BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADfPA

A Translation of Chapter Two:

'EXAMINATION OF THE TRAVERSED, THE UNTRAVERSED,
AND THAT WHICH IS BEING TRAVERSED'

by
WILLIAM L. AMES

INTRODUCTION 1

The Madhyamaka 2 school is one of the two major philosophical

schools of Mahfiyfina Buddhism, along with the Yogficfira school.
The Madhyamaka is best known for its doctrine of emptiness
(gtinyatd). The idea of emptiness is found in the "perfection of
discernment" (praj~d-pdramitd) sfitras, which are among the
earliest Mahfiyfina sfitras. While the sfitras expound emptiness in a
discursive way, the Mfidhyamikas use systematic argument.
Emptiness, for the Madhyamaka school, means that dharmas are
empty of intrinsic nature (svabhdva). All Buddhists hold that
conditioned dharmas arise in dependence on causes and condi-
tions. For the Mfidhyamikas, this fact of dependent origination
(pratitya-samutpdda) implies that dharmas can have no intrinsic,
self-sufficient nature of their own. Since dharmas appear when the
proper conditions occur and cease when those conditions are
absent, the way in which dharmas exist is similar to the way in
which mirages and dreams exist) Thus attachment and aversion are
undermined, since ultimately, they have no substantial objects and
lack any self-sufficient status of their own. 4
The Madhyamaka school was founded by Nfigfirjuna (active c.
t50--200), the author of the M~la-madhyamaka-kdrikd (MMK).
The M M K inspired a number of commentaries which not only
expounded the meaning of the M M K but also often acted as
vehicles for the commentators' own views. The Akutobhayd seems

Journal of Indian Philosophy' 23: 295--365, 1995.

9 1995 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
296 WILLIAM L. AMES

to be the earliest of the extant commentaries. It is of uncertain

authorship, although it is sometimes ascribed to Nfigfirjuna himself.5
The earliest extant commentary on the MMK by a known author 6
is that of Buddhapfilita (c. 500). Buddhapfilita closely followed
Nfigfirjuna's own method, which utilized mainly prasahga argu-
ments. These are arguments which show that the opponent's
position leads to consequences (prasahga) unacceptable to the
opponent himself, without, however, committing the Mfidhyamika
to affirming a contrary position.
Bhfivaviveka (c. 500--570) was the next important Mfidhyamika
philosopher. Besides his commentary on the MMK, the Prajhd-
pradipa, he wrote some notable independent works, such as the
Madhyamaka-hr.daya-kdrikd and its autocommentary, the Tarka-
jvdld. Bhfivaviveka seems to have been the first to use the formal
syllogism of Indian logic in expounding the Madhyamaka; and he
strongly criticized Buddhapfilita for failing to do so. He felt that the
author of a commentary should state independent inference
(svatantra-anumdna) rather than simply giving prasahga arguments]
Bhfivaviveka's position was later criticized by Candrakirti, who
defended Buddhapfilita in his own commentary on the MMK, the
Prasannapadd.
Bhfivaviveka's Prajh@radipa is, in the first place, of great
interest for its explanation and elaboration of the MMK. In the
second place, it is important in the history of the Madhyamaka.
Bhfivaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapfilita in the Prajh@radipa
resulted in the division of the Madhyamaka into two subschools:
the Svfitantrika-Madhyamaka of Bhfivaviveka and the Prfisafigika-
Madhyamaka of Buddhapfilita and Candraldrti. (The names of
these subschools, derived from svatantra-annumdna and prasahga,
seem to have originated some centuries after Candraldrti and are
known to us only from Tibetan sources, s)
Moreover, the Prajhdpradipa is the first commentary on the
MMK to make use of the formal apparatus of Buddhist logic and
the first to discuss non-Buddhist philosophical schools extensively.
Bhfivaviveka's accounts, in the Prajh@radipa and elsewhere, of the
positions of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools give valuable
information on the state of Indian philosophy in his day.
Chapter two is one of the most important chapters of the MMK,
for in it, Nfigfirjuna develops his critique of a fundamental and
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJN/IPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 297

pervasive concept, "activity" (kriyd). Many of the arguments in

chapter two, or variations of them, are utilized in later chapters of
the MMK; and Nfigfirjuna refers explicitly to chapter two no less
than four times. 9 Thus chapter two, like chapter one, plays a key
role in the structure of the MMK.
Chapter two is stated in terms of a critique of motion, rather
than of activity in general. As Bhfivaviveka explains, this is done
for two reasons. First, in the dedicatory verses of chapter one
(MMK 1-A,B), Nfigfirjuna set forth eight negations characterizing
dependent origination, among them "without coming, without
going." One purpose of chapter two is to establish these two nega-
tions. Beyond that, if one takes motion as a paradigmatic example
of activity and then negates motion, it will be easy to show that
other activities can be negated in the same way. 1~
In reading chapter two, one might get the impression that Nfigfir-
juna's aim was to construct a grammatical tour de force in which
seemingly every form derived from the root gain ("to go," etc.) is
used and negated. One might also wonder whether he was critiqu-
ing motion or language. I think that his purpose in chapter two can
be understood in the following way:
In the first place, he did not wish to deny motion from the point
of view of convention (vyavahdra) or "superficial reality" (sam vrti).
Rather, he wanted to show that the conventional existence of
motion does not imply that some sort of intrinsic nature (svabhdva)
exists as the basis of motion. 11 He proceeded to do this by analyz-
ing the process of motion into its interdependent components of
goer, path, going, beginning of going, stopping, etc. Then he could
show that these components, while not identical, lacked the sort of
self-sufficient independence which they would necessarily have if
each possessed its own intrinsic nature.
His analysis naturally made use of the rich variety of nouns and
adjectives which the Sanskrit language can derive from a single
verbal root. His intent, though, was not to analyze Sanskrit as such
or language as such but rather to show that there is no intrinsic
nature at work in what we conventionally call "motion."
From a modern point of view, one might object that Nfigfirjuna's
analysis applies only to Sanskrit because other languages may use
different categories for talking about motion, leading to a different
analysis of the process of motion. It is difficult to see, however,
298 WILLIAM L. AMES

how any such categories could fail to be just as interdependent as a

"goer" and his or her "going." Thus Nfigfirjuna's basic argument
against intrinsic nature would still apply if another language were
used, even though the details might have to be formulated differ-
ently.
Aside from a few quotations in the Prasannapadd, the Pr@id-
pradipa has been lost in the original Sanskrit. It exists in Tibetan
and Chinese translations. The Chinese translation is reportedly
rather poor; 12 but the Tibetan translation, done by JfiS_nagarbha
and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the early ninth century, seems to
be excellent. The same translators also translated Avalokitavrata's
massive subcommentary on the Prajfidpradipa, called the Prajfid-
pradipa-tfkd. (Avalokitavrata's work is not extant in Sanskrit, and
apparently no Chinese translation was ever made.)
The present English translation was made from the Tibetan. I
consulted the Peking, Narthang, Derge, and Cone editions and
made my own edition of the text. Most of the variants found in the
different Tibetan editions are either obvious scribal errors or else
represent different orthographic conventions. Rarely do the variants
offer significant alternatives for the meaning of a sentence.
I also made extensive use of the Peking and Derge editions of
Avalokitavrata's subcommentary. Since the Prajfidpradipa is often
terse, allusive, or technical, sentences frequently need to be ampli-
fied with phrases in square brackets; and explanatory notes some-
times need to be provided. For both purposes, Avalokitavrata's
work is invaluable. Also, since the subcommentary quotes the
entire Prajfidpradipa, it is sometimes helpful in establishing the text.
An English-Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary has been provided for
important terms. Although we do not have the Sanskrit text of the
Prajfidpradtpa, the Tibetan practice of using standardized transla-
tion equivalents enables one to infer the Sanskrit original of many
terms with a high degree of confidence. Sanskrit terms in the
glossary are given in the translation in parentheses at their first
occurrence, unless the English translation equivalent is so widely
used that this seems unnecessary. Sanskrit and Tibetan words and
phrases which are not in the glossary are also sometimes quoted in
parentheses, especially when the translation is a bit conjectural.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADIPA: C H A P T E R T W O 299

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1 The introduction to my translation of chapter one of the Praj~dpradipa (Ames

(1993)) is repeated here (with minor revisions) for the convenience of the
reader, except that material specific to chapter one has been replaced by a
discussion of chapter two. Also, for more details on all the matters discussed in
this introduction, see Ames (1986), ~ I: Introduction," and the sources cited
therein.
Addendum to Ames (1993): Avalokitavrata's quotation from a non-Buddhist
text, mentioned in Ames (1993), p. 236, n. 20, has been identified by J. W. de
Jong as Manusmrti IV.80; see Jong (1988), p. 430.
2 As a general rule, "Madhyamaka" is the name of the school and its philosophy;
a follower of the school is called a "Mfidhyamika." See Ruegg (1981), p. 1 and
n. 3.
3 See, e.g., MMK 7--34 and 17--33.
4 See, e.g., chapter 23 of the MMK, which is discussed in Ames (1988).
s On the Akutobhayd, see Huntington (1986).
6 There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Asaflga which
deals only with the dedicatory verses of MMK (MMK 1--A,B). See Ruegg
(1981), p. 49, and Keenan (1989).
7 In this connection, it is interesting to note that in his commentary on MMK
2--19 (see following translation), Bhfivaviveka admits that Nfigfirjuna gives a
praswiga argument. In his commentary on MMK 1--1 (see Ames (1993)) and
elsewhere, Bhfivaviveka criticizes BuddhapSlita's praswiga arguments because,
among other reasons, they could be converted into syllogisms asserting things
which Buddhapfilita does not, in fact, wish to say. For example, Bhfivaviveka
claims that BuddhapSlita's prasar~ga argument against things originating from
themselves could be converted into a syllogism showing that things originate
from another. In the case of MMK 2--19, however, Bhfivaviveka converts
Nfigfirjuna's prasa~ga argument against a goer and his going's being the same
into a syllogism which also simply negates sameness without asserting difference.
Thus Bhfivaviveka seems inconsistent, if not biased, on this point.
8 See Ruegg (1981), p. 58.
9 See MMK 3--3, 7--14, 10--13, and 16--17.
10 See Bhfivaviveka's commentary preceding the opponent's initial objection at
the beginning of chapter two.
11 Bhfivaviveka apparently accepts, on the conventional level, a "cinematic"
theory of motion in which motion is, in a sense, illusory even conventionally.
(See his commentary following MMK 2--22c and n. 176 to the translation of
chapter two.) Nfigfirjuna would not necessarily have rejected such a theory on
the conventional level. The point is that some conventional activity is taking
place, whether one describes it as continuous motion or as rapid origination and
cessation at successive points; but that conventional activity has no intrinsic
nature.
12 See Kajiyama (1963), p. 39.
300 WILLIAM L. AMES

TRANSLATION 1,2

Now [Nfigfirjuna] begins the second chapter because he wishes

[either] [1] to show that dependent origination possesses the
characteristics of [being] without coming and without going,3 or [2]
to refute positions contrary (vipaks.a) to the teaching in the first
chapter that all entities are unoriginated.
[Buddhapdlita's commentary:] [Buddhapfilita]4 comments:
[Nfigfirjuna] begins the second chapter for the sake of students
(~is.ya) [in whom] conviction (graddhd) has arisen through hearing
the reasoning [which proves] nonorigination [and who] wish to hear
a negation of the going and coming which are commonly known in
the world. 5
[Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, because
it is not [logically] possible that one whose mind is in error due to
specious means of knowledge (pramdn.a-dbhdsa) would ask such [a
question]. [Rather,] it is [logically] possible that that [sort of
student] 6 would state inferences in order to show that going exists
and in order to show that origination exists. Also, how is that
[idea], "In ultimate reality, going does not exist," [logically] possible
for one whose mind is confused by specious means of knowledge?
[This is so] since the question [as framed by Buddhapfilita] is not
suitable. 7 If one supposes that it is a question [put by] one who
does not understand, [that is not the case] because this treatise
would [then] be within the [cognitive] domain of ordinary people. 8
The world, for the most part, is attached to things to be done by
virtue of the conventional practice (vyavahdra) of many activities.
In order to remove that thorn of attachment, if one [first] removes
one activity which has the defining characteristic of going, [then] it
will be easy to remove the remaining activities also. 9 Therefore a
contrary position will be set forth. 1~
Here one who is an opponent of the point under discussion
appears: 11
Objection:
[Thesis:] Internal entities have indeed originated,
[Reason:] because the conventional activities (vyavahdra) of one
who possesses the objects of those [internal entities] 12 are per-
formed.
[Dissimilar example:] Here one who does not originate does not
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADiPA: CHAPTER TWO 301

perform the conventional activities of one who possesses the

objects of those [internal entities]. For example, a childless
woman's son does not go.
[Similar example:] It is not the case that Devadatta and Vis.numitra
likewise do not go.
[Conclusions:] Therefore internal entities do indeed originate.
Answer: In order to refute the contrary position which has been
set forth, the following is said: If [you] are establishing the origina-
tion and going and coming which are commonly known in the
world [and] which bring about giving (ddna), moral conduct (dila),
meditation (dhydna), and so on, [then you] establish what is
[already] established [for us]. But if [you seek to] establish that
origination and going and coming exist in ultimate reality, ]that is,]
with reference to the yogin in meditative concentration (samdhita)
]whose] eye of discernment sees the true state ~3 of entities, [then]
the meaning of ]your] reason -- "because the conventional activities
of one who possesses the objects of those [internal entities] are
performed" -- is not established. [This is so] because going has
been negated by the negation of going, too, just according to the
negation of origination. ~4 Even if [you] suppose that ]your] reason
is commonly known to both sides in a general way (spyi'i rnam
pas), is [in that case,] the meaning of your reason is contradictory.
]This is so] because there is no positive concomitance (anvaya)
[between your reason and the property to be proved] and because
that [reason[ is positively concomitant only with dissimilar cases
(vipaksa). 16
Furthermore, [the following arguments] are given: Here if going
existed in ultimate reality, that [going] would exist either on the
traversed (gata), on the untraversed (agata), or on that which is
being traversed (gamyamdna). Moreover, as to that,
To begin with, the traversed (gata) is not being traversed
(gamyate)57 [MMK 2--1a]
[This is so] because there [i.e., on the part of the path which has
already been traversed,] the activity of going [or traversing] is past.
Since that point is common knowledge to others, also, [we] will
not prove [it]. That ]point] was stated because [Nfigfirjuna] wishes
[to have] an example which is accepted by others. The property of
that [already traversed path] is that it is a path; [the property] of the
302 WILLIAM L. AMES

not [yet] traversed [portion of the path] is also similar to that. 18

Therefore,
The untraversed (agata) is also not being traversed. [MMK 2--1b]
The idea is that [this is so]
[Reason:] because it is a path,
[Example:] like the [already] traversed path. 19
Alternatively, [one can make the following argument:] "Untra-
versed" [means] that the activity of going [or traversing] has not
[yet] begun. The property of that [portion of the path] is that it has
not [yeq been traversed. An example [is stated] by virtue of [the
property] to be proved and the proving property. [In this case, the
example is] a path which one does not wish to traverse, [since it
is] a property-poseessor (dharmin) which possesses properties
(dharma) commonly known to both [proponent and opponenq. 2~
Here the inference is:
[Thesis:] The untraversed is not being traversed,
[Reason:[ because it has not [yet] been traversed,
[Example:] like a path different from that, which one does not wish
to traverse.
Objection: Here the Aulfikyas 21 say: Do [you] show that going
does not exist on that untraversed [path] because Devadatta's
activity of going has not [yet] originated [there]? Or do [you] show
that going does not exist because the activity of going [will] not
[ever] exist [there]? The point is this: If [you] maintain the former
supposition, [you] are establishing what is [already] established [for
us]. But if ]you[ maintain the latter supposition, the meaning of
[your] reason ["because the activity of going will not ever exist
there,"] is contradictory. 22 Therefore it is not the case that the
meaning of [our] previous reason 23 is unestablished.
[The Anlfikyas continue:] ff [you] say that that [argument of ours]
is not ]logically] possible because it is not established that going is
different from substance, 24 [we reply:]
[Thesis:] [Devadatta as] the object of a mind (mati) which thinks,
"Devadatta possesses going," possesses [something belonging to[
a category (paddrtha) different from Davadatta's self ((ttman),25
[Reason:] because certainty (nges pa) arises,
[Example:[ as with the object of a mind which thinks, "Devadatta
has a staff.''26
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNfi~PRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 303

Answer: As to that, if here [you] show that [Devadatta as] the

object of a mind [which thinks of] Devadatta [as] possessing some
characteristic (vi~esa), possesses [something belonging to] a category
different from Devadatta's self, [then you] establish what is [already]
established conventionally [for us]. [This is so] because [we] accept
this mind which thinks, "This possesses going," as referring to a
collection of conditioned factors 27 called "Devadatta" which has the
particular defining characteristic of originating in another place. 2s
But if [you] say that Devadatta posesses a category called
"going," there is no example. 29 But even if it is otherwise, [then]
since the meaning [of your reason] is contradictory even con-
ventionally, 3~ what need is there to speak of ultimate reality?
Therefore there is no avoiding the fault 31 which [we] have stated.
Objection: Some of [our] fellow Buddhists 32 say: Effort (prayatna
or vydydma) arises from wishing (chanda) as [its] cause; [and effort]
produces the element (dhdtu), air. Because of [the element, air], the
collection of elements and matter depending on the elements which
is called a "body" comes to originate uninterruptedly in another
place; [and this] is called "going." Therefore going does not exist as
a different thing (artha). Since that which originates ceases in the
very place where it originates, going is illusory (bhrdnta) like
tongues of flame and so on. 33 Therefore [we] do not accept going
as a different thing. Also, in ultimate reality, going does not exist.
Therefore [your] negation of going in ultimate reality [that is, of
ultimately real going] establishes what is [already] established [for
US].
Answer: [1] Since [we] have negated origination, the proof which
you have stated is not established. [2] That cognition ]which knows]
that going is illusory (bhrdnta) like tongues of flame, etc., is also
mistaken (bhrdnta). 34 [3] [We] will also negate [the idea that] the
one who goes and [his] going are not different. Therefore [for these
three reasons,] that ]argument of yours] also does not please the
minds of learned persons.
Objection: The Sfi.mkhyas say: When [the guna called] rajas
becomes predominant on the not [yet] traversed [path] and [rajas']
function (pravrtti) of performing activities becomes manifest, [then]
one goes. 35
Answer: For them, also, going is not established, since manifesta-
tion has been negated. Therefore [this] is a mere supposition.
304 WILLIAM L. AMES

