10.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A.
FACUNDO and REYNALDO C. MEJICA, petitioners,
vs.
TH E HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 125498 February 18, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioners Rodrigo and Mejica are the Mayor and
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator,
respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, while petitioner
Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer of the same
municipality.
Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor
Rodrigo, entered into an agreement with Philwood
Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the
electrification of Barangay Caboloan, for the sum of
P486,386.18. Mejica, prepared an Accomplishment
Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project
was 97.5% accomplished. Said report was supposedly
approved by Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu.
On the basis of said report, payment of P452,825.53 was
effected by the Municipal Treasurer, petitioner Facundo,
to Philwood Construction.
Petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance the
Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, who found that as per
COA (Commission on Audit) evaluation of the
electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project was
actually accomplished. Of the two units of generator
supposedly purchased, only one second-hand unit was
delivered. So, the Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the
amount of P160,910.46. Petitioners requested the Auditor
to lift the notice of disallowance and to re-inspect the
project, however, it was allegedly not acted on.
The Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for
estafa before the Ombudsman against petitioners and
impleaded were Lu and Ang, President and General
Manager, and Project Engineer.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a
memorandum recommending that the charges against
petitioners be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said
memorandum. Petitioners thereafter filed before the
Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information
alleging, as grounds therefor that (1) the facts alleged in
the information did not constitute an offense, and (2) the
same information charged more than one offense. The
Sandiganbayan denied said motion. the prosecution
moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners
opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan
lacked jurisdiction over them. Petitioners thus filed before
this Court the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining
order prayed for.
ISSUES:
over the petitioners.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on
28 August 1996 LIFTED.
RATIO:
Sec. 2 of R. A. No. 7975 redefined the
jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court such that the pertinent
portions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606. To distinguish the
"big fish" from the "small fry," Congress deemed the 27th
Grade as the demarcation between those who should come
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and those
within the regular courts'. Thus, officials occupying
positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes
referred to in Section 4 a. and b., are within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; those
below come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are stated
by name in Section 4 a., the position of Municipal Mayor
is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress provided a
catchall provision. Such a catchall is necessary, for it
would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to
list down each position created or will be created
pertaining to Grades 27and above. Grade is therefore a
means of grouping positions "sufficiently equivalent as to
level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work" so that they may
be lumped together in "one range of basic compensation."
Petitioner mayor's position having been classified as
Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No 6758, and having
been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a., of P.D No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By
virtue of the same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-
accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft Court' s
jurisdiction.
11.
ANTONIO P. SANTOS
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY,
G.R. No. 139792 November 22, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Judge of the MeTC of Quezon
City, and he thereafter assumed office. After the military-
backed EDSA revolt, petitioner was reappointed to the
same position. Petitioner optionally retired from the
Judiciary under R.A. No. 910,2 as amended, and received
his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in
the government service; and five years thereafter he has
been regularly receiving a monthly pension. Petitioner re-
entered the government service and was appointed
Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA.
His appointment was approved by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924,
which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
Pursuant thereto, the MMDA issued Resolution No. 16,
series of 1996, which, inter alia, authorized the payment of
separation benefits to the officials and employees of the
former MMA who would be separated as a result of the
implementation of R.A. No. 7924. The MMDA issued a
Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of
his "voluntary option to be separated from the service" his
services would automatically cease effective at the close
of office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would
be entitled to "separation benefits equivalent to one and
one-fourth (1¼) monthly salary for every year of service
as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law."
Petitioner submitted a Position Paper wherein he asserted
that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A.
No. 910, as amended, is not an additional or double
compensation, all the years of his government service,
including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited
in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A.
No. 7924.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner elevated the opinion of Director Acebedo to the
CSC. The CSC promulgated Resolution No. 97-4266
affirming the opinion of Director Acebedo and dismissing
petitioner’s appeal.
The CSC promulgated Resolution No. 98-1422 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to set
aside these Resolutions.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, now
challenged in this case. It held that the CSC was "correct
in dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the opinion of
Director Acebedo."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s claim constitutes
double compensation.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the
judgment appealed from, the petition in this case is
DENIED for want of merit, and the decision of 19 August
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48301 is
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner
RATIO:
The case at bench is not, strictly speaking, about ‘double
pension.’ It is, however, about the interpretation of a
gratuity law, viz., Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7924
which awards separation pay to those government
employees who were displaced by the reorganization of
the MMA into the MMDA, which should be construed to
preclude a government employee from receiving double
gratuity for the same years of service. We affirm the
assailed judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals
and the Civil Service Commission that for the purpose of
computing or determining petitioner’s separation pay
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in
the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation
pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA.
Second, petitioner himself must have realized that Section
11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous
government service. If he were convinced that it does he
could have instead applied for retirement benefits, since
by adding his years of service in the MMA to his previous
years of service in the Government he could have retired
under the third paragraph of Section 11.
Third, after the approval of his optional retirement on 1
April 1992, petitioner was fully paid of his retirement
gratuity under R.A. No. 910, as amended; and five years
thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.
12.
CELERINO VALERIANO vs. EM PLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION and
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM.
G.R. No. 136200 June 8, 2000
FACTS:
Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire
truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. One
evening, petitioner was standing along Santolan road,
when he met a friend for dinner. On their way home, the
jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on collision
with another vehicle at an intersection. Due to the strong
impact of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the
vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the
mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals for
treatment.
Petitioner filed a claim for income benefits under
PD 626, with the Government Security Insurance Service.
His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the
injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from
the nature of his work. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial by the System but the same
was turned down on the ground that the condition for
compensability had not been satisfied. Petitioner then
interposed an appeal to the Employees' Compensation
Commission (ECC). ECC ruled against herein appellant.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of
the Employees' Compensation Commission that
petitioner's injuries and disability were not compensable,
emphasizing that they were not work-connected. Hence,
this Petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE
SOLDIERS, CAN BE PRESUMED TO BE ON 24-
HOUR DUTY AND PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE
WORK-CONNECTED.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
For the injury and the resulting disability to be
compensable, they must have necessarily resulted from an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly
how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries
he had suffered. That he sustained the injuries after
pursuing a purely personal and social function — having
dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of
the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place;
nor were they sustained while he was performing an act
within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an
order of his superior. Following the rationalization in
GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine cannot be applied to
petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned
work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors
when he met an accident. But the more important
justification for the Court's stance is that he was not doing
an act within his duty and authority as a firetruck driver,
or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his
injuries. We cannot find any reasonable connection
between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver.