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Terrorism
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Countering terrorism: U.S. policy in the 1980s and

1990s
a
Yonah Alexander Conference Chairman and Editor & L. Paul Bremer III
a
U.S. Department of State , Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism
Published online: 09 Jan 2008.

To cite this article: Yonah Alexander Conference Chairman and Editor & L. Paul Bremer III (1988) Countering terrorism: U.S.
policy in the 1980s and 1990s, Terrorism, 11:6, 531-538, DOI: 10.1080/10576108808435749

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 Terrorism. Volume 11, pp. 531-557 0149-0389/88 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the UK. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1988 Taylor & Francis

Conference Report on "Terrorism: An Evaluation of

the Reagan Years and An Agenda for the
Next Administration"

YONAH ALEXANDER
Conference Chairman and Editor

Editor's Note:
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On 22 November 1988, The George Washington University (the Elliott School of Inter-
national Affairs), the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL), and The Leon and
Marilyn Klinghoffer Memorial Foundation of the ADL co-sponsored a conference on
"Terrorism: An Evaluation of the Reagan Administration and An Agenda for the Next
Administration" held at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. The fol-
lowing presentations have been selected for publication in this issue. Other papers will be
published in subsequent issues.

Countering Terrorism: U.S. Policy in the 1980s

and 1990s

L. PAUL BREMER III

Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism
U.S. Department of State

Introduction
Today I would like to talk to you about U.S. counterterrorism policy in the 1980s and the
priorities for the 1990s. Reasonable observers have questioned, continue to question, and
will likely go on questioning the effectiveness of our government's counterterrorism ef-
fort. It is not hard to see why. After all, the Iran-Contra affair dealt a blow to our
credibility. Nine Americans are still held hostage in Lebanon. And according to the State
Department's own statistics, 1987 was the bloodiest year for terrorist incidents since we
began compiling such figures. This year attacks on U.S. targets are running 31 percent
above their 1987 levels; while incidents for 1988 are running about 4 percent above 1987.
So it is certainly fair to question the effectiveness of our country's counterterrorism
policy.

531
 532 L. Paul Bremer III

United States Government Counterterrorism Policy

Let me suggest to you, however, that these data do not reflect a failed policy. Rather they
are evidence that terrorism is now and will be a persistent international problem. We
cannot expect completely to eradicate terrorism. But we can aim to reduce significantly
terrorism's status on the international agenda. And I believe our policy is moving toward
that goal.
American counterterrorist policy stands on three solid pillars. First, we will not ac-
cede to terrorist demands. We will not pay ransom, pardon convicted terrorists, or pres-
sure other countries to give in to terrorist demands. In other words, we will make no
deals. But we will talk to anyone authoritative, anywhere, any time about the welfare and
unconditional release of our hostages.
Second, we have taken the lead in pressuring states which support terrorist groups
and use terrorism as part of their foreign policy. We have shown these states that they
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will be penalized for supporting terrorism. The United States will not tolerate their aiding
and abetting terrorist groups by supplying them with weapons, money, passports,
training bases, and safe houses.
Third, we are imposing the rule of law on terrorists for their criminal actions. Good
police work is catching terrorists, and they are being brought to trial. The United States
now has on the books a law which enables our law enforcement agencies to better combat
terrorism. Popularly called a "long-arm" statute, the law makes it a federal crime to kill,
injure, threaten, detain, or seize an American citizen anywhere in the world in order to
compel a third person or government to accede to a terrorist's demands.

U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: How Is It Working?

So we have a clear and comprehensive counterterrorist policy. How is it working?
Let us look first at the "no concessions" element of our policy. Obviously, this
element of our policy was damaged by the Iran-Contra affair. However, for the past two
years, the president has made it crystal clear to Iran and others our government's stead-
fast commitment to the no-deals principle. No country, no group should believe there is
gain in trying to blackmail the United States.
Based on my own meetings with counterterrorism officials and experts from other
countries and in this country, we have largely recovered the credibility lost by the Iran-
Contra affair. The International counterterrorism community understands our position,
and there is strong bipartisan support here for our policy of firmness in dealing with
terrorists.
We have enjoyed an important measure of success on the second ingredient of our
policy—pressuring states supporting terrorism. Some of the more notorious state sup-
porters of terrorism have attempted—publicly at least—to distance themselves from ter-
rorism.
Our 1986 air strike on Libya's terrorist camps was the watershed event in the world's
fight against terrorist supporting states. European nations followed our lead against Libya
by imposing political, economic, and security measures against the Qadhafi regime. Eu-
ropean community members expelled more than one hundred Libyan "diplomats" and
restricted the movements of other Libyan "diplomatic" and "consular" personnel.
These moves severely damaged Libya's European network dedicated to supporting inter-
national terrorism.
Qadhafi learned that his support for international terrorism would not be cost-free.
 Countering Terrorism "3