The proponents of going, fearing the faults which [we] have stated,
might think:
Objection: If [we] assert that going exists on that ]portion of the
path] which is [in the process of] being traversed (gamyamdna), the
stated faults will not exist.
Answer: The dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna], having ascertained that point,
explains that that which is being traversed does not exist apart
from the traversed and the untraversed:
Apart from the traversed and the untraversed, that which is
being traversed is not known (gamyate). IMMK 2--1cd[
The meaning is that it cannot be grasped. 36
How is it that that does not exist? Here that which is being
traversed must be either the traversed or the untraversed or some-
thing which is both partly traversed and partly untraversed; but [if
any of these cases] there would be conflict with inference, as shown
in both cases [separately].37
Objection: It is not the case that that which is being traversed
does not exist, because
Going (gati) ]exists] where there is movement of the limbs
(cestd). And because that movement ]exists] on that which is
being traversed,
Not on the traversed [and] not on the untraversed, therefore
going exists on that which is being traversed. [MMK 2--2]
As to that, going exists in that place where a movement of the
limbs appears which has as [its] defining characteristic lifting up
and setting down the foot. Because that movement of the limbs
also appears on that which is being traversed, but that movement
neither appears on the traversed nor appears on the untraversed,
therefore going exists on that which is being traversed. Therefore,
in that way, going is established because that which is being
traversed exists; [and] hence what we maintain is established.
Therefore, by the method which [we] have thus stated, what
[Nfigfirjuna] said, "That which is being traversed is not known"
[MMK 2--1d], is not [logically] possible; and there will be no
conflict with the inferences which [you] have shown in both cases
[separately].
[Buddhapdlita's commentary:] [Buddhapfilita]38 says: yatah.
]means] "of the goer" (gantuh.).39
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 305

[Bhdvaviveka's critique:]4~ That is not [logically] possible, [1]

because there would be no correlative of the word "therefore," [2]
because the basis (gzhi) of an activity is invariable (avyabhicdrin), 41
and [3] because the negation of a goer's going [on[ the traversed
and the untraversed has been shown already.
Answer [to the objection expressed in MMK 2--2]: Here [Nfigfir-
juna] says,
How will going (gamana) be possible on that which is being
traversed? 42 [MMK 2--3ab]
The idea is that ]this is the case] when:
]Thesis:] Whether [you] accept that ]that which is being traversed]
has an intrinsic nature which is separate or not separate [from
the traversed and the untraversed], 43 it is not possible that going
exists there,
[Reason:] because ]that which is being traversed] is a path,
[Example:] like the path which has been traversed [already].
Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 2--3ab as follows:]
How will going be possible on that which is being traversed?
[MMK 2--3ab]
The idea is that [this is so] because there would be the same
question raised in objection. If one supposes that going exists on
that which is being traversed, there would be this same question
raised in objection: Where does movement of the limbs exist, on
the traversed, on the untraversed, or on [some path] having
properties dissimilar to those two? The faults in those [three alter-
natives], moreover, have been explained [already]. 44
Alternatively, [one can explain MMK 2--3ab in a third way:]
How will going be possible on that which is being traversed?
[MMK 2--3ab t
]This is so] because there is no inference showing that ultimately
real going exists.
[How will going (gamana) be possible on that which is being
traversed,[
When that which is being traversed is not possible without
going? [MMK 2--3 cd]
The idea is that [going is not possible on that which is being
306 WILLIAM L. AMES

traversed] also because it would be like the tethered horse. 45 How

would this be like the tethered horse? Because by saying, "What is
that which is being traversed? It is [the place] where movement of
the limbs [exists]. Where does movement of the limbs ]exist]? On
that which is being traversed," neither of the two is specified.
Objection: Having accepted [the path] which is being traversed,
which has been common knowledge conventionally from beginning-
less [time], [we] maintain that ultimately real going exists there.
Answer: Even so, that single activity of going which exists here
has the power of being applied to what is called "that which is
being traversed." What is that other going, [of which one could
say,] "Going exists on that which is being traversed? ''46
As to that, what the opponent said [in his initial syllogism] --
"Internal entities do indeed originate, because one who possesses
the objects of those [internal entities] performs conventional activ-
ities" -- is not established, because the meaning of the reason is not
established. ~Iis] example 47 is also not established, because
Devadatta is not established in ultimate reality.
Objection: The activity of going is not complete in that [term,]
"that which is being traversed." Because we express that ]activity of
going[ in the word "going," therefore, since that [activity of going]
exists, it is not the case that the meaning of [our] reason is unestab-
lished. 48
Answer:
For one for whom going (gamana) exists on that which is being
traversed, it follows that
That which is being traversed [exists] without going (gati), for
that which is being traversed is known. 49 [MMK 2--4]
For [one] disputant, going exists on that which is being traversed.
For the position of that ]disputant], it follows that although [the
activity of] going exists in [the word] "going," that which is being
traversed ]exists] without going. Why? Because "that which is being
traversed" is known and understood without the activity of going's
being complete in that ]term] and without [its] applying [to that
term]. [The opponent] does not maintain that; he maintains that
that [term] "that which is being traversed" does possess going.
Therefore since [in that case,] the activity of going has [already]
performed its function (artha) in regard to that [term, "that which
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJ]V~4PRADIPA: CHAPTER TWO 307

is being traversed"], another going is not possible. Thus there is no

avoiding the fault which [we] have stated.
Desiring to rid himself of the pain of the stated fault, [the oppo-
nent may] say:
Objection: [We] maintain that that which is being traversed does
possess [ultimately real] going; and [ultimately real] going itself is
[the activity of] going. 5~
Answer: Even so,
If going exists on that which is being traversed, it follows that
there are two goings,
That by which that [is called I "that which is being traversed" and
that which is the going on that. [MMK 2--5]
If [you] suppose that going exists on a ]path] which is being
traversed [and] which possesses an ultimately real going, it follows
that there will be two goings: that [ultimately real] going by which
[that path] which is being traversed would be called "that which is
being traversed" and that ]conventional] going by which there
would be conventional going on that [path] which is being tra-
versed. 51 In that case,
If it follows [that there are] two goings, it also follows [that there
are] two goers . . . [MMK 2--6ab]
Why? The rest of the sentence is:
Because without a goer, going is not possible. [MMK 2--6cd]
That also is not maintained. Therefore one who wishes to
remove definitively the stain of the faults which [we] have described
[should[ accept just one conventional going. 52 A ]conventional[ goer
and a [conventional path] which is being traversed are ]then] estab-
lished through dependence on that [conventional going]; but since
an ultimately real going is also s3 not possible, the meaning of the
reason [in the opponent's initial syllogism] -- "because one who
possesses the objects of those [internal entities] performs conven-
tional activities" -- is not established. For that reason and [also]
because [his] example does not exist, [the opponent's thesis,]
"Internal entities do indeed originate," is not established; and
dependent origination which possesses the characteristics of being
without coming and without going is established.
308 WILLIAM L. AMES

Objection: The grammarians 54 say: There is only one going; and

that very [going], by its own intrinsic nature, [is what] we call
"going." That basis (gzhi) where that [going] exists is that which is
being traversed, and that one who is the goer is the agent [of the
activity of going[. Therefore it does not follow that there are two
goers and [two] goings.55
Answer: That is not [logically] possible, [1] because the origina-
tion of going in ultimate reality has been negated, [2] because going
does not exist since that which is being traversed does not exist, [3]
because a collection of conditioned factors which has originated in
a different place is conventionally designated as a goer, and [4]
because that which is being traversed has also been investigated
[already] .56
Objection:
[Thesis:] One should understand that going does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because the basis of that [going] exists.
[Dissimilar example:] Here that which has no basis does not exist,
like the falling, going, etc., of a childless woman's son.
[Similar example:] The basis of going, a goer [such as] Devagarman,
does exist.
[Conclusion:] Thus because [its] basis exists, going exists.
Therefore, because the reason [in our initial syllogism] is established,
internal entities do indeed exist; and going and coming and so on
are also established.
Answer:
ff the goer does not exist, going is not possible.
ff going does not exist, how indeed will a goer exist? 57 [MMK
2--7]

[The opponent might] think that if he does not state a reason,

going is not established; [and then] it would not be the case that the
stated faults do not exist. [Recognizing that] if the goer does not
exist, going does not exist, [he might] therefore state a reason --
"because [its] basis exists" -- which depends on the goer, the basis
of going.
ff so, is it not the case that
If the goer does not exist, going is not possible? [MMK 2--7ab]
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 309

[But] it has been ascertained [already] that that going is also not
possible. Therefore,
If going does not exist, how indeed will a goer exist? [MMK
2--7cd]
The idea is that [this is so] since the cause of being a goer [i.e.,
going] does not exist.
The word "how" (kutah.) [shows] that it is not credible (yid mi
ches pa); the meaning of the sentence is that the goer does not
exist. [The explanation] in full is as before. 58 Since the goer is not
established, the meaning of [your] reason, "because [its] basis
exists," either is not established or else is contradictory. 59
Objection: Well, listen to this other inference, which will establish
going:
[Thesis:] It is certain that going does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because by means of that [going], there is the conventional
designation (vyavahdra) of one who possesses that [going].6~
IDissimilar example:] Here, as for what does not exist, one does not
point out one who possesses that by means of that [nonexistent
thing]; for example, one does not point out a horned hare.
[Similar example:] "Devadatta goes:" By means of going, this con-
ventional designation of one who possesses that [going] does
exist.
[Conclusion:] Therefore going exists.
[And because going exists, our] intended meaning is established. 61
Answer: Do [you] maintain here that this conventional designa-
tion, "Devadatta goes," is [a designation] of one who is a goer in
ultimate reality or of one who is not a goer? As to that,
To begin with, a goer does not go. [MMK 2--8a]
The phrase, "to begin with" (tdvat), refers to the order [of
negations in MMK 2--8]. "A goer does not go" sets forth the
thesis.
[Why is the verb "go" in MMK 2--8a in the middle voice? 62
There are some grammarians 63] who follow mere words and are
not skilled in the discrimination of dharmas. Their intellects are
impaired by bad views; and they have turned their backs on moral
conduct (dffa), meditation (dhydna), and discernment (prajfid).
310 WILLIAM L. AMES

They themselves have entered a wrong path; and they also cause
others to enter that [wrong path], by saying [such things as the
following:]64
If a word is faulty in accent or letter, [then[ since it is wrongly
used, it does not express its meaning.
That adamantine word destroys the sacrificer, as [the word]
indradatru ]destroyed V.rtra] because of a defect in accent. 65
"When those asuras said, 'Helayo he&yah.,' they were defeated.''66
"If one who maintains a sacred fire (gthita-agni) has uttered an
incorrect word (apadabda), he should perform an expiatory sacrifice
(isti) in honor of Sarasvati, ''67 etc.6s "ff even one word is rightly
used, one goes to the world of those who perform [ritual] well.''69
Likewise, [they say,] "The fixed inherent natures (svar6pa) of verbal
roots (dhdtu) which are conjugated in the active voice only (paras-
maipadin), in the middle voice only (dtrnanepadin), or in both
voices (ubhayapadin) are only [to be] repeated [and not to be
changed]. Therefore [a verbal root conjugated in the active voice
only] cannot be designated as a conventional sign (sam.keta) having
the middle voice.''7~ [NgLgfiljuna]has used the middle voice [in
MMK 2--8a] in order to cause [those grammarians] to abandon
attachment to that [i.e., to mere words].
To them, the following should be said:
[Thesis:] Verbal roots which are conjugated in the active voice only,
do not have the intrinsic nature of being conjugated in the active
voice only,
[Reason:] because they [1] are not conjugated in both voices and [2]
are verbal roots,
[Example:] like ]verbal roots[ which are conjugated in the middle
voice only.
One should state [a similar syllogism] also in regard to verbal
roots which are conjugated only in the middle voice. Likewise,
]Thesis:] Verbal roots which are conjugated in both voices also do
not have the intrinsic nature of being conjugated in both voices,
[Reason:] because they are verbal roots,
[Example:] like [verbal roots] other than those [i.e., like verbal roots
which are conjugated in only o n e v o i c e ] . 71
To the etymologists,72 one should say [the following]: In super-
ficial reality, there is no harm ]in using gam in the middle voice in
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJN~4PRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 311

MMK 2--8@ [1] because one repeats the words used by a distin-
guished person 73 and [2[ because gam [can be] established as being
conjugated only in the middle voice by the methods of "rule-
division ''74 and so on.
In this [thesis], "A goer does not go," the [proving] property of
that [goer] is [his] possession of activity, because a goer does
possess activity. An example [is given] by virtue of [the property] to
be proved and the proving property. [In this case, the example I is
one different from that [goer]. Here the syllogism is:
[Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, a goer does not go,
[Reason:] because he [already] possesses activity,
[Example:] like one who stays (sthdtr).
Thus, to begin with, a goer does not go.
Objection: Since [we hold that] a nongoer goes, that proof [of
yours] does no harm to us [i.e., to our position[.
Answer:
A nongoer does not go. [MMK 2--8b]
It is common knowledge that conventionally, [a goer] possesses
going. When it is not possible that even a goer goes, then a non-
goer, who is empty of going, indeed does not go. The idea is that
[this is so] because [a nongoer] is devoid of going, ff one is a
nongoer, how could one go? But if one goes, one cannot be called
a nongoer.
Alternatively, [the statement,]
A nongoer does not go, [MMK 2--8b]
adduces a similar example. One should understand that here a
nongoer is to be established as not possessing going, because
A nongoer does not go, [MMK 2--8b]
is the topic [under discussion] here. Since a property of a nongoer
is [his1 being devoid of going, the proving property is evident.
Therefore the syllogism is:
[Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, a nongoer also does not go,
[Reason:] because he is devoid of going,
[Example:] like [a nongoer] different from that. 7s
The followers of Kanfida [i.e., the Vaigesikas] and [our] fellow
Buddhists should also be answered in that way. 76
312 WILLIAM L. AMES

The $5~. khyas might charge [Nfigfirjuna] with the fault of estab-
lishing what is [already] established [for them[, [namely, that a
nongoer does not go]. They should be asked [the following] ques-
tion raised in objection: What is that nongoer [of whom you say
that a nongoer does not go]? If it is one in whom going is unmani-
fest (avyakta), [we] will declare the same conflict with inference
which was explained [previously].77
If [the Sfimkhya replies that the nongoer who does not go] is the
state prior to a goer, ]that] conflicts with [his[ own inference. [This
is so] because in the state prior to a goer, those who have the form
of standers and so on are also nongoers. 7s
If [the Sfi.mkhya replies that the nongoer who does not go] is the
absence of a goer, 79 [that] conflicts with [his own] former position,
since [he] does not accept that the absence of a goer [is indicated]
by the word "nongoer.''s~
Objection: The Jains 81 say: [We] accept the going of [one who is
both] a goer and a nongoer, according to the mode (parydya). 82
[Therefore we] avoid the faults which [you] have stated.
Answer: The dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] explains that another intrinsic
nature [that is, an intrinsic nature] of a mixed ('chol ha) goer and
nongoer, does not possess an activity of going and does not exist:
What third [category], different from a goer and a nongoer, will
go? [MMK 2--8cd]
The idea is that that [third category] of such a kind simply (eva)
does not exist. [This is so] because it is difficult to point out that
which would be both a goer and a nongoer. Here there will be the
fault of [self]-contradiction (vipratisedha), due to the teachings
(tham lag) of the modal point of view.83 Therefore [you[ must
undoubtedly embrace a twofold doctrine, [namely,] that in relation
to one ]mode?], one is a goer and in relation to another [mode?],
one is a nongoer. Even then, there will be conflict with the infer-
ences which have been shown in the cases of a goer and a nongoer
]separately]. Therefore the point which [you] maintain is not estab-
lished.
Objection: [The reason,] "possession of activity," does not
pervade the set of all similar examples (sapaks.a). 84 Therefore the
meaning of [your] reason is not established.
Answer: That is not good, because [we] specify that the very one
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJ]VAPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 313

who possesses activity does not [emphasis represents eva] go. 85

[This is so] because, for example, although [the set of all similar
examples] is not pervaded by the specification, "The very [thing]
which immediately follows effort is not ]emphasis represents eva]
permanent," [nevertheless that[ property of the subject (paks.a-
dharma) is considered to be a reason, s6 It is also not the case that
the meaning of [our] reason, "possession of activity," is not estab-
lished for [the purpose of] negating going. This ]argument] has also
answered [a similar objection, by showing[ that being devoid of
going is a reason. 87
Objection: One who stays becomes a nongoer, but he also
becomes a goer. Therefore, since one who stays is accepted [as the
example in your syllogism], the example [in fact] does not exist.
[This is so] because it lacks one part of the property to be
proved. 88
Answer: Since the portion to be proved is common knowledge
to both [parties in the debate], it is a suitable example; 89 hence
there is no fault [in the syllogism].
Therefore, if that is the case, here any conventional designation
"goes" is not possible. Therefore the meaning of [your[ reason,
"because there is the conventional designation of one who pos-
sesses that [going[," is not established. 9~ [Your] example also does
not exist, because it lacks the property to be proved. The meaning
of the reason is also contradictory. 91
Objection: One observes that the expression, "A goer goes," [is
commonly used[. Since there is no other [means of knowledge]
superior to observation, it is not the case that [our[ reason and so
on are unestablished. 92
Answer: True; but that is observed by a cognition which belongs
to convention. That very [observation] must be examined as to [its]
ultimate reality. Is that which is observed as it appears to be, or is
it different? As to that, to begin with, if [you] say that it is so [i.e.,
as it appears], [thatI cannot be understood. 93 Why?
To begin with, how will it be possible that a goer goes? [MMK
2--9ab l
The meaning of the sentence is that it is indeed not possible. For
example, it is like [the rhetorical question,] "How [could] one who
is intent upon fleeing from a battle be a hero?"
314 WILLIAM L, AMES

How is it not possible? To show that, [Nfigfirjuna says,]

When a goer is not possible without going. [MMK 2--9cd]
How going is not possible has been shown at the very beginning
[of this chapter by the verses] starting with
To begin with, the traversed is not being traversed; [MMK
2-1al
and [it has been shown by] the negation of the origination of
going. 94
Alternatively,
To begin with, a goer does not go, [MMK 2--8a]
sets forth the thesis; and [MMK 2--9] starting with
To begin with, how will it be possible that a goer goes? [MMK
2--9ab]
shows that. [MMK 2--9] should be explained according to [the
previous] explanation.
Objection: Therefore, in that way, going does not exist in ulti-
mate reality. Nevertheless [we say:] The goer is unreal (abhf~ta); but
by imputation (samdropya), the goer goes.
Answer:
For one whose position (paksa) is that a goer goes, it follows
That [there is] a goer without going -- because he maintains that
a goer goes. [MMK 2--10]
For that disputant according to whose position it is maintained that
a goer goes, it follows that [there is] a goer without going. Why?
Because he maintains that a goer goes. The idea is that [this is so]
because if going does not exist, the goer does not possess that
going. Alternatively, [it is so] because that single going which exists
is complete in that [term,] "goes. ''95
But if [the opponent], wishing to avoid that fault, maintains that
the goer possesses an ultimately real going, even so [Nfigfirjuna
says,]
If a goer goes, it follows that [there are] two goings:
That by which he is manifest (ajyate) as a "goer" and that which
he, having become a goer, goes. [MMK 2--11]
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJN~4PRADiPA: CHAPTER TWO 315

If a goer possesses going, it follows that [there are] two goings.

