, friction and antagonism between the states. Historically, water
disputes have not been violent; however, the depletion of fresh water, at such an alarming rate, is
causing some analysts to predict that future wars will be fought on water instead of oil.

South Asia is one of the poorest regions of the world with a plethora of problems. It has
perhaps the highest population growth rate which is taxing all its resources and water is no
exception. According to a World Bank report, there are some 20 major river basins across the
region. Of these the four largest are those of the Indus, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the
Meghna (Barak), shared between the countries of the South Asia, as well as, China. These
transnational rivers have sharp variations in terms of the volume of water flows, climatic changes
such as monsoons and droughts in the territory of some countries many a times disturbing settled
transnational water sharing arrangements. Rapid population growth, industrialization, expanding
urbanization, and fast growing water needs for irrigation and power generation are putting ever
increasing strains on these rivers3. To make matters worse, there is a perpetual animosity and a
1
Igor A Shiklomanov, “World Water Resources: A New Appraisal and Assessment for 21st
Century” (Johanesberg: Water International, Vol 25, Issue 1, 2000), p 12.
2
Kent H Butts, “The Strategic Importance of Water”, (Honolulu: Seminar -Water and Conflict
in Asia?- Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 1999)
3
M.A.Salman and Kishor Upreti, “Coflict and Cooperation on South Asia’s International
Rivers: A Legal Perspective”, The World Bank Law, Justice and Development Series
lack of trust between the countries of the region, particularly, with the largest country India,
which shares river waters with four countries of South Asia.

GENESIS OF THE INDUS WATERS ISSUE

The Indus basin system of rivers comprises nine rivers. The system is named after the most
important river of the system-Indus. Six rivers of the system namely the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab,
Ravi, Sutlej and Beas, are placed in one group because their flows are shared commonly by
Pakistan and India. The other three rivers, Kabul, Swat and Kurram, are placed in another group
because their flows are commonly shared by Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although these rivers
have their own tributaries and independent courses of flows, they are also treated as the
tributaries of the Indus because they all culminate directly or indirectly in the Indus which
eventually falls in the Arabian Sea. However, in common perception, the system is only referred
to as the first group of six rivers since they flowed through the British India. The colonial
administration understood the importance of the water resources of these rivers for economic
development and exploited them for irrigation with the help of modern technology. (tajudin).

The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab are known as the Western rivers of the system because
they originate in the western region of Shivalik and Pir Panjal ranges and their flows work as
drainage of the NW Himalayas. Ravi, Sutlej and Beas are called the Eastern rivers since they
originate from the territory lying east of these ranges and function as natural drainage of the SE
region4. The Indus Basin consists of three geographical regions: Himalayan region, Sub-
Himalayan region and the Plains. The Indus Plain is a semi-arid and arid region. No agriculture
is sustainable in this fertile plain without artificial irrigation except near foot-hills and river
margins. The flat Indus Plains with the perennial rivers flowing through it like the fingers of a
hand is ideally suitable for the development of the largest contiguous canal irrigation system.
According to experts no other area in world has a similar natural advantage for the development
of a canal irrigation system5. And hence, the British constructed one of the largest canal networks
in the world.

Such a network was manageable under a one central authority. However when under the
Government of India Act 1935, the responsibility of the management of these river waters was
transferred to the Provinces, differences became visible. In 1939 Sind, then part of the Bombay
province, objected to certain development schemes being planned by Punjab. Government of
India formed a commission under Justice B N Rao to resolve the issue, but the provinces rejected
the proposals of the commission and the matter was referred to His majesty’s government in
London. However, the process was stalled because of the partition. The partition plan divided the

(Washington DC: Library of Congress, 2002).

