ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

G.R. No. 118904          April 20, 1998

Facts:

Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.
When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at
Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Sometime
after the marriage, he demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the
(1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.

Arturio Trinidad filed, an action for partition of four parcels of land. Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s
birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the
complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a
share in the produce of the land.

Arturio presented witnesses to prove his position. Jovita Gerardo testified that Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato are the parents of Arturio; that Felix and Lourdes as the uncle and aunt of Arturio; and also identified pictures
where the respondents were with Arturio and his family.(At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue
and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad.) Another witness, ISABEL MEREN, 72 years old and a
widow testified that she knows Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad; that she knew Inocentes Trinidad
and Felicidad Molato as the parents of Arturio and that she was present when they were married in New Washington,
Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. She further testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him. ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. As
proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism, and
a certificate of loss issued by the LCR that his birth certificate was burned during World War 2. He also testified that
he lived with Felix and Lourdes and provided for his needs.

On the other hand, defendants presented Pedro Briones who testified that Inocentes was not married when he died
in 1940s. Lourdes Trinidad also testified that she was not aware that his brother married anybody and denied that
Arturio lived with them. Beatriz Sayon also testified that Inocentes died in 1941, and that Felicidad Molato had never
been married to Inocentes. The trial court rendered a twenty-page decision in favor of Arturio. The CA reversed the
decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient evidence of his parent’s marriage and his filation.

Ruling:

The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of
the decedent’s estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of
a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes).

When the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of
a witness to the matrimony, the couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock,
the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records
of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said
municipality. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In
place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren and Jovita Gerardo. It further
gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the child’s father and mother, and family pictures.

The totality of petitioner’s positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondent’s self- serving negations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The trial courts decision is REINSTATED.

1
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO

556 SCRA 711 (2008)

Psychological incapacity must be characterized by utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.

Respondent Lynnette Baguio (Lynnette) and Martini Baguio (Martini), a seaman working overseas, got married in
1997. The couple lived at Lynette‘s parents. Martini stayed there only on weekends and during weekdays, he stayed
with his parents. Because of this, Lynette suggested that they lived with Martini‘s parents but the later disagreed.

Lynette later on noticed that every time the two of them talk, Martini would always mention his mother and his family.
She therafter realized that Martini was a ―mama‘s boy.‖ On Martini‘s mother insistence, Martini‘s money was
equally divided between her and Lynette. In 1999, when Martini returned from work, he stayed with his parents. Since
then, Lynette had not heard from Martini and stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire
from Martini’s employer who told her that he had already disembarked. Lynette soon found out that he was in
Muntinlupa.

When Lynette and Martini finally met, he informed her that they should part ways. The last time the two of them
talked was at the airport when Martini was about to depart for abroad. Since then, Martini never communicated with
Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his employment records that he is “single” and
named his mother as principal allottee. Hence, Lynette filed before Regional Trial Court of Cebu a Complaint for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of Martini‘s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital
duties and obligations under Articles 68-70 of the Family Code. The RTC found that Martini‘s being ―mama‘s boy‖
manifests his psychologically incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and that the
same incapacity existed at the time the couple exchanged their marriage vows.

The Solicitor General challenged the RTC‘s decision before the Court of Appeals. The CA held that Lynette‘s oral
deposition and the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Gerong, a clinical psychologist, declaring Martini‘s
psychological incapacity was sufficient proof that indeed Martini suffers psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in declaring the marriage between Lynette and Martini null and void on the ground of latter‘s
psychological incapacity

HELD:

Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides that “[a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and
41 which provide different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable
marriages, and Article 55 on legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not to
be applied indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. And Article 36 should not be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves, nor with legal separation
in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.

“Psychological incapacity” has been elucidated on as follows: The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating
nature must be fully explained the mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” does
not constitute psychological incapacity nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons. It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of
meeting their duties and responsibilities due to some psychological (not physical) illness, which insensitivity or
incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.

2
Here, Dr. Gerong found that Martini’s “personality disorders” including his being a “mama’s boy” are “serious, grave,
existing already during the adolescent period and incurable” and concluded that Martini “appeared” to be dependent
upon his family and unable “to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family.”

The doctor’s findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnette’s
deposition. From Lynnette’s deposition, however, it is gathered that Martini’s failure to establish a common life with
her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will,which renders a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor
arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any such personality
disorders of Martini have been existing since Martini’s adolescent years has not been explained.

3
 Ansaldo v Sheriff
G.R. No. L-43257 Feb. 19, 1937 Abad Santos, J. Cristobal
petitioners Margarita Quintos De Ansaldo and Angel A. Ansaldo
respondents Sheriff of City of Manila, Fidelity & Surety Company of the PH Islands and Luzon Surety
Company
summary H agreed to indemnify a guarantor. Debtor defaulted to guarantor paid loan and then sued H.
After favorable judgment for the guarantor, sheriff levied on the bank account of the spouses.
Held: joint savings account as part of the property of the conjugal partnership is not liable for
the separate obligation of the husband. It will be liable only if family derived benefit from the
obligation, which in this case was not proved.

facts of the case

Romarico Agcaoili obtained a loan from Phil Trust Co. upon the express guaranty of Fidelity and Surety Co.
Angel Ansaldo in turn agreed to indemnify Fidelity. Agcaoili defaulted, and so Fidelity paid Phil Trust. Fidelity then
sued Ansaldo for the recovery of P19,065.17, and after obtaining a judgment in its favor, caused the sheriff to levy on
the joint savings account of Angel and Margarita in BPI amounting to P165.84.

Margarita and Angel filed a 3rd-party claim alleging that the money is part of the conjugal property of the
spouses and not liable for the payment of Angel’s personal obligations. They also filed an action against the
(respondents) to have the execution levy declared void. The CFI granted, ordering the [respondents] to pay P636.80,
hence this appeal.

issue

WON a joint account of a husband and wife is liable for the payment of the obligation of the husband? NO

ratio

It is undisputed that the sum of P636.80 which is now in controversy was derived from the paraphernal
property of Margarita. It therefore belongs to the conjugal partnership of the said spouses.

The provision of article 1408 CC to the effect that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for all the debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband must be understood as subject to the qualifications
established by article 1386 of the same Code, which provides that:

The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be subject to the payment of personal obligations of the husband,
unless it be proved that such obligation were productive of some benefit to the family.

The meaning of this article is clarified by reference to the first paragraph of the preceding article 1385 which reads as
follows:

The fruit of the paraphernal property form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and are subject to the
payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses.

Construing the two article together, it seems clear that the fruits of the paraphernal property which become part of the
assets of the conjugal partnership are not liable for the payment of personal obligations of the husband, unless it be
proved that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family.

There was no attempt to prove that the obligations contracted by Angel produced any benefit to the family. There is
also no merit to the contention that half of the P636.80 belongs to Angel and can be levied, because the right of one
spouse to one-half of the property of the conjugal partnership does not vest until the dissolution of the marriage when
the conjugal partnership is dissolved

4
SAYSON vs. CA

Case no. 63 SAYSON vs. CA   G.R. Nos. 89224-25 | January 23, 1992 | 205 SCRA 321
Adoption; Succession; Representation;
While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of representation.
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.
Eleno died on Nov. 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on Mar.
23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on Mar. 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On Apr. 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa and Remedios, together with Juana (Isabel’s mother), filed a complaint
for partition of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel. Delia, Edmundo (both legally adopted) and Doribel (the
legitimate daughter), who alleged successional rights to the estate as the decedents’ lawful descendants, resisted
said complaint and filed their own complaint for the partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela claiming that
they are entitled to inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of representation.
REPORT THIS AD
The trial court declared them entitled to inherit by right of representation.

On appeal, the CA modified the decision disqualifying Delia and Edmundo from inheriting from the estate of the
deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to inherit their father’s share in the estate of his (Teodoro)
parents’ estate by right of representation.
HELD: YES as to Doribel but NO as to Delia and Edmundo.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
Doribel has a right to represent here deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Art. 981 (NCC), she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which
shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children.

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
the latter, those rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the
estate of their parents with the petitioners. The CA was correct however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents’ intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the
adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

5
 CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 121027.  July 31, 1997]
Facts:

The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero,
who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983
without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein
petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation. 

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to
herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latter’s name.

Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled
to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the
legitimacy of Hermogenes.

During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with documentary
evidences offered to prove petitioners’ filiation to their father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case
and submitted a written offer of the exhibits.

Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to
prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal,
declaring that the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family
picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the
petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation.

Ruling: 

1. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule
that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with
the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: ‘The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs
must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is
void.’  This principle applies under our Family Code.  Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to “the action to impugn the legitimacy.”  This action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed by law.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can
no longer be brought.  The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned.  The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a
state of uncertainty for a long time.  It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of
such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the
period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.

2. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be
divided in this case, to wit:

6
 “Art. 975.  When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the
latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.  But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in
equal portions.”
“Art. 995.  In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.”
“Art. 1001.  Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.”

Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the
surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are
entitled to jointly inherit in their own right.  Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total undivided
three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein private respondent.  Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of
an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

APOLONIO TANJANCO V. CA and ARACELI SANTOS

18 SCRA 994 – December 17, 1996

7
FACTS:
About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio expressed his undying love
affection to Araceli also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of Apolonio promise of marriage
Araceli consented and acceded to Apolonio’s pleas for carnal knowledge. Until December 1959, through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result
of which the latter conceived a child. Araceli informed Aplolonio and pleaded with him to make good his promises of
marriage but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, Apolonio stopped and refrained from seeing
Araceli since about July 1959 has not visited her and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and
his promises.

ISSUE:
WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21.

HELD:
No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to
1959, Araceli, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Hence, the courts conclude that no case is made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the complaint. The decision of CA is reversed and that of
CFI is affirmed.

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

FIRST DIVISION

8
 [G.R. NO. 160748. July 14, 2004]

SPOUSES ANTONIO and LUCY VERA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. LUCY

CALDERON, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 20, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
57900 which affirmed with modifications the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laguna, Branch 31. Likewise, challenged is the Resolution dated November 10,
2003 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.2 cralawred

The antecedent facts are as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Lucy Calderon and Avelino Belisario, Jr. were married on January 31, 1967.3 On
October 23, 1970,4 they bought a parcel of land with an area of 248 square meters,
located on Mabini Street, Poblacion, Bian, Laguna, from Avelinos aunt, Margarita
Arguelles. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10744 was issued in the
name of Avelino Belizario, Jr., married to Lucy Calderon. The spouses separated in
1981 and Lucy resided with her children in Garcia Subdivision, San Antonio, Bian,
Laguna.

On June 3, 1986, Avelino sold the subject property to petitioner spouses Antonio
and Lucy Vera Cruz.5 The Vera Cruz spouses registered the sale on July 30, 1986
and TCT No. T-143101 was issued in their name.6 When Avelino died on November
20, 1993, his wife, respondent Lucy Calderon, discovered that their conjugal
property had been sold by her husband without her knowledge and consent and
that her signature on the Deed of Sale had been forged. Hence, she filed a
complaint against the Vera Cruz spouses for annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale
and TCT No. T-143101 with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch
31, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-4488.

In their answer, petitioner spouses assert that they purchased the property in good
faith and for value. In 1984, Avelino offered to lease the land to Antonios brother,
Joselito Vera Cruz.7 The latter, as manager of the store and vice-president of
VeraCruz, Inc., entered into a verbal lease agreement with Avelino for a period of
two (2) years.8 In May 1986, at about the time the lease expired, Avelino and
Joselito visited petitioners in Marikina. Avelino offered to sell the land to them.9 He
showed them the owners duplicate title of the property as well as the Deed of Sale
executed by Margarita Arguelles, which were both in his name. Thus, petitioners
were convinced that the lot was Avelinos exclusive property.10 This notwithstanding,
they asked Avelino to bring his wife during the execution of the deed of
sale.11 cralawred

On June 3, 1986, Joselito and petitioner spouses, along with Avelino and a woman,
whom he introduced as his wife, Lucy Calderon, met and executed the deed of sale
before Notary Public Atty. Democlito J. Angeles.12 Thereafter, petitioners filed the
Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.

After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Lucy
Calderon,13 the dispositive portion of which states:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against

defendants:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 3, 1986 (Exhibits D
and 4) as null and void (sic) insofar as the share of plaintiff on the lot in litigation is
concerned;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

9
2.ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch to cancel TCT No. T-
14101 (Exhibits B and 5) in the name of defendants Antonio Vera Cruz and Lucy
Vera Cruz and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the names of the said defendant
spouses over the undivided share and in the name of plaintiff over the other half of
the subject lot; andcralawlibrary

3.ordering the defendant spouses to pay plaintiff P20,000 for and as attorneys fees.

Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the trial court declared that the subject parcel of land was presumed
conjugal under Article 160 of the Civil Code,14 and that petitioners were negligent in
failing to inquire into the ownership of the property purchased.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial
court with modification, and ruled:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with

modification. We find the appellants purchasers in good faith and We delete the
award of attorneys fees and costs:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 3, 1986 (Exhibits D
and 4) as null and void insofar as the share of plaintiff on the lot in litigation is
concerned; and,

2.Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch to cancel TCT No.
14101 (Exhibits B and 5) in the name of defendants Antonio Vera Cruz and Lucy
Vera Cruz and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the names of the said defendant
spouses over the undivided share and in the name of the plaintiff over the other
half of the subject lot.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hence this petition anchored on the sole ground that:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
ALTHOUGH PETITIONERS ARE BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE OF THE
LAND IN QUESTION, THEY ARE ONLY ENTITLED TO OWN ONE HALF PORTION
THEREOF AND THAT RESPONDENT LUCY CALDERON IS ENTITLED TO THE OTHER
HALF PORTION.