How? The going by which he is manifest as a "goer" and the going
which he, having become a goer, goes. In that case, there will also
be this fault:

If it follows [that there are] two goings, it also follows [that there
are] two goers.
Because without a goer, going is not possible. [MMK 2--6]

The idea is that [this is so] because an activity is dependent on a

basis (gzhi).
[The proponents of going[ 96 do not maintain that there is a goer
without going [or] two goings and two goers. What do they main-
tain? They maintain that a goer has going and that [there is] just
one going and also just one goer. [We say that] that also is estab-
lished in superficial reality; but in ultimate reality, it is not estab-
lished. Hence, because [their[ example 97 does not exist, the proof
stated by [our] opponents is not established.
Objection: The opponents say:
[Thesis:] Going does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because the beginning (ffrarnbha) of that exists.
[Dissimilar example:] Here that which does not exist has no begin-
ning, as, for example, a garland of sky-flowers has no beginning.
[Similar example:] One who has been staying (sdod par gyur pa)
does possess the beginning of going, which has the defining
characteristic of movement (rab tu gYo ba).
[Conclusion:] Therefore going does indeed exist.
Answer: Here, like one who paints a multicolored fowl another
color and presents [it as a different bird], [you] have presented in
different words just what [we] have answered previously. For the
ffcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] raises an objection in the form of a question to
you, [asking,] "Here does that very beginning of going exist on the
traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed?"
[Then] as before, it is not possible in any way. Wishing to show
[that], [Nfigfirjuna] says,

One does not begin to go on the [path already[ traversed. [MMK

2--12a]

[This is so] because there the activity of going is [already[ past.

316 WILLIAM L. AMES

One does not begin to go on the [path] not [yet] traversed.

[MMK2--12b]
[This is so] because going does not exist on the [path[ not [yet]
traversed, which is empty of going.
One does not begin [to go] on the [path] which is [in the process
of] being traversed. [MMK 2--12c1
[This is so] because the [path[ which is [in the process of] being
traversed never exists apart from the [path already[ traversed and
the [path] not [yet] traversed.
Where does one begin to go? [MMK 2--12d]
Now then, tell [us] that [argument] by which [your[ stated reason
will be established, so that the meaning which [you] maintain will
be established! Therefore here the meaning of the sentence [i.e.,
MMK 2--12d] is that it has been shown that the beginning [of
going[ does not exist on the traversed, the untraversed, or that
which is being traversed.
Thus here there will be [the following] syllogisms:
[Thesis:] The beginning of going does not exist on the [path
already[ traversed,
[Reason:] because it is a path,
[Example:] like the untraversed path.
Alternatively,
]Thesis:] The beginning of going does not exist on the untraversed
[i.e., the path not yet traversed],
[Reason:] because it is untraversed,
[Example:] like an untraversed [path] other than [the path] one
wishes to traverse.
Likewise,
[Thesis:] Even on that which is being traversed, the beginning of
going is not possible,
[Reason:] because it is a path,
[Example:] like [paths] different from that [i.e., the traversed and
the untraversed].
Therefore, in that way, since the beginning [of going] does not
exist, the meaning of [your] reason, 98 [that is,] the beginning [of
going], is not established; and [your reason] is too specific (asd-
dhdran, a). 99 [The explanation] in full is as before? ~176
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S P R A J N A P R A D I P A : CHAPTER TWO 317

Objection:
[Thesis:] Well, one can understand in a different way that going
exists,
[Reason:] because a cause exists for applying a particular expression
to an entity which has [a temporal stage] different from [going's]
own temporal stage (avasthd). 1~
[Dissimilar example:] Here, as for that which does not exist, there is
no cause for applying a particular expression to an entity which
has [a temporal stage] different from its own temporal stage. For
example, there is no cause for applying the particular expres-
sions, "One blind from birth saw; one blind from birth sees; he
will see," to one blind from birth, who is devoid of visual
cognition.
[Application:[ There is a cause for applying a particular expression
to an entity which has [a temporal stage] different from going's
own temporal stage. That [place] where that [going] has [already]
occurred is the traversed [path]. That [place] where that ]going] is
[now] occurring is [the path] which is being traversed. That
[place] where that [going[ has not [yet] occurred is the untra-
versed [path].
[Conclusion:] Therefore, just by virtue of the reason which has
been stated, going does indeed exist; and the point under discus-
sion 1~ is established.
Answer: If the origination of going existed, it would also be the
case that "That [place] where that [going] has [already] occurred is
the traversed [path]. That [place] where that [going] is [now] occurr-
ing is [the path] which is being traversed. That [place] where that
[going] has not [yet] occurred is the untraversed [path]." But it has
been shown that that going also does not exist.
Even if going did exist,

Prior to the beginning of going, neither [the path[ which is being

traversed nor the [path already] traversed,
Where that going could begin, exists. How could there be going
on the untraversed? [MMK 2--13]
Prior to the beginning of going, [the path[ which is being tra-
versed, where going could begin, does not exist and is empty of
going. The [path already] traversed also does not exist. The idea is
that that [path already traversed] is not possible for one who does
318 WILLIAM L. AMES

not possess going. 1~ Likewise, the meaning of [the rhetorical

question,] "How could there be going on the untraversed?" is that
going does not exist [there]. [This is so] because [such a[ thesis
would conflict with inference, since there are the inferences pre-
viously indicated, 1~ which show that if [a path] is empty of going,
going is not possible [there].
Therefore, in that way, when in ultimate reality, the conceptual
construction of going is not possible in any way, then
If the beginning of going just does not appear in any way,
What traversed [path or] what ]path] which is being traversed
[or] what untraversed [path] is conceptually constructed?
NMK 2--141
The word "just" (eva) has the meaning of specification. Here one
should understand that "just" [goes with] "does not appear." Other-
wise, one would understand that [the beginning] of just going [does
not exist], but not [that the beginnings[ of other [activities do not
exisq. 1~ [The conceptual construction of the traversed, etc.] is like
the conceptual construction by one suffering from eye disease of
unreal hairs, flies, mosquitoes, and so on. Since going does not
exist, that same fault 1~ pursues you, like the javelin ]which killed]
Ghatotkaca. 1~
Objection:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, going does indeed exist,
[Reason:] because [its] opposite exists.
[Similar Example:] Here it is seen that whatever has an opposite
exists, as for example, the opposite of light, darkness, exists [and
so light exists].
[Application:] Going also has an opposite, [namely,] stopping. 1~
[Conclusion:] Therefore going does indeed exist.
Answer: You [will be asked] a question raised in objection
]concerning] that, also. To whom do you think stopping belongs?
Does it belong to a goer or a nongoer? As to that, if [you] think
that it belongs to a goer, [N~tg~trjuna says,]
To begin with, a goer does not stop. [MMK 2--15a]
The phrase "to begin with" (tavat) relates to the order [of nega-
tions in MMK 2--15]. "A goer does not stop" sets forth the thesis.
Since a property of a goer is that he possesses an activity [of
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADI-PA:CHAPTER TWO 319

going], the property of the subject ]which proves the thesis] is

evident. An example [is given] by virtue of that [proving property
and property to be proved]. [In this case, the example is] a goer
whose going is unimpaired. Here the inference is:
]Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, it is not possible that a goer stops,
[Reason:] because he possesses an activity of going,
[Example:] like Devadatta [when his activity of[ going is unim-
paired.
But if you think that [stopping] belongs to a nongoer, [Nfigfirjuna
says,]
A nongoer does not stop. [MMK 2--15b]
The idea is that [this is so] because that is not possible, since even
conventionally, one who is devoid of going cannot cease to go.
But if, because ]you] are possessed by the demon of obstinacy, 1~
[you] think that some other stops, [Nfigfirjuna asks,]
What third [category[, different from a goer and a nongoer, will
stop? [MMK 2--15cd]
Now tell [us[ that, friend! The meaning of the sentence is that it is
not possible that any [such] stops.
Alternatively, [one can show as follows that a goer does not
stop:]
To begin with, how indeed will it be possible that a goer stops,
When a goer is not possible without going (gamana)? [MMK
2--16]
The idea is that [this is so] because it is not possible, since two
activities [of a single agent] at the same time are contradictory.
Thus that sentence [i.e., MMK 2--16] has shown that the conven-
tional expression, "A goer stops," is not possible, because it has
shown that one who stops is devoid of going.
Objection: There is no fault [in saying that one who stops goes]
since it is established that even one who is devoid of going is a
goer, because he possesses the state of [having] the capacity [to go]
in the three times, like a potter. 11~
Answer: Because [you[ accept a metaphorical designation
(upacdra) [that is, that one who is not going is a goer], what [you
yourself] accept [that is, that one who is really a goer stops] is lost.
320 WILLIAM L. AMES

Therefore, as before, it follows that [your] reason and example will

be faulty, m
Alternatively, there is also another way of refutation. Is that
stopping supposed here to be a cessation [of going] on the tra-
versed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed? As to
that, [Nfigfirjuna says,]
One does not stop on that which is being traversed, nor on the
traversed or the untraversedJ lz [MMK 2-- 17ab]
One does not stop on that which is being traversed because, by the
inference previously shown, stopping is not possible for one who
possesses going.
If [you] say that that ]stopping] is established on the [path
already] traversed, [we answer that] the establishment of that
[stopping] on the traversed is also not ]logically] possible. [This is
so] because stopping, the cessation of going, does not exist on the
traversed, where there is no going.
If [you] think, "Well then, stopping will be established on the
untraversed," that is also not possible, because the cessation [of
going] is not possible where going does not exist. Therefore one
also does not stop on the untraversed.
Thus the meaning of ]your] reason 113 is not established. There is
also no positive concomitance [in your example] since [we] do not
accept that light and darkness are opposites in ultimate reality.
Alternatively, the meaning [of your reason] is also contradictory. 114
Objection: Stopping does indeed exist, [1] because [its] opposite
[i.e., going] exists, [2] because [its] beginning (drambha) exists, and
[3] because an entity [i.e., going] 115 originates due to the cessation
of that ]staying].
Answer: To those [who make such an objection], one should say,
Going (gamana), beginning (sam.pravrtti), and cessation (nivr.tti)
are the same as going (gati). [MMK 2--17cd]
[1] Just as the opposite of going is not possible for a goer, a
nongoer, or one different from those, so also the opposite of
stopping is not possible for one who stops, one who does not stop,
or one different from those. [2] Just as the beginning (drambha) of
going is not possible on the traversed, the untraversed, or that
which is being traversed, so also the beginning (sam.pravrtti) of
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNelPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 321

stopping is not possible on [a path] where one has stopped

[already], on ]a path] where one has not ]yet] stopped, or on [a
path] where one is [in the process of] stopping. [3] Just as the
cessation of going is also not possible on the traversed, the untra-
versed, or that which is being traversed, so also the cessation of
stopping is not possible on [a path] where one has stopped
[already], where one has not [yet] stopped, or where one is [in the
process of] stopping. In that way, one should expand inferences.
For fear of prolixity and because the meaning has been explained
[already], [these points] have not been explained in detail. Never-
theless, I will explain just a part:
[Thesis:] One who stops does not go,
[Reason:] because he is devoid of going,
[Example:] like another who stops, whose stopping is [still] un-
impaired.
[Thesis:] The beginning of stopping does not exist on [a path] where
one has [already] stopped,
[Reason:] because one has [already[ stopped [there],
[Example:] like [a path] where one has stopped for a long time.
[Thesis:] Stopping does not cease on [a path] where one has
[already[ stopped,
[Reason:[ because going does not exist [there[,
[Example:] like another [path where[ stopping is [still[ unimpaired.
Likewise, in the remaining [cases[ also, one should apply infer-
ences appropriately. Therefore in that way, because stopping is not
established, [you] are certainly not freed from the fault which [we]
have stated. 116
Objection: You say that neither a goer nor going exists. Since
[you thus] exclude [expressions I commonly known in the world,
[such as] "Caitra goes; Maitra goes," [your position] will be in
conflict with common knowledge. For example, it is common
knowledge in the world that [what is called] "hare-possessing" 117 is
just the moon; but to exclude [that, saying that it is] not the moon
[is in conflict with common knowledge].
Answer: Here what is the meaning of [your] reason? Is it "because
of excluding what is commonly known in the world" or "because of
excluding what is commonly known in treatises?" The point is this:
If [the meaning is] "because of excluding what is commonly known
in the world," the meaning of [your] reason is not established. [This
322 WILLIAM L. AMES

is so] because [we] have not abandoned the conventional designa-

tions of goer and going which are commonly known in the world,
since [we] have just employed a qualified thesis [by saying,] "in
ultimate reality."
If [on the other hand, you mean that] that [position of ours] will
be in conflict with common knowledge because it excludes what is
commonly known in [our] own treatises, ]you] ought to say ]instead]
that it will be in conflict with what [we ourselves] accept. [But] that
]fault] also finds no place with us. [This is so] because we do not
accept that a goer and going exist in ultimate reality and also
because [we] have shown previously that those two ]i.e., a goer and
going] are not possible.
Moreover, [the following answer to the opponent's objection] is
explained. If a goer and going were established in ultimate reality,
they would necessarily be either the same or different; but that is
also not possible. How [is it not possible]? [Nfigfirjuna] will examine
that very [point]:
It is not [logically] possible that a goer is just the same as [his]
going (gamana),
Nor is it [logically] possible that the goer is just different from
[his] going (gati). [MMK 2--18]
That ]verse] sets forth two theses. How are [sameness and
difference] not [logically] possible?
If a goer were just the same as [his] going (gamana),
The identity (eMbhdva) of agent and action/object (karman) 118
would follow. [MMK 2--19]
Thus because here [in MMK 2--19] there is a prasahga-
argument, 119 the original meaning (prakrta-artha) can be negated;
and [the verse] has the meaning of a statement in which a reversed
meaning is manifest. 12~ For example, [it is like the following argu-
ment:] If sound were permanent, it would follow that a jar would
also be permanent; but it is not maintained that a jar, which is
made [and] is impermanent, is permanent. Therefore,
]Thesis:] sound is impermanent,
[Reason:] because it is made,
]Example:] like a jar.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADIPA: CHAPTER TWO 323

Therefore here, by virtue of the meaning of [that] statement [in

which a reversed meaning is manifest], the syllogism is:
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, goer and going are not just the same,
[Reason:] because they are agent and action/object,
[Example:] like the cutter and the cut (bcad pa).
Although [we] have explained that goer and going are not just the
same, [we] have not [thereby] shown that they are just different. 12l
Objection: Others 122 say: If one examines the meaning of [your[
thesis, [one finds that your] example does not exist, because the
cutter and the cut lack difference, which has the defining charac-
teristic that each [of two things[ is empty of the potentiality for the
other. 123
Answer: That is not good, because [we] merely negate sameness;
and that [example], too, is indeed common knowledge because the
manifestations of cutter and cut are distinct. Even if one accepts
that the meaning of the thesis has the defining characteristic that
each [of the two, goer and going[ is empty of the potentiality for
the other, it is not the case that an example does not exist. [This is
so] because in superficial reality, it is generally established that
what is to be known (rtogs par bya ba) and the one who knows
(rtogs par byed pa) are each empty of the potentiality for the other;
and just those are maintained to be the exampleJ 24
Objection:
[Thesis:[ In ultimate reality, the cutter and the cut are not just
different,
[Reason:] because they are measurable, 125
[Example:] like the cut's own self.
Therefore [your reason] suffers from [the fault] that it is counter-
balanced. 126
Answer: That is also not [logically] possible, because [our reason]
will not [in fact] suffer from [the fault] of being counterbalanced.
[This is so] since it is not established that the cut's own self is not
just different. 127
Even if [our reason] did suffer from [the fault[ of being counter-
balanced, [we] do not believe ('chel ba) in the two extremes (anta)
of sameness and difference. Since [we] wish to show that [those two
extremes[ are not established in ultimate reality, what [we] maintain
is established. 128 If [you are trying[ to prove that [the cutter and the
324 WILLIAM L. AMES

cut] are the same conventionally, [that thesis] will be in conflict

with common knowledge.
[The opponent], having agreed to 129 the meaning of [our] thesis,
might argue ]as follows:]
Objection: By explaining that the goer and the going are not just
the same, ]you] have shown that goer and going are just different.
Therefore there will be conflict with what [you yourself] accept.
Answer: That ]objection] has also been answered by that same
]argument, i.e., by the answer to the previous objection]. 13~
In order to refute those who, wishing to avoid the faults which
have been explained, resort to the position that [goer and going]
are different, [I] will [now] show the proof of the second thesis
which was set forth [in MMK 2--18]: [Conventionally, the goer
is] 131 a collection of conditioned factors, 132 which arises if [its]
specific (pratiniyata) causes and conditions exist. 133 ]That collection
is composed of] various intrinsic natures, TM and it is the basis of
activities. It has arisen from the traces and seeds and causes of
conceptual proliferation proceeding from beginningless time. 135
]Conventionally, going is] the uninterrupted origination [of that
collection] in another place by virtue of false conceptual construc-
tion (abh(tta-parikalpa). 136 In regard to ]that conventional goer and
going],
If a goer who is just different from going (gati) is conceptually
constructed, [MMK 2--20ab]
one who conceptually constructs [such a goer] can in no way be
stopped ]from doing so]; but he will suffer by obtaining an unde-
sired [consequence]. 137
How [will there be an undesired consequence]? Here if one
accepts that goer and going are just different,
There would be going (gamana) without a goer and a goer
without going. ]MMK 2--20cd]
The idea is that [this is so] because they are different like a pot and
a cloth, which are not related by the relation (bhdva) of support
(rten) and supported (brten pa). 138 ]But] even the proponent of
difference does not maintain that there is going without a goer or a
goer without going.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJ~?APRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 325

By means of that undesired consequence, 139 the property of the

subject [which proves the thesis] is the [mutual] dependence of goer
and going; and the property to be proved is that [goer and going]
are not different. By virtue of that [property to the proved and
proving property], the example is shown to be a subject (dharmin)
which is common knowledge [to both proponent and opponent,
and] which possesses the [property] to be proved and the proving
property. 14~ [Therefore] here the syllogism is:
[Thesis:] One should understand that in ultimate reality, going is
not just different from the goer,
[Reason:] because [the goer] is dependent on the use of a particular
expression (brjod pa khyad par can jug pa),
[Example:] like going's own self.
Likewise,
[Thesis:] One should specify that in ultimate reality, a goer is also
not just different from [his] going,
[Reason:] because [going] is dependent on the use of a particular
expression,
[Example:] like the goer's own self. TM
It has not been shown that [the above reason] is absent from all
dissimilar cases, because [its[ absence from that [set of all dissimilar
cases] is established [simply] because that [set of dissimilar cases]
does not exist. 142
Objection: [Mutual] dependence is not established for [things] for
which the relation of support and supported is not established.
Therefore [your reason] does not pervade one part of the subject. 143
Answer: Even for those [things], finally there is undoubtedly the
use of the particular expression, "This is one [thing]; this is another."
Therefore, since they are [mutually] dependent, there is no fault [in
our reason]. 144
Objection: [Things] are different [from each other] because of a
discrimination (vyavaccheda) that one is not the other or because
they possess [the quality (gun.a) of] difference. 145
Answer: Even for those [things], the use of the particular expres-
sion, "This is one [thing[; this is another," undoubtedly exists in
dependence on that [discrimination or that quality]. Therefore since
they are dependent, it is not the case that the meaning of [our]
reason is unestablished.
326 WILLIAM L. AMES

By the very inference which has been shown, difference is not

established [at all]. Therefore, since there are no dissimilar cases, it
is also not the case that [our reason] is inconclusive) 46
There is also no conflict with common knowledge. [This is so]
because the examination of reality is not the province of those with
untrained minds, chariot-makers and so on, and because [this] has
been shown previously) 47
Objection:
[Thesis:] The goer is just different from [his] going,
]Reason:] because the conventional designation ["a goer's going"]
exists,
[Example:] just as [the conventional designation I "Devadatta's
horse" [exists, and Devadatta is different from his horse]) 4s
Answer: That, too, is not good, [1] because [difference] is not
established for one part of the subject since [the expression] "the
goer's own self" is established in the case of a goer 149 and [2]
because [your reason] is inconclusive even for yourself because of
[the example of] a goer's own self) 5~ [Your argument is not good]
because [your] example also does not exist, since it is not estab-
lished that Devadatta and ]his] horse are different [in ultimate
reality]. That [refutation] has also answered [arguments with]
reasons such as "because the cognitions are different," etc. TM
Objection: [The following syllogism[ might occur to the mind of
one who is sharp-witted:
[Thesis:] The term, "the goer, Devadatta" has a referent (visaya)
which is connected with a category (paddrtha) [i.e., going] which
is different from [the goer, Devadatta's] own self [and therefore
goer and going are different], 152
[Reason:] because there is positive and negative concomitance, 153
[Example:] like the term "blue blanket. ''154
[Dissimilar Example:] That term which is not of the sort which has
been described does not have positive and negative concomit-
ance, as with the term "existence. ''1s5
Answer: As to that, if ]you] infer that [goer and going] are differ-
ent, [then] since there is no relation of support and supported, the
relation of goer and going is excluded. Therefore ]you] will be in
conflict with [your own] inference. 156
[Moreover, your[ reason is inconclusive. [This is so] because
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADIPA: CHAPTER TWO 327

there is positive and negative concomitance of the term "Devadatta,

Devadatta" also with other [persons] of the same name, t57 who are
not connected with a category different from their own selves.
Even if [your reason] is stated specially, the meaning of the reason
is not established. 158 [Your example is faulty] because it is also not
established in ultimate reality that the term "blue blanket" has the
referent (vis.aya) which ]you] have stated. 159
By ]pointing out] the faults of the [opponent's] reason and
example, that ]preceding refutation] has also answered the position
]concerning] the cognition that the goer is just different from [his]
going. ~6~
Objection: Since [you] have shown an inference in order to
negate sameness, [you] have [thereby] refuted the inferences which
[you] have shown negating difference. Therefore ]your] negation of
difference is also not established.
Answer: [We] have negated sameness and difference by virtue of
showing inferences negating both. [By those negations, we] wish to
show that the cognition which has those [two, sameness and differ-
ence] as [its] object is unoriginated. 161 Hence there is no fault [in
our giving inferences to negate both]. Therefore, in that way, [we]
have shown that it is not the case that the goer is just different
from [his] going. [But] the opponent has wrongly supposed that the
meaning of [our] thesis is that [goer and going] are just nondifferent
[i.e., the same]; 162 [and] he has implied ~63 that [this] conflicts with
what [we ourselves] accept. There is ]however] no ]such] conflict.
Objection: Another [Vaiie.sika] might show, by a minute exami-
nation, that [our] example does not exist, because it is not estab-
lished that the goer's own self is not just different from itself. 164
Answer: That is also not good. Since [we] have established that
the goer's own self is empty of the intrinsic nature of difference,
there is no fault in giving [the goer's own self] as an example.
Therefore, in that way, the arguments adduced by the followers of
Kanfida [i.e., the Vaiie.sikas] out of a desire to conceal the faults of
their own doctrine do not harm us.
Objection: Having abandoned the original topic, [namely,] that
going does not exist, [you] assert that goer and going are not the
same or different. That [constitutes] abandoning the original topic
and futile rejoinder. 165
328 WILLIAM L. AMES

Answer:
For which two, by means of identity (ekibhdva) or difference
(ndndbhdva) . . . M M K 2--21ab
If goer and going were established as the same or different, one
would know that those two exist. But when, as has been explained,
as the same or different,
there is no establishment, how can there be establishment of
those tWO? 166 [MMK 2--21cd]

Therefore, in that way, because [we] wish to negate the very exist-
ence (bhdva) of that [going], [our raising the question of whether
goer and going are the same or different] is not abandoning the
original topic. Because the conceptual construction that they are
the same, etc., is itself negated, [our argument] is also not a futile
rejoinder.
ObJection: 167 Although they cannot be specified as the same or
different, goer and going are established. Therefore the faults which
[you] have explained [for each of those two cases] do not exist [for
our own position].
Answer: To that [objection], also, [our] answer is the same:
For which two [there is existence] by means of identity or differ-
e n c e . . . [MMK 2--2lab]
one can understand that those two exist conventionally; but you
maintain that in ultimate reality, [goer and going cannot be de-
scribed as the same or different]. Therefore if as the same or
different,
there is no establishment, how can there be establishment of
those two? [MMK 2--21cd]
]That is, their establishment] does not exist. The idea is that ]this is
so] because there is no inference showing the existence [of two
things] which do not exist as the same or different. 168
[We] have previously shown [the following] inferences: 169
[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a goer does not go,
[Reason:] because he [already] possesses activity,
[Example:] like one who stays.
Likewise,
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJN~4PRADIPA : CHAPTER TWO 329

[Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is not possible that a goer stops,

[Reason:[ because he possesses an activity of going,
[Example:[ like Devadatta [when his activity of] going is unimpaired.
Others, who fancy that they are learned, allege that [those syllo-
gisms] are faulty:
Objection: What is the general meaning Iof the reason in these
two syllogisms[? Is it that one who possesses an activity does not
perform another activity? Or is it that he does not perform that
activity which he possesses? As to that, if [you] maintain the former
supposition, there is no example, because [the examples you have
cited[ do perform activities different from that [activity which is
under consideration]. 17~But if [you[ maintain the latter supposition,
even so the meaning [of your reason[ is contradictory. [This is so]
because a speaker speaks words and a cutter cuts wood and
[because[ one performs that [activity] because of possessing that
[activity]. ~71
Answer: As to that, here it is not the case that there is no
example. [We do, in fact,l maintain that [our] example is the agent
of an activity different from that [going], who is not established as
an agent of going, [such as] one who stays, etc. Therefore there is
no avoiding the faults which [we] have stated. 172
Nor is the meaning [of our reason] contradictory, for
That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest
as a goer. [MMK 2--22ab]
The meaning is that that goer does not go that going by which he is
manifest as a "goer." [This is so] because in ultimate reality [the
goer and that going by which he is manifest as a goer] are not just
different, like [the goer and his] own self. Therefore [you] will be in
conflict with [your] own inference. 17~
Those who say that [goer and going] are not just different
[conventionally] will also be in conflict with common knowledge,
because it is common knowledge in the world that
Someone goes somewhere. [MMK 2--22d]
[That is, someone goes somewhere[ different from his own setf. 174
Alternatively, [one can argue as follows:[
That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest
as a goer. [MMK 2--22ab]
330 WILLIAM L. AMES

Why?
Because [the goer] does not exist prior to [his] going (gall).
[MMK 2--22c]
"Prior to ]his] going" [means] "before [his] going." The meaning is
"before the origination of [his] going."
]Prior to his going,] there is not any goer persisting by his own
self who [either] would be the cause of going or would depend on
the conventional designation, "He moves and goes. ''iv5 For conven-
tionally, the goer is a collection of conditioned factors which
originates continuously (dus tha dad pa reed par) in another place.
[This origination] occurs by virtue of the element (dhdlu), air,
which is produced by effort; [and that effort, in turn,] arises from
wishing as [its] cause. 176 Going is that which is the arising of that
[goer] with a defining characteristic unlike that of the previous
moment. 177
]We] also do not maintain that because of the conventional
designation of the cause as the agent, that [goer] is the agent [of
going] in reality (yang dag par). For
Someone goes somewhere. [MMK 2--22d]
[That is, he does] not [go] to his own self, because it is not possible
to act on one's own self. 178
Thus to begin with, [the half-verse]
That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest
as a goer, [MMK 2--22ab]
[is stated] for [our] fellow Buddhists. 179
Objection: For the Sfi.mkhya position, also, [going and goer have
the same nature; but the goer performs the activity of going]. Going
is the predominance of [the guna called] rajas in [the elements]
earth and so on [when they have] the particular state (rnam par
gnas pa) of a ]living] body. The goer is [the body as] the group of
states (gnas) which perform the activity [of going], which possess
that [rajas] and have the nature of that [rajas].18~
Answer: That also [is not possible],
Because [the goer] does not exist prior to ]his] going. [MMK
2--22c]
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNftPRADIPA: CHAPTER TWO 331

Prior to going, one who has the nature of that ]going, i.e., rajas]
does not exist, because otherwise it would follow that one goes
even when one stays.
When going has [already] appeared, then it is also not possible
that [the goer] is the cause of that [going]. [This is so because]
Someone goes somewhere. [MMK 2--22d]
The idea is that that very [going] does not make that [going]. ~a
Those expressions, [such as] "A sprout grows" [or] "He makes
himself learned," [which refer] to the production of a particular
origination in something, are also imputed by conceptual construc-
tion. [This is so] because it is not possible to act on the unori-
ginated. 182
Just as it is not possible that [a goer] who has the nature of going
goes, so also in the case of [expressions such as] "A speaker speaks
words" or "A cutter cuts wood," it is not possible to perform an
activity on one's own self.
Objection: I83 Here also, effort arises from wishing as [its] cause.
[Effort] produces the places of articulation (sthdna) and the activity
of the organs of articulation (karana). The collection of condi-
tioned factors of speech, called "letters (vya~jana), words, and
sentences (pada), ''184 arises from [the places of articulation and the
activity of the organs of articulation] as [its] cause. [The collection
of conditioned factors of speech] is not different in intrinsic nature
from the speaker. It [originates with] a defining characteristic unlike
that of the previous moment. 185 Because of a particular [collection
of conditioned factors of speech], [a person] is [conventionally]
called a speaker. Since the cause of that [collection of conditioned
factors of speech] is the speaker, [one says that] the speaker speaks
words.186
Answer: That is also not possible,
Because [the speaker] does not exist prior to ]his] speaking.
Someone speaks something. 187
By that Iargument], [we] have also answered [the assertion] that a
cutter cuts wood. Therefore, in that way, the examples also, like the
exemplified (dngos), are not established. 188 Hence it is [logically]
possible that the fault that they have a contradictory meaning will
o c c u r . 189
332 WILLIAM L. AMES

[Buddhapdlita's commentary:] Here [Buddhapfilita] 190 says: As to

that [pdda],
Because [a goer] does not exist prior to [his] going: [MMK
2--22c]
Prior to the origination of going, it is not possible that a goer who
is devoid of going is ]in fact] a goer. Therefore, since the conven-
tional designation, "A goer goes," is not possible, it is not ]logically]
possible that a goer goes.
[Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That [explanation] is not [logically]
possible, because the point has [already] been shown by means of
that [argument] that a goer does not go [in MMK 2--9].
Objection: The Vaigesikas say: It is true that
That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest
as a goer. [MMK 2--22ab]
Nevertheless, since [for us] that [goer] is just different from that
[going], 191 we will not be harmed by a refutation (bddha) of the
sort which [you] have stated. We prove that:
]Thesis:] The cognition of substance and the cognition of action are
just different,
[Reason:] because they have separate objects (visaya),
]Example:] like the difference of [one's] cognition of a cow and
[one's] cognition of a gayal.
[Dissimilar Example:] That [cognition] which is not just different
does not have a separate object, just as a cognition of a cow is
not just different from itself.
Answer: Just as
That [goer] does not go that going (gati) by which he is manifest
as a goer, [MMK 2--22ab]
because that is not [logically] possible, likewise
That [goer] does not go a going (gati) different from that by
which he is manifest as a goer. [MMK 2--23ab]
The idea is that [this is so] [1] because [a going] different from that
[goer] has been negated [in MMK 2--20], [2] because there is no
inference which shows that, [3] because it is accepted that it is not
possible for anything which is together (sdrdharn) with something
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 333

to be different [from it], 192 and [4] because an example is also not
established.
Alternatively, [the half-verse,]
That [goer] does not go a going (gati) different from that by
which he is manifest as a goer, [MMK 2--23ab]
sets forth the thesis. Why [is that thesis so]?
Because two goings (gati) are not possible for one goer. [MMK
2--23cd]
That ]half-verse] shows that the ]proving] property of the goer is
that he does not possess two goings. Here the inference is:
]Thesis:] In ultimate reality, a goer does not go a going different
from himself,
]Reason:] because he does not possess two goings,
[Example:] like one who stays.
[Buddhapdlita's commentary:] Here [Buddhapfilita] 193 says:
Because two goings (gati) are not possible for one goer: [MMK
2--23cd]
Because two goings -- [namely, the going] by which he is manifest
as a goer and [the going] which he goes [after] having become a
goer -- are not possible for one goer, therefore the goer also does
not go a going which is different from that [by which he is manifest
as a goer].
[Bhdvaviveka's critique:] That is not [logically] possible, [1]
because, since [you] have accepted that just one cause of going
does exist [for one goer], it is established that a goer goes because
of possessing that ]single cause of going], [2] because it has not
been negated that [the goer] is different [from his going], and [3]
because [this argument] is not different from that [given in MMK
2--9:]
To begin with, how will it be possible that a goer goes? [MMK
2--9ab]
Objection: The followers of Kanfida [i.e., the Vaigesikas] say:
[There isI just one going. That [going] is indeed different from the
goer; and because of [his] possessing that [going], one can conven-
tionally designate the goer as a "goer." Since [the goer] is the cause
334 WILLIAM L. AMES

of going, one says, "He goes," when he performs that [going]. For
example, since a lamp is the cause of light, one says, "[The lamp]
illuminates." Therefore that [argument of yours,]
Because two goings (gati) are not possible for one goer, [MMK
2--23cd]
is not [logically] possible. 194
Answer: That is not good, [1] because [you] have established the
reason which [we] have stated, 19s [2] because going has been
negated in ultimate reality, and [3] because origination from [a
prior state ofl nonexistence has been negated. 196
Alternatively, [that objection is not good[ because it will suffer
from conflict with inference, since
[Thesis:] It is understood that a goer is not a cause which possesses
going,
[Reason:] because he is the cause of the use of a particular cogni-
tion and word,
[Example:] like action (karman)? 97
[Moreover, neither a goer nor a nongoer possesses going. A goer
does not possess going] because it would be pointless for a goer to
possess that. [A nongoer does not possess going] because a nongoer
also, since he is not a goer, does not possess that [going], just as
one who stays [does not]) 9s
Here [you] should ask for or state syllogisms. Since all propo-
nents are valiant in propounding their own systems (gzhung), there
is no end to words. 199
Therefore if one investigates in that way by means of reasoning,
A real (sadbhtita) goer does not go the threefold going (gamana).
An unreal (asadbh(tta) [goer] also does not go the threefold
going. [MMK 2--24]
]A goer] who is both real and unreal (sadasadbhtita) does not go
the threefold going. [MMK 2--25ab]
"A real goer" is a goer who possesses going 2~176('gro ba dang
ldan pa); the meaning is that he has going ('gro ba yod pa). [In
these verses,] "going" (gamana) [means] "that which is to be
traversed" (gantavya). "Threefold" [refers to] the traversed (gata),
the untraversed (agata), and that which is being traversed (garnya-
mdna). "An unreal [goer]" is a goer who is devoid of going. "[A
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADIPA: CHAPTER TWO 335

goer] who is both real and unreal" is a goer who both possesses
going and is devoid of going.
As to that, to begin with,
[Thesis:] A real goer does not go the threefold going,
]Reason:] because he [already] possesses the activity [of going],
[Example:] like [another real goer] different from that [first real
goer]. 2~
[Thesis:] An unreal [goer] also does not go the threefold going,
]Reason:] because he is devoid of going,
[Example:] like one who stays.
[A goer] who is both real and unreal also does not go the three-
fold going, because there would be conflict with the inferences
shown in both cases [separately]. Likewise, one should also adduce
appropriate reasons and examples for [syllogisms with] "going" as
the subject. 2~
Therefore when one thus examines in every way by means of
reasoning and scripture, the threefold going, etc., are not possible
in any way.
Therefore [the activity of I going (gati), the goer, and that which
is to be traversed (gantavya) do not exist. [MMK 2--25cd]
[That half-verse] is the conclusion [of the chapter I by virtue of
the result of the effort which has been shown. By means of this
case [i.e., goer and going], the dcdrya [Nfigfirjuna] has also shown
the negation of the remaining activities and agents.
As to that, here the meaning of the chapter [is as follows:] By
showing that going lacks intrinsic nature, it has been shown that
dependent origination possesses the characteristics of [being1
without coming and without going.
Therefore those [scriptural[ statements [such as the following] are
established: 2~
[From the Arya-aksayamati-nirde~a-s~tra,] a04
Where there is no going (gad) and no coming (dgati), that is the
state (gati) of the Noble Ones.
[From the Dharmodgata chapter of the Ast.asdhasrikd-
prajhdpdramitd-sfitra,] 20s
Son of good family, the Tathfigata has no coming or going.
[From the Arya-brahma-vigesa-cintd-pariprcchd-sfttra,] 2o6
Here there is not any coming or going.
336 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

All dharrnas are like space.