4
Aloys Arthur Michel, “The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition” (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1967) p 34.
5
Mohammad Tajuddin and Muzaffar Ali, “Two States in One River Basin System: Conflict to
Cooperative Co-Existence”, in Kulwant Kaur (ed.), South Asia Dynamics of Politics, Economy
& Security (New Delhi:Knowledge World) p130
Indus basin between two sovereign independent states and thus the issue was internationalized.
The partition was to be carried out in 73 days and the division of the Indus basin was left to be
decided later. Sir Cyril Redcliff, Chairman of the Punjab Boundary Commission expressed ‘hope
that a solution will be found between the two states for some joint control6……

THE PAKISTAN-INDIA EQUATION

Of the 37 million acres of land irrigated by canals from the Indus and its tributaries, over
thirty million acres fell in Pakistan-an area equal to the combined irrigated lands of Egypt and
Sudan7. The partition severed the hydrologic unity of the Indus canals system. The uninterrupted
flow of irrigation waters to the fields in West Punjab became dependent on the decision of
another sovereign state, India. The boundary line between the two states was drawn right across
the Indus basin, leaving Pakistan as the lower riparian state. Two important irrigation headworks,
one at Madhopur on River Ravi (regulating waters to the Central Bari Doab canal) and the other
at Ferozepur on Sutlej river (regulating supplies to Dipalpur canal), though in the Muslim
majority areas were left in the Indian territory 8. Pakistan rightly felt its livelihood threatened by
the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the
basin. Quite surprisingly, the issue of distribution of these waters was also not referred to the
Arbitral Tribunal set up to make awards in respect of division of assets and liabilities between
the new provinces of East and West Punjab9. Under these conditions the Chief Engineers of East
and West Punjab signed an agreement on 20 Dec 1947 to avoid the partition affecting the flow of
waters in the canals. The agreement known as the “Standstill Agreement” bound India to allow
pre-partition allocation of water in the basin up to 31 March 1948.

India used water as a political weapon in the spring of 1948 when after the expiration of
the Standstill Agreement; it shut off water supplies from Ferozepur headwork to the Depalpur
Canal and to the Pakistani portions of the Lahore and main branches of the Upper Bari Doab
canal. This affected about 5.5% of the sown area and nearly 8 percent of cultivable command
area in Pakistan at the beginning of the critical Kharif sowing season10. The city of Lahore was
deprived of the main source of municipal water and, the supply of electricity from the Mandi
hydroelectric scheme was also cut off. This Indian move to pressurize Pakistan into submission
on Kashmir exposed the vulnerability and dependence of Pakistan. In the words of David
Lilienthal, “No armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan

6
Leonard Mosley, “The Last Days of British Raj” (New York: Werdenfeld and Nicholson,1962)
p190.
7
Abdul Sattar, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2005: A Concise History” (New York: Oxford
University Press,2007) p73
8
Pervaiz I Cheema, “The Politics of the Punjab Boundary Award” (Heidelberg: Heidelberg
Papers,2000) p22
9
Mohammad Tajuddin and Muzaffar Ali, op cit., p130
10
Asma Yaqoob, “International River Waters In South Asia: Source of Conflict or
Cooperation?” (Islamabad: Regional Studies Autumn 2004) p 132.
could be devastated by the simple expedient of India’s permanently shutting off the source of
waters that keep the fields and people of Pakistan green.”11.

The situation triggered a serious water dispute to an extent that both the countries came to
the brink of war. Pakistan’s PM Liaquat Ali Khan through a telegram on 15 April requested
Prime Minister Nehru ‘to take immediate action for restoring water supply’. The issue was
partially resolved in Inter-Dominion Conference held on 3-4 May 1948. The Inter-Dominion
Agreement signed between Mr Jawaharlal Nehru (the Prime Minister of India) and Mr Ghulam
Muhammad (then Finance Minister of Pakistan) was not a solution of the water dispute but it
provided modus vivendi for the supply of waters to West Punjab from the two headworks at
Madhopur and Ferozepur . However, it remained the basis of water supply to Pakistan with few
exceptions till a treaty was finally signed in 1960 with mediation of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank)12.

THE INDUS WATERS TREATY 1960

The treaty consists of a preamble, twelve articles and eight annexure. The preamble of the
treaty expresses mutual desire of both countries to attain ‘the most complete and satisfactory
utilization of the waters of the Indus system of rivers…in a spirit of goodwill and friendship….

Article’ I-Definitions- explains all the terms used in the text of the treaty and its
annexure.

