What is Protagoras’ ‘Secret Doctrine’? Does it provide support to his ‘Man-Measure Doctrine’?

The Secret Doctrine - a collection of theses which Plato supplies to help construct a coherent
Protagorean epistemology - attempts to provide support to the Man-Measure Doctrine, but ultimately proves
self-contradictory. In this essay, I shall analyse how the Man-Measure Doctrine and the Secret Doctrine
relate to each other and Theaetetus’ original principle that “knowledge is nothing other than perception;”1 I
shall then show how Plato successfully argues that the Secret Doctrine fails to support the Man-Measure
Doctrine; and finally I shall examine the proper philosophical obligations for anyone attempting to
reformulate or amend the Secret Doctrine to successfully support the Man-Measure Doctrine.

I - The Doctrines

Both the Man-Measure Doctrine and the Secret Doctrine appear in the first part of the Theaetetus
which handles Socrates’ interpretation and refutation of Theaetetus’ thesis of knowledge. Socrates adduces a
reformulation of Theaetetus’ original utterance, stating “you say that perception (αἴσθησις) is knowledge;”2
he then adds two interpretative doctrines: the Man-Measure Doctrine (MMD) and the Secret Doctrine (SD).

Socrates proposes the MMD as an alternate way of phrasing the same thesis:

ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων
χρημάτων μέτρον’ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

Protagoras said this too, but he stated this same thing in another way. For he said approximately
that man is the measure of all things: of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that
they are not.
Theaetetus 152a

He further elaborates:

As any given thing appears (φαίνεται) to me, so it is for me, and as to you, so it is for you, since you
and I are both the ‘man’.
Theaetetus 152a

The MMD posits that the existence or nonexistence of an object’s qualities are dependent in some way on a
person’s perception of that object; it also suggests that its existence is for that person - that is, that its
existence is in some way relative to that person.

Socrates then introduces the SD:

1 οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις, Th. 151e

2 αἴσθησις, φῄς, ἐπιστήμη, ibid.

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 ἓν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ᾽ ὁποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ὡς
μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, σύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς
ὄντος ἑνὸς μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν; ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα
γίγνεται πάντα ἃ δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες: ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ
γίγνεται.

Nothing is one thing in and of itself, nor could you rightly say that anything was of a particular sort,
but if you were to call it big, it would also appear small, and if heavy, light, and likewise in all other
ways, since nothing is just one thing nor one sort; but from movement and motion and mixing with
each other, all things which we say are really become; we say this wrongly, for nothing ever is, but is
always becoming.

Theaetetus 152d - 152e

The SD posits the idea that all things are in a state of flux and are always changing, an idea which Socrates
suggests is common in Greek thought more generally, not only philosophy. The SD, like the MMD,
incorporates perceiving by claiming that the same object can have two contradictory qualities to the same
perceiver, for example by being both big and small; thus both its sort and its perceptible qualities are able to
change.

On the one hand, these doctrines can be interpreted as parts of an overall Protagorean argument
wherein Theaetetus’ original thesis depends on the MMD, which in turn depends on the SD; on the other,
they can be understood as a pair of related but separate doctrines for which Protagoras was known, but
which were not necessarily dependent on each other or necessary for Theaetetus’ thesis.

Fine’s interpretation of these doctrines requires that they form a coherent argument, mandating that
“we should aim to interpret each of the three theses in a way that makes it plausible to suggest that each of
them is committed to and best supported by the others.”3 She makes this requirement because she believes
that Plato is supposing that Theaetetus’ thesis commits him to the MMD, and the MMD commits him to the
SD - that is, the strongest possible interpretation of their coincidence in this part of the argument. Thus, for
Fine, not only must all of these theses be true or none of them, but they must each also be supported by the
other two. This interpretation results in a ‘hard’ hypothesis in response to our question - that the SD must
provide support to the MMD such that if either is found to be false the other must also be found false.