Likewise, [from the Bhagavati-prajhdpdramitd-suvikrdntavikrdmi-
stitra,] 207
W h e r e t h e r e is n o t e v e n so m u c h as an a t o m to b e t r a v e r s e d o r
to b e a r r i v e d at, that is the b o d h i s a t t v a ' s p e r f e c t i o n o f d i s c e r n m e n t .
T h e r e c o m i n g a n d going are n o t discerned. Suvikr5_ntavikrSa-nin, the
c o m i n g a n d going o f m a t t e r are n o t d i s c e r n e d (prajhdyate). T h e
c o m i n g and going o f feeling, p e r c e p t i o n / c o n c e p t i o n , m e n t a l for-
mations, a n d cognition are n o t d i s c e r n e d . T h a t which is the n o n -
d i s c e r n m e n t o f the c o m i n g and going o f matter, feeling, p e r c e p t i o n /
c o n c e p t i o n , m e n t a l f o r m a t i o n s , a n d cognition is the p e r f e c t i o n o f
d i s c e r n m e n t . 2~
T h e s e c o n d c h a p t e r , " E x a m i n a t i o n o f the T r a v e r s e d , the U n t r a -
versed, a n d that w h i c h is being T r a v e r s e d , " o f the Prajfi@radipa, a
c o m m e n t a r y o n [Nfigfirjuna's] MadhyamakarnFda c o m p o s e d b y
dcdrya B h a v y a k a r a / B h a v y a k f i r a (legs ldan byed) 2~ [is concluded].

N O T E S TO T R A N S L A T I O N

I would like to express my thanks to David Seyfort Ruegg, in whose class at

the University of Washington I read part of chapter two, for a number of helpful
comments and insights. I would also like to thank David Eckel for sending me a
copy of his notes for a translation of chapter two. Any errors in this translation
are, of course, my own.
2 "The traversed, the untraversed, and that which is being traversed" translates
gata-agata-gamyamdna. I generally translate forms derived from the Sanskrit
verbal root gam with forms of the English verb "to go." Unlike "to go," however,
garn may take a direct object. In this chapter, passive forms of gain, such as
gata, agata, gamyamdna, and gantavya refer to the path which is (or is not) being
traversed or gone over or gone on at some point in time. Here I have used the
English verb "to traverse" to translate gain. The third singular present passive
gamyate may mean either "is being traversed" or "is known," depending on the
context. See also note 17.
In verses 22 and 23, gati is used as a direct object of gacchati. Here gatim.
gacchati means "one goes the going" in the sense of "one performs the activity of
going." In verses 24 and 25, on the other hand, gamanam gacchati means "one
goes the going" in the sense of "one traverses (the path) to be traversed"
(gamana glossed as gantavya). See note 200.
3 See MMK 1--A,B. Avalokitavrata comments that Mahfiyfina sfitras, such as

the Prajfi@dramitd, teach that all dharmas are without coming and going.
Nevertheless, others will not understand just by means of that scripture. There-
fore here [NfigfirjunaI wishes to show that by means of reasoning. See Ava
P252a--4,5,6; D216a--7 to 216b--2.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 337

4 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P253a--3ff., D217a--

4ff.
5 Rephrasing of Buddhapfilita's text, for which see Saito (1984), p. 31.1--4.
Avalokitavrata quotes Buddhapfilita directly; see Ava P253a--4,5; D217a--5,6.
6 According to Avalokitavrata, there are three types of student: one whose mind
is in error; one who doubts; and one who has not understood. Here "one whose
mind is in error due to specious means of knowledge" refers to the first type.
See Ava P253a--7ff.; D217a--7ff.
7 "Suitable" translates tshul dang mthun pa. According to Avalokitavrata, "one
whose mind is c o n f u s e d . . . " refers to the second type of student. (See previous
note.) Since he is in doubt as to whether motion exists or not, he would have no
conviction that motion does not exist in ultimate reality and thus would not ask
for a negation merely of conventional going and coming. See Ava P254a--lff.,
D218a--lff.
8 According to Avalokitavrata, this sentence refers to the third type of student.
(See note 6.) The Madhyamaka~dstra is not within the [cognitive] domain of
ordinary people (phal pa'i spyod yul, probably prdkrta-gocara) because it is
taught with reference to mahdbodhisattvas. See Ava P254a--7 to 254b--5,
D218a--5 to 218b--2.
~) The first two sentences of this paragraph explain why Nfigfirjuna now takes up
the subject of coming and going, instead of proceeding through the eight nega-
tions of MMK 1--A in order. See Ava P254b--5ff., D218b--2ff. "Things to be
done" translates bya ba'i dngos po, perhaps kdrya-vastu.
10 "Contrary position" here translates phyogs snga ma, pt~rva-paks.a, literally,
"previous position." According to Avalokitavrata, going will be negated by means
of refuting a contrary position. See Ava P255b--5,6; D219a--6,7.
~ That is, one who holds that the origination of entities exists. "Point under
discussion" translates skabs kyi don, probably prakrta-artha, mi mthun pa'i
phyogs, vipaks.a is here glossed as dgra bo phyogs, probably ~atru-paksa. See
Ava P255b--7 to 256a--1, D219a--7 to 219b--1.
~2 The internal entities are the six inner dyatanas, that is, the six sense organs.
Avalokitavrata explains that their objects are the six sense objects. "Possessing
the objects of those" (that is, being connected with or characterized by them)
refers to the bodily organs. The collection of those organs, that is, a living body,
performs the activities of going and so on. Such a collection is conventionally
designated as a person, so that one says, "Devadatta goes" or "Vi.s.numitra goes."
See Ava P256a--3 to 256b--3, D219b--3 to 218a--2.
3 yang dag pa fi lta ba bzhin rtyid, perhaps ydthdtathya.
~4 In negating origination in general, the origination of going and so on has also
been negated. See Ava P257b--5,6; D221a--2.
~5 That is, it is established for the proponents of origination that origination
and going and coming exist in ultimate reality; and it is established for the
Mfidhyamikas that origination and going and coming exist in superficial reality.
See Ava P257b--6,7,8; D221a--3,4.
16 It is contradictory to adduce a reason valid only in superficial reality to prove
a positive thesis about ultimate reality. Since the property to be proved is
origination in ultimate reality, there is no positive concomitance between it and a
338 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

reason concerning conventional activities. Such a reason pertains only to some

dissimilar eases, that is, things which exist only conventionally. See Ava
P258a--1 to 6, D221a--4 to 221b--1.
17 The Tibetan translation in BPP of gatam, na gamyate (PSP 92.7) is song la
'gro reed de. The postposition la is inserted presumably because the Tibetan
verb 'gro ha, like the English verb "to go," cannot take a direct object. The
Sanskrit verb garn, however, may take a direct object; and I have used the
Engfish verb "traverse" here and in similar instances in order to follow the
syntax of the Sanskrit more closely. See also note 2.
~8 In other words, everyone admits that going is not presently taking place on
that portion of a path which has already been traversed. According to Bhfivavi-
veka, Nfigfirjuna mentions this well-known fact only because he wants to use it
as an example in an implied syllogism. The already traversed path's property of
being a path will be used as the proving property in that syllogism. See Ava
P258b--3 to 259a--3, D221b--5 to 222a--3.
79 Avalokitavrata paraphrases this argument as follows: The [alreadyI traversed
path is not [now] being traversed, because it is a path. Likewise, the not [yet]
traversed path is not [now] being traversed, because it is a path. See Ava
P259a--5,6; D222a--5,6.
20 That is, both sides acknowledge that going does not take place on an
untraversed path which will, in fact, never be traversed. Thus such a path
possesses both the proving property, being not yet traversed, and the property to
be proved, not being a locus of going. See Ava P259b--1 to 260a--1, D222b--1
to 7.
2~ Vaigesikas who hold that there are substances (dravya), according to Avaloki-
tavrata. See Ava P260a--7,8; D223a--4.
22 According to Avalokitavrata, this interpretation of the Mfidhyamika's reason
would contradict common knowledge, since it is seen in the world that the
untraversed is traversed when the activity of traversing arises there later. See
Ava P260b--2,3; D223a--6,7.
23 That is, the reason in the opponent's first syllogism near the beginning of the
chapter. See Ava P260b--3,4; D223a--7 to 223b--1.
24 The Aulfikya here anticipates a possible objection which the Mfidhyamika
might make. The Mfidhyamika might say that he does not seek to negate
conventional going as recognized in the world. Rather, he seeks to refute the
Aulfikya/Vaigesika position that going exists in ultimate reality under the heading
of karman, one of the six or seven Vaigesika categories (paddrtha). The category
of karrnan is distinct from the category of substance. See Ava P260b--6 to
261a--1, D223b--1 to 5. On the Vaigesika category of karman, see, e.g., Potter
(1977), pp. 131--2 and Sinha (1956), pp. 318--21.
2s That is, the object of such a thought, Devadatta, possesses a paddrtha, going,
which is different from Devadatta's dtman, which belongs to the paddrtha of
substance. See Ava P261a--4 to 8, D223b--7 to 224a--3. See also, e.g., Potter
(1977), pp. 67--73, 95--100 and Sinha (1956), pp. 311--6, 414ff.
26 The idea seems to be that just as it is clear that the staff is one thing and
Devadatta who possesses the staff is another, so it is clear that going is one thing
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJN~4PRADIPA: C H A P T E R TWO 339

and Devadatta who possesses going is another. See Ava P261a--8 to 261b--5,
D224a--3 to 7.
27 sarnskdrdh in the sense of samskrtd dharmdh. On the meanings of sam.skdra,
see, e.g., May (1959) p. 74 n. 108 and p. 252 n. 902. (Note that, contrary to n.
108, three senses of samskdra are distinguished.)
28 In the Buddhist view, "going" results when an identifiable collection of
momentary dharmas ceases in one place and arises at an adjacent place continu-
ously from moment to moment.
29 If the Aulfikyas mean to establish a category of "going," such a category is
absent in the example of their syllogism, which refers to Devadatta's possessing a
staff. See Ava P262a--7 to 262b--1, D224b--7 to 225a--2.
3o The Aulfikyas may insist that the general fact that conventionally, things
possess characteristics which are different from themselves, proves that going
exists as a category. This is contradictory even conventionally because going is
absent from the perception that Devadatta has a staff. See Ava P262b--2 to 5,
D225a--2 to 5.
31 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the fault which the Mfidhyamika
has pointed out in the reason in the opponent's first syllogism in this chapter.
See Ava P262b--6,7; D225a--6.
32 The Sautrfintikas, according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P262b--7,8; D225a--
7.
33 That is, there is only the origination, immediately followed by cessation, of
momentary dharmas. Nothing exists tong enough to move. Thus motion is a
perceptual illusion. See Ava P263b--l,2,3; D225b--7 to 226a--2.
34 The cognition that what is called "going" can be reduced to origination and
cessation is mistaken because origination does not exist in ultimate reality. See
Ava P264a--2,3,4; D226a--6 to 226b--1.
.35 Among the three Sfimkhya gun.as, rajas is the principle of activity and
motion. See Sdm.khyakdrikd 12 and 13. See also, e.g., Frauwallner (1973), Vol.
1, p. 276; Sharma (1960), pp. 154--5; Sinha (1952), pp. 13--5; and Larson and
Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 65--73, 154, 184.
36 Buddhapfilita and Candrakirti agree with Bhfivaviveka in taking gamyate in
MMK 2--1cd to mean "is known," rather than "is being traversed." See Saito
(1984), 31.18,19 and PSP 93.8. Here Avalokitavrata glosses "cannot be grasped"
(gzung du meal) as "cannot be apprehended" (dmigs su med). See Ava P265a--1,
D227a--3.
The idea is that apart from the path which has already been traversed and the
path which has yet to be traversed, one cannot perceive a path which is just now
in the process of being traversed. Here Avalokitavrata explains, "What is called
'that which is being traversed' is the path which is presently being covered by a
stride (gorn pas renan pa, probably padendkrdntam.), which is neither the
traversed path nor the untraversed path. But that does not exist apart from the
traversed and the untraversed paths, [that is,] between the two." See Ava
P265a--l,2; D227a--3,4.
37 That is, if the gamyarndna is completely gata or completely agata, those cases
have already been treated. If it is something which is partly gata and partly
340 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

agata, each part separately falls under the cases which have already been treated.
3s Literally, "others." Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P265b--8, D227b--
7.
39 Tibetan in Saito (1984), 10.11. The issue is this: Buddhapfitita apparently
understood yatah in MMK 2--2b as the masculine or neuter genitive singular of
the present active participle of root i, "to go." The present active participle of i
has strong stem yant (compare third plural present active yanti) and weak stem
yat; hence one has yatah., "of one going." Bhfivaviveka, on the other hand, under-
stands yatah, as the indeclinable meaning "because," correlative with tatah.,
"therefore," in MMK 2--2d. See also Saito (1984), translation, pp. 234--5 n. 7.
4o Literally, "some say." Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P266a--8,
D228a--7.
41 According to Avalokitavrata, "activity" refers to the activity of going/travers-
ing; "basis" refers to the path which is being traversed; and "invariable" means
"definite, always just that." See Ava P266b--5,6,7; D228b--4,5. The idea seems
to be that the qualification "of the goer" is unnecessary.
42 Throughout most of chapter two, gati and gamana appear to be used synony-
mously to mean "going" in the sense of "the activity of going." In MMK
2--24,25, however, garnana is used to mean gantavya, "[the path] to be
traversed." See notes 2 and 200.
I have translated the phrase garnyamanasya gamanam. (PSP 94.6) as "going
9 .. on that which is being traversed." The same phrase occurs in verses four and
five and is similarly translated there. I have understood the phrase to mean "a
traversing of which is being traversed" (objective genitive). If one takes it to
mean "that which is being traversed possesses going" (possessive genitive), then
MMK 2--4 becomes difficult to understand.
The Tibetan translation is bgom la 'gro bar yod par, which can be understood
either as possessive ("that which is being traversed possesses going") or locative
("going exists on that which is being traversed"). I have opted for the latter
translation.
One might argue that the translation "there is a traversing of that which is
being traversed" is preferable, since it is the most literal translation of the
Sanskrit. It is, however, difficult to maintain consistently, since we have the
Sanskrit only for the verses and not for Bhfivaviveka's commentary.
43 This translation follows Avalokitavrata's explanation. See Ava P267a--5ff.,
D229a--3ff. "Separate" translates drnigs kyis bsal ba, perhaps vidhdrita here. In
the first case ("separate"), that which is being traversed is something different
from both the traversed and the untraversed. In the second case ("not separate"),
it is included in them.
44 In MMK 2--1, it was argued that going cannot exist on the already traversed

path or the not yet traversed path and that no third category of path exists9 The
same applies to movement of the limbs. See Ava P267b--5 to 268a--4,
D292b--2 to 230a--1.
45 The story of the tethered horse is as follows: Someone asks, "Who owns this
tethered horse?" He is told, "The one who owns this other horse." He asks,
"Then who owns this other horse?" He is told, "The one who owns the tethered
horse." See Ava P268b--5,6; D230a--7 to 230b--1.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 341

