PRESIDENT TERM LIMIT

Pormento v. Estrada

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a person's second (whether immediate or not)
election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conlict of legal rights
[6]
exists. There is in this case no deinite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal
[7]
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No speciic relief may conclusively be decreed upon by
[8]
this Court in this case that will beneit any of the parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for
the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in
this case.

PRESIDENT, QUALIFICATIONS

NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DEFINED

CASE: fornier v. COMELEC

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from ofice. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12,
Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court
en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise –

“Rule 12. Jurisdiction. -The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualiications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

“Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the iling of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo
warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.

“Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines
who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by iling a veriied petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.”

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualiications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally deined as being an action against a person who
[5]
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public ofice. In such context, the election contest can
only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received
either the second or third highest number of votes could ile an election protest. This rule again presupposes a
post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, deined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualiications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

(p.29 fulltext)
citizenship issue

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322
B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of
an ofice. Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described
as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-suficient existence.
The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualiications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements,
[8]
on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in
public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.

Natural born defined

The 1935 Constitution merely enumerates who are Filipino citizens, it does not mention, much less define
who is a natural-born Filipino. But under the 1973 & 1987 Constitutions do, both refer to a natural-born
citizen as one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his or her Philippine citizenship.

In the case of FORNIER VS COMELEC, the candidacy of FPJ was questioned as to his status as a “natural-
born citizen.” In that case, FPJ was born 20 August 1939. Thus, 1935 Constitution applies. There can only
be 2 ways to acquire “natural-born” status — jus soli and jus sanginis, since in these case no act is
needed, you are basically born into the situation. The 1935 Constitution adopts JUS SANGUINIS.

Since blood relationship was deemed basis as to acquiring natural-born status as to the 1935 Constitution, it
all boils down to whether or not his father, Allan F. Poe, was himself a Filipino citizen. It is important to
connect to the status of his grandfather Lorenzo, since more likely it will create a domino effect as to the
citizenship of his descendant — including FPJ.

Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death
in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor.

General Rule: One is natural-born if he is a citizen of the Philippines

without the need of performing any act. Exceptions:

(1) Election of Philippine Citizenship is required by those born BEFORE January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching majority age are deemed natural-born citizens.
(2) Natural-born citizenship is reacquired upon taking oath of allegiance, an abbreviated repatriation process
that restored not only citizenship but also all civil and political rights and obligations.

What is the significance of January 17, 1973?

This was when the 1973 Constitution took effect. It upheld the principle of jus sanguinis as the basic
foundation of citizenship. It also equalized the levels of Filipino men and women. Because under the 1973
Constitution, those born to Filipina mothers on or after the effectivity of the 1973 C, even if the father is an
 alien, are deemed Filipino citizens, without the need of performing any act such as election of citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. This makes them natural-born.

Are Foundlings deemed natural-born?

Yes. Foundlings as a class, are natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution did not enumerate
foundlings as natural-born citizens, there is no restrictive language definitely excluding them either. The
framers found no need to explicitly indicate foundlings because under international law there was already a
clear effect that foundlings followed the citizenship of the place where they are found.

In POE VS COMELEC ———

1. Framers found no need since IL already dictates that foundling follow citizenship on where they are
found.

2. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may
be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not
just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust.

3. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.

4. The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to
have the "nationality of the country of birth.”

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines
is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention.

5. The probability of 99% shifts in her favor that her parents are Filipinos. Look at her features.

CASE: POE v. COMELEC EXXX

“In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making.
We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of
the community of nations. “

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in
[145]
Bengson III v. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clariied to mean at the time of birth: "A person
who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural born citizen thereof." Neither is
"repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that
there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that
there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualiications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

TN: “BORN TO” her adoptive parents – p.46

Residence, defined.

In MARCOS VS COMELEC, “residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of
an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may
seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It
is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.” – see discussion sa notebook

For purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile which is the individual’s permanent
home, a place to which whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.

In UYTENGSU VS REPUBLIC, Residence is so often used synonymously with domicile for election
purposes — So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election
law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

"Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile"

denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A
man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can
have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
CASE: MARCOS v. COMELEC
the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice.

There must concur:

(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;

(2) intention to remain there; and

(3) intention to abandon the old domicile.

In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi.

[27]
Faypon vs Quirino, held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
 [28]
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence.
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court
has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to
abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

“Ms. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the
same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence. “

DOCTRINE: It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certiicate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether or not an individual has satisied the constitution's residency qualiication requirement.
The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certiicate of candidacy which would lead to his
or her disqualiication.

DOCTRINE:

Domicile, defined.

Includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Kinds of Domicile:
(1) Domicile of Origin - where one is born or raised or marriage
(2) Domicile of Choice
(3) Domicile by Operation of law

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
[37]
demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona ide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity
or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time.[

[34]
More signiicantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, we explained that: -p.54

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot,
and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an
election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town
to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself
from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualiications to
be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the oficials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been deemed suficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. It inds justiication in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth.
This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.

Example: In the case of Imelda, though she may have left Tacloban to be with her husband she was not
deemed to have abandoned her domicile since there is no showing of animus non-revertendi to the old one
to establish a new one. She kept close ties to Tacloban. Hence, there was still animus revertendi.

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one
is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

RESIDENCE , EVIDENCE OF

In DOMINO VS COMELEC, The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original
domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the
intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.

How may domicile be reacquired?

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

CASE: DOMINO v. COMELEC

"residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualiications for suffrage and for elective ofice, means the same
thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a ixed place but also personal presence in
[21]
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a ixed permanent
[22]
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
"Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must
be borne in mind, namely:

(1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;

(2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and

(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

A person's "domicile"
once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one
is established.

