2017 CASES PENNED BY JUSTICE PERLAS-BERNABE
1. G.R. No. 220617, January 30, 2017
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. BENNY A. PUEDAN, JR., JAYFER D. LIMBO, BRODNEY N. AVILA,
ARTHUR C. AQUINO, RYAN A. MIRANDA, RONALD R. ALAVE, JOHNNY A. DIMAYA, MARLON B. DELOS REYES,
ANGELITO R. CORDOVA, EDGAR S. BARRUGA, CAMILO B. CORDOVA, JR., JEFFRY B. LANGUISAN, EDISON U.
VILLAPANDO, JHEIRNEY S. REMOLIN, MARY LUZ A. MACATALAD, * JENALYN M. GAMUROT, DENNIS G. BAWAG,
RAQUEL A. ABELLERA, AND RICANDRO G. GUATNO, JR., RESPONDENTS.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated March 26, 2015 and the Resolution [3]dated
September 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132686, which affirmed the Decision [4]dated May
30, 2013 and the Resolution[5] dated August 30, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in LAC No.
02-000699-13/ NCR-03-04761-12, declaring petitioner Nestle Philippines, Inc. (NPI), jointly and severally liable with Ocho
de Septiembre, Inc. (ODSI) to respondents Benny A. Puedan, Jr., Jayfer D. Limbo, Bradney N. Avila, Arthur C. Aquino,
Ryan A. Miranda, Ronald R. Alave, Johnny A. Dimaya, Marlon B. Delos Reyes, Angelita R. Cordova, Edgar S. Barruga,
Camilo B. Cordova, Jr., Jeffry B. Languisan, Edison U. Villapando, Jheirney S. Remolin, Mary Luz A. Macatalad, Jenalyn
M. Gamurot, Dennis G. Bawag, Raquel A. Abellera, and Ricandro G. Guatno, Jr. (respondents) for separation pay,
nominal damages, and attorney's fees.
The Facts
The instant case arose from an amended[6] complaint[7] dated July 6, 2012 for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's
fees filed by respondents against, inter alia, ODSI and NPI. Respondents alleged that on various dates, ODSI and NPI
hired them to sell various NPI products in the assigned covered area. After some time, respondents demanded that they
be considered regular employees of NPI, but they were directed to sign contracts of employment with ODSI instead.
When respondents refused to comply with such directives, NPI and ODSI terminated them from their position. [8] Thus,
they were constrained to file the complaint, claiming that: (a) ODSI is a labor-only contractor and, thus, they should be
deemed regular employees of NPI; and (b) there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal. [9]
For its part, ODSI averred that it is a company engaged in the business of buying, selling, distributing, and marketing of
goods and commodities of every kind and it enters into all kinds of contracts for the acquisition thereof. ODSI admitted
that on various dates, it hired respondents as its employees and assigned them to execute the Distributorship
Agreement[10] it entered with NPI,[11] the relevant portions of which state:
3.1 DISTRIBUTOR (ODSI) shall assign a sales force in his/her regular employ, dedicated solely to the handling of NPI
Grocery Retail Products under this Agreement, and who shall exclusively cover assigned areas/channels of
distribution.
3.2 DISTRIBUTOR shall service the outlets within the Territory by re-selling Products obtained exclusively from Nestle
Philippines, Inc. and not from any other source.
3.3 DISTRIBUTOR shall utilize booking and distribution salesmen to undertake territory development. Booking done by
DISTRIBUTOR shall be delivered by its personnel. Collection of accounts shall be taken cared (sic) of by
DISTRIBUTOR, without prejudice to the provisions of Clause 13 hereof.
3.4 DISTRIBUTOR's route salesmen shall exclusively cover assigned ex-truck areas/channels of distribution.
1
3.5 DISTRIBUTOR shall also provide training to its staff or personnel where necessary, to improve operations in
servicing the requirements of DISTRIBUTOR's customers. From time to time, NESTLE shall offer to
DISTRIBUTOR suggestions and recommendations to improve sales and to further develop the market.
3.6 DISTRIBUTOR shall meet the sales, reach and distribution targets agreed upon by NESTLE and DISTRIBUTOR.
For purposes of this clause, reach targets refer to the number of stores, dealers and/or outlets which
DISTRIBUTOR should cover or service within a particular period. Distribution targets refer to the number of stock
keeping units and/or product lines covered by this Agreement.
In the event of DISTRIBUTOR's failure to meet NESTLE's sales targets, NESTLE has the sole discretion of
assigning another distributor of the Products and/or reducing the Territory covered by DISTRIBUTOR.
3.7 DISTRIBUTOR agrees to provide at its own cost and expense facilities and other resources necessary for the
distribution and sale of the Products.
3.8 NESTLE's sales personnel may get orders for the Products distributed by DISTRIBUTOR and pass on the said
orders to DISTRIBUTOR.
3.9 NESTLE shall provide the necessary promotional and marketing support for the Products through promotional
materials, product information literature, participation in trade fairs, and other market development activities.
3.10 Should NESTLE manufacture and/or distribute other products not subject of this Agreement, which, in NESTLE's
opinion, should likewise be extended to DISTRIBUTOR's outlets, such additional products shall be included among
those listed in Annex "A" hereof.
NESTLE shall deliver the Products to DISTRIBUTOR's warehouse(s) at its own expenses. Immediately upon
receipt of the Products, DISTRIBUTOR shall carry out a visual inspection thereof. In the event any quantity of the
Products is found to be defective upon such visual inspection, NESTLE shall replace such quantity of the Products
at no cost to DISTRIBUTOR.
3.11 All costs for transportation and/or shipment of the Products from DISTRIBUTOR's warehouse(s) to its
outlets/customers shall be the account of the DISTRIBUTOR. [12]
However, the business relationship between NPI and ODSI turned sour when the former's sales department badgered
the latter regarding the sales targets. Eventually, NPI downsized its marketing and promotional support from ODSI which
resulted to business reverses and in the latter's filing of a petition for corporate rehabilitation and, subsequently, the
closure of its Nestle unit due to the termination of the Distributorship Agreement and the failure of rehabilitation. Under
the foregoing circumstances, ODSI argued that respondents were not dismissed but merely put in floating status. [13]
On the other hand, NPI did not file any position paper or appear in the scheduled conferences.[14]
 The Labor Arbiter Ruling
In a Decision  dated December 28, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, but
[15]
nevertheless, ordered, inter alia, ODSI and NPI to pay respondents nominal damages in the aggregate amount of
P235,728.00 plus attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary awards.[16] The LA found that: (a)
respondents were unable to prove that they were NPI employees; and (b) respondents were not illegally dismissed as
ODSI had indeed closed down its operations due to business losses.[17] As to the issue on the failure to give respondents
a thirty (30)-day notice prior to such closure, the LA concluded that all the impleaded respondents therein (i.e., including
NPI) should be held liable for the payment of nominal damages plus attorney's fees.[18]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the NLRC.[19]
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated May 30, 2013, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling and, accordingly, ordered ODSI and
NPI to pay each of the respondents: (a) separation pay amounting to 1/2 month pay for every year of service reckoned
from the time they were employed until the finality of the Decision; and (b) nominal damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. The NLRC likewise ordered NPI and ODSI to pay respondents attorney's fees amounting to ten percent
(10%) of the monetary awards.[21]
Contrary to the LA's findings, the NLRC found that while ODSI indeed shut down its operations, it failed to prove that
such closure was due to serious business losses as it did not present evidence, e.g., financial statements, to corroborate
its claims. As such, it ruled that respondents are entitled to separation pay. In this relation, the NLRC also found that
since ODSI failed to notify respondents of such closure, the latter are likewise entitled to nominal damages. [22]
Further, the NLRC found ODSI to be a labor-only contractor of NPI, considering that: (a) ODSI had no substantial
capitalization or investment; (b) respondents performed activities directly related to NPI's principal business; and (c) the
fact that respondents' employment depended on the continuous supply of NPI products shows that ODSI had not been
carrying an independent business according to its own manner and method.[23] Consequently, the NLRC deemed NPI to
be respondents' true employer, and thus, ordered it jointly and severally liable with ODSI to pay the monetary claims of
respondents.[24]
Respondents moved for a partial reconsideration,[25] arguing that since it was only ODSI that closed down operations and
not NPI and, considering the finding that the latter was deemed to be their true employer, NPI should reinstate them, or if
not practicable, to pay them separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service. NPI also moved for
reconsideration,[26] contending that: (a) it was deprived of its right to participate in the proceedings before the LA and the
NLRC; and (b) it had no employer-employee relationship with respondents as ODSI was never its contractor, whether
independent or labor-only.[27] However, the NLRC denied both motions in a Resolution[28] dated August 30, 2013, holding
that: (a) respondents' termination was due to the closure of ODSI's Nestle unit, an authorized cause and, thus, the
monetary awards in their favor were proper; (b) NPI was not deprived of its right to participate in the proceedings as it
was duly served with copies of the parties' respective pleadings, as well as the rulings of both the LA and the NLRC; (c)
assuming arguendo that NPI was indeed deprived of due process, its subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC cured the defect as it was able to argue its position in the said motion; and ( d) the circumstances
surrounding the Distributorship Agreement between ODSI and NPI showed that the former is indeed a labor-only
contractor of the latter.[29]
Dissatisfied, NPI filed a petition for certiorari[30] before the CA, essentially insisting that: (a) it was deprived of due process
before the tribunals a quo; and (b) there was no employer-employee relationship between NPI and respondents.
[31]
 Records reveal that no other party elevated the matter before the CA.
The CA Ruling
2
In a Decision[32] dated March 26, 2015, the CA affirmed the NLRC ruling. Anent the issue on due process, the CA held
that NPI was not deprived of its opportunity to be heard as it was able to receive a copy of the complaint and other
pleadings, albeit it failed to respond thereto.[33] As regards the substantive issue, the CA ruled that despite ODSI and
NPI's contract being denominated as a "Distributorship Agreement," it contained provisions demonstrating a labor-only
contracting arrangement between them, as well as NPI's exercise of control over the business of ODSI. Moreover, the
CA pointed out that: (a) there was nothing in the records which showed that ODSI had substantial capital to undertake an
independent business; and (b) respondents performed tasks essential to NPI's business.[34]
Undaunted, NPI moved for reconsideration,[35] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[36] dated September 17, 2015;
hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not the CA correctly ruled that: (a) NPI was accorded due
process by the tribunals a quo; and (b) ODSI is a labor-only contractor of NPI, and consequently, NPI is respondents'
true employer and, thus, deemed jointly and severally liable with ODSI for respondents' monetary claims.
The Court's Ruling
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of
which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[37]
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[38]
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA was correct in ruling that the labor tribunals a
quo gave NPI an opportunity to be heard. However, it erred in not ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC's
finding that ODSI is a labor-only contractor of NPI and, thus, the latter is the respondents' true employer, and jointly and
severally liable with ODSI for respondents' monetary claims. As will be explained hereunder, such finding by the NLRC is
not supported by substantial evidence.
I.
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The
essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal
or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. [39] The Court's
disquisition in Ledesma v. CA[40] is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process
is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[41] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this case, NPI essentially claims that it was deprived of its right to due process when it was not notified of the
proceedings before the LA and did not receive copies and issuances from the other parties and the LA, respectively.
[42]
 However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, NPI was furnished via courier of a copy of the amended complaint filed
by the respondents against it as shown by LBC Receipt No. 125158910840.[43] It is also apparent that NPI was also
furnished with the respondents' Position Paper, Reply, and Rejoinder.[44] Verily, NPI was indeed accorded due process,
but as the LA mentioned, the former chose not to file any position paper or appear in the scheduled conferences. [45]
Assuming arguendo that NPI was somehow deprived of due process by either of the labor tribunals, such defect was
cured by: (a) NPI's filing of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC; (b) the NLRC's subsequent issuance of its
Resolution dated August 30, 2013 wherein the tribunal considered all ofNPI's arguments as contained in its motion; and
(c) NPI's subsequent elevation of the case to the CA. In Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission,[46] the Court reiterated the
rule that "[a]ny seeming defect in [the] observance [of due process] is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration,"
and that "denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who [was] afforded the opportunity to be heard
x x x."[47] Similarly, in Autencio v. Manara,[48] it was held that defects in procedural due process may be cured when the
party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[49]
Evidently, the foregoing shows that NPI was not denied due process of law as it was afforded the fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain its side.
II.
In holding NPI jointly and severally liable with ODSI for the monetary awards in favor of respondents, both the NLRC and
the CA held that based on the provisions of the Distributorship Agreement between them, ODSI is merely a labor-only
contractor of NPI.[50] In this regard, the CA opined that the following stipulations of the said Agreement evinces that NPI
had control over the business of ODSI, namely, that: (a) NPI shall offer to ODSI suggestions and recommendations to
improve sales and to further develop the market; (b) NPI prohibits ODSI from exporting its products (the No-Export
provision); (c) NPI provided standard requirements to ODSI for the warehousing and inventory management of the sold
goods; and (d) prohibition imposed on ODSI to sell any other products that directly compete with those of NPI. [51]
However, a closer examination of the Distributorship Agreement reveals that the relationship of NPI and ODSI is not that
of a principal and a contractor (regardless of whether labor-only or independent), but that of a seller and a buyer/re-seller.
As stipulated in the Distributorship Agreement, NPI agreed to sell its products to ODSI at discounted prices, [52] which in
turn will be re-sold to identified customers, ensuring in the process the integrity and quality of the said products based on
the standards agreed upon by the parties.[53] As aptly explained by NPI, the goods it manufactures are distributed to the
market through various distributors, e.g., ODSI, that in turn, re-sell the same to designated outlets through its own
employees such as the respondents. Therefore, the reselling activities allegedly performed by the respondents properly
pertain to ODSI, whose principal business consists of the "buying, selling, distributing, and marketing goods and
commodities of every kind" and "[entering] into all kinds of contracts for the acquisition of such goods [and
commodities]."[54]
Thus, contrary to the CA's findings, the aforementioned stipulations in the Distributorship Agreement hardly demonstrate
control on the part of NPI over the means and methods by which ODSI performs its business, nor were they intended to
dictate how ODSI shall conduct its business as a distributor. Otherwise stated, the stipulations in the Distributorship
Agreement do not operate to control or fix the methodology on how ODSI should do its business as a distributor of NPI
products, but merely provide rules of conduct or guidelines towards the achievement of a mutually desired result[55] -
which in this case is the sale of NPI products to the end consumer. In Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections,
Inc.,[56] the Court held that the imposition of minimum standards concerning sales, marketing, finance and operations are
nothing more than an exercise of sound business practice to increase sales and maximize profits, to wit:
Finally, both the CA and DISI rely heavily on the Dealer Performance Expectation required by Steelcase of its distributors
to prove that DISI was not functioning independently from Steelcase because the same imposed certain conditions
pertaining to business planning, organizational structure, operational effectiveness and efficiency, and financial stability.
It is actually logical to expect that Steelcase, being one of the major manufacturers of office systems furniture, would
3
require its dealers to meet several conditions for the grant and continuation of a distributorship agreement. The
imposition of minimum standards concerning sales, marketing, finance and operations is nothing more than an exercise
of sound business practice to increase sales and maximize profits for the benefit of both Steelcase and its distributors.
For as long as these requirements do not impinge on a distributor's independence, then there is nothing wrong with
placing reasonable expectations on them.[57] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Verily, it was only reasonable for NPI - it being a local arm of one of the largest manufacturers of foods and grocery
products worldwide - to require its distributors, such as ODSI, to meet various conditions for the grant and continuation of
a distributorship agreement for as long as these conditions do not control the means and methods on how ODSI does its
distributorship business, as shown in this case. This is to ensure the integrity and quality of the products which will
ultimately fall into the hands of the end consumer.
Thus, the foregoing circumstances show that ODSI was not a labor only contractor of NPI; hence, the latter cannot be
deemed the true employer of respondents. As a consequence, NPI cannot be held jointly and severally liable to ODSI's
monetary obligations towards respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 26, 2015 and the Resolution dated September 17,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 132686 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Decision dated May 30, 2013 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission in
LAC No. 02-000699-13/NCR-03-04761-12 are MODIFIED, DELETING petitioner Nestle Philippines, Inc.'s solidary
liability with Ocho de Septiembre, Inc. (ODSI) for the latter's monetary obligations to respondents Benny A. Puedan, Jr.,
Jayfer D. Limbo, Brodney N. Avila, Arthur C. Aquino, Ryan A. Miranda, Ronald R. Alave, Johnny A. Dimaya, Marlon B.
Delos Reyes, Angelito R. Cordova, Edgar S. Barruga, Camilo B. Cordova, Jr., Jeffry B. Languisan, Edison U. Villapando,
Jheimey S. Remolin, Mary Luz A. Macatalad, Jenalyn M. Gamurot, Dennis G. Bawag, Raquel A. Abellera, and Ricandro
G. Guatno, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
2. G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017
MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA AND SERVILLANO NACIONAL, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 221425]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANNY RAMOS, ROBERTO SALONGA A.K.A. "JOHN,"
"KONYONG" SALONGA AND SERVILLANO NACIONAL @ "INONG" @ DIONISIO NACIONAL, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated cases[1] is the Decision[2] dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05095, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated December 8, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,
Pangasinan, Branch 70 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. B-243, convicting accused-appellants Manny Ramos (Ramos),
Roberto Salonga (Salonga), and Servillano Nacional (Nacional; collectively, accused-appellants) of the crime of Murder
Aggravated with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) in relation to Republic Act No. (RA) 8294.[4]
The Facts
The instant cases stemmed from an Information filed before the RTC, charging accused-appellants of the
aforementioned crime, the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about January 20, 2002, in the evening, at Brgy. Cabanaetan, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their
superior strength and at night time, armed with an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot ROLANDO NECESITO y FABRIGAS which caused his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of
his heirs.[5]
The prosecution alleged that between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 20, 2002, eyewitness Reynaldo
Necesito (Reynaldo) was walking towards the store of Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon accused-appellants
having an altercation with the victim, Rolando Necesito (Rolando). From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos yell,
"Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and saw accused-appellants chase and eventually surround Rolando
at an area around seven (7) meters away from where Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four (4) successive
gunshots, making him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the fourth shot
when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the ground. To ensure Rolando's demise, Ramos approached
Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter, accused-appellants fled the scene.[6]
The next day, Rolando's body was found near the duhat tree, prompting police officers to conduct an investigation from
which were gathered the following evidence and information: (a) a piece of bamboo was recovered three (3) meters away
from Rolando's corpse; (b) Rolando purportedly had a previous misunderstanding with Ramos sometime in 1997, yet the
same was settled before the barangay; and (c) Rolando allegedly had a drinking spree with his friends at the time of the
incident. An autopsy was likewise conducted on Rolando's body, revealing that there were four (4) incised wounds on his
left hand, a stab wound on his left chest, and five (5) gunshot wounds on his body; that based on the nature and sizes of
his wounds, it was possible that the firearm used was of the same caliber; and that his injuries could not have been
inflicted by a single person.[7]
For their respective parts, accused-appellants similarly invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. Essentially, they insisted
that they were somewhere else when the incident occurred. In addition, Ramos maintained that the declarations of
Reynaldo against him were motivated by a personal grudge, while Nacional claimed that the corpus delicti was not
proven with exact certainty since the cadaver that was exhumed and examined was already in an advanced stage of
decomposition, having been interred for more than a month.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[9] dated December 8, 2010, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole, and ordered
to pay jointly and severally Rolando's heirs the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.[10]
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to the direct, straightforward, and categorical eyewitness testimony of Reynaldo
positively identifying each of the accused-appellants as co-perpetrators of the crime, further noting that Reynaldo had no
ill-motive to falsely testify against them. On the other hand, it found the defense testimonies to be untenable, as they
were riddled with various inconsistencies and contradictions. Further, the RTC found the presence of the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to Murder, considering that the accused-appellants took advantage
of their combined strength and their several weapons to overcome their unarmed victim and assure the success of their
felonious design. In view of the foregoing, the RTC concluded that accused-appellants "are equally guilty of the crime of
Murder aggravated with the use of unlincensed firearm, there having been proven the existence of implied conspiracy
between them."[11]
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.[12]
The CA Ruling
4
In a Decision[13] dated April 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused appellants' conviction for the crime of Murder with the Use
of an Unlicensed Firearm with modification, increasing the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages to P75,000.00
each and imposing legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from finality of the judgment until
fully paid.[14] It held that Reynaldo was able to positively identify accused-appellants as Rolando's killers, given that he
was only seven (7) meters away from the situs criminis. The CA likewise held that the accused-appellants took
advantage of their combined superior strength as they even used several weapons to render the unarmed victim
completely defenseless.[15]
Hence, the instant consolidated cases.
Dissatisfied, Nacional filed a Notice of Appeal,[16] (G.R. No. 221425) while Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for review
on certiorari before the Court (G.R. No. 218466).
The Issues Before the Court
The issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld accused-appellants' conviction for
the crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
The Court's Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Nacional elevated the matter before the Court thru a Notice of Appeal [17] (G.R. No.
221425) filed before the CA; on the other hand, Ramos and Salonga filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Court (G.R. No. 218466).[18] As a general rule, appeals of criminal cases shall be brought to the Court by filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court;[19] except when the CA imposed the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty," in which case, the appeal shall be made by a mere notice of appeal filed
before the CA.[20] In this case, Ramos and Salonga clearly availed of a wrong mode of appeal by filing a petition for
review on certiorari before the Court, despite having been sentenced by the CA of reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, in
the interest of substantial justice, the Court will treat their petition as an ordinary appeal in order to resolve the
substantive issue at hand with finality.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[21]
As will be explained hereunder, the accused-appellants should only be held liable for simple Murder, and not Murder with
the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm.
To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed;
(b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.[22]
In the instant case, the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Reynaldo, had established beyond reasonable
doubt that: the accused-appellants chased, ganged up, and eventually, killed Rolando, and likewise, it was shown that
they deliberately used weapons (i.e., gun and bamboo stick), which rendered Rolando defenseless from their fatal
attacks. Thus, such killing was attended with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, [23] which perforce
warrants accused-appellants' conviction for Murder.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the Use of an
Unlicensed Firearm.
Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." There are two (2) requisites to establish such
circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus
probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.[24]
In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear
from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and
(b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that
the disquisitions of the courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants
used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation. [25] Having failed in
this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby modifies accused-appellants conviction to simple Murder.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659,[26] Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present (except for abuse of superior strength which was used to qualify
the killing to Murder), accused-appellants must be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, to conform with
existing jurisprudence, accused-appellants must be ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando's heirs the amounts of
P50,000.00 as temperate damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality
of this judgment until fully paid.[27]
WHEREFORE, the consolidated appeals are DENIED. The Decision dated April 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05095 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows: accused-appellants Manny Ramos,
Roberto Salonga, and Servillano Nacional are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to jointly and severally pay Rolando Necesito's heirs the amounts of
P50,000.00 as temperate damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages with six percent (6%) legal interest per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No. 215009, January 23, 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 27, 2013 and the Resolution[3] dated
September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085, affirming the Orders dated
October 13, 2006[4] and January 22, 2007[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Dumangas, Iloilo, Branch 68 (RTC), which
allowed the correction of the area of Lot No. 2285 in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 46417 from 20,948 square
meters to 21,298 square meters.
The Facts
5
On September 2, 2003, respondent Carmen Santorio Galeno (respondent) filed a petition[6] for correction of the area of
Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle Cadastre (subject property) before the RTC. She alleged therein that
she is one of the co-owners of the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Sale [7] dated July 6, 1962. The survey and
subdivision of the subject property was duly approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
per its Approved Subdivision Plan of Lot No. 2285.[8]
Respondent further alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose of
partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land area of the subject property as appearing in OCT No. 46417, [9] in that
the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters, while the Certification[10] issued by the DENR Office of the Regional
Technical Director, Lands Management Services, shows an area of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she sought to correct
the area of the subject property in order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners. [11]
There being no opposition to the petition, the RTC allowed the presentation of respondent's evidence ex parte before the
Branch Clerk as well as for the satisfaction of the jurisdictional requirements.[12]
The RTC Ruling
In an Order[13] dated October 13, 2006, the RTC granted the petition upon a finding that respondent was able to
substantiate the allegations in her petition to warrant a correction of the area of the subject property. Hence, it directed
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Iloilo to correct such area in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 to 21,298 square
meters.[14]
Herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion
for reconsideration claiming that the adjoining owners had not been notified, stressing that such notice is a jurisdictional
requirement.[15] In the Order[16] dated January 22, 2007, the RTC denied the motion, finding that a Notice of
Hearing[17] was sent to the adjoining owners. As such, respondent was able to prove compliance with the said
jurisdictional requirement.[18]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.[19]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated June 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Order. It found that respondent, by a preponderance of
evidence, was able to prove, based on the records of the proper government authority, i.e., the Office of the Technical
Director, Land Management Services of the DENR, that the true and correct area of the subject property was 21,298
square meters as shown in the approved plan. Moreover, petitioner failed to rebut with contrary evidence respondent's
claim that she and her co-owners followed the boundaries in the technical description of OCT No. 46417 when they
caused its resurvey. In fact, no proof had been adduced to show that the boundaries had been altered. Also, the CA
pointed out that none of the adjoining owners, who were properly notified of the proceedings and who stand to be
adversely affected by the change in the land area of the subject property, objected to respondent's petition.[21]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[22] was denied in a Resolution[23] dated September 17, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in upholding the correction of the area of the
subject property in OCT No. 46417.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.
A scrutiny of the evidence marked and formally offered by respondent before the court a quo shows that the former failed
to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow the correction of the area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417 from
20,948 square meters to 21,248 square meters.
Records reveal that respondent offered in evidence the following documents: (a) the Certification[24] issued by a certain
Althea C. Acevedo (Acevedo), Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical Services Section of the Office of the Regional
Technical Director, Land Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo City, which states that "the true and correct area of
[L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square meters;" (b) the technical description[25] of Lot No. 2285, a copy of
which was certified by Ameto Caballero (Caballero), Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified
correct by Acevedo; and (c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258,[26] certified by Rogelio M. Santome
(Santome), Geodetic Engineer; Alfredo Muyarsas (Muyarsas), Chief of the Regional Surveys Division, and Edgardo R.
Gerobin (Gerobin), OIC, Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Services, DENR. On the strength of these
pieces of evidence, respondent sought a reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the records of the DENR.
Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence are not sufficient to warrant the correction prayed for. The Court
cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify
in court to prove the facts stated therein.
In Republic v. Medida,[27] the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy x x x.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. - Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of
a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even
records of public documents. x x x[28] (Emphases supplied)
As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued respondent's documentary
evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of probative value and cannot, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein.[29] At best, they may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[30]
In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent's sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno
6
Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents, [31] as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor
was she a public officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who
represented petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court
below,[32] it should be borne in mind that "hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,"[33] which do not, however,
obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent's documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing
party's lack of objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight. The Court has
explained that:
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may
result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into thinking that such declarations are thereby
impressed with probative value. Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay
evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.[34]
Besides, case law states that the "absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance
because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic
barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on the
basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit."[35] Moreover, "in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's."[36]
In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any competent evidence to prove that the true and correct area of
the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of 20,948 square meters to warrant a correction thereof in OCT No.
46417. Accordingly, respondent's petition for the correction of the said Certificate of Title must be denied, and the present
petition be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2013 and the Resolution dated
September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Carmen Santorio Galeno's petition for correction of area of Lot No. 2285 on Original Certificate of Title No. 46417
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 213209, January 16, 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. GERTRUDES V. SUSI, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated February 13, 2014 and the
Resolution[3] dated June 25, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127144, which upheld the
Order[4] dated July 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 (RTC): (a) denying petitioner Republic
of the Philippines' (Republic) Motion to Vacate Judgment in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05); and (b) upholding the
Decision[5] dated January 12, 2011, granting respondent Gertrudes V. Susi's (Susi) petition for reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118999.
The Facts
On September 27, 2005 Susi filed before the RTC a verified Petition[6] for reconstitution of TCT No. 118999 purportedly
registered in her name, covering Lot25[7] of plan Psu-32606 located in Barrio (now Barangay) Talanay, Quezon City (QC),
with an area of 240,269 square meters (subject land). She claimed that the original copy of TCT No. 118999 was
destroyed by the fire that gutted the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (RD-QC) on June 11, 1988; [8]hence, the petition
based on the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999,[9] docketed as LRC Case No. Q-20493(05).
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order[10] dated October 13, 2005: (a)
setting the case for initial hearing on February 2, 2006; (b) directing that the concerned government offices be furnished
a copy thereof; and (c) directing that the said order be published in the Official Gazette once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks and posted at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled hearing at the main entrance of the Quezon
City Hall, the bulletin boards of the RTC, as well as the Sheriffs Office of the RTC of QC, and the Barangay Hall of the
barangay where the subject land is situated.[11] The notice was published in the December 19 and 26, 2005 issues of the
Official Gazette (Vol. 101, Nos. 51 and 52),[12] and posted as required.[13]
On January 16, 2006, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) filed with the RTC a Manifestation [14] dated December 5,
2005 stating that respondent filed similar petitions for reconstitution covering the subject land before Branches 88 and
220 of the same RTC, for which it had previously issued Reports dated March 1, 1995[15] and December 12, 1995,
[16]
 respectively.
On February 2, 2006, Susi presented proof of the jurisdictional requirements without any opposition. [17] The City
Government of QC (QC Government) thereafter filed an Opposition[18] dated February 3, 2006 on the ground of res
judicata.[19] However, the latter was subsequently declared to be without any locus standi to oppose the reconstitution
petition.[20]
After Susi was allowed to formally offer her evidence[21] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance
in the case, and manifested that it had deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor of QC to appear on its behalf, subject
to its supervision and control.[22]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[23] dated January 12, 2011 (January 12, 2011 Decision), the RTC granted Susi's petition, and directed the
RD-QC to reconstitute the lost/destroyed original copy of TCT No. 118999.[24]
The RTC ruled that the presentation of the owner's copy of TCT No. 118999[25] and the Certification[26] from the RD-QC
that the original of TCT No. 118999 was burned during the fire that razed the QC Hall on June 11, 1988 were sufficient to
warrant the reconstitution sought. It held that the subject petition was not barred by the dismissal by Branch 220 of the
same RTC of a similar petition anchored on her failure to: (a) comply with the technical requirements of the law,
specifically, her omission to allege matters required under Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. (RA) 26; [27] and (b)
convince the court that TCT No. 118999 sought to be reconstituted was valid and existing at the time it was destroyed,
holding that both objections have been sufficiently overcome in the present case. [28]
Dissatisfied, the QC Government filed a motion for reconsideration,[29] while the Republic, through the OSG, filed its
Notice of Appeal,[30] which were both denied in an Order[31] dated July 8, 2011. The QC Government's subsequent Notice
of Appeal[32] was also denied in an Order[33] dated September 15, 2011, on the grounds that (a) it has no authority to
appear or to bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic; and (b) the appeal was belatedly filed, hence, not
perfected. The RTC likewise declared the January 12, 2011 Decision as having attained finality.
On October 25, 2011, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment,[34] insisting that the January 12,
2011 Decision should be set aside and vacated on the ground of res judicata.[35] On March 8, 2012, Sunnyside Heights
Homeowner's Association, Inc. moved[36] to join the OSG's motion, claiming to be registered owners and occupants of
various portions of the subject land.
Meanwhile, on March 31,2011, the LRA filed a Manifestation[37] (a) expressing its unwillingness to comply with the
directive contained in the January 12, 2011 Decision; and (b) praying that the RTC set aside the same and dismiss Susi's
petition on the ground that her owner's duplicate of TCT No. 118999 is of doubtful authenticity.[38]Consequently, the LRA
maintained that there was a need to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements under Sections 3 (f), 12,
and 13 of RA 26, without which the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject petition.[39]
7
In an Order[40] dated July 5, 2012 (July 5, 2012 Order), the RTC denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment, considering that
the January 12, 2011 Decision had become final and executory after the Republic's appeal had been denied due course.
Thereafter, the corresponding Writ of Execution[41] was issued on July 20, 2012.
Unperturbed, the Republic filed a Petition for certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction[42] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 127144.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[43] dated February 13, 2014, the CA found no reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in granting the petition for reconstitution, considering that Susi was able to sufficiently establish that the
certificate of title sought to be reconstituted was valid and existing under her name at the time it was destroyed. [44]
The CA found the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to this case since the dismissal of the prior similar petition
was based on Susi's failure to comply with the technical requirements of the law. Hence, the latter was not precluded
from filing another petition to prove the necessary allegations for the reconstitution of the subject title, which the RTC
correctly found to have been fully established.[45]
The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration,[46] attaching therewith a copy of a Resolution[47] issued by the LRA en
consulta, stating, among others, that: (a) the subject land is also covered by subsisting titles and occupied by a number
of persons;[48] and (b) Susi has two (2) uncertified reproduced owner's duplicate copies of TCT No. 118999, but bearing
different serial numbers[49] - i.e., a copy bearing serial number 1775634[50] which was earlier presented before Branch
220, and another one with serial number 1121955[51] adduced in evidence a quo.
In a Resolution[52] dated June 25, 2014, the CA denied the said motion; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed no grave
abuse of discretion in: (a) issuing the Order dated July 5, 2012 denying the Republic's Motion to Vacate Judgment in
LRC Case No. Q-20493(05); and (b) upholding the January 12, 2011 Decision granting Susi's petition for reconstitution.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
A. The Republic is not estopped from assailing the propriety of the order of reconstitution.
At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or
agents, absent any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens.[53]
Thus, whether or not the OSG's motion to vacate was the proper remedy under the Rules of Court (Rules) does not bar
the Republic from assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by the RTC which it claimed to have acted without
jurisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolving the case. Moreover, it bears to emphasize that even assuming that no
opposition was filed by the Republic or a private party, the person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his burden of
proving not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted, but that also at that time, she was the
registered owner thereof. As such, the Republic is not estopped from assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the
basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.[54]
B. Procedures and requirements for reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title; effect of non-compliance.
The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under RA 26 means the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost
or destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to
enable, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in
the same form and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction. [55]
RA 26 provides two procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title
depending on the source of the petition for reconstitution.[56] Section 10 in relation to Section 9 provides the procedure
and requirements for sources falling under Sections 2 (a), 2 (b), 3 (a), 3 (b), and 4 (a). On the other hand, Sections 12
and 13 lay down the procedure and requirements for sources falling under Sections 2 (c), 2 (d), 2 (e), 2 (f), 3 (c), 3 (d), 3
(e), and 3 (t).[57] Thus, before the court can properly act, assume, and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition
and grant the reconstitution prayed for, petitioner must observe the above procedures and requirements prescribed by
the law.[58]
In numerous cases, the Court has held that the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its proceedings
are rendered null and void. The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of
the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute
and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be
utterly void.[59] As such, the court upon which the reconstitution petition is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the
same, and review the record and the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional requirements.[60]
C. The petition for reconstitution failed to comply with the applicable procedures and requirements for reconstitution.
The present reconstitution petition was anchored on a purported owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 (questioned
certificate) which is a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3 (a) [61] of RA 26, prompting Branch 77 to follow the
procedure outlined in Sections 9[62] and 10[63] of the said law.
However, records show that as early as January 16, 2006, the LRA, in a Manifestation[64] dated December 5, 2005, had
already called the court's attention to its Report[65] dated March 1, 1995 in the previous reconstitution petition before
Branch 88, expressing serious doubts on the authenticity of Susi's duplicate title, and informing it of the existence of other
titles over the subject land.[66]
It is well to point out that trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-bound to take into account the
LRA's report.[67] Notably, both the RTC and the CA overlooked the fact that while the petition for reconstitution before
Branch 77 was filed on the basis of Susi's purported owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No.
1121955, Susi's prior reconstitution petitions, as stated in the LRA's Report, were anchored on an owner's duplicate
certificate bearing a different serial number, i.e., Serial No. 1775634. Indeed, a perusal of the said certificates[68] of title,
which were attached to the Republic's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision dated February 13, 2014, reveals
that save for the serial number, all the entries therein are the same. The Court notes that Susi did not refute the
existence of the said certificates bearing different serial numbers in her comment [69] to the said motion.
In cases where the LRA challenges the authenticity of the applicant's purported owner's duplicate certificate of title, the
reconstitution petition should be treated as falling under Section 3 (f)[70] of RA 26, and the trial court should require
compliance with the requisites under Sections 12[71] and 13[72] of RA 26.[73]
In particular, the reconstitution petition and the published and posted notice of hearing in compliance with the October 13,
2005 Order failed to show that notices were sent to the other occupants, possessors, and persons who may have an
interest in, or who have buildings or improvements on the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be
reconstituted, as well as the owners of adjoining properties.[74]
Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the date of hearing
of the reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the trial court with
8
jurisdiction thereon.[75] If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having
interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void. [76]
Thus, in light of the LRA's report of the subsistence of other certificates of title over the subject land, it behooved the RTC
to notify the registered land owners of the reconstitution proceedings, in observance of diligence and prudence;
[77]
 however, it failed to act accordingly. But more than this, courts have the inherent power to correct fatal infirmities in its
proceedings in order to maintain the integrity thereof.[78]
In view of the failure to comply with the requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, particularly, on the service of
notices of hearing on the registered owners and/or actual possessors of the land subject of the reconstitution case, the
RTC, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, and all proceedings held thereon are null and void. That being said, the
Court finds it unnecessary to delve on the other matters raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2014 and the Resolution dated June 25,
2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127144, upholding the Order dated July 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05) which denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, and sustained the grant of the petition for reconstitution filed by respondent
Gertrudes V. Susi, are hereby SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING the petition for reconstitution for
lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
5. G.R. No. 218871, January 11, 2017
JEBSENS* MARITIME, INC.,SEA CHEFS LTD.,** AND ENRIQUE M. ABOITIZ, PETITIONERS, VS. FLORVIN G. RAPIZ,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated January 20, 2015 and the Resolution[3]dated
June 5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 130442, which affirmed the Decision [4] dated January 25,
2013 and the Resolution[5] dated May 22, 2013 of the Office of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) in AC-305-NCMB-NCR-78-01-08-12 and, accordingly, ordered petitioners
Jebsens Maritime, Inc., Sea Chefs Ltd. (Sea Chefs), and Mr. Enrique Aboitiz (Aboitiz; collectively, petitioners) to jointly
and severally pay respondent Florvin G. Rapiz (respondent) permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of US$6,000.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment.
The Facts
On March 16, 2011, Jebsens, on behalf of its foreign principal, Sea Chefs, engaged the services of respondent to work
on board the M/V Mercury as a buffet cook for a period of nine (9) months with a basic monthly salary of US$501.00.
[6]
 On March 30, 2011, respondent boarded the said vessel. Sometime in September 2011, respondent experienced
excruciating pain and swelling on his right wrist/forearm while lifting a heavy load of meat. A consultation with the ship
doctor revealed that respondent was suffering from severe "Tendovaginitis DeQuevain"[7]which caused his medical
repatriation since it was not possible for him to work without using his right forearm.[8]
On October 14, 2011,[9] respondent was repatriated to the Philippines and underwent consultation, medication, and
therapy with the company-designated physician. After a lengthy treatment, the company-designated physician issued a
7th and Final Summary Medical Report[10] and a Disability Grading[11] both dated January 24, 2012, diagnosing respondent
with "Flexor Carpi Radialis Tendinitis, Right; Sprain, Right thumb; Extensor Carpi Ulnaris Tendinitis, Right ," and
classifying his condition as a "Grade 11" disability pursuant to the disability grading provided for in the 2010 Philippine
Overseas Employment Association-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Dissatisfied, respondent consulted an
independent physician, who classified his condition as a Grade 10 disability.[12] Thereafter, respondent requested
petitioners to pay him total and permanent disability benefits, which the latter did not heed, thus, constraining the former
to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the NCMB. As the parties failed to amicably settle the case, the parties submitted the
same to the VA for adjudication.[13]
Respondent argued, inter alia, that while both the company-designated and independent physicians gave him disability
ratings of Grade 11 and 10, respectively, he is nevertheless entitled to permanent and total disability benefits as he was
unable to work as a cook for a period of 120 days from his medical repatriation.[14] On the other hand, petitioners
maintained that respondent is only entitled to Grade 11 disability benefits pursuant to the classification made by the
company-designated physician.[15]
The VA Ruling
In a Decision[16] dated January 25, 2013, the VA ruled in respondent's favor and, accordingly, ordered petitioners to pay
him permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of
US$6,000.00 or their peso equivalent at the time of payment.[17]
The VA found that respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits, considering that: (a) he suffered his
disability on his right hand while working at petitioners' vessel; (b) he can no longer pursue his work on board the vessel
as a cook due to the recurrent nature of his disability; and (c) such disability persisted beyond 120 days after his medical
repatriation.[18] The VA also found respondent to be entitled to attorney's fees as he was forced to litigate to protect his
rights and interest.[19]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[20] but the same was denied in a Resolution[21] dated May 22, 2013.
Aggrieved, they appealed to the CA via a petition for review.[22]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[23] dated January 20, 2015, the CA affirmed the VA ruling. Similar to the VA's findings, the CA held that: (a)
respondent's disability should be considered permanent and total because he was unable to continue his work as a
seaman for more than 120 days from his medical repatriation on October 11, 2011; and (b) he is entitled to attorney's
fees as he was forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights and interests. [24]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration,[25] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[26] dated June 5, 2015; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that respondent is entitled to
permanent and total disability benefits.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In this case, the VA and the CA's award of permanent and total disability benefits in respondent's favor was heavily
anchored on his failure to obtain any gainful employment for more than 120 days after his medical repatriation. However,
in Ace Navigation Company v. Garcia,[27] the Court explained that the company-designated physician is given an
additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a
declaration as to the nature of the latter's disability, viz.:
9
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case
to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic
wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-Standard Employment Contract [(SEC)]
and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum
of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability
already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
medical condition.
xxxx
As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician
within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period
without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the present case, while the
initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-designated doctor duly made a
declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work.[28] (Emphases and underscoring in
the original)
In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr.,[29] the Court further clarified that for the company-designated
physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he must first perform some significant act to justify an extension (e.g.,
that the illness still requires medical attendance beyond the initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days); otherwise, the
seafarer's disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and total.[30] Accordingly, the Court laid down the
following guidelines that shall govern seafarers' claims for permanent and total disability benefits:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading
within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a
sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the
period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the
company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days,
then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.[31]
Here, records reveal that on October 14, 2011, respondent was medically repatriated for what was initially diagnosed by
the ship doctor as "Tendovaginitis DeQuevain." As early as January 24, 2012, or just 102 days from repatriation, the
company-designated physician had already given his final assessment on respondent when he diagnosed the latter with
"Flexor Carpi Radialis Tendinitis, Right; Sprain, Right thumb; Extensor Carpi Ulnaris Tendinitis, Right " and gave a final
disability rating of "Grade 11" pursuant to the disability grading provided in the 2010 POEA-SEC.[32] In view of the final
disability rating made by the company-designated physician classifying respondent's disability as merely permanent and
partial[33] - which was not refuted by the independent physician except that respondent's condition was classified as a
Grade 10 disability - it is plain error to award permanent and total disability benefits to respondent.
Moreover, it bears noting that as per respondent's contract[34] with Jebsens, his employment is covered by the 2010
POEA-SEC. It is well-settled that the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties and, as such, its provisions bind both of
them.[35] Under Section 20 (A) (6) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the determination of the proper disability benefits to be given
to a seafarer shall depend on the grading system provided by Section 32 of the said contract, regardless of the actual
number of days that the seafarer underwent treatment:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are
as follows:
xxxx
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness[,] the seafarer shall be
compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his
benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the
time the illness or disease was contracted.
The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of this Contract, and shall not be
measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness
allowance is paid. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this case, respondent's disability was already determined as only permanent and partial, in view of its classification as
Grade 11 by the company-designated physician and Grade 10 by the independent physician. As such, the award of
US$60,000.00 representing Grade 1 (i.e., permanent and total disability) benefits in favor of respondent clearly has no
basis and, consequently, must be struck down.
Be that as it may, it remains undisputed that respondent suffered an injury while on board the M/V Mercury, a work-
related disability that is clearly compensable as it is a permanent and partial disability, as classified by both the company-
designated and independent physicians. As already adverted to, there is a slight discrepancy with the classifications of
the aforesaid physicians, as the former rated respondent's disability as Grade 11, while the latter's rating was Grade 10.
In this regard, the Court rules that the findings of the company-designated physician should prevail, considering that he
examined, diagnosed, and treated respondent from his repatriation on October 14, 2011 until he was assessed with a
Grade 11 disability rating on January 24, 2012; whereas the independent physician only examined him sparingly on
March 13, 2012. In Formerly INC Shipmanagement Incorporated (now INC Navigation Co. Philippines, Inc.) v. Rosales,
[36]
 the Court held that under these circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated physician is more credible
for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private
physician done in one day on the basis of an examination or existing medical records.[37] In view of the foregoing,
respondent is therefore entitled to permanent and partial disability benefits corresponding to a Grade 11 rating in the
amount of US$7,465.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment,[38] which shall then earn legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.[39]
Finally, the Court finds that the award of attorney's fees lacks legal basis and, perforce, should be deleted. [40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 20, 2015 and the Resolution dated June 5, 2015
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 130442 are hereby MODIFIED, ordering petitioners Jebsens Maritime, Inc.,
Sea Chefs Ltd., and Enrique M. Aboitiz to jointly and severally pay respondent Florvin G. Rapiz permanent and partial
disability benefits corresponding to a Grade 11 disability under the 2010 POEA-SEC in the amount of US$7,465.00 or its
peso equivalent at the time of payment, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
6. G.R. No. 215290, January 11, 2017
HEIRS OF PABLO FELICIANO, JR., NAMELY: LOURDES FELICIANO TUDLA, GLORIA FELICIANO CAUDAL,
GABRIELA FELICIANO BAUTISTA, ANGELA FELICIANO LUCAS, DONNA CELESTE FELICIANO-GATMAITAN,
CYNTHIA CELESTE FELICIANO, AND HECTOR REUBEN FELICIANO, REPRESENTED BY ITS ASSIGNEE,
10
VICTORIA ALDA REYES ESPIRITU, PETITIONERS, VS. LAND BANK PHILIPPINES, OF THE RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Amended Decision[2] dated October 24, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122761, directing respondent the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay
petitioner, Victoria Aida Reyes Espiritu (Espiritu) the amount of P1,892,471.01, representing the interest due on the
balance of the revalued just compensation which accrued from July 1, 2009 until December 13, 2011, with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum (p.a.) from the finality of the Decision until full payment.
The Facts
Petitioners heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr., namely: Lourdes Feliciano Tudla, Gloria Feliciano Caudal, Gabriela Feliciano
Bautista, Angela Feliciano Lucas, Donna Celeste Feliciano-Gatmaitan, Cynthia Celeste Feliciano, and Hector Reuben
Feliciano (Feliciano heirs) are co-owners of a 300 hectare (ha.) parcel of agricultural land situated at F. Simeon, Ragay,
Camarines Sur, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT 3080 (4120). [3]
In 1972, a 135.2583 ha. portion of the afore-mentioned land was classified as unirrigated riceland (subject land), and
placed under the coverage[4] of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.[5] The Certificates of Land Transfer were distributed to
the 84 tenant-beneficiaries in 1973 who were issued Emancipation Patents in 1989.[6] The claim folder covering the
subject land was received by the LBP from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on December 2, 1997.[7] The DAR
valued the subject land at P1,301,498.09, inclusive of interests, but the Feliciano heirs rejected the said valuation,
prompting the LBP to deposit the said amount in the latter's name on January 26, 1998.[8] On March 24, 2000, the said
amount was released to them.[9]
After the summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation, the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Camarines Sur, Branch I rendered a Decision[10] dated September 28, 2001, fixing the
value of the subject land at P4,641,080.465 or an average of P34,302.375/ha.[11]
On November 22, 2001, the LBP filed a petition[12] for the determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Branch 23 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 2001-0359, which was initially dismissed, but
eventually reinstated.[13]
In the interim, the Feliciano heirs assigned their rights over the just compensation claims to Espiritu. [14]
The RTC Proceedings
In an Order dated May 4, 2011, the RTC directed the LBP to revalue the subject land in accordance with DAR
Administrative Order No. (AO) 1, Series of 2010[15] (DAR AO 1, Series of 2010). In compliance therewith, the LBP
revalued the land at P7,725,904.05. Espiritu accepted the said amount but insisted on petitioners' entitlement to twelve
percent (12%) interest p.a. on the revalued amount on the ground of unreasonable delay in the payment thereof.[16]
In a Decision[17] dated September 19, 2011, the RTC (a) fixed the just compensation for the subject land at
P7,725,904.05; and (b) directed the LBP (i) to pay Espiritu the said amount, less amounts already paid to and received
by the Feliciano heirs, and (ii) to pay 12% interest p.a. on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, computed from
January 1, 2010 until full payment.[18] It observed that the subject land, which was expropriated pursuant to PD 27, fell
under the coverage of DAR AO 13, Series of 1994,[19] DAR AO 2, Series of 2004,[20] and DAR AO 6, Series of
2008[21] (DAR AO 6-2008; collectively, DAR AOs) that provided for the payment of 6% annual interest for any delay in the
payment of just compensation. Since DAR AO 06-2008 was effective only until December 31, 2009, the RTC imposed
12% interest p.a. on the unpaid just compensation[22] from January 1, 2010 until full payment.[23]
Both parties moved for reconsideration,[24] which were denied in an Order[25] dated November 24, 2011, modifying the
reckoning of the 12% interest p.a. from the finality of the Decision until its satisfaction.
Aggrieved, the Feliciano heirs, represented by Espiritu (collectively, petitioners), elevated the matter before the CA. [26]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[27] dated March 17, 2014, the CA fixed the just compensation for the subject land at P7,725,904.05, plus
legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a., computed from July 1, 2009 up to the finality of the Decision, or the
total amount of P8,316,876,97, and directed the LBP to pay the said amount to Espiritu.[28] It ruled that the DAR AOs are
no longer applicable to the instant case since the subject land was revalued based on the July 1, 2009 values pursuant to
DAR AO 1, Series of 2010. It further held that interest at 12% p.a. was proper considering the delay in the payment of
just compensation.[29]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[30] but the same was denied by the CA in an Amended Decision[31]dated
October 24, 2014, which modified its earlier ruling. The CA pointed out that since the LBP had already paid petitioners
the total amount of P7,725,904.05 on December 13, 2011, it is only liable for the payment of 12% interest p.a., accruing
from July 1, 2009 up to the said date, or the amount of P1,892,471.01. Accordingly, it ordered the LBP to pay Espiritu the
said amount, which shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) p.a. from the finality of the said Decision
until full payment.[32] Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA's determination of just compensation is correct.
The Court's Ruling
Case law states that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete - such as in this case, where the just
compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled - just compensation should be determined and the process be
concluded under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,[33] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988."[34]
For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated under
Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c)
the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax
declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.[35]
However, it bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700[36] on August 7, 2009, further amending certain
provisions of RA 6657, as amended, among them, Section 17, its implementing rules, i.e., DAR AO 2, Series of 2009,
[37]
 clarified that the said law shall not apply to claims/cases where the claim folders were received by the LBP prior to
July 1, 2009.[38] In such a situation, just compensation shall be determined in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, prior to its further amendment by RA 9700.[39]
In LBP v. Kho,[40] the Court had succinctly explained the "cut-off rule" in the application of RA 9700:
It is significant to stress, however, that DAR AO 1, series of 2010 which was issued in line with Section 31 of RA 9700
empowering the DAR to provide the necessary rules and regulations for its implementation, became effective
only subsequent to July 1. 2009. Consequently, it cannot be applied in the determination of just compensation for the
11
subject land where the claim folders were undisputedly received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, and, as such, should
be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its further amendment by RA 9700 pursuant to the cut-off
date set under DAR AO 2, series of 2009 (cut-off rule). Notably, DAR AO 1, series of 2010 did not expressly or impliedly
repeal the cut-off rule set under DAR AO 2, series of 2009, having made no reference to any cut-off date with respect to
land valuation for previously acquired lands under PD 27 and EO 228 wherein valuation is subject to challenge by
landowners. Consequently, the application of DAR AO 1, series of 2010 should be, thus, limited to those where the claim
folders were received on or subsequent to July 1, 2009. (Emphases and underlining supplied)
Following the above dictum, since the claim folder covering the subject land was received by the LBP on December 2,
1997,[41] or prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just compensation using pertinent DAR regulations
applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by RA 9700 instead of adopting the new DAR issuance. While the
RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR since
the valuation of property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with
the courts, and not with administrative agencies,[42] it must explain and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation
from the prescribed factors and the applicable formula. [43]
In this case, the Court has gone over the records and found that neither the RTC nor the CA considered the date when
the claim folder was received nor explained their reasons for deviating from the DAR formula. Therefore, as it stands, the
RTC and the CA should have utilized the basic formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing
prior to the passage of RA 9700, in determining the just compensation for the subject land.
Accordingly, while the parties did not raise as issue the improper application of DAR AO 1, Series of 2010, the Court
finds the need to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation to ensure compliance with the
law, and to give everyone - the landowner, the farmers, and the State - their due.[44] To this end, the RTC is hereby
directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, in this case, when emancipation patents were issued in the names of the farmer beneficiaries in
1989.[45] Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the RTC for the valuation of the subject land must be
based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.[46]
2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior
to its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that while it should take into account the different formula
created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation for the subject land, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations
before it do not warrant their application.[47] In any event, should the RTC find the said guidelines to be inapplicable, it
must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the
reasonable just compensation for the acquired property.[48]
3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing
jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is
delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on
the part of the State.[49] Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of
taking in 1989 when Emancipation Patents were issued, until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013,
until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a. [50] in line with
the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799,[51] Series of 2013.
For guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as the
concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties
covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is
not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided
that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other
words, courts of law possess the power to make a final determination of just compensation. [52]

WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision dated October 24, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122761
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2001-0359 is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 23 for reception of evidence on the issue of just compensation in accordance with the guidelines set in this
Decision. The trial court is DIRECTED to conduct the proceedings in the said case with reasonable dispatch, and to
submit to the Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty (60) days from notice of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
7. A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P (Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-31-SCC-P), February 21, 2017
JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., PETITIONER, VS. RAHIM A. ARABANI, JUNIOR PROCESS SERVER, AND
ABDURAJI G. BAKIL, UTILITY WORKER I, BOTH FROM SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MAIMBUNG, SULU,
RESPONDENTS.
[A.M. NO. SCC-10-15-P (FORMERLY A.M. NO. 06-3-03-SCC)]
JUDGE BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., 4TH SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MAIMBUNG, SULU, PETITIONER, VS.
RODRIGO RAMOS, JR., CLERK OF COURT, 4TH SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MAIMBUNG, SULU, RESPONDENT.
[A.M. NO. SCC-11-17 (FORMERLY A.M. NO. 10-34-SCC)]
CLERK OF COURT RODRIGO RAMOS, JR., PROCESS SERVER RAHIM A. ARABANI AND UTILITY WORKER I
ABDURAJI G. BAKIL, ALL OF 4TH SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MAIMBUNG, SULU, AND UTILITY CLERK
SHELDALYN* I. MAHARAN, 5TH SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, PATIKUL, SULU, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE
BENSAUDI A. ARABANI, JR., 4TH SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT, MAIMBUNG, SULU, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated petitions involving the Judge and staff of the 4 th Shari'a Circuit Court (4th SCC) of
Maimbung, Sulu.
The Facts
12
I. In A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P:
In a letter[1] complaint dated July 17, 2009, Presiding Judge Bensaudi A. Arabani, Jr. (Judge Arabani) charged
respondents Rahim A. Arabani (Rahim), Junior Process Server, and Abduraji G. Bakil (Abduraji), Utility Worker I, with
conduct unbecoming of a court employee, dishonesty, insubordination, and misconduct[2] arising out of Bakil's alleged
punching of Rahim's bundy card on three (3) occasions despite being repeatedly warned by Judge Arabani.[3]
In a joint letter[4] reply dated October 22, 2009, Rahim and Abduraji countered that there were only two (2) instances of
punching involved, i.e.: (a) when Abduraji accidentally punched Rahim's bundy card one afternoon that Rahim was
absent, mistakenly thinking that it was his bundy card, but he immediately informed Judge Arabani of the mistake;
and (b) when Abduraji punched Rahim's bundy card upon seeing the latter approximately 3 to 4 meters away from the
bundy clock with his way blocked by another person, as it was "nearing time" already. The latter incident was seen by
Judge Arabani who happened to be behind Rahim, and scolded them. However, Rahim immediately erased the time and
punched his bundy card again. They both apologized to Judge Arabani and promised that it would not happen again.[5]
In the same letter, Rahim and Abduraji made counter-charges against Judge Arabani, which are among the subject
matter of A.M. No. SCC-11-17, which will be discussed hereunder.
2. In A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P:
In a letter[6] dated May 13, 2010, Judge Arabani charged Clerk of Court Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. (Rodrigo) with conduct
unbecoming a court employee, alleging, among others, that, from the time Rodrigo reported back to his station at the
4th sec in January 2010, after his detail to the 3rd SCC of Parang-Indanan, Sulu was revoked by the Court in a
Resolution[7] dated November 17, 2009 in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC, Rodrigo: (a) was constantly not at his assigned
table; (b) roams in and out of the office openly; (c) does not attend to his work; (d) refused to comply with the directive to
place his bundy card on the designated rack, thereby making it difficult to monitor the correctness and accuracy of the
entries therein for the months of March and April 2010; and (e) did not properly fill-up his Application for Leave (leave
application) filed in April 2010 with the specific dates of his intended leave of absence.[8] In a letter[9] dated May 17, 2010,
Judge Arabani requested that all succeeding unverified/unsigned bundy cards of Rodrigo be made part of the complaint.
Responding to the Court's Resolution[10] dated August 24, 2010 directing him to comment on the charges against him,
Rodrigo averred that he kept with him his bundy cards for the months of January and February 2010 [11] for reasons of
convenience.[12] He, however, complied with Judge Arabani 's directive to place his March 2010 bundy card on the
designated rack[13] but the latter took and hid the same in bad faith, and submitted the same to the Leave Division, Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) after a few months without signing the same.[14] Accordingly, in a letter[15] dated October
27, 2010 to the Leave Division, OCA, Rodrigo manifested that he is submitting his April to September 2010 Daily Time
Records (DTRs) sans Judge Arabani's signature.[16]
Further, Rodrigo denied the charge of "loafing," and alleged that since the court had no clients for the most part, and
considering the strained relations between him and Judge Arabani who surrounded himself with bodyguards who tried to
intimidate him, for his own protection, he started to place himself within close range of the security guards and the
Philippine marines detailed at the Hall of Justice which is a stone's throw away from his office, and where he can clearly
see any client who goes to the adjoining Shari'a Building.[17] He, thus, claimed that he started incurring absences as an
act of self-preservation for fear of being killed.[18]
3. In A.M. No. SCC-11-17:
In separate Affidavits[19] both dated May 31, 2010, Rahim and Abduraji charged Judge Arabani with conduct unbecoming
of a Judge, and many abuses consisting, among others, of his absences without filing the corresponding leaves of
absence, and toleration of the absences and tardiness of members of his family. [20] Rahim further claimed that Judge
Arabani was courting a court employee, Sheldalyn A. Maharan (Sheldalyn), who he asked to accompany him on his
motorcycle to go around town, professing his love and buying her gifts.[21] At one time, Judge Arabani made a drawing of
a vagina and a penis and tried to show it to Sheldalyn, but their Clerk, Mirad Ahmad (Mirad), grabbed the drawing, tore
the same, and told Judge Arabani "Lummuh kaw sir."[22] The incident was reported to Rodrigo who even picked up the
drawing from the wastebasket.[23]
On the other hand, Sheldalyn, in an Affidavit[24] dated January 26, 2010, charged Judge Arabani of sexual harassment,
alleging, among others, that: (a) when they were still holding office at the residence of Judge Arabani, he would take her
for a ride on his motorcycle, and while going around town, he would court her; (b) there were instances when he would
suddenly step on the brakes so that her body would touch his; (c) he once took her to a snack house, called her at home,
and bought her lotion, baby powder, and other things; (d) he also made a drawing of a penis and a vagina on a piece of
paper and tried to show it to her, but the same was crumpled by Mirad who threw it in a wastebasket; (e) one time, he
forced her to learn karate, and while teaching her, she felt him caressing her arms; (f) when he professed his for love for
her, she started avoiding him by going out with Rodrigo; and (g)because she was afraid, she and her officemate, Jean
Maldisa (Mrs. Maldisa) would accompany each other in going to the comfort room.[25]
In several letters dated May 8, 2010,[26] June 16, 2010,[27] and July 30, 2010,[28] Rodrigo charged Judge Arabani with
grave abuse of authority, verbal abuses, dishonesty in his certificate of service, and sexual harassment, [29]arising out of
the following acts, among others: (a) harassing him by taking and hiding his DTR for the month of March
2010; (b) surrounding himself with goons who tried to intimidate him with their "tiger look";[30] (c) his wife's tardiness;
[31]
 (d) irregularities in the conduct of flag ceremony;[32] (e) molestation of a "labandera" and her teenage daughter;
[33]
 and (f) courting Sheldalyn to whom he had shown a drawing of a penis and a vagina.[34]
Responding to the Court's directive[35] to comment on the charges against him, Judge Arabani filed his Comment[36]dated
October 27, 2010 essentially denying the same, and claiming that the accusations were merely fabricated to muddle the
issues involving the complaints he filed against Rodrigo, Rahim and Abduraji,[37] and were mere repetition of issues
already resolved and terminated in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC,[38] like the one involving his wife's purported tardiness in
coming to office, which remained unsubstantiated and uncorroborated in the present complaints. [39] He further maintained
that: (a) his absences were covered with the corresponding leave applications[40] and/or certificates of appearance;
[41]
 (b) he does not have even a single body guard;[42] (c) Rodrigo was the only employee complaining about the location
of the bundy clock and the placing of the bundy card on the designated rack;[43] (d) he did not steal Rodrigo's bundy card,
which was submitted to the OCA together with his leave application to support the complaint against him;[44] (e) it is not
true that he was courting Sheldalyn who is publicly known to be a tomboy, and the story of immorality was fabricated to
destroy his credibility; and (f) the drawing of a penis and vagina which purportedly occurred in 2005 when the court was
still holding office in his residence was merely fabricated; otherwise, it would have been included in Rodrigo's previous
complaints against him between the years 2005 and 2006.[45]
In a Resolution[46] dated November 15, 2011, the cases were consolidated, and referred for joint investigation,
recommendation and report by the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Jolo, Sulu, Branch 3.
The Investigating Judge's Findings and Recommendations
In a Joint Investigation, Report and Recommendation[47] dated April 8, 2013, the Investigating Judge, Betlee-Ian J.
Barraquias (Judge Barraquias), made the following findings and recommendations:
With respect to A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P, Judge Barraquias found that there was an irregularity in the punching of the
bundy card of Rahim by Abduraji, and Rahim's silence and inaction despite his awareness thereof made him equally
responsible as he is deemed to have consented to the commission of the improper act.[48] This is bolstered by the fact
that Abduraji: (a) admitted having punched the bundy card of Rahim sometime in the first week of June 2009 (first
incident) but explained that he did the same by mistake, thinking that it was his own bundy card, and on June 16, 2009
(second incident), thinking that Rahim was already at the door of the office; and (b) averred that he could not recall
whether or not he punched the bundy card of Rahim on June 30, 2009 (third incident; subject incidents).[49]Judge
Barraquias then concluded that their collaboration (1) is a clear violation of (a) Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
13
Circular No. 7-2003 on the accomplishment/submission of Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records,
and (b) Section 4, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292[50] (Civil Service
Rules); and (2) is an act of dishonesty. Noting, however, that it is the first offense of Abduraji and Rahim, he
recommended that they be suspended for six (6) months without pay with a stem warning that similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.[51]
On the charge of insubordination and conduct unbecoming of court employees, however, Judge Barraquias found no
deliberate intent on the part of Abduraji and Rahim to defy the authority of Judge Arabani and, thus, deemed it proper to
recommend that they be reprimanded and given a stem warning for their non-compliance with the latter's memorandum
requiring them to explain the subject incidents  in writing.[52]
Anent A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P, Judge Barraquias found sufficient evidence on record showing that Rodrigo (a) did not
leave his bundy card at the designated bundy card rack,[53] and (b) failed to heed Judge Arabani 's directive to refrain
from bringing home and carrying in his possession his bundy card, and to leave it in its designated rack. Consequently,
he recommended that Rodrigo be meted a two (2) month forfeiture of salary (February and March 2010; sic)  with a stem
warning that any similar incident would be dealt with more severely. However, he found to be unsubstantiated the
allegations that Rodrigo was constantly not at his assigned table, roams in and out of the office, and is not attending to
his work. He further held that Rodrigo's failure to indicate the specific dates of his absence was a mere formal defect
which can be remedied by specifying the dates of his leave.[54]
As regards A.M. No. SCC-11-17, Judge Barraquias found that the issues raised by Rodrigo, Rahim and Abduraji against
Judge Arabani were mere rehash of those already deliberated upon by the Court in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC, which was
already closed and terminated. Accordingly, Judge Barraquias refused to pass upon the same.[55]
On the other hand, Judge Barraquias recommended the dropping of the sexual harassment charge filed by Sheldalyn
against Judge Arabani for insufficiency of evidence,[56] noting that other than her own account and the parties to this case
who have declared their ill-feelings against Judge Arabani, Sheldalyn has no other witness to corroborate the said
charge.[57] On the contrary, the charge was disputed by the testimony of Mrs. Maldisa which failed to show any single act
of sexual harassment committed by Judge Arabani on Sheldalyn.[58] Nonetheless, Judge Barraquias found it an
established fact that Judge Arabani made a drawing of a vagina and a penis in front of his staff, and recommended that
the latter (a) be reprimanded therefor with a stem warning that any similar distasteful acts would be dealt with more
severely; and (b)  undergo mandatory gender sensitivity seminar so that he may be apprised of the value of giving due
respect to the opposite sex.[59]
In a Resolution[60] dated June 23, 2015, the Court referred Judge Barraquias' Joint Investigation, Report and
Recommendation dated April 8, 2013 to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The OCA's Evaluation, Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum[61] dated August 25, 2016, the OCA adopted the findings[62] contained in Judge Barraquias' Joint
Investigation, Report and Recommendation dated April 8, 2013, and recommended:
1. in A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P, that: (a) Rahim and Abduraji be found guilty of committing irregularities in the punching of
Rahim's bundy card on three (3) occasions (i.e., on the subject incidents), which are also acts of dishonesty, and be
suspended for six (6) months without pay with a stem warning that similar acts would be dealt with more severely; (b) the
complaint for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a court employee against Rahim and Abduraji be dismissed for
lack of intent to deliberately defy Judge Arabani's authority as the head of office; and (c) Rahim and Abduraji be
reprimanded for their non-compliance with Judge Arabani's memorandum requiring them to explain the subject incidents
in writing, and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or any similar act shall also be dealt with severely; [63]
2. in A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P, that: (a) Rodrigo be found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for his
refusal to leave his bundy card on the designated rack, and be meted the penalty of forfeiture of two (2) months' salary
(February and March 2010; sic)  with a stem warning that the commission of the same or any similar act shall be dealt
with more severely; (b) the complaint charging Rodrigo of being constantly not at his assigned table, roaming in and out
of the office, and not attending to his work (loafing) be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence; and (c) Rodrigo be allowed
to remedy his failure to indicate the specific dates of his leave of absence for April 2010 for being a mere formal defect;
[64]
 and
3. in A.M. No. SCC-11-17, that: (a) the complaint of sexual harassment filed by Sheldalyn against Judge Arabani be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence; (b) Judge Arabani be found guilty of the distasteful act of drawing a vagina and a
penis in front of his court staff, and be reprimanded and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or any similar act will
be dealt with more severely; and (c) the other charges raised therein be dismissed for being a mere rehash of those
already deliberated upon and resolved by the Court En Banc  in the Resolution dated November 17, 2009 in A.M. No. 06-
3-03-SCC.[65]
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the factual findings of the OCA, but differs in some of the conclusions and the imposed penalties as
shall be hereunder discussed:
1. In A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P:
a. on the charge of dishonesty against Abduraji and Rahim:
Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity." [66] As
correctly ruled by the OCA, Abduraji and Rahim are guilty of dishonesty by committing irregularities in the punching of
Rahim's bundy card/DTR on three (3) occasions, i.e.,  on the subject incidents. The punching of a court employee's DTR
is a personal act of the holder which cannot and should not be delegated to anyone else.[67]Moreover, every court
employee has the duty to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of his arrival at and departure from the office. [68] Thus,
case law holds that falsification of DTRs is an act of dishonesty and is reflective of respondent's fitness to continue in
office and of the level of discipline and morale in the service,[69]rendering him administratively liable in accordance with
Section 4,[70] Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules.
Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents (such as DTRs) and dishonesty
are both grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time offenders. Nonetheless, while it is
the Court's duty to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are
undesirable, it also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy, taking in mind that the
objective for discipline is not their punishment, but the improvement of the public service, and the preservation of the
public's faith and confidence in the government.[71]
In this relation, Section 48,[72] Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. Among
the circumstances jurisprudentially held as mitigating include, among others, the erring individual's admission of guilt,
remorse, high performance rating, and the fact that the infraction complained of is his/her first offense. [73]Thus, in several
cases involving first time offenders,[74] as Abduraji and Rahim in this case, the Court has reduced
the imposable penalty of dismissal to suspension of six (6) months without pay.
Following judicial precedents, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the OCA,
and accordingly suspends Abduraji and Rahim for a period of six (6) months without pay.
14
b. On the charge of insubordination and conduct unbecoming a court employee against Abduraii and Rahim:
Insubordination is defined as a refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed,
and imports a willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the Judge.[75]
In this case, the Court finds to be likewise well-taken the OCA's recommendation for the dropping of the said charges
against Abduraji and Rahim considering the perceived absence of intent on their part to deliberately defy Judge Arabani's
authority as the head of office. However, they should be reprimanded for their failure to comply with Judge Arabani's
memorandum requiring them to explain the subject incidents in writing, which constitutes a violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations, a light offense punishable with reprimand for the first offense.[76]
2. in A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P:
The OCA correctly found Rodrigo to have violated reasonable office rules and regulations when he refused to leave his
bundy card or DTR on the designated rack despite orders from Judge Arabani. Records show that Rodrigo himself
admitted that he did not leave his bundy card/DTR on the designated bundy card rack for the months of January and
February 2010 (not the months complained of) for reasons of convenience, and from the months of April to September
2010 for fear of getting lost.[77] As aptly observed by the OCA, "[t]he reason he provided is not convincing enough and
raises doubt as to its truthfulness since other court employees are able to comply and leave their bundy cards on the
racks specifically provided therefor."[78]
Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is only a light offense punishable with reprimand for the first offense.
[79]
 Nonetheless, in addition to such non-compliance, Rodrigo likewise failed to secure the signature of Judge Arabani on
his bundy cards for the months of March to September 2010 when they are required to be certified correct by the
Presiding Judge.[80] Rodrigo's avowed reason for his failure to leave his bundy cards on the designated rack having been
found to be unjustified, the forfeiture of his entire salary for the said months should have been in order, if not for the
Certification[81] dated October 5, 2010 issued by Mirad, Clerk II/Timekeeper of the 4th SCC of Maimbung, Sulu, certifying
the number of absences incurred by Rodrigo for the months of April through September 2010, which Judge Arabani
submitted, thus, impliedly admitting that Rodrigo was present on the working days not so indicated therein.
In relation thereto, the failure of Rodrigo to specify the number of working days of leave applied for and the inclusive
dates in his leave application[82] filed on April 12, 2010, which merely indicated the type of leave as "SPL [special privilege
leave] & VL" (vacation leave), is not a mere formal defect that may be remedied by the expedience of subsequently
stating the specific dates of leave. It must be pointed out that leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an
official or employee or of any member of his immediate family must be contingent upon the needs of the service.
Hence, the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion of the head of department/agency. [83]
In this case, Judge Arabani as the approving authority cannot properly act on Rodrigo's leave application because it was
not filled-up completely, rendering the latter's immediately succeeding and continuous absence on the working days on
April 19 to 23 and 26 to 30, 2010, and May 4 to 7, 2010 as unauthorized. Consequently, the latter shall not be entitled to
receive his salary corresponding to the period of his unauthorized leave of absence, but said absences shall not be
deducted from his accumulated leave credits, if any.[84]
Records also show that Rodrigo further incurred numerous unauthorized[85] monthly absences from May to September
2010,[86] totalling 44 whole days and 12 half-days.[87] Notably, in letters dated July 30, 2010[88] and October 27, 2010,
[89]
 Rodrigo admitted that he did not submit his bundy cards from April 2010, and his leave applications for Judge
Arabani's signature.[90]
While the mere failure to file a leave of absence in advance does not ipso facto  render an employee administratively
liable, the unauthorized leave of absence becomes punishable if the absence is frequent or habitual. An officer or
employee in the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs unauthorized absences exceeding the Section 4. Work-related Sexual harassment; how committed.  — Work-related sexual harassment is committed when:
allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the Leave law at least three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3) (a) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment
consecutive months during the year.[91] of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in anyway would
In this case, Rodrigo incurred consecutive unauthorized monthly absences of more than 2.5 days from April to discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. It shall include,
September 2010,[92] rendering him administratively liable for the offense of frequent unauthorized absences.Moreover, but shall not be limited to, the following modes:
contrary to the OCA's finding, the Court finds Rodrigo guilty of loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from duty 1. Physical, such as malicious touching, overt sexual advances, and gestures with lewd insinuation.
during regular hours for more than once.[93] It is imperative that as Clerk of Court, Rodrigo should always be at his station
during office hours.[94] However, records show that he incurred 12 half day absences from May to September 2010, 2. Verbal, such as requests or demands for sexual favors, and lurid remarks.
[95]
 which were undisputedly without previous notice to the Presiding Judge.
3. Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or written notes with sexual underpinnings.
Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that court personnel shall commit
themselves exclusively  to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours. Court personnel should
4. Other acts analogous to the foregoing.
strictly observe the prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof to inspire public respect for the
justice system. Thus, court officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly  observe official time because the
(b) The above acts would impair the employee's rights or privileges under existing laws; or
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat, from the judge to the last and lowest of its employees. [96] Loafing results in inefficiency and non-performance of
(c) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee. [103](Emphasis
duty, and adversely affects the prompt delivery of justice.[97]
supplied)
Section 23 (q),[98] Rule XIV of the Civil Service Rules punishes "[f]requent unauthorized absences,[99] loafing or frequent
unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours" with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one
Section 53, Rule X of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 01-0940, otherwise known as the "Administrative
(1) year for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Records are bereft of showing, however, that Rodrigo
Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases", classifies sexual harassment into grave, less grave and light
had been previously found guilty of such offense. Consequently, the Court deems it proper to impose upon him the
offenses, viz.:
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension. The OCA's recommendation for the forfeiture of salary for the
months of February (sic;  not the month complained of) and March, 2010 must be, therefore, modified accordingly.
Section 53. Sexual harassment is classified as grave, less grave and light offenses.
3. In A.M. No. SCC-11-17:
A. Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
a. On the various charges hurled by Rodrigo, Rahim and Abduraji against Judge Arabani:
1. unwanted touching of private parts of the body (genitalia, buttocks and breast);

The Court finds no reason to disturb the OCA's recommendation upholding Judge Barraquias' finding that the issues 2. sexual assault;
raised by Rodrigo, Rahim and Abduraji against Judge Arabani, save as shall be hereunder discussed, were mere rehash
of those already deliberated upon by the Court in A.M. No. 06-3-03-SCC,[100] which was already closed and terminated. 3. malicious touching;
[101]
 Moreover, other than their own testimonies which must be taken with a grain of salt considering their manifest ill-
feelings towards Judge Arabani, they failed to present sufficient evidence to corroborate their charges against him. 4. requesting for sexual favor in exchange for employment, promotion, local or foreign travels, favorable working
conditions or assignments, a passing grade, the granting of honors or scholarship, or the grant of benefits or payment of
b. On the charge of sexual harassment against Judge Arabani, and of making a drawing of a vagina and a penis in front a stipend or allowance, and
of his court staff:
5. other analogous cases.

Section 3 of the "Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work B. Less Grave Offenses shall include, but are not limited to:
Decorum in the Judiciary"[102] defines work-related sexual harassment as follows:
1. unwanted touching or brushing against a victim's body;
Section 3. Work-related Sexual harassment; definition.  – Work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or
an employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, 2. pinching not falling under grave offenses;
demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or
requirement for submission is accepted by the latter. 3. derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members of one sex, or one's sexual orientation
or used to describe a person;

Section 4 of the same rules provides the modes of commission of the said act, to wit: 4. verbal abuse with sexual overtones; and

15
5. other analogous cases.
C. The following shall be considered Light Offenses;
1. surreptitiously looking or staring a look of a person's private part or worn undergarments;
2. telling sexist/smutty jokes or sending these through text, electronic mail or other similar means, causing
embarrassment or offense and carried out after the offender has been advised that they are offensive or embarrassing
or, even without such advise, when they are by their nature clearly embarrassing, offensive or vulgar;
3. malicious leering or ogling;
4. the display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti;
5. unwelcome inquiries or comments about a person's sex life;
6. unwelcome sexual flirtation, advances, propositions;
7. making offensive hand or body gestures at an employee;
8. persistent unwanted attention with sexual overtones;
9. unwelcome phone calls with sexual overtones causing discomfort, embarrassment, offense or insult to the receiver;
and
10. other analogous cases. (Emphases supplied)
Despite his protestations, the charge that Judge Arabani made a drawing of a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showed
it to Sheldalyn was corroborated by Mirad, a disinterested witness, who categorically declared that it was Judge Arabani
who made the drawing, and affirmed that it was he (Mirad) who crumpled it.[104] The act was enough to create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for Sheldalyn such that all subsequent interaction with Judge Arabani
became unwelcome on her part. In fact, the substantial evidence on record showed that Sheldalyn became afraid of
Judge Arabani[105] and started to avoid him.[106]
The distasteful act by Judge Arabani of making a drawing of a vagina and a penis, and thereafter showing it to an
employee of the court of which he is an officer constitutes sexual harassment. It is an act that constitutes a physical
behavior of a sexual nature; a gesture with lewd insinuation. To the Court's mind, Judge Arabani deliberately utilized this
form of expression, i.e., drawing, to maliciously convey to Sheldalyn his sexual desires over her; hence, his conduct
cannot be classified as a mere display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti under Section 53 (C) (4), Rule X
of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, such as one who is caught watching or reading pornographic materials. Rather, Judge
Arabani's behavior should be classified as an analogous case (Section 53 [B] [5]) of verbal abuse with sexual overtones
under Section 53 (B) (4) of the same issuance, which thus, qualifies the same as a less grave offense. Section 56 (B),
Rule XI of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940 states the penalties for less grave offenses:
B. For less grave offenses:
1st offense – Fine or suspension of not less than thirty (30) days and not exceeding six (6) months
2nd offense – Dismissal
16
Accordingly, as it appears that this is Judge Arabani's first infraction of this kind, the Court imposes upon him the penalty
of suspension for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. in A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P:
a. respondents Rahim A. Arabani (Rahim), Junior Process Server, and Abduraji G. Bakil (Abduraji),
Utility Worker I, both of the 4th Shari'a Circuit Court (4th SCC) of Maimbung, Sulu, are found GUILTY of
committing irregularities in the punching of Rahim's bundy card/DTR on the subject incidents, and
hereby SUSPENDEDfor six (6) months without pay, with a STERN WARNING that similar acts would be dealt
with more severely;
b. the complaint for insubordination and conduct unbecoming a court employee against Rahim and
Abduraji are DISMISSED for lack of merit;
c. Rahim and Abduraji are REPRIMANDED for failing to comply with Judge Arabani 's memorandum
requiring them to explain the subject incidents in writing, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or any similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
2. in A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P:
a. respondent Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. (Rodrigo), Clerk of Court of the 4th SCC of Maimbung, Sulu is
found GUILTYof violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, and is
hereby REPRIMANDED, and STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or any similar act shall be
dealt with more severely;
b. Rodrigo is declared GUILTY of frequent unauthorized absences, and loafing or frequent
unauthorized absences from duty during regular office hours, and is accordingly SUSPENDED for six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay, with a STERN WARNING that similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. He shall not be entitled to receive his salary corresponding to the period of his unauthorized leave of
absence as afore-discussed, but said absences shall not be deducted from his accumulated leave credits, if
any; and
3. in A.M. No. SCC-11-17:
a. respondent Judge Arabani, Presiding Judge of the 4th SCC of Maimbung, Sulu, is found GUILTY of
sexual harassment classified as a less grave offense under Section 53 (B) (5), Rule X of Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 01-0940, and is accordingly SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely; and
b. the other charges raised in the case are DISMISSED for being mere rehash of those already
deliberated upon and resolved by the Court in the Resolution dated November 17, 2009 in A.M. No. 06-3-03-
SCC, and for being unsubstantiated.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
attached to respondents' respective records.
SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO AND COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated May 29, 2015 and the
Resolution[3] dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed the
Decision[4] dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891
declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36[5] of the Family Code, as amended.[6]
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in
Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.[7] Very soon, they became romantically involved.[8]
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided
for Jose's tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28,
1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on
December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the Philippine
Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.[9]
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since,
only returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and lot in
Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.[10]
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition[11] for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In support of
her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as
husband and father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the shoulder a few days
before their church wedding, causing it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his parents;
he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house
where they were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle of the night sometime in
December 2007 when she fetched her relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel added that
Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when
Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: " love, kung ayaw mo na akong
magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito."[12] Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na
akong magtext at tumawag sa'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other
woman with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of sexual
intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.[13]
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their
marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions.[14]
17
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley[15] and her sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,[16] which corroborated
her allegations, as well as the testimony[17] of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the Psychological
Report[18] (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview
with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized by: ( a) his
lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his
own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his marital commitments; and
(d) his lack of remorse for his shortcomings.[19]
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of his
marital and parental duties and obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for his family's financial and emotional
needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that although they
occasionally had misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their first major
argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate through mail during
her stay overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family the financial aid
that they need so long as she would not sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital affair and
having laid hand on Rachel and their son.[20] Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his
allegations.[21]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[22] dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes with
his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his actions,
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against him.[23]
Jose appealed[24] to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek employment, squandering of their money on vices,
violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent psychological condition that incapacitates him to
perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be considered as grounds for legal separation
under Article 55[25] of the same code.[26]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[27] dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC,[28] holding that the totality of the evidence
Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.[29] Particularly, the CA declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek
employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were
not so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible,
insensitive, or emotionally immature which nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that the law requires.
Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and
the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the relation between Jose's
"deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on one hand, and grave and permanent psychological malady, on the
other. Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only offered a general evaluation on the
supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder.[30]
Rachel moved for reconsideration,[31] which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution[32] dated December 1, 2015;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, [33] and marriage as the
foundation of the family.[34] Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under
Article 36[35] of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [36] It should refer to no
less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under
Article 68[37] of the Family Code, among others,[38] include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity, and render help and support.[39] In other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[40]
In Santos v. CA,[41] the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it
must be incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. [42] The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 in Republic v. Molina[43] (Molina) whose salient
points are footnoted below,[44] that incorporated the basic requirements the Court established in Santos.
Nothwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [45] The evidence need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the
spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or
about the time of the marriage.[46] In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application calls for a
more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
[47]
 To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity,
incurability, and juridical antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,[48] the Court declared that therein respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not
be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due
to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity.[49] In Toring v. Toring,[50] the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to
undertake  the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code
addresses."[51] The Court equally did not consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,
[52]
 Republic v. Encelan,[53] Republic v. De Gracia,[54] and Republic v. Romero,[55] to name a few, and thus dismissed their
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity
amount to psychological incapacity.
18
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees;
(2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as a
husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged
in an extramarital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel
admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized
Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality
flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early
childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and
beyond repair despite any form of intervention."[56]
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as
grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological
incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to
what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition
has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why
and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his
marital obligations. Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition"
that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the
history of Jose's condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could
explain his behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing
at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness personally
examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are presented
sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters.[57] Considering that her Report was based solely on Rachel's side
whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent
standards which the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet
the responsibility and duty of a married person.[58] There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations
of the psychological incapacity.[59]
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; [60] a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null
and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36,
the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 1, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
9. A.M. No. 17-01-04-SC, February 07, 2017 Applying the foregoing to this case, it is clear that aside from his bare allegations, complainant has not shown any prima
facie evidence to support his claim that CA Marquez and DCA Bahia should be held equally liable for the delay in the
RE: COMPLAINT OF AERO ENGR. DARWIN A. RECI AGAINST COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. transmittal of the case records of Criminal Case No. 05-236956 to the Court of Appeals in due time. Absent any proof to
MARQUEZ AND DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR THELMA C. BAHIA RELATIVE TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05- the contrary, CA Marquez and DCA Bahia are presumed to have regularly performed their duties,[6] and consequently,
236956 the complaint against them ought to be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a single-paged Administrative Complaint dated August 20, 2016 filed by SO ORDERED.
complainant Aero Engr. Darwin A. Reci (complainant) charging Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez (CA
Marquez) and Deputy Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia (DCA Bahia) with Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.

The Facts

Complainant alleges that he is the older brother of PO2 Dennis Azuela Reci (PO2 Reci), the accused in Criminal Case
No. 05-236956 for the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons defined and penalized under Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 9208, otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003," docketed before the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Manila, Branch 9 (RTC) and presided by Judge Amelia Tria Infante (Judge Infante). It appears that PO2 Reci
was convicted in the said case, and as such, his counsel filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC. According to
complainant, he discovered that after three (3) long years from the filing of said notice, the case records have yet to be
transmitted to the Court of Appeals, and that it was only after his subsequent prodding that such transmittal was made.
Complainant further alleges that while the delayed transmittal resulted in administrative sanctions meted by the Second
Division of the Court (i.e., reprimand and warning), he feels that the same were insufficient as there were no penalties
imposed upon the clerk of court and the court stenographer of the RTC. Thus, he filed the instant complaint accusing CA
Marquez and DCA Bahia of Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty "for failing to monitor the gross incompetence of
[Judge Infante]" in the transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 05-236956 to the Court of Appeals in due time.
Complainant insists that CA Marquez and DCA Bahia were equally responsible for the aforesaid delay, and thus, should
also be held administratively liable.[1]
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not CA Marquez and DCA Bahia should be held
administratively liable for Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
The Court's Ruling
Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross or simple neglect of duty or negligence. Gross neglect of duty or gross
negligence "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property." It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a
person to perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable.[2] In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a
task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference." [3]
In this relation, it is settled that the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual liable for the aforesaid offenses is
substantial evidence, or "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion."[4] Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but
such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence
commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.[5]
10. G.R. No. 215910, February 06, 2017 ]
MANUEL C. UBAS, SR. PETITIONER, VS. WILSON CHAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is the Decision[2] dated October 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 04024 dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner Manuel C. Ubas, Sr. (petitioner) for lack of cause of
action.
The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment [3] (Complaint) filed by
petitioner against respondent Wilson Chan (respondent) before the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar,
Branch 19 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. C-1071. In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent, "doing
business under the name and style of UNIMASTER," was indebted to him in the amount of P1,500,000.00, representing
the price of boulders, sand, gravel, and other construction materials allegedly purchased by respondent from him for the
construction of the Macagtas Dam in Barangay Macagtas, Catarman, Northern Samar (Macagtas Dam project). He
claimed that the said obligation has long become due and demandable and yet, respondent unjustly refused to pay the
same despite repeated demands.[4] Further, he averred that respondent had issued three (3) bank checks, payable to
"CASH" in the amount of P500,000.00 each, on January 31, 1998, March 13, 1998, and April 3, 1998, respectively
(subject checks),[5] but when petitioner presented the subject checks for encashment on June 29, 1998, the same were
dishonored due to a stop payment order. As such, respondent was guilty of fraud in incurring the obligation. [6]
Respondent filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[7] seeking the dismissal of the case on the following grounds: (a) the
complaint states no cause of action, considering that the checks do not belong to him but to Unimasters Conglomeration,
Inc. (Unimasters); (b) there is no contract that ever existed between him and petitioner; and (c) if petitioner even had a
right of action at all, the complaint should not have been filed against him but against Unimasters, a duly registered
construction company which has a separate juridical personality from him. [8]
During trial, petitioner testified that on January 1, 1998, he entered into a verbal agreement with respondent for the
supply of gravel, sand, and boulders for the Macagtas Dam project.[9] He presented as the only proof of their business
transaction the subject checks issued to him by respondent and delivered to his office by respondent's worker on

19
different occasions.[10] He alleged that, at the behest of respondent, he only deposited the checks to his bank account on
June 29, 1998.[11] When the checks were dishonored, petitioner demanded from respondent the value of the dishonored
checks, but to no avail.[12] Apart from his own testimony, petitioner presented Jose Chie Ubas, the company operations
manager of Ubas Construction, Inc., who testified that in 1998, he accompanied several deliveries of gravel, sand, and
boulders to a certain project engineer named Paking dela Cruz at the Macagtas Dam project site, and that respondent
issued checks for their payment; thus, he came to know that there was a transaction between them. [13] Petitioner also
presented Francisco Barrelo, the former employee of Far East Bank, who testified that the subject checks were
dishonored upon presentment because of a stop payment order by the bank.[14]
On the other hand, respondent presented Unimasters' comptroller, Belma Murillo (Murillo), who testified that Unimasters
was contracted by the Department of Public Works and Highways for the Macagtas Dam project; that Engineer Ereberto
Merelos (Engr. Merelos) was hired as project engineer tasked to supervise the work, the hiring of laborers, the delivery
and payment of aggregates, and the payroll, and was likewise in charge of negotiating the supply of aggregates and the
revolving fund for its payments; that the subject checks were issued for the replenishment of the revolving fund, [15] but
Engr. Merelos lost the same sometime in January 1998; and that upon being informed about the loss of the checks,
respondent, as President of Unimasters, instructed Murillo to issue a Stop Payment Order on April 10, 1998. [16] Murillo
belied petitioner's claim that the subject checks were given to the latter in payment of the aggregates and materials that
he allegedly delivered for the Macagtas Dam project, considering that their office did not process any delivery receipt or
proof of delivery of such aggregates by petitioner.[17]
For his part, respondent admitted to having issued the subject checks. However, he claimed that they were not issued to
petitioner, but to Engr. Merelos for purposes of replenishing the project's revolving fund.[18] Respondent also described
the procedure in the delivery of aggregates to their project sites, asserting that petitioner was not among their suppliers of
aggregates for the Macagtas Dam project as, in fact, the latter never submitted any bill attaching purchase orders and
delivery receipts for payments as other suppliers did.[19]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated January 30, 2008, the RTC ruled that petitioner had a cause of action against respondent. At the
outset, it observed that petitioner's demand letter - which clearly stated the serial numbers of the checks, including the
dates and amounts thereof - was not disputed by respondent. Also, it did not lend credence to respondent's claim that the
subject checks were lost and only came into the possession of petitioner, considering the fact that petitioner mentioned
the details of the subject checks in the said demand letter and, thus, would have incriminated himself had he actually
stolen them.[21] It also took note that respondent did not file a case for theft in relation to the lost checks found in
possession of petitioner.[22] Thus, finding that respondent failed to overcome the disputable presumption that every party
to an instrument acquired the same for a valuable consideration under Section 24 of Act No. 2031,[23] or the Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL), the RTC ordered him to pay petitioner the amount of P1,500,000.00 representing the principal
obligation plus legal interests from June 1998 until fully paid, P40,000 as litigation expenses, P50,000 as attorney's fees,
and cost of the suit.[24]
With the subsequent denial[25] of his motion for reconsideration,[26] respondent filed a notice of appeal.[27]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[28] dated October 28, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, dismissing petitioner's
complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.
It held that respondent was not the proper party defendant in the case, considering that the drawer of the subject checks
was Unimasters, which, as a corporate entity, has a separate and distinct personality from respondent. It observed that
the subject checks cannot be validly used as proof of the alleged transactions between petitioner and respondent, since
from the face of these checks alone, it is readily apparent that they are not personal checks of the former. Thus, if at all,
20
the said checks can only serve as evidence of transactions between Unimasters and petitioner.[29] Accordingly,
Unimasters is an indispensable party, and since it was not impleaded, the court had no jurisdiction over the case. [30]
In any event, the CA found that petitioner's claim of unpaid deliveries had no merit, given that not a single delivery
receipt, trip ticket or similar document was presented to establish the delivery of construction materials to respondent.
[31]
 Further, the CA gave scant consideration to petitioner's argument that respondent and Unimasters should be treated
as one and the same under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction because not only was the issue raised for
the first time on appeal, but that the records bear no evidence that would establish the factual conditions for the
application of the doctrine.[32]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred m dismissing petitioner's complaint for lack of cause of action.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. [33]
In this case, petitioner's cause of action is anchored on his claim that respondent personally entered into a contract with
him for the delivery of construction materials amounting to P1,500,000.00, which was, however, left unpaid. He also
avers that respondent is guilty of fraud in the performance of said obligation because the subject checks issued to him by
respondent were dishonored on the ground of stop payment. As proof, petitioner offered in evidence, among others, the
demand letter he sent to respondent detailing the serial numbers of the checks that were issued by the latter, including
the dates and amounts thereof. He also offered the dishonored checks which were in his possession.
Respondent neither disputes the fact that he had indeed signed the subject checks nor denies the demand letter sent to
him by petitioner. Nevertheless, he claims that the checks were not issued to petitioner but to the project engineer of
Unimasters who, however, lost the same. He also disclaims any personal transaction with petitioner, stating that the
subject checks were in fact, issued by Unimasters and not him. Besides, petitioner failed to present any documentary
proof that he or his firm delivered construction materials for the Macagtas Dam project.
The Court finds for petitioner.
Jurisprudence holds that "in a suit for a recovery of sum of money, as here, the plaintiff-creditor [(petitioner in this case)]
has the burden of proof to show that defendant [(respondent in this case)] had not paid [him] the amount of the
contracted loan. However, it has also been long established that where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and submits in
evidence an instrument showing the indebtedness, a presumption that the credit has not been satisfied arises in [his]
favor. Thus, the defendant is, in appropriate instances, required to overcome the said presumption and present evidence
to prove the fact of payment so that no judgment will be entered against him."[34] This presumption stems from Section 24
of the NIL, which provides that:
Section 24. Presumption of Consideration. - Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a
valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.
As mentioned, petitioner had presented in evidence the three (3) dishonored checks which were undeniably signed by
respondent. During trial, respondent admitted to the following:
[Atty. Arturo Villarin] Q: Showing to you this check dated January 31, 1998 x x x, please go over this check and tell the
Honorable Court if that is the same check that you issued as replenishment for the revolving fund?

xxxx
[Respondent] A: Yes, this is the check I signed.
Q: At the right bottom portion of this check is a signature, whose signature is this?
A: That is my signature.
Q: Likewise, for the month of March 13, 1998[,] there is a check in the amount of [P500,000.00]. Is this also the check
that you issued as replenishment for the project?
A: Yes, Sir.[35] (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as the RTC correctly ruled, it is presumed that the subject checks were issued for a valid consideration, which
therefore, dispensed with the necessity of any documentary evidence to support petitioner's monetary claim. Unless
otherwise rebutted, the legal presumption of consideration under Section 24 of the NIL stands. Verily, "the vital function
of legal presumption is to dispense with the need for proof."[36]
Respondent's defense that the subject checks were lost and, thus, were not actually issued to petitioner is a factual
matter already passed upon by the RTC. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, it would have been contrary to human
nature and experience for petitioner to send respondent a demand letter detailing the particulars of the said checks if he
indeed unlawfully obtained the same. In fact, it is glaring that respondent did not present Engr. Merelos, the project
engineer who had purportedly lost the checks, to personally testify on the circumstances surrounding the checks' loss.
Further, Unimasters' comptroller, Murillo, testified during trial that "she came to know that the lost checks were deposited
in the account of [petitioner as] she was informed by the [o]ffice[r]-in-charge of the drawee bank, the Far East Bank of
Tacloban, City Branch."[37] However, there was no showing that Unimasters and/or respondent commenced any action
against petitioner to assert its interest over a significant sum of P1,500,000.00 relative to the checks that were
supposedly lost/stolen. Clearly, this paucity of action under said circumstances is again, inconsistent with ordinary human
nature and experience. Thus, absent any cogent reason to the contrary, the Court defers to the RTC's findings of fact on
this matter. In Madrigal v. CA,[38] it was explained that:
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It leaves these matters to the lower court, which [has] more opportunity and
facilities to examine these matters. This same Court has declared that it is the policy of the Court to defer to the factual
findings of the trial judge, who has the advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the stand and to determine their
demeanor whether they are telling or distorting the truth.[39]
Besides, Section 16 of the NIL provides that when an instrument is no longer in the possession of the person who signed
it and it is complete in its terms, "a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary is proved," as in
this case.
In Pacheco v. CA,[40] the Court has expressly recognized that a check "constitutes an evidence of indebtedness" and is a
veritable "proof of an obligation." Hence, petitioner may rely on the same as proof of respondent's personal obligation to
him.
Although the checks were under the account name of Unimasters, it should be emphasized that the manner or mode of
payment does not alter the nature of the obligation. The source of obligation, as claimed by petitioner in this case, stems
from his contract with respondent. When they agreed upon the purchase of the construction materials on credit for the
amount of P1,500,000,00, the contract between them was perfected.[41] Therefore, even if corporate checks were issued
for the payment of the obligation, the fact remains that the juridical tie between the two (2) parties was already
established during the contract's perfection stage and, thus, does not preclude the creditor from proceeding against the
debtor during the contract's consummation stage.
That a privity of contract exists between petitioner and respondent is a conclusion amply supported by the averments and
21
evidence on record in this case.
First, the Court observes that petitioner was consistent in his account that he directly dealt with respondent in his
personal and not merely his representative capacity. In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that "[Chan, doing business
under the name and style of Unimaster] is indebted to [him] in the amount [P1,500,000.00] x x x."[42]
Moreover, the demand letter, which was admitted by respondent, was personally addressed to respondent and not to
Unimasters as represented by the latter.[43]
Also, it deserves mentioning that in his testimony before the RTC, petitioner explained that he delivered the construction
materials to respondent absent any written agreement due to his trust on the latter, viz.:
[Atty. Daniel Arnold Añover] Q: So, when you delivered the aggregates, did you agree to deliver the aggregates to Mr.
Chan the defendant in this case, you did not put the terms into writing? Am I correct?
[Petitioner] A: None, because it is verbal only, because I trusted him being a contractor.
xxxx
Q: Now, Mr. Witness you said that you trusted Mr. Chan, am I correct? 
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And that he promised you several times that he would pay you? 
A: Yes, he promised me many times.
Q: And yet you still hold all these checks for security? Correct? 
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, you said that you trusted Mr. Chan, then why did you not just handed [sic] over the checks to him,
because you said you trusted him?
A: How many times I gone to Tacloban and I went to Unimaster Office but they referred me to the Leyte Park Hotel, since
they are no longer in good terms with Mr. Wilson Chan so they referred me to Leyte Park Hotel and then I went to Mr.
Chan he promised that he will pay me and after several months again, the same will be paid next month because there
will be final inspection I even let him borrow my equipment for free and hoping that the checks will be funded but again
he lied.[44]
This squares with respondent's own testimony, wherein he stated that every time he wanted to have supplies delivered
for the Macagtas Dam project, he would not enter into any written contract:
[Atty. Marlonfritz Broto] Q: [Okay], now having read this particular statement Mr. Witness would you agree with this
representation that every time you want to have supplies in Macagtas dam you do not enter into contract as you testified
here a while ago?
[Respondent] A: Yes, Sir.[45] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner further testified that he personally demanded the value of the subject checks from respondent in his office, viz.:
[Atty. Daniel Arnold Añover] Q: Now, Mr. Witness you said that you visited Leyte Park Hotel several times, am I correct?
[Petitioner] A: I think once or twice to demand from Mr. Wilson Chan. 
Q: And of course, you were able to see Mr. Chan personally?
A: Yes, we had the conversation.  charges.[6] However, on June 26, 1997, BPI received a notice from its correspondent bank, Bankers Trust Company New
xxxx
Q: So you are saying you are talking to him in his office?  the United States of America (US government).[10] This prompted BPI to inform respondents of such dishonor and to
A: Yes, apparently, it was his Office.
xxxx
Q: You said that when you were there you were just talking each other [sic] and you were taking coffee and made
promises, right?
A: Yes, sir.[46]
Notably, these statements were considered undisputed. Hence, the same are binding on the parties.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA erred in dismissing petitioner's complaint against respondent on the ground of lack of
cause of action. Respondent was not able to overcome the presumption of consideration under Section 24 of the NIL and
establish any of his affirmative defenses. On the other hand, as the holder of the subject checks which are presumed to
have been issued for a valuable consideration, and having established his privity of contract with respondent, petitioner
has substantiated his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. "'Preponderance of evidence' is a phrase that, in
the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto."[47] Consequently, petitioner's Complaint should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 28, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 04024 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 30, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman,
Northern Samar, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. C-1071 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
11. G.R. No. 198799, March 20, 2017
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PETITIONER, V. AMADO M. MENDOZA AND MARIA MARCOS VDA. DE
MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is the Decision[2] dated February 4, 2011 and the Resolution[3]dated
August 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91704, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[4] dated May 9, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
1913, and consequently, dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) against
respondents Amado M. Mendoza (Amado) and his mother, Maria Marcos vda. de Mendoza (Maria; collectively,
respondents).
The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money with Application for Writ of Attachment [5] filed by BPI against
respondents before the RTC. BPI alleged that on April 8, 1997, respondents: (a) opened a foreign currency savings
account with Account No. 0584-0007-08 (US savings account) at BPI-Gapan Branch and deposited therein the total
amount of US$16,264.00, broken down as follows: US$100.00 in cash and US$16,164.00 in US Treasury Check with
No. 3149-09693369 payable to "Ma. Marcos Vda. de Mendoza" (subject check); and (b) placed the amount of
US$2,000.00 in a time deposit account. After the lapse of the thirty (30)-day clearing period on May 9 and 13, 1997,
respondents withdrew the amount of US$16,244.00 from the US savings account, leaving only US$20.00 for bank
22
York (Bankers Trust), that the subject check was dishonored due to "amount altered",[7] as evidenced by (1) an electronic
mail (e-mail) advice from Bankers Trust,[8] and (2) a photocopy of the subject check with a notation "endorsement
cancelled" by Bankers Trust[9] as the original copy of the subject check was allegedly confiscated by the government of
demand reimbursement.[11] BPI then claimed that: (a) on July 18, 1997, respondents allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of
their time deposit account in the amount ofUS$2,015.00 to their outstanding obligation;[12] (b) upon the exhaustion of the
said time deposit account, Amado gave BPI a promissory note dated September 8, 1997 containing his promise to pay
BPI-Gapan Branch the amount of P1,000.00 monthly;[13] and (c) when respondents failed to fulfill their obligation despite
repeated demands, BPI was constrained to give a final demand letter[14] to respondents on November 27, 1997.[15]
For their part, while respondents admitted the withdrawals and exchanged the same with BPI at the rate of P26.159 per
dollar, they did not receive the amount of P582,140.00 from the proceeds. Respondents then maintained that Amado
only affixed his signature in the letter dated July 18, 1997 in order to acknowledge its receipt, but not to give his consent
to the application of the proceeds of their time deposit account to their purported obligations to BPI. According to Amado,
he would have been willing to pay BPI, if only the latter presented proper and authenticated proof of the dishonor of the
subject check. However, since the bank failed to do so, Amado argued that BPI had no cause of action against him and
his mother, Maria.[16]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[17] dated May 9, 2007, the RTC ruled in BPI's favor, and accordingly, ordered respondents to pay: (a)
P369,600.51 representing the peso equivalent of amounts withdrawn by respondent less the amounts already recovered
by BPI, plus legal interest of 12% per annum reckoned from the time the money was withdrawn; and (b) 10% of the
aforesaid monetary award representing attorney's fees. [18]
The RTC found that: (a) BPI duly notified respondents of the dishonor of the subject check, thus, creating an obligation
on the part of the respondents to return the proceeds that they had already withdrawn; and (b) Amado unmistakably
acknowledged the same by executing a promissory note dated September 8, 1997 promising to pay BPI-Gapan Branch
the amount of P1,000.00 monthly in connection with such obligation. In this regard, the RTC opined that since
respondents withdrew the money prior to the dishonor and that BPI allowed such withdrawal by mistake, it is only proper
that respondents return the proceeds of the same pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti  under Article 2154 of the
Civil Code. [19]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.[20]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated February 4, 2011, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and consequently, dismissed
BPI's complaint for lack of merit.[22] It held that BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check, since: (a) the
presentation of a mere photocopy of the subject check is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule; and ( b) the e-mail advice
from Bankers Trust was not properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence as the person
who sent the e-mail advice was neither identified nor presented in court. As such, the CA ordered the dismissal of the
complaint due to BPI's failure to prove its claim against respondents.[23]
Dissatisfied, BPI moved for reconsideration,[24] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[25] dated August 26, 2011;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed BPI's complaint for sum of
money against respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to the review of pure questions of law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition does not allow the review of questions
of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts.[26] Case law provides that "there is a 'question of law' when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a 'question of
fact' when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether
the supposed error was one of 'law' or 'fact' is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is
whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question
of law; otherwise, it is one of fact."[27] Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the
conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relationship to each other, the issue is factual.[28]
Notably, however, the foregoing general rule admits of several exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the RTC
and the CA are conflicting or contradictory,[29] which is evident in this case. As such, the Court is constrained to make its
own factual findings in order to resolve the issue presented before it.
To recapitulate, the RTC declared that BPI was able to sufficiently establish by preponderance of evidence that
respondents were duly notified of the dishonor of the subject check, rendering them liable to refund what they had
withdrawn from BPI. Pertinently, it hinged its ruling on the pieces of evidence presented during the trial, namely: the e-
mail printout advice from Bankers Trust informing BPI that the subject check was dishonored, the BPI letters dated June
27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 addressed to respondents, and the subject promissory note voluntarily executed by Amado.
On the contrary, the CA held that respondents were not liable to BPI for its failure to competently prove the fact of the
subject check's dishonor and its subsequent confiscation by the US government. In this relation, the CA deemed that the
printout of the e-mail advice is inadmissible in evidence for lack of proper authentication pursuant to the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.
After a judicious review of the records, including a re-evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties, the Court is
inclined to sustain the findings of the RTC over that of the CA, as will be explained hereunder.
It is settled that in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's.
[30]
 Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term 'greater weight of evidence' or 'greater weight of credible
evidence.’[31] Succinctly put, it only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence.[32]
Records evince that BPI was able to satisfactorily prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of respondents'
obligation in its favor. Verily, Amado acknowledged its existence and expressed his conformity thereto when he
voluntarily: (a) affixed his signature in the letters dated June 27, 1997[33] and July 18, 1997,[34] where he acknowledged
the dishonor of the subject check, and subsequently, allowed BPI to apply the proceeds of their US time deposit account
to partially offset their obligation to the bank; and (b) executed a Promissory Note[35] dated September 8, 1997 wherein he
undertook to pay BPI in installments of P1,000.00 per month until the remaining balance of his obligation is fully paid.
On the other hand, aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not present any corroborative evidence to support his claim
that his performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was subject to BPI's presentment of the proper and authenticated
proof of the dishonored subject check. Amado's unsubstantiated testimony is self-serving at the most, and hence, cannot
be relied upon.[36] In fact, the RTC did not lend any credence to Amado's testimony in resolving this case. In this regard, it
should be borne in mind that the "findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial
judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the
witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination. Absent any showing that the
trial court's calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment," [37] as in this case.
Overall, assessing the pieces of evidence presented by BPI as opposed to the self-serving allegations of respondents,
the weight of evidence clearly preponderates in favor of the former. Otherwise stated, BPI has proven by the required
quantum of proof, i.e., preponderance of evidence, respondents' obligation towards it, and as such, respondents must be
made to fulfill the same.
In any event, the CA erred in concluding that BPI failed to prove the dishonor of the subject check by merely presenting:
(a) a photocopy thereof with its dorsal portion stamped "ENDORSEMENT CANCELLED" by Bankers Trust;[38] and (b) a
print-out of the e-mail advice from Bankers Trust stating that the subject check was returned unpaid because the amount
was altered.[39]
Anent the subject check, while the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130[40] of the Rules of Court states that
generally, the original copy of the document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry,
23
the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as "[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror."[41] In order to fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial that the
offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason
for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed.[42]
In this case, BPI sufficiently complied with the foregoing requisities. First, the existence or due execution of the subject
check was admitted by both parties. Second, the reason for the non-presentation of the original copy of the subject check
was justifiable as it was confiscated by the US government for being an altered check. The subject check, being a US
Treasury Warrant, is not an ordinary check, and practically speaking, the same could not be easily obtained. Lastly,
absent any proof to the contrary and for the reasons already stated, no bad faith can be attributed to BPI for its failure to
present the original of the subject check. Thus, applying the exception to the Best Evidence Rule, the presentation of the
photocopy of the subject check as secondary evidence was permissible.
As to the e-mail advice, while it may not have been properly authenticated in accordance with the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, the same was merely corroborative evidence, and thus, its admissibility or inadmissibility should not diminish
the probative value of the other evidence proving respondents' obligation towards BPI, namely: (a) Amado's voluntary
acts of conforming to BPI's letters dated June 27, 1997 and July 18, 1997 and executing the promissory note to answer
for such obligation; and (b) the photocopy of the subject check, which presentation was justified as falling under the
afore-discussed exception to the Best Evidence Rule. As such, their probative value remains.
Besides, it should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the evidence presented by BPI, as
shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition to the latter's formal offer of evidence. [43] It is well-settled that
evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered by the court in arriving at its judgment, as
what the RTC did in this case, since it was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during the
trial.[44]
In sum, considering that BPI had proven its cause of action by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds the CA to
have erred in dismissing BPI's complaint against respondents. Accordingly, the RTC ruling must be reinstated, subject to
modification in the award of interest imposed on the adjudged amount.
To recount, respondents were ordered by the RTC to pay BPI the amount of P369,600.51 representing the peso
equivalent of the amounts withdrawn by respondents less the amounts already recovered by BPI, plus legal interest of
twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned from the time the money was withdrawn,[45] thus, implying that such amount
was a loan or a forbearance of money. However, records reveal that BPI's payment of the proceeds of the subject check
was due to a mistaken notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it was dishonored due to an alteration in the
amount indicated therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to respondents was clearly made by mistake, giving rise to
the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio indebiti under Article 2154[46] in relation to Article 2163[47] of the Civil Code. Not
being a loan or forbearance of money, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the amount to be
refunded and on the damages and attorney's fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand until its
satisfaction.[48] Consequently, respondents must return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand – or on June 27, 1997, the date when BPI informed
respondents of the dishonor of the subject check and demanded the return of its proceeds – until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 4, 2011 and the Resolution dated August 26,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91704 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May
9, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Branch 87 in Civil Case No. 1913
is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, adjusting the interest imposed on the amount ordered to be returned, i.e.,
P369,600.51, to six percent (6%) per annum reckoned from the date of extrajudicial demand on June 27, 1997, until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
12. G.R. No. 225593, March 20, 2017
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PALA TOUKYO Y PADEP, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Pala Toukyo y Padep (Toukyo) assailing the
Decision[2] dated July 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 05510, which modified the
Decision[3] dated March 6, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 31270-
R, and accordingly, found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 11 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
On November 23, 2010, an Information[5] was filed before the RTC charging Toukyo of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs,
defined and penalized under Article 5 of RA 9165, viz.:
That on or about the 22nd day of November, 2010, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver one (1) piece
marijuana, a dangerous drug, in brick form wrapped in brown packaging tape weighing 1,000 grams, to Agent Ryan
Peralta, a member of the PDEA-CAR who acted as poseur buyer, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug, in violation
of the aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The prosecution alleged that on November 22, 2010, Agent Ryan Peralta (Agent Peralta) of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency - Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR) received information from a civilian informant
regarding the illegal drug selling activities of Toukyo. After confirming via text message that Toukyo was indeed selling a
brick of marijuana for P2,000.00, the PDEA-CAR sent a buy-bust team comprised of Agents Peralta, John Kay-an (Agent
Kay-an), and Santino Awichen (Agent Awichen) to entrap Toukyo. In the afternoon of even date near a restaurant located
at Burnham Park, Agent Peralta and the informant met with Toukyo. After Toukyo showed Agent Peralta the brick
of marijuana, Agent Peralta executed the pre-arranged signal, leading to Toukyo's arrest. Agents Kay-an and Awichen
immediately marked the seized marijuana at the place of arrest, and thereafter, Agent Peralta took the marijuana as well
as the backpack where it is placed. Upon reaching the PDEA-CAR field office, Agent Peralta turned over the backpack
containing the seized marijuana to Agent Dick Dayao (Agent Dayao), who in turn, executed the proper documentation
and delivered the seized item to the Crime Laboratory.[7] A qualitative examination reveals that the backpack indeed
contains one (1) kilogram/1,000 grams of marijuana.[8]
For his part, Toukyo invoked the defenses of denial and frame-up. He averred that on November 21, 2010, he was at the
Igorot Garden when he overheard a certain Bonifacio and a companion regarding a possible work opportunity. After
inquiring if he could join them in the said opportunity, Bonifacio replied in the affirmative and told him to wait for his text
the next day. On the day he was arrested, Toukyo met with Bonifacio and they rode a jeepney together towards Burnham
Park. Upon reaching Burnham Park, Bonifacio asked Toukyo to wait for him as he will just go to the restroom, with the
former leaving his backpack to the latter. While holding Bonifacio's backpack, Toukyo was suddenly grabbed by police
agents and asked where his companion is. Toukyo then pointed at the restroom but Bonifacio was no longer there,
prompting the police to bring him to the PDEA-CAR office. Thereat, Toukyo was mauled to force him to admit ownership
of the contents of the bag but he refused. After taking the cash from his wallet, Toukyo was fingerprinted, taken to the
hospital for a "check-up," and returned to the PDEA-CAR office. After he again denied ownership of the contents of the
backpack, he was brought to the detention cell and was told to wait for his transfer to the Baguio City Jail. [9]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[10] dated March 6, 2012, the RTC found Toukyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P5,000,000.00. [11]
24
The RTC found that the PDEA-CAR agents successfully executed a buy-bust operation which resulted in Toukyo's arrest
as the seller of the seized marijuana. In this regard, the RTC found untenable Toukyo's defenses of denial and frame-up
in view of the clear and convincing evidence against him as well as the presumption of regularity in the official duties of
the PDEA-CAR agents who arrested him.[12]
Aggrieved, Toukyo appealed to the CA.[13]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated July 3, 2015, the CA modified Toukyo's conviction, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11 of RA 9165, and accordingly, sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00.[15]
Contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that there was no valid buy-bust operation that took place, especially in light
of the fact that upon seeing the brick of marijuana, Agent Peralta prematurely executed the prearranged signal which led
to Toukyo's arrest. Since no actual transaction took place before Toukyo's arrest, i.e., the exchange of the marijuana and
the marked money between the poseur-buyer and the seller, Toukyo cannot be convicted of the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs. This notwithstanding, the CA convicted Toukyo of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
defined and penalized under Section 11 of RA 9165, as: (a) he clearly had no authority to possess the one (1)
kilogram/1,000 grams worth of marijuana seized from him; and (b) case law has consistently ruled that the crime of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs is necessarily included in the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the crime
charged in the Information.[16]
In this relation, the CA held that the PDEA-CAR agents complied with the chain of custody rule, considering that: ( a) the
marking of the seized items were immediately made at the scene of the arrest; (b) Agent Peralta took custody of the
seized marijuana and handed it over to Agent Dayao; (c) Agent Dayao conducted an actual inventory of the seized item
in the presence of and signed by the representatives of the DOJ, barangay, and the media; and (d) thereafter, Agent
Dayao delivered the seized item to the Crime Laboratory where it was received by the Forensic Chemical Officer, Police
Senior Inspector Alex Diwas Biadang, Jr.[17]
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Toukyo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11 of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it appears from the records that in a letter[18] dated January 26, 2017, Director General Atty. Benjamin C.
De Los Santos of the Bureau of Corrections informed the Court that Toukyo had already died on October 15, 2014,
attaching thereto a Certification[19] issued by Mr. Jose Ramon C. Padua, the Bureau's Officer-in-Charge for its
Rehabilitation Operations Division, as well as the Death Report[20] issued on even date by Dr. Ursicio D. Cenas, Medical
Officer III of the same Bureau.
Therefore, the criminal case against Toukyo, including the instant appeal, is hereby dismissed.
Under Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, the consequences of Toukyo's death are as follows:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
In People v. Bayotas,[21] the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
    a) Law
    b) Contracts
    c) Quasi-contracts
    
    d) x x x
    e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and su ject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. [22]
Thus, upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused.[23] Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case, there being no
private complainant to begin with.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to: (a) SET ASIDE the appealed Decision dated July 3, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR HC No. 05510; (b) DISMISS Criminal Case No. 31270-R before the Regional Trial Court
ofBaguio City, Branch 61 by reason of the death of accused-appellant Pala Toukyo y Padep; and (c) DECLARE the
instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
13. G.R. No. 224943, March 20, 2017
25
JORGE B. NAVARRA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution[3]dated
May 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35855, which affirmed the Decision [4] dated March 13,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 01-303 finding petitioner Jorge
B. Navarra (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 22 (a), in relation to Section 28
(h) and (f), of Republic Act No. (RA) 8282.[5]
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information[6] dated January 18, 2001 filed before the RTC charging, inter alia,
petitioner of violation of Section 22 (a), in relation to Section 28 (h) and (f), of RA 8282, the accusatory portion of which
states:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses JORGE B. NAVARRA, x x x of the crime of violation of Section 22
(a), in relation to Section 28 (h) and (f)[,] of R.A. 1161, as amended, by R.A. 8282, committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised between July 1997 and June 2000, in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being members of the board of
directors of the Far East Network of Integrated Circuits Subcontractors (FENICS) Corporation, a covered member of the
Social Security System (SSS), conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and refuse to remit and pay to the SSS the SS/Medicare/EC
contributions withheld by them from the salaries of the FENICS employees, the counterpart SSS/Medicare/EC
contributions of FENICS, as well as the salary/calamity loan payments due to the SSS withheld by them, despite
demands from them to remit and pay these obligations to the SSS.
Contrary to law.[7]
Upon motion,[8] the criminal case was dismissed as against petitioner's co-accused as it was found that they were no
longer serving as members of FENICS's Board of Directors during the period when the aforesaid crime was allegedly
committed.[9] On the other hand, the case pushed through against petitioner who pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.[10]
The prosecution alleged that from 1995 to 2000, petitioner served as the President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Far East Network of Integrated Circuits Subcontractors Corporation (FENICS), an employer registered with
the Social Security System (SSS) and with SSS ID No. 03-9020939-1.[11] Sometime in the years 1999 to 2002, a total of
eleven (11) employees of FENICS filed separate complaints before the SSS, Alabang Branch against FENICS for the
latter's non-remittance of their SSS contributions, prompting Account Officer Felicula B. Argamosa (Argamosa) to
investigate the matter. Upon verification, Argamosa discovered that FENICS indeed failed to remit the SSS contributions
of its employees from July 1997 to June 2000 and, thus, determined that FENICS's total unpaid obligations amounted to
P10,077,656.24,[12] excluding the three percent (3%) monthly penalty mandated by law.[13]Despite numerous demands,
FENICS failed to pay its delinquencies, thus, constraining SSS to file an Affidavit-Complaint [14] against petitioner and his
co-accused for the aforesaid crime before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City (OCP). [15]
Meanwhile, pending preliminary investigation proceedings, petitioner sent a letter[16] dated October 25, 2000 to the SSS,
offering to pay in installments FENICS' delinquent remittances from July 1997 to September 2000, attaching thereto two
(2) postdated checks in the amount of P500,000.00 each and payable to SSS as payment, and promising to pay the
remaining balance via 48 equal monthly installments.[17] While the first check was encashed, the second was dishonored
for being drawn against a closed account. The SSS sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but the latter ignored the same.
[18]
 In addition, petitioner failed to follow through with the monthly installments. [19]Later on and while the case was pending
trial, petitioner sent another letter[20] dated April 25, 2003 to the SSS, proposing a restructuring of FENICS's account, but
the SSS rejected such proposal.[21]
In his defense, petitioner averred that while he is indeed the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
FENICS, he never had custody of the employees' SSS contributions, as it was the Human Resources Department that
was tasked to handle such matters. Further, he asserted that during the period when the alleged delinquencies were
incurred, FENICS had already shut down. In this relation, petitioner narrated that: (a) from 1995-1996, FENICS diligently
remitted the employees' SSS contributions; (b) beginning 1997, its business started to decline due to the pull-out of one
of its biggest customers eventually leading to its shut down; and (c) since FENICS was already non-operational, its
employees were unable to work, and naturally, there could have been no wages/salaries from which the SSS
contributions could be sourced.[22]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[23] dated March 13, 2013, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
ordered him to pay the SSS the unpaid obligation of P9,577,656.24[24] plus three percent (3%) monthly interest reckoned
from July 1997 until fully paid.[25]
In so ruling, the RTC did not give credence to petitioner's claim that the FENICS's operations had already shut down,
considering that: (a) if this claim were indeed true, then it should have been raised from the moment the SSS sent its first
demand letter to FENICS and before the filing of the case before the court; and (b) the same is inconsistent with the
letters petitioner himself made in an attempt to amicably settle FENICS's SSS delinquencies. Further, the RTC took note
of petitioner's letter dated April 25, 2003 wherein he proposed to settle FENICS's outstanding delinquencies with the
SSS. In this regard, the RTC ratiocinated that since the said letter was made during the pendency of the instant criminal
case, then the same should be considered as an implied admission of guilt on his part.[26]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[27] to the CA, arguing that: (a) the information against him was defective as it failed to
properly charge him with a criminal offense; (b) he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 28 (h) of RA 8282 since
under this provision, it is the employer, i.e., FENICS, that should be charged with the same; (c) the prosecution failed to
establish that the private complainants were indeed FENICS's employees; and (d) in any event, his criminal liability was
already extinguished by his compromise agreement with the SSS.[28]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[29] dated October 29, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction in toto.[30] It held that: (a) petitioner's
failure to raise the issue of the validity or regularity of the Information prior to entering his plea was deemed a waiver of
any defect in the same; (b) since FENICS is a corporation, its failure to remit the SSS contributions of its employees
subjects its officers, such as petitioner, to liability, especially since FENICS had already been dissolved; (c) the
prosecution's documentary evidence clearly show that the private complainants were FENICS's employees; (d)
petitioner's letters dated October 25, 2000 and April 25, 2003 proposing to settle FENICS's delinquencies should be
viewed as an admission of guilt on his part; and (e) there was no compromise as SSS did not assent thereto, and even
assuming there was one, such cannot extinguish petitioner's criminal liability.[31]
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[32] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[33] dated May 19, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for
violation of Section 22 (a), in relation to Section 28 (h) and (f), of RA 8282.
The Court's Ruling
26
The petition has no merit.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that petitioner assails the validity or regularity of the Information filed against him on the
ground that it allegedly did not charge a criminal offense. However, as pointed out by the CA, petitioner never raised
such issue prior to his arraignment. In fact, a reading of the records shows that petitioner only raised the same afterhe
was convicted by the RTC and the case was already on appeal before the CA. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that his
failure to object to the alleged defect in the Information before entering his plea amounted to a waiver of such defects,
especially since objections as to matters of form or substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal.[34] Hence, petitioner can no longer be allowed to raise this issue before the Court.
Going now to the substantive issue of the instant case, a plain reading of the Information reveals that petitioner, as
FENICS's President and Chairman of the Board of Directors at that time, is charged for violation of Section 22 (a), in
relation to Section 28 (h)[35] and (f), of RA 8282 for FENICS's failure and/or refusal to remit its employees' SSS
contributions to the SSS during the period from July 1997 to June 2000. Section 22 (a) of RA 8282 states:
Section 22. Remittance of Contributions. - (a) The contributions imposed in the preceding section shall be remitted to the
SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are applicable or within such
time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable
for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution
a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed expedient
and advisable by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annually
in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That
upon separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due shall be credited or refunded to his
employer.
xxxx
Verily, prompt remittance of SSS contributions under the aforesaid provision is mandatory.[36] Any divergence from this
rule subjects the employer not only to monetary sanctions, i.e. the payment of penalty of three percent (3%) per month,
but also to criminal prosecution if the employer fails to: (a) register its employees with the SSS; (b) deduct monthly
contributions from the salaries/wages of its employees; or (c) remit to the SSS its employees' SSS contributions and/or
loan payments after deducting the same from their respective salaries/wages.[37] In this regard, Section 28 (f) of RA 8282
explicitly provides that "[i]f the act or omission penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership,
corporation or any other institution, its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in
this Act for the offense." Notably, the aforesaid punishable acts are considered mala prohibita and, thus, the defenses of
good faith and lack of criminal intent are rendered immaterial.[38]
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that the prosecution - through a plethora of documentary
evidence[39] - had established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that during the period of July 1997 to June 2000,
FENICS failed to remit its employees' SSS contributions despite withholding such amounts from their respective salaries.
It is settled that "[f]actual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by this
Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record,"[40] as in this case.
In sum, the CA correctly affirmed petitioner's conviction for the crime of violation of Section 22 (a), in relation to Section
28 (h) and (f), of RA 8282.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated May 19, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35855, which affirmed the Decision dated March 13, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 206 in Crim. Case No. 01-303 finding petitioner Jorge B. Navarra GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 22 (a), in relation to Section 28 (h) and (f), of Republic Act No. 8282
is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, petitioner Jorge B. Navarra is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and is ordered to pay the SSS the unpaid obligation of P9,577,656.24 plus three
percent (3%) monthly interest reckoned from July 1997 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017
ERLINDA DINGLASAN DELOS SANTOS AND HER DAUGHTERS, NAMELY, VIRGINIA, AUREA, AND BINGBING,
ALL SURNAMED DELOS SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. ALBERTO ABEJON AND THE ESTATE OF TERESITA
DINGLASAN ABEJON, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated March 19, 2014 and the Resolution[3]dated
December 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96884, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[4] dated August 25, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 (RTC), and accordingly, ordered
petitioners Erlinda Dinglasan-Delos Santos (Erlinda) and her daughters, Virginia, Aurea, and Bingbing, all surnamed
Delos Santos (petitioners), to pay respondents Alberto Abejon and the estate of his spouse, Teresita Dinglasan-Abejon
(Teresita; collectively, respondents) the aggregate amount of P2,200,000.00 plus legal interest, among others.
The Facts
The instant case arose from a Complaint for Cancellation of Title with collection of sum of money[5] filed by respondents
against petitioners before the RTC. The complaint alleged that Erlinda and her late husband Pedro Delos Santos (Pedro)
borrowed the amount of P100,000.00 from the former's sister, Teresita, as evidenced by a Promissory Note dated April 8,
1998. As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their property consisting of 43.50 square meters situated at
2986 Gen. Del Pilar Street, Bangkal, Makati City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 131753 (subject land)
which mortgage was annotated on the title. After Pedro died, Erlinda ended up being unable to pay the loan, and as
such, agreed to sell the subject land to Teresita for P150,000.00, or for the amount of the loan plus an additional
P50,000.00. On July 8, 1992, they executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage, and eventually, TCT No.
131753 was cancelled and TCT No. 180286 was issued in the name of "Teresita, Abejon[,] married to Alberto S. Abejon."
Thereafter, respondents constructed a three (3)-storey building worth P2,000,000.00 on the subject land. Despite the
foregoing, petitioners refused to acknowledge the sale, pointing out that since Pedro died in 1989, his signature in the
Deed of Sale executed in 1992 was definitely forged. As such, respondents demanded from petitioners the amounts of
P150,000.00 representing the consideration for the sale of the subject land and P2,000,000.00 representing the
construction cost of the three (3)-storey building, but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed the instant case. [6]
In defense, petitioners denied any participation relative to the spurious Deed of Sale, and instead, maintained that it was
Teresita who fabricated the same and caused its registration before the Register of Deeds of Makati City. They likewise
asserted that Erlinda and Pedro never sold the subject land to Teresita for P150,000.00 and that they did not receive any
demand for the payment of P100,000.00 representing the loan, as well as the P2,000,000.00 representing the
construction cost of the building. Finally, they claimed that the improvements introduced by Teresita on the subject land
were all voluntary on her part.[7]
During the pre-trial proceedings, the parties admitted and/or stipulated that: (a) the subject land was previously covered
by TCT No. 131753 in the name of Erlinda and Pedro, but such title was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 180286 in
the name of Teresita; (b) the Deed of Sale and Release of Mortgage executed on July 8, 1992 were forged, and thus,
should be cancelled; (c) in view of said cancellations, TCT No. 180286 should likewise be cancelled and TCT No.
131753 should be reinstated; (d) from the time when the spurious Deed of Sale was executed until the present,
petitioners have been the actual occupants of the subject land as well as all improvements therein, including the three
(3)-storey building constructed by respondents; and (e) the P100,000.00 loan still subsists and that respondents paid for
the improvements being currently occupied by petitioners, i.e., the three (3)-storey building. In view of the foregoing
27
stipulations and admissions, the RTC limited the issue as to who among the parties should be held liable for damages
and attorney's fees.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[9] dated August 25, 2010, the RTC: (a) declared the Deed of Sale null and void; (b) ordered the cancellation
of TCT No. 180286 and the reinstatement of TCT No. 131753; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay respondents the
following amounts: (1) P100,000.00 plus twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from July 8, 1992 until fully paid
representing the loan obligation plus legal interest; (2) P2,000,000.00 representing the construction cost of the three (3)-
storey building; and (3) another P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.[10]
The RTC ruled that respondents should be reimbursed for the amount of the loan, as well as the expenses incurred for
the construction of the three (3)-storey building in view of petitioners' categorical admission of their indebtedness to her,
as well as the construction of the building from which they derived benefit being the actual occupants of the property.
[11]
 Finally, it found that respondents are entitled to attorney's fees for being forced to litigate. [12]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.[13]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated March 19, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modifications: (a) cancelling the Release of
Mortgage; (b) adjusting the twelve percent (12%) per annum interest imposed on the loan obligation, in that it should be
computed from November 25, 1997, or from the filing of the instant complaint; and (c) imposing a six percent (6%)
interest per annum on the construction cost of the three (3)-storey building from the finality of the decision until its full
satisfaction.[15]
Anent the loan obligation, the CA ruled that since petitioners admitted their indebtedness to Teresita during the pre-trial
proceedings, respondents should be allowed to recover the amount representing the same, including the appropriate
interest. In this relation, the CA opined that while it is true that the loan obligation was contracted by Erlinda and Pedro
and not by their children, the children (who joined Erlinda in this case as petitioners) may still be held liable for such
obligation having inherited the same from Pedro upon the latter's death.[16]
As to the construction cost of the three (3)-storey building, the CA held that in view of petitioners' admission that they
knew of and allowed said construction of the building, and thereafter, started occupying the same for more than two (2)
decades up to the present, it is only proper that they reimburse respondents of the cost of such building. [17]
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,[18] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[19] dated December 11,
2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held that petitioners should be held liable to
respondents in the aggregate amount of P2,200,000.00, consisting of the loan obligation of P100,000.00, the
construction cost of the three (3)-storey building in the amount of P2,000,000.00, and attorney's fees and costs of suit
amounting to P100,000.00.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that a pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues
raised by the parties and to take the trial of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pre-
trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most
important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial
and resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize the
paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.[20]
In the case at bar, it must be reiterated that during the pre-trial proceedings, the parties agreed/stipulated that: (a) the
subject land was previously covered by TCT No. 131753 in the name of Erlinda and Pedro, but such title was cancelled
and replaced by TCT No. 180286 in the name of Teresita; (b) the Deed of Sale and Release of Mortgage both executed
on July 8, 1992 were forged, and thus, should be cancelled; (c) in view of said cancellations, TCT No. 180286 should
likewise be cancelled and TCT No. 131753 should be reinstated; (d) from the time when the spurious deed of sale was
executed until the present, petitioners have been the actual occupants of the subject land as well as all improvements
therein, including the three (3)-storey building constructed by respondents; and (e) the P100,000.00 loan still subsists
and that respondents paid for the improvements being currently occupied by petitioners, i.e., the three (3)-storey building.
[21]
 As such, the parties in this case are bound to honor the admissions and/or stipulations they made during the pre-trial.
[22]
Thus, in view of the foregoing admissions and/or stipulations, there is now a need to properly determine to whom the
following liabilities should devolve: (a) the P100,000.00 loan obligation; (b) the P50,000.00 extra consideration Teresita
paid for the sale of the subject land, which was already declared void - a matter which the RTC and the CA completely
failed to resolve; and (c) the P2,000,000.00 construction cost of the three (3)-storey building that was built on the subject
land.
I.
While petitioners admitted the existence of the P100,000.00 loan obligation as well as respondents' right to collect on the
same, it does not necessarily follow that respondents should collect the loan amount from petitioners, as concluded by
both the RTC and the CA. It must be pointed out that such loan was contracted by Erlinda, who is only one (1) out of the
four (4) herein petitioners, and her deceased husband, Pedro, during the latter's lifetime and while their marriage was still
subsisting.[23] As they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines [24] and absent any showing
of any pre-nuptial agreement between Erlinda and Pedro, it is safe to conclude that their property relations were
governed by the system of conjugal partnership of gains. Hence, pursuant to Article 121 [25] of the Family Code, the
P100,000.00 loan obligation, including interest, if any, is chargeable to Erlinda and Pedro's conjugal partnership as it was
a debt contracted by the both of them during their marriage; and should the conjugal partnership be insufficient to cover
the same, then Erlinda and Pedro (more particularly, his estate as he is already deceased) shall be solidarity liable for
the unpaid balance with their separate properties. While the portion attributable to Pedro was not considered
extinguished by his death, it is merely passed on to his estate; and thus, his heirs, i.e., herein petitioners, could not be
held directly answerable for the same, contrary to the CA's conclusion. [26] In sum, both the RTC and the CA erred in
holding petitioners liable to respondents for the loan obligation in the amount of P100,000.00.
Alternative to the collection of the said sum, respondents may also choose to foreclose the mortgage on the subject land
as the same was duly constituted to secure the P100,000.00 loan obligation. In other words, respondents have the option
to either file a personal action for collection of sum of money or institute a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. The aforesaid remedies are alternative, meaning the choice of one will operate to preclude the other.[27]
II.
It is settled that "the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and
condition in which they were found before the execution thereof."[28] Pursuant to this rule, since the Deed of Sale involving
the subject land stands to be nullified in view of the parties' stipulation to this effect, it is incumbent upon the parties to
return what they have received from said sale. Accordingly, Erlinda and the rest of petitioners (as Pedro's heirs) are
28
entitled to the return of the subject land as stipulated during .the pre-trial. To effect the same, the Register of Deeds of
Makati City should cancel TCT No. 180286 issued in the name of Teresita, and thereafter, reinstate TCT No. 131753 in
the name of Pedro and Erlinda and, restore the same to its previous state before its cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage
executed by the parties annotated thereon. On the other hand, respondents, as Teresita's successors-in-interest, are
entitled to the refund of the additional P50,000.00 consideration she paid for such sale. However, it should be clarified
that the liability for the said amount will not fall on all petitioners, but only on Erlinda, as she was the only one among the
petitioners who was involved in the said sale. Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames,[29] the amount of P50,000.00 shall be
subjected to legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid. [30]
III.
As correctly argued by petitioners, it is more accurate to apply [31] the rules on accession with respect to immovable
property, specifically with regard to builders, planters, and sowers,[32] as this case involves a situation where the
landowner (petitioners) is different from the owner of the improvement built therein, i.e., the three (3)-storey building
(respondents). Thus, there is a need to determine whether petitioners as landowners on the one hand, and respondents
on the other, are in good faith or bad faith.
The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who,
not being the owner of the land, builds, plants, or sows on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the
defect in his title or mode of acquisition. "The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another."[33] On the other hand, bad faith may only
be attributed to a landowner when the act of building, planting, or sowing was done with his knowledge and without
opposition on his part.[34]
In this case, it bears stressing that the execution of the Deed of Sale involving the subject land was done in 1992.
However, and as keenly pointed out by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa during the deliberations of this case,
Teresita was apprised of Pedro's death as early as 1990 when she went on a vacation in the Philippines. [35] As such, she
knew all along that the aforesaid Deed of Sale which contained a signature purportedly belonging to Pedro, who died in
1989, or three (3) years prior to its execution - was void and would not have operated to transfer any rights over the
subject land to her name. Despite such awareness of the defect in their title to the subject land, respondents still
proceeded in constructing a three (3)-storey building thereon. Indubitably, they should be deemed as builders in bad
faith.
On the other hand, petitioners knew of the defect in the execution of the Deed of Sale from the start, but nonetheless, still
acquiesced to the construction of the three (3)-storey building thereon. Hence, they should likewise be considered as
landowners in bad faith.
In this relation, Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner and the builder, planter, or sower
acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in good faith, viz.:
Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another,
but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted
in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and
without opposition on his part.
Whenever both the landowner and the builder/planter/sower are in good faith (or in bad faith, pursuant to the afore-cited
provision), the landowner is given two (2) options under Article 448[36] of the Civil Code, namely: (a) he may appropriate
the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses
under Articles 546[37] and 548[38] of the Civil Code; or (b) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably
more than that of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.[39]
Applying the aforesaid rule in this case, under the first option, petitioner may appropriate for themselves the three (3)-
storey building on the subject land after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code,
as applied in existing jurisprudence. Under this option, respondents would have a right of retention over the three (3)-
storey building as well as the subject land until petitioners complete the reimbursement. Under the second option,
petitioners may sell the subject land to respondents at a price equivalent to the current market value thereof. However, if
the value of the subject land is considerably more than the value of the three (3)-storey building, respondents cannot be
compelled to purchase the subject land. Rather, they can only be obliged to pay petitioners reasonable rent.[40]
Thus, following prevailing jurisprudence, the instant case is remanded to the court a quo for the purpose of determining
matters necessary for the proper application of Articles 448 and 453, in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code,
[41]
 as applied in existing jurisprudence.
IV.
Finally, anent the issue on attorney's fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit.[42] The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 [43] of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification. In this case, the Court finds no justification for the award of attorney's fees to
either party. Accordingly, any award for attorney's fees made by the courts a quo must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated March 19, 2014 and the Resolution dated
December 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96884 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as
follows:
(a) The Deed of Sale and the Release of Mortgage both dated July 8, 1992 are declared NULL and VOID;
(b) The Register of Deeds of Makati City is ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 180286 in the name of
Teresita D. Abejon, married to Alberto S. Abejon, and REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131753 in the name
of Pedro Delos Santos and Erlinda Dinglasan Delos Santos, and restore the same to its previous state before its
cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage executed by the parties annotated thereon; and
(c) The entire fourth paragraph[44] of the dispositive portion of the Decision dated March 19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
is hereby SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof:
I. The P100,000.00 loan obligation is DECLARED to be the liability of the conjugal partnership of petitioner Erlinda
Dinglasan Delos Santos and her deceased husband Pedro Delos Santos which may be recovered by herein respondents
in accordance with this Decision;
II. Petitioner Erlinda Dinglasan Delos Santos is ORDERED to return to respondents the amount of P50,000.00
representing the additional consideration Teresita D. Abejon paid for in the sale, with legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid;
III. For the purpose of determining the proper indemnity for the 3-storey building, the case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 for further proceedings consistent with the proper application of Articles 448, 453,
546, and 548 of the Civil Code, as applied in existing jurisprudence; and
IV. The award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of P100,000.00 is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
15. G.R. No. 220940, March 20, 2017
29
JOY VANESSA M. SEBASTIAN, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES NELSON C. CRUZ AND CRISTINA P. CRUZ AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Resolutions dated March 13, 2015[2] and October 9, 2015[3]of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 136564 dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioner
Joy Vanessa M. Sebastian (Sebastian) before it.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a petition[4] for annulment of judgment filed by Sebastian before the CA, praying for the
annulment of the Decision[5] dated March 27, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 69 (RTC)
in LRC Case No. 421. Petitioner alleged that respondent Nelson C. Cruz (Nelson), married to Cristina P. Cruz (Cristina;
collectively, Spouses Cruz), is the registered owner of a 40,835-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Bogtong-
Bolo, Mangatarem, Pangasinan and covered by Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. (OCT No.) P-41566[6] (subject land).
Sometime in November 2009, Nelson, through his father and attorney-infact, Lamberto P. Cruz (Lamberto), then sold the
subject lot in favor of Sebastian, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale [7]executed by the parties. Upon Sebastian's
payment of the purchase price, Lamberto then surrendered to her the possession of the subject land, OCT No. P-41566,
and his General Power of Attorney[8] together with a copy of Tax Declaration No. 9041 and Property Index No. 013-26-
019-0322.[9] Sebastian then paid the corresponding capital gains tax, among others, to cause the transfer of title to her
name.[10] However, upon her presentment of the aforesaid documents to the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Pangasinan (RD-Pangasinan), the latter directed her to secure a Special Power of Attorney executed by Spouses Cruz
authorizing Lamberto to sell the subject land to her. Accordingly, Sebastian requested the execution of such document to
Lamberto, who promised to do so, but failed to comply. Thus, Sebastian was constrained to cause the annotation of an
adverse claim in OCT No. P-41566 on August 2, 2011 in order to protect her rights over the subject land. [11]
According to Sebastian, it was only on July 14, 2014 upon her inquiry with RD-Pangasinan about the status of the
aforesaid title when she discovered that: (a) Nelson executed an Affidavit of Loss dated September 23, 2013 attesting to
the loss of owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566, which he registered with the RD-Pangasinan; (b) the Spouses
Cruz filed before the RTC a petition for the issuance of a second owner's copy of OCT No. P-41566, docketed as LRC
Case No. 421; and (c) on March 27, 2014, the RTC promulgated a Decision granting Spouses Cruz's petition and,
consequently, ordered the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 in their names.[12] In view of the
foregoing incidents, Sebastian filed the aforesaid petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Essentially, she contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of LRC Case No. 421 as
the duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 - which was declared to have no further force in effect - was never lost, and in
fact, is in her possession all along.[13]
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution[14] dated March 13, 2015, the CA did not give due course to Sebastian's petition and, consequently,
dismissed the same outright.[15] It held that the compliance by Spouses  Cruz with the jurisdictional requirements of
publication and notice of hearing clothed the RTC with jurisdiction to take cognizance over the action in rem, and
constituted a constructive notice to the whole world of its pendency. As such, personal notice to Sebastian of the action
was no longer necessary.[16]
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[17] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[18] dated October 9, 2015;
hence, this petition.[19]
The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly denied due course to Sebastian's petition for
annulment of judgment, resulting in its outright dismissal.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court
should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject
matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are
divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed
and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become
executory. It also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.[20]
As will be explained hereunder, the CA erred in denying due course to Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment
and, resultantly, in dismissing the same outright.
The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title is Republic Act No. (RA) 26,[21] Section 15 of which provides when
reconstitution of a title should be allowed:
Section 15. If the court, after hearing, finds that the documents presented, as supported by parole evidence or otherwise,
are sufficient and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, and that petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or has an interest therein, that the said certificate of title was in force at the time it was
lost or destroyed, and that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title, an order of reconstitution shall be issued. The clerk of court shall
forward to the register of deeds a certified copy of said order and all the documents which, pursuant to said order, are to
be used as the basis of the reconstitution. If the court finds that there is no sufficient evidence or basis to justify the
reconstitution, the petition shall be dismissed, but such dismissal shall not preclude the right of the party or parties
entitled thereto to file an application for confirmation of his or their title under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites must be complied with for an order for reconstitution to be
issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are
sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; ( c) that the petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was
lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in
the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The
purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in
exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title
is sought to be reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System.[22]
Motor Industries Corporation v. Skunac Corporation, Rodriguez v. Lim, Villanueva v. Viloria, and Camitan v. Fidelity
Investment Corporation. Thus, with evidence that the original copy of the TCT was not lost during the conflagration that
hit the Quezon City Hall and that the owner's duplicate copy of the title was actually in the possession of another, the
RTC decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
xxxx
In reconstitution proceedings, the Court has repeatedly ruled that before jurisdiction over the case can be validly
acquired, it is a condition sine qua non that the certificate of title has not been issued to another person.If a certificate of
title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court
rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new title. The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by (such) third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are
already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The existence of a prior
title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings. The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding before the
regional trial court the validity of the Torrens title already issued to the other person.[24] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In this case, Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA clearly alleged that, contrary to the claim of
Spouses Cruz in LRC Case No. 421, the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. P-41566 was not really lost, as the same
was surrendered to her by Lamberto, Nelson's father and attorney-in-fact, and was in her possession all along.[25] Should
such allegation be proven following the conduct of further proceedings, then there would be no other conclusion than that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of LRC Case No. 421. As a consequence, the Decision dated March
27, 2014 of the RTC in the said case would then be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Thus, the Court finds prima facie merit in Sebastian's petition for annulment of judgment before the CA. As such, the
latter erred in denying it due course and in dismissing the same outright. In this light, the Court finds it more prudent to
remand the case to the CA for further proceedings to first resolve the above-discussed jurisdictional issue, with a
directive to: (a) grant due course to the petition; and (b) cause the service of summons on Spouses Cruz and the RD-
Pangasinan, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 47[26] of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 13, 2015 and October 9, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 136564 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case
is REMANDED to the CA for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner's duplicate certificate of title is crucial in clothing the RTC with
jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. In Spouses Paulino v. CA,[23] the Court reiterated the rule that
when the owner's duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, viz.:
As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA, the Court has held that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has
not been lost, but is, in fact, in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the
court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original
certificate. This rule was reiterated in the cases of Villamayor v. Arante, Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. [CA], Eastworld 16. G.R. No. 224834, March 15, 2017

30
 JONATHAN Y. DEE, PETITIONER, VS. HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED,
BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, AND ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF ALLIANCE
SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, AS DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 224871
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BONDEAST PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG
HIN KAY, AS MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND HEDY S.C.
YAP-CHUA, AS A DIRECTOR AND SHAREHOLDER OF ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
PETITIONERS, VS. ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN Y. DEE,
RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS, ERWIN M. ELECHICON, AND BARBARA
ANNE C. MIGALLOS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions[1]  for review on certiorari are the Decision[2]  dated February 15, 2016 and the
Resolution[3]  dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the
Resolution[4] dated August 24, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE NO.
15-234 and, accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a quo for further proceedings after
payment of the proper legal fees.
The Facts
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap
Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities, minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.
(Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of Alliance's Board of Directors. [5]  As per Alliance's by-laws, its
Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15.[6]  However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting held at
three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed
a Board Resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance's  2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock Rights
Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of Pl Billion which was earlier approved in a Board Resolution
passed on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's Disclosure dated May 29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock
Exchange, such postponement was made "to give the stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the annual
meeting, after taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of [Alliance]."[7]  This prompted Harvest All, et al. to
file the instant Complaint (with Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
Restraining  Order/Writ  of Preliminary  Injunction)[8]  involving  an  intra-corporate  controversy  against  Alliance, and  its
other  Board  members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee, Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera- Cruz,
Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon, and Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest All,  et
al. principally claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot be made a condition precedent to
the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in the 2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their
full  voting  rights  proportionate  to  their  existing  shareholdings.[9] Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the
declaration of nullity of the Board Resolution dated May  29, 2015  indefinitely  postponing  the  2015 ASM, as well as the
Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SR0.[10]  The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest
All, et al. with filing fees amounting to P8,860.00 which they paid accordingly.[11]  Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an
Amended Complaint:[12]  (a) deleting its prayer to declare  null  and  void  the  Board  Resolution  dated  February  17, 
2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that the Alliance Board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out
the SRO prior to and as a condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.[13] 
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of Harvest All, et al.' s failure to pay
the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO
which was valued at P1 Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did not mention such capital infusion in their prayers and, as
such, were only made to pay the measly sum of P8,860.00. On the other hand, Harvest  All,  et  al.  maintained  that 
31
they  paid the  correct  filing  fees, considering that the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not
a claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that they simply relied on the
assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to defraud the government.[14] 
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution[15]  dated  August  24,  2015,  the  RTC  dismissed  the instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to
Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay  the  correct  filing  fees.[16]  Citing  Rule 141 of  the  Rules of  Court,  as amended  by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,[17]  and the Court's  pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym,  Sr. (Lu),[18] the RTC found  that the basis for
the computation  of filing fees should have been the PI Billion value of the SRO, it being the property in litigation.  As
such,  Harvest All, et al. should  have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less P20 Million and not just P8,860.00.  In
this  regard,  the  RTC  also  found  that  Harvest  All,  et  al.'s payment  of incorrect filing fees was done in bad faith and
with clear intent to defraud the government, considering  that: (a)  when the issue on correct filing fees was first raised
during the hearing on the application for TRO, Harvest All, et al. never manifested their willingness to abide by the Rules
by paying additional filing fees when so required; (b) despite Harvest All, et al.'s admission  in their complaint  that the
SRO was valued at P1 Billion, they chose to keep mum on the meager assessment made by the Clerk of Court; and (c)
while Harvest All, et al. made mention of the SRO in the body of their complaint,  they  failed  to  indicate  the  same  in 
their  prayer,  thus, preventing the Clerk of Court from making the correct assessment of filing fees. [19] 
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed[20] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated February  I5, 20I6,  the CA reversed the RTC's order  of dismissal  and, accordingly,  reinstated 
the case and remanded  the same to the court a quo for further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.
[22]
 Also citing Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the
prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies  always  involve  a  property  in  litigation. Consequently, it  agreed 
with  the RTC's finding  that  the  basis  for  the computation of filing fees should have been the PI  Billion value of the
SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less P20 Million and not just
P8,860.00.[23]  However, in the absence of contrary  evidence,  the CA held that Harvest All, et al. were not in bad faith 
and  had  no intention  of  defrauding  the  government,  as they  merely relied  in  the assessment  of  the  Clerk  of 
Court.  Thus,  in  the  interest  of substantial justice, the CA ordered the reinstatement  of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint
and the remand of the same to the RTC for further proceedings, provided that they pay the correct filing fees. [24] 
The parties moved for reconsideration,[25] which were, however, denied in a Resolution[26] dated May 25, 2016. Hence,
these consolidated petitions.
The Issues Before the Court
The  primordial issues  raised for the  Court's resolution are: (a) whether  or  not  Harvest All,  et  al.  paid  insufficient
filing fees  for  their complaint, as the same should have been based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO; and  (b)  if 
Harvest  All,  et  al.  indeed  paid insufficient  filing  fees, whether or not such act was made in good faith and without any
intent to defraud the government.
The Court's Ruling
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is partly granted.
I.
 [An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made,  or opinion  expressed, by a judge, in his decision  upon  a cause by the way,
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing fees for Harvest All, et al.'s complaint should be based that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon  the question before  him,  or  upon  a point not necessarily
on the P1 Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary  involved in the determination of the cause,  or introduced by way  of illustration, or analogy  or  argument.  It does not
estimation  - both  the  RTC  and  the  CA  heavily  relied  on  the Court's  pronouncement  in Lu. In Lu, the Court  embody  the  resolution or determination of the  court, and  is  made  without argument, or full consideration of the  point.
mentioned  that in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 which introduced Section 21 (k)[27]  to  Rule  141  of  It lacks  the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an  opinion  with  no  binding force  for  purposes of res
the  Rules  of  Court,  it  seemed that  "an  intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation" and that judicata."[34]  (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
"there  can be no case of intra-corporate  controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated."[28] 
For these  reasons, therefore,  the courts a quo   erred  in applying  the case of Lu.
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly pointed out[29]  that the foregoing
statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum. II.

To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving an intra-corporate controversy instituted therein, i.e.,
declaration of nullity of share  issuance,  is incapable  of pecuniary estimation  and, thus, the correct docket  fees were
paid.[30] Despite  such pronouncement,  the Court still went on to say that had the complaint therein been filed during the
effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have ruled otherwise because the amendments  brought about by the
same "seem to imply that there can be no case  of  intra-corporate  controversy  where  the  value  of the  subject matter
cannot be estimated,"[31] viz.:
In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in Lu  was actually incorrect. This is because depending  on the
nature of the principal action  or  remedy  sought,  an  intra-corporate controversy  may  involve  a subject matter which is
either capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In Cabrera v. Francisco,[35]  the Court laid down the parameters  in determining whether an action is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation or not:

The  new  Section  21  (k)  of  Rule  141  of the  Rules  of  Court,  as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC (July 20, 2004),
expressly provides that "[f]or petitions  for  insolvency  or  other cases  involving intra-corporate controversies,  the fees
prescribed  under Section 7 (a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was omitted
from the  reference.  Said  paragraph refers to  docket  fees  for  filing  "[a]ctions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated" and "all other actions not involving property."
By referring the  computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an intra-corporate  controversy  the  subject of the litigation may  not  be estimated in terms  of money, and are cognizable exclusively by [C]ourts of
always  involves a property in litigation, the value of which is always the basis for computing the applicable filing fees.
The latest amendments seem to imply that there can be  no  case  of  intra-corporate controversy where the  value of the
subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of corporate books.
If the complaint were  filed  today,  one could safely find  refuge in the express phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141  corporation's  by laws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their  voting  interest  with
that paragraph (a) alone applies.
In  the  present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000 during which  time Section  7, without
qualification, was the applicable provision. Even the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time
the applicable rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for computing the filing fees  in  intra-
corporate  cases,  recognizing that  there  could  be  an  intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated, such  as  an  action  for  inspection  of  corporate books.  The immediate illustration shows  that  no
mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the assessment of the docket fees. [32] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property  in litigation" and that
"there  can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" are
clearly non-determinative  of the antecedents  involved in that case and, hence, cannot be controlling jurisprudence to
bind our courts when it  adjudicates  similar cases  upon  the  principle  of  stare  decisis.  As  it  is evident,  these  At this juncture,  it should be mentioned that the Court passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC[38]  dated October 5, 2016, which
passages  in Lu only constitute  an opinion  delivered  by the Court as a "by the way" in relation to a hypothetical
scenario (i.e., if the complaint was filed during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which it was not) different from the
actual case before it.
In  Land  Bank  of  the  Philippines v.  Santos, [33]  the  Court  had  the opportunity  to  define  an obiter  dictum  and 
discuss  its  legal  effects  as follows:
In  determining whether an  action  is one the subject matter of which  is not  capable of pecuniary estimation this  Court
has  adopted the criterion of first  ascertaining the  nature of the principal action  or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is  in  the
municipal courts  or  in  the [C]ourts of  [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic  issue  is  something other than the  right to  recover a  sum  of money, where  the  money  claim is purely 
incidental  to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such  actions  as  cases  where 
 
[F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts). [36] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
This  case  is  a  precise illustration as  to  how  an  intra-corporate controversy may be classified as an action whose
subject matter is incapable of pecuniary  estimation.  A  cursory perusal  of  Harvest All,  et  al.'s Complaint  and 
Amended  Complaint  reveals  that  its  main purpose is  to have Alliance  hold its 2015 ASM on the date  set in the
 
the corporation  would  somehow  be  preserved. Thus,  Harvest  All,  et  al.  sought  for  the  nullity  of the  Alliance 
Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM pending completion 
of subscription  to the SR0.[37]  Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief of holding
the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum of money. The mere mention of Alliance's 
impending SRO valued at P1 Billion cannot transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary
estimation, considering  that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement to, the shares
subject of  the SRO; and (b) such mention was  merely narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution
that their voting interest as minority shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was
completed. If, in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered by virtue of
Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their principal action. Clearly therefore, Harvest
All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
introduced amendments to the  schedule  of  legal  fees  to  be  collected  in  various commercial  cases, including those
involving intra-corporate controversies. Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:
RESOLUTION
xxxx

Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.  No. 04-2-04-SC  effective 16 August 2004, 

32
incorporated  the equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed for petitions for rehabilitation under Section 21 (i)  thereof
and, furthermore, provided under Section 21(k) thereof that the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said rule shall  general rule no vested  right  may attach to,  nor  arise from, procedural laws.  It has  been  held  that "a person has no
apply  to  petitions  for  insolvency or  other  cases  involving  intra-corporate controversies;
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new schedule of filing fees as follows:
xxxx
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court  is hereby  DELETED as  the  fees covering  petitions  for  Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance with  A.M. No. 04-02-04- SC;
insolvency  are already provided for in this Resolution. As for cases involving intra corporate controversies, the 
applicable  fees shall  be those  provided under  Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of
Court  depending  on the nature of the action.
xxxx
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers
of national circulation. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Verily, the deletion  of Section  21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of Section 7 (a) [fees for  actions
where  the value  of the subject matter can  be determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for  actions where  the value  of the
subject matter cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3) [fees for all  other  actions not  involving  property] of the  same  Rule  to
cases  involving  intra-corporate controversies for  the  determination  of the correct filing fees, as the case may be,
serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments concretize the Court's recognition that the subject matter of an
intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable of pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were also
made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum)
implying that all intra-corporate cases involved a subject matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
affected. Nor  is  the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The  reason is that  as a
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or
criminal, of  any  other  than  the  existing  rules  of  procedure." [40]  (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view  of the  foregoing,  and  having  classified  Harvest  All,  et al.'s action as one incapable of pecuniary  estimation,
the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should  be made  to pay the appropriate docket  fees in accordance with  the
applicable fees provided  under  Section  7 (b) (3) of Rule  141 [fees for all other actions not involving  property]  of the
Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with  A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated  October  5, 2016.  The matter is therefore 
remanded  to the RTC in order:
(a)  to  first determine  if Harvest,  et  al.'s payment  of filing fees in the amount of P8,860.00, as initially assessed  by the
(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s  payment of P8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest,  et al.'s payment  of any discrepancy 
within  a period  of fifteen  (15)  days  from  notice, and after such payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the
case with dispatch; or
(c)  if Harvest  All,  et  al.'s payment  of  P8,860.00  is already sufficient, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case
with dispatch.
WHEREFORE,  the petition in G.R. No. 224834  is DENIED, while the petition  in G.R.  No. 224871  is PARTLY 
GRANTED.  The  Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L.  CASE NO. 15-234 is
hereby REMANDED  to the Regional  Trial Court  of Pasig  City, Branch  159 for further proceedings as stated in the final
paragraph of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

While the Court is not unaware  that the amendments brought  by A.M. No.  04-02-04-SC dated  October  5, 2016  only 
came  after  the  filing  of  the complaint  subject  of this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive 17. [ G.R. No. 226622, March 14, 2017 ]
effect  so  as  to  make  them  applicable to  the  resolution of the instant  consolidated petitions  as they  merely 
pertained  to a procedural  rule, i.e.,  Rule  141,  and  not  substantive  law.  In  Tan, Jr. v. CA,[39]  the  Court thoroughly COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PETITIONER, VS. BAI HAIDY D. MAMALINTA, RESPONDENT.
explained the retroactive  effectivity  of procedural  rules, viz.:

The general  rule that statutes  are prospective  and  not retroactive does  not  ordinarily  apply  to procedural  laws.  It  PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
has  been  held  that  "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated March 11, 2016 and the Resolution[3]dated
under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches  a new  disability,  in respect  of August 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 134368, which reversed and set aside the Decision No.
transactions  or considerations  already past. Hence,  remedial  statutes  or statutes relating to remedies or  modes of 13-0969[4] dated September 24, 2013 and the Resolution No. 14-00135[5] dated January 28, 2014 of the Civil Service
procedure, which  do not create new or  take  away  vested rights, but  only  operate in  furtherance of  the remedy  or Commission (CSC), and accordingly, reinstated respondent Bai Haidy D. Mamalinta (Mamalinta) to her former position
confirmation of rights  already existing,  do not come within the  legal  conception of a  retroactive law, or  the  general prior to her dismissal, without loss of seniority rights, and with payment of the corresponding back salaries and all
rule  against the  retroactive operation of statutes." The general  rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose benefits which she would have been entitled to if not for her illegal dismissal.
effect is to impair the obligations of contract  or  to disturb  vested  rights  does  not  prevent  the application  of statutes
to proceedings  pending at the time of their enactment  where they neither  create  new  nor  take  away  vested  The Facts
rights.  A  new statute  which deals  with  procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions  - those which have
accrued or are  pending. During the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, petitioner Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
appointed Mamalinta as Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) for South Upi, Maguindanao, together
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to  actions  pending and  undetermined at  with Abdullah K. Mato (Mato) and Pablito C. Peñafiel (Peñafiel), Sr. as Vice-Chairman and Member, respectively. While
the  time  of  their passage.  Procedural  laws are retroactive  in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural  performing their functions as such, the MBOC allegedly committed the following acts: ( a) on May 16, 2004, the MBOC
statutes may somehow affect the litigants'  rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The proclaimed Datu Israel Sinsuat (Sinsuat) as Mayor, Datu Jabarael Sinsuat [6] as Vice-Mayor, and eight (8) members of
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative  of any  right of  a  person who  may  feel  that he  is adversely the Sangguniang Bayan as winning candidates, on the basis of nineteen (19) out of the thirty-five (35) total election

33
returns; (b) on even date, the MBOC caused the transfer of the place for canvassing of votes from Tinaman Elementary
School, South Upi, Maguindanao to Cotabato City without prior authority from the COMELEC; and (c) two days later or
on May 18, 2004, they proclaimed a new set of winning candidates, headlined by Antonio Gunsi, Jr. (Gunsi) as Mayor
and four (4) new members of the Sangguniang Bayanon the basis of thirty (30) out of thirty five (35) election returns.
Thus, on May 20, 2004, Atty. Clarita Callar, Regional Election Director of the COMELEC Regional Office No. XII,
reported the incidents to the COMELEC En Banc, which in turn, directed the COMELEC Law Department to conduct a
fact-finding investigation on the matter. Thereafter, the COMELEC Law Department recommended the filing of
administrative and criminal cases against the members of the MBOC, and subsequently, Mamalinta was formally
charged with Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Gross Inefficiency and Incompetence, and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service.[7]
In her defense,[8] Mamalinta denied the charges against her, essentially claiming that the MBOC's acts of double
proclamation and transferring the place for canvassing were attended by duress in view of the imminent danger to their
lives due to the violence and intimidation initiated by Gunsi's supporters.[9]
The COMELEC En Banc Ruling
In a Resolution[10] dated May 24, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc found Mamalinta guilty of Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and accordingly, dismissed her from public
service, with imposition of all accessory penalties relative thereto.[11]
Adopting the fmdings of its Law Department, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that the MBOC's acts of proclaiming two (2)
sets of winning candidates; issuing such proclamations based on an incomplete canvass of votes; and transferring the
place for the canvassing of votes are blatant violations of various laws and COMELEC resolutions on the conduct of
elections, and thus, sufficient to hold Mamalinta liable for the aforesaid administrative offenses, thereby justifying her
dismissal from service. In this relation, the COMELEC En Banc did not lend credence to Mamalinta's claim of duress
and/or threats, opining her failure to substantiate the same.[12]
Mamalinta moved for reconsideration,[13] which was denied in a Resolution[14] dated November 27, 2012. Aggrieved, she
appealed to the CSC.[15]
The CSC Ruling
In Decision No. 13-0969[16] dated September 24, 2013, the CSC affirmed the COMELEC En Banc ruling. It held that as
MBOC Chairman, Mamalinta clearly committed the acts complained of which violated various election laws and rules and
tarnished the image and integrity of her public office, as well as the elections in South Upi, Maguindanao, in general. The
CSC likewise did not lend credence to Mamalinta's claims of violence, opining that they were self-serving, absent any
evidence supporting the same.[17]
Dissatisfied, Mamalinta filed a motion for reconsideration,[18] attaching thereto the Minutes[19] of the MBOC dated May 14
and 15, 2004 and the Report[20] dated May 16, 2004, both prepared by Peñafiel narrating the incidents that transpired
during the canvassing in South Upi, Maguindanao.[21] Such motion was, however, denied by the CSC through Resolution
No. 14-00135[22] dated January 28, 2014. Undaunted, she elevated the matter to the CA via a petition[23] for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[24] dated March 11, 2016, the CA reversed and set aside the CSC ruling, and accordingly, reinstated
Mamalinta to her former position prior to her dismissal, without loss of seniority rights, and with payment of the
corresponding back salaries and all benefits which she would have been entitled to if not for her illegal dismissal.
34
Contrary to the findings of the COMELEC En Banc and the CSC, the CA found that Mamalinta sufficiently substantiated
her claims of duress by presenting various documentary evidence, namely, the Joint-Affidavit [25] dated May 18, 2004 she
executed with her Vice-Chairman, Mato, and the Minutes[26] of the MBOC dated May 14 and 15, 2004 and the
Report[27] dated May 16, 2004 both prepared by Peñafiel, all of which recounted the acts of duress and intimidation
pressed on them. Further noting that Mamalinta immediately flew to Manila after escaping the hostile incidents they
experienced in order to report the same to then-COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, the CA concluded that
Mamalinta and the rest of the MBOC were indeed forced, intimidated, and coerced into performing the acts constituting
the charges against them, and thus, they could not be held administratively liable therefor.[28]
The COMELEC moved for reconsideration,[29] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[30] dated August 26, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the CSC ruling, and
consequently, absolved Mamalinta from the administrative charges of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.[31]
On the other hand, and as compared to Simple Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give
proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference, Gross Neglect of Duty is
characterized by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and
palpable breach of duty.[32]
Meanwhile, certain acts may be considered as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service as long as they tarnish
the image and integrity of the public office and may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to violate
the law or to disregard established rules.[33] In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,[34] the Court outlined the following acts that
constitute this offense, such as: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back to work
without prior notice, failure to keep in safety public records and property, making false entries in public documents, and
falsification of court orders.[35]
In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability under the foregoing offenses, only the quantum of proof of
substantial evidence is required, or that amount or relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.[36]
In the case at bar, a judicious review of the records reveals that Mamalinta is being charged of committing the following
acts, namely: (a) the double proclamation of Sinsuat and Gunsi as mayor of South Upi; (b) the transfer of the place for
canvassing of votes from Tinaman Elementary School, South Upi, Maguindanao to Cotabato City without prior authority
from the COMELEC; and (c) the premature proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the basis of an
incomplete canvass of election returns.
Anent the first two (2) acts complained of, i.e., the double proclamation and the unauthorized transfer of the place for
canvassing, the Court agrees with the CA that Mamalinta should not be held administratively liable for the same to
warrant her dismissal from the service, as such acts were committed while under duress and intimidation. In People v.
Nuñez,[37] the Court defined duress as follows:
Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future
injury is not enough.
To be available as a defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great bodily
harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape
or self-defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could shield himself from prosecution
for crime bl merely setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a third person.[38](Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Thus, "[d]uress, as a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for one's own life. It should not
be inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A threat of future injury is not enough. It must be clearly shown that
the compulsion must be of such character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape."[39]
In the instant case, records reveal that Mamalinta and the rest of the MBOC of South Upi, Maguindanao, were under
heavy duress from supporters of mayoralty candidate Gunsi. As stated in Mamalinta's Joint Affidavit [40] with Mato, the
Vice-Chairman of the MBOC, they were forcibly taken and held hostage by Gunsi's supporters, and while detained, were
forced, intimidated, and coerced into declaring Gunsi as the winning candidate, despite their earlier proclamation that
Sinsuat was the true winner of the mayoralty elections. Mamalinta and Mato's statements in their Joint Affidavit were then
corroborated by the Minutes[41] of the MBOC dated May 14 and 15, 2004 and the Report[42]dated May 16, 2004 both
prepared by Peñafiel, another member of the MBOC, stating inter alia, that while the MBOC was canvassing the votes,
Gunsi's supporters kicked open the doors of the room, rushed towards the members of the MBOC, and even attempted
to throw chairs to them. Irrefragably, the foregoing incidents show that duress and intimidation were clearly exercised
against Mamalinta and the rest of the MBOC, and thus, the latter succumbed to the same by performing the aforesaid
acts, i.e., the double proclamation and the unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing, albeit against their will.
Furthermore, the CA aptly pointed out that as soon as Mamalinta and the MBOC escaped from their dire situation, she
immediately flew to Manila to report the incidents to the COMELEC, and such fact was not seriously disputed by the
latter.[43] Thus, there is more reason to believe that Mamalinta and the MBOC did not willingly commit the aforementioned
acts.
To clarify, the CA did not err in considering Mamalinta and Mato's Joint Affidavit - as well as the Minutes of the MBOC
dated May 14 and 15, 2004 and the Report dated May 16, 2004 both prepared by Peñafiel - although they were not
formally offered as evidence during the investigation before the COMELEC. As a rule, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Hence, in proper cases such as this, the procedural rules
may be relaxed for the furtherance of just objectives.[44] Thus, the CA did not err in taking these documents in
consideration.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court notes that the CA failed to determine Mamalinta's administrative liability on the
third act she was accused of committing, i.e., the premature proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the
basis of an incomplete canvass of election returns. In Nasser Immam v. COMELEC,[45] the Court ruled that a complete
canvass of votes is necessary in order to reflect the true desire of the electorate, and that a proclamation of winning
candidates on the basis of incomplete canvass is illegal and of no effect, viz.:
Jurisprudence provides that all votes cast in an election must be considered, otherwise voters shall be disenfranchised. A
canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless and until all returns are considered and none is
omitted. In this case, fourteen (14) precincts were omitted in the canvassing.
xxxx
35
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass cannot be
reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and none is omitted. This is true when the
election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the election.
We note that the votes of petitioner totaled one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one (1,961) while private respondent
garnered a total of one thousand nine hundred thirty (1,930) votes. The difference was only thirty-one (31) votes. There
were fourteen (14) precincts unaccounted for whose total number of registered voters are two thousand three hundred
and forty-eight (2,348). Surely, these votes will affect the result of the election. Consequently, the non-inclusion of the 14
precincts in the counting disenfranchised the voters.[46] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, the COMELEC En Banc correctly pointed out that the uncanvassed election returns can still drastically
affect the outcome of the elections, since "at the time of Sinsuat's proclamation, he garnered only [1,230] votes, with the
exclusion of the [12] election returns and [4] election returns that have yet to be canvassed. These [4] election returns
amount to [3,049] votes, or equivalent to 42.91% of the total registered voters of South Upi, Maguindanao." [47] Notably,
Mamalinta's defense of duress which was upheld in her other two (2) acts of double proclamation and unauthorized
transfer of the place for canvassing is untenable in this instance as there was no showing that the MBOC was intimidated
or coerced into proclaiming Sinsuat as the winning candidate for the position of Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao. The
allegations of Mamalinta that force and threats were exerted on her to make said premature proclamation are self-serving
and not supported by any other evidence, hence, cannot be relied upon.[48] Therefore, Mamalinta's afore-described act of
premature proclamation may still be considered as Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and/or Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of Service, and thus, she should be held administratively liable therefor.
In sum, while Mamalinta may be absolved from administrative liability for her acts of double proclamation and
unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing as such acts were done under duress, she is nevertheless
administratively liable for her premature proclamation of Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the basis of an incomplete
canvass of votes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 11, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 26, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134368 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Bai Haidy D.
Mamalinta is hereby found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. Accordingly, her civil service eligibility is CANCELLED, and her retirement and other benefits,
except accrued leave credits, are hereby FORFEITED. Further, she is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIEDfrom re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or
government financial institution.
SO ORDERED.
18. A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017
ROSA YAP PARAS, COMPLAINANT, V. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS, RESPONDENT. 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint[1] (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras
(complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the practice of
law for a year. The issues before the Court now are (a) whether respondent should be held administratively liable for
allegedly violating his suspension order and (b) whether his suspension should be lifted.
The Facts
In a Decision[2] dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for
falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality
and abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served simultaneously.[3] Respondent moved for The Issues Before the Court
reconsideration[4] but the Court denied it with finality in a Resolution[5] dated January 22, 2001. The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while he
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion[6] to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. was suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.
Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading The Court's Ruling
prepared by respondent, in violation of the suspension order.[7] Moreover, complainant claimed that respondent appeared At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation
before a court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension order.[8] On March 26, 2001, pertain to respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the Court to lift the suspension order.
complainant filed a second motion for contempt and disbarment,[9] claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating
appeared for Paras and Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension order issued against respondent. Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant –
[10]
 Complainant filed two (2) more motions for contempt dated June 8, 2001[11] and August 21, 2001[12] raising the same which was already resolved with finality by no less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of
arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments,[13]and complainant filed her replies[14] to both Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's
comments. Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension[15]dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he report and recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this
completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started accepting new leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its basis in resolving the issues raised before it.
clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension.[16] Also, complainant manifested that respondent
appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift suspension. In
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid
view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for report and
and compelling reasons,[38] as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised.
recommendation.[17] [39]
 Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order[18] on the status of respondent'
proceedings.[40] However, in light of the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission that he resumed
suspension, essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his
practicing law even without a Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the
suspension.[19] Meanwhile, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry through a Letter[20]dated
matters raised before it even without the IBP's factual findings and recommendation thereon.
March 21, 2003 signed by Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and recommendation. [21]
law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and
In a Report and Recommendation[22] dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order
experience."[41] During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing
declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the Court.[23]Citing
law.[42] It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the
case law, the OBC opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in
suspension period.[43] The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the
the Court's decision and an order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable him to resume the practice
suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law.[44]
of his profession. In this regard, the OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on May 23,
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001 and
2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that
lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension.
the suspensions were to be served simultaneously, the period of suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002.[24] To
However, soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to
date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting the suspension.
accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the Department of
Soon thereafter, in a Resolution[25] dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and
Agrarian Reform.[45] Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the
recommendation on the pending incidents referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was
suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor.
constrained to issue a Resolution[26] dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report regarding the
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and willfully
said incidents. In response, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter [27] to the Court, conveying that the Board
appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of in this case – are grounds for
of Governors had passed a Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's suspension from the practice of law.
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law,[46] to wit:
[28]
 However, in view of the pendency of respondent's motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
the case records to the Court as soon as said motion is resolved.[29] Thereafter, in a letter[30]dated September 22, 2015,
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
the IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. The Court received the records and
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
relevant documents only on February 15, 2016.[31]
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
In the Report and Recommendation[32] dated January 16, 2012, instead of resolving only the pending incidents referred to
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against respondent which had
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
been resolved with finality by the Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and Resolution dated January 22, 2001.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law[47] shows that the Court consistently imposed
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years
an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an
for falsifying his wife's signature in the bank loan documents and for immorality.[33]
additional suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is
In a Resolution[34] dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
mindful, however, that suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent
Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from
had already been disbarred from the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v.
the practice of law for one (1) year.[35] Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for reconsideration,[36] alleging that his
Paras.[48] In Sanchez v. Torres,[49] the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed
administrative liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had been settled more than a decade ago in the
on a lawyer who had been previously disbarred.[50] Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's administrative
Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to suspend him anew for another year based on the same
liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent therein
grounds would constitute administrative double jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the
should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer be imposed in view of his
IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the
previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the
suspension. Such motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015.[37]

36
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his
previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the
propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and academic.
As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 2001[51] and indicating therein the
firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.
As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings
on their behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared the
pleading and only requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by complainant was dated
February 21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo
must be denied for lack of merit.
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters referred to it for
investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to ensure proper
administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, considering
that respondent has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record
as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. 225608, March 13, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR AND JOEL ANGELES
Y DE JESUS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellants Alberto Alejandro y Rigor (Alejandro) and Joel
Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Decision [2] dated June 3, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495, which affirmed with modification the Joint Decision [3] dated August 20,
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96),
73-SD(96), and 74-SD(96) convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of Simple Rape and Homicide, defined and
penalized under Articles 335[4] and 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), respectively.
The Facts
On March 28, 1996, a total of three (3) separate Informations were filed before the RTC, each charging accused-
appellants of one (1) count of Simple Rape and one (1) count of Homicide, viz.:[5]
Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality
of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
37
accused [Alejandro], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA[6]] against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock [sic] in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality
of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one AAA against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.
Contrary to law.
Crim Case No. 74-SD(96)
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of [Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Alejandro and Angeles],
together with two (2) other persons whose identities are still unknown (John Doe and Peter Doe), conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, box, beat and stab one [BBB] on the different parts of her body with the use of a pointed instrument, thereby
causing her instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Contrary to law.
Upon Alejandro's arrest, he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him as stated in Crim. Case Nos. 72-SD(96) and
74-SD(96).[7]
While Angeles was still at large, the prosecution sought for the amendment of the Informations in Crim. Case Nos. 72-
SD(96) and 73-SD(96) to convey a conspiracy between accused-appellants in the rape cases against AAA. The RTC
allowed the amendment of the Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) to include Alejandro therein as a conspirator;
however, it disallowed the proposed amendment in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96) to include Angeles therein as conspirator
on the ground that Alejandro had already been arraigned in the latter case.[8] The amended Information in Crim. Case No.
73-SD(96) reads:
That on or about the 5th day of January 1996, at around 2:30 o'clock in the morning, at Brgy. [Collado], Municipality of
[Talavera], Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [Angeles], with lewd design, and in conspiracy with one ALBERTO ALEJANDRO Y RIGOR (a), "JESUS", by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to law.[9]
Eventually, Angeles was arrested and arraigned in connection with Crim. Case Nos. 73-SD(96) and 74-SD(96), to which
he pleaded not guilty. Alejandro was likewise arraigned in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) and pleaded not guilty as well.[10]
The prosecution alleged that on December 12, 1995, AAA joined her co-worker for a vacation in the province of Nueva
Ecija as they were both laid off from work, and they stayed at the one-storey house of the latter's 62-year old mother,
BBB. Thereat, AAA would sleep at the papag while BBB slept on a mattress on the floor. At around 2:30 in the morning
of January 5, 1996, AAA awoke to the sound of BBB's pleas for mercy. Aided by the kerosene lamp placed on the floor,
AAA saw BBB being mauled and stabbed to death by Alejandro and Angeles. Thereafter, Angeles approached AAA and
restrained her arms, while Alejandro pulled AAA's pants and underwear down and started having carnal knowledge of
her. After Alejandro was done, he switched places with Angeles and the latter took his turn ravishing AAA. As AAA was
able to fight back by scratching Angeles's back, Angeles punched her on the left side of her face while Alejandro hit her
left jaw with a piece of wood. AAA then lost consciousness and woke up in a hospital, while BBB succumbed to her
injuries.[11]
At the hospital, the police officers interviewed AAA and showed her several mugshots in order for her to identify her
assailants. AAA was then able to recognize Alejandro and Angeles from said mugshots and positively identified them as
the perpetrators of the crime. Medical records also revealed that AAA was indeed sexually assaulted, while BBB died
due to "neurogenic shock" or severe pain secondary to "multiple blunt injury and fracture of the mandibular and facio-
maxillary bones."[12]
In his defense, Angeles denied the charges against him and presented an alibi. He averred that on the night before the
incident, he was at home with his wife and slept as early as eight (8) o'clock in the evening. Upon waking up at seven (7)
o'clock in the morning of the next day, he was informed by his brother-in-law of BBB's death. He further averred that his
relationship with BBB was like that of a mother and son.[13]
Similarly, Alejandro invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that at around nine (9) o'clock in the evening
prior to the incident, he went home and slept. As testified by Noel Mendoza (Mendoza), Alejandro's relative by affinity, he
asked Alejandro to help him irrigate the rice field, but the latter declined. At around midnight, Mendoza went to
Alejandro's house to personally fetch Alejandro, but considering that the house was closed, Mendoza peeped through a
hole and there he saw Alejandro soundly asleep. Alejandro further claimed that he does not know both AAA and Angeles
until the filing of the charges against him.[14]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision[15] dated August 20, 2013, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty as charged and, accordingly,
sentenced them as follows: (a) in Crim. Case No. 72-SD(96), Alejandro was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellants were each sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and each ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-
appellants were sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered
to pay BBB's heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter's death. [16]
In so ruling, the RTC gave credence to AAA's positive identification of accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crimes charged, expressly noting that AAA had no ill motive to falsely testify against them. In this light, the RTC found
untenable accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi, considering too that they have failed to show that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when the crimes against AAA and BBB were committed. [17]
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed[18] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated June 3, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with the following modifications: (a) in Crim. Case
No. 72-SD(96), Alejandro was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape and, accordingly, was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Alejandro was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1) count of Simple Rape, while Angeles was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the same crime, and accordingly, were separately sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
38
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Simple Rape; and (c) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96),
accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and, accordingly, were each sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to
solidarity pay BBB's heirs the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as temperate damages. In addition, accused-appellants are likewise ordered to pay legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on all monetary awards from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.[20]
It held that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants' complicity to the crimes charged,
as they were positively identified by AAA who had an unobstructed view of their appearance when said crimes were
being committed. It likewise found the existence of conspiracy in the commission of said crimes, considering that
accused-appellants: (a) cooperated in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in her death; and (b) took turns in having
carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent, while the other restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. [21]
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
aforesaid crimes.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that during the pendency of the instant appeal, Alejandro filed a Motion to Withdraw
Appeal[22] dated January 19, 2017, stating that despite knowing the full consequences of the filing of said motion, he still
desires to have his appeal withdrawn. In view thereof, the Court hereby grants said motion, and accordingly, deems the
case closed and terminated as to him. Thus, what is left before the Court is the resolution of Angeles's appeal.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law."[23]
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to modify accused-appellants' convictions, as will be explained
hereunder.
Article 249 of the RPC states:
Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceeding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide
and punished by reclusion temporal.
"To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1)
that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused
had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have performed all the
acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical
intervention or attendance."[24]
On the other hand, pertinent portions of Article 335 of the RPC (the controlling provision as the rapes were committed
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. [RA] 8353[25] in 1997) read:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
"Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) said carnal
knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented. The provision also states that if the act
is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape,
necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty."[26]
In this case, both the RTC and the CA were one in giving credence to AAA's positive identification that accused-
appellants conspired in stabbing and mauling BBB, resulting in the latter's death; and that thereafter, Angeles proceeded
to rape her while Alejandro restrained her arms to prevent her from resisting. Absent any cogent reason to the contrary,
the Court defer to the findings of fact of both courts and, thereby, upholds Angeles's conviction for Rape in Crim. Case
No. 73-SD(96) and Homicide in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), given that the elements of said crimes square with the
established incidents. In People v. Antonio:[27]
It is a fundamental rule that the trial court's factual findings, especially its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect and binding upon this Court, particularly when affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has
repeatedly recognized that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses'
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can
observe the furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant
or full realization of an oath. These are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of
unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [28]
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court deems it appropriate to modify Angeles's conviction in Crim. Case No. 73-
SD(96), as ruled by the CA. As adverted to earlier, the CA convicted Angeles for two (2) counts of Simple Rape in Crim.
Case No. 73-SD(96) alone, ratiocinating that "Angeles must be held liable for two (2) counts of simple rape in Crim. Case
No. 73-SD(96) for raping AAA and for aiding (or conspiring with) Alejandro in raping her."[29]
The CA erred on this matter.
The accusatory portion of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) states that "[Angeles], with lewd
designs, and in conspiracy with one [Alejandro], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of one [AAA] against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice
of the said offended party."[30] Plainly, the wording of the amended Information reveals that it charged accused-appellants
with only one (1) count of Rape. As such, it was error for the CA to convict Angeles with two (2) counts. Thus, Angeles
must be convicted with one (1) count of Rape in relation to Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96).
On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro
as a co-accused and that accused-appellants were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the
39
conviction in said case from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if
the rape is committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the
crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance. Notably, this will no longer affect Alejandro as he had already withdrawn
his appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision.
In sum, Angeles should be convicted of one (1) count of Qualified Rape and one (1) count of Homicide.
Anent the proper penalties to be imposed on Angeles, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
connection with Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), and the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, as regards Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96).
Finally, in line with existing jurisprudence, the Court deems it proper to adjust the award of damages as follows: (a) in
Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) in Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), Angeles is ordered to
pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
temperate damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until
fully paid.[31]
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Alberto Alejandro y Rigor's Motion to Withdraw Appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
instant case CLOSED and TERMINATED as to him.
On the other hand, the appeal of accused-appellant Joel Angeles y de Jesus (Angeles) is DENIED. The Decision dated
June 3, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06495 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as to
him, as follows:
(a) In Crim. Case No. 73-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Qualified Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 74-SD(96), accused-appellant Angeles is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
each suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and ordered to pay the heirs of BBB the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P50,000.00 as temperate damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
20. G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PUYAT MACAPUNDAG Y LABAO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT. 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Puyat Macapundag y Labao (Macapundag) assailing
the Decision[2] dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06224, which affirmed the Joint
Decision[3] dated June 13, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos.
81014 and 81015, finding Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations filed before the RTC accusing Macapundag of violating Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165, viz.:
Criminal Case No. 81014
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to PO[3] GEORGE ARDEDON[5] who posed, as buyer, EPHEDRINE weighing 0.01 gram, a dangerous drug,
without the corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be such.
Contrary to Law.[6]
Criminal Case No. 81015
That on or about the 14th day of March, 2009 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing EPHEDRINE
weighing 0.02 gram, 0.01 gram & 0.02 gram, when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests
of Ephedrine [sic], a dangerous drug.
Contrary to Law.[7]
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:00 to 8:30 in the morning of March 14, 2009, an informant tipped the Caloocan
City Police that a certain individual known as alias "Popoy" was selling  shabu in Baltazar Street, 10thAvenue, Caloocan
City. Acting on the tip, Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Christopher Prangan (PCI Prangan) ordered the conduct of a buy-
bust operation in coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), with Police Officer 3 (PO3) George
Ardedon (PO3 Ardedon) designated as poseur-buyer, and Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Arnel Victoriano (SPO1
Victoriano) and Police Officer 2 (PO2) Jeffred Pacis (PO2 Pacis), as back-up officers. [8] After the team's final briefing,
they proceeded to the target area where they saw Macapundag, who was then identified by the informant as "Popoy."
Consequently, PO3 Ardedon approached Macapundag and retorted "Brad, pakuha," followed by "Brad, paiskor naman."
Macapundag replied "Magkano?," to which PO3 Ardedon responded "Tatlong piso lang," and simultaneously handed the
three (3) marked P100.00 bills. Macapundag then took four (4) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance,
gave one to PO3 Ardedon, and returned the other three (3) back to his pocket. Upon receiving the sachet, PO3 Ardedon
gave the pre-arranged signal by holding his nape and then held Macapundag, as the back-up officers rushed to the
scene. PO3 Ardedon marked the plastic sachet he purchased from Macapundag, while SPO1 Victoriano marked the
other three (3) recovered from his pocket.[9] Thereafter, they brought Macapundag to the police station, where the seized
items were turned over to PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito), the investigator on duty. [10] Later, PO2 Hipolito brought
the items to the crime laboratory for physical examination.[11] Eventually, Forensic Chemical Officer-PCI Stella Ebuen
(PCI Ebuen) examined the specimen, which tested positive for ephedrine, a dangerous drug.[12]
In his defense, Macapundag denied the charges against him. He testified that he was arrested on March 12, 2009, and
not on March 14, 2009 as alleged by the prosecution. At around noon of the said date, he claimed that he was just sitting
in his house when three (3) armed men suddenly entered and looked for a certain "Rei." He told them that "Rei" lived in
the other house, but one of the men held and handcuffed him. He was then brought to the Sangandaan Police Station
where he was detained in a small cell. Later, he was asked to call some relatives. When he replied that he only has his
daughter, SPO1 Victoriano hit him on the chest. After a few days, the police demanded P50,000.00 from Macapundag's
daughter for his release. When he told them that he did not have that amount, he was hit again. On March 15,2009, he
was brought to the house of the fiscal for inquest.[13]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision[14] dated June 13, 2013, the RTC found Macapundag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively, finding
that all the necessary elements thereof have been proven. In particular, the prosecution was able to establish that PO3
40
Ardedon indeed purchased a sachet of ephedrine from Macapundag in the amount of P300.00. Likewise, it was shown
that three (3) other sachets of ephedrine were recovered from Macapundag upon his arrest.[15] The RTC further observed
that the prosecution was able to demonstrate an unbroken chain of custody over the seized items. [16] Meanwhile, the RTC
gave no credence to the latter's defenses of denial and alibi in light of his positive identification as the culprit, as well as
the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers in the performance of their duties. [17]
Aggrieved, Macapundag elevated his conviction before the CA.[18]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated April 22, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto, finding that the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt that Macapundag illegally sold and possessed dangerous drugs in violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In the same vein, the CA found that the integrity of the seized drugs was aptly
preserved and the chain of custody was not broken, notwithstanding the fact that the procedural requirements in Section
21 of RA 9165 were not faithfully observed.[20]
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Macapundag's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, as defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[21] The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
[22]
Macapundag was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution
must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold
and the payment.[23] On the other hand, the prosecution must establish the following elements to convict an accused
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as
a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug.[24]
Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to obviate
any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the
moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.[25]
In the Appellant's Brief,[26] Macapundag prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section
21 of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Particularly, he claims that they did not make any
inventory and failed to take pictures of the confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of his arrest. There was also no
justification given as to why they failed to comply with these requirements of law.[27]
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[28] Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. [29]
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that PO3 Ardedon (with respect to the sachet handed over by
Macapundag to him) and SPO1 Victoriano (with respect to the three sachets recovered from Macapundag upon his
arrest) marked the seized items immediately at the place of arrest. However, the prosecution's witnesses failed to state
whether or not the police officers inventoried and photographed the seized sachets in the presence of Macapundag or his
representative. Likewise, they were silent as to the presence of the other required witnesses,  i.e., a representative from
the Department of Justice (DOJ), any elected public official, and a member of the press. [30] In fact, the prosecution did not
even offer any inventory of the seized items or photographs thereof as evidence. [31] In this relation, it is observed that the
Evidence Acknowledgement Receipt[32] and the Affidavit of Attestation,[33] which form part of the evidence of the
prosecution, likewise failed to disclose that the seized items were actually inventoried or photographed in accordance
with the parameters provided by Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR; thus, their submission cannot constitute compliance
with the law.
In People v. Sanchez,[34] the Court recognized that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21 of 9165 may not always be possible, and ruled that under the implementing guidelines of the said
Section, "non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items." However, the Court added that the prosecution bears the burden of proving
justifiable cause.[35]
Thus, in People v. Almorfe,[36] the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain
the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.[37] Also, in People v. De Guzman,[38] it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.[39]
In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the inventory and photograph of the seized
evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at the police station, as required by the IRR in case
of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of
Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a representative from the DOJ, the media and an elected public official
to witness the inventory and receive copies of the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and photographs
of the seized items.[40] Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the
accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti  had been compromised.[41] It has been repeated in
jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside
as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. [42]
With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds petitioner's acquittal in order. As such, it is unnecessary to delve into
the other issues raised in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06224 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Puyat Macapundag y Labao is ACQUITTED of
the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is
being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
21. G.R. No. 189950*, April 24, 2017
BERNADETTE S. BILAG, ERLINDA BILAG-SANTILLAN, DIXON BILAG, REYNALDO B. SUELLO, HEIRS OF
LOURDES S. BILAG, HEIRS OF LETICIA BILAG-HANAOKA, AND HEIRS OF NELLIE BILAG, PETITIONERS, VS.
ESTELA AY-AY, ANDRES ACOP, JR., FELICITAS AP-AP, SERGIO AP-AP, JOHN NAPOLEON A. RAMIREZ, JR., AND
MA. TERESA A. RAMIREZ, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated March 19, 2009 and the Resolution[3]dated
September 3, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266, which set aside the Order[4] dated October
10, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 (RTC Br. 61), and consequently, remanded the case to
the latter court for trial.
41
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint[5] dated August 12, 2004 for Quieting of Title with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction filed by respondents Estela Ay-Ay, Andres Acop, Jr., Felicitas Ap-Ap, Sergio Ap-Ap, John Napoleon A.
Ramirez, Jr., and Ma. Teresa A. Ramirez (respondents) against petitioners Bernadette S. Bilag, Erlinda Bilag-Santillan,
Dixon Bilag, Reynaldo B. Suello, Heirs of Lourdes S. Bilag, Heirs of Leticia Bilag-Hanaoka, and Heirs of Nellie Bilag
before the RTC Br. 61, docketed as Civil Case No. 5881-R. Essentially, respondents alleged that Iloc Bilag, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, sold to them separately various portions of a 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by
the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated at Sitio Benin, Baguio City (subject lands), and
that they registered the  corresponding Deeds of Sale[6] with the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. According to
respondents, Iloc Bilag not only acknowledged full payment and guaranteed that his heirs, successors-in-interest, and
executors are to be bound by such sales, but he also caused the subject lands to be removed from the Ancestral Land
Claims. Respondents further alleged that they have been in continuous possession of the said lands since 1976 when
they were delivered to them and that they have already introduced various improvements thereon. Despite the foregoing,
petitioners refused to honor the foregoing sales by asserting their adverse rights on the subject lands. Worse, they
continued to harass respondents, and even threatened to demolish their improvements and dispossess them thereof.
Hence, they filed the instant complaint to quiet their respective titles over the subject lands and remove the cloud cast
upon their ownership as a result of petitioners' refusal to recognize the sales.[7]
For their part, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] dated November  4, 2004 on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction,
prescription/laches/estoppel, and res judicata.  Anent the first ground, petitioners averred that the subject lands are
untitled, unregistered, and form part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation which were long classified as lands of the public
domain. As such, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as it is the Land Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau
of Lands) which is vested with the authority to determine issues of ownership over unregistered public lands. [9]
As to the second ground, petitioners argued that it is only now, or more than 27 years from the execution of the Deeds of
Sale, that respondents seek to enforce said Deeds; thus, the present action is already barred by prescription and/or
laches.[10]
Regarding the final ground, petitioners pointed out that on January 27, 1998, respondents had already filed a complaint
against them for injunction and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 3934-R before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 5 (RTC Br. 5), wherein they principally asserted their ownership over the subject lands. However, RTC Br. 5
dismissed Civil Case No. 3934-R for lack of merit on the ground of respondents' failure to show convincing proof of
ownership over the same,[11] which Order of dismissal was then affirmed by the CA on appeal.[12] Eventually, the Court
issued a Resolution dated January 21, 2004[13] declaring the case closed and terminated for failure to file the intended
petition subject of the Motion for Extension to file the same. In view of the foregoing, petitioners contended that due to the
final and executory ruling in Civil Case No. 3934-R, the filing of Civil Case No. 5881-R seeking to establish the ownership
thereof is already barred by res judicata.[14]
The RTC Br. 61 Ruling
In an Order[15] dated October 10, 2005, the RTC Br. 61 ruled in petitioners' favor, and consequently, ordered the dismissal
of Civil Case No. 5881-R on the following grounds: (a) it had no authority to do so; (b) the Deeds of Sale in respondents'
favor could not as yet be considered title to the subject lands, noting the failure of respondents to perfect their title or
assert ownership and possession thereof for the past 27 years; and (c) the filing of the instant case is barred by res
judicata  considering the final and executory Decision dismissing the earlier filed Civil Case No. 3934-R where
respondents similarly sought to be declared the owners of the subject lands.[16]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA.[17]
 The CA Ruling
In a Decision[18] dated March 19, 2009, the CA set aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R, and accordingly,
remanded the case to the court a quo for trial.[19] It held that Civil Case No. 3934-R was an action for injunction where
respondents sought to enjoin petitioners' alleged entry into the subject lands and their introduction of improvements
thereat; whereas Civil Case No. 5881-R is an action to quiet title where respondents specifically prayed, inter alia, for the
removal of the cloud upon their ownership and possession of the subject lands. In this light, the CA concluded that while
these cases may involve the same properties, the nature of the action differs; hence, res judicata is not a bar to the
present suit. On the issue of laches, prescription or estoppel, the CA pointed out that in view of respondents' allegation
that they have been in possession of the subject lands since 1976, their action to quiet title is imprescriptible. [20]
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration[21] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[22] dated September 3,
2009; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly set aside the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R,
and accordingly, remanded the case to the court a quo  for trial.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in setting aside the Order of dismissal of Civil Case No. 5881-R due to the
inapplicability of the grounds of res judicata and prescription/laches, the CA notably omitted from its discussion the first
ground relied upon by petitioners, which is lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that "[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and
decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must
acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the
power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and
not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus,
when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it  has is to dismiss the action."[23] Perforce, it is
important that a court or tribunal should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented
before it, considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and without any binding legal
effects. The Court's pronouncement in Tan v. Cinco,[24] is instructive on this matter, to wit:
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and
produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court
or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.[25]
Now, on the issue of jurisdiction, a review of the records shows that the subject lands form part of a 159,496-square
meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu 189147 situated at Sitio
Benin, Baguio City. Notably, such parcel of land forms part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, a portion of which, or
146, 428 square meters, was awarded to Iloc Bilag due to the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record
No. 211, as evidenced by a Decision[26] dated April 22, 1968 promulgated by the then-Court of First Instance of Baguio
42
City.
In a catena of cases,[27] and more importantly, in Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1271,[28] it was expressly declared that all
orders and decisions issued by the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in connection with the proceedings for
the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record 211, covering lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation are null and void and without force and effect. While PD 1271 provides for a means to validate ownership
over lands forming part of the Baguio Townsite Reservation, it requires, among others, that a Certificate of Title be issued
on such lands on or before July 31, 1973.[29] In this case, records reveal that the subject lands are unregistered and
untitled, as petitioners' assertion to that effect was not seriously disputed by respondents. Clearly, the award of lots 2 and
3 of the 159,496-square meter parcel of land designated by the Bureau of Lands as Approved Plan No. 544367, Psu
189147 – which includes the subject lands – to Iloc Bilag by virtue of the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record 211, is covered by the blanket nullification provided under PD 1271, and consistently affirmed by the
prevailing case law. In view of the foregoing, it is only reasonable to conclude that the subject lands should be properly
classified as lands of the public domain as well.
Therefore, since the subject lands are untitled and unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is
the Director of Lands who has the authority to award their ownership.[30] Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized its
lack of power or authority to hear and resolve respondents' action for quieting of title. [31] In  Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila,[32] the
Court ruled that the trial court therein correctly dismissed an action to quiet title on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for
lack of authority to determine who among the parties have better right over the disputed property, which is admittedly still
part of public domain for being within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, viz.:
The DENR Decision was affirmed by the Office of the President which held that lands within the Baguio Townsite
Reservation belong to the public domain and are no longer registrable under the Land Registration Act. The Office of the
President ordered the disposition of the disputed property in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure for the
disposition of alienable public lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation, particularly Chapter X of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 on Townsite Reservations and other applicable rules.
Having established that the disputed property is public land, the trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the
complaint to quiet title for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court had no jurisdiction to determine who among the parties have
better right over the disputed property which is admittedly still part of the public domain. As held in Dajunos v. Tandayag:
x x x The Tarucs' action was for "quieting of title" and necessitated determination of the respective rights of the litigants,
both claimants to a free patent title, over a piece of property, admittedly public land. The law, as relied upon by
jurisprudence, lodges "the power of executive control, administration, disposition and alienation of public lands with the
Director of Lands subject, of course, to the control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."
In sum, the decision rendered in civil case 1218 on October 28, 1968 is a patent nullity. The court below did not have
power to determine who (the Firmalos or the Tarucs) were entitled to an award of free patent title over that piece of
property that yet belonged to the public domain. Neither did it have power to adjudge the Tarucs as entitled to the "true
equitable ownership" thereof, the latter's effect being the same: the exclusion of the Firmalos in favor of the Tarucs.
In an action for quieting of title, the complainant is seeking for "an adjudication that a claim of title or interest in property
adverse to the claimant is invalid, to free him from the danger of hostile claim, and to remove a cloud upon or quiet title to
land where stale or unenforceable claims or demands exist." Under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two
indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his title by reason of any instrument, record, deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie  appearance of validity.
In this case, petitioners, claiming to be owners of the disputed property, allege that respondents are unlawfully claiming
the disputed property by using void documents, namely the "Catulagan" and the Deed of Waiver of Rights. However, the
records reveal that petitioners do not have legal or equitable title over the disputed property, which forms part of Lot 43, a
public land within the Baguio Townsite Reservation. It is clear from the facts of the case that petitioners' predecessors-in-
interest, the heirs of Pocdo Pool, were not even granted a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim over Lot 43, which remains
public land. Thus, the trial court had no other recourse but to dismiss the case.[33] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In conclusion, RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein respondents)
seek to quiet title over lands which belong to the public domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881-R must be dismissed
on this ground. It should be stressed that the court a quo's  lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it
without authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the merits of the case. To reiterate, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it performs without
jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal effects. In this light, the Court finds no further need to discuss
the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 19, 2009 and the Resolution dated September 3,
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86266 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case
No. 5881-R is DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 61.
SO ORDERED.
22. G.R. No. 224764, April 24, 2017
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER ALFREDO V. MISAJON, GROUP SUPERVISOR
ROLANDO M. BALBIDO, AND EXAMINER REYNANTE DP. MARTIREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. LEPANTO CERAMICS,
INC., RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba City, Province of Laguna, Branch
35 (RTC Br. 35), through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Assistant Commissioner Alfredo V. Misajon (Misajon), Group Supervisor Rolando M.
Balbido (Balbido), and Examiner Reynante DP. Martirez (Martirez; collectively, petitioners) assail the Decision [2] dated
June 1, 2015 and the Order[3] dated October 26, 2015 of the RTC Br. 35 in Civil Case No. 4813-2014-C, which found
Misajon, Balbido, and Martirez (Misajon, et al.) guilty of indirect contempt and, accordingly, ordered them to pay a fine of
P5,000.00 each.
The Facts
On December 23, 2011, respondent Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. (LCI) a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine Laws with principal office address in Calamba City, Laguna - filed a petition[4] for corporate rehabilitation
pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 10142,[5] otherwise known as the "Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act (FRIA)
of 2010," docketed before the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 34, the designated Special Commercial Court in Laguna
(Rehabilitation Court). Essentially, LCI alleged that due to the financial difficulties it has been experiencing dating back to
the Asian financial crisis, it had entered into a state of insolvency considering its inability to pay its obligations as they
become due and that its total liabilities amounting to P4,213,682,715.00 far exceed its total assets worth
P1,112,723,941.00. Notably, LCI admitted in the annexes attached to the aforesaid Petition its tax liabilities to the
national government in the amount of at least P6,355,368.00.[6]
43
On January 13, 2012, the Rehabilitation Court issued a Commencement Order,[7] which, inter alia: (a) declared LCI to be
under corporate rehabilitation; (b) suspended all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for the enforcement of
claims against LCI; (c) prohibited LCI from making any payment of its liabilities outstanding as of even date, except as
may be provided under RA 10142; and (d) directed the BIR to file and serve on LCI its comment or opposition to the
petition, or its claims against LCI.[8] Accordingly, the Commencement Order was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and the same, together with the petition for corporate rehabilitation, were personally served upon LCI's
creditors, including the BIR.[9]
Despite the foregoing, Misajon, et al., acting as Assistant Commissioner, Group Supervisor, and Examiner, respectively,
of the BIR's Large Taxpayers Service, sent LCI a notice of informal conference[10] dated May 27, 2013, informing the
latter of its deficiency internal tax liabilities for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 2010. In response, LCI's court-appointed
receiver, Roberto L. Mendoza, sent BIR a letter-reply, reminding the latter of the pendency of LCI's corporate
rehabilitation proceedings, as well as the issuance of a Commencement Order in connection therewith. Undaunted, the
BIR sent LCI a Formal Letter of Demand [11] dated May 9, 2014, requiring LCI to pay deficiency taxes in the amount of
P567,519,348.39.[12] This prompted LCI to file a petition[13] for indirect contempt dated August 13, 2014 against petitioners
before RTC Br. 35. In said petition, LCI asserted that petitioners' act of pursuing the BIR's claims for deficiency taxes
against LCI outside of the pending rehabilitation proceedings in spite of the Commencement Order issued by the
Rehabilitation Court is a clear defiance of the aforesaid Order. As such, petitioners must be cited for indirect contempt in
accordance with Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 16 of RA 10142.[14]
For their part, petitioners maintained that: (a) RTC Br. 35 had no jurisdiction to cite them in contempt as it is only the
Rehabilitation Court, being the one that issued the Commencement Order, which has the authority to determine whether
or not such Order was defied; (b) the instant petition had already been mooted by the Rehabilitation Court's
Order[15] dated August 28, 2014 which declared LCI to have been successfully rehabilitated resulting in the termination of
the corporate rehabilitation proceedings; (c) their acts do not amount to a defiance of the Commencement Order as it
was done merely to toll the prescriptive period in collecting deficiency taxes, and thus, sanctioned by the Rules of
Procedure of the FRIA; (d) their acts of sending a Notice of Informal Conference and Formal Letter of Demand do not
amount to a "legal action or other recourse" against LCI outside of the rehabilitation proceedings; and (e) the indirect
contempt proceedings interferes with the exercise of their functions to collect taxes due to the government. [16]
The RTC Br. 35 Ruling
In a Decision[17] dated June 1, 2015, the RTC Br. 35 found Misajon, et al. guilty of indirect contempt and, accordingly,
ordered them to pay a fine of P5,000.00 each.[18] Preliminarily, the RTC Br. 35 ruled that it has jurisdiction over LCI's
petition for indirect contempt as it is docketed, heard, and decided separately from the principal action. [19] Going to
petitioners' other contentions, the RTC found that: (a) the supervening termination of the rehabilitation proceedings and
the consequent lifting of the Commencement Order did not render moot the petition for indirect contempt as the acts
complained of were already consummated; (b) petitioners' acts of sending LCI a notice of informal conference and
Formal Letter of Demand are covered by the Commencement Order as they were for the purpose of pursuing and
enforcing a claim for deficiency taxes, and thus, are in clear defiance of the Commencement Order; and ( c) petitioners
could have tolled the prescriptive period to collect deficiency taxes without violating the Commencement Order by simply
ventilating their claim before the rehabilitation proceedings, which they were adequately notified of. In this relation, the
RTC Br. 35 held that while the BIR is a juridical entity which can only act through its authorized intermediaries, it cannot
be concluded that it authorized the latter to commit the contumacious acts complained of, i.e., defiance of the
Commencement Order. Thus, absent any contrary evidence, only those individuals who performed such acts, namely,
Misajon, et al., should be cited for indirect contempt of court.[20]
Aggrieved, Misajon, et al. moved for reconsideration,[21] which was, however, denied in an Order[22] dated October 26,
2015; hence, this petition.
 The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC Br. 35 correctly found Misajon, et al. to have defied the
Commencement Order and, accordingly, cited them for indirect contempt.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit. Section 4 (gg) of RA 10142 states:
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
(gg) Rehabilitation shall refer to the restoration of the debtor to a condition of successful operation and solvency, if it is
shown that its continuance of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value
of payments projected in the plan, more if the debtor continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
xxxx
"[C]ase law has defined corporate rehabilitation as an attempt to conserve and administer the assets of an insolvent
corporation in the hope of its eventual return from financial stress to solvency. It contemplates the continuance of
corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful
operation and liquidity."[23]
Verily, the inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and means to minimize the expenses of the distressed
corporation during the rehabilitation period by providing the best possible framework for the corporation to gradually
regain or achieve a sustainable operating form.[24] [It] enable[s] the company to gain a new lease in life and thereby allow
creditors to be paid [t]heir claims from its earnings. Thus, rehabilitation shall be undertaken when it is shown that the
continued operation of the corporation is economically more feasible and its creditors can recover, by way of the present
value of payments projected in the plan, more, if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately
liquidated.[25]
In order to achieve such objectives, Section 16 of RA 10142 provides, inter alia, that upon the issuance of a
Commencement Order which includes a Stay or Suspension Order - all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for
the enforcement of "claims" against the distressed company shall be suspended.[26] Under the same law, claim "shall
refer to all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against the debtor or its property, whether for money or
otherwise, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, including, but
not limited to; (1) all claims of the government, whether national or local, including taxes, tariffs and customs duties; and
(2) claims against directors and officers of the debtor arising from acts done in the discharge of their functions falling
within the scope of their authority: Provided, That, this inclusion does not prohibit the creditors or third parties from filing
cases against the directors and officers acting in their personal capacities."[27]
To clarify, however, creditors of the distressed corporation are not without remedy as they may still submit their claims to
the rehabilitation court for proper consideration so that they may participate in the proceedings, keeping in mind the
general policy of the law "to ensure or maintain certainty and predictability in commercial affairs, preserve and maximize
the value of the assets of these debtors, recognize creditor rights and respect priority of claims, and ensure equitable
treatment of creditors who are similarly situated."[28] In other words, the creditors must ventilate their claims before the
rehabilitation court, and any "[a]ttempts to seek legal or other resource against the distressed corporation shall be
sufficient to support a finding of indirect contempt of court."[29]
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that LCI filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. Finding the same to be sufficient in
form and substance, the Rehabilitation Court issued a Commencement Order[30] dated January 13, 2012 which, inter alia:
(a) declared LCI to be under corporate rehabilitation; (b) suspended all actions or proceedings, in court or otherwise, for
the enforcement of claims against LCI; (c) prohibited LCI from making any payment of its outstanding liabilities as of even
44
date, except as may be provided under RA 10142; and (d) directed the BIR to file and serve on LCI its comment or
opposition to the petition, or its claims against LCL It is likewise undisputed that the BIR - personally and by publication -
was notified of the rehabilitation proceedings involving LCI and the issuance of the Commencement Order related
thereto. Despite the foregoing, the BIR, through Misajon, et al., still opted to send LCI: (a) a notice of informal
conference[31] dated May 27, 2013, informing the latter of its deficiency internal tax liabilities for the Fiscal Year ending
June 30, 2010; and (b) a Formal Letter of Demand[32]dated May 9, 2014, requiring LCI to pay deficiency taxes in the
amount of P567,519,348.39, notwithstanding the written reminder coming from LCI's court-appointed receiver of the
pendency of rehabilitation proceedings concerning LCI and the issuance of a commencement order. Notably, the acts of
sending a notice of informal conference and a Formal Letter of Demand are part and parcel of the entire process for the
assessment and collection of deficiency taxes from a delinquent taxpayer,[33] - an action or proceeding for the
enforcement of a claim which should have been suspended pursuant to the Commencement Order. Unmistakably,
Misajon, et al.'s foregoing acts are in clear defiance of the Commencement Order.
Petitioners' insistence that: (a) Misajon, et al. only performed such acts to toll the prescriptive period for the collection of
deficiency taxes; and (b) to cite them in indirect contempt would unduly interfere with their function of collecting taxes due
to the government, cannot be given any credence. As aptly put by the RTC Br. 35, they could have easily tolled the
running of such prescriptive period, and at the same time, perform their functions as officers of the BIR, without defying
the Commencement Order and without violating the laudable purpose of RA 10142 by simply ventilating their claim
before the Rehabilitation Court.[34] After all, they were adequately notified of the LCI's corporate rehabilitation and the
issuance of the corresponding Commencement Order.
In sum, it was improper for Misajon, et al. to collect, or even attempt to collect, deficiency taxes from LCI outside of the
rehabilitation proceedings concerning the latter, and in the process, willfully disregard the Commencement Order lawfully
issued by the Rehabilitation Court. Hence, the RTC Br. 35 correctly cited them for indirect contempt. [35]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 1, 2015 and the Order dated October 26, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Province of Laguna, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 4813-2014-C are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
23. G.R. No. 184262**, April 24, 2017
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS (UST), PETITIONER, VS. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST, FERNANDO
PONTESOR,* RODRIGO CLACER, SANTIAGO BUISA, JR., AND JIMMY NAZARETH, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 12, 2008 and the Resolution[3] dated
August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85464, which reversed and set aside the Resolutions
dated March 26, 2004[4] and May 25, 2004[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CASE
NO. 00-08-08586-99 (NLRC CA No. 035509-03) and, accordingly, reinstated the Decision[6]dated October 23, 2002 of the
Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC-NCR-0-08-08586-99 declaring respondents Fernando Pontesor (Pontesor), Rodrigo Clacer
(Clacer), Santiago Buisa, Jr. (Buisa), and Jimmy Nazareth (Nazareth; Pontesor, et al., collectively) as regular employees
of petitioner University of Santo Tomas (petitioner) and, thus, were illegally dismissed by the latter.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a complaint[7] for regularization and illegal dismissal filed by respondents Samahang
Manggagawa ng UST and Pontesor, et al. (respondents) against petitioner before the NLRC. Respondents alleged that
on various periods spanning the years 1990-1999, petitioner repeatedly hired Pontesor, et al. to perform various
maintenance duties within its campus, i.e., as laborer, mason, tinsmith, painter, electrician, welder, carpenter. Essentially,
respondents insisted that in view of Pontesor, et al.'s performance of such maintenance tasks throughout the years, they
should be deemed regular employees of petitioner. Respondents further argued that for as long as petitioner continues to
operate and exist as an educational institution, with rooms, buildings, and facilities to maintain, the latter could not
dispense with Pontesor, et al.'s services which are necessary and desirable to the business of petitioner.[8]
On the other hand, while petitioner admitted that it repeatedly hired Pontesor, et al. in different capacities throughout the
aforesaid years, it nevertheless maintained that they were merely hired on a per-project basis, as evidenced by
numerous Contractual Employee Appointments (CEAs)[9] signed by them. In this regard, petitioner pointed out that each
of the CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the project to
which they are assigned, and that each contract was renewable in the event the project remained unfinished upon the
expiration of the specified term. In accordance with the express provisions of said CEAs, Pontesor, et al.'s project
employment were automatically terminated: (a) upon the expiration of the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when
the project is completed ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when their employment was extended due to the non-
completion of the specific project for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project. As such, the
termination of Pontesor, et al.'s employment with petitioner was validly made due to the completion of the specific
projects for which they were hired.[10]
The LA Ruling
In a Decision[11] dated October 23, 2002, the LA ruled in Pontesor, et al.'s favor and, accordingly, ordered petitioner to
reinstate them to their former jobs with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights. [12] The LA found that
Pontesor, et al. should be deemed as petitioner's regular employees, considering that: (a) they have rendered at least
one (1) year of service to petitioner as its employees; (b) the activities for which they were hired for are vital or inherently
indispensable to the maintenance of the buildings or classrooms where petitioner's classes were held; and (c) their CEAs
were contrived to preclude them from obtaining security of tenure. In this light and in the absence of any valid cause for
termination, the LA concluded that Pontesor, et al. were illegally dismissed by petitioner.[13]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[14] to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Resolution[15] dated March 26, 2004, the NLRC vacated the LA ruling and, consequently, entered a new one
dismissing respondents' complaint for lack of merit.[16] Contrary to the LA's findings, the NLRC found that Pontesor, et al.
cannot be considered regular employees as they knowingly and voluntarily entered into fixed term contracts of
employment with petitioner. As such, they could not have been illegally dismissed upon the expiration of their respective
last valid and binding fixed term employment contracts with petitioner. This notwithstanding, the NLRC rejected
petitioner's contention that Pontesor, et al. should be deemed project employees, ratiocinating that their work were not
usually necessary and desirable to petitioner's main business or trade, which is to provide elementary, secondary,
tertiary, and post-graduate education. As such, the NLRC classified Pontesor, et al. as mere fixed term casual
employees.[17]
Respondents moved for reconsideration,[18] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[19] dated May 25, 2004.
Dissatisfied, they filed a petition[20] for certiorari before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated June 12, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling and, accordingly, reinstated that of
the LA.[22] It held that Pontesor, et al. cannot be considered as merely fixed term or project employees, considering that:
45
(a) they performed work that is necessary and desirable to petitioner's business, as evidenced by their repeated rehiring
and petitioner's continuous need for their services; and (b) the specific undertaking or project for which they were
employed were not clear as the project description set forth in their respective CEAs were either too general or too broad.
Thus, the CA classified Pontesor, et al. as regular employees, who are entitled to security of tenure and cannot be
terminated without any just or authorized cause.[23]
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[24] but the same was denied in a Resolution[25] dated August 22, 2008;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Pontesor, et al. are regular employees
and, consequently, were illegally dismissed by petitioner.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"Preliminarily, the Court stresses the distinct approach in reviewing a CA's ruling in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the
Court examines the correctness of the CA's Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65.
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court views the CA
Decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari was presented to the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the
CA's Decision from the prism of whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision."[26]
Case law states that grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[27]
"In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and
jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the
petition."[28]
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC, as its finding that Pontesor, et al. are not regular employees of petitioner patently deviates from the
evidence on record as well as settled legal principles of labor law.
Article 295[29] of the Labor Code,[30] as amended, distinguishes project employment from regular employment as follows:
Art. 295 [280]. Regular and casual employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding
and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services
to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such activity exists.
Under the foregoing provision, the law provides for two (2) types of regular employees, namely: (a) those who are
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer
(first category); and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect
to the activity in which they are employed (second category).[31] In Universal Robina Corporation v. Catapang,
[32]
 citing Abasolo v. NLRC,[33] the Court laid down the test in determining whether one is a regular employee, to wit:
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the
former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade
in its entirety. Also, if the emplovee has been performing the iob for at least a year, even if the performance is not
continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessitv if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered
regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. [34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
In Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism, and Nationalism - Organized Labor Ass'n. in Line
Industries and Agrigulture (KJLUSAN-OLALIA) v. Drilon (Kimberly),[35] the company was engaged in the manufacture of
paper products, while the questioned employees occupied the positions of mechanics, electricians, machinists, machine
shop helpers, warehouse helpers, painters, carpenters, pipefitters and masons. In that case, the Court held that since
they have worked for the company for more than one (1) year, they should belong to the second category of regular
employees by operation of law.
In the case at bar, a review of Pontesor, et al.'s respective CEAs[36] reveal that petitioner repeatedly rehired them for
various positions in the nature of maintenance workers, such as laborer, mason, painter, tinsmith, electrician, carpenter,
and welder, for various periods spanning the years 1990-1999. Akin to the situation of the employees in Kimberly,
Pontesor, et al.'s nature of work are not necessary and desirable to petitioner's usual business as an educational
institution; hence, removing them from the ambit of the first category of regular employees under Article 295 of the Labor
Code. Nonetheless, it is clear that their respective cumulative periods of employment as per their respective CEAs each
exceed one (1) year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. fall under the second category of regular employees under Article 295 of the
Labor Code. Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with respect to the activities for which
they were hired and for as long as such activities exist.
In this relation, the Court clarifies that Pontesor, et al. were not project employees of petitioner, who were validly
terminated upon the completion of their respective projects/undertakings. In Gadia v. Sykes Asia, Inc.,[37] the Court
discussed the requisites for a valid project employment, to wit:
A project employee is assigned to a project which begins and ends at determined or determinable times. Unlike regular
employees who may only be dismissed for just and/or authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of
employees who are hired as "project[-based] employees" may be lawfully terminated at the completion of the project.
According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as
"project[-based] employees" as distinguished from "regular employees," is whether or not the employees were assigned
to carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time they were
engaged for that project. The project could either be (1) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual
business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other
undertakings of the company; or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word "project" to prevent
employees from attaining a regular status, employers claiming that their workers are project[-based] employees should
not only prove that the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but also, that
there was indeed a project.[38] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As aptly held by the CA, Pontesor, et al. could not be considered as project employees because the specific
undertakings or projects for which they were employed were not clearly delineated. This is evidenced by the vagueness
of the project descriptions set forth in their respective CEAs,[39] which states that they were tasked "to assist" in various
46
carpentry, electrical, and masonry work. In fact, when the aforesaid CEAs are pieced together, it appears that during the
years 1990 to 1999, Pontesor, et al. were each engaged to perform all-around maintenance services throughout the
various facilities/installations in petitioner's campus. Thus, it seems that petitioner, through the CEAs, merely attempted
to compartmentalize Pontesor, et al.'s various tasks into purported "projects" so as to make it appear that they were hired
on a per-project basis. Verily, the Court cannot countenance this practice as to do so would effectively permit petitioners
to avoid hiring permanent or regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or casual basis, thereby violating
the employees' security of tenure relative to their jobs.[40]
Lest it be misunderstood, there are instances when the validity of project[41] or fixed term[42] employments were upheld on
the ground that it was "agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter."[43] However, if it is apparent from the circumstances
of the case "that periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee," such project or
fixed term contracts are disregarded for being contrary to public policy,[44]as in this case.
In view of the foregoing, Pontesor, et al. should, as discussed earlier, be considered regularized casual employeeswho
enjoy, inter alia, security of tenure. Accordingly, they cannot be terminated from employment without any just and/or
authorized cause, which unfortunately, petitioner was guilty of doing in this case. Hence, Pontesor, et al. must be
reinstated to their former or equivalent positions, with full backwages and without loss of seniority rights. As pointed out
by the LA, the NLRC Computation & Examination Unit should be directed to compute the monetary awards that petitioner
should be ordered to pay Pontesor, et al. as a consequence of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 12, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85464 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
24. G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017
JOSEPH C. DIMAPILIS, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari[1] with urgent prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
a Status Quo Ante Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the Resolutions dated April 11, 2016[2] and
August 31, 2016[3] of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-436 (BRGY) (MP), which
cancelled the Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) filed by petitioner Joseph C. Dimapilis (petitioner) for the position of Punong
Barangay  of Barangay Pulung Maragul, Angeles City (Brgy. Pulung Maragul) for the October 28, 2013 Barangay
Elections (2013 Barangay Elections), annulled his proclamation as the winner, and directed the Barangay Board of
Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes as the duly-
elected official for the said post.
The Facts

Petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay  of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay Elections. He ran for
re-election for the same position in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and filed his CoC[4] on October 11, 2013, declaring
under oath that he is "eligible for the office [he seeks] to be elected to." Ultimately, he won in the said elections and was
proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay  of Brgy. Pulung Maragul on October 29, 2013.[5]
On even date, the COMELEC Law Department filed a Petition for Disqualification [6] against petitioner pursuant to Section
40 (b)[7] of Republic Act No. 7160,[8] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC). It claimed that
petitioner was barred from running in an election[9] since he was suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office as a consequence of his dismissal from service[10] as then Kagawad  of Brgy. Pulung
Maragul, after being found  guilty, along with others, of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct, in a Consolidated
Decision[11] dated June 23, 2009 (OMB Consolidated Decision) and an Order[12] dated November 10, 2009 (collectively,
OMB rulings) rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-L-A-08-0401-G, and allied cases.[13]
On December 17, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order[14] directing petitioner to file his answer.
In his Verified Answer cum  Memorandum[15] dated February 24, 2014, petitioner averred that the petition should be
dismissed, considering that: (a) while the petition prayed for his disqualification, it partakes the nature of a petition to
deny due course to or cancel CoC under Section 78[16] of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (OEC),[17]and
combining these two distinct and separate actions in one petition is a ground for the dismissal of the petition[18]pursuant to
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[19] (COMELEC Rules); (b) the COMELEC Law Department is not a proper party to a
petition for disqualification, and cannot initiate such case motu proprio;  [20]  and (c) the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 58 (RTC of Angeles City) had permanently enjoined the implementation of the aforesaid OMB Consolidated
Decision in a November 8, 2013 Resolution[21] in Civil Case No. 15325, grounded on the condonation doctrine.[22]
The COMELEC Law Department countered petitioner's averments, maintaining that it has the authority to file motu
proprio  cases, and reiterating its earlier arguments.[23]
On the other hand, the OMB submitted its Comment[24] on April 8, 2014, averring that the OMB rulings had attained
finality as early as May 28, 2010 for failure of petitioner to timely appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), rendering him
disqualified from running for any elective position.[25]
The COMELEC Second Division Ruling
In a Resolution  dated April 11, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition, and cancelled petitioner's
[26]
CoC, annulled his proclamation as the winner, and directed the Barangay Board of Canvassers to reconvene and
proclaim the qualified candidate who garnered the highest number of votes as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of
Brgy. Pulung Maragul.[27]
It treated the petition as one for cancellation of CoC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC, notwithstanding that it was
captioned as a "Petition for Disqualification" under Section 40 (b) of the LGC, holding that the nature of the petition is not
determined by the caption given to it by the parties, but is based on the allegations it presented.[28] It ruled that petitioner
committed material misrepresentation in solemnly avowing that he was eligible to run for the office he seeks to be elected
to, when he was actually suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office by virtue of a final judgment
dismissing him from service.[29]
The COMELEC Second Division likewise upheld its Law Department's authority to initiate motu proprio the Petition for
Disqualifcation as being subsumed under the COMELEC's Constitutional mandate to enforce and administer laws
relating to the conduct of elections.[30]
47
Finally, it rejected petitioner's invocation of the condonation doctrine as jurisprudentially established in Aguinaldo v.
Santos[31] since the same had already been abandoned in the 2015 case of Carpio Morales v. Binay, Jr. (Carpio
Morales).[32] It ruled that the doctrine cannot apply to petitioner, who was clearly established to be suffering from
perpetual disqualification to hold public office, which rendered him ineligible, voided his CoC from the beginning, and
barred his re-election.[33] Consequently, it declared petitioner to be not a candidate at all in the 2013 Barangay Elections;
hence, the votes cast in his favor should not be counted.[34]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[35] maintaining that: (a) the petition should have been outrightly dismissed as the
same is a combination of a disqualification case and a petition to deny due course to or cancel CoC, which is proscribed
by the COMELEC Rules;[36] (b) he was not dismissed or removed from service since the CA had permanently enjoined
the execution of the OMB Consolidated Decision in a December 17, 2009 Decision[37] in CA-G.R. SP No. 109986, which
was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution[38] dated August 2, 2010 in G.R. No. 192325;[39] (c) the RTC of Angeles City,
Branch 60 had already dismissed the criminal case against him that was anchored on the same basis as the
administrative cases before the OMB, in a November 20, 2015 Order[40] in Criminal Case No. 09-5047;
[41]
 and (d) petitioner's re-election as Punong Barangay  of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013 Barangay Elections operated
as a condonation of his alleged misconduct.[42]
The COMELEC En Banc Ruling
In a Resolution[43] dated August 31, 2016, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the ruling of its Second Division. It explained that petitioner's reliance on the aforesaid CA Decision and RTC
Order was misplaced, observing that: (a) the evident intent of the CA Decision was only to enjoin the implementation of
the OMB Consolidated Decision, while petitioner's motion for reconsideration was pending, and not thereafter;
[44]
 and (b) absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution and vice versa.[45]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling
petitioner's CoC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
I. Petitioner's perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility.
A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office.[46] Section 74 of the OEC provides that the CoC of the person
filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true
to the best of his knowledge. To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an
office.[47] Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or
appointed to a particular position."[48] In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess the
required qualifications for the position for which be or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for
disqualification under the law.[49]

In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished with dismissal from
service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual disqualification from holding public office. [50] Verily, perpetual
disqualification to bold public office is a material fact involving eligibility[51] which rendered petitioner's CoC
void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he
filed the same.
II. The COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio  bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
Under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to "[e]nforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x." The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has
the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold
public office, albeit, arising from a criminal conviction.[52] Considering, however, that Section 52 (a), Rule 10 of the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the penalty of perpetual disqualification
from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service, the Court sees no reason why the
ratiocination enunciated in such earlier criminal case should not apply here, viz.:
Even without a petition under either x x x Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from
the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running
for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed
that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC
because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election." The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as
affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the
conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from
perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior
perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss
in its constitutional duty to "enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu
proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final
judgment.[53] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In Romeo G. Jalosjos v. COMELEC[54] (Jalosjos), the Court had illumined that while the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced
through a petition based on either Sections 12 or 78 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor
are rendered conclusive on account of final and executorv judgments, as in this case, such exercise falls within the
COMELEC's administrative functions.[55] To note, the choice as to which action to commence belongs to the petitioner:
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor,  a petition under Section
48
12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner
has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40
of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt
belongs to the petitioner.[56]
As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and executory OMB rulings dismissing him from
service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC to cancel petitioner's CoC as a matter of
course,  else it be remiss in fulfilling its Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election.
Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to petitioner's claim [57] of denial of due process because even though the special
circumstance extant herein calls for the outright cancellation of his CoC in the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative
function, it even allowed him to submit his Verified Answer cum  Memorandum to explain his side, and to
file a motion for reconsideration from its resolution.
III. Petitioner's re-election as Punong Barangav  of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013 Barangay Elections cannot
operate as a condonation of his alleged misconduct.
In Carpio Morales,  the Court abandoned the "condonation doctrine," explaining that "[e]lection is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support
the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense
done during a prior term.[58]
Although Carpio Morales  clarified that such abandonment should be prospectively applied[59] (thus, treating the
condonation doctrine as "good law" when the COMELEC's petition was commenced on October 29, 2013, and when
petitioner filed his Verified Answer cum  Memorandum invoking the same), the parameters for the operation of such
doctrine simply do not obtain in petitioner's favor.
Prior to Carpio Morales, the Court, in the 1996 case of Reyes v. COMELEC[60] (Reyes), had illumined that the rationale in
the Aguinaldo cases[61] was hinged on the expiration of the term of office during which the misconduct was committed
before a decision could be rendered in the administrative case seeking the candidate's removal. As such, his or her re-
election bars removal for said misconduct since removal cannot extend beyond the term when the misconduct was
committed.[62] Reyes likewise noted that the Aguinaldo cases involved a misconduct committed prior to the enactment of
the LGC, and there was no existing provision similar to Section 40 (b), disqualifying a person from running for any
elective local position as a consequence of his removal from office as a result of an administrative case. [63] Thus, it
rejected petitioner's invocation of the condonation doctrine, holding that:
Second.  The next question is whether the reelection of petitioner rendered the administrative charges against him moot
and academic. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC  [(see supra note 31)], in which it was held that a
public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was
because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could
be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend
beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of
office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the
ruling in the two Aguinaldo  cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the
decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result
that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to
appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to Section 40 (b) of the
Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo  cases were decided there was no provision similar to Section 40 (b) which
disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 x x x could not be given retroactive effect. x x x. [64]
x x x x (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
In this case, the OMB rulings dismissing petitioner for Grave Misconduct had already attained finality on May 28, 2010,
which date was even prior to his first election as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010
Barangay Elections. As above-stated, "[t]he penalty of dismissal [from service] shall carry with it that of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service,
unless otherwise provided in the decision."[65] Although the principal penalty of dismissal appears to have not been
effectively implemented (since petitioner was even able to run and win for two [2] consecutive elections), the
corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office had already rendered him
ineligible to run for any elective local position. Bearing the same sense as its criminal law counterpart, [66] the term
perpetual in this administrative penalty should likewise connote a lifetime restriction and is not dependent on the term of
any principal penalty. It is undisputable that this accessory penalty sprung from the same final OMB rulings, and
therefore had already attached and consequently, remained effective at the time petitioner filed his CoC on October 11,
2013 and his later re-election in 2013. Therefore, petitioner could not have been validly re-elected so as to avail of the
condonation doctrine, unlike in other cases where the condonation doctrine was successfully invoked [67] by virtue of
re-elections which overtook and thus, rendered moot and academic pending
administrative cases.
IV. With the cancellation of his CoC, petitioner is deemed to have not been a candidate in the 2013 Barangay
Elections, and all his votes are to be considered stray votes.
A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all because his CoC is considered
void ab initio,  and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.[68] The cancellation of the
CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray votes,[69] and are not considered in determining the winner
of an election.[70] This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation[71] and entitle the qualified candidate receiving the
highest number of votes to the position.[72] Apropos is the Court's ruling in Maquiling v. COMELEC,[73] to wit:
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are
allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications
set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
xxxx
x x x The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only
the COC but also the proclamation.[74] (Emphasis supplied)
49
In light of the cancellation of petitioner's CoC due to ineligibility existing at the time of filing, he was never a valid
candidate for the position of Punong Barangay  of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and the votes
cast for him are considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified candidate for the said post who received the highest number
of valid votes shall be proclaimed the winner.[75]
It is likewise imperative for the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number of votes to assume the office.
In Svetlana P. Jalosjos v. COMELEC,[76] the Court explained:
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the highest number of votes must
assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto  officer by
virtue of the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in instances when a de facto  officer is
ousted from office and the de jure  officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto  officer cannot create a permanent vacancy
as contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure  officer, the rightful
winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position.[77]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated April 11, 2016 and August 31, 2016 of respondent the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 13-436 (BRGY) (MP) are hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Joseph C. Dimapilis
is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Pulung Maragul,
Angeles City.
SO ORDERED.
25. G.R. No. 188269*, April 17, 2017
SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION (SURVIVING ENTITY IN A MERGER WITH DAVAO FRUITS
CORPORATION AND OTHER COMPANIES), PETITIONER, VS. BERNABE BAYA, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated May 14, 2008 and the Resolution[3] dated May
20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85950, which set aside the Resolutions dated March 10,
2004[4] and May 31, 2004[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA NO. M-007670-2003 and,
accordingly, reinstated the Decision[6] dated June 30, 2003 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC Case No. RAB-11-09-1062-
02 declaring respondent Bernabe Baya (Baya) to have been illegally/constructively dismissed by AMS Farming
Corporation (AMSFC) and Davao Fruits Corporation (DFC), with modification deleting the award of backwages, annual
vacation leave pay, sick leave pay, monthly housing subsidy, electric light subsidy, and exemplary damages, and
ordering AMSFC and DFC to pay Baya the amounts of P194,992.82 as separation pay, P8,279.95 as 13th month pay,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,327.28 as attorney's fees.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a complaint[7] for, inter alia, illegal/constructive dismissal filed by Baya against AMSFC
and DFC before the NLRC.[8] Baya alleged that he had been employed by AMSFC since February 5, 1985, and from then
on, worked his way to a supervisory rank on September 1, 1997. As a supervisor, Baya joined the union of supervisors,
and eventually, formed AMS Kapalong Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multipurpose Cooperative (AMSKARBEMCO), the
basic agrarian reform organization of the regular employees of AMSFC. In June 1999, Baya was reassigned to a series
of supervisory positions in AMSFC's sister company, DFC, where he also became a member of the latter's supervisory
union while at the same time, remaining active at AMSKARBEMCO. Later on and upon AMSKARBEMCO's petition
before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), some 220 hectares of AMSFC's 513-hectare banana plantation were
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Eventually, said portion was transferred to AMSFC's regular
employees as Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs), including Baya. Thereafter, the ARBs explored a possible
agribusiness venture agreement with AMSFC, but the talks broke down, prompting the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer to terminate negotiations and, consequently, give AMSKARBEMCO freedom to enter into similar agreement with
other parties. In October 2001, the ARBs held a referendum in order to choose as to which group between
AMSKARBEMCO or SAFFPAI, an association of pro-company beneficiaries, they wanted to belong 280 went to
AMSKARBEMCO while 85 joined SAFFPAI.[9]
When AMSFC learned that AMSKARBEMCO entered into an export agreement with another company, it summoned
AMSKARBEMCO officers, including Baya, to lash out at them and even threatened them that the ARBs' takeover of the
lands would not push through. Thereafter, Baya was again summoned, this time by a DFC manager, who told the former
that he would be putting himself in a "difficult situation" if he will not shift his loyalty to SAFFPAI; this notwithstanding,
Baya politely refused to betray his cooperative. A few days later, Baya received a letter stating that his secondment with
DFC has ended, thus, ordering his return to AMSFC. However, upon Baya's return to AMSFC on August 30, 2002, he
was informed that there were no supervisory positions available; thus, he was assigned to different rank-and-file
positions instead. On September 20, 2002, Baya's written request to be restored to a supervisory position was denied,
prompting him to file the instant complaint. On even date, the DAR went to the farms of AMSFC to effect the ARBs'
takeover of their awarded lands.[10] The following day, all the members of AMSKARBEMCO were no longer allowed to
work for AMSFC "as they have been replaced by newly hired contract workers"; on the other hand, the SAFFPAI
members were still allowed to do so.[11]
In their defense, AMSFC and DFC maintained that they did not illegally/constructively dismiss Baya, considering that his
termination from employment was the direct result of the ARBs' takeover of AMSFC's banana plantation through the
government's agrarian reform program. They even shifted the blame to Baya himself, arguing that he was the one who
formed AMSKARBEMCO and, eventually, caused the ARBs' aforesaid takeover. [12]
The LA Ruling
In a Decision  dated June 30, 2003, the LA ruled in Baya's favor and, accordingly, ordered AMSFC and DFC to: (a)
[13]
reinstate Baya to his former position as supervisor without loss of seniority rights, or should reinstatement be impossible,
to pay him separation pay at the rate of 39.25 days of salary for every year of service as practiced by the company; and
(b) pay Baya backwages and other benefits, as well as moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.[14]
The LA found that since it was undisputed that Baya held supervisory positions in AMSFC and DFC, his demotion to
various rank-and-file positions without any justifiable reason upon his return to AMSFC constituted constructive
dismissal. In this regard, the LA opined that the alleged lack of supervisory positions in AMSFC was not a valid
justification for Baya's demotion to rank-and-file, as AMSFC and DFC should not have caused Baya's return to AMSFC if
there was indeed no available supervisory position. Further, the LA did not lend credence to AMSFC and DFC's
contention that Baya's termination was on account of the ARBs' takeover of the banana plantations, considering that: (a)
the acts constituting constructive dismissal occurred when Baya returned to AMSFC on August 30, 2002, while the
takeover was done only on September 20, 2002; and (b) only members of AMSKARBEMCO were no longer allowed to
work after the takeover, while members of SAFFPAI, the pro-company cooperative, were retained. [15]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed[16] to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Resolution[17] dated March 10, 2004, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling except for the payment of
13th month pay which was affirmed with modification, and entered a new one dismissing the case for lack of merit.
50
[18]
 Contrary to the LA's findings, the NLRC found that the termination of Baya's employment was not caused by
illegal/constructive dismissal, but by the cessation of AMSFC's business operation or undertaking in large portions of its
banana plantation due to the implementation of the agrarian reform program. Thus, the NLRC opined that Baya is not
entitled to separation pay as such cessation was not voluntary, but rather involuntary, on the part of AMSFC as it was an
act of the State, i.e., the agrarian reform program, that caused the same.[19]
Baya moved for reconsideration,[20] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[21] dated May 31, 2004. Dissatisfied, he
filed a petition for certiorari[22] before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[23] dated May 14, 2008, the CA set aside the NLRC ruling and reinstated that of the LA with modification
deleting the award of backwages, annual vacation leave pay, sick leave pay, monthly housing subsidy, electric light
subsidy, and exemplary damages, and ordering AMSFC and DFC to solidarily pay Baya the aggregate amount of
P278,600.05, consisting of P194,992.82 as separation pay, P8,279.95 as 13th month pay, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,327.28 as attorney's fees.[24]
It held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Baya's complaint as the undisputed facts clearly
establish constructive dismissal, based on the following considerations: (a) in spite of knowing that there was no
available supervisory position in AMSFC, the top management still proceeded to order Baya's return there to force him to
accept rank-and file positions; (b) such "return to AMSFC" was done after Baya was harassed by company managers
into switching loyalties to the pro-company cooperative, which was refused by Baya; (c) such acts of the top
management of AMSFC and DFC were in furtherance of their cooperative busting tactics as stated in the Joint Affidavits
executed by AMSKARBEMCO members, which were not refuted by AMSFC and DFC; and ( d) such acts constituting
constructive dismissal were done even before the ARBs were allowed to take over the lands awarded to them. Despite
the fact of constructive dismissal, the CA opted not to award backwages to Baya, as he was already awarded a portion of
AMSFC's banana plantation through the agrarian reform program. Thus, in the interest of justice and fair play, the CA
only awarded him separation pay and 13th month pay, plus moral damages and attorney's fees.[25]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[26] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[27] dated May 20, 2009.
Meanwhile and during the pendency of the CA proceedings, petitioner Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation (Sumifru)
acquired DFC via merger[28] sometime in 2008. According to Sumifru, it only learned of the pendency of the CA
proceedings on June 15, 2009, or after the issuance of the CA's Resolution dated May 20, 2009.[29] Thus, Sumifru was
the one who filed the instant petition on behalf of DFC.[30]
The Issue Before the Court
The issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not: (a) the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion, and consequently, held that AMSFC and DFC constructively dismissed Baya; (b) whether or not AMSFC and
DFC are liable to Baya for separation pay, moral damages, and attorney's fees; and (c) whether or not Sumifru should be
held solidarily liable with AMSFC's for Baya's monetary awards.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or
quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character
of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all m contemplation of law."[31]
"In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion."[32]
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in reversing the LA ruling, as the LA's finding that Baya was constructively dismissed from employment
is supported by substantial evidence.
"Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because 'continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits. Aptly called a
dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may,
likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part
of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment." [33] In Peckson v.
Robinsons Supermarket Corp.,[34] the Court held that the burden is on the employer to prove that the transfer or demotion
of an employee was a valid exercise of management prerogative and was not a mere subterfuge to get rid of an
employee; failing in which, the employer will be found liable for constructive dismissal, viz.:
In case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an
employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be
considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries,
privileges and other benefits. Failure of the employer to overcome this burden of proof, the employee's demotion shall no
doubt be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.[35]
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals that the top management of both AMSFC and DFC, which were
sister companies at the time, were well-aware of the lack of supervisory positions in AMSFC. This notwithstanding, they
still proceeded to order Baya's return therein, thus, forcing him to accept rank-and-file positions. Notably, AMSFC and
DFC failed to refute the allegation that Baya's "end of secondment with DFC" only occurred after: (a) he and the rest of
AMSKARBEMGO officials and members were subjected to harassment and cooperative busting tactics employed by
AMSFC and DFC; and (b) he refused to switch loyalties from AMSKARBEMCO to SAFFPAI, the pro-company
cooperative. In this relation, the Court cannot lend credence to the contention that Baya's termination was due to the
ARBs' takeover of the banana plantation, because the said takeover only occurred on September 20, 2002, while the
acts constitutive of constructive dismissal were performed as early as August 30, 2002, when Baya returned to AMSFC.
Thus, AMSFC and DFC are guilty of constructively dismissing Baya.
However, in light of the underlying circumstances which led to Baya's constructive dismissal, it is clear that an
atmosphere of animosity and antagonism now exists between Baya on the one hand, and AMSFC and DFC on the other,
which therefore calls for the application of the doctrine of strained relations under the doctrine of strained relations, the
payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its
employ a worker it could no longer trust.[36] Thus, it is more prudent that Baya be awarded separation pay, instead of
being reinstated, as computed by the CA.
Further, and as aptly pointed out by both the LA and the CA, the acts constitutive of Baya's constructive dismissal are
clearly tainted with bad faith as they were done to punish him for the actions of his cooperative, AMSKARBEMCO, and
for not switching his loyalty to the pro-company cooperative, SAFFPAI. This prompted Baya to litigate in order to protect
his interest and to recover what is properly due him. Hence, the award of moral damages and attorney's fees are
warranted.
Finally, Sumifru's contention that it should only be held liable for the period when Baya stayed with DFC as it only merged
with the latter and not with AMSFC[37] is untenable. Section 80 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines clearly states
51
that one of the effects of a merger is that the surviving company shall inherit not only the assets, but also the liabilities of
the corporation it merged with, to wit:
Section 80. Effects of merger or consolidation. - The merger or consolidation shall have the following effects:
1. The constituent corporations shall become a single corporation which, in case of merger, shall be the surviving
corporation designated in the plan of merger; and, in case of consolidation, shall be the consolidated corporation
designated in the plan of consolidation;
2. The separate existence of the constituent corporations shall cease, except that of the surviving or the consolidated
corporation;
3. The surviving or the consolidated corporation shall possess all the rights, privileges, immunities and powers and shall
be subject to all the duties and liabilities of a corporation organized under this Code;
4. The surviving or the consolidated corporation shall thereupon and thereafter possess all the rights, privileges,
immunities and franchises of each of the constituent corporations; and all property, real or personal, and all receivables
due on whatever account, including subscriptions to shares and other choses in action, and all and every other interest
of, or belonging to, or due to each constituent corporation, shall be deemed transferred to and vested in such surviving or
consolidated corporation without further act or deed; and
5. The surviving or consolidated corporation shall be responsible and liable for all the liabilities and obligations of each of
the constituent corporations in the same manner as if such surviving or consolidated corporation had itself incurred such
liabilities or obligations; and any pending claim, action or proceeding brought by or against any of such constituent
corporations may be prosecuted by or against the surviving or consolidated corporation. The rights of creditors or liens
upon the property of any of such constituent corporations shall not be impaired by such merger or consolidation.
In this case, it is worthy to stress that both AMSFC and DFC are guilty of acts constitutive of constructive dismissal
performed against Baya. As such, they should be deemed as solidarily liable for the monetary awards in favor of Baya.
Meanwhile, Sumifru, as the surviving entity in its merger with DFC, must be held answerable for the latter's liabilities,
including its solidary liability with AMSFC arising herein. Verily, jurisprudence states that "in the merger of two existing
corporations, one of the corporations survives and continues the business, while the other is dissolved and all its rights,
properties and liabilities are acquired by the surviving corporation,"[38] as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 14, 2008 and the Resolution dated May 20, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85950 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation, as
the surviving entity in its merger with Davao Fruits Corporation, shall be held answerable for the latter's obligations as
indicated in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
26. G.R. No. 182582*, April 17, 2017
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is the Decision[2] dated April 21, 2008 of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 340, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated August 13, 2007 and the Resolution[4]dated
November 14, 2007 of the CTA First Division (CTA Division) in CTA Case No. 6765, and consequently, dismissed
petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company's (Metrobank) claim for refund on the ground of prescription.
The Facts
On June 5, 1997, Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) entered into an agreement with Luzon Hydro Corporation (LHC),
whereby the former extended to the latter a foreign currency denominated loan in the principal amount of
US$123,780,000.00 (Agreement). Pursuant to the Agreement, LHC is bound to shoulder all the corresponding internal
revenue taxes required by law to be deducted or withheld on the said loan, as well as the filing of tax returns and
remittance of the taxes withheld to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). On September 1, 2000, Metrobank acquired
Solidbank, and consequently, assumed the latter's rights and obligations under the aforesaid Agreement.[5]
On March 2, 2001 and October 31, 2001, LHC paid Metrobank the total amounts of US$1,538,122.17[6] and
US$1,333,268.31,[7] respectively. Pursuant to the Agreement, LHC withheld, and eventually paid to the BIR, the ten
percent (10%) final tax on the interest portions of the aforesaid payments, on the same months that the respective
payments were made to petitioner. In sum, LHC remitted a total of US$106,178.69,[8] or its Philippine Peso equivalent of
P5,296,773.05,[9] as evidenced by LHC's Schedules of Final Tax and Monthly Remittance Returns for the said months.[10]
According to Metrobank, it mistakenly remitted the aforesaid amounts to the BIR as well when they were inadvertently
included in its own Monthly Remittance Returns of Final Income Taxes Withheld for the months of March 2001 and
October 2001. Thus, on December 27, 2002, it filed a letter to the BIR requesting for the refund thereof. Thereafter and in
view of respondent the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (CIR) inaction, Metrobank filed its judicial claim for refund via
a petition for review filed before the CTA on September 10, 2003, docketed as CTA Case No. 6765.[11]
In defense, the CIR averred that: (a) the claim for refund is subject to administrative investigation; (b) Metrobank must
prove that there was double payment of the tax sought to be refunded; (c) such claim must be filed within the prescriptive
period laid down by law; (d) the burden of proof to establish the right to a refund is on the taxpayer; and (e) claims for tax
refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions, and as such, should be construed strictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer.[12]
The CTA Division Ruling
In a Decision[13] dated August 13, 2007, the CTA Division denied Metrobank's claims for refund for lack of merit.[14]1t ruled
that Metrobank's claim relative to the March 2001 final tax was filed beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period. It
pointed out that since Metrobank remitted such payment on April 25, 2001, the latter only had until April 25, 2003 to file
its administrative and judicial claim for refunds. In this regard, while Metrobank filed its administrative claim well within the
aforesaid period, or on December 27, 2002, the judicial claim was filed only on September 10, 2003. Hence, the right to
claim for such refund has prescribed.[15] On the other hand, the CTA Division also denied Metrobank's claim for refund
relative to the October 2001 tax payment for insufficiency of evidence. [16]
Metrobank moved for reconsideration,[17] which was partially granted in a Resolution[18] dated November 14, 2007, and
thus, was allowed to present further evidence regarding its claim for refund for the October 2001 final tax. However, the
CTA Division affirmed the denial of the claim relative to its March 2001 final tax on the ground of prescription.
[19]
 Aggrieved, Metrobank filed a petition for partial review[20] before the CTA En Banc,docketed as C.T.A. EB No. 340.
The CTA En Banc  Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated April 21, 2008, the CTA En Banc  affirmed the CTA Division's ruling. It held that since Metrobank's
March 2001 final tax is in the nature of a final withholding tax, the two (2)-year prescriptive period was correctly reckoned
52
by the CTA Division from the time the same was paid on April 25, 2001. As such, Metrobank's claim for refund had
already prescribed as it only filed its judicial claim on September 10, 2003.[22]
Hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CTA En Banc correctly held that Metrobank's claim for refund
relative to its March 2001 final tax had already prescribed.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Section 204 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended,[23] provides the CIR with, inter alia,  the authority to
grant tax refunds. Pertinent portions of which read:
Section 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. –  The Commissioner
may –
xxxx
(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of
internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or
change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit
or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for
credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however,  That a return filed
showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In this relation, Section 229 of the same Code provides for the proper procedure in order to claim for such refunds, to wit:
Section 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. –  No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court
for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the
tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however,  That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon
which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As may be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, a claimant for refund must first file an administrative claim for refund
before the CIR, prior to filing a judicial claim before the CTA. Notably, both the administrative and judicial claims for
refund should be filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period indicated therein, and that the claimant is allowed to file
the latter even without waiting for the resolution of the former in order to prevent the forfeiture of its claim through
prescription. In this regard, case law states that "the primary purpose of filing an administrative claim [is] to serve as a
notice of warning to the CIR that court action would follow unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected
erroneously or illegally is refunded. To clarify, Section 229 of the Tax Code – then Section 306 of the old Tax Code
however does not mean that the taxpayer must await the final resolution of its administrative claim for refund, since doing
so would be tantamount to the taxpayer's forfeiture of its right to seek judicial recourse should the two (2)-year
prescriptive period expire without the appropriate judicial claim being filed."[24]
In this case, Metrobank insists that the filing of its administrative and judicial claims on December 27, 2002 and
September 10, 2003, respectively, were well-within the two (2)-year prescriptive period. Citing ACCRA Investments
Corporation v. Court of Appeals[25] CIR v. TMX Sales, Inc.,[26] CIR v. Philippine American Life Insurance, Co.,[27]and CIR v.
CDCP Mining Corporation,[28] Metrobank contends that the aforesaid prescriptive period should be reckoned not from
April 25, 2001 when it remitted the tax to the BIR, but rather, from the time it filed its Final Adjustment Return or Annual
Income Tax Return for the taxable year of 2001, or in April 2002, as it was only at that time when its right to a refund was
ascertained.[29]
Metrobank's contention cannot be sustained.
As correctly pointed out by the CIR, the cases cited by Metrobank involved corporate income taxes, in which the
corporate taxpayer is required to file and pay income tax on a quarterly basis, with such payments being subject to an
adjustment at the end of the taxable year. As aptly put in CIR v. TMX Sales, Inc., "payment of quarterly income tax
should only be considered [as] mere installments of the annual tax due. These quarterly tax payments which are
computed based on the cumulative figures of gross receipts and deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable income,
should be treated as advances or portions of the annual income tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the calendar or
fiscal year. x x x Consequently, the two-year prescriptive period x x x should be computed from the time of filing of the
Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax."[30] Verily, since quarterly income tax
payments are treated as mere "advance payments" of the annual corporate income tax, there may arise certain
situations where such "advance payments" would cover more than said corporate taxpayer's entire income tax liability for
a specific taxable year. Thus, it is only logical to reckon the two (2)-year prescriptive period from the time the Final
Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return was filed, since it is only at that time that it would be possible to
determine whether the corporate taxpayer had paid an amount exceeding its annual income tax liability.
On the other hand, the tax involved in this case is a ten percent (10%) final withholding tax on Metrobank's interest
income on its foreign currency denominated loan extended to LHC. In this regard, Section 2.57 (A) of Revenue
Regulations No. 02-98[31] explains the characterization of taxes of this nature, to wit:
Section 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source
(A) Final Withholding Tax.  - Under the final withholding tax system[,] the amount of income tax withheld by the
withholding agent is constituted as a full and final payment of the income tax due from the payee on the said income. The
liability for payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his failure to withhold
the tax or in case of under withholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected from the payor/withholding agent. The payee
is not required to file an income tax return for the particular income.
The finality of the withholding tax is limited only to the payee's income tax liability on the particular income. It does not
extend to the payee's other tax liability on said income, such as when the said income is further subject to a percentage
tax. For example, if a bank receives income subject to final withholding tax, the same shall be subject to a percentage
tax. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the foregoing, it may be gleaned that final withholding taxes are considered as full and final payment of the income
53
tax due, and thus, are not subject to any adjustments. Thus, the two (2)-year prescriptive period commences to run from
the time the refund is ascertained, i.e.,  the date such tax was paid, and not upon the discovery by the taxpayer of the
erroneous or excessive payment of taxes.[32]
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Metrobank's final withholding tax liability in March 2001 was remitted to the BIR
on April 25, 2001. As such, it only had until April 25, 2003 to file its administrative and judicial claims for refund. However,
while Metrobank's administrative claim was filed on December 27, 2002, its corresponding judicial claim was only filed
on September 10, 2003. Therefore, Metrobank's claim for refund had clearly prescribed.
Finally, the Court finds untenable Metrobank's resort to the principle of solutio indebiti in support of its position.[33] In CIR
v. Manila Electric Company,[34] the Court rejected the application of said principle to tax refund cases, viz.:
In this regard, petitioner is misguided when it relied upon the six (6)-year prescriptive period for initiating an action on the
ground of quasi contract or solutio indebiti  under Article 1145 of the New Civil Code. There is solutio indebiti  where: (1)
payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who
received the payment; and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other
cause. Here, there is a binding relation between petitioner as the taxing authority in this jurisdiction and respondent
MERALCO which is bound under the law to act as a withholding agent of NORDILB Singapore Branch, the taxpayer.
Hence, the first element of solutio indebiti  is lacking. Moreover, such legal precept is inapplicable to the present case
since the Tax Code, a special law, explicitly provides for a mandatory period for claiming a refund for taxes erroneously
paid.
Tax refunds are based on the general premise that taxes have either been erroneously or excessively paid. Though the
Tax Code recognizes the right of taxpayers to request the return of such excess/erroneous payments from the
government, they must do so within a prescribed period. Further, "a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a
refund, but also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within
which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would result in the denial of his claim."[35] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In sum, the CTA Division and CTA En Banc correctly ruled that Metrobank's claim for refund in connection with its final
withholding tax incurred in March 2001 should be denied on the ground of prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 21, 2008 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc  in C.T.A.
EB No. 340 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
27. G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017
CONCEPCION C. DAPLAS, CITY TREASURER, PASAY CITY, AND CONCURRENT OIC, REGIONAL DIRECTOR
BUREAU OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (BLGF) REGION VII, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
REPRESENTED BY TROY FRANCIS C. PIZARRO, JOSELITO F. FERNANDEZ, REYNALDO * L. LAZARO, MELCHOR
B. PIOL, AND ISMAEL S. LEONOR, AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition[1] for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[2] dated August 27, 2014 and the
Resolution[3] dated October 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122851, which dismissed petitioner
Concepcion C. Daplas' (petitioner) petition for review, thereby upholding the Joint Decision[4] dated May 8, 2007 of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in the administrative aspects of the cases, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0234-E
and OMB-C-A-06-0354-G. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of
Section 8 (A) of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713, and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, and all its accessory
penalties, without prejudice to criminal prosecution.
The Facts
Petitioner joined the government service as a casual clerk for the Municipal Treasurer of Kawit, Cavite sometime in 1968,
and had held various posts until she was appointed as the Pasay City Treasurer on May 19, 1989, with a gross monthly
salary of P28,722.00. At the time material to the complaints, petitioner was concurrently holding the position of Officer-in-
Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) in Cebu City.[5]
Two (2) separate complaints were filed against petitioner by the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection
Service (DOF-RIPS) and the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman;
respondents) for averred violations[6] of Sections 7 and 8 of RA 3019,[7] Section 8 (A) of RA 6713,[8] Section 2 of RA 1379,
[9]
 Article 183[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Executive Order No. (EO) 6[11] dated March 12, 1986,
[12]
 constituting Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, arising out of
her failure to disclose the true and detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and
financial connections, and those of her spouse in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs). [13] In
particular, petitioner: (1) failed to declare (a) a 1993 Mitsubishi Galant sedan with Plate No. TBH-238 (Galant sedan)
registered under the name of her late husband with an estimated value of P250,000.00; (b) her stock subscription in KEI
Realty and Development Corp. (KEI) valued at P1,500,000.00 with a total paid up amount of P800,000.00;
[14]
 and (c) several real properties in Cavite[15] (which had been the subject of a previous administrative complaint against
her that had been dismissed[16]); and (2) traveled multiple times abroad without securing a travel authority, which cast
doubt on her real net worth and actual source of income considering her modest salary.[17]
For her part, petitioner insisted that she acquired her properties through lawful means, and maintained that she was not
totally dependent on her salary to finance the said acquisitions.[18] She alleged that: (a) her late husband purchased the
Galant sedan out of his personal money, hence, the same did not form part of their conjugal properties;[19] (b) she had
already divested her interest in KEI in 1998, along with her husband, but her husband and children reacquired their
respective shares sometime in 2003;[20] and (c) her travels were sponsored by the government or by her relatives abroad.
[21]
The Ombudsman Ruling
In a Joint Decision[22] dated May 8, 2007, the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposed the penalty of Dismissal, and its accessory penalties, without
prejudice to criminal prosecution.[23] It observed that petitioner committed perjury under Article 183 of the RPC when she
failed to declare in her SALNs for 1997 to 2003 the Galant sedan, and her business interest in KEI in her 1997 SALN,
which is sufficient basis to hold her liable for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.[24] Likewise, it found her liable for
violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 for her failure to disclose the said assets despite the legal obligation to do so. [25]
However, the Ombudsman found respondents to have failed to substantiate the charges that: (a) petitioner's numerous
foreign travels were indicia of her acquisition of unlawful wealth;[26] and (b) KEI was put up as a subterfuge for petitioner's
ill-gotten wealth.[27]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Joint Order[28] dated May 30, 2011,
prompting her to elevate her case before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122851.
54
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[29] dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the Ombudsman's ruling was
sufficiently supported by substantial evidence.[30] It found that petitioner's failure to declare all her assets and business
interests constituted Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and a violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713. [31] It gave no credence to
her defense of good faith considering that she knew of the said assets and gave no justification for their exclusion in her
SALNs.[32] Moreover, it ruled that her resignation from the government service did not render the Ombudsman ruling
moot.[33]
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution [34] dated October 22, 2015; hence,
the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Joint Decision of the Ombudsman
finding petitioner liable for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposing on her
the corresponding penalties.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution[35] in order to promote transparency in
the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves through unlawful
means.[36] By mandate of law, i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government official or employee to accomplish and submit
a sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests,
including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households, [37] in
order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealthbecause the latter usually results from non-disclosure of such
matters.[38]
In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to declare some properties in her SALNs for the years 1997 to
2003 despite the legal obligation to do so. Both the Ombudsman and the CA held that such omission provides substantial
basis to hold petitioner liable for the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8
(A) of RA 6713, warranting the supreme penalty of dismissal from service, with all its accessory penalties.
The Court disagrees.
Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the administrative offenses of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct[39] are lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from service.
Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact,practices or
attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. It
is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, betray or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and the lack of fairness and straightforwardness.[40]
On the other hand, misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of
the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
[41]
 Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is properly characterized as simple
misconduct only.[42] Most importantly, without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the
charge of grave misconduct shall necessarily fail.[43]
Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and would normally
amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-declaration of the required data in the SALN
does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make
false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-
declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from
other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions. [44]
Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and
conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN
her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to
conceal the truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes.[45]
Notably, petitioner readily admitted in her Counter-Affidavit her business interest in KEI in 1997, [46] which belied any
malicious intent to conceal. While concededly, the omission would increase her net worth for the year 1997, the Court
observes that the Ombudsman declared respondent's evidence insufficient to warrant a finding that petitioner had any
unexplained wealth.[47] On the contrary, it found that her children have the financial capacity to put up KEI.[48]
It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained wealth. Thus, in several
cases[49] where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly accounted for, the Court deemed the same an
"explained wealth" which the law does not penalize. Consequently, absent any intent to commit a wrong, and having
accounted for the source of the "undisclosed wealth," as in this case, petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the charge
of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately.
Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there
is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable.[50] An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives and/or
purposes,[51] as in the present case, is merely Simple Negligence.
In the same vein, petitioner's failure to declare the Galant sedan in her SALNs from 1997 to 2003 stemmed from the fact
that the same was registered in her husband's name, and purportedly purchased out of his personal money.[52]While such
bare allegation is not enough to overthrow the presumption that the car was conjugal, neither is there sufficient showing
that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in not disclosing the same. In fact, the Ombudsman conceded that petitioner's
husband was financially capable of purchasing the car,[53] negating any "unexplained wealth" to warrant petitioner's
dismissal due to Dishonesty.
Likewise, the charge of Grave Misconduct against petitioner must fail. Verily, the omission to include the subject
properties in petitioner's SALNs, by itself, does not amount to Grave Misconduct, in the absence of showing that such
omission had, in some way, hindered the rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation or connection
between the two.[54]
Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, but
declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in accomplishing her SALN. Simple Negligence is akin to Simple
Neglect of Duty,[55] which is a less grave offense punishable with suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months, for the first offense.[56] Since the penalty of suspension can no longer be imposed on account of
55
petitioner's resignation,[57] and considering that she readily admitted her omissions which do not appear to have been
attended by any bad faith or fraudulent intent,[58] the Court finds that the penalty of fine in the amount equivalent to one
(1) month and one (1) day[59] of petitioner's last salary is reasonable and just under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 27, 2014 and the Resolution
dated October 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122851 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one
is ENTERED finding petitioner Concepcion C. Daplas GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE in accomplishing her
Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth for the years 1997 to 2003, and is meted a fine in the amount equivalent
to one (1) month and one (1) day of her last salary.
SO ORDERED.
28. G.R. No. 186421*, April 17, 2017
ROBERTO P. FUENTES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated September 30, 2008 and the Resolution[3]dated
February 16, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 28342, which found petitioner Roberto P.
Fuentes[4] (Fuentes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, entitled
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."[5]
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information charging Fuentes of violation of Article 3 (e) of RA 3019, the accusatory
portion of which states:
That on January 8, 2002 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at the Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused ROBERTO P. FUENTES, a high-
ranking public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation
to office, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue
injury to private complainant Fe N. Valenzuela by then and there refusing for unreasonable length of time, to renew the
latter's Business Permit to engage in Ship Chandling Services in the Port of Isabel without any legal basis or reason
despite the fact that Fe N. Valenzuela has complied with all the requirements and has been operating the Ship Chandling
Services in the Port of Isabel since 1993, which act caused damage to the perishable ship provisions of Fe N. Valenzuela
for M/V Ace Dragon and a denial of her right to engage in a legitimate business thereby causing damage and prejudice to
Fe N. Valenzuela.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
On September 15, 2006, Fuentes pleaded "not guilty" to the aforesaid charge.[7]
The prosecution alleged that private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela (Valenzuela) is the sole proprietor of Triple
A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services (Triple A), which was operating in the Port of Isabel, Leyte since 1993
until 2001 through the Business Permits issued by the Local Government Unit of Isabel (LGU) during the said period.
However, in 2002, Fuentes, then Mayor of Isabel, refused to sign Triple A's Business Permit, despite: ( a) Valenzuela's
payment of the renewal fees; (b) all the other municipal officers of the LGU having signed the same, thereby signifying
their approval thereto; and (c) a Police Clearance[8] certifying that Valenzuela had no derogatory records in the
municipality. Initially, Triple A was able to carry out its business despite the lack of the said Business Permit by securing
temporary permits with the Port Management Office as well as the Bureau of Customs (BOC). However, Triple A's
operations were shut down when the BOC issued a Cease and Desist Order[9] after receiving Fuentes's unnumbered
Memorandum[10] alleging that Valenzuela was involved in smuggling and drug trading. This caused the BOC to require
Valenzuela to secure a Business Permit from the LGU in order to resume Triple A's operations. After securing the
Memorandum, Valenzuela wrote to Fuentes pleading that she be issued a Business Permit, but the latter's security
refused to receive the same. Valenzuela likewise obtained certifications and clearances from Isabel Chief of Police
Martin F. Tamse (Tamse),[11] Barangay Captain Dino A. Bayron,[12] the Narcotics Group of Tacloban National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Isabel Police Station, and the Police Regional Office 8
of the PNP similarly stating that she is of good moral character, a law-abiding citizen, and has not been charged nor
convicted of any crime as per verification from the records of the locality. Despite the foregoing, no Business Permit was
issued for Triple A, causing: (a) the spoilage of its goods bought in early 2002 for M/V Ace Dragon as it was prohibited
from boarding the said goods to the vessel due to lack of Business Permit; and (b) the suspension of its operations from
2002 to 2006. In 2007, a business permit was finally issued in Triple A's favor.[13]
In his defense, Fuentes averred that as early as 1999, 2000, and 2001, he has been hearing rumors that Valenzuela was
engaged in illegal activities such as smuggling and drug trading, but he did not act on the same. However, in 2002, he
received written reports from the Prime Movers for Peace and Progress and Isabel Chief of Police Tamse allegedly
confirming the said rumors, which prompted him to hold the approval of Valenzuela's Business Permit for Triple A, and to
issue the unnumbered Memorandum addressed to port officials and the BOC. Fuentes maintained that if he went on with
the approval of such permit and the rumors turned out to be true, many will suffer and will be victimized; on the other
hand, if the rumors were false, then only one stands to suffer. Further, Fuentes presented corroborative testimonies of
other people, essentially: (a) refuting Valenzuela's claim that Triple A was unable to resume operations due to lack of
Business Permit; and (b) accusing Valenzuela of pulling out her application for Business Permit from the Mayor's Office,
which precluded Fuentes from approving the same.[14]
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
In a Decision[15] dated September 30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan found Fuentes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six
(6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office, and ordered to pay Valenzuela the amount of P200,000.00 as nominal damages.[16]
The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution had established all the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
considering that: (a) Fuentes was admittedly the Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at the time relevant to the case; ( b) he singled
out Valenzuela's Triple A despite the fact that the rumors relative to the illegal smuggling and drug-related activities
covered all ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel; (c) he still refused to approve Valenzuela's Business Permit for
Triple A even though she had already secured clearances not only from the other offices of the LGU, but from the PNP
itself, exculpating her from any illegal activities; and (d) as a result of Fuentes's acts, Valenzuela was unable to operate
her ship chandling business through Triple A, thus, causing her undue injury.[17]
Aggrieved, Fuentes moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution[18] dated February 16, 2009;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the
crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit. Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
56
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the accused must
be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with
such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that
his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.[19]
After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the Sandiganbayan correctly convicted Fuentes of the
crime charged, as will be explained hereunder.
Anent the first element, it is undisputed that Fuentes was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Isabel, Leyte at
the time he committed the acts complained of.
As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the crime, namely,
through "manifest partiality", "evident bad faith", and/or "gross negligence." In Coloma, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[20] the Court
defined the foregoing terms as follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather
than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it
partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission
of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property."[21] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In other words, there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another. On the other hand, "evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.[22]
In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith. As can be
gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all five (5) ship chandlers
operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading. Yet, it was only Valenzuela's
chandling operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of a Business Permit, as evidenced by Business
Permits issued to two (2) other chandling services operators in the said port, namely: S.E. De Guzman Ship Chandler
and General Maritime Services; and Golden Sea Kers Marine Services. Moreover, if Fuentes truly believed that
Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug trading, then he would not have issued Business Permits
to the latter's other businesses as well. However, and as aptly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, Fuentes issued a
Business Permit to Valenzuela's other business, Gemini Security, which provides security services to vessels in the Port
of Isabel. Under these questionable circumstances, the Court is led to believe that Fuentes's refusal to issue a Business
Permit to Valenzuela's Triple A was indeed committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of the other
ship chandling operators in the Port of Isabel.
As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor's prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to
issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 16[23] and 444 (b) (3) (iv)[24] of the Local Government Code as an incident of
his power to issue the same, it must nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is premised
on the violation of the conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on non-compliance
with the pre-requisites for said issuance. In the exercise of these powers, the mayor must observe due process in that it
must afford the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.[25]
Here, it is clear that Valenzuela had complied with all the pre-requisites for the issuance of a Business Permit for Triple
A, as her application already contained the prior approval of the other concerned officials of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela
even submitted numerous certifications issued by various law enforcement agencies clearing her of any kind of
participation from the alleged illegal smuggling and drug trading activities in the Port of Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes
still refused to issue a Business Permit for Valenzuela's Triple A without affording her an opportunity to controvert the
rumors against her. Worse, he even issued the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from
conducting its ship chandling operations without a Business Permit. Quite plainly, if Fuentes truly believed the rumors
that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal activities in the Port of Isabel, then he should have already acted upon it in
the years 1999, 2000, and 2001, or when he allegedly first heard about them. However, Fuentes's belated action only in
2002 - which was done despite the clearances issued by various law enforcement agencies exonerating Valenzuela from
such activities - speaks of evident bad faith which cannot be countenanced.
Anent the third and last element, suffice it to say that Fuentes's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in
Valenzuela's favor, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from
engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of
Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations prevented Valenzuela from engaging in
an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002. To make things worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a Business
Permit for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as it was only in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple A's favor.
Under prevailing case law, "[p]roof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or
the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible."[26]
In view of the foregoing, Fuentes committed a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, and hence, must be held criminally
liable therefor.
As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on Fuentes, Section 9 (a)[27] of RA 3019 states that the prescribed penalties
for violation of the aforesaid crime includes, inter alia, imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month to
fifteen (15) years, and perpetual disqualification from public office. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten
(10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
Finally, the Court deems it proper to modify the award of damages in Valenzuela's favor. To recapitulate,
the Sandiganbayan awarded her P200,000.00 as nominal damages occasioned by Fuentes's non-issuance of a
Business Permit to Triple A. As defined under Article 2221[28] of the Civil Code, nominal damages are "recoverable where
a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss
of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have
been or can be shown."[29] In this case, however, it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some sort of pecuniary loss due to
the suspension of Triple A's ship chandling operations, albeit the amount thereof was not proven with certainty. Thus, the
award of temperate, and not nominal, damages, is proper. The Court's pronouncement in Evangelista v. Spouses
Andolong[30] is relevant on this matter:
In contrast, under Article 2224 [of the Civil Code], temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with
certainty. This principle was thoroughly explained in Araneta v. Bank of America [148-B Phil. 124 (1971)], which cited the
Code Commission, to wit:
The Code Commission, in explaining the concept of temperate damages under Article 2224, makes the following
comment:
In some States of the American Union, temperate damages are allowed. There are cases where from the nature of the
case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there has been such loss.
For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty in
57
terms of money. Should damages be denied for that reason? The judge should be empowered to calculate moderate
damages in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful act.
Thus, in Tan v. OMC Carriers, Inc. [654 Phil. 443 (2011)], temperate damages were rightly awarded because plaintiff
suffered a loss, although definitive proof of its amount cannot be presented as the photographs produced as evidence
were deemed insufficient. Established in that case, however, was the fact that respondent's truck was responsible for the
damage to petitioner's property and that petitioner suffered some form of pecuniary loss. In Canada v. All Commodities
Marketing Corporation [590 Phil. 342 (2008)], temperate damages were also awarded wherein respondent's goods did
not reach the Pepsi Cola Plant at Muntinlupa City as a result of the negligence of petitioner in conducting its trucking and
hauling services, even if the amount of the pecuniary loss had not been proven. In Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v.
Paras [686 Phil. 736 (2012)], the respondent was likewise awarded temperate damages in an action for breach of
contract of carriage, even if his medical expenses had not been established with certainty. In People v. Briones [398 Phil.
31 (2000)], in which the accused was found guilty of murder, temperate damages were given even if the funeral
expenses for the victim had not been sufficiently proven.
Given these findings, we are of the belief that temperate and not nominal damages should have been awarded,
considering that it has been established that respondent herein suffered a loss, even if the amount thereof cannot be
proven with certainty.
xxxx
Consequently, in computing the amount of temperate or moderate damages, it is usually left to the discretion of the
courts, but the amount must be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but
less than compensatory.
Here, we are convinced that respondent sustained damages to its conveyor facility due to petitioner's negligence.
Nonetheless, for failure of respondent to establish by competent evidence the exact amount of damages it suffered, we
are constrained to award temperate damages. Considering that the lower courts have factually established that the
conveyor facility had a remaining life of only five of its estimated total life of ten years during the time of the collision, then
the replacement cost of P7,046,351.84 should rightly be reduced to 50% or P3,523,175.92. This is a fair and reasonable
valuation, having taking into account the remaining useful life of the facility.[31] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Under these circumstances, the Court holds that the award of temperate damages in the amount of P300,000.00 is
proper, considering that Valenzuela's net income from the previous year, 2001, was P750,000.00. Further, such amount
shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until fully paid, in light of prevailing
jurisprudence.[32]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and the Resolution dated February 16,
2009 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 28342 are hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Roberto P. Fuentes is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of
six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from public office, and is ordered to pay private complainant Fe Nepomuceno Valenzuela the amount of
P300,000.00 as temperate damages, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
29. A.M. No. 17-03-33-MCTC, April 17, 2017
RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF ROWIE A. QUIMNO, UTILITY WORKER I, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT OF IPIL - TUNGAWAN - ROSELLER T. LIM, LPIL, ZAMBOANGA SIBUGAY.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case involves Mr. Rowie A. Quimno (Quimno), Utility Worker I in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Ipil Tungawan-Roseller T. Lim in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
show that Quimno has not submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR) since February 2016 up to the present. He neither
submitted any application for leave. Thus, he has been on absence without official leave (AWOL) since February 1, 2016.
[1]
Moreover, Presiding Judge Arthur L. Ventura (Judge Ventura) of the MCTC informed the OCA that Quimno not only
failed to submit his DTR since the month of February 2016, but also failed to report for work since July 20, 2016 without
applying for leave.[2] Judge Ventura added that prior to said date, Quimno was either late for work or absent; showed little
concern for time lost from work; and was lazy, indifferent, and unreliable. [3] Thus, Quimno received unsatisfactory ratings
in his performance evaluations for the rating periods July 1 to December 31, 2015[4] and January 1 to June 30, 2016.
[5]
 Judge Ventura later found out that Quimno was arrested at his residence on September 20, 2016; and was
subsequently formally charged for violating several provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 before the Regional Trial Court
of lpil, Zamboanga Sibugay, Branch 24.[6]
To date, Quimno has still not reported for work. His salaries and benefits were withheld based on a Memorandum dated
June 2, 2016.[7]
The OCA informed the Court of its findings based on the records of its different offices: ( a) Quimno is still in
the plantilla  of court personnel, and thus, considered to be in active service; (b) he is no longer in the payroll; (c) he has
no application for retirement; (d) no administrative case is pending against him; and (e) he is not an accountable officer.[8]
In its report[9] dated February 20, 2017, the OCA recommended that: (a) Quimno's name be dropped from the rolls
effective February 1, 2016 for having been absent without official leave for more than thirty (30) working days; (b) his
position be declared vacant; and (c) he be informed about his separation from service at his last known address on
record at Purok Everlasting, Don Andres, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The OCA added, however, that Quimno is still
qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the govemment.
[10]
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation.
Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 13, Series of 2007,
[11]
 states:
Section 63. Effect of absences without approved Leave. — An official or employee who is continuously absent without
approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and
shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Based on this provision, Quimno should be separated from service or dropped from the rolls in view of his continued
absence since February 2016.
Indeed, prolonged unauthorized absence causes inefficiency in the public service.[12] A court employee's continued
absence without leave disrupts the normal functions of the court.[13] It contravenes the duty of a public servant to serve
with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. [14] The Court stresses that a court personnel's
conduct is laden with the heavy burden of responsibility to uphold public accountability and maintain people's faith in the
judiciary.[15]
As Judge Ventura reported, Quimno failed to report for work long before he was arrested. He also exhibited disinterest in
diligently fulfilling his assigned tasks. Evidently, his conduct constitutes gross disregard and neglect of his duties.
Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in the government
service.[16]
58
WHEREFORE, Rowie A. Quimno, Utility Worker I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Ipil-Tungawan-Roseller T. Lim, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, is hereby DROPPED from the rolls effective February 1, 2016 and his position is
declared VACANT. He is, however, still qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled to under existing laws and
may still be reemployed in the government.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served upon him at his address appearing in his 201 file pursuant to Rule XVI, Section
63 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
30. G.R. No. 181149*, April 17, 2017
CITY OF DAVAO, REPRESENTED BY RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR, RIZALINA
JUSTOL, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE CITY ACCOUNTANT, AND ATTY. WINDEL E. AVISADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
CITY ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONER, VS. ROBERT E. OLANOLAN, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 29, 2006 and the Resolution[3] dated
November 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00643 which: (a) nullified and set aside the Orders
dated September 5, 2005[4] and September 22, 2005[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16 (RTC) in
Spec. Civil Case No. 31,005-2005, dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by respondent Robert E. Olanolan
(respondent) on procedural grounds; and (b) directed petitioner City of Davao (petitioner) to immediately release the
withheld funds of Barangay 76-A, Bucana, Davao City (Brgy. 76-A).
The Facts
On July 15, 2002, respondent was elected and proclaimed Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. On July 25, 2002, an
election protest was filed by the opposing candidate, Celso A. Tizon (Tizon), before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Davao City (MTCC). Tizon's election protest was initially dismissed by the MTCC, but was later granted by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 2nd Division, on appeal. Hence, Tizon was declared the duly-elected Punong
Barangay of Brgy. 76-A.[6]
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[7] before the COMELEC, but to no avail. Thus, he filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, with prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order[8] (TRO), before the
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165491. On November 9, 2004, the Court en banc gave due course to the petition and
issued a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO)[9] which was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). Thus, respondent was reinstated to the disputed office.[10]
Upon his reinstatement, respondent presided over as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A which, in the regular course of
business, passed Ordinance No. 01, Series of 2005,[11] on January 5, 2005, otherwise known as the "General Fund
Annual Budget of Barangay Bucana for Calendar Year 2005" totalling up to P2,216,180.20. Likewise included in the local
government's annual budget is the Personnel Schedule amounting to P6,348,232.00, which formed part of the budget of
the General Administration, appropriated as salaries and honoraria for the 151 employees and workers of Brgy. 76-A.[12]
On March 31, 2005, the Court en banc rendered a Decision[13] dismissing respondents' petition in G.R. No. 165491.
Consequently, it also recalled its SQAO issued on November 9, 2004[14] (Recall Order). Undaunted, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration[15] on April 29, 2005.[16]

In the meantime, the Regional Office of the DILG, Region XI rejected the request of Tizon's legal counsel for immediate
implementation of the Court's Recall Order on the ground that the timely filing of respondents' motion for reconsideration
had stayed the execution of the March 31, 2005 Decision. The City Legal Officer of petitioner, on the other hand,
opined[17] that the Recall Order was in effect, an order of dissolution which is immediately executory and effective. On the
basis of the latter's opinion, the City of Davao thus refused to recognize all acts and transactions made and entered into
by respondent as Punong Barangay after his receipt of the Recall Order as it signified his immediate ouster from the
disputed office.[18]
This notwithstanding, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Brgy. 76-A issued Resolution No. 115, Series of
2005[19] on June 1, 2005, requesting that the Regional Director of the DILG issue a directive for the officials of petitioner
to recognize the legitimacy of respondent as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. On June 6, 2005, respondent wrote a letter
to the Regional Office XI of the DILG, endorsing the said Resolution.[20]
Before any action could be taken by the DILG on respondent's letter, or on July 26, 2005, he filed a Petition
for Mandamus etc.[21] (mandamus petition) before the RTC, docketed as Spec. Civil Case No. 31,005-2005, seeking to
compel petitioner to allow the release of funds in payment of all obligations incurred under his administration.[22]
In the interim, the Court en banc issued a Resolution[23] dated June 28, 2005, denying with finality respondent's motion for
the reconsideration of its March 31,2005 Decision in G.R. No. 165491 for lack of merit.[24]
The RTC Ruling
In an Order[25] dated September 5, 2005, the RTC dismissed respondent's mandamus petition on the sole ground that
there was still an adequate remedy still available to respondent in the ordinary course of law, i.e., his pending request
before the DILG Regional Director to recognize his legitimacy and to give due course to the financial transactions of
Brgy. 76-A under his administration. In this regard, respondent was deemed to have violated the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies, which perforce warranted the dismissal of his petition.[26]
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order[27] dated September 22, 2005.
Thus, he elevated his case to theCA on certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00643.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[28] dated June 29, 2006, the CA nullified and set aside the RTC's Orders, holding that the latter court gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing respondent's mandamus petition on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. In so ruling, the CA observed that an exception to the said doctrine was present in that the mandamus petition
only raised pure legal questions; hence, the same should not have been dismissed.[29]
Although the RTC confined its ruling on the procedural infirmity of the mandamus petition, the CA nonetheless proceeded
to resolve the substantive issue of the case, i.e., whether or not petitioner should be compelled by mandamus to release
the funds under respondent's administration. Ruling in the affirmative, the CA ruled that it is the ministerial duty of
petitioner to release the share of Brgy. 76-A in the annual budget. Moreover, it found that the city government is not
authorized to withhold the said share, as the Local Government Code only mandates that the Punong
Barangay concerned be accountable for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets.[30]
Accordingly, the CA directed petitioner to release the withheld funds of Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the
compensation of the employees and workers which were already due and payable before the Court's issuance of the
June 28, 2005 Resolution denying respondent's motion for reconsideration with finality.[31]
59
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration[32] but was denied in a Resolution[33] dated November 21, 2007; hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's dismissal of
respondent's mandamus petition.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done
when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other
is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[34] In Special People,
Inc. Foundation v. Canda,[35] the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamusis an extraordinary remedy that is
issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.[36]
In this case, respondent has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. To recount,
respondent filed a mandamus petition before the RTC, seeking that petitioner, as city government, release the funds
appropriated for Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the compensation of barangay employees, and all funds that in
the future may accrue to Brgy. 76-A, including legal interests until full payment. [37] As it appears, respondent anchors his
legal interest to claim such relief on his ostensible authority as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. In this regard, Section
332 of Republic Act No. 7160,[38] otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991," provides that:
Section 332. Effectivity of Barangay Budgets. - The ordinance enacting the annual budget shall take effect at the
beginning of the ensuing calendar year. An ordinance enacting a supplemental budget, however, shall take effect upon
its approval or on the date fixed therein.
The responsibility for the execution of the annual and supplemental budgets and the accountability therefor shall be
vested primarily in the punong barangay concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
However, records clearly show that respondent's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by the COMELEC
upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-elected Punong Barangayof Brgy. 76-A.
While the Court en banc indeed issued an SQAO on November 9, 2004 which temporarily reinstated respondent to the
disputed office, the same was recalled on March 31, 2005 when a Decision was rendered dismissing respondent's
petition in G.R. No. 165491. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the status quo ante order issued by this Court on November 9,
2004 is hereby RECALLED.[39]
While respondent did file a motion for reconsideration of the March 31, 2005 Decision, the Court's recall of the SQAO
was without any qualification; hence, its effect was immediate and non-contingent on any other occurrence. As such,
respondent cannot successfully argue that the SQAO's recall was suspended during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration.
In fact, as petitioners correctly argue,[40] the Court's SQAO is akin to preliminary injunctions and/or TROs. As per the
November 9, 2004 Resolution issuing the SQAO, the parties were required "to observe the STATUS QUO prevailing
before the issuance of the assailed resolution and order of the Commission on Elections."[41] Therefore, as they carry the
same import and effect, the recall of the SQAO subject of this case should be accorded the same treatment as that of the
recall of said provisional reliefs.
The recall of the SQAO is effectively a dissolution of the said issuance. In Defensor-Santiago v. Vasquez,[42] the Court
discussed the immediately executory nature of orders dissolving preliminary injunctions and/or TROs:
[A]n order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not final. A dismissal,
discontinuance, or non suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates
as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect
such dissolution. Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There
must be a new exercise of judicial power.[43]
Thus, considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed
his mandamuspetition on July 26, 2005, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest
to the reliefs prayed for. In fact, it should be pointed out that respondent's motion for reconsideration before the Court
was altogether denied with finality even prior to his filing of the mandamus petition, i.e., on June 28, 2005. This means
that, for all legal intents and purposes, respondent could not have even relied on the supposed effectivity of the SQAO
during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration, because at the time he filed his mandamus petition, the Court's
March 31, 2005 Decision against him had already attained finality. Therefore, stripped of the technical niceties, the Court
finds that respondent had no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled of, which altogether
justifies the dismissal of his mandamus petition.
In addition, petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds prayed for by respondent in
view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that "[m]andamus only lies to enforce the performance of a
ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and
discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right
conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own
judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others."[44]
positions. Also, there were available funds in the Barangay 76-A BUDGET to cover their compensation.
(b) In contrast, the other set of Barangay functionaries are contractual or job-order workers, and NOT employees of
Barangay 76-A. The budget of Barangay 76-A did not have funds to cover their compensation at the time that they were
allowed by [respondent] to work or render service for the Barangay. The funds for the year to cover the compensation of
these individuals had already been exhausted by the Barangay itself. That is why Supplemental Budget No. 1 had to be
drawn up, which budget was, however, not approved. Supplemental Budget No. 1 was drawn up precisely to pay these
workers. But the point is, no funds were available to pay the services of these people when they started rendering
services at the behest of [respondent.][48]
xxxx
Thus, given these supervening circumstances which ostensibly preclude the satisfaction of the reliefs prayed for,
respondent's mandamus petition should also be dismissed on the ground of mootness. That being said, the Court finds it
unnecessary to delve into the other issues raised in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 29, 2006 and the Resolution dated November 21,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00643 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition
for mandamus filed by respondent Robert E. Olanolan in Spec. Civil Case No. 31,005-2005 before the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 16 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to respondent 31. G.R. No. 224143, June 28, 2017
considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. Surely, it was part
KEVIN BELMONTE Y GOROMEO, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. 
of petitioner's fiscal responsibility to ensure that the barangay funds would not be released to a person without proper
authority. Section 305 (1) of RA 7160 provides that:
Section 305. Fundamental Principles. - The financial affairs, transactions, and operations of local government units shall
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
be governed by the following fundamental principles:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Kevin Belmonte y Goromeo (Belmonte) assailing
the Decision[2] dated June 30, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated March 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
xxxx
CR-H.C. No. 05362, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated November 23, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando
City, La Union, Branch 30 (RTC) in: (1) Crim. Case No. 8979, finding Belmonte, Mark Anthony Gumba y Villaraza
(1) Fiscal responsibility shall be shared by all those exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and
(Gumba), and Billy Joe Costales (Costales) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
operations of the local government units;
Act No. (RA) 916,[5] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002;" and (2) Crim. Case No.
Barangay funds shall be kept in the custody of the city or municipal treasurer, at the option of the barangay, [45] and any
8997, finding Gumba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II, thereof.
officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds
The Facts
shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of the law.[46]
The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations[6] filed before the RTC accusing: (1) Belmonte, Gumba,
[7]
 and Costales of violating Section 5,[8] Article II of RA 9165; and (2) Gumba of violating Section 11,[9]Article II of RA
Moreover, "[t]he city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision
9165, viz.:
over component barangays to ensure that the said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and
Criminal Case No. 8979
functions."[47] Hence, given the COMELEC's ruling revoking respondent's election and proclamation as Punong
That on or about the 23rd day of November 2010, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines,
Barangay of Brgy. 76-A, which in fact, was later on validated by no less than the Court, petitioner could not have been
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, without first securing the necessary permit,
faulted for not automatically releasing the funds sought for by respondent in his mandamus petition.
license or prescription from the proper government agency, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell, dispense and/or deliver one (1) bundle of dried
At any rate, petitioner points out that the issue in this case has already been rendered moot and academic. In particular,
marijuana fruiting tops[,] a dangerous drug, weighing EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY[-]EIGHT POINT NINETY SIX (828.96)
petitioner states that the release of the barangay funds corresponding to the aggregate amount of respondents' claim is
gram[s] to 103 SHARON O. BAUTISTA, who posed as a buyer thereof using marked money consisting of four (4) pieces
no longer possible given that the budget for the year 2005 has already been exhausted. Notably, respondent did not
of five hundred pesos (P 500.00) BILLS, BEARING Serial Nos. KN 368332, EV933163, HH157963 and HL685267,
proffer any objection on the following submissions in the instant petition:
respectively.
(a) [Petitioner] released funds to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for payment to
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
the REGULAR employees of Brgy. 76-A for the reason that their continuance in office was not dependent on
Criminal Case No. 8997
[respondent's] incumbency as Punong Barangay. With or without [respondent], these employees are secured in their

60
That on or about the 23rd day of November 2010, in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of La Union, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, 17 years old minor (child in conflict with the
law and who acted with discernment), without first securing the necessary permit, license, or prescription from the proper
government agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously have in his possession, control and custody four
(4) bricks of marijuana dried leaves and fruiting tops with an individual weight of EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY[-]NINE POINT
SIXTEEN (869.16) grams, EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY[-]EIGHT POINT THIRTY[-]THREE (828.33) grams, EIGHT
HUNDRED TWELVE POINT FORTY (812.40) grams and EIGHT HUNDRED NINE POINT FIFTY[-]FOUR (809.54)
grams with a total weight of THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN POINT FORTY[]THREE (3,319.43)
grams.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [11]
The prosecution alleged that at around 9 o'clock in the morning of November 23, 2010, Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) Agent Sharon Ominga (Ominga)[12] received information from a confidential informant (agent) that a
certain "Mac-Mac," later identified as Gumba,[13] was selling marijuana.[14] Ominga immediately coordinated with the
PDEA Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Anti-Illegal Drug Special
Operation Task Group (PAIDSOTG) and a buy-bust team composed of Ominga, Intelligence Officer 1 Ranel Cañero
(Cañero), and members of the PDEA-QRF and PNP-PAIDSOTG was formed.[15] Ominga was designated as the poseur-
buyer, Cañero as arresting officer, and the rest as back-up officers.[16] Ominga then instructed the agent to contact
Gumba and place an order for P2,000.00 worth of marijuana. Thereafter, Ominga prepared four (4) P500.00 bills as buy-
bust money, marked them with her initials, and proceeded with the rest of the buy-bust team to the public cemetery of
San Gabriel, La Union, the designated place for the transaction.[17]
Upon the buy-bust team's arrival at the target area, Ominga, Cañero, and the agent walked towards the cemetery while
the back-up officers waited in the vehicle.[18] As Gumba was taking long to arrive, Ominga's group decided to return to
their vehicle. But as they were walking, Gumba and two (2) male companions came into view.[19] When the three (3) men
reached Ominga's group, one of Gumba's companions, who turned out to be Belmonte,[20] asked if they were the buyers.
[21]
 The agent confirmed this, after which Gumba asked for the money from Cañero.[22] Cañero pointed to Ominga, who
motioned to hand the marked money to Gumba but Gumba's other companion, later identified as Costales,[23] took it.
[24]
 Gumba then took a bundle of suspected dried marijuana leaves from the black bag he was carrying and handed it to
Ominga.[25] Believing that it was marijuana, Ominga declared that they were PDEA agents.[26] Ominga and Cañero were
able to arrest Gumba and Belmonte but Costales escaped with the marked money.[27]
Ominga's group waited for the local police and barangay officials to arrive before opening the black bag which, in the
meantime, lay on the ground in front of Belmonte and Gumba.[28] When police officers Manzano, Campit, and Barangay
Captain[29] Carlos D. Caoeng arrived, Ominga opened the black bag which yielded four (4) more bricks of dried marijuana
wrapped in masking tape.[30] Ominga then took a knife and slashed a small portion of each brick to see the contents.
Satisfied that it was marijuana, she placed her initials "SOB," signature, and the date of confiscation on the outside of
each bundle, including the bundle earlier sold to them.[31] Ominga's group then prepared an inventory, photographed the
activity, and asked the PNP and barangay officials to sign the inventory.[32]
Thereafter, Ominga's group returned to the PDEA office in San Fernando, La Union where Ominga prepared the request
for laboratory examination[33] dated November 23, 2010, among other necessary documents.[34] Ominga then delivered
the seized items to the PDEA for crime laboratory examination.[35] In her report, PDEA Regional Officer 1 Chemist Lei-
Yen Valdez (Valdez), the chemist who conducted the quantitative and qualitative examination on the seized drugs,
confirmed that the seized bricks and bundle contained marijuana.[36]
For their defense, Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales (who subsequently surrendered voluntarily) all denied the charges
against them and claimed that they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Belmonte averred that in the morning of
November 23, 2010, he and his wife walked to the town proper of San Gabriel, La Union from their barangay in
Mamleng-Bucao, San Gabriel, La Union as he intended to proceed to Bauang, La Union to get a duck from his aunt.
[37]
 Upon reaching Barangay Bumbuneg, San Gabriel, La Union, he stopped at Gumba's house to borrow fifty pesos
(P50.00) from Gumba.[38] Gumba lent him the money but requested Belmonte to accompany him to the cemetery to visit
his grandfather's tomb.[39] Belmonte agreed and they rode Costales'[40] tricycle but the two had to alight at Lipay Road
because there was palay laid out on the road leading to the cemetery.[41] As Belmonte and Gumba walked up the road
going to the cemetery, they were apprehended by two (2) men later on identified as Cañero and Atty. Allan Ancheta
(Atty. Ancheta) of the PDEA-QRF.[42]
61
Gumba corroborated Belmonte's testimony and admitted knowing Belmonte from high school and Costales from
elementary.[43] At around 10 o’clock in the morning of November 23, 2010, Gumba was allegedly home in Bumbuneg,
San Gabriel, La Union when Belmonte came to borrow money (P50.00) which the latter intended to use for his fare going
to his aunt in Bauang, La Union.[44] Gumba gave Belmonte the money and requested the latter to accompany him to the
cemetery so he could visit his grandfather's tomb.[45] They rode Costales' tricycle to the cemetery and as they continued
walking towards the cemetery, two (2) men approached them - one carrying a black bag and wearing a hat, and another
who wore short pants and a black shirt.[46] Gumba was allegedly held by the man in short pants, later on identified as Atty.
Ancheta, while Belmonte was held by the one with the black bag, later on identified as Cañero.[47] Gumba struggled to
free himself but was trapped by another man - a tall man with big body build who he later discovered to be police officer
Jose Bautista.[48] Bautista allegedly hit Gumba in the head with a small gun and asked "why do you still try to escape?"[49]
Meanwhile, Costales advanced the defense of alibi. He claimed that on November 23, 2010, while on his way back to the
parking area for tricycles in San Gabriel, La Union, he was flagged down by Belmonte and Gumba who were his
batchmates from elementary.[50] Belmonte and Gumba asked to be brought to the cemetery but they had to alight at Lipay
Road because the tricycle could not pass through the road.[51] After dropping them off, he returned to the tricycle station
near the Municipal Hall and market where he joined other tricycle drivers.[52] While sitting in a nearby canteen, he learned
that two (2) minors were arrested at the cemetery and saw a police patrol car pass by with Belmonte and Gumba on
board.[53] Seeing that they were brought to the police station nearby, Costales and the other tricycle drivers proceeded to
the police station where they stayed for approximately fifteen (15) minutes before returning to the tricycle station. [54] On
January 22, 2011, while vacationing in Baguio City, his uncle informed him that there is a warrant for his arrest. [55] He
returned to San Gabriel, La Union on January 24 and surrendered voluntarily to police officer Campit who was his
neighbor.[56]
Upon arraignment, Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales all pleaded not guilty to the charges against them.[57] After the
preliminary conference in both cases, the RTC ordered that joint trial be conducted.[58]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[59] dated November 23, 2011, the RTC found Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II, of RA 9165 in Crim. Case Nos. 8979, for illegal sale of marijuana, and sentenced
Belmonte and Costales to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P500,000.00 each. Meanwhile,
Gumba, who was 17 years old at the time the crime was committed, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, and to pay the fine of P300,000.00. A similar sentence
was imposed on Gumba in Crim. Case No. 8997 for violating Section 11, Article II, of RA 9165.
The RTC held that all the elements for the prosecution of sale of dangerous drugs, namely: the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and consideration, and the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment therefor, were all
established.[60] It noted that the witnesses for the prosecution were able to prove that the buy-bust operation took place
and the marijuana subject of the sale was brought and duly presented in court, with the poseur-buyer, Ominga, positively
identifying Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales as the sellers of the dangerous drug.[61] The RTC further noted the
categorical, consistent, and straightforward narration of the prosecution's witnesses of the circumstances leading to the
consummation of the sale and the arrest of all the accused which, according to the RTC, was more credible than the
defenses of alibi and frame-up which can be concocted easily.[62] Conspiracy among the accused was also evident as
Belmonte even asked if Ominga and her team were the buyers, while Gumba handed them the bundle of marijuana
leaves and Costales took the marked money.[63] These, according to the RTC, showed their common interest and
purpose.
Aggrieved, Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales elevated their conviction to the CA,[64] arguing that the chain of custody of
the seized items was not established because the markings and inventory were done in San Gabriel, La Union, while the
signing of the Certificate of Inventory[65] by the representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media took
place in Carlatan, San Fernando City, La Union.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[66] dated June 30, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling,[67] finding that the prosecution successfully
established the continuous chain of custody of the confiscated marijuana which preserved the identity, integrity, and
evidentiary value of the illicit items.[68]
The CA held that the subsequent signing of the Certificate of Inventory undertaken after the arrest of the accused at a
different place is not fatal to the case since the prosecution was able to show the continuous whereabouts of the exhibits
between the time it came into their possession and until it was tested in the PDEA laboratory. [69] Citing the rule that the
crime can still be proven notwithstanding the failure to strictly follow the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165, the
CA ruled that the prosecution was able to satisfactorily show the whereabouts of the exhibits, from the time they came
into the possession of the police officer and were tested in the laboratory, up to the time they were offered in evidence.
[70]
 It further held that the accused failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they were somewhere else
when the buy-bust operation was conducted and that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the scene of
the crime before, during, or after it was committed.[71]
Undaunted, Belmonte moved for reconsideration[72] which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution[73] dated March
14, 2016; hence the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Belmonte's conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined
and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove
the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.[74]
In this relation, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. In order to
obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain
of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from
the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.[75]
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in
handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[76] Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. [77]
It is important to note that while the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers,
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165,[78] as well as jurisprudence nevertheless
provides that non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of
the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance; and (b) the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be
justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
marijuana confiscated from the accused were preserved, and any deviation from the chain of custody procedure was
adequately justified.
Records bear that the bricks and bundle of marijuana confiscated from the accused were immediately marked,
photographed, and inventoried upon the arrest of Belmonte and Gumba, and that the markings were done by Ominga
herself who placed her initials, signature, and the date of confiscation thereat in the presence of Belmonte, Gumba, the
back-up officers from the PDEA and the PNP, and the Barangay Captain of Poblacion, San Gabriel.[79]After the inventory
and photography at the arrest site, Ominga and her team returned to the PDEA office where Ominga personally prepared
the crime laboratory examination request which she delivered to the PDEA chemist, Valdez, together with the bricks and
bundle of marijuana confiscated from the accused.[80]
Ominga's testimony on this point was corroborated by Valdez who testified that at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 23, 2010, Ominga delivered four (4) bricks of suspected marijuana leaves and a bundle of marijuana fruiting
tops for examination. [81] Valdez also gave a clear account of the procedure for testing the specimen submitted to her
such as, weighing and marking them, taking representative samples therefrom, and performing the screening and
62
confirmatory tests thereon.[82] Ominga and Cañero also identified in open court the bricks and bundle of marijuana
confiscated from the accused,[83] which matched Valdez's testimony.[84]
By and large, the foregoing sufficiently established the existence of a continuous chain of custody which preserved the
identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the items confiscated from the accused, notwithstanding the absence of the
representatives from the media and the DOJ at the time of the arrest and the taking of inventory. Notably, the absence of
media representatives at the time Ominga prepared the inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-
examination when she testified that when contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far from the
area and would not be able to arrive on time.[85] As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, Eulogio Gapasin, the
DOJ clerk who signed the inventory, explained that it has been the practice in their office for him to go to the PDEA office
to sign the inventories instead of going to the site of the crime.[86] While this is not ideal and the Court by no means
condones it, the Court is also cognizant of the fact that this is not the fault of the apprehending officers. Verily, under
varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be
possible.[87] What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[88] In People v. Rebotazo,
[89]
 the Court held that so long as this requirement is met, as in this case, non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated inadmissible. [90]
The Court also observes that while the inventory was not signed by the accused and that they did not have copies of it,
such omission was sufficiently explained by the prosecution witnesses who testified that Belmonte and Gumba were
given copies thereof but they refused to sign it.[91] The accused also had no relatives or lawyers at the time the arrest and
confiscation were effected. As such, their copy of the inventory was given to Barangay Captain Caoeng as their
representative.[92]
Furthermore, the Court also agrees with the finding that there was conspiracy among the accused. As aptly observed by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA, conspiracy among them is evident as Belmonte even asked if Ominga and her team
were the buyers. Indeed, there is no other explanation for Belmonte's question aside from the fact that he knew why they
were there, i.e., for the sale of the marijuana.
As a final point, it should be mentioned that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and involve the credibility
of witnesses, are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions are made from such findings.[93] This rule finds even more stringent application where the
findings are sustained by the CA,[94] as in this case. After all, as the trier of facts, the RTC has the opportunity to observe
the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying and, as such, is a better judge of their credibility.[95]
All told, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that Belmonte is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal sale of marijuana, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 14, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of Kevin Belmonte y Goromeo for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, and the penalty of life imprisonment and payment of a fine of P500,000.00 imposed
upon him are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
32. G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017
DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA, PETITIONER, V. EMMANUEL D. SAPIGAO AND GINALYN C. ACOSTA,
RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Resolutions dated June 17, 2015[2] and March 17, 2016[3]of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 140206 dismissing petitioner Danilo Calivo Cariaga's (Cariaga) petition for
review[4] before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint Affidavit[5] filed by Cariaga before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(OPP) Urdaneta City, Pangasinan accusing respondents Emmanuel D. Sapigao (Sapigao) and Ginalyn C. Acosta
(Acosta; collectively, respondents) of the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification, and Slander by
Deed, defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In the said complaint,
Cariaga alleged that respondents, in their respective capacities as Barangay Chairman and Secretary of Brgy.
Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious entries in the barangay blotter, i.e., (a) Entry No.
00054[6] dated August 3, 2012[7] stating that an unnamed resident reported that someone was firing a gun inside
Cariaga's compound, and that when Sapigao went thereat, he was able to confirm that the gunfire came from inside the
compound and was directed towards the adjacent ricefields; and (b) Entry No. 00057[8] dated September 26, 2012 stating
that a concerned but unnamed resident reported to Sapigao that Cariaga and his companions attended the funeral march
of former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr. (Calivo, Sr.) with firearms visibly tucked in their waists (blotter entries). According
to Cariaga, the police authorities used the blotter entries to obtain a warrant for the search and seizure operation made
inside his residence and cattle farm on December 18, 2012. While such operation resulted in the confiscation of a firearm
and several ammunitions, the criminal case for illegal possession of firearms consequently filed against him was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City.[9]Claiming that the statements in the blotter entries were
completely false and were made to dishonor and discredit him, Cariaga filed the said complaint, docketed as NPS-I-01e-
INV-14B-00084.[10]
In his defense,[11] Sapigao denied the accusations against him, maintaining that the blotter entries were true, as he
personally witnessed their details. In this regard, he presented the Joint Affidavit[12] executed by
Barangay Kagawads Elpidio Cariaga, Metrinio Dela Cruz, Greg Turalba, and Ex-Barangay Kagawad Jaime Aguida
attesting that: (a) during the funeral march of Calivo, Sr., they observed that Cariaga and his employees had handguns
tucked into their waists; and (b) the firing of guns was a common occurrence in Cariaga's farm.[13] For her part,[14] Acosta
averred that she was merely performing her duties as Barangay Secretary when she certified as true copies the
photocopies of the aforesaid blotter entries requested by the police authorities.[15]
The OPP's Ruling
In a Resolution[16] dated April 10, 2014, the OPP dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause. It found that the
questioned blotter entries were all made in good faith and merely for recording purposes; done in the performance of
respondents' official duties; and based on personal knowledge of what actually transpired. In this relation, the OPP
pointed out that Cariaga's complaint and supporting affidavits, which mainly consist of a general and blanket denial of the
incidents described in the blotter entries, could not prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of Sapigao and
his witnesses.[17]
Cariaga moved for reconsideration[18] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[19] dated July 28, 2014. Aggrieved, he
filed a petition for review[20] before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) - Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. [21]
The ORSP's Ruling
In a Resolution[22] dated January 5, 2015, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's ruling. The ORSP found that absent any showing
of ill-motive on respondents' part in making the blotter entries, there can be no basis to charge them of Falsification of
Private Documents. This is especially so as the statements therein were supported by testimonies of several witnesses,
and there is colorable truth to the same, since the search conducted by the police authorities in Cariaga's home and
cattle farm resulted in the seizure of a firearm and several ammunitions and the eventual filing of a criminal case against
Cariaga for illegal possession of firearms.[23] Further, the ORSP ruled that the blotter entries were not intended to malign,
dishonor, nor defame Cariaga; as such, respondents could not be said to have committed the crime of Slander by Deed.
[24]
 Finally, the ORSP pointed out that Acosta's mere authentication of the photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be
equated to issuing a false certification so as to indict her of such crime.[25]
Undaunted, Cariaga moved for reconsideration,[26] but the same was denied in a Resolution[27] dated March 14, 2015.
Thus, he filed a petition for review[28] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 140206.
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution[29] dated June 17, 2015, the CA dismissed Cariaga's petition before it. It held that the ORSP is not the
final authority in the hierarchy of the National Prosecution Service, as one could still appeal an unfavorable ORSP ruling
to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ). As such, Cariaga's direct and immediate recourse to the CA to assail the ORSP ruling
without first filing a petition for review before the SOJ violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Thus, the dismissal of Cariaga's petition for review is warranted.[30]
63
Unperturbed, Cariaga filed a motion for reconsideration,[31] but it was denied in a Resolution[32] dated March 17, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed Cariaga's petition for review before it on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Court's Ruling
The petition must be denied.
I.
To recapitulate, Cariaga's petition for review before the CA was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies as he did not elevate the adverse ORSP ruling to the SOJ before availing of judicial remedies.
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70[33] dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal," which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter
alia, the RSP, in cases subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a verified petition for
review before the SOJ.[34] However, this procedure was immediately amended by the DOJ's Department Circular No. 70-
A[35] dated July 10, 2000, entitled "Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain
Cases," pertinent portions of which read:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 70-A
SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Regional State
Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases
In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 ("2000
NPS RULE ON APPEAL"), all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, except in the National Capital
Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in
accordance with the pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department Circular.
The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to his power of supervision
and control over the entire National Prosecution Service and in the interest of justice, review the resolutions of the
Regional State Prosecutors in appealed cases. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As may be gleaned above, Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to rule with finalitycases
subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case is not filed in the
National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs) - which includes not only
violations of city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years,
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties attached thereto.
[36]
 This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling should the former deem it
appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing amendment is further strengthened by a later issuance, i.e.,
Department Circular No. 018-14[37] dated June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases,"
pertinent portions of which read:
DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 018-14
SUBJECT: Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases
In the interest of service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws with the objective of institutionalizing the
Department's Zero Backlog Program on appealed cases, the following guidelines shall be observed and implemented in
the resolution of appealed cases on Petition for Review and Motions for Reconsideration:
1. Consistent with Department Circular No. 70-A, all appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors,
except those from the National Capital Region, in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, shall be by way of a petition for review to the concerned province or city.
The Regional Prosecutor shall resolve the petition for review with finality, in accordance with the rules prescribed in
pertinent rules and circulars of this Department. Provided, however, that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to
the power of control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify or reverse, the
resolutions of the Regional Prosecutor in these appealed cases.
2. Appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors, except those from the National Capital Region, in
all other cases shall be by way of a petition for review to the Office of Secretary of Justice.
3. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in cases cognizable by
Metropolitan Trial Courts shall be by way of a petition for review to the Prosecutor General who shall decide the
same with finality. Provided, however that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to the power of control and
supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify or reverse, the resolutions of the Prosecutor
General in these appealed cases.  proper evaluation of the merits may be had — as in this case — the Court may dispense with the time-consuming
4. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in all other cases shall be by
way of a petition for review to the Office of the Secretary.
xxxx
This Circular supersedes all inconsistent issuances, takes effect on 01 July 2014 and shall remain in force until further
orders.
For guidance and compliance.
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing appeals process in the NPS with regard to complaints
subject of preliminary investigation would depend on two factors, namely: where the complaint was filed, i.e., whether in
the NCR or in the provinces; and which court has original jurisdiction over the case, i.e., whether or not it is
cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as follows:
(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may
be appealable by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with finality;
   
(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP
may be appealable by way of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with finality;
(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be
appealable by way of petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling shall be with finality;
   
(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may
be appealable by way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with finality;
   
(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of control and supervision
over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of the ORSP or the Prosecutor
64
General, as the case may be.
In the instant case, Cariaga filed a complaint before the OPP in Pangasinan (i.e., outside the NCR) accusing
respondents of committing the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed,
defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359 of the RPC. Of the crimes charged, only False Certification and
Slander by Deed are cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs,[38] while Falsification of Public Documents is cognizable by
the Regional Trial Courts.[39] Applying the prevailing rule on the appeals process of the NPS, the ruling of the ORSP as
regards Falsification of Public Documents may still be appealed to the SOJ before resort to the courts may be availed of.
On the other hand, the ruling of the ORSP pertaining to False Certification and Slander by Deed should already be
deemed final - at least insofar as the NPS is concerned - and thus, may already be elevated to the courts.
Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga's petition before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the crime of Falsification of Public Documents may be
referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling regarding the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed may already
be elevated before the courts. Thus, the CA should have resolved Cariaga's petition on the merits insofar as the crimes
of False Certification and Slander by Deed are concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates that the instant
case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits. "However, when there is already enough basis on which a
procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of
justice."[40] In view of the foregoing - as well as the fact that Cariaga prayed for a resolution on the merits - the Court finds
it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
II.
In the recent case of Hilbero v. Morales, Jr.,[41] the Court reiterated the guiding principles in determining whether or not
the courts may overturn the findings of the public prosecutor in a preliminary investigation proceedings on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of his/her functions, viz.:
A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause — that is, one made for the purpose of filing an information in
court — is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny. The
exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and perforce becomes
correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. It is fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion
transcends mere judgmental error as it properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise definition,
grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law. To note, the underlying
principle behind the courts' power to review a public prosecutor's determination of probable cause is to ensure that the
latter acts within the permissible bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. This manner of judicial
review is a constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very core of our system of
government. x x x
xxxx
In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public prosecutor's resolution if he
arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause. In particular, case law states that probable cause,
for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief and, as such,
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities,
Inc. [(582 Phil. 505, 591 [2008])] :
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.[42] (Emphases in the original.)
In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the ORSP correctly ruled that there is no probable
cause to indict respondents of the crimes of Slander by Deed and False Certification. As aptly found by the ORSP, there
was no improper motive on the part of respondents in making the blotter entries as they were made in good faith; in the
performance of their official duties as barangay officials; and without any intention to malign, dishonor, or defame
Cariaga. Moreover, the statements contained in the blotter entries were confirmed by disinterested parties who likewise
witnessed the incidents recorded therein. On the other hand, Cariaga's insistence that the blotter entries were completely
false essentially rests on mere self-serving assertions that deserve no weight in law. [43]Thus, respondents cannot be said
to have committed the crime of Slander by Deed. Furthermore, suffice it to say that the mere act of authenticating
photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be equated to committing the crime of False Certification under the law. In sum,
the ORSP correctly found no probable cause to indict respondents of the said crimes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
33. G.R. No. 224022, June 28, 2017
TEODORICO A. ZARAGOZA, PETITIONER, V. ILOILO SANTOS TRUCKERS, INC., RESPONDENT.  and the costs of suit.[30]
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated July 22, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated April 8,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 07839 which affirmed the Decision [4] dated July 5, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 (RTC-Br. 23) in Civil Case No. 12-31294, and accordingly, held, inter alia,
that petitioner Teodorico A. Zaragoza (petitioner) could not eject respondent Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc. (respondent)
from the leased premises as the latter complied with its obligation to pay monthly rent thru consignation.
The Facts
On June 26, 2003, petitioner Teodorico A. Zaragoza (petitioner) bought a 3,058-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land
located at Cabatuan, Iloilo, denominated as Lot No. 937-A, from his parents, Florentino and Erlinda Zaragoza,[5] and
eventually, had the same registered under his name in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 090-2010009190.[6] Petitioner
claimed that unknown to him, his father leased[7] a 1,000-sq. m. portion of Lot 937-A (subject land) to respondent Iloilo
Santos Truckers, Inc. (respondent), for a period of eight (8) years commencing on December 5, 2003 and renewable for
another eight (8) years at the sole option of respondent.[8] This notwithstanding, petitioner allowed the lease to subsist
and respondent had been diligent in paying its monthly rent amounting to P10,000.00 per month[9]
(P11,200.00[10] including value added tax[11]) pursuant to the lease contract.
Petitioner claimed that when Florentino died, respondent stopped paying rent. On the other hand, respondent maintained
that it was willing to pay rent, but was uncertain as to whom payment should be made as it received separate demands
from Florentino's heirs, including petitioner.[12] Thus, respondent filed an interpleader case before the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City, Branch 24 (RTC-Br. 24), docketed as Civil Case No. 07- 29371. After due proceedings, RTC-Br. 24 issued:
(a) Order[13] dated June 22, 2010 dismissing the action for interpleader, but at the same time, stating that respondent may
avail of the remedy of consignation; and (b) Order[14] dated August 17, 2010 which, inter alia, reiterated that respondent
may consign the rental amounts with it in order to do away with unnecessary expenses and delay. Pursuant thereto,
respondent submitted a Consolidated Report[15] dated January 26, 2011 and a Manifestation and Notice[16] dated May 30,
2011 informing petitioner that it had consigned the aggregate amount of P521,396.89[17] before RTC-Br. 24.[18]
This notwithstanding, petitioner sent respondent a letter[19] dated May 24, 2011, stating that granting without conceding
the propriety of consignation, the same did not extinguish the latter's obligation to pay rent because the amount
consigned was insufficient to cover the unpaid rentals plus interests from February 2007 to May 2011 in the amount of
P752,878.72. In this regard, petitioner demanded that respondent pay said amount and at the same time, vacate the
subject land within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter. In its reply, [20] respondent reiterated that it had already paid
rent by consigning the amount of P521,396.89 with RTC-Br. 24 representing monthly rentals from February 2007 to
March 2011, and maintained that it is not obligated to pay interests under the lease contract. In a letter [21] dated June 9,
65
2011, petitioner clarified that the aforesaid amount consigned by respondent was insufficient to cover monthly rentals
from February 2007 to March 2011 which already amounted to P562,125.00 without interest. He likewise reiterated that
his earlier demand to pay was for the period of February 2007 to May 2011. Thus, petitioner posited that respondent had
continuously failed and refused to comply with the terms and conditions of the lease contract concerning the payment of
monthly rental, with or without consignation.[22] As his demands went unheeded, petitioner filed on June 21, 2011 a
suit[23] for unlawful detainer against respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, Branch 10 (MTCC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 32-11.[24]
In its defense, respondent maintained, inter alia, that its consignation of rental amounts with RTC-Br. 24 constituted
compliance with the provisions of the lease contract concerning the monthly rental payments. As such, petitioner has no
cause of action against it, and accordingly, it cannot be ejected from the subject land.[25]
Pending the unlawful detainer suit, respondent sent petitioner a letter[26] dated September 29, 2011 expressing its
intention to renew the lease contract. In response, petitioner sent letters dated October 10, 2011 [27] and October 11,
2011[28] rejecting respondent's intent to renew in view of the latter's failure to timely pay its monthly rentals.
The MTCC Ruling
In a Decision[29] dated December 29, 2011, the MTCC ruled in petitioner's favor, and accordingly, ordered respondent to:
(a) vacate the subject land; and (b) pay petitioner back rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month from February 2007
and the succeeding months thereafter until it vacates the subject land, plus legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from extrajudicial demand until full payment, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, P50,000.00 as litigation expenses,
The MTCC found that petitioner's complaint properly makes out a case for unlawful detainer as it alleged that respondent
defaulted in its rental payments from February 2007 to May 2011 in the total amount of P752,878.72 and that the latter
failed to pay the same and to vacate the subject land despite demands to do so.[31] Further, the MTCC opined that
respondent's consignation with RTC-Br. 24 is void, and thus, did not serve to release respondent from paying its
obligation to pay rentals. As there was no valid consignation, respondent was held liable to pay unpaid rentals and that
petitioner was justified in terminating the lease contract.[32]
Aggrieved, respondent appealed[33] to the RTC-Br. 23, docketed as Civil Case No. 12-31294.
The RTC-Br. 23 Ruling
In a Decision[34] dated July 5, 2013, the RTC-Br. 23 reversed and set aside the MTCC ruling, and accordingly, dismissed
petitioner's complaint. Contrary to the MTCC's findings, the RTC-Br. 23 ruled, inter alia, that respondent's consignation of
the rental amounts was proper, considering that: (a) it was made pursuant to RTC-Br. 24's order, which had jurisdiction
over the interpleader case, consignation being an ancillary remedy thereto; (b) it was made even before petitioner's filing
of the unlawful detainer case and that petitioner knew of such fact; and (c) petitioner even withdrew the consigned
amounts. Thus, the consignation effectively released respondent from its obligation to pay rent, and hence, petitioner's
complaint for unlawful detainer must necessarily fail.[35]
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review, [36] docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 07839.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[37] dated July 22, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC-Br. 23 ruling. It held, inter alia, that while petitioner's
complaint for unlawful detainer sufficiently states a cause of action on its face, petitioner, however, failed to substantiate
his allegation that respondent violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract by intentionally failing to pay the
monthly rentals.[38] In this regard, the CA found that respondent was actually ready and willing to comply with its
obligation to pay rent, but was in a quandary as to whom it should remit its payment.[39] Hence, it showed good faith by
consigning its rental payments to RTC-Br. 24, which was properly made and was acknowledged by petitioner by
withdrawing the consigned amounts in court. There being no violation of the lease contract, petitioner could not validly
eject respondent from the subject land.[40]
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[41] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[42] dated April 8, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that petitioner could not eject respondent
from the subject land as the latter fully complied with its obligation to pay monthly rent thru consignation.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Spouses Manzanilla v. Waterfields Industries Corporation,[43] the Court discussed the requisites of an unlawful detainer
suit in instances where there is a subsisting lease contract between the plaintiff-lessor and defendant-lessee, to wit:
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or
comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate.  The first
requisite refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the jurisdictional
requirement of demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. Implied in the first requisite, which is needed
to establish the cause of action of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation of the contract of lease
entered into by the plaintiff and the defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions alleged to have
been violated. Thus, in Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals  [(357 Phil. 483, 492 [1998])], the Court held that the
evidence needed to establish the cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is (1) a lease contract and (2) the violation
of that lease by the defendant.[44](Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In other words, for an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first, initially, the defendant-
lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease contract; second, such possession
eventually became illegal, either due to the latter's violation of the provisions of the said lease contract or the termination
thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained in possession of the leased premises, thus, effectively depriving the
plaintiff-lessor enjoyment thereof; and fourth, there must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and that the
suit is brought within one (1) year from the last demand.[45]
In this case, the first, third, and fourth requisites have been indubitably complied with, considering that at the time the suit
was instituted on June 21, 2011: (a) there was a subsisting lease contract[46] between petitioner and respondent; (b)
respondent was still in possession of the subject land; and (c) the case was filed within one (1) year from petitioner's
letter[47] dated May 24, 2011 demanding that respondent pay monthly rentals and at the same time, vacate the subject
land. Thus, the crux of the controversy is whether or not the second requisite has been satisfied, that is, whether or not
respondent violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract, specifically with regard to the payment of monthly
rentals.
According to the RTC-Br. 23 and the CA, respondent did not breach its obligation to pay rent as its consignation of its
monthly rentals with RTC Br. 24 constitutes sufficient compliance thereof.
The RTC-Br. 23 and the CA are mistaken.
To recapitulate, in its letter[48] dated May 24, 2011, petitioner demanded payment for, among others, monthly rentals for
the period of February 2007 to May 2011. In response thereto,[49] respondent claimed that it had already complied with its
obligation to pay monthly rentals via consignation with RTC-Br. 24, as evidenced by the Manifestation and
Notice[50] dated May 30, 2011 it filed before said court. However, a closer reading of such letter-reply and Manifestation
and Notice reveals that the amount consigned with RTC-Br. 24 represents monthly rentals only for the period of February
2007 to March 2011, which is two (2) whole months short of what was being demanded by petitioner. In fact, petitioner
pointed out such fact in his letter[51] dated June 9, 2011 to respondent, but the latter still refused to make any additional
payments, by either making further consignations with RTC-Br. 24 or directly paying petitioner.
From the foregoing, it appears that even assuming arguendo that respondent's consignation of its monthly rentals with
RTC-Br. 24 was made in accordance with law, it still failed to comply with its obligation under the lease contract to pay
monthly rentals. It is apparent that at the time petitioner filed the unlawful detainer suit on June 21, 2011, respondent
was not updated in its monthly rental payments, as there is no evidence of such payment for the months of April, May,
and even June 2011. Irrefragably, said omission constitutes a violation of the lease contract on the part of respondent.
Considering that all the requisites of a suit for unlawful detainer have been complied with, petitioner is justified in ejecting
respondent from the subject land. Thus, the rulings of the RTC-Br. 23 and the CA must be reversed and set aside, and
accordingly, the MTCC ruling must be reinstated. However, in light of prevailing jurisprudence, the rental arrearages due
to petitioner shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from first demand on May 24, 2011 to
June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. The other amounts awarded by the
66
MTCC, i.e., P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, P50,000.00 as litigation expenses, and the costs of suit) shall likewise earn
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully paid. [52]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 22, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 07839 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision
dated December 29, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Iloilo City, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. 32-11 is
hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION in that the rental arrearages due to petitioner Teodorico A. Zaragoza shall
earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from first demand on May 24, 2011 to June 30, 2013,
and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction. The other amounts awarded in favor of petitioner
Teodorico A. Zaragoza, such as the P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, P50,000.00 as litigation expenses, and the costs of
suit shall also earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
34. A.C. No. 8371, June 28, 2017
SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO AND DOMINGA SALONOY, COMPLAINANTS, V. ATTY. EDUARDO Z.
GATCHALIAN, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a complaint[1] filed by Spouses Gerardo Montecillo and Dominga Salonoy
(complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian (respondent) before the Office of the Bar Confidant charging him of
grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for being negligent in handling complainants' case. In a
Resolution[2] dated August 9, 2010, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
The Facts
Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent for an ejectment case in which they were the defendants.[3]After
filing their Answer to the complaint, complainants received a notice from the court setting the preliminary conference on
March 25, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants went to respondent's office to confer with him about it, the
latter told them that he did not receive the notice and that he could not attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict
in his schedule. Complainants expressed that they can attend the conference even without him. He allegedly advised
them not to attend anymore as he would arrange with the court for a new schedule when he is available. [4]
Complainants relied on respondent's advice and did not attend the preliminary conference anymore. Thereafter, they
found out that respondent not only failed to attend the scheduled preliminary conference, but also failed to take any steps
to have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also learned that, contrary to respondent's representation, he did
receive the notice setting the date of the preliminary conference. Subsequently, complainant received an Order[5] dated
March 25, 2009 that deemed the ejectment case submitted for decision due to complainants' failure to appear during the
preliminary conference. When they approached respondent about it, he belittled the matter and told them not to worry as
he would take care of it.[6]
Subsequently, the trial court issued a Decision[7] dated April 21, 2009 adverse to the complainants. Respondent received
it on May 4, 2009 but failed to inform complainants about the status of the case as to enable them to prepare the next
course of action. Complainants learned about the adverse ruling upon inquiring with the trial court only on May 13, 2009,
or nine (9) days after respondent's receipt thereof, when their period to appeal was almost about to lapse. [8]
Complainants went to respondent's office wherein the latter prepared a Notice of Appeal. Afterwards, complainants
terminated respondent's legal services and engaged another lawyer to prepare their Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal,
the ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin.[9]
In sum, complainants assail respondent's negligent and complacent handling of their case.[10]
In his Comment,[11] respondent contended that when complainants informed him about the scheduled preliminary
conference, he told them that he would be unable to attend due to a conflict in schedule, as he was committed to attend
a criminal case hearing in Quezon City. Nevertheless, he instructed complainants to attend the preliminary conference
even without his appearance and inform the court about the conflict in schedule. He denied having advised complainants
not to attend the preliminary hearing and belittled the Order dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he alleged that the Order
dated March 25, 2009 was complainants' fault, due to their failure to attend the preliminary conference, and upon telling
this to complainants, they terminated his legal services.[12]
On June 22, 2011, while the case was pending before the IBP, complainants filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Withdraw Complaint.[13]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the IBP's Report and Recommendation[14] dated August 29, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for breach of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). He explained that the submission of the ejectment case for resolution and the eventual adverse
decision against complainants were attributable to respondent's negligence. Knowing that he had a conflict in schedule,
respondent should have prepared and filed an appropriate motion to cause the cancellation and resetting of the
scheduled preliminary conference. Whether he advised complainants to attend the preliminary conference on March 25,
2009 or not is immaterial. What was relevant was his course of action when confronted with a conflict of schedule in his
court appearances.[15]
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found complainants' version of facts more in line with common experience as
opposed to respondent's version. Notably, there was no cogent explanation why complainants would dismiss his alleged
instruction to attend the conference without him.[16]
In a Resolution[17] dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution[18] dated September 23, 2016.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.
Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost diligence and competence, and never neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him.[19] A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients' cause[20] and, accordingly is expected to exercise the required
degree of diligence in handling their affairs.[21] Consequently, he is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency, and to devote one's full attention, skill, and competence to the case, whether it is accepted for a fee or
for free.[22] The relevant provisions of the CPR read thus:
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties of competence and diligence include not merely reviewing cases or giving
sound legal advice, but also consist of properly representing a client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings and conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting handled cases with reasonable
dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him to do so. [23] A lawyer's
negligence in fulfilling these duties subjects him to disciplinary action.[24]
Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed to exercise the diligence required of lawyers in handling
complainants' case. Based on the records, he failed to file the necessary motion to postpone the hearing due to a conflict
67
in his schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their opportunity to present their evidence in the ejectment case. As
complainants' counsel in the ejectment case, respondent was expected to exercise due diligence. He should have been
more circumspect in preparing and filing the motion, considering the serious consequence of failure to attend the
scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to ajudgment,[25] as
what happened in this case.
The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to immediately inform complainants about the trial court's adverse
decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an obligation to promptly apprise clients regarding the status of a case as
expressed in Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must advise them without delay about
matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the present case, respondent failed to immediately notify
complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the complainants not inquired with the trial court, they
would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason, respondent is also administratively liable for negligence
under Rule 18.04 of the CPR.
As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their clients' affairs
by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update clients about court decisions, the Court suspended them from the
practice of law for six (6) months. In Caranza Vda. de Saldivar v. Cabanes,[26] a lawyer was suspended for failure to file a
pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,[27] a lawyer was likewise
suspended for not attending pre-trial, failing to inform clients about the dismissal of their case, and failing to file position
papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda,[28] a lawyer suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a scheduled
hearing despite due notice, which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these cases, the
Court agrees with the IBP's recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
35. G.R. No. 223708, June 28, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. NORIETO MONROYO Y MAHAGUAY, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Norieto Monroyo y Mahaguay (Monroyo) assailing the
Decision[2] dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06078, which affirmed the Joint
Decision[3] in Crim. Case Nos. C-04-7785, C-04- 7786 and C-04-7787 and the Decision[4] in Crim. Case No. C-04-7788
both dated November 16, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 (RTC), finding Monroyo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and one (1) count of Rape under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,[5] otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."
The Facts
On October 13, 2004, four (4) Informations were filed before the RTC, charging Monroyo of the crimes of Acts of
Lasciviousness against AAA[6] and Qualified Rape against her sister, BBB, viz.:
Criminal Case No. C-04-7787 (Acts of Lasciviousness)
That on or about 24 August, 2003, at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning, in the dwelling of complainant AAA located at
Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust and lewd desire, with force and intimidation, did and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit acts of lasciviousness on AAA, a fourteen (14) year-old-virgin, by then and
there touching her private parts, against her will and without her consent, [an] act which debases, degrades or demeans
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said AAA, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.[7]
Criminal Case No. C-04-7786 (Acts of Lasciviousness)
That on or about 15 October, 2003, at around 10:30 o'clock in the morning, at Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of
Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, actuated by lust and lewd desire, with force and intimidation, did and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
commit acts of lasciviousness on AAA, a fourteen (14) year-old-virgin, by then and there touching her private parts,
against her will and without her consent, [an] act which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
the said AAA, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.[8]
Criminal Case No. C-04-7785 (Acts of Lasciviousness)
That on or about 13 October, 2003, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in the dwelling of complainant AAA located at
Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust and lewd desire, with force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and [feloniously], commit acts of lasciviousness on AAA, a fourteen (14) year-old-virgin, by then
and there touching her private parts, against her will and without her consent, [an] act which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said AAA, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.[9]
Criminal Case No. C-04-7788 (Rape)
That on or about November 18, 2003, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, in the dwelling of complainant BBB,
[10]
located at Barangay San Isidro, Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd desire and by means of force
and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one BBB, a sixteen (16) year-old-virgin,
against the will and without the consent of said private complainant, thereby violating her person and chastity, [an] act of
sexual abuse which debase[s], degrade[s] and demean[s] her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, to the
damage and prejudice of said private complainant.
In the commission of the offense the qualifying circumstance of relationship is attendant, the accused being a relative of
the complainant by affinity within the 3rd civil degree and the complainant being then under eighteen years of age.
Contrary to law.[11]
On the charges of Acts of Lasciviousness, the prosecution alleged that at around 11:30 in the morning of August 24,
2003, AAA was alone in her house when her uncle, Monroyo, arrived. While AAA was cleaning the house, Monroyo
approached her, touched her private organ, and warned her against telling her parents about what happened.[12]
The incident was repeated on October 13, 2003, at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when Monroyo went to AAA's
house to ask for cigarette sticks. AAA went out to buy the cigarette sticks, handed them to Monroyo, and went to the
living room to resume cleaning the house. Monroyo followed her to the living room and once more, touched her private
organ.[13]
68
Finally, at around 10:30 in the morning of October 15, 2003, AAA went to Monroyo's house looking for her cousin,
Norton, but the latter was not at home. When she was about to leave, Monroyo touched her private organ. [14]
On the charge of Rape, the prosecution claimed that on the night of November 18, 2003, BBB, a sixteen (16) year-old
girl, slept on a bed with her siblings, AAA and EEE. At around 11 o'clock in the evening, BBB woke up when she felt
someone touching her breast. She saw Monroyo, the husband of her mother's half-sister,[15] sitting on the floor beside
their bed. Her uncle instructed her to sit down on the floor and told her not to make any noise. He then forced her to lie
down on the floor and started kissing her all over her body while BBB cried. He forcibly removed her shorts and panty
and thereafter stood up to remove his shorts and brief. He then placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis into her
private organ, and made a push and pull motion. BBB cried loudly but Monroyo covered her mouth with his hand. After
satisfying his lust, he put on his clothes and threatened to kill BBB and her family if she tells anyone about what
happened. BBB did not see him again after the incident.[16]
In March 2004, BBB mustered enough courage to tell her mother about the incident when the latter saw her crying. BBB
subjected herself to a medical examination administered by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Ma. Virginia R. Valdez (Dr.
Valdez), who found healed hymenal lacerations that could have been caused by a hard object, like an erect penis.[17]
For his part, Monroyo denied the accusations against him and testified that on October 15, 2003, AAA and BBB asked for
money from him to buy junk food while he was buying cigarettes from a store. When he refused to give them money, they
grabbed the belt bag tied around his belt. Monroyo tried to retrieve the bag by tickling them on the side of their bodies but
the bag was ripped in the process. Monroyo slapped AAA and BBB for destroying the bag and then he went home. He
claimed that he does not know why the cases were filed against him by complainants but speculated that it was probably
because of a familial tiff with the latter's father regarding the house that he and his wife were residing in. [18]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision[19] dated November 16, 2011, the RTC found Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3)
counts of Acts of Lasciviousness (Crim. Case Nos. C-04-7785, C-04-7786 and C-04-7787) and accordingly, sentenced
him to suffer in each case the penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period, as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional  in its medium period, as maximum, and ordered
him to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, as well as P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.[20]
The RTC gave more credence to AAA's testimony clearly and convincingly narrating the details of each lascivious
conduct committed by Monroyo against her. It added that AAA had no ill motive against Monroyo, while the latter's
excuses were too shallow and insignificant for AAA to concoct a story that she was molested. [21]
In another Decision[22] dated November 16, 2011, the RTC similarly found Monroyo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape (Crim. Case No. C-04-7788), and accordingly, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered
him to pay BBB P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
[23]
The RTC gave full faith and credence to BBB's testimony, as she was likewise able to narrate the details of how Monroyo
raped her inside their house, noting further that her youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. The foregoing
account was corroborated by the medical certificate issued by the physician who examined BBB (i.e., Dr. Valdez) that
confirmed the latter's hymenal lacerations, which could have been caused by a hard object, like an erect penis. On the
other hand, Monroyo merely interposed the defense of bare denial, which cannot be given greater weight than the
positive declaration of a credible witness like BBB. The RTC however, did not consider the special qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority because these were not purportedly alleged in the Information.[24]
Dissatisfied, Monroyo elevated his case to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[25] dated May 27, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling, observing that the trial court's findings as to the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies deserve the highest respect absent any showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied material facts or circumstances.[26] The CA added that the minor inconsistencies in AAA
and BBB's testimonies do not refer to the essential elements of the crimes; thus, they are not grounds to reverse the
conviction.[27] Notably, the CA no longer discussed the attendant circumstances of relationship and minority in the Rape
case.
Aggrieved by his impending conviction, Monroyo filed the present appeal.[28]
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Monroyo's conviction for three (3) counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness and one (1) count of Rape should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
The Court first examines the charges of Acts of Lasciviousness against Monroyo in Crim. Case Nos. C-04-7785, C-04-
7786 and C-04-7787, committed against AAA.
Preliminarily, although the three Informations designated the crime committed only as "Acts of Lasciviousness," the facts
alleged therein pertain not only to violations of Article 336 of the RPC but also of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, otherwise
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." It is settled that a
designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford
him the opportunity to prepare his defense.[29] Nevertheless, the erroneous reference to the law violated does not vitiate
the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. [30] As the Court had
ruled, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the legal provision alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of facts in the information.[31] In the present case, the recital of facts in the Informations constitute violations of Acts
of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610.
Article 336 of the RPC provides:
Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of
either sex under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Its elements are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done ( a) by using force
or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or (c) when the offended
party is under twelve (12) years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. [32]
On the other hand, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 states:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - x x x
The penalty of reclusion temporal  in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse; x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The elements under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[33] In Quimvel v. People,[34] the Court held that the allegation of
“force and intimidation" is sufficient to classify the minor victim as one who is "exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse."[35]
Common to both legal provisions is the element of lascivious conduct or lewdness. The term "lewd" is commonly defined
as something indecent or obscene. It is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is
entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is a mental process that can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. [36]
In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the prosecution was able to
establish the presence of the aforementioned elements. As correctly observed by the lower courts, AAA clearly and
69
convincingly narrated in detail each lascivious act committed by Monroyo against her. On various occasions, i.e., August
24, October 13 and 15, 2003, Monroyo succeeded in touching the latter's private organ. The Court finds that Monroyo's
overt acts were done against AAA's will and much more, committed without any other justifiable reason, hence,
demonstrating its lewd character. AAA also sufficiently established that she was a minor during that time. In this relation,
it should be pointed out that Monroyo was AAA's uncle and thus, exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her,
which according to case law, constitutes intimidation.[37]
Verily, AAA's testimony is worthy of full faith and credence as there is no proof that she was motivated to falsely accuse
Monroyo of the crimes charged. To this, it may not be amiss to state that in several cases, the Court has observed that
no young and decent girl (like AAA in this case) would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself to undergo public
trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she is not impelled by a sincere desire to put behind bars the person
who assaulted her.[38] Ultimately, the credibility of AAA's testimony, as well as Monroyo's opposite account involves
findings of fact which the Court does not generally review. Case law dictates that factual findings of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the Court barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance,[39] of which there are none in this case.
In view of the foregoing, Monroyo's conviction for three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness is proper under Article 336 of
the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[40] Monroyo is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[41]Furthermore, in order to
conform with prevailing jurisprudence,[42] his civil liabilities are adjusted, in that he is ordered to pay the amounts of
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, also for each
count.
Separately, Monroyo was charged with the crime of Qualified Rape in Crim. Case No. C-04-7788, this time committed
against AAA's sister, BBB. At the outset, it should be clarified that, contrary to the RTC's observation, the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were sufficiently alleged in the Information in Crim. Case No. C-04-7788, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
In the commission of the offense the qualifying circumstance of relationship is attendant, the accused being a relative of
the complainant by affinity within the 3rd civil degree and the complainant being then under eighteen years of age.
[43]
 (Emphases supplied)
The presence of these circumstances is readily verifiable from the records of this case. As to BBB's minority ( i.e., sixteen
years old at the time the crime was committed), the prosecution formally offered a photocopy of her birth certificate, the
authenticity of which was not in any way disputed by the defense.[44] Meanwhile, the fact that Monroyo is BBB's relative
by affinity within the third civil degree was attested to by BBB, who testified that Monroyo is the husband of her mother's
half-sister.[45] In fact, Monroyo admitted their relationship on cross-examination, stating that "his wife is the sister of the
mother of [BBB]."[46]
Well-settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for scrutiny on any question, even one not
raised by the parties as errors,[47] and that the appeal confers the appellate court with full jurisdiction over the case,
enabling the court to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.[48] Thus, given that the circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven in
this case, the Court examines Monroyo's criminal liability for Qualified Rape as charged.
Article 266-A (1) (a), in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, defines and penalizes the crime of
Rape, including the circumstances which qualify the penalty to be imposed:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed-
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
The elements of Qualified Rape under these provisions are: (a) the victim is a female over twelve (12) years but under
eighteen (18) years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and ( c) the offender has carnal
knowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation. [49]
A perusal of the records reveals that all these elements are present. Both the RTC and the CA found credible BBB's
categorical testimony that on November 18, 2003, Monroyo had carnal knowledge of her without her consent; that she
was sixteen (16) years old at that time; and that Monroyo is her uncle, being the husband of her mother's half-sister. In
addition, the results of Dr. Valdez's medical examination corroborated BBB's account. The lower courts also noted BBB's
testimony that Monroyo previously molested her five (5) times prior to the rape incident but she opted not to inform her
parents due to Monroyo's threats against her.[50]
As in the Acts of Lasciviousness cases, the Court defers to the findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA.
Jurisprudentially settled is the principle that if a victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of
credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. Putting more emphasis, the factual findings of
the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal,[51] as in this case.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that Monroyo only proffered the defense of denial, which the courts a quo,
found to be too shallow and insignificant so as to impel BBB to falsely charge her uncle and publicly disclose that she
was raped. Case law edifies that "[d]enial cannot prevail over [a] private complainant's direct, positive and categorical
assertion that rings with truth. Denial is inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between
a categorical statement that has the earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail."[52]
Based on the foregoing, Monroyo's criminal liability in Crim. Case No. C-04-7788 is thus upheld. However, for the
reasons initially stated, his conviction is modified from Rape to Qualified Rape, which, based on Article 266-B of the
RPC, as amended by RA 8353, is penalized with death. Pursuant to RA 9346,[53] courts shall impose the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and the offender shall not be eligible for parole. As for his civil liability,
jurisprudence states that when death is the imposable penalty for the crime committed but it cannot be imposed due to
RA 9346, the Court shall award the following to BBB: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral
damages; and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.[54]
Finally, the Court imposes interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid, for each count of Acts of Lasciviousness and Qualified Rape. [55]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 06078 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, finding accused-appellant Norieto
Monroyo yMahaguay GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness and one (1) count
of Qualified Rape. Accordingly:
(a) In Criminal Case Nos. C-04-7785, C-04-7786, C-04-7787, Monroyo is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment with an indeterminate period of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count and is ORDERED to pay AAA the
amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, also
for each count;
70
(b) In Criminal Case No. C-04-7788, Monroyo is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and is ORDERED to pay BBB the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(c) All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
36. A.M. No. P-17-3709 (Formerly OCA IPI No.13-4058-P), June 19, 2017
JUDGE CELSO O. BAGUIO, COMPLAINANT, V. JOCELYN P. LACUNA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 34, GAPAN CITY, NUEVA ECIJA, RESPONDENT. 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative matter stemmed from a letter-complaint [1] filed by Judge Celso O. Baguio (Judge Baguio), Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija (RTC), charging respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna
(respondent), Stenographer III of the same court, with gross incompetence.
In his letter-complaint, Judge Baguio alleged that on January 25, 2013, the RTC had to reset the scheduled initial trial of
Criminal Case No. 14405-10, entitled People of the Philippines v. Jason Ondrade, for failure of respondent to transcribe
and submit the stenographic notes of the pre-trial proceedings held on November 16, 2012. As a result, she was directed
to immediately transcribe the same in an Order[2] dated January 25, 2013, and ordered to submit a written explanation
why she should not be held administratively liable for her failure to perform her job in accordance with the rules.[3] While
respondent apologized for her incompetence in a letter[4] dated January 28, 2013, she nonetheless claimed that the
resetting of the case was not solely due to her failure to perform her task but also in view of the absence of the witness
for the prosecution. Judge Baguio further claimed that despite having been previously suspended for a similar offense in
A.M. No. P-11-2933 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2674-P),[5] respondent did not improve, and that her proficiency as
stenographer was doubtful given that she relied solely on tape recordings for the past fifteen (15) years. He pointed out
that the incident complained of was just one of the many similar incidents involving respondent's dismal failure to perform
her tasks, which resulted in the cancellation of hearings and caused embarrassment to the court. Nevertheless, Judge
Baguio remarked that respondent has an almost perfect attendance and that she behaved well in court although she
mostly tended to keep to herself and was always very quiet.[6]
In the 1st Indorsement[7] dated March 4, 2013 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), respondent was
directed to comment on the letter-complaint dated January 28, 2013.
In her Comment[8] dated April 15, 2013, respondent admitted having failed to transcribe the stenographic notes of the pre-
trial held on November 16, 2012. However, she contended that her omission was not due to her gross inefficiency but
rather, due to simple oversight or inadvertence on her part. She explicated that the court regularly scheduled hearings
three (3) times a week, with the bulk of the criminal cases heard every Tuesday and Friday, and that the date complained
of was a Friday, during which there were many criminal cases scheduled for hearing at that time. She added that there
were only three (3) stenographers in Branch 34 and each of them took turns in their duty at least once a week,
transcribing not only stenographic notes of pre-trial and trials, but also encoded orders of the court. She clarified that her
apology should not be viewed as an admission of her incompetence, and further denied that she solely relied on tape
recordings. Likewise, she contended that her regular attendance was a manifestation of her enthusiasm to not only cope
with her work load but also her willingness to improve in the performance of her official functions. Accordingly, she
prayed that the complaint be dismissed or if found guilty, that her penalty be mitigated.[9]
On September 11, 2015, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be referred to the Executive Judge of
the RTC of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija for investigation, report and recommendation. [10]
In a Report and Recommendation[11] dated March 2, 2017, Executive Judge Ana Marie C. Joson-Viterbo recommended
that respondent be meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay, having been found guilty only of simple
neglect of duty.[12] The Executive Judge noted that respondent admittedly failed to timely transcribe half of her
stenographic notes within the period prescribed prior to January 25, 2013 (the date of the incident complained of) but
nonetheless completed the same before the next scheduled hearing of the cases, and that the primary cause for the
delay was her slow performance despite her noticeable hard work. Since the investigation showed that respondent has
significantly improved, and in fact, exerted efforts to fulfill her duties within the prescribed time, the Executive Judge
found respondent not to have acted in bad faith and therefore guilty of simple neglect of duty only. Accordingly, the
Executive Judge recommended the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay after considering her previous
infraction for a similar offense,[13] the twenty-one (21) years of public service, and complainant's admission that her
working habits had greatly improved.[14]
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the Executive Judge's recommendation to be in accord with the law and the facts of the case and thus,
adopts and approves the same except as to the imposable penalty.
The duties of a Stenographer are clearly embodied under Section 17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 17. Stenographer. - It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has attended a session of a court either in the
morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or afternoon
session, all the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise be the duty of the clerk
to demand that the stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of court shall stamp the date on which such notes are
received by him. When such notes are transcribed the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly initialed on each
page thereof, to be attached to the record of the case. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
(6) months for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. While the Court is duty bound to
sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, the Court
also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy.[22] Thus, in several administrative cases, the
Court has restrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating facts, such as, length of service in
the judiciary, the acknowledgment of infractions and feelings of remorse, and family circumstances, among others.[23] In
this case, apart from respondent's long service in the government, it has been observed during the administrative
investigation, and as admitted by complainant, that the latter's working habits had greatly improved and had since
complied with her duties.[24]
Accordingly, the Court finds the imposable penalty of three (3) months suspension without pay, instead of the six (6)
months penalty recommended by the Executive Judge, to be more fair and reasonable under the circumstances. It is
noteworthy to point out that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by the
employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is
herebySUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months without pay and STERNLY WARNED to be more circumspect in
the performance of her duties, as a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this Decision be entered in the 201 file of respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna.
SO ORDERED.

Under the afore-cited provision, stenographers are enjoined to immediately deliver to the clerk of court all the notes taken
during the session of the court, which are to be attached to the record of the case. In this regard, Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 24-90[15] requires stenographers to transcribe their notes and attach the transcripts to the
record of the case within a period of twenty (20) days from the time they were taken, thus:
2. (a) All stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the transcripts to the record of the
case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the notes are taken.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that respondent failed to comply with the twenty (20) day period in the transcription of
the stenographic notes for the Pre-Trial in Criminal Case No. 14405-10, and hence, guilty of violating Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 24-90. The heavy work load proffered by respondent in her attempt to be exonerated from
liability is not an adequate excuse for her to be remiss in the performance of her duties. To allow otherwise would permit
every government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty to resort to the same convenient excuse to
evade punishment.[16]
It bears stressing that a court stenographer performs a function essential to the prompt and fair administration of justice.
The conduct of every person connected with the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. All public officers are accountable to the people at all time and must
perform their duties and responsibilities with utmost efficiency and competence.[17] As administration of justice is a sacred
task, the Court condemns any omission or act which would erode public faith in the judiciary.[18] A public office is a public
trust, and a court stenographer, without doubt, violates this trust by failing to fulfill his duties. [19] 37. OCA IPI No. 11-3800-RTJ, June 19, 2017
While respondent admitted to incurring delay in the performance of her duties, records show that she nonetheless
OSCAR C. RIZALADO, COMPLAINANT, V. PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR.
completed the same in time for the calendar of cases. Under the circumstances, her failure to timely transcribe the
21, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT.
stenographic notes was correctly found by the Executive Judge to constitute simple neglect of duty, which is defined as a
disregard of, or a failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee, simple neglect of duty signifies
[OCA IPI No. 12-3867-RTJ, June 19, 2017]
carelessness or indifference.[20]
Section 46 (D) of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service [21] provides that simple
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT DATED JUNE 27, 2011 OF OSCAR C. RIZALADO AGAINST JUDGE GIL BOLLOZOS,
neglect of duty is categorized as a less grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RELATIVE TO G.R. NO. 188427 (CYNTHIA G.

71
 ESPANO, ET AL. v. DR. OTHELLO C. GUZMAN, ET AL.).
[OCA IPI No. 12-3897-RTJ, June 19, 2017]
OTHELLO C. GUZMAN, RICARDO GUZMAN, MARIO C. GUZMAN, SR., AND ROSARIO GUZMAN RIZALADO,
COMPLAINANTS, V. PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, CAGAYAN
DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT.  the Court.
[OCA IPI No. 13-4070-RTJ, June 19, 2017]
OSCAR C. RIZALADO, COMPLAINANT, V. PRESIDING JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 21, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, RESPONDENT.  Guzman, et al.'s counsels.[27]
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution are four (4) administrative cases filed against respondent Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos
(respondent), namely: (a) OCA IPI Nos. 11-3800-RTJ,[1] 12-3867-RTJ,[2] and 13-4070-RTJ,[3] all initiated by complainant
Oscar C. Rizalado (Rizalado) alleging undue delay in the disposition of the case, partiality, and gross ignorance of the
rules, and (b) OCA IPI No. 12-3897-RTJ[4] filed by complainants Othello C. Guzman[5] (Othello), Ricardo Guzman, Mario
C. Guzman, Sr., and Rosario Guzman Rizalado (Guzman, et al.) for gross ignorance of the law, undue delay in the
administration of justice, and bias.
The Facts
These consolidated cases are all related to G.R. No. 188427, entitled "Cynthia G. Espano, et al. v. Dr. Othelo Ch.
Guzman, et al.," where the Court, in a Resolution[6] dated March 24, 2010, affirmed the Decision[7] dated September 2,
2008 and Resolution[8] dated May 29, 2009 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80347-MIN,
entitled "Dr. Othelo Ch. Guzman, et al. v. Cynthia G. Espano, et al."
The said case originated from Civil Case No. 92-368 for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Documents as Null and Void,
Partition, Accounting and Damages with Preliminary Injunction, and Civil Case No. 92-409 for Annulment of Lease
Contracts and Damages with a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, which the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 21 (RTC) resolved on February 13, 2003.[9] In its September 2, 2008 Decision, the CA affirmed with
modification the RTC's ruling and ordered, inter alia, defendant therein, Reuben Guzman (Reuben), to reimburse
Guzman, et al. whatever rentals he had received pertaining to their shares in a specific property and to make an
accounting of all the rentals received by him and the former administrator.[10]
The Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 188427 became final and executory on September 14, 2010.[11] Thus, Guzman, et al.,
through their counsel of record, Atty. Ismael S. Laya (Atty. Laya), filed a Motion for Execution [12] of the judgment before
the RTC. In a Joint Order[13] dated July 14, 2011 (July 14, 2011 Joint Order), respondent ordered Guzman, et al., to make
an accounting of all monies and properties under litigation.[14]
OCA IPI No. 11-3800-RTJ
In a complaint[15] dated November 14, 2011, Rizalado, who claimed to be the attorney-in-fact of Guzman, et al., alleged
that respondent failed to act on the motion for execution within a considerable amount of time. He also averred that
respondent's July 14, 2011 Joint Order was inconsistent with the CA Decision and was intended to delay the execution of
the judgment to favor Reuben.[16]
Moreover, Rizalado disputed the Comment[17] of Atty. Jerlie P. Luis Requerme (Atty. Requerme), Clerk of Court of the
RTC, which stated that there was no proof of the alleged official receipts (ORs) of monies deposited with the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC (OCC-RTC) as rental payments, since the parties required to deposit failed to comply with the
court's order to submit the corresponding ORs for monitoring.[18] Rizalado asserted that the parties should not be required
to submit their copies of the ORs to the OCC-RTC, insisting that the latter should have duplicate copies, especially since
the summary of payments and withdrawals[19] for Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409 from July 13, 1992 to July 13, 2011
showed that the accounting was monitored and conducted by Atty. Requerme. He also challenged Atty. Requerme's
recommendation for the appointment of a commissioner to conduct the said accounting. Further, Rizalado lamented that
when Guzman, et al. attempted to withdraw the rental deposits for the period from 1992 to 2011 from the OCC-RTC,
they were refused.[20]
72
In defense,[21] respondent claimed that he resolved Guzman, et al.'s motion for execution through the issuance of the July
14, 2011 Joint Order and that he gave the judgment defendants an opportunity to comment on the said motion. He also
stated that prior to the filing of Guzman, et al.'s motion for execution through Atty. Laya, a motion to withdraw deposits
and to compel lessees to pay unpaid rentals[22] (motion to withdraw deposits) had been filed by Atty. Leonardo N.
Demecillo (Atty. Demecillo), who also appeared as counsel for them.[23] In an Order[24] dated January 31, 2011 (January
31, 2011 Order), respondent held in abeyance the resolution of the latter motion as the records of the case were still with
Thereafter, Rizalado himself, who also claimed to represent Guzman, et al., filed another motion for execution.
[25]
Respondent then directed[26] Guzman, et al. to manifest who was truly representing them, prompting Atty. Demecillo
and Rizalado to withdraw their motions. Subsequently, respondent issued the aforesaid July 14, 2011 Joint Order. He
posited that any delay in the execution of the judgment, therefore, could be attributed to the multiple motions filed by
Furthermore, respondent claimed that there were legal issues to be resolved before he could order the release of the
monies and compel the lessees to pay their unpaid rentals. He explained that the accounting submitted by the parties,
the report of the OCC-RTC, and the withdrawals of the monies all had to be first validated. He also averred that the ORs
evidencing the deposits of the rentals to the OCC-RTC could not be found, and that the parties did not object when they
were required to make an accounting. Moreover, records do not disclose that estate taxes had been paid to warrant the
distribution of the estate. As such, pending compliance as to the nomination of an administrator and an accountant, he
granted the motion for execution filed by Atty. Laya in his Joint Order[28] dated December 5, 2011 (December 5, 2011
Joint Order).[29]
Likewise, respondent asseverated that Rizalado had no legal personality to file the instant administrative complaint, as
he is no longer the attorney-in-fact of Guzman, et al. Respondent also claimed to have undergone medical treatment
after suffering a heart attack that necessitated an extended leave, after which, he resolved all pending incidents [30] Finally,
respondent stressed on Rizalado's propensity to file unwarranted complaints against judges, defying the Court's earlier
warning[31] against the same.[32]
Subsequently, Rizalado filed another complaint[33] dated April 2, 2012 against respondent, alleging once again that the
July 14, 2011 Joint Order which the latter had earlier issued was an amendment of the judgment sought to be executed.
He also averred that the nomination of another administrator and/or accountant as ordered by respondent was also
tantamount to an alteration of the judgment, to which Guzman, et al., as the prevailing party, were not amenable.
Respondent filed his comment[34] thereto on July 4, 2012.
OCA IPI No. 12-3867-RTJ
In a subsequent letter-complaint[35] dated June 27, 2011, Rizalado questioned the January 31, 2011 Order issued by
respondent, which held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to withdraw deposits previously filed by Atty. Demecillo.
Rizalado claimed that the issuance thereof was "anomalous," considering that the execution of the judgment in Civil
Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409 has been put on hold for five (5) months. Hence, he ascribes ignorance of the Rules of
Court, specifically Section 1, Rule 39 thereof, upon respondent.[36]
In his Comment[37] thereto, respondent pointed out that Rizalado had already filed a complaint against him dated
November 14, 2011, docketed as OCA IPI No. 11-3800-RTJ, to which he had already submitted his comment. He
explained that all the administrative complaints against him referred to Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409, which the
Court had already resolved in G.R. No. 188427. Having already submitted his comment to the earlier complaints filed by
Rizalado, he therefore adopted the same.[38]
OCA IPI No. 12-3897-RTJ
In another complaint[39] dated May 7, 2012, this time initiated by Guzman, et al., they alleged, among others, that
respondent has been delaying the execution of the judgment in their favor and "protecting" the opposing party's counsel,
Atty. Andrew Barba (Atty. Barba) by refusing to hold the latter in contempt despite the various motions filed by him
opposing their motion for execution. Likewise, they argued that Reuben should be held in contempt for failing to comply
with respondent's orders. Moreover, their request for respondent to update the rental payments of all tenants as well as
to release the same from the OCC-RTC in their favor remained unresolved. Furthermore, they claimed that respondent's
order for them to pay estate tax was premature, as most of the tenants have not updated their rental payments. [40]
In his comment[41] dated August 24, 2012, respondent denied that he was protecting Atty. Barba, as well as Reuben,
arguing that if Guzman, et al. found their acts contemptuous, they should have filed a proper motion to cite Atty. Barba
and Reuben in contempt.[42] As regards the request for updated rental payments, respondent claimed that there was no
motion filed by Guzman, et al. requesting the same and instead, asserted that it could be done through the appointment
of an administrator.[43] With respect to respondent's order for the payment of estate tax, he averred that it would be
premature to release the rentals unless it is certified that estate taxes have been paid.[44]
Moreover, respondent reiterated that he had already granted Guzman, et al.'s motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution through his December 5, 2011 Joint Order. Praying for the dismissal of the complaint, he argued that it was
filed solely to harass him and to compel the release of rental deposits without compliance with his directive to ensure the
authenticity and veracity of Guzman, et al.'s claim.[45] He also prayed for the consolidation of the administrative
complaints filed against him and for his comments in the earlier complaints to be deemed part of his comment in the
present complaint.[46]
OCA IPI No. 13-4070-RTJ
Finally, in a letter-complaint[47] dated April 17, 2013, Rizalado alleged that despite the finality of the decision in Civil Case
Nos. 92-368 and 92- 409, respondent still failed to implement the same. Rizalado insinuated that Reuben bribed Atty.
Laya and respondent to delay the execution of the judgment. He claimed that Atty. Laya intentionally altered the date in
the motion for execution and made it appear as "July 24, 1990" instead of "July 2, 1980" to deceive Guzman, et al. He
also reiterated his allegations in a previous complaint that despite Reuben's failure to comply with respondent's order to
submit an accounting, respondent has never cited him in contempt.[48]
Rizalado also asserted that respondent allowed Atty. Barba to file pleadings despite the finality of the judgment. He
maintained that the motion to withdraw deposits previously filed by Atty. Demecillo had been denied by respondent, in
contravention of the Court's final order. Questioning the appointment of a commissioner, he averred that it was intended
to conceal anomalies committed by respondent.[49]
In his Comment,[50] respondent denied any knowledge of the alleged bribery perpetrated by Reuben and of the alteration
of dates in the motion for execution as well as the writ of execution. He insisted that the delay in the implementation of
the writ was caused by Guzman, et al. for their refusal to assist the branch sheriff to locate the whereabouts of Reuben,
for which reason the writ remained unserved.[51]
Further, he explained that the July 24, 2011 Joint Order merely directed Atty. Laya to submit an accounting of all the
monies that were deposited with the OCC-RTC in view of the absence of ORs on file. With regard to his failure to hold
Reuben in contempt of court, he averred that the matter can only be tackled after the writ of execution had been served
and the appropriate motion had been filed in court. As regards Atty. Barba's filing of various other pleadings, respondent
asserted that he cannot prevent the former from doing so in defense of his client.[52]
Finally, respondent repeated that the appointment of a commissioner was necessary for the accounting of the rental
funds before any withdrawal could be had.[53]
Other Undocketed Complaints Against Respondent
Aside from the foregoing complaints, Rizalado filed several other letter-complaints[54] against respondent before the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), all related to respondent's alleged inaction and undue delay in the execution of the final
and executory judgment in Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409.
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum[55] dated December 12, 2016, the OCA recommended that: (a) the consolidated administrative
complaints against respondent be dismissed for raising issues that are judicial in nature and for lack of merit; ( b)
Rizalado be found guilty of contempt of court and ordered imprisoned for a period of five (5) days and to pay the fine in
the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely; and ( c) that
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be directed to immediately cause the arrest and confinement of Rizalado to
serve his imprisonment.[56]
In its evaluation of the consolidated cases, the OCA noted that the charges against respondent all pertain to his issuance
of the January 31, 2011 Order and July 14, 2011 Joint Order, which Rizalado and Guzman, et al. claim to be anomalous
and irregular. The OCA posited, however, that if such had been their belief, they should have availed of the remedies
provided under the Rules of Court, which they unfortunately failed to do. The OCA opined that by questioning the manner
by which respondent had acted on the case filed before him, complainants are in effect infringing on the exercise of his
judicial discretion, an act that is beyond the ambit of an administrative inquiry or disquisition. [57]
With regard to the charge of undue delay, the OCA found respondent's explanation to be meritorious, as the latter
clarified that between the filing of the first motion for execution and the issuance of the July 14, 2011 Joint Order, he only
gave the judgment-defendants the opportunity to comment. Further, he had to first resolve the multiple motions filed by
Guzman, et al. through their two (2) counsels, as well as by Rizalado, before proceeding with the case. Subsequently,
73
pending compliance with the nomination of an administrator and an accountant, he had already granted the motion for
execution filed by Atty. Laya in his December 5, 2011 Order.[58] Finally, the OCA recommended that all the other charges
against respondent be dismissed for lack of substantiation.[59]
On the other hand, in recommending that Rizalado be held guilty of contempt of Court, the OCA found that he had the
audacity to file several administrative cases against respondent, all in connection with G.R. No. 188427 (Civil Case Nos.
92-368 and 92-409) and all accusing the latter of delay, ignorance of the law, and/or partiality.[60]
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether grounds exist in this case to hold respondent administratively liable
and to find Rizalado guilty of contempt of court.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings of the OCA.
It is well-settled that "in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the acts complained
of rests on the complainant. x x x. Bare allegations of bias and partiality are not enough in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the
charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in
addition to the palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or order itself."[61]
In this case, the charges of bias and partiality against respondent have not been substantiated. Complainants failed to
present substantial evidence to prove that respondent was motivated by bias, bad faith, or partiality in the disposition of
G.R. No. 188427 (Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409), particularly in the issuance of the January 31, 2011 Order and
July 14, 2011 Joint Order.
Moreover, it has been held that "the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of
actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy
exists."[62] "The law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive
law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new
trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in
character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are[, inter alia,] the special civil
actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may
be."[63]
Relative thereto, "disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory of,
nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of
other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only
after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the
door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed." [64]
As such, the Court concurs with the OCA's opinion in this case that if Guzman, et al. indeed believed that respondent's
issuances pertaining to G.R. No. 188427 (Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409) were tainted with irregularity, they should
have availed themselves of the appropriate judicial remedies and refrained from filing these administrative cases against
respondent. It bears to stress that respondent is legally clothed with judicial discretion in the disposition of cases, which
involves the exercise of judgment. As a judge, he must be allowed reasonable latitude for the operation of his own
individual view of the case, his appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the applicable law on the matter. [65] "To
hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred,
would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge."[66]
As regards the charge of undue delay in the resolution of the motions for execution, the Court finds respondent's
explanation meritorious, considering the multiple motions filed by Guzman, et al.'s two counsels. In any case, respondent
had already granted the motion for execution filed by Atty. Laya in his December 5, 2011 Order.
On the other hand, Rizalado has indiscriminately and repetitively filed several complaints against respondent, all in
connection with the latter's disposition of G.R. No. 188427 (Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-409). The filing of multiple
complaints against respondent has therefore resulted in confusion due to the number of actions docketed before the
OCA. In this respect, the Court concurs with the OCA recommendation that Rizalado be found guilty of contempt of court,
likewise taking into consideration his previous transgression and penalty in Othello Ch. Guzman, et al. by Oscar Rizalado
v. Executive Judge Edgardo T. Lloren where he was meted with a fine[67] for his unjustified attacks against the
competence and integrity of judges and was ordered arrested for his refusal to pay the fine.[68] However, instead of
imposing the penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days in addition to the payment of the fine of P5,000.00, the Court
deems it proper to increase the amount of the fine to P20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaints against respondent Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos of the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan De Oro City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 21 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. On the other hand,
complainant Oscar C. Rizalado is found GUILTY of contempt of Court and ORDERED to pay the FINE in the amount of
P20,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
38. A.C. No. 11600, June 19, 2017
ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. ROLANDO V. ZUBIRI, RESPONDENT.  notice of hearing. In this regard, the Investigating Commissioner noted that a manifestation merely informs the court
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint [1] filed by complainant Romulo De Mesa Festin
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for gross violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013
elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa), filed an election protest against him before the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch 46 (RTC).[2] After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued an
Order[3] dated January 15, 2014 (January 15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution pending appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is GRANTED.
The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is hereby directed to issue a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal after the lapse of
twenty (20) working days to be counted from the time [complainant's] counsel receives a copy of this Special Order, if no
restraining order or status quo order is issued pursuant to Section 11 (b),[4] Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.[5] (Emphasis
supplied)
Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari[6] before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal.[7] In an Order[8]dated
February 13, 2014, the COMELEC issued a TRO, directing Hon. Gay Marie F. Lubigan-Rafael (RTC Judge), in her
official capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC, to cease and desist from enforcing the January 15, 2014 Order, effective
immediately.[9] Accordingly, the RTC issued another Order[10] dated February 25, 2014 (February 25, 2014 Order),
pertinent portion of which reads:
In view thereof, the OIC-Branch [COC] is directed NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution in accordance with the [January
15, 2014] Order until further notice.[11]
Despite the TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order, respondent, as counsel of Villarosa, filed five (5)
manifestations[12] addressed to the COC insisting on the writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these
manifestations to the other party.[13]
In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's January 15, 2014 Order on January 18,
2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on February 12, 2014.[14] Since the COMELEC only
74
issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer had any effect. Respondent further asserted that the TRO was
addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the COC; therefore, the COC is not bound by the TRO. For these reasons,
respondent insisted that the COC could legally issue the writ of execution pending appeal.[15]
The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal addressed to the sheriff. However, complainant only
found out about respondent's manifestations when the sheriff attempted to serve the writ on him.[16] Soon thereafter,
complainant filed the disbarment complaint.
In his complaint, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled and induced the COC to
defy lawful orders - particularly, the COMELEC's TRO and the RTC's February 25, 2014 Order. [17] As a result, respondent
allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19 of the CPR.[18]
In his answer,[19] respondent claimed that, first, since the case records had been transmitted to the COMELEC on
January 31, 2014, the RTC was divested of jurisdiction over the case; therefore, it had no more power to issue the
February 25, 2014 Order.[20] Respondent put forward the same reason for filing the five manifestations with the COC
instead of the RTC Judge.[21] Second, the manifestations contained no misleading statements or factual deviations. He
merely stated in his manifestations his honest belief that the twenty-day period had already lapsed when the COMELEC
issued its TRO; hence, it no longer had any binding effect. He explained that the filing of manifestations to highlight his
position did not violate any rule.[22] Third, he allegedly filed those manifestations pursuant to his duty under Canon 18 of
the CPR to represent his client with competence and diligence.[23]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation[24] dated September 1, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.[25] He observed that by filing manifestations instead
of motions, respondent was able to disregard the rule that motions shall be served on the other party and shall contain a
about a certain matter involving the case, and does not require affirmative action by the court. In the present case,
however, the manifestations filed by respondent were actually motions as these contained arguments to support his
prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner also held that
respondent acted in bad faith when he convinced the COC to disregard the COMELEC's TRO. He pointed out that when
the TRO enjoins the court, it includes the judge and all officers and employees of the court, including the clerk of court.
Hence, respondent was unfair to the other party and employed deceit when he filed the manifestations. As a result, the
other party was not afforded due process by being deprived of an opportunity to oppose the manifestations. [26]
In a Resolution[27] dated December 14, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigation Commissioner.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[28] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[29] dated May 28, 2016.
On October 10, 2016, respondent filed a petition for review[30] before the Court purportedly pursuant to the procedure laid
out in Ramientas v. Reyala  (Ramientas).[31]
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of.
The Court's Ruling
I.
At the outset, the Court deems it proper to clarify that respondent's filing of the instant petition for review does not
conform with the standing procedure for the investigation of administrative complaints against lawyers.
Section 12 (b) and (c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015,
[32]
 states:
Section 12. Review and Recommendation by the Board of Governors. -
xxxx
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court
the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which
it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.
c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted
to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Under the old rule, the IBP Board had the power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of was either exonerated
or meted a penalty of "less than suspension of disbarment." In this situation, the case would be deemed terminated
unless an interested party files a petition before the Court.[33] The case of Ramientas,[34] which was cited as respondent's
basis for filing the present petition for review, was pronounced based on the old rule.[35]
In contrast, under the amended provisions cited above, the IBP Board's resolution is merely recommendatory regardless
of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The amendment stresses the Court's authority to discipline a lawyer who
transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR. Hence, any final action on a lawyer's administrative liability shall be done
by the Court based on the entire records of the case, including the IBP Board's recommendation, without need for the
lawyer-respondent to file any additional pleading.
On this score, respondent's filing of the present petition for review is unnecessary. Pursuant to the current rule, the IBP
Board's resolution and the case records were forwarded to the Court. The latter is then bound to fully consider all
documents contained therein, regardless of any further pleading filed by any party - including respondent's petition for
review, which the Court shall nonetheless consider if only to completely resolve the merits of this case and determine
respondent's actual administrative liability.
II.
After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable for his violations of the CPR. However, the Court finds it proper to impose a lower penalty.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes.
[36]
Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers to conduct themselves with fairness
towards their professional colleagues, to observe procedural rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
These provisions read thus:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAW OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
xxxx
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS
PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL
xxxx
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
xxxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
75
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as "manifestations" to sidestep the requirement
of notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he violated his professional obligations to respect and observe procedural
rules, not to misuse the rules to cause injustice, and to exhibit fairness towards his professional colleagues.
The difference between a manifestation and a motion is essential in determining respondent's administrative liability.
A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated. In a manifestation,
the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather than to contest or argue. [37] In contrast, a motion is an
application for relief from the court other than by a pleading [38] and must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof
of service to the other party, unless the motion is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. [39] Settled is the rule
that a motion without notice of hearing is pro forma  or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it
and the clerk has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party to
agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due process. [40]
In the present case, respondent filed five (5) manifestations before the COC praying for affirmative reliefs. The Court
agrees with the IBP that these "manifestations" were in fact motions, since reliefs were prayed for from the court -
particularly, the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal. By labelling them as manifestations, respondent craftily
sidestepped the requirement of a notice of hearing and deprived the other party of an opportunity to oppose his
arguments. Moreover, the fact that he submitted these manifestations directly to COC, instead of properly filing them
before the RTC, highlights his failure to exhibit fairness towards the other party by keeping the latter completely unaware
of his manifestations. Undoubtedly, respondent violated his professional obligations under the CPR.
He attempts to justify his acts by arguing that he merely represented his client with competence and diligence. However,
respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound not only to serve his client but also the court, his
colleagues, and society. His obligation to represent his client is not without limits, but must be "within the bounds of the
law" pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR. Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and honest means to attain
their clients' objectives.
Respondent further argues that his filing of the manifestations with the COC is justified considering that the RTC had
already lost jurisdiction over the case and the COC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. His argument
fails to persuade. The Court has ruled that a COC has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution when the judge
directs its issuance.[41] In this case, however, the RTC Judge had issued the second Order (dated February 25, 2014)
explicitly directing the COC "NOT TO ISSUE a Writ of Execution." Therefore, the COC in this case did not have a
ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. If respondent honestly believed that his client was entitled to the writ, then
he should not have clandestinely submitted ex parte manifestations directly to the COC to coerce the latter to grant his
intended relief. Instead, respondent should have filed the proper motions before the court, which alone has the inherent
power to grant his prayer pursuant to Section 5 (c), (d), and (g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court. [42]
The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, it may to
impose a less severe punishment if such penalty would achieve the desired end of reforming the errant lawyer.[43] In light
of the foregoing discussion, the Court deems that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is
sufficient and commensurate with respondent's infractions.[44]
As a final note, the Court stresses that a lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any
conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. [45]Indeed, a
lawyer must champion his client's cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot invoke this as an excuse for his
failure to exhibit courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal processes designed to afford due
process to all stakeholders.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Canon 8, and
Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months effective from the finality of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be attached to respondent's personal record
as a member of the Bar. Furthermore, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
39. G.R. No. 192391, June 19, 2017
ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., REPRESENTED BY RAFAEL A. POBLADOR, PETITIONER, VS. ROSARIO
L. MANZANO, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated September 30, 2009 and the
Resolution[3] dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 that denied the appeal of
petitioner Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. (petitioner), represented by Rafael A. Poblador (Rafael), from the Order[4]dated
January 13, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC). Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the
dismissed criminal case for Estafa which it filed against respondent Rosario L. Manzano (Manzano).
The Facts
Petitioner was the subject of settlement proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 9984 before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City (Probate Court). Among its properties was one share of stock in Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc.
(Wack-Wack Share) covered by membership Certificate No. 3759 issued on September 17, 1974.[5]
In an Order dated May 10, 1996, the Probate Court authorized petitioner's administratrix, Elsa A. Poblador (Elsa), to
negotiate the sale of certain properties of petitioner, including the Wack-Wack Share. Upon Elsa's instruction, Rafael
(one of the heirs of the deceased Honorio Poblador, Jr.) looked for interested buyers. Subsequently, he engaged the
services of Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated (Metroland) [6] who, on September 9, 1996, faxed a
computation for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share to petitioner,[7] showing a final net amount of P15,000,000.00. On
September 18, 1996,[8] the final net amount to the seller was increased to P15,200,000.00.
Manzano later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty, Inc. (Moreland), and in September 1996, the parties entered into a
Deed of Absolute Sale[9] with Elsa covering the Wack-Wack Share for the gross amount of P18,000,000.00. Out of the
P18,000,000.00 purchase price, Moreland directly paid Elsa the amount of P15,200,000.00 through a Metrobank check.
[10]
 The balance of P2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to Manzano for the payment of the capital gains tax, documentary
stamp tax, and other pertinent fees, as well as for her service fee.[11]
In October 1996, however, the Probate Court annulled the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. Thus, Elsa returned to
Moreland the amount of P18,000,000.00 which the latter paid for the Wack-Wack Share, plus interest, and applied with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for the refund of the taxes paid for the annulled sale. Petitioner likewise asked
Manzano to return the broker's service fee.[12]
Meanwhile, Rafael, through petitioner's accountant, Nonilo P. Torres (Torres), allegedly requested Manzano for an
accounting of the P2,800,000.00 she received on behalf of petitioner. In response, Manzano faxed the following
documents addressed to Torres: (a) Cover letter dated February 4, 1997;[13] (b) Capital Gains Tax Return dated
September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of P1,480,000.00 as capital gains tax;[14] (c) BIR Certification dated
September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of P1,480,000.00 as capital gains tax;[15] (d) Authority to Accept Payment
76
dated September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of P135,000.00 as documentary stamp tax;[16] and (e)Deed of Absolute
Sale between petitioner, represented by Elsa, and Moreland.[17] Examining these documents, Rafael and Torres allegedly
noticed a discrepancy in the faxed Capital Gains Tax Return: while the typewritten portion of the Return indicated
P1,480,000.00 as the capital gains tax paid, the machine validation imprint reflected only P80,000.00 as the amount paid.
To clarify the discrepancy, petitioner secured a certified true copy of the Capital Gains Tax Return from the BIR that
reflected only P80,000.00 as the capital gains tax paid for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. [18] As a result, petitioner
demanded[19] Manzano to properly account for the P2,800,000.00 allegedly given to her for the payment of taxes and
broker's fees, but to no avail.[20] This led to the filing, on December 8, 1999, of an Information[21] for the crime
of Estafa  under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Manzano before the RTC,
docketed as Crim. Case No. 113549.[22] In the course of the proceedings, Manzano filed a Demurrer to
Evidence[23] praying for the dismissal of the case for failure of the prosecution to establish the essential elements
of Estafa  with which she was charged.[24]
The RTC Ruling
In an Order[25] dated January 13, 2003, the RTC granted Manzano's Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the complaint
for Estafa  for failure of the prosecution to "prove all the elements of estafa through misappropriation as defined in and
penalized under paragraph 1 (b)[, Article 315] of the Revised Penal Code, x x x."[26] The RTC found that the element of
deceit was absent, considering that both Manzano and Rafael were equally guilty of defrauding the government of taxes
actually due on the transaction. It pointed out that Rafael knew and concurred with the plan, including the special
arrangements that had to be made with the BIR, as long as the estate would receive a higher net proceed from the sale.
In fact, petitioner received in full the agreed net sale proceeds of P15,200,000.00. Finally, it held that Manzano was
entitled to her broker's fee in the amount of P900,000.00 as she was commissioned and successfully closed the
transaction for petitioner.[27]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[28] which the RTC denied in an Order[29] dated March 11, 2003.
Hence, petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[30] dated September 30, 2009, the CA denied petitioner's appeal, declaring that the prosecution did not only
fail to prove all the elements of Estafa through misappropriation;[31] it also failed to prove the alleged civil liability of
Manzano in the amount of P2,800,000.00.[32]
It found that the prosecution's evidence failed to show that Manzano personally received the P2,800,000.00 earmarked
for the payment of taxes and broker's fees.[33] At most, such evidence only proved that Manzano tried to help broker and
negotiate the sale of the Wack-Wack Share.[34] In fact, Rafael himself admitted that he was unsure if Manzano indeed
received the P2,800,000.00. Neither could he state the date when she supposedly received the same. [35]
Moreover, the CA stressed that: (a) petitioner readily admitted receipt of the full amount of P15,200,000.00 – the amount
agreed upon in the computation sent by Manzano – for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share which was paid with a check by
the buyer, Moreland Realty, Inc., and acknowledged by Elsa A. Poblador;[36] (b) Rafael made a categorical admission that
he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR and that the name of Manzano did not appear in the
documents with respect to the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax;[37] and (c) petitioner knew
that Manzano was merely an employee of Metroland, who talked to and negotiated with it in such capacity, and with
whom it would not have dealt with had she not been Metroland's employee.[38]
Finally, the CA observed that this is a case of pari delicto, as petitioner's predicament would have been avoided if only
Rafael sought the permission and approval of the Probate Court prior to the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. [39]

Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration,[40] which the CA denied in a Resolution[41] dated May 26, 2010; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's appeal on the civil liability ex delicto  of
Manzano.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
It is a fundamental rule that "[t]he acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the
civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to
prove the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him."[42]
In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People,[43] the Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex delicto  in Estafa  cases
under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the RPC (with which Manzano was likewise charged), stating that when the element
of misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa  and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto  does
not exist. Particularly, the Court said:
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation through estafa  under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements of estafa  are:
(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause damage. As this Court
previously held, "the element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable." Our law abhors the act of defrauding another person
by abusing his trust or deceiving him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which constitute estafa.  Article 315, paragraph 1 (b)
states that estafa  is committed by abuse of confidence —
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). —  ... (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of misappropriation or conversion. When the
77
element of misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no  estafa.  In such case, applying the foregoing
discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil
liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence
of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to
prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud
amounts to estafa.  As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any
criminal penalty, civil liability exists.[44]
The Court further clarified that "whenever the elements of estafa  are not established, and that the delivery of any
personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa  cannot be awarded in the
criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto,  which arises from
the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto  is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil
action deemed instituted with the criminal case."[45]
In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that the prosecution failed to prove all the
elements of estafa  through misappropriation as defined in, and penalized under, paragraph 1 (b), [Article 315] of the
[RPC].[46] As the RTC aptly noted, Rafael, as the representative of herein petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with
the entire arrangement, including those which had to be made with the BIR. In fact, petitioner itself admitted that it
received the full amount of P15,200,000.00 – the full amount to which it was entitled to under the terms of the sale of the
Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner could not claim that it was deceived. Thus, absent the element of fraud,
there could be no misappropriation or conversion to speak of that would justify the charge of Estafa and, with it, the
alleged civil liability ex delicto.
More significantly, the CA correctly observed that petitioner's evidence utterly failed to show that Manzano personally
received the P2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make delivery to the latter. In fact,
Rafael categorically admitted that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that Manzano's name
did not appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax.[47] This
admission clearly contradicts the disputable presumption under Section 3 (q) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,  that
the ordinary course of business has been followed, which petitioner adamantly relies on to support its claim.
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.[48] It is an inference of the existence or non-existence of
a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.[49] However, a presumption is not evidence,[50] but
merely affects the burden of offering evidence.[51] Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable presumptions are satisfactory, if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence, as in this case. Apart from Rafael's admission,
petitioner further admitted that: (a) Moreland directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check although it did not
actually see and was unaware to whom Moreland gave this check;[52] (b) it did not ask Moreland to issue the check for the
payment of the taxes directly in the name of the BIR;[53] (c) it would not have dealt with Manzano had she not been
Metroland's employee;[54] and (d) it has several lawyers and an accountant at its disposal, and its representative Rafael
is, in fact, in the real estate business and is familiar with brokerage transactions.[55]
With these admissions and under these circumstances, it is thus safe to conclude that the parties deliberately deviated
from the ordinary course of business, and that – at the very least – Manzano did not deal with it in bad faith. By and
large, petitioner failed to prove even by preponderance of evidence[56] the existence of any act or omission of Manzano
that would support its claim of civil liability ex delicto.  In consequence, the present petition must fail.
As a final point, it deserves mentioning that in petitions for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law are addressed. It is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence (which tasks belong to the
trial court as the trier of facts and to the appellate court as the reviewer of facts). The Court is confined to the review of
errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review.[57] "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its
findings of fact being conclusive."[58]
All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the CA ruling denying petitioner's appeal as its findings and conclusion are
well supported by the facts and are founded in law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009 and the Resolution dated May 26, 2010
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
40. G.R. No. 225634, June 07, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. ALLAN JAO Y CALONIA AND ROGELIO CATIGTIG Y
COBIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellants Allan Jao y  Calonia (Jao) and Rogelio
Catigtig yCobio (Catigtig; collectively, accused-appellants) assailing the Decision[2] dated October 28, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01393, which affirmed in toto  the Joint Judgment[3] dated August 25, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 30 (RTC), convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of Illegal Delivery
and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Sections 5[4] and 11,[5] Article II of Republic Act
No. (RA) 9165,[6] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from four (4) separate Amended Informations all dated September 23, 2008 charging
accused-appellants of violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19189
That at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of June 2, 2008 at Barangay Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Jao], did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, DELIVER AND GIVE AWAY to an informant of law enforcers, without authority by law, one (1) plastic
sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu", weighing 0.01 gram, of which he was
caught "in flagrante delicto."[7]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19190
That at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of June 2, 2008 at Barangay Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Jao], did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously HAVE in his possession, custody and control, without authority by law, six (6) plastic sachets containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu", weighing 0.06 gram which were confiscated as a result of a
search incidental to an arrest.[8]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19187
That at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 2, 2008 at Barangay Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Catigtig], did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, DELIVER AND GIVE AWAY to [a] law enforcer, without authority by law, ten (10) plastic
sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu", weighing 0.10 gram, of which he was
caught "in flagrante delicto."[9]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19188
That at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 2, 2008 at Barangay Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Catigtig], did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously HAVE in his possession, custody and control, without authority by law, ONE (1) plastic sachet
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as "shabu", weighing 0.06 gram, three (3) hand-rolled tinfoil
and two (2) empty transparent plastic sachets which were confiscated as a result of a search incidental to an arrest. [10]
On September 26, 2008, accused-appellants were arraigned but refused to enter a plea. Thus, a plea of "not guilty" was
entered for all the charges against them.[11]
78
The prosecution alleged that on June 2, 2008, a police team planned a buy-bust operation at Four Queens Motel located
at Barangay Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, after an informant notified them that Jao was engaged in the sale
of shabu. Pursuant to the plan, four police officers checked in at Room 6 of the motel at around 5:45 in the afternoon.
Acting as poseur-buyer, the informant called Jao and ordered shabu worth P800.00 for delivery at Room 6 of the motel.
He then waited outside the room for Jao to arrive. When the latter arrived, the informant asked for the shabu and Jao
replied by taking a plastic sachet from his waistband and handing it over to the former. The informant then executed the
pre-arranged signal, prompting the policemen to arrest Jao. Thereafter, the arresting policemen searched Jao and found
six (6) more plastic sachets containing shabu. Special Investigator Marlon Manzanaris (SI Manzanaris) then marked the
plastic sachets seized from Jao.[12] However, when SI Manzanaris was about to prepare the inventory of the seized items,
Jao suddenly and voluntarily informed the policemen that Catigtig was his source of contraband and agreed to cooperate
for the latter's arrest. Special Agent Michael Dungog then instructed Jao to call Catigtig to order ten (10) more sachets
of shabu, to which the latter agreed to deliver at around 8 o'clock that evening. Due to this development, the conduct of
the inventory was suspended, and consequently, the policemen checked out of the motel and returned to their
headquarters. During this time, SI Manzanaris retained custody of the items seized from Jao. [13]
At around 7:30 in the evening, the policemen went back to the motel after Jao received a text message from Catigtig that
he was already outside Room 6. Three (3) policemen then hid inside the bathroom, while Jao acted as an informant and
Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Allen Germodo (SPO2 Germodo) as the poseur-buyer. When Catigtig entered the room,
Jao introduced SPO2 Germodo as the buyer of shabu, thus, prompting Catigtig to hand over a Marlboro cigarette pack
containing ten (10) plastic sachets of shabu to SPO2 Germodo, who in turn, said "Okay na ni," signifying that the
transaction had already taken place. The other policemen then rushed into the scene, arrested Catigtig, and frisked him,
resulting in the discovery of another sachet of shabu. SPO2 Germodo then marked the sachets seized from Catigtig, and
thereafter, he and SI Manzanaris conducted a formal inventory of the items seized from both Jao and Catigtig in the
presence of representatives from the media, the DOJ, and the barangay. While the inventory was on-going, Special
Investigator Nicanor Tagle then took photographs of the seized items.[14]
The accused-appellants were then taken to the NBI office for booking, while SI Manzanaris and SPO2 Germodo
personally delivered the seized items in their respective custody to the Crime Laboratory. The seized items were
received by PO1 Rex Tan (PO1 Tan), who in turn, handed them over to the Forensic Chemist, Police Chief Inspector
(PCI) Josephine Llena (PCI Llena), who conducted a qualitative examination on the same. The examination revealed that
the contents of the seized sachets from accused-appellants are indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.[15]
In his defense, Jao denied the charges against him. He claimed that on the day of his arrest, he was working at his
employer's house. At around 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he received a call asking him to go to the motel as there was a
woman waiting for him there. When he arrived at the motel, men pointed their guns at him and mauled him inside the
motel room. He also denied calling Catigtig, insisting that one of the police officers called the latter. [16]
For his part, Catigtig likewise denied the accusations against him. He asserted that at about past 3 o'clock in the
afternoon of June 2, 2008, Jao called and invited him to go to the motel to meet a woman. He initially declined but later
on agreed. When Catigtig arrived at the motel, someone pointed a gun at him and dragged him inside the room where he
was mauled. Catigtig admitted that an inventory was conducted in his presence but denied knowledge as to the source of
the drugs placed on the table after his arrest.[17]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Judgment[18] dated August 25, 2011, the RTC found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged, and accordingly, sentenced them as follows: (a) for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, each
accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00; and (b) for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, each accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum term to
fourteen (14) years as maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of P400,000.00.[19]
The RTC found the prosecution to have established that accused-appellants were validly arrested in a legitimate buy-
bust operation, and that the searches made on them were likewise valid as they were made incidental to such arrests.
On the other hand, it did not give credence to accused-appellants' defense of denial in light of the positive testimonies
and the credible evidence against them. Further, the RTC upheld the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
as the policemen properly complied with the chain of custody rule.[20]
Aggrieved, accused-appellants appealed to the CA.
 The CA Proceedings
In a Decision[21] dated October 28, 2015, the CA affirmed accused appellants' respective convictions in toto.[22] It held
that: (a) the prosecution had sufficiently established all the elements of illegal delivery and illegal possession
of shabu against accused-appellants; (b) accused-appellants' arrests were made after legitimate buy-bust operations and
not by instigation; and (c) there was no break in the chain of custody that would have compromised the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items.[23] Hence, the instant appeal.
Meanwhile and after accused-appellants filed their Notice of Appeal, the CA received a letter [24] dated February 9, 2016
from the Bureau of Corrections, stating that Catigtig had already died on August 7, 2015.[25] Thus, the CA issued a
Resolution[26] dated June 8, 2016 which, inter alia, referred the said letter to the Court for its consideration.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violations of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling
Jao's appeal must be denied, while the cases against Catigtig should be dismissed and declared closed and terminated.
I.
For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be proven that the accused
passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; that such delivery is
not authorized by law; and that the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be
committed even without consideration.[27] On the other hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the
prosecution must prove that the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug;
that such possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. [28]
In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution had established Jao's criminal liability
for the aforesaid crimes, considering that: (a) Jao himself delivered a plastic sachet containing 0.01 gram of shabu to the
informant during a legitimate buy-bust operation; and (b) upon his arrest, the arresting officers searched Jao and found
six (6) more plastic sachets containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.06 gram. Similarly, both courts a quo found
that there was no break in the chain of custody of the sachets seized from Jao as SI Manzanaris had sole possession of
such sachets from the time of Jao's arrest until he turned them over to PO1 Tan, who in turn, handed it over to Forensic
Chemist PCI Llena for qualitative examination. It is settled that "[f]actual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA,
are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the
evidence on record."[29] Absent any showing that the trial and the appellate courts overlooked certain facts and
circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome, their rulings must be upheld, [30] as in this case.
II.
While Jao's criminal liability remains, the same conclusion cannot be made with respect to Catigtig in view of his
supervening death pending appeal. As already adverted to, in a letter[31] dated February 9, 2016, the Bureau of
Corrections informed the CA that Catigtig had already died on August 7, 2015, attaching thereto a duplicate copy of
Catigtig's Certificate of Death[32] issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General.
Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, states:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
In People v. Egagamao,[33] the Court eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
79
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only  the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."[34]
Thus, upon Catigtig's death pending appeal of his conviction, his criminal liability is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused.[35] As such, the criminal cases against him should be dismissed and declared
closed and terminated.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 01393 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(a) In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19189, accused-appellant Allan Jao y  Calonia is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165,
and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00;
   
(b) In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 19190, accused-appellant Allan Jao y Calonia is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165, and accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day as minimum term to fourteen (14) years as maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of
P400,000.00; and
   
(c) CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 19187 and 19188 are hereby DISMISSED and DECLARED
CLOSED and TERMINATED in view of the death of accused-appellant Rogelio Catigtig y Cobio.
SO ORDERED.
41. A.M. No. P-06-2279 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2452-P), June 06, 2017
MAURA JUDAYA AND ANA AREVALO, COMPLAINANTS, VS. RAMIRO F. BALBONA, UTILITY WORKER I, OFFICE
OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU CITY, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is an Amended Affidavit[1] dated May 29, 2006 filed by complainants Maura Judaya and Ana
Arevalo (complainants) against respondent Ramiro F. Balbona (respondent), Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), for Grave Misconduct.
The Facts
In the Amended Affidavit, complainants alleged that they are the mother and live-in partner, respectively, of one Arturo
Judaya (Arturo), who was arrested purportedly for the use of illegal drugs. Complainants were then told that respondent
could facilitate Arturo's release in exchange for P30,000.00. Thus, at 9:30 in the morning of February 24, 2005,
complainants went to the Palace of Justice, Capitol, Cebu City to deliver the said amount to respondent, who then
assured them that he would help secure Arturo's release. Respondent, however, failed to perform his undertaking; thus
the demand to return the money. Out of the P30,000.00, respondent only returned P2,500.00 to complainants; hence, the
instant complaint.[2]
In his defense, respondent essentially denied the accusations against him, maintaining that as a mere utility worker, he
could not in any way facilitate the release of a detention prisoner. He likewise denied personally knowing complainants
and receiving money from them. In this relation, respondent pointed out that he is stationed at the Cebu City Palace of
Justice, while the case of Arturo was pending at Branch 55 of the RTC, which was located in Mandaue City. Finally,
respondent asserted that it is contrary to human experience for complainants to simply hand over a large amount of
money to a complete stranger; that complainants' act of doing so for the release of a prisoner was illegal and showed
their lack of moral fitness; and that complainants have no one to blame but themselves for the consequences of their act.
[3]
In light of the seriousness of the accusations against respondent, the Court, as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), redocketed the case as a regular administrative matter and referred the same to the Executive
Judge of the RTC for investigation, report, and recommendation.[4]
In a Report[5] dated December 21, 2015, the Executive Judge recommended respondent's dismissal on the ground of
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Government Employee. It was disclosed that pending the instant
proceedings, respondent stopped reporting for work, had been declared absent without official leave (AWOL), had
resigned since September 20, 2007,[6] and eventually, his position was occupied by another person.[7] Despite the
foregoing, the Executive Judge opined that the foregoing did not render the instant case moot and academic.
[8]
Subsequently, it was found that respondent's act of receiving money from complainants on the pretext that the latter will
obtain a favorable ruling constitutes Grave Misconduct for which he should be held administratively liable. [9]
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum[10] dated October 19, 2016, the OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of Grave
Misconduct, an offense punishable by dismissal from service under Section 2 (e), Canon III, of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel.[11] It found substantial evidence showing that respondent indeed solicited and received money from
complainants. However, since such penalty could no longer be imposed on respondent due to his separation from
service during the pendency of the investigation against him, the OCA recommended that he be, instead, meted the
accessory penalties appurtenant to the same, namely: cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits; and perpetual disqualification from holding public office and from taking civil service examinations. [12]
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
Grave Misconduct.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA. 
Preliminarily, it is worthy to