46 If there were no activity of traversing or going, the path which is being

traversed would not be called "that which is being traversed." Thus one activity
of going is necessary for that which is being traversed to be so designated. Once
the path which is being traversed is established as such, there is no second,
independently established activity of going which exists on that path. Conven-
tionally, of course, the goer, the going, and the path which is being traversed are
designated in dependence on the activity of going. Since these are all interde-
pendent, since none of them can exist without the others, none of them exists by
intrinsic nature. It is this last point which Nfigfirjuna is concerned to prove. This
argument will be expanded in the following verses.
47 The reference is evidently to the similar example in the opponent's initial
syllogism in this chapter, namely, that Devadatta and Vi.snumitra do go.
48 Here the opponent's position is that the single activity of going which exists in
a particular case applies to the word "going" (gamana), not to "that which is
being traversed" (gamyarndna). See Ava P269b--7 to 270a--2, D231a--7 to
231b--2 and Bhfivaviveka's answer.
49 As with gamyate in MMK 2--1d, Bhfivaviveka takes gamyate in 2--4d to
mean "is known" rather than "is being traversed." For the interpretations of the
other commentaries, see Saito (1984), translation, p. 236 n. 11.
5o See Ava P271a--2,3; D232b--l,2.
s~ According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent holds that the intrinsic nature of
ultimately real going is the activity of going; and the intrinsic nature of that
which is being traversed is established because it possesses that activity. Subse-
quently, that going which exists on that which is being traversed is conventional
going. See Ava P271a--2,3; D 2 3 2 b - - l , 2 and also Ava P271a--6,7; D232b--4,5.
52 A conventional going which is "established as long as one does not investi-
gate" (ma brtags na 'grub pa), according to Avalokitavrata. See Ava P271b--6,7;
D233a--4.
53 According to Avalokitavrata, the word "also" (yang, api) is used to indicate
that an ultimately real goer is not possible, either. See Ava P271b--8 to 272a--
1, D233a--5,6.
54 sgra pa dag, s'dbdika, glossed by Avalokitavrata as "those who have the
~abda-siddhdnta, that is, the vaiydkaranas." See Ava P272a--8, D233b--5,6. On
the grammarians as a philosophical school, see Coward and Raja (1990).
55 Avalokitavrata gives a parallel example: When a man cuts wood, there is only
one activity of cutting. That activity, by its intrinsic nature, is called "cutting."
The basis, wood, which is to be cut by that activity of cutting is that which is cut;
and the man who performs that activity is the cutter. See Ava P272a--8 to
272b--2, D233b--6,7.
56 Ultimately real origination was negated in chapter one, and the path which is
being traversed was negated in MMK 2--1cd. See Ava P272b--5 to 273a--1,
D234a--3 to 6.
57 This translation follows the Tibetan. The Sanskrit of PSP 97.6,7 translates as,
"If going is not possible without a goer, then if going does not exist, how indeed
will a goer exist?" See May (1959), p. 60 n. 37.
55 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that just as going does not exist on
the traversed, the untraversed, or that which is being traversed, so also the goer
342 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

does not exist on those three paths. See Ava P274a--6 to 274b--3, D235a--6 to
235b--3.
59 It is not established in ultimate reality, and it is contradictory to try to prove
a thesis about ultimate reality using a reason which is valid only conventionally.
See Ava P274b--3,4; D235b--3,4.
6o According to Avalokitavrata, by means of that going, [the expressions]
"Devadatta goes" and so on exist as conventional designations of a goer who
possesses that going. See Ava P274b--6,7; D235b--6.
61 This refers back to the opponent's initial syllogism in this chapter. See Ava
P275a--l,2; D236a--1,2.
62 The verb garn, "to go," is normally conjugated in the active voice (parasmai-
pada) in classical Sanskrit, although forms in the middle voice (dtmanepada) are
found in the epics. In the Sanskrit texts of the verses of MMK as preserved in
the Prasannapadd, garn is indeed in the active voice in MMK 2--8a (gacchati,
PSP 97.14). The Tibetan translation does not distinguish between active and
middle voice. Nevertheless, from Bhfivaviveka's following commentary, it seems
that he must have read gacchate (middle voice) here.
63 Identified by Avalokitavrata as vaiydkarandh.; see Ava P275a--7,8; D236a--
6.
64 The first three, at least, of the following quotations are taken from the
opening section of Patafijali's Vydkarana-rnahdbhds.ya,where he explains the
advantages of the study of grammar. (I am indebted to David Seyfort Ruegg for
this information.) See, e.g., Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), pp. 10ft.
65 See Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), p. 10. The story alluded to is found in the
Satapatha Brdhrnana 1.6.3. The god Tvastr had a son named Vigvarfipa, who
was killed by Indra. When Tvastr created the serpent Vrtra to destroy Indra in
revenge, he intended to say, "Grow, destroyer of Indra!" (indra~atrtlr vardhasva).
Instead, Tvastr incorrectly accented the compound on the first syllable
(indra~atru), thus making it a bahuvrihi compound ("having Indra as destroyer")
rather than a tatpurus.a compound ("destroyer of Indra"). (As a tatpurus.a
compound, it would be accented on the last syllable.) Thus Tvastr actually said,
"Grow, having Indra as your destroyer!"; and Indra destroyed Vrtra, contrary to
Tvastr's intent. See also Ava P275b--7 to 276a--4, D236b--5 to 237a--1.
. . .

66 See Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), p. 10 and ~atapatha Brdhmana

3.2.1.23,24. See also Ava P276a--6,7,8; D237a--3,4,5. In one of the battles
between the gods and the asuras, the gods began to flee. The asuras meant to
shout, "Oh enemies! Oh enemies!" (he 'rayo he 'rayah). Instead, they made an
error in one letter and uttered the meaningless sound helayo helayah. As a
result, their merit was exhausted; and the gods returned and vanquished them.
Avalokitavrata remarks that this is an example of the use of a word with an
incorrect letter, whereas the previous quotation gave an example of the use of a
word with an incorrect accent. See Ava P276a--4,5; D237a--l,2.
67 See Abhyankar and Shukla (1969), p. 18 and Ava P276b--1 to 4, D237a--
5,6,7.
68 According to Avalokitavrata, the word "etc." indicates examples from other
texts which also show the misfortunes which result from the use of incorrect
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJigdPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 343

words. The next quotation, on the other hand, shows the benefits which arise
from the correct use of words. See Ava P276b--4,5,6; D237a--7 to 237b--2.
69 "Those who perform [ritual] well" translates legs par byed pa rnams, probably
sukrtah. On the meaning of this word, see Gonda (1966), pp. 116ft., 130ft. I
have not been able to find this passage in Patafijali's Vydkara{m-mahdbhdsya.
Compare, however, satyadevdh sydrnety adhyeyam vydkaranarn, "We should
study grammar in order to become true gods" (Abhyankar and Shukla (1969),
p. 19).
David Eckel has informed me that a similar quotation, ekah dabdah sufl~dta.h.
suprayuktah, svarge loke kdmadhug bhavati, is found in Kaiyat.a's Pradipa on the
first dhnika of the Mahdbhdsya.
70 My translation of this passage follows my understanding of Avalokitavrata's
subcommentary. See Ava P276b--8 to 277a--7, D237b--4 to 238a--1. Avaloki-
tavrata remarks, "Even the sfitras of Pfinini are sftras of repetition (rjes su smra
ba), not invented (byas pa) sftras" (Ava P277a--3, D237b--6). The opponent's
idea seems to be that verbal roots take the active, middle, or both voices by
intrinsic nature and that Nfigfirjuna is wrong to use the middle voice arbitrarily
in MMK 2--8a.
71 Avalokitavrata points out that similar syllogisms can be stated about other
grammatical categories, such as the six kdrakas, the seven case affixes (vibhakti),
the three genders (lifiga), and the three numbers (vacana). See Ava P278b--5 to
279b--3, D239a--3 to 239b--6.
72 nges par smra ba dag, glossed by Avatokitavrata nas brda sprod papa nges
par smra ba dag; see Ava P279b--6, D239a--l,2. This translation is somewhat
conjectural, since the regular Tibetan equivalent of nirukti is nges pay tshig.
73 Avalokitavrata explains that the .r.si Vyfisa (the legendary author of the
Mahdbhdrata) and other authorities have used nonstandard forms; and he quotes
two verses to illustrate his point. He points out that the grammarians (vaiyd-
karan,a) themselves accept that such usages must somehow be explained as
correct, at least in those cases. Nfigfirjuna is also an authority, and his usage
must also be seen as being correct. See Ava P279b--7 to 280a--4, D240a--2
to 5.
74 sbyor ba rnam par dbye ba, probably yoga-vibhdga. Yoga-vibhdga, literally,
"rule-division," is a method of interpreting grammatical rules, particularly
Pfinini's sfitras. One divides a single rule into two in order to explain the forma-
tion of certain words which would otherwise be ungrammatical. See Abhyankar
(1961), yoga-vibhdga, s.v. According to Avalokitavrata, if gain is taken to mean
"to know," then the middle voice is permissible. How this relates to yoga-vibhdga
is not clear to me. See Ava P280a--4 to 280b--2, D240a--6 to 240b--3.
David Eckel points out that Pfinini 1.3.29 is a sFttra which might be made, by
means of yoga-vibhdga, to permit dtmanepada forms for gain. As it stands, the
sFttra prescribes the dtmanepada for gain and certain other roots, but only when
they have the prefix sam- and are used intransitively.
7~ This rather confusing alternative interpretation of MMK 2--8b is consider-
ably clarified by Avalokitavrata. According to him, the nongoer referred to in
the thesis is [an animate being?] such as Devadatta, whom the Sfi.mkhyas and so
344 WILLIAM L. A M E S

on consider to be a nongoer. The nongoer referred to in the example is [an

inanimate object?] such as a mountain, which is also a nongoer and does not go
because it is devoid of going. See Ava P282a--5 to 282b--3, D242a--3 to 7.
76 Avalokitavrata explains that both of these schools hold that entities come into
existence after having previously been nonexistent. As long as the activity of
going has not originated, one is a nongoer and does not go; but later, when the
activity of going has originated, one is a goer and therefore does go. The
Mfidhyamika should argue that one who is a nongoer previously also does not
go later, because of being devoid of going, like another [nongoer]. See Ava
P282b--3,4,5; D 2 4 2 a - - 7 to 242b--2.
77 The Sfimkhyas might maintain that one in whom going is unmanifest is a
nongoer and does not go, but that later when going becomes manifest, he does
become a goer and does go. The manifestation theory of the Sfim.khyas has,
however, been refuted previously (in the commentary shortly before M M K
1--2). The unmanifest cannot become manifest, because it is unmanifest, like a
sky-flower. See Ava P283a--2 to 6, D 2 4 2 b - - 5 to 243a--1.
78 The Sfimkhyas might maintain that one who is a nongoer in the state prior to
his becoming a goer does not go, but that later he does become a goer and does
go. Then one has the absurd consequence that a stander (or sitter or lier) also
later becomes a goer and goes. See Ava P283a--6 to 283b--5, D 2 4 3 a - - 2 to 7.
79 Or "a nonexistent goer," 'gro ba po med pa.
80 Avalokitavrata explains that the Sfimkhyas hold that even before the activity
of going originates, the goer always possesses the nature of rajas and that
therefore the goer always exists. See Ava P284a--l,2,3; D243b--3,4,5. Accord-
ing to the Sfi.mkhyas, rajas is one of the three gunas which constitute prakrti,
"primordial matter" or "original nature." Part of the nature of rajas is its being
mobile (cala); see Sdm.khyakdrikd 13 and the references in note 35.
81 Literally, "others." Identified by Avalokitavrata as the Arhatas, i.e., the Jains.
See Ava P284a--4, D243b--5.
82 According to Avalokitavrata, the Jains maintain that the nature of the soul
(fiva) is mobile, while the nature of the body is immobile (presumably because a
dead body does not move). Thus according to the mode of the soul, a goer goes;
but according to the mode of a body, a nongoer goes. See Ava P284a--4 to 8,
D 2 4 3 b - - 5 to 244a--1.
On the Jainas' view of substances (dravya), qualities (guna), and modes
(parydya), see, e.g., Sinha (1952), pp. 197, 213--6. Note that qualities are
sometimes considered to be a kind of mode.
83 Here "modal point of view" translates rnarn grangs kyi tshul, probably
parydya-naya in this context, although tshul may also translate other Sanskrit
words. As a technical term in Jaina philosophy, naya means "point of view,
partial knowledge." The nayas are divided into dravya-nayas, points of view
which emphasize the substantial aspect of a thing to the exclusion of its modes
and qualities, and parydya-nayas, which do the reverse. These two classes of
nayas are further subdivided. See, e.g., Sinha (1952), pp. 199--205.
In any case, the idea seems to be that it is self-contradictory to say that
something is both a goer and a nongoer from one and the same point of view. If
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADiPA: CHAPTER TWO 345

it is a goer in one way and a nongoer in another way, then each of the two
aspects become subject to arguments made earlier in the cases of a goer and a
nongoer, separately (as Bhfivaviveka goes on to say).
s4 This refers to Bhfivaviveka's syllogism immediately before MMK 2--8b,
showing that in ultimate reality, a goer does not go. According to Avalokitavrata,
the opponent's point is that it is not the case that all who do not go possess
activity. For example, one who stands and a childless woman's son both do not
go; but the latter does not possess activity. See Ava P285b--2 to 6, D 2 4 4 b - - 7
to 245a--3.
ss That is, we do not say that everyone who does not go possesses activity.
Rather, we say that everyone who possesses activity does not go. See Ava
P285b--8 to 286a--5, D 2 4 5 a - - 5 to 245b--1.
86 Anything which "immediately follows effort" (prayatna-anantar[yaka), that is,
which is produced by effort, such as sound or a pot, is necessarily impermanent.
This is so despite the fact that some impermanent things, such as lightning and
wildflowers, are not produced by effort. See Ava P286a--6 to 286b--4,
D 2 4 5 b - - 2 to 7.
87 This refers to the reason in Bhfivaviveka's syllogism following MMK 2--8b,
showing that in ultimate reality, a nongoer does not go, because he is devoid of
going. According to Avalokitavrata, an opponent might object that while [the
property of] being devoid of going does indeed exist in a mountain, which does
not go, it cannot be said to exist in a childless woman's son, who also does not
go. The answer is the same as in the previous case. See Ava P286b--7 to 287a--
8, D 2 4 6 a - - 2 to 246b--1.
88 One who stays does not do so at all times. After staying, he may become a
goer and go. See Ava P287b--1 to 5, D 2 4 6 b - - 2 to 5.
89 It is well known that as long as one who stays does stay, he does not go.
Therefore the example is suitable. See Ava P287b--6 to 288a--1, D 2 4 6 b - - 6 to
247a--1.
90 This refers to the reason in the opponent's syllogism preceding 1VEMK 2--8a.
Since in ultimate reality, a goer does not go and a nongoer does not go, the
designation "goes" is not possible in ultimate reality. The example, "Devadatta
goes," also does not exist in ultimate reality.
91 Presumably, this means, as before, that if the reason merely refers to what
exists conventionally, it cannot prove a thesis about ultimate reality. That is, the
conventional existence of a conventional designation proves nothing about
ultimate reality. I do not understand Avalokitavrata's subcommentary here. See
Ava P288a--6,7; D247a--4,5.
92 The opponent's point is that there is no means of knowledge (pramdna) more
authoritative that direct perception (pratyakqa). See Ava P288a--8 to 289a--1,
D247a--6.
93 Avalokitavrata glosses this as "is not possible." See Ava P288b--3,4;
D247b--l,2.
94 Implicit in the negation of origination in chapter one. See Ava P289a--l,2,3;
D 2 4 7 b - - 6 to 248a--1.
95 That is, the single activity of going is expressed by the verb "goes;" and then
346 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

there is no other activity of going which can make the goer a goer independently
of the going which he performs. Compare MMK 2--3,4; and see Ava P289b--5
to 8, D247a--3,4,5. (Note omission in Ava P.)
96 See Ava P290b--6ff., D249b--2ff.
97 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers to the example in the opponent's
syllogism just before MMK 2--7. See Ava P291a--5 to 291b--2, D250a--1
to 5.
98 This refers to the reason in the opponent's syllogism just before MMK
2--12a. See Ava P292b--8 to 293a--3, D251b--2,3,4.
99 According to Avalokitavrata, it is too specific because the beginning of going
is not "in common with" (sddhdraqa) the traversed, etc. See Ava P293a--2,3;
D251b--3,4.
100 According to Avalokitavrata, if an opponent raises an objection similar to
that in MMK 2--2, the answer should be similar to MMK 2--3; and so on. See
Ava P293a--3,4,5; D251b--4,5.
10l That is, the activity of going serves as a cause for applying the expressions,
"He went; he goes; he will go," to past, present, and future goers. See Ava
P293b--1 to 5, D252a--1 to 5. In other words, a single activity of going at a
particular time becomes a cause of the expression "He will go" throughout all
time prior to that activity, and it becomes a cause of the expression "He went"
throughout all time subsequent to that activity.
102 According to Avalokitavrata, this refers back to the opponent's initial
syllogism at the beginning of the chapter. See Ava P294a--8 to 294b--1,
D252b--6,7.
103 That is, there is no path which one who has not moved has already
traversed.
104 Avalokitavrata refers to MMK 2--lab, "etc." See Ava P295a--4, D253b--2.
105 In the Sanskrit of MMK 2--14cd, eva, "just," immediately follows gamanasya,
"of going." Bhfivaviveka, however, says that it must be understood with adr.@a-
rndne, "does not appear," in order to avoid the implication that it is only the
beginning of going which does not exist in ultimate reality, and not the beginnings
of other activities. See Ava P295b--3,4,5; D253b--7 to 254a--2.
106 The fault that the reason in your syllogism is not established. See Ava
P296a--5,6; D254b--1.
107 In the Mahdbhdrata, Ghatotkaca was the son of Bhima, the second of the
five Pfin.dava brothers, by the rdksasi Hidimbfi. Ghatotkaca was killed by Karna
with the "unfailing javelin" (amoghd gaktih) of Indra, which Karna had been
saving for his final battle with Arjuna.
Avalokitavrata tells a version of the story slightly different from that in the
Mahdbhdrata. He has the javelin pursuing Ghatotkaca as he flees through the
three worlds. See Ava P295b--8 to 296a--6, D254a--4 to 254b--1.
108 In the context of MMK 2--15,16,17, the verb sdodpa, sthd (elsewhere
translated as "staying") has the connotation of "ceasing to go, stopping," rather
than "remaining stationary." See especially Bhfivaviveka's commentary following
MMK 2--15b and his commentary on MMK 2--17ab.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADiPA: CHAPTER TWO 347

109 "Obstinacy" translates legs par ma zin pa, which, I have assumed, stands for
durgraha here.
110 According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent means that there is no fault in
saying that one who stops goes, as opposed to saying that a goer stops. He explains
that although a potter normally stays seated at his potter's wheel, he sometimes
gets up and moves about. See Ava P297b--8 to 298a--3, D256a--1 to 3.
111 See Ava P298a--4,5,6; D256a--4,5.
~12 Sanskrit and Tibetan have the ablative, so that MMK 2--17ab literally reads,
"One does not stop from that which is being traversed," etc.
113 This refers to the reason, "because its opposite exists," in the opponent's
syllogism preceding MMK 2--15a. See Ava P298b--7, D256B--5,6.
i14 If the proponents of going assert that stopping, the opposite of going, exists
conventionally, it is contradictory to use this reason to prove that going exists in
ultimate reality. See Ava P299a--l,2; D256b--7 to 257a--1.
11s See Ava P299a--4,5; D257a--3.
116 That is, the fault that the reason in the opponent's syllogism preceding MMK
2--15a is unestablished. See Ava P300b--8 to 301a--1, D258b--1,2.
117 "Hare-possessing" translates ri bong can, iagin. In India, the "man in the
moon" is a "hare in the moon."
118 karman may mean either "action" or "direct object of an action." (In the
sense of action, karman is synonymous with kriyd, "activity.") Here both senses
seem appropriate, gamana, "going," is, of course, the name of an action. One
can, however, say gantd gamanam gacchati, "the goer goes the going." (See, e.g.,
MMK 2--24,25.) In that case, gamana is also the direct object of the verb gain,
"to go."
119 glags yodpa'i tshig. See Ames (1993), p. 244, n. 102.
120 That is, the explicit hypothesis that goer and going are the same is to be
negated. The sense is that goer and going are not the same. See Ava P302b--8
to 303a--3, D260a--5,6,7.
121 This is so because the negation is a simple negation, not an implicative
negation. See Ava P303b--5,6,7; D261a--l,2. See also Ames (1993), p. 242,
n. 85.
122 Sfimkhyas who are proponents of potentiality, according to Avalokitavrata.
See Ava P303b--8, D261a--3.
123 According to Avalokitavrata, the opponent holds that not being the same
means being different, and that two things' being different means that one is
empty of the potentiality for the other. For the Sfimkhyas, since all tl~dngs (except
purusa) are made of the three gun.as, all things ultimately have the same nature;
and nothing is empty of the potentiality for anything else. In particular, this is
true of the cutter and the cut. See Ava P303b--8 to 304a--6, D261a--3 to 7
and the references in note 35.
124 According to Avalokitavrata, the Sfirpkhyas hold that spirit (pwztsa) knows
and that primary matter (pradhdna), composed of the three gu.nas, is known.
They also hold that spirit and primary matter are different in nature. As knower
and known, however, they are also agent and object and thus can serve as an
348 WILLIAM L. A M E S

example in the preceding syllogism. See Ava P304b--2 to 8, D 2 6 1 b - - 4 to

262a--1, and Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), pp. 73--83.
This passage suggests that Bhfivaviveka understands karrnan in M M K 2--19
as "direct object of an action." On the other hand, Bhfivaviveka may wish to be
ambiguous in order to include both senses of the term.
125 "Measurable" translates dpag tu yod pa, glossed as tshad yod pa. Here
Avalokitavrata glosses "the cut" as shing, "wood." See Ava P305a--2,3; D 2 6 2 a - -
2,3.
126 ~gal ba 'khrul pa reed pa, probably viruddha-avyabhicdrin. A reason is
counterbalanced when it leads to one conclusion and another valid reason leads
to a contradictory conclusion. According to Dignfiga, this is a variety of incon-
clusive reason; but Dharmakirti did not recognize it as a separate type of fallacy.
See Stcherbatsky (1930), vol. 2, pp. 220--9 and Tachikawa (1971), pp. 124--5,
135 n. 40, 142. See also Ava P305a--1 to 7, D262a--1 to 5.
127 Avalokitavrata's gloss adds the qualification "in ultimate reality." See Ava
P305a--8, D262a--6,7.
128 That is, we wish to show that agent and action/object are not the same and
that they are not different. See A v a P305b--3,4,5; D262b--1,2,3.
129 See Ames (1994), p. 125, n. 47.
130 Avalokitavrata refers again to the fact that the Mfidhyamika uses simple
negation, not implicative negation. See Ava P306a--2,3,4; D 2 6 2 b - - 7 to 263a--1.
131 See Ava P306a--7,8; D263a--3,4.
132 See note 27.
133 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that the collection of conditioned
factors conventionally called "Devadatta" has specific causes and conditions,
different from the causes and conditions which give rise to the collection called
Yajfiadatta. See Ava P306b--1,2; D263a--5,6.
134 That is, the different natures of the five aggregates. See Ava P306b--2,3;
D263a--6.
135 According to Avalokitavrata, the "cause" referred to is the dlaya-vijhdna. See
Ava P306b--3,4,5; D 2 6 3 a - - 7 to 263b--1.
136 According to Avalokitavrata, the conventional goer, the basis of going,
belongs to the paratantra-svabhdva. The conventional activity of going belongs to
the parikalpita-svabhdva. See Ava P306b--5 to 8, D 2 6 3 b - - l , 2 , 3 .
137 According to Avalokitavrata, one who insists that a pillar is an elephant
cannot be stopped from doing so because he is subject only to his own arbitrary
conceptions; but since a pillar is not an elephant, he will suffer the undesired
consequences of his false belief. Likewise, one who is rash enough to insist that
goer and going are different cannot be stopped; but he will incur an undesired
logical consequence (prasahga). See Ava P307a--1 to 4, D263b--4,5,6.
138 If the activity of going and the goer who is the basis of that activity were
each established by themselves, they would be unrelated like a pot and a cloth;
and like a pot and a cloth, each could be perceived in the absence of the other.
A pot and a cloth are not related as support and supported in the way that the
basis of an activity and the corresponding activity are. See Ava P307a--5 to
307b--2, D 2 6 3 b - - 7 to 264a--4.
139 glags yod pa, prasatiga. See Ames (1993), p. 244, n. 102.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRADIPA: C H A P T E R TWO 349

140 See Ava P 3 0 7 b - - 8 to 308a--8, D 2 6 4 b - - 1 to 265a--1.

141 According to Avalokitavrata, going is dependent on the use of the particular
expression, "He goes." The goer is dependent of the use of the particular
expression, "He goes on the path which is being traversed." See A v a P 3 0 8 b - - 2
to 8, D 2 6 5 a - - 2 to 6.
The point of this argument may be that goer and going correspond to differ-
ent elements extracted from the same sentence mad that they therefore cannot
exist independently of each other.
142 That is, it is not necessary to show that all things which are different from
each other are not dependent on the use of particular expressions, because (in
ultimate reality) there are no such things. See Ava P308b--8 to 309a--6,
D 2 6 5 a - - 7 to 265b--3.
143 According to Avalokitavrata, what the opponent means is the following:
When a potter is not making pots, he and the pot are not mutually dependent/
related. Thus the Mfidhyamika's reason does not really apply to all things. That
is, it is not the case that there are no dissimilar examples. See Ava P 3 0 9 a - - 7 to
209b--1, D265b--4,5.
144 The idea seems to be that even difference is a relation; but if two things are
related, they are not (totally) different; that is, they are not independent. As
Nfigfirjuna will argue in M M K 14--5, one thing is different from another only in
dependence on that other. A thing cannot be said to be different without some
other thing from which it is different.
145 According to Avalokitavrata, this is an allusion to the views of the
Vaigesikas. On the first point, he gives as an example the fact that a cloth is said
to be different from a pot because of a discrimination that it is not a pot. See
Ava P 3 0 9 b - - 4 to 310a--3, D266a--1 to 6.
146 According to Avalokitavrata, this is a response to an objection that the
reason in the preceding syllogisms is inconclusive because some things which are
dependent/related are different and some are not. As before, Bhfivaviveka replies
that the same argument shows that no two things are (completely) different. See
Ava P310a--3 to 8, D266a--6 to 266b--2.
147 Avalokitavrata refers to Bhfivaviveka's commentary on M M K 1--A,B, where
he explains that origination exists in superficial reality but not in uttimate reality.
See Ava P310b--3,4; D266b--5,6.
148 See A v a P310b--5 to 8, D 2 6 6 b - - 6 to 267a--1.
149 That is, it is true that one says, "Devadatta's horse;" and Devadatta is
conventionally different from his horse. But one also says, "the goer's own self;"
and a goer is not conventionally different from his own self. See Ava P311 a--
1,2,3; D267a--2,3,4.
is0 That is, the opponent himself recognizes that one speaks of a goer's own
self; but he does not maintain that a goer is different from himself. See Ava
P31 la--5,6,7; D267a--5,6,7.
151 A n opponent might argue that goer and going are different because the
cognition (or "idea," blo, buddhi) of a goer and the cognition of his going are
different cognitions. It seems that one refutes this argument by again invoking
the case of a goer and his own self. See Ava P311b--1 to 8, D 2 6 7 a - - 2 to 7.
152 See Ava P 3 1 2 a - - 2 to 6, D 2 6 8 a - - 2 to 5.
350 WILLIAM L. A M E S

153 Jug pa dang ldog pa. One would expect anvaya-vyatireka, but 'jug pa does
not normally translate anvaya. Given what is apparently a Vaigesika context, the
Sanskrit may have been anuvrtti-vydv.rtti.
In any case, the point is that the term "goer" is applied to Devadatta when
and only when he is connected with going. See Ava P312a--6 to 312b--1,
D268a--5,6,7.
154 The term "blue blanket" is used if and only if the blanket is connected with
blue, a category different from the blanket's own self. See Ava P312b--1 to 6,
D 2 6 8 a - - 7 to 268b--4.
155 Since all entities possess existence, there is no negative concomitance.
According to Avalokitavrata, this is a reference to the views of the Vaigesikas.
Existence (yod pa nyid, sattd or astitva) is a "great universal" (mahdsdmdnya), as
opposed to a "limited universal" (avdntara-sdmdnya), because it belongs to all
entities. Limited universals are different from the entities to which they apply,
but great universals are not. See Ava P312b--6 to 313a--3, D 2 6 8 b - - 4 to
26%--1.
In fact, the Vaigesikas held that existence is different from entities. See, e.g.,
Potter (1977), pp. 133--5, 140--2; Sinha (1956), pp. 326--7; and Frauwallner
(1973), vol. 2, pp. 175--6.
156 The opponent wishes to show that going and goer are different. But if they
are different (that is, independent and unrelated) like a crow and an owl, they
cannot be related as support and supported. In that case, they also cannot be
related as goer and going. See Ava P313a--5 to 8, D269a--2,3,4.
157 The reading ming mthun pa for mi mthun pa is found only once in the
subcommentary on this sentence in Ava D. It is not found in Ava D's quotation
of the sentence, or in Ava P or PP PNDC. Nevertheless, it is much easier to
understand Avalokitavrata's explanation if this reading is adopted. The idea
seems to be that the many individuals named "Devadatta" are not connected
with a common "Devadattaness" different from themselves, but that nevertheless
the name "Devadatta" applies only to certain individuals and not to others. See
Ava P 3 1 3 b - - 2 to 7, D 2 6 9 a - - 5 to 269b--2.
158 If the reason applies only to the subject of the syllogism, it becomes one part
of the meaning of the thesis, as in the fallacious syllogism, "Sound is permanent
because it is sound." See A v a P 3 1 3 b - - 7 to 314a--4, D 2 6 9 b - - 2 to 5.
159 Because all entities are unestablished in ultimate reality. See Ava P 3 1 4 a - -
4,5,6; D269b--6,7.
160 The opponent might make the same argument in terms of the cognition of
Devadatta as a goer, rather than the verbal expression, "the goer, Devadatta." In
that case, the refutation is the same. See Ava P314a--7 to 314b--4, D270a--1
to 4.
161 Avalokitavrata here glosses 'hanoriginated" as "not one thing and not some-
thing manifold because of being dependently originated." See Ava P315a--4,
D270b--3,4.
162 See Ava P315a--6,7,8; D270b--5,6,7.
163 nye bar brtags pa, perhaps upalaksita.
164 This refers to Bhfivaviveka's second syllogism following M M K 2--20cd. The
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJdgdPRADIPA: C H A P T E R T W O 351

Vaigesika's argument is that all entities possess the gu.na "difference" (gzhan
nyid). Since the goer's own self possesses this gun.a, it is not established that it is
not different from itself. See Ava P315a--8 to 315b--4, D270b--7 to 271a--3.
The Sanskrit original of gzhan nyid here is probably pr.thaktva rather than
paratva. All substances possess prthaktva, "separateness" or "distinctness." It
serves to distinguish them from other substances. On the other hand, paratva in
the Vai~esika system means "remoteness," as opposed to aparatva, "proximity."
See, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 112ff., Sinha (1956), pp. 4 1 0 - - 1 , 4 1 3 .
165 Avalokitavrata explains that "abandoning the original topic" is one of the
"grounds of defeat" (nigraha-sthdna) recognized by the Naiyfiyikas. It probably
corresponds to the second of the twenty-two grounds of defeat, pratij~dnmra.
From a different point of view, raising the question of whether goer and going
are the same or different is a kind of futile rejoinder (jdti). See Ava P316a--4 to
316b--3, D271b--2 to 7. On the grounds of defeat, see, e.g., Potter (1977), pp.
272--4 and Sinha (1956), pp. 537--50.
166 Bhfivaviveka splits MMK 2--21 into two half-verses with missing syntax
supplied in each case by the commentary. This makes it difficult to translate the
verse into readable English. Putting the verse back together, we have,
How can there be establishment of those two
For which there is no establishment by means of identity or difference?
[MMK 2--21]
167 Avalokitavrata ascribes this objection to the Sautrfintikas. They hold that
goer and going, like cause and result, are indescribable as the same or different.
See Ava P317a--4,5,6; D272a--7 to 272b--1.
168 On this interpretation of MMK 2--21, see Ava P317a--8 to 317b--6,
D272b--3 to 7.
169 The first syllogism was stated just before MMK 2--8b, the second just
before 2--15b.
170 In the first syllogism, the example cited, one who stays, does perform an
activity different from going, namely, staying. Likewise, in the second syllogism,
"Devadatta when his activity of going is unimpaired" performs an activity
different from stopping. Thus, according to the opponent, neither is a proper
example for its respective syllogism. See Ava P318a--5,6; D273a--4,5,6.
171 According to Avalokitavrata, the reason, "because he does not perform that
activity which he possesses," contradicts direct perception because it is directly
perceived that a speaker speaks words and a cutter cuts wood. It contradicts the
world because it is common knowledge in the world that one does perform an
activity which one possesses. See Ava P318a--7 to 318b--3, D273b--1 to 4.
172 The faults that it is not established that a goer goes and not established that
a goer stops. See Ava P318b--8, D274a--1.
173 The point seems to be that if the opponent maintains that the goer does
perform an activity of going from which he is not different, then he must hold
that agent and object are not different in general. But the opponent himself has
already argued that one perceives that a speaker speaks words and a cutter cuts
wood; and one does not perceive that the speaker and his words or the cutter
352 WILLIAM L. A M E S

and the wood are the same. See Ava P319a--6 to 319b--3, D274a--6 to
274b--3. F o r gati to be strictly analogous to words which are spoken or wood
which is cut, it would have to be understood in its sense of "path," rather than
"activity of going."
174 According to Avalokitavrata, this means, for example, a man or a woman
goes to a town or a city which is different from his or her own self. See Ava
P319b--5,6,7; D274b--4,5,6. Thus it would be contrary to common knowledge
for a goer to perform a going from which he is not different. Again, this seems
to slide over the distinction between an activity and the direct object of an
activity.
175 'gro bar byed cing 'gro'o, perhaps gacchan gacchati.
176 Avalokitavrata points out that this is the view of the Sautrfintikas, which
Bhfivaviveka accepts on the conventional level but not ultimately. The goer is
conventionally designated as the agent of going because he is the cause of going.
See Ava P320a--8 to 320b--5, D 2 7 5 a - - 6 to 275b--4. See also the parallel
passage in the commentary following M M K 2 - - l b .
177 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that at the former instant the goer
is unmoving (gYo ba reed pa) and then is moving at the next instant. See Ava
P320b--5,6,7; D275b--4,5.
iv8 By the above definitions, goer and going are not really different. Therefore
the goer does not perform the activity of going, because nothing can act on or
make its own self. See Ava P321a--1 to 4, D 2 7 5 b - - 7 to 276a--3.
179 Specifically, the Sautrfintikas. See Ava P321a--5,6; D276a--4.
180 See Ava P321a--7 to 321b--3, D276a--5 to 276b--2. See also note 35, and
compare Larson and Bhattacharya (1987), p. 262.
181 When Devadatta goes to town, Devadatta and his destination are different.
Likewise, a goer cannot be the cause of a going with which he is essentially
identical. See Ava P 3 2 1 b - - 7 to 322a--6, D 2 7 6 b - - 5 to 277a--4.
182 Someone might cite these worldly expressions as evidence that things can act
on themselvles. They are, however, mere imputations. For instance, one may say,
"The rice gruel should be cooked;" but if it is already rice gruel, it does not need
to be cooked; and if it needs to be cooked, it is not rice gruel. See Ava
P322a--6 to 322b--5, D 2 7 7 a - - 4 to 277b--3.
183 Avalokitavrata attributes this objection to the Sautrfintikas (Ava P323a--4ff.,
D278a--2ff.). Their account of speech is similar to their account of motion. See
notes 32 and 176.
184 See A K 2--74ab. The term for "word" in A K is ndman (Tibetan rning).
Here Bhfivaviveka uses ngag, usually corresponding to vdc.
185 A t the previous moment, it was not a speaker. A t the next moment, it is a
speaker. See Ava P323b--4,5; D278b--2.
186 This translation is based on Avalokitavrata's explanation. See Ava P323a--4
to 324a--1, D 2 7 8 a - - 2 to 278b--6. Note that Avalokitavrata says that the arising
of the collection of conditioned factors of speech is the speaking of words (Ava
P323a--6,7,8; D277a--4,5.
187 Here Bhfivaviveka makes an argument parallel to M M K 2--22cd, replacing
"going," etc., with "speaking," etc. It is common knowledge in the world that the
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNe{PRADrlPA: CHAPTER TWO 353