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate:

1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
 3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

 The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indeinite period of time;

 the change of residence must be voluntary;

 and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

DOCTRINE:

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile.

“The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. “

PERIOD OF RESIDENCE

In POE VS COMELEC, a naturalized American Citizen may reacquire domicile in the country by
presenting voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile.
Prove the concurrence of the 3 requisites mentioned above.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S.
domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S.
passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she
travelled abroad, School records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting
June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles
for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations
issued in April 2006

The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she
decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence.

When is period of residence reckoned for repatriated citizens?

It is reckoned from the date the former Filipino obtains:

1) a permanent resident visa or
2) reacquires Philippine citizenship.
But when evidence is overwhelming, it may be reckoned even before visa or reacquisition of citizenship took
place,like in the case of Grace Poe.

Even if the candidate committed an error in stating her residency in the COC (ex Marcos case), it is not
conclusive. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive
in determining whether an individual satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification.

An act instituting a Balikbayan Program

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free
as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a
Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who
must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and
[163]
"comes or returns to the Philippines." The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity
to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of
[164] [165]
society upon their return to the country" in line with the government's "reintegration program."
Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Residence requirement, rationale.

The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public
office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the
electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for.

In TORAYNO VS COMELEC, generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in

the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with
the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community." Such provision is aimed at excluding
outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain."
Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice.”

CASE: TORAYNO v. COMELEC

Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

[18]
The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991,
which provides for the qualiications of local elective oficials, as follows:"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An
elective local oficial must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be
elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted
with the conditions and needs of a community and not identiied with the latter from [seeking] an elective ofice
[19]
to serve that community." Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of
[20]
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a
community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through
the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best
met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."

RATIONALE:

We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that oficials of districts or localities be
acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the
constituents themselves -- their needs, dificulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all
matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar
with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualiications and
itness for the ofices they seek.

In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro
City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his
qualiications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence
requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.
PROPERTY QUALIFICATION

CASE: MAQUERA v. BORRA

DOCTRINE:

That said property qualiications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system
ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is
premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent
upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich
and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be
elected to public ofice;

VICE-PRESIDENT, HOW ELECTED, TERM OF OFFICE AND TERM LIMIT

1987 Constitution, Art.VII, Sec.8

PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, IN CASE OF VACANCY ON MID-TERM

Art.7, Sec.7

PRESIDENT ELECT and PRESIDENT, distinguished (TIP)

CASE: TOPACIO v. PAREDES see digest

JURISDITION OF CFI sec.27 and administrative remedy authorized the governor general to declare the office

The jurisdiction of the CFI under Sec. 27 of Act No. 1582 is confined only to those matters which may be
decided by an inspection of the registry list and of the ballots and their res gestae. It does not have any
jurisdiction to determine the eligibility of a candidate elect to hold office.

Sec 12 of Act No. 1582 provides for an administrative remedy in which the Governor-general is authorize to
declare the office vacant on the account of the ineligibility of the candidate elect. The word “Elect” is defined by
lexicographers as follows:

- “chosen to an office, but not yet actually inducted into it; as, bishop elect, governor or mayor elect” - “elected
to office but not yet in charge of its functions; as, president elect, the bishop elect”

The word "ineligible" is defined as follows:

-  "Legally or otherwise disqualified for office. Not eligible. (Standard, Edition 1910.)

-  "Disqualified to the elected to an office; also disqualified to hold an office, if elected or

appointed to it." (28 Wis., 99; Black's Law Dict.)

The foregoing provisions of law cover every case of ineligible elective provincial officers. The governor-
general may only exercise the power conferred by him in the interval between the election and the
induction. Had it been otherwise, the legislature would not have used the words “governor-elect” / “third
member elect”. Also, ineligibility must be derived from the personal character of the individual. The
 findings of the special tribunal with regards as to who received the plurality of votes are final and
conclusive but those administrative proceedings, authorized by law for the determination of the
eligibility of candidates elect, while conclusive upon the administrative branch, are not exclusive as to
the courts.

p.69 fulltext

All election disputes may be divided into two distinct classes: (1) those which pertain to the casting and
counting of the ballots; and (2) those which pertain to the eligibility of the candidates. If there be cases
incapable of being so classiied, they have not been suggested. Those parts of section 27 [Act No. 1582 as
amended by Act No. 2170], indicative of the kind of contests which are to be determined under its provisions,
read:

"Such court (of First Instance) shall have exclusive and inal jurisdiction except as hereinafter provided, and
shall forthwith cause the registry lists and all ballots used at such election to be brought before it and
examined, and to appoint the necessary oficers therefor and to ix their compensation, * * * ********

In such proceedings the registry list as inally corrected by the board of inspectors shall be conclusive as to who
was entitled to vote at such election."

p.70

The indings of the special tribunals above mentioned, acting within their jurisdictional powers, are inal and
conclusive. The returns of the canvassing board as corrected in accordance with the indings of these special
tribunals are inal and conclusive upon all departments of the government and upon all interested parties, as to
who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. But those administrative proceedings, authorized by law for
the determination of the eligibility of candidates elect, while conclusive upon the administrative branch of the
government, are not exclusive as to the courts. They do not abridge the right to the remedy of quo warranto

TIP: quo warranto v. election protest

(u) Election protest – refers to an election contest involving the election and returns of municipal elective
officials, grounded on fraud or irregularities committed in the conduct of the elections, i.e., in the casting and
the counting of the ballots, in the consolidation of votes and in the canvassing of returns, not otherwise
classified as a pre-proclamation controversy cognizable by the COMELEC. The issue is who obtained the
plurality of valid votes cast.

(v) Quo Warranto under the Omnibus Election Code – refers to an election contest involving the
qualifications for office of an elective municipal official, on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. The issue is whether the respondent possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications prescribed by law.