Lee, on the other hand, adopts the second interpretation of the doctrines. She takes both the MMD
and the SD as “a friendly amendment which develops and recommends a thesis under consideration.”4 Thus,

3 G. Fine, ‘Protagorean Relativisms’, in Plato on Knowledge and Forms (Oxford, 2003) 137
4 M.-K. Lee, ‘The Secret Doctrine in Plato’s Theaetetus’, in Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism
in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus (Oxford, 2005) 79

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according to Lee, we can read Socrates’ introduction of the MMD and SD as the adducement of the best and
most persuasive formulation of a broader thesis. Theaetetus’ reformulated statement ‘perception is
knowledge’ does not necessarily imply the MMD, under this interpretation, and nor does the MMD
necessarily imply the SD; but each of these is rather one of any number of possible developments of the
preceding thesis. Thus, for Lee, Theaetetus’ thesis does not commit him to the MMD, and the MMD does
not commit him to the SD; they are simply the most ostensibly plausible versions of those theses. This
interpretation is therefore rather ‘softer’ than Fine’s, since if the SD turns out to be true, it does not by
necessity imply that all permutations of the MMD are also true, and if the SD turns out to be false, it does
not by necessity imply that all permutations of the MMD are also false.

II - The Relativistic Principle

Socrates introduction of the MMD is through the example of the coldness of wind:

S: It is not the case that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us shivers and another does
not? [...]

T: Certainly.

S: Well then, shall we call the wind in itself cold or not cold? Or shall we follow Protagoras, that it is
cold for the one who shivers and is not cold for the one who doesn’t?

T: Apparently.
Plato, Theaetetus 152b

Lee formulates the MMD as a biconditional: that x is F for A if and only if x seems F to A. This
formulation implies (1) that if x seems F for A, it is F for A; but also (2) that if x does not seem F for A, it is
not F for A. The SD, according to Lee, “is introduced in order to supply auxiliary materials for
understanding and explaining the measure doctrine as a biconditional,” particularly the second thesis.5

The SD contains several theses, but the most relevant one for the purposes of developing Protagoras’
theory of perception here is the principle that nothing is anything in itself, but is whatever it is relative to
some perceiver (the relativistic principle); thus, for example, “it is impossible to become sweet, but not
sweet for anyone.”6 This thesis posits that perceptible qualities cannot be attributed to any object without
relating that quality to a perceiver.

Precisely how qualities are attributed to objects is explored through the example of an object
appearing large, white or hot to an observer. The apparent contradiction is that the same object can appear

5 Ibid. 85
6 γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδϵνὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατoν γϵνέσθαι, Plato, Th. 160a-b

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different to multiple observers, or to the same observer at different times. Lee characterises Socrates’
argument in the following way:7

(1) If the object were large, white, or hot, then it would not become different (when it comes into
contact with something else) without changing. But it does become different when it comes into
contact with something else, without changing; therefore it is not large, white, or hot.

(2) If the sense‐organ were large, white, or hot, then when something new approached it or when
something happened to the first thing which approached it and the sense‐organ was not affected, it
would not have become different. But it does become different without being affected; therefore, the
sense‐organ is not large, white, or hot.

As the argument goes, we are inclined to locate the largeness, whiteness or hotness of an object either in the
object itself, or the perceptual organ which perceives it. These arguments prove that neither of these are
possible; for the quality to be within either of them, the lack of change in the object would fail to account for
the change in quality. Therefore, Socrates motivates finding an alternative genesis for qualities, outside
either the object itself or the perceptual organ.

This genesis, according to Socrates, is the offspring of the collision between the perceptual organ
and the object. Under this formulation, this collision produces both the perception of the perceptual organ
and the perceptual quality of the object, always in pairs: so “all sorts of colour are akin to all sorts of vision,
and likewise sounds to hearing, and all sorts of qualities spring forth akin to all sorts of perceptions.”8
Therefore, a perceptible quality of an object can only arise from such a collision, and as such can never arise
without a perceiver to whom it can be related. This captures the second thesis of the biconditional MMD -
that if x does not seem F for A, it is not F for A.

III - The Flux Principle

Socrates is seeking to ultimately refute the MMD and the SD, and accordingly he brings in another thesis
from the SD, the principle that all things are constantly changing in every respect (the flux principle):

S: Do you call it motion when something changes place or rotates in the same place?

T: I do.

7 Plato, Th. 154b

8 ὄψεσι μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα
αἰσθητὰ συγγενῆ γιγνόμενα, Plato, Th. 156c

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 S: Let this then be one sort of motion. But when something stays in one place, and ages or becomes
black instead of white or hard instead of soft, or changes in any other way, is it not right to call this
another sort of motion?

T: It seems necessary to me to do so. [...]

S: Let us ask them: do you mean that everything moves in both ways, both spatially and
qualitatively, or one thing in both way and another in only one way?

T: By Zeus, I could not say; but I think that they would say in both ways. [...]

S: Then since everything must be in motion, and inertia is not possible for anything, everything is
always moving in all kinds of motion.