speaker does not exist (as such) prior to his spealdng and that speaking is
different from the speaker himself. Therefore the speaker does not speak that
speech by which he is manifest as a speaker. See Ava P324a--1 to 5, D278b--6
to 279a--2.
188 This refers to the examples, speaking and cutting, given in the opponent's
objection preceding the first occurrence of MMK 2--22ab. "The exemplified" is
the opponent's position that a goer goes.
189 Literally, "it is [logically] possible that it is not the case that there will be no
occasion for the fault that they have a contradictory meaning." The examples
and the exemplified have a contradictory meaning because it is not possible to
act on one's own self. See Ava P324b--2 to 5, D279a--6 to 279b--2.
190 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P324b--6ff.,
D279b--3ff. Bhfivaviveka here gives a loose paraphrase of Buddhapfilita's
commentary, the text of which is found in Saito (1984), p. 47.12--14 and is
quoted by Avalokitavrata (Ava P324b--7,8; D279b--4).
191 For the Vaigesikas, the goer belongs to the category of substance; but going
belongs to the category of action (karman). See Ava P325a--6,7; D280a--2,3.
On the Vaigesika categories, see, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 49ff. and Sinha (1956),
pp. 311ff.
192 See MMK 14--4. Avalokitavrata refers to chapter fourteen, samsarga-
pariks.d; see Ava P326b--4 to 7, D281a--6 to 282b--1.
193 Literally, "others;" identified by Avalokitavrata. See Ava P327b--3ff.,
D282a--3ff. Tibetan text in Saito (1984), p. 48.5--7.
194 Again, Avalokitavrata explains that according to the Vaigesikas, going
belongs to the category of action; and the goer belongs to the category of
substance. Thus they are different; and there is only one going, which is related
to the goer through his possessing it. See Ava P328a--4 to 7, D282b--3 to 6.
~95 According to Avalokitavrata, the Mfidhyamika has argued that a goer who
possesses an activity of going does not perform that same activity of going which
he possesses, because he (already) possesses it. The Vaigesika has accepted the
reason, "because the goer [already] possesses activity." See Ava P328a--8 to
328b--3, D282b--6 to 283a--1.
196 The Vaigesikas hold that a cause produces an effect which did not exist prior
to its origination (asatkdryavdda). See, e.g., Potter (1977), pp. 57--60 and Sinha
(1956), pp. 399--402.
~97 According to Avalokitavrata, action causes the use, or occurrence, of the
cognition and the word, "action." Thus it is not a cause which possesses action.
(Presumably, this is so because a thing cannot possess itself.) Likewise, a goer is
the cause of the use of the cognition and word, "goer." See Ava P328b--5 to
329a--3, D283a--3 to 283b--1.
J9s One who is already a goer by intrinsic nature does not need to possess
going. One who is a nongoer by intrinsic nature cannot possess going. See Ava
P329a--3 to 8, D283b--1 to 5.
~99 The opponent should state syllogisms to prove his own position. He should
also demand to know by what syllogisms the Mfidhyamika establishes his
position, and then he should refute them. If each side seeks to establish its
354 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

position by mere words, without syllogisms, the argument wiU never be decided.
See Ava P329a--8 to 330a--2, D283b--5 to 284a--7.
2o0 When it is a question of defining a real, etc., goer, the Sanskrit correspond-
ing to 'gro ba is probably gati, in the sense of "the activity of going." (Compare
MMK 2--25cd.) In MMK 2--24, 25ab, gamana is used in the sense of gantavya
= gata-agata-gamyamdna. Elsewhere in this chapter, gati and gamana appear to
be used interchangeably. In any case, the Tibetan translation does not distinguish
between them.
20i See Ava P330a--8 to 330b--2, D284b--5,6.
2o2 According to Avalokitavrata, this means that one divides gamana into the
three cases of traversed, untraversed, and that which is being traversed. Then
one argues, "On the [already] traversed, neither a real nor an unreal nor a both
real and unreal goer goes, because the activity of going is past," etc. See Ava
P331a--2 to 6, D285a--6 to 285b--2.
2o3 According to Avalokitavrata, scriptural quotations are given in order to
answer the objection, "[The negation of going] has been established by a mere
limited treatise of desiccated logic." Avalokitavrata replies that it will also be
established by reliable scriptural sources. See Ava P331b--4,5; D285b--7 to
286a--1 and also P333a--1 to 4, D287a--3 to 6. See also Ames (1994), p. 134,
n. 176.
204 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P331b--5, D286a--1. The Sanskrit is
quoted in PSP (with a variant) as part of a longer quotation; see PSP 108.3.
Avalokitavrata quotes even more of the passage; see Ava P331b--6 to 332a--4,
D286a--2 to 7.
20s The story of Sadfiprarudita is summarized by Avalokitavrata. See Ava
P332a--4 to 332b--4, D286a--7 to 286b--6. The closest Sanskrit equivalent of
this quotation can be found in Vaidya (1960), p. 253.25,26.
2o6 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P332b--5, D286b--7.
207 Identified by Avalokitavrata; see Ava P332b--8 to 333a--1, D287a--3. The
Sanskrit text of the last three sentences is in Hikata (1958), p. 34.
208 The Sanskrit has "Where the coming and going o f . . . are not discerned, that
is the perfection of discernment." Ibid.
209 See Ames (1994), p. 135, n. 188.
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJNAPRAD[PA: CHAPTER TWO 355

SANSKRIT TEXT TO MMK. CHAPTER TWO, ACCORDING TO

PSP AS EMENDED BY J. W. DE JONG (1978) AND FURTHER
EMENDED BY AKIRA SAITO (1985)

gataro, na gamyate tfivad agatarg, naiva gamyate /

gatfigatavinirmuktar#, gamyamfinarg, na gamyate//

ces.tfi yatra gatis tatra gamyamfine ca sfi yata.h /

na gate nfigate cestfi gamyamfine gatis t a t a h / /

gamyamfinasya gamanam katham nfimopapatsyate /

gamyamfinarn, vigamanam yadfi naivopapadyate//

gamyamfinasya gamanam yasya tasya prasajyate /

rte gater gamyamfinaro, gamyamfinarg, hi gamyate//

gamyamS_nasya gamane prasaktarn, gamanadvayam /

yena tad gamyamfinar9 ca yac cfitra gamanam p u n a h / /

dvau gantfirau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye /

gantfiram hi tiraskrtya gamanav#, nopapadyate//

gantfirarn, cet tiraskrtya gamanarg, nopapadyate /

gamane 'sati gantfitha kuta eva bhavisyati//

gantfi na gacchati tfivad agantfi naiva gacchati /

anyo gantur agantui ca kas t.rtiyo 'tha gacchati//

gantfi tfivad gacchatiti katham evopapatsyate /

gamanena vinfi gantfi yadfi naivopapadyate//

pakso gantfi gacchatiti yasya tasya prasajyate /

gamanena vinfi gantfi gantur gamanam icchatah// 10

gamane dve prasajyete gantfi yady uta gacchati /

ganteti cfijyate yena gantfi san yac ca gacchati// 11

gate nfirabhyate gantum gantum nfirabhyate 'gate /

nfirabhyate gamyamfine gantum firabhyate k u h a / / 12
356 WILLIAM L. AMES

prfig asti gamanfirambhfid gamyamfinam na vfi gatam /

yatrfirabhyeta gamanam agate gamanam k u t a h / / 13

gatam kim gamyamfina .m kim agatam kim vikalpyate /

adrgyamfina firambhe gamanasyaiva sarvathfi// 14

gantfi na tisthati tfivad agantfi naiva tisthati /

anyo gantur agantug ca kas t.rtiyo 'tha tisthati// 15

gantfi tfivat tisthatiti katham evopapatsyate /

gamanena vinfi gantfi yadfi naivopapadayate// 16

na tis.thati gamyamfinfin na gatfin nfigatfid api /

gamanam sargpravrttig ca nivrttig ca gate.h samfi// 17

yad eva gamanam gantfi sa eveti na yujyate /

anya eva punar gantfi gater iti na y u j y a t e / / 18

yad eva gamanam gantfi sa eva hi bhaved yadi /

ekibhfiva.h prasajyeta kartuh karmana eva c a / / 19

anya eva punar gantfi gater yadi vikalpyate /

gamana .m syfit rte gantur gantfi syfid gamanfid r t e / / 20

eka-bhfivena vfi siddhir ngnfibhfivena vfi yayoh /

na vidyate tayo.h siddhih katham nu khalu vidyate// 21

gatyfi yayfijyate gantfi gatim trim sa na gacchati /

yasmfin na gatipfirvo 'sti kagcit kimcid dhi gacchati// 22

gatyfi yayfijyate gantfi tato 'nyfim sa na gacchati /

gati dye nopapadyete yasmfid eke tu gantari// 23

sadbhfito gamanam gantfi triprakfiraxn, na gacchati /

nfisadbhfito 'pi gamanarft triprakfiram sa gacchati// 24

gamanam sadasadbhfitah triprakfirato, na gacchati /

tasmfid gatig ca gantfi ca gantavyam ca na v i d y a t e / / 25
 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJN~IPRAD[PA: C H A P T E R T W O 357

GLOSSARY

English Tibetan Sanskrit

about to originate skye bar 'dod pa utpitsu

absence of self bdag med pa nyid nairfitmya
action las karman
activity bya ba kriyfi
aeon bskal pa kalpa
agent byed pa po kartr
affliction nyon mongs pa klega
kun nas nyon mongs pa samklega
afflictive nyon mongs pa can klista
aggregate phung po skandha
appropriation nye bar len pa upfidfina
nye bar blang ba
appropriator nye bar len pa po upfidfitr
assertion dam bcas pa pratijfifi
attachment mngon par zhen pa abhinivega
attention yid la byed pa manasikfira

basis gzhi figraya, etc.

(a) being seres can sattva
Blessed One bcom ldan 'das bhagavan

causal condition, rkyen pratyaya

condition
cause rgyu hetu
rgyu kfirana
cause of maturation rnam per stain pa'i rgyu vipfika-hetu
cognition blo buddhi
rnam par shes pa vijfifina
shes pa jfifina
coming into existence bdag nyid thob pa fitma-lfibha
common knowledge grags pa prasiddhi, prasiddha
conceptual construction rnam par rtog pa vikalpa
rtog pa kalpanfi
conceptual proliferation spros pa prapafica
concomitance lhan cig nyid, sahabh~va
lhan cig gi dngos po
conditioned 'dus byas samskrta
conditioned factor 'du byed samskfira
conflict gnod pa bfidha
confusion gti mug moha
conjoined cause mtshung par ldan pa'i sa .mprayukta-hetu
rgyu
358 W I L L I A M L. AMES

consciousness shes pa yod pa nyid caitanya

convention, conventional tha snyad vyavahfira
designation,
conventional
activity
conventional truth tha snyad kyi bden pa vyavahfira-satya
conventionally tha snyad du vyavahfiratal).
conviction dad pa graddhfi
counterbalanced 'gal ba 'khrul pa reed pa viruddha-avyabhicfirin
counterexample, mi mthun pa'i phyogs vipaksa
dissimilar case,
set of all such;
counterposition
craving sred pa trsnfi
. . ,

criticism sun dbyung ba dfisana

defective vision rab rib timira

defining characteristic mtshan nyid laksana 9 .

dependent designation brten nas gdags pa upfidfiya prajfiapti

dependent origination rten cing brel par 'byung pratitya-samutpfida
ba
desire 'dod chags riga
'dod pa kfima
direct object las karman
disadvantage nyes dmigs fidinava
. ~ _

discernment shes rab prajna

doctrine tshul naya
mdzad pa'i mtha' krtSnta
grub pa'i mtha' siddhSma
domain spyod yul gocara
dominant causal bdag po'i rkyen adhipati/fidhipateya-
condition pratyaya

element 'byung ba bhfita

khams dhfitu
(to) emanate sprul pa nir-mfi
emancipation byang grol apavarga
entity dngos po bhfiva
vastu
established grub pa siddha
establishing what is grub pa la sgrub pa siddha-sfidhana
[already] established

fact of having this as a rkyen 'di dang ldan pa idarnpratyayatfi

causal condition nyid
feeling tshor ba vedanfi
 B H A V A V I V E K A ' S PRAJNfiIPRADIPA: C H A P T E R T W O 359

fellow Buddhist rang gi sde pa svayfithya

(more literally,
"coreligionist")
founders of non-Buddhist mu stegs byed t~rthakara
sects
futile rejoinder ltag chod jfiti

hatred zhe sdang dvesa

higher realms mtho ris svarga

identifying mark mtshan ma nimitta

immediately preceding de ma thag pa'i rkyen (sam)anantara-pratyaya
causal condition
implicative negation ma yin par dgag pa paryudfisa-pratisedha
imputation sgro 'dogs pa samfiropa
in superficial reality kun rdzob tu sa.mvrtyfi
m ultimate reality don dam par paramfirthatal?
inconclusive ma nges pa anaikfintika
inference rjes su dpag pa anumfina
inherent nature rang gi ngo bo svarfipa
instrument byed pa karana
internal nang gi fidhyfitimika
intrinsic nature ngo bo nyid svabhfiva
rang bzhin svabhfiva
invariable 'ldlrul pa reed pa avyabhicfirin

locus gzhi hgraya

(as in figraya-asiddhi)
logical mark rtags linga
[logically] possible rigs pa yukta

manifestation gsal ba vyakti

material gzugs can rfpin
matter gzugs rfpa
(as first aggregate)
matter dependent on the 'byung ba las gyur pa'i bhautika-rfipa
on the elements gzugs
meditation bsam gtan dhyfina
meditational attainment snyoms par 'jug pa samfipatti
meditative concentration ting nge 'dzin samfidhi
(in) meditative mnyam par bzhag pa samfihita
concentration
meditative cultivation bsgom pa bhhvanfi
meditative sphere skye mched fiyatana
mental factor seres las byung ba caitta
360 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

mental formation 'du byed samskfira

(as fourth aggregate)
mere assertion dam bcas pa tsam pratijfifi-m~tra
merit bsod nams punya
mind sems citta
yid manas
moral conduct tshul khrims sSla

necessary connection med na mi 'byung ba avinfibhfiva

negation dgag pa pratisedha
neutral lung d u m a bstan pa avyfikrta
nihilistic negation skur pa 'debs pa apavfida
noble 'phags pa firya
nonconceptual wisdom rnam par mi rtog pa'i nirvikalpaka-jfifina
ye shes
noncondition rkyen ma yin pa apratyaya
nonobstructing cause byed pa'i rgyu kfirana-hetu

object yul visaya

object, object to be gzung ba grfihya
grasped [by a subject]
object of cognition dmigs pa firambana, filambana
object of correct gzhal bya prameya
knowledge
object of knowledge shes bya jfieya
one who desires chags pa rakta
one who hates sdang ba dvista
, .

original meaning, point skabs kyi don prak.rta-artha

under discussion
overextension ha cang thal ba atiprasafiga

perception-conception 'du shes sam.jfifi

perfection pha rol tu phyin pa pfiramitfi
person gang zag pudgala
position phyogs paksa
positive concomitance rjes su 'gro ba anvaya
potentiality nus pa gakti
previous position phyogs snga ma pfirvapaksa
primary matter gtso bo pradhS_na
primordial matter, rang bzhin prakrti
original nature
property of the subject phyogs kyi chos paksa-dharma
[which proves the
thesis]
property to be proved bsgrub par bya ba'i chos sfidhya-dharma
proving property sgrub pa'i chos sfidhana-dharma
 B H A V A V I V E K A ' S PRAJNAPRADfPA: C H A P T E R T W O 361

question raised in brgal zhing brtag pa paryanuyoga

objection

reality de kho na tattva

reason gtan tshigs hetu
reasoning rigs pa yukti, nyfiya
refutation sun dbyung ba dfisana
result 'bras bu phala
'bras bu kfirya

scripture lung figama

gsung tab pravacana
secondary matter rgyur byas pa'i gzugs upfidfiya-rfipa
self-contradiction dgag pa mi mthun pa vipratisedha
sense organ dbang po indriya
separate tha dad pa prthak, bhinna, vyatirikta,
etc.
set of all similar mthun pa'i phyogs sapaksa
examples
similar cause skal pa mnyam pa'i rgyu sabhfiga-hetu
similar example chos mthun pa'i dpe sfidharmya-drs.tfinta
simple negation med par dgag pa prasajya-pratisedha
simultaneously arisen lhan cig 'byung ba'i rgyu sahabhfi-hetu
cause
specific so sot nges pa pratiniyata
specification nges par gzung ba avadhfirana, nirdhfirana
specious ltar snang ba -fibhfisa
spirit skyes bu purusa
spiritually immature byis pa bfila
state of existence 'gro ba gati
student slob ma gisya
subject [of a thesis] chos can dharmin
subsequent reasoning rtog ge phyi ma uttara-tarka
substance rdzas dravya
superficial reality kun rdzob samvrti
superficial truth kun rdzob kyi bden pa sa.mvrti-satya
superficially real kun rdzob pa sfimvrta
supramundane 'jig rten las 'das pa lokottara
syllogism sbyor ba'i tshig prayoga-vfikya
system gzhung lugs mata, samaya

thesis dam bcas pa pratijfifi

thing characterized mtshan nyid kyi gzhi laks.ya
tranquil zhi ba giva
trace bag chags vfisanfi
treatise bstan bcos gfistra
362 W I L L I A M L. A M E S

true state yang dag pa ji lta ba yfithfitathya (?)

bzhin nyid

ultimate reality don dam pa paramfirtha

ultimate truth don dam pa'i bden pa paramfirtha-satya
ultimately real don dam p a p a pfiramfirthika
unconditioned 'dus ma byas asamskrta
undesired consequence thal ba prasafiga
universal cause ktm tu 'gro ba'i rgyu sarvatraga-hetu
unreal yang dag pa ma yin pa abhfita
unwholesome mi dge ba akugala

valid means of tshad ma pramfina

knowledge
virtue chos dharma
visible form gzugs rfipa
(as an ~yatana)

wholesome dge ba kugala

. ~ _

wisdom ye shes jnana

 BHAVAVIVEKA'S PRAJIVf[PRADiPA: C H A P T E R T W O 363

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John F. Kennedy University

Orinda, California, U.S.A.