And he changed his behavior, which, after all, was the objective of our attack. Libya's
involvement in terrorism declined from nineteen incidents in 1986 to six in 1987.
Syria, another long-time supporter of terrorism, felt the pressure of our counterter-
rorism strategy also. In late 1986, British and West German courts established Syrian
complicity in terrorist attacks in London and West Berlin. Together with Great Britain,
the United States joined an international campaign employing diplomatic, political, and
economic sanctions to convince Syria to reduce its links to terrorist groups.
These efforts worked. In 1985 Syria was implicated in thirty-four terrorist incidents,
but in 1986 only six. In 1987, a year after our pressures, we detected Syria's hand in only
one incident. Moreover, Syria expelled the violent Abu Nidal Organization in June
1987—a major victory for our counterterrorist policies.
This pillar of U.S. government policy may not force these nations to cease entirely
their support for terrorist groups. Indeed both Libya and Syria continue to provide such
support. But a concerted, vigorous Western strategy does make them move more cau-
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tiously and become more circumspect.

The third and final element of our tripartite program—using the rule of law against
terrorists and encouraging others to do the same—is maturing into a potent weapon for
two basic reasons. First there has been a sea change in international attitudes toward
terrorists. Second, governments have decided to provide law enforcement agencies the
resources necessary to deter terrorism.
Not long ago, many usually responsible countries granted terrorists dispensation for
their crimes. Ironically, terrorists were perceived as victims of those vague forces called
"oppression" and "imperialism"—victims or, worse, romantic adventurers whose be-
havior should be indulged.
No longer is this true. Terrorists began to lose this international indulgence as they
widened their circle of targets in the late 1970s. In some instances, they even attacked
their sympathizers and supporters. The shock of such actions turned indulgence to revul-
sion.
And as popular disgust mounted, politicians finally insisted on action to counter the
terrorists. Law enforcement agencies were given the resources to do their jobs. National
police departments now have the surveillance gear, the communications equipment, the
money for overtime to gather intelligence and to track and arrest terrorists. As a result,
more and more terrorists are being brought to trial and convicted.

• Two weeks ago a Maltese court sentenced the sole surviving terrorist in
the November 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner to twenty-five years'
imprisonment—the maximum sentence under Maltese law. The surviving
hijacker belonged to the Abu Nidal Organization.
• Last month a Sudanese court passed the death sentence on five Palestinian
terrorists for their attack this year on Khartoum's Acropole Hotel and the
Sudan Club. These five were also members of the Abu Nidal Organiza-
tion.
• Also last month a French court convicted in absentia the notorious Fatah
terrorist Colonel Hawari to ten years—the maximum allowed under
French law, for complicity to transport arms, ammunition, and explosives
and for criminal association.
• A West German court is currently trying Mohammed Hamadi, a Lebanese
terrorist implicated in the 1985 TWA hijacking which resulted in the
murder of an innocent American seaman.
 534 L. Paul Bremer III

• In Greece, authorities will soon decide on Muhammad Rashid's extradi-

tion to this country, where he is wanted for planting a bomb in 1982 on a
Pan Am airliner. His extradition to the U.S. would be an important indica-
tion of Greece's adherence to its stated policy of combating terrorism.
• And here in Washington, D.C., Fawaz Younis, a Lebanese terrorist, will
go on trial next year for holding American citizens hostage when he led
the 1985 hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines flight.
So the United States has a policy in place, and it works. But we cannot become
complacent. The threat remains.