Plato, Theaetetus 181c-182e

Here Socrates characterises the perceptible quality of an object, which he had previously established as the
product of perception, as constantly subject to change. If all objects change in all respects, this must
necessarily include perceptible qualities of those objects.

According to the formulation of the MMD laid out above, if x seems F for A, it is F for A. Thus,
taking Socrates’ white stone example, if A perceives the stone as white - that is, if A’s eye and the stone
collide so as to produce a perception for A’s eye and whiteness for the stone - then the stone is really white
for A, according to the relativistic principle.

With the addition of the flux principle, however, the whiteness of the stone is subject to constant
change, such that the stone must possess different colours to the same perceiver on the same occasion; the
stone remaining white for any period of time, no matter how short, would contradict this principle. Thus the
flux principle combines with the relativistic principle to produce a contradiction: the stone must be both
white-for-A and not white-for-A. As such, the formulation of the MMD which relies upon the SD proves
inconsistent.

IV - Protagorean Doctrine

Two obvious objections arise to this reading of the SD: first, that it relies upon taking all theses in the SD as
a set and under particular interpretations, when they are not obviously reliant upon each other so as to
necessitate doing so; and secondly, that the refutation put forward in III only refutes one formulation of both
the MMD and the SD.

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 The refutation relies on taking the flux principle to its most extreme form, that (1) everything is (2)
constantly changing (3) in every way. Ostensibly, a less all-encompassing version of this principle could
avoid the issues presented in the refutation; but, as Lee emphasises, “Socrates' strategy has [always] been to
exploit a general metaphysical world‐view, summed up in the theses constituting the Secret Doctrine, for the
purpose of finding support for Protagoras.”9 The principles which he attributes to Protagoras, among many
others, are grouped not by their philosophical affinities for each other but by convention: they evidently
possess an impressive pedigree, attributed to Protagoras himself, Heracleitus, Empedocles, Homer and
Epicharmus.

Looking to both the purported supporters of the SD and the clearly underdeveloped links between
the various theses of which it is composed, the SD looks like just such a world-view; a set of theses broadly
accepted to some degree by many contemporary philosophers, but whose details had not been fully fleshed
out. Thus, Socrates’ process of adding theses from the SD onto the MMD looks like a process of
constructing a coherent epistemological theory from a pool of generally Protagorean ideas; so Socrates can
move smoothly from Theaetetus’ thesis to the MMD to the SD because advocates of any one of these theses
were likely to advocate the others as well.

With Socrates’ process of compilation in mind, the argument in this part of the Theaetetus looks
most like a refutation of Protagoreanism in general, having built an epistemology from those ‘Protagorean’
theses readily available to him. Thus, diluting the flux principle could result in the MMD turning out true,
but would also compromise the entire SD; compromising the cohesion of the SD also compromises Plato’s
aim to refute Protagoras’ philosophy more generally.

With this idea of the ‘Protagorean ontology’ established, the refutation does still only address one
possible formulation of Theaetetus’ thesis and the MMD; but this is, according to Plato, the best way to
incorporate Protagorean ideas into a single, cohesive epistemology. If we accept that Protagoras likely held
a set of beliefs similar to the SD, if not identical to it, it also seems likely that in order to find further support
for the MMD a radically different supplementary ontology would be required: and this would again
compromise the cohesion of the Protagorean doctrine.

Finally, returning to the interpretations of Fine and Lee of the relationship between Theaetetus’
thesis, the MMD and the SD, the ‘hard’ hypothesis of Fine turns out to be unnecessary: instead of the three
doctrines necessarily implying each other, their linking proves to be a product of how obscure Protagoras’
epistemological convictions turn out to be. While a successful Protagorean epistemological ontology should
incorporate all of them successfully, this formulation’s failure is not due to any biconditional mandate
between them; the problem is rather that no one of them can be removed or diluted without compromising
Protagoras’ wider philosophical commitments. Likewise, the ‘soft’ hypothesis of Lee turns out not to fully
capture the philosophical obligations on any attempt at formulating Protagorean doctrine in this way
successfully, for the same reason that the objection that this refutes only one formulation of the MMD fails.

9 Lee (2005) 115-6

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 Therefore, the Secret Doctrine turns out not to support the Man-Measure Doctrine. If we accept that
the cohesion of Protagoras’ doctrine prevents us from diluting the Secret Doctrine, the contradiction
between the relativistic principle and the flux principle appears to be irreconcilable.