Article II-Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers-states that all the three eastern rivers shall
be available for the unrestricted use of India except for domestic, non-consumptive and
agricultural use as specified in relevant annexure. However, Pakistan may use the waters of these
rivers once they have finally crossed into Pakistan.

Article III-Provisions Regarding Western Rivers- states that India is obliged to let flow
waters of the three western rivers to Pakistan without interference except for domestic, non-
consumptive and agricultural uses specified in Annexure C and generation of hydro-electric
power as set out in Annexure D. India is also allowed limited storages on these rivers as given in
Annexure E.

Article IV-Provisions Regarding Eastern Rivers and Western Rivers- defines the general
guidelines for the ongoing and future uses by the two parties in such a manner that no damage is
done to the material interests of the other party. It also urges Pakistan to construct replacement
works provided for in the treaty.

Article V-Financial Provisions- provides mechanism for Indian contribution of Pound

Sterling 62,060,000 for the replacement works. It also defines the amount to be paid by Pakistan
in case of extension in the transition period.

11
Abdul Sattar, op cit., p 73
12
Aloys Arthur Michel, op cit., p 205.
 Article VI-Exchange of Data- describes the type of data to be exchanged between the two
parties on monthly basis.

Article VII-Future Cooperation- highlights the common interest of the parties in the
optimum development of the rivers by mutual cooperation. It also binds each party to keep the
other informed of intended works on the waters.

Article VIII-Permanent Indus Commission- provides detailed mechanism for the

establishment of a high powered commission to oversee the implementation of the treaty and to
‘promote cooperation between the parties in the development of the waters and related issues’.
The Commission is to meet regularly, at least once a year, alternatively in India and Pakistan.
Each Commissioner is to be granted diplomatic status by the other country as per the treaty.

Article IX-Settlement of Differences and Disputes-defines ‘difference’ and ‘dispute’ and

explains the procedure for resolution of the same. This includes referral to Neutral Expert or
Court of Arbitration.

Article X-Emergency Provision (redundant)- allows Pakistan to use this article in case it
is unable to procure materials and equipments necessary for the completion of replacement
works by a given date, due to some large scale international hostilities arising out of causes
beyond its control. In such a situation the World Bank would notify each party about it and they
would enlist the good offices of the World Bank to decide if there was a need for any
modification in the treaty.

Article XI-General Provisions- affirms that the treaty governs the rights and obligations
of each party in relation to the other with respect only to the use of the waters of the rivers and
matters incidental thereto. Provisions of the Treaty will not be construed as in any way
establishing a general principle or precedent. The parties agree not to invoke the treaty for
anything not expressly recognized under the treaty.

Article XII-Final Provisions-states the name of the treaty, date of effect, scope of its
modification and its continuity until terminated by another treaty.

ANALYSIS OF INDUS WATERS TREATY

The signing of the treaty on 19 Sep 1960 in Karachi was a big international event.
Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan, .Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the
Vice President of the World Bank W.A.B. Iliff signed the treaty. The representatives of USA, the
UK, Australia, New Zealand and Germany were also present on the occasion. This signature
resulted in the formal settlement of a serious water dispute between the two riparian states in a
peaceful manner. The importance of the treaty was recognized by the World Bank in its press
release of 19 Sep according to which the signing of the treaty ‘marks the end of a critical and
long-standing dispute’ and opens the way for development of water resources in the Indus basin,
on which depends the livelihood of some 50 million in India and Pakistan13. The leaders of
13
IBRD Press Release, No. 618, quoted in N.D.Gulati, “Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in
International Mediations” (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1973) p 339.
Pakistan and India expressed their satisfaction and hope for better relations in future. Ayub Khan
said, ‘the treaty was an event of great historic significance for the two countries concerned…..for
the whole world14. Nehru said, ‘we are going to have many benefits out of this agreement but
important than the material advantages are the psychological and emotional benefit’ 15. the
international press acclaimed it as proof that even a seemingly insolvable international conflict
might be resolved if the parties were sincere to find a solution and there was a neutral mediator
to steward the negotiation for a success.

The people of Pakistan and India generally welcomed the treaty. It was considered a great
opportunity for the promotion of better bilateral relations. But it was criticized by the extremist
in both the countries. In the opinion of the Indian extremists New Delhi had surrendered its
rivers to Pakistan. The Indian contribution for the replacement works was also perceived as an
unfair burden. In Pakistan some resentment was expressed, justifiably, on the loss of the three
Eastern Rivers.

The treaty was the result of the sincere desire and effort by both the parties in association
with the World Bank to come to a diplomatic solution of the problem. It was the culmination of a
complex negotiation process for nine years from 1951 to 1960. The negotiations continued in
sessions; whenever, any deadlock emerged, and there were many, the World Bank found out a
way to resolve it by new ideas or by consulting the political leadership of the two countries. The
World Bank worked not only as a facilitator and mediator in the negotiation but also as an
organizer of funds for the actualization of the settlement of the water dispute. The credit of the
treaty should also go the statesmanship of Ayub and Nehru, who saved the negotiation whenever
a stalemate emerged and to the persistence of the World Bank to resolve the old dispute16.

From Pakistan’s point of view the settlement plan as envisaged under the Indus Waters
Treaty had some advantages as well as shortfalls17:

Advantages

1. After the completion of the Indus Basin Replacement Works Plan, each country
became independent of the other in the operation of its water supplies.

2. Indus basin irrigation system which was mostly based on run-of-the-river system got
reliable storage facilities to make the system more reliable under seasonal variations.

3. Each country became responsible for planning, construction and administering its
own facilities in its own interests and free to allocate its supplies within its own
territories.

14
The Dawn (Karachi) 20 September 1960.
15
The Hindu (Madras) 20 September 1960.
16
Mohammad Tajuddin and Muzaffar Ali, op cit., p 149.
17
Interview Mr Jamait Ali Shah, Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters, Islamabad, 09 Nov
2009.
 4. This provided strong incentive to each country to make the most effective use of
water, since any efficiency accomplished by works undertaken by either country for
storage, transfer and reduction of loses, accrues directly to the benefit of that country.

5. The independence afforded by the treaty also brought a benefit of a different kind.
The location of works serving each country or territories under its control and the
assurances against interference by either country with the supplies on which the other
depends reduced the chances of disputes and tension.

6. As a result of the treaty, storage projects also increased the canal water diversions
from 67 MAF to 104 MAF.

7. Water available in winter has been assured and so the country is least affected in
drought conditions.

Drawbacks

1. Pakistan had to forego the entire perpetual flow of fresh waters of the eastern rivers
(24 MAF) which it used to historically receive for irrigation.

2. The traditional flood irrigation, the most ancient way of using river waters, on the
Sutlej, Beas and to some extent on Ravi disappeared. As a result no cultivation was
possible in the flood plains of these rivers thus rendering a large extent of area barren.

3. Eastern rivers have lost their regular flow channels due to silting up and subsequent
flood can cause great havoc in Pakistan, in addition to other environmental effects.

4. The upkeep of the new link canals and storages means a heavy additional burden on
the cost of maintaining irrigation.

5. Storages are not substitutes of perpetual flow water as the storages have limited life.
Pakistan is already feeling the effect of silting up of its major reservoirs.

CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WITH INDIA

Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 has served both India and Pakistan for last 44 years.
However, taking advantage of the provisions of the treaty, according to which India is permitted
the use of water for domestic, non-consumptive (including navigation), agriculture (limited) and
storage (limited) and hydro electric power, India has already initiated/ proposed some
controversial projects over the Indus system which have a potential of escalating into tensions.
India, apparently is working on the policy of gradually undermining the treaty. Six major
disputes have since been raised; first two listed below have been resolved to the entire
satisfaction of the two countries; remaining are still to be resolved18.
18
Formulated in light of Interview and Data from Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters,
(Lahore, 2009).
Irrigated Cropped Area. Soon after the signing of the treaty, India was
obliged to communicate to Pakistan the irrigated area from the western rivers. India
provided an exaggerated figure of 692,479 acres. After successful negotiations both
countries agreed to reduce the figure to. 642,477 acres.

Salal Hydro-Electric Project. The Salal project is located 45 miles upstream of

Marala on river Chenab. It has a small reservoir of 0.23 MAF. Information about the
project was provided to Pakistan in 1974. The project is a run-of-river hydro-electric
plant. Its stage-I of 345 MW was commissioned in 1987, whereas, the stage-2 was
commissioned in 1995. Pakistan objected to the design which had six low-level
outlets and over all height of spillway gates of 40 ft in clear violation of the treaty.
After a series of meetings the issue got resolved through an agreement arrived at
between the two governments in April 1978. These outlets were plugged permanently
and the height of the spillway gates was also reduced from 40 ft to 30 ft. Pakistan
wanted the height restriction of 20 ft, reduced height of 30 ft was conceded as a
compromise. However, the manipulative storage of the dam got reduced from
230,000 acre ft to a manageable figure of 58000 acre ft after plugging of the low level
outlets.

Baghliar Hydro-Electric Power Project. Baglihar hydro-electric project is

located on river Chenab 80 km upstream of Salal project. It is also a run-of-river
hydro-electric plant. It envisages the construction of a 317m long and 144.5m high
concrete gravity dam with a gross storage capacity of about 0.321 MAF, of which
about 0.29 MAF is dead storage capacity. Pakistan objected to the design of under-
sluice type gated spillway (violation of para 8 of Annexure D to the Treaty). The
presence of these under-sluices could cause a shortage of inflows at Marala headwork
for about 20-25 days during lean months on mal-operation of dam by India.

The Permanent Indus Commission could not resolve the objections, Pakistan
invoked the relevant provisions of the Treaty and in order to resolve the issue under
the provisions of the Treaty, the World Bank appointed a Neutral Expert on 10 May
2005. The Neutral Expert gave his Final Determination on 12 February 2007. The
decision of the Neutral Expert upheld Pakistan’s contention that the design by India is
not in conformity with the design criteria of all the four design features of the dam as
laid down in the Treaty. The changes as determined by the Neutral Expert were
confirmed during the Tour of Inspection by the Permanent Indus Commission in July
2008. India formally commissioned the Plant on 10 October 2008. For
commissioning of the Plant, India filled the dam for its dead storage in August 2008
and again did not abide by the specific provisions of the Treaty so as to maintain the
flow of 55,000 cusecs at Marala Headwork in Pakistan.
 In spite of repeated requests by Pakistan Commissioner, India did not provide
details of schedule for initial filling of Baglihar Plant. The protest on reduction of
flow was accordingly lodged against the Treaty violation with India. Pakistan has
asked for compensation of lost waters however, due to India’s intransigence the issue
remains unresolved and Pakistan needs to exercise the option of Third Party.

Wuller Barrage on River Jhelum. The construction of Wuller Barrage at the

downstream of Wuller Lake, was started by India in 1985 without informing Pakistan
in advance, a clear violation of the treaty. It was given the name of ‘Tulbul
Navigation Project’. It has a length of 439 ft, with a gated weir, under-sluices and a
40 ft wide navigation lock. It will have a maximum discharge capacity of 50,000
cusecs. With the construction of Wuller Barrage, India would be able to create an
additional storage capacity of 0.30 MAF. This would help it to store water up to 6
months during wet season and release discharges up to 4000 cusecs during the period
from October to February. In this way India would get regulation control of “Wuller
Lake, a natural lake on river Jhelum. Strong protest was lodged by Pakistan and the
work got suspended in 1987. According to sub-para 8 (h) of Annexure E of the Indus
Waters Treaty, India is entitled to construct only such barrage on Main Jhelum and
Main Chenab rivers which have incidental storage of no more than 10,000 acre ft,
only after the design has been scrutinized and approved by Pakistan. Whereas, the
Wuller barrage’s capacity is 300,000 acre ft, which is thirty times more than the
permitted capacity. The work is still suspended and the matter is under resolution
between the two governments. On suspension of the construction work, Pakistan did
not take the case in the Court of Arbitration. Wuller is the only water related issue
which is part of the composite dialogue.

Kishenganga Storage-Cum-Hydro-Electric Project on river Jhelum. The

information regarding the Kishanganga hydro-electric project was revealed in Nov 88
when India started construction of a tunnel near Kanzalwan on the river Neelum to
divert the waters into the Wuller Lake. The reservoir behind the dam has a full
capacity of about 0.18 MAF with a power storage capacity of about 0.14 MAF. In the
proposed scheme, the stored water of river Kishanganga (Neelam) is to be diverted
through a 24 km long, 5.3m dia horse shoe tunnel to produce 330 MW power. The
power house located near Bunkot will deliver the water through a Tail Race into a
nullah called Bonar-Madmati, another tributary of river Jhelum which outfall into
Wullar Lake. This will deprive Neelum-Jhelum hydro-electric project (an under-
construction project of government of Pakistan) with some critical discharges. In this
way production capacity of Neelum Jhelum link hydro-electric project is likely to be
reduced from 11% to 16%. Pakistan has objected to diversion of water from Neelum
to Jhelum River. The Commission has not been able to resolve the issue and Pakistan
 has kicked off the process for resolution through Court of Arbitration and Neutral
Expert for legal and technical issues respectively.

Dul Hasti Hydro-Electric Plant. The Dal Hasti hydro-electric project

envisages the construction of 180.5 m long and 59.5 m high concrete gravity dam
upstream of Baglihar hydro-electric project on river Chenab. A low level orifice type
spillway has been provided with a capacity of the order of 8600 acre ft. The
construction of this project was started in 1991. Compared to Salal and Baglihar
Projects, the effect of this project on Pakistan is not grave since stoppage of water can
be of the order of 1-2 days only. However, it is imperative to discourage India from
providing under-sluices type gated spillway in the body of the dam.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The history of water dispute resolution, in contrast to that of conflict, is much more
impressive. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has identified more
than 3600 treaties relating to international water resources, dating between 805 and 1984, the
majority of which deal with some aspect of navigation. Since 1814 about 300 international
treaties have been negotiated to deal with non navigational issues of water management: flood
control, hydropower projects, and allocations for consumptive or non consumptive uses in
international basins. Accounts of conflict related to water indicate that only seven minor
skirmishes have occurred in this century and that no war has yet been fought over water. In
contrast, 145 water-related treaties were signed in the same period. War over water seems not to
be strategically rational, hydrographically effective, or economically feasible. Shared interests
along a waterway seem to consistently outweigh water’s conflict-inducing characteristics.
Furthermore, once cooperative water regimes are established through treaties, they turn out to be
impressively resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparian states and even as
conflict is waged over other issues. These patterns suggest that the most valuable lesson to be
learned from the history of international water disputes is that this is a resource whose
characteristics tend to induce cooperation, inciting violence only as the exception19.

The Indus Waters Treaty has served Pakistan and India for forty nine years. Both the
countries owe their green revolution of the 60s and 70s to this treaty. Regardless of the rhetoric
of the few against the treaty, the treaty is internationally accepted as a success story. The treaty is
not the ideal solution for the dispute, which should have been an integrated joint development of
the Indus system but, given the circumstances after partition and animosity between the two, it is
perhaps the closest possible realistic solution. There will always be issues which require
19
Aaron T. Wolf, “Trends in Trans boundary Water Resources: Lessons for Cooperative
Projects in the Middle East”, paper delivered at a workshop at the International Development
Research Centre, Ottawa Canada, 30 Oct 1998 available at http://www.idrc.ca/CONFLICT/ev-
33233-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html.
deliberation and clarification and they may be resolved in a spirit of mutual cooperation and
goodwill. It may be noted that both the countries are facing shortage of water. India with a larger
population and faster industrial growth may be affected more. It is therefore, in the benefit of
both the countries to realize the cooperative potential of this resource and exploit it to common
good of the people on both sides of the divide.

The treaty has served the two countries well in the past and all efforts must be aimed at
arriving mutual benefit decisions. Efforts to undermine the treaty by particular interest groups be
discouraged by saner elements on both sides and the media should create awareness in the
general masses of the rationality of having the treaty and the importance of cooperation in
utilizing the water resources. Yes suggestions to improve certain aspects of the treaty could
always be welcomed but these should be left for better days when the two neighbours have
achieved a détente. This is perhaps the only instrument between the two countries that has stood
the test of time. Even during full-fledged wars and hostilities between Pakistan and India the
treaty has remained enforce and effective.

For some time now an interest group in India has been questioning the efficacy of the
treaty. This group advocates that the treaty besides placing undesirable restrictions on India does
not cater fully to the needs of J&K population. It is also argued that the treaty has outlived its
utility and needs to be abrogated or replaced with a new treaty. Pakistanis also have grievances
which have deeper roots. To start with, at the time of partition, if Muslim majority areas of
Gordaspur, which were originally meant to go to Pakistan, were not allotted to India, India would
not have any claim on Kashmir and the issue of water would not even have arisen. However,
even after partition it was India’s unwarranted stoppage of water in 1948 which initiated the
problem and the resultant mistrust. A number of Pakistanis are not happy to part with the three
eastern rivers under the treaty, as well.

Both the sides have grievances and some of them are not ill-founded. Nevertheless, we
cannot live in the past; the two countries have suffered a great deal because of their hostility and
mistrust and need to move on, for the sake of better future for their citizens. If we do not change
our attitudes and continue to grow seeds of suspicion and hatred, the future generations will not
forgive us. The Indus Waters Treaty has provided a platform for cooperation. It was brokered
after a considerable effort of the World Bank and perhaps, sincerity of purpose of the existing
leadership from both sides. Not only that the treaty should stay, it should in fact be used as a
basis for future cooperation. No document or instrument is final or eternal though. Once the two
sides reach a certain level of understanding and cooperation there would be ample opportunities
to improve the treaty in the interest of both. The treaty provides opportunity for future
cooperation and joint management of the waters; it is therefore disappointing to note that since
the signing of the treaty no projects have been undertaken under the provisions of “future
cooperation”. It is no secret that the available waters of the Indus system are not being utilized
judiciously by both sides. The water availability vis-à-vis the growing demand is on the decline
and every drop of available water has to be utilized in the best and most economical manner.
However, neither country, at this moment has enough resources to harness the full potential
available. It is therefore, mandatory that both states should combine their resources and expertise
to benefit from the opportunity. This is not only imperative for the progress and prosperity of
Pakistan and India but diffusion of tension among these two nuclear neighbours could be catalyst
for the progress of the entire region.

It is proposed that a joint body should be formed either independently or within the ambit
of the Permanent Indus Commission to work out modalities and scope of joint cooperation. The
body composed of apolitical, technical experts should be tasked to find avenues for mutual
cooperation. Guidance and help of international regimes specializing in this field may also be
helpful. One of the impediments in cooperation and resolution of issues is India’s insistence on
‘bilateralism’. This is evident in India’s relations with all its neighbours. For the good of the
Indian citizen and the region as a whole, India must show flexibility and magnanimity. Indus
Waters Treaty is a great example of peaceful resolution of conflicts with the assistance of a third
party. This success could have been emulated by the two countries in other areas of difference
with little sincerity and compassion. No doubt the ultimate aim would be to coexist peacefully
and cooperate without the help of others.

CONCLUSION

Water is essential for sustenance of life on the planet and therefore, nature has provided
the commodity in sufficient amount. However, due to uneven distribution of water the entire
mankind is not equally blessed. It is, therefore, our duty to preserve and use this ‘common
heritage of mankind’ judiciously and with a cooperative spirit. Pakistan and India are blessed to
have a number of large rivers being fed constantly from the Himalayas. The two countries have
also inherited one of the largest irrigation networks of the world. Despite the foregoing, the per
capita availability of water is decreasing in both the countries while the countries are locked in
disputes over available resources. Indus Waters Treaty provides a mechanism and platform for
the two countries to manage their waters in a spirit of goodwill and mutual cooperation. This is
an opportunity to move from conflict to cooperation. This could act as a catalyst for peace and
prosperity for the people and who knows the spirit carried in the treaty may bring the two
neighbours closer to the resolution of other issues like Kashmir.