The Threat Environment

Terrorists still have the means to outrage us, to force our attention to them, and to strike
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almost anywhere in the world. As we look at the threat environment today, we identify
three particular threats in the period just ahead. And as we look into the next decade, we
have some additional concerns. Let me address both sets of issues.

Radical Palestinian Groups

Our first immediate concern is the likely increase in radical Palestinian terrorism.
In May 1988, terrorists from the radical Palestinian group, the Abu Nidal Organiza-
tion, used machine guns and grenades to attack a Sudanese hotel and club frequented by
foreign visitors. Two months later Abu Nidal terrorists struck a^ain, attacking the Greek
passenger ship City of Poros with grenades and machine guns. Just last month West
German police arrested members of another radical Palestinian group, the PFLP-GC,
before they could carry out a terrorist attack. And recently other violent fanatical Pales-
tinian groups, including Abu Musa and the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, publicly proclaimed their intention to step up their terrorism effort against
Israel.
Combining a deep, visceral hostility to the West with cold-blooded terror, these rad-
ical Palestinian groups receive financial, logistical, and weapons support from Syria and
Libya. They are responsible for some of the most vicious terrorist operations on record.
Although Israel is their main target, Israel is not their only target. These groups represent
an ongoing international danger.
Let me say a word about the November 1988 declaration on terrorism by the Pales-
tinian National Committee. Some people, some press reports, and even some govern-
ments have concluded that in its declaration the PNC renounced terrorism. This is non-
sense.
The PNC specifically endorsed the 1985 Cairo Declaration in which the PLO, while
condemning terrorism, also affirmed "its adherence to the Palestinian people's right to
resist the Israeli occupation of their land in any way possible in order to achieve a with-
drawal."
By explicitly excluding Israel and the Occupied Territories from coverage, the Cairo
Declaration by implication endorses terrorism in these areas. The U.S. government has
always considered politically motivated attacks against noncombatants anywhere (in-
cluding Israel and the Occupied Territories) to be terrorism.
The PNC also endorsed two UN Security Council Resolutions, one of which we
supported (UN Resolution 40/61). However, the other Resolution (Resolution 42/159) is
 Countering Terrorism 535

highly objectionable. That resolution used all the code words terrorists use to justify their
acts, by reiterating "the inalienable right to self-determination" and upholding "the le-
gitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements."
So it is simply incorrect to assert that by its recent declaration the PLO renounced
terrorism.

Libya
Libya's continued—even growing—involvement in terrorism is our second concern.
After two years of relative quiet, Qadhafi is becoming more active. Instead of using
Libyan citizens, he is increasingly using surrogates to implement his terrorist attacks. We
have indications that Libya is augmenting its assistance to and enhancing its relationship
with such terrorist groups as the Abu Nidal Organization, the Japanese Red Army, and
the Provisional IRA.
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In the last three years, the relationship between Tripoli and the vicious Abu Nidal
organization (ANO) has intensified. Abu Nidal is now based in Tripoli, and Libya pro-
vides most of its funding. One of the ANO terrorists who attacked the City of Poros
carried a Libyan passport. The weapons used in that attack were from Libya's military
inventory.
The 14 April attack on the USO club in Naples, in which one American and four
Italians were killed, was conducted by the Japanese Red Army. It took place on the
anniversary of the U.S. attack on Libya, and the attackers proclaimed their solidarity
with Libya.
Qadhafi has obviously calculated that if he can hide his hand well enough, the West
will not respond. He may be right. At the exact moment we detect increased Libyan
activity, a number of European countries are responding to a "charm offensive"
launched by Qadhafi by improving their relations with him. We may inadvertently be
sending Qadhafi the message that it is not acceptable to directly commit terrorism, but
that there is no price for using surrogates.