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari to the Supreme Court. Although it has long been settled that findings
of fact are conclusive upon this Court, there are exceptional circumstances which
would require us to review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals,15 to
wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

It is well settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on
the parties and on this Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the
facts set forth in the decision as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; (10) the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is

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premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

The case at bar falls under one of the exceptions, it appearing that there was a
disparity between the findings of the trial court and those of the Court of Appeals
on the issue of whether petitioners were purchasers in good faith.

Reviewing the contradicting factual findings of the courts below, we agree with the
following findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioners are purchasers in good
faith:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Under the circumstances of the case, they are entitled to claim the status of
innocent purchasers for value. They exercised the necessary diligence in
ascertaining the credentials of the seller, the registered owner himself, Avelino
Belisario, Jr.

We cannot charge said appellants with negligence since, at the time of the sale to
them, the land was registered in the name of the vendor and the tax declaration
was also issued in the latters name.It was also clearly indicated at the back of the
transfer certificate of title that Avelino acquired ownership over the said land by
virtue of the Deed of Sale. Even appellee confirmed that they bought the
property.There is no annotation, defect or flaw in the title that would have aroused
any suspicion as to its authenticity.Such being the case, appellants had the right to
rely on what appeared on the face of the certificate of title.

Based on the records, it was the registered owner who sold the land to them.
Avelino validly possessed the title since he was the administrator thereof. Avelino
presented his title as well as the deed of sale in his favor to show how he acquired
said property. It was Avelino himself who brought and introduced another woman
as Lucy Calderon. Joselito testified that Avelino and this woman were living
together as husband and wife. Even plaintiff-appellee Lucy Calderon admitted that
she knew her husband was living with another woman.16 cralawred

Indeed, petitioners were dealing with the registered owner of the property and they
had no reason to suspect that the woman whom he introduced to them as his wife,
Lucy Calderon, was an impostor.

We have long settled the rule that an innocent purchaser for value is one who buys
the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or
interest in such property and pays the full price for the same, at the time of such
purchase or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in
the property.17 A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.18 cralawred

Anent the issue that the respondents are entitled to only one half () of the portion
of the conjugal property corresponding to the share of Avelino, the pertinent
provisions involved are Articles 165, 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the law at the
time the sale was contracted in 1986.

Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.

Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift,
or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may
compel her to grant the same. x x x.

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or

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her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.

In the recent case of Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares  ,19 we

reiterated the rule that the husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real
property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife, otherwise, the
contract is voidable. To wit:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

Indeed, in several cases the Court has ruled that such alienation or encumbrance
by the husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as
merely voidable and not void. This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil Code
pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10 years from the
questioned transaction, seek its annulment.

Likewise, in the case of heirs of Christina Ayuste v. Court of Appeals,20 we declared

that:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of the
conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his wife is
voidable. The action for annulment must be brought during the marriage and within
ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife. Where the law speaks in
clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation there is room
only for application.

In the present case, the deed of sale was executed on February 27, 1987. Rafael
Ayuste died on October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, 1990 that
Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with the lower court asking for the annulment
of the sale. Although the action was filed within ten years from the questioned
transaction, it was not brought during the existence of the marriage which was
dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989.Clearly, the action for annulment
filed by Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time.

The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale after the death of her
husband is not material. We affirm public respondents ruling that registration of the
sale with the Register of Deeds constitutes a notice to the whole world. Precisely,
the purpose of the legislature in providing a system of registration is to afford a
means of publicity so that persons dealing with real property may search the
records and thereby acquire security against instruments the execution of which
have not been revealed to them. Since the deed of sale was registered on March 5,
1987, Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from
such date.

This case is on all fours with the above-quoted Ayuste  case.Under Article 173 of the
Civil Code, an action for the annulment of any contract entered into by the husband
without the wifes consent must be filed (1) during the marriage; and (2) within ten
years from the transaction questioned. Where any one of these two conditions is
lacking, the action will be considered as having been filed out of time. In the case
at bar, while respondent filed her complaint for annulment of the deed of sale on
July 8, 1994, i.e., within the ten-year period counted from the execution of the
deed of sale of the property on June 3, 1986, the marriage between her and
Avelino had already been dissolved by the death of the latter on November 20,
1993. In other words, her marriage to Avelino was no longer subsisting at the time
she filed her complaint. Therefore, the civil case had already been barred by
prescription.

Actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law.21 The registration of the
deed of sale executed by Avelino in favor of petitioners served as constructive
notice thereof.As such, respondent is chargeable with knowledge of the sale as to
let the prescriptive period run against her.Her complaint must, therefore, be
ordered dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. B-4488 is ordered
DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.

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No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

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