Terrorism in the Andes

The final item on our short list of immediate concerns is terrorism in the Andean coun-
tries—Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia—and the increasing danger posed by the
"narcoterrorists." We do not read or hear much about terrorism in these countries, but
terrorist acts against American facilities and personnel are becoming more disturbing.
Because of economic and political influence in Latin America, the United States is an
obvious target for groups like the National Liberation Army in Columbia, Sendero Lu-
minoso in Peru, Alfaro Vive Carajo (AVC) in Ecuador, and far left groups in Bolivia—
groups aiming to undermine foreign investment so as to create economic chaos in their
own countries.
So far this year Colombian terrorist groups have carried out more than seventy anti-
U.S. attacks—almost half of all terrorist attacks against U.S. targets worldwide. Almost
all of these attacks were against U.S. oil company facilities. And all four major Colom-
bian terrorist groups have received arms and training from Cuba and reportedly aid from
Libya.
Looking at Peru, a modest decline in violent anti-U.S. activity does not truly reflect
the considerable level of violence there. Since 1980, when the Sendero Luminoso
 536 L. Paul Bremer III

launched its terror campaign, more than twelve thousand people have been killed and
more than $10 billion in material losses has been registered. Sendero began targeting
foreign interests about a year ago. Several recent attacks have been made on U.S. in-
terests.
In Ecuador the small but deadly Alfaro Vive group has been contained by the Ecua-
doran government. Although weakened, these urban terrorists are still capable of violent
and coordinated action, especially when they receive help, as they have in the past, from
the better organized Colombian terrorist groups.
Bolivia, until recently, had largely avoided the terrorist problems plaguing its
neighbors. Now some elements of the far left are preparing and carrying out terrorist
activities. Examples of the growing threat level in this Andean country include the recent
bombing attempt on Secretary Shultz's motorcade. But the predominant threat in Bolivia
conies from drug traffickers.
Narcoterrorism is on the rise throughout the Andes. Drug traffickers have always
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used terrorist tactics to suit their purpose, but now they are frequently working together
with terrorist groups. Big-time narcotics dealers offer Latin American terrorist groups
financial backing in exchange for the terrorists attacking the drug traffickers' enemies.
And the United States government is at the top of the drug dealers' enemies list.

Terrorism in the 1990s

These three issues—radical Palestinian terrorist groups, Libya, and Andean terrorism—
will certainly demand our attention for the rest of the 1980s. But what of the next decade?
Should we anticipate changes in strategy or tactics by terrorists? Are there any trends we
should be alert to?
You have all read or heard apocalyptic stories of terrorists stealing or building their
own nuclear weapons. Yet most experts agree that nuclear terrorism presents less poten-
tial danger than terrorists resorting to less dramatic but no less potent means of mass
destruction, such as chemical weapons, or by exploiting more sophisticated technologies.
Terrorists have noted that the use of chemical weapons by the Soviets in Afganistan
and during the Iran-Iraq war provoked little public outrage. They have seen increased
deterrent measures around their traditional targets—airports, embassies, government
buildings. These favored terrorist targets are no longer easy marks. And equally impor-
tant, the international media have been relatively restrained lately in reporting on terrorist
outrages.
Some terrorist groups might decide, therefore, to welcome the new decade by upping
the ante—by using chemical weapons to gain attention. A number of states which sup-
port terrorism have chemical weapons in their arsenals. Recently Libya acquired a very
substantial capacity to make chemical weapons.
We also believe terrorists will make greater use of high technology in their attacks.
To take one example, the Provisional IRA, which has contact with Middle Eastern
groups and Libya, has become expert in building bombs with long-delay timing de-
vices—bombs which can be set to explode in days rather than hours. The IRA placed
such a bomb in its 1985 attempt on Prime Minister Thatcher.
We also expect that terrorists will make more use of modern plastic explosives. These
are much more powerful than traditional explosives like dynamite and TNT. And they are
much more difficult to detect with current technology. Libya has already shipped several
tons of a Czech plastic explosive called Semtex to the Provisional IRA in recent years.
And the IRA has used Semtex in devastating attacks in Northern Ireland.
 Countering Terrorism 537

Priorities for the New Administration

What are the lessons from the 1980s for the new administration?
Firmness and persistence must continue as the hallmarks of this country's counterter-
rorism effort. Only a sustained, relentless effort will suppress terrorism. So we must
maintain the patience and discipline to allow our current policy to work for the next
period.
We should be confident enough not to cut deals with hostage-takers.
States supporting terrorism must be exposed to the sunlight. When necessary, interna-
tional sanctions, including military force, should be imposed on these states to make
them behave as responsible members of the world community.
To further international cooperation against terrorist-supporting states, we should ex-
pand our cooperation with Latin American, East Asian, and African countries. Terrorism
is not limited to the Middle East or Europe.
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Let us buttress the rale of law as a tool by having Congress pass the Terrorist Alien
Removal Act—the so-called Rat bill. The proposed Rat legislation, drafted by the Justice
Department, would expedite procedures for deporting alien terrorists found in the U.S.
To further reinforce our law enforcement tactics, we and our allies should agree to
share as much information on terrorists as possible. Complementing this effort, U.S.
government agencies need to work more closely in permitting access to data bases on
terrorism. Ideally, within the U.S. government and with our allies, we should all be
working from a central data base. By enhancing the flow of data among and between
ourselves and our allies we can make it easier to track and eventually apprehend ter-
rorists.
On a less visible level, there will continue to be a place in the fight against terrorists
for covert action. Terrorist groups draw strength from their small size and secrecy. This
inherent strength is also a weakness which we can exploit by making them doubt their
cadres' loyalty and making them worry about Western infiltration.
We need to combat the terrorists' use of high technology. This means being willing to
expend time and money for research and development activities. For most of our
agencies, counterterrorism R&D projects simply do not cross above the budgetary cut
line.
To deal with this problem, we have created a national counterterrorism R&D program
for which the State Department annually seeks funds. Unfortunately, the amount of funds
appropriated by Congress for the national counterterrorism R&D program is shrinking at
an alarming rate. I hope the new administration and the new Congress will restore this
vital program to a high priority.
We, too, can put new technologies to work. Progress in miniaturization has permitted
the development of more accurate sensors, better able to detect explosives and hazardous
gases. Research into DNA technology is providing forensic scientists with the biological
tools to determine whether a specimen comes from a specific individual. Refinements in
computer software are enhancing our ability to gather and analyze information.

Conclusion
No one can promise a world free of terrorism. But, through hard-earned experience, our
country has developed a policy which is showing signs of success against the terrorists.
They know we are serious. States which in the past routinely supported terrorists are now
more cautious in their actions.
 538 L. Paul Bremer III

Terrorists, once caught, are being put on trial and sentenced to lengthy jail terms. No
longer are they being allowed to slip quietly away.
Our successes should encourage confidence that the tide is turning our way—that we
are on the right path.
We must understand, however, that suppressing terrorism will not be easy. We still
have a long and difficult struggle before us. With heightened vigilance, clear thinking,
and steady discipline, I am confident that we can prevail.

Future Domestic and International Terrorism:

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The FBI Perspective

BOB A. RICKS
Deputy Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

My intention today is to focus on the domestic side of the program. However, in some
ways you cannot separate the international aspects of it, because oftentimes the two do
meld together. In looking backward, in order to give a prediction of the future, one is
reminded that 5 September 1972 changed the way that we all perceive terrorism. Prior to
that day, terrorism seemed confined to countries or parts of the world that many Amer-
icans had never heard about, nor much cared about. But those international terrorists of
the Black September organization demonstrated that they had both the capability to strike
outside the borders of the Middle East and the resolve to do so. In the years since, we
witnessed a global explosion of terrorism. I believe it's probably been mentioned here
today that in 1987 there were 832 acts of international terrorism. In the United States, in
the late 1970s, we were also experiencing an explosion of domestic terrorism. And that
year we recorded 112 terrorist incidents.
Terrorism, in the FBI, is defined as the unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. We break it down into
components of either domestic or international terrorism.
Domestic terrorism is committed by those homegrown groups who have no ties or
connections outside the United States. International terrorists are those whose activities
transcend national boundaries or who are funded or sponsored by international groups.
The FBI's primary goal in conducting counterterrorism investigations is to prevent a
terrorist incident from occurring, which we accomplish through collection and analysis of
information—in other words, good, solid intelligence. In the event that an incident does
occur before we are able to prevent it, we believe a quick and agressive response to those
terrorist incidents is needed by utilizing traditional law enforcement techniques with the
goal of prosecution and subsequent deterrence of further acts of terrorism.
We believe the FBI's counterterrorism program has been extremely successful. And
the statistics do bear that out. From the number of 112 in 1978, we have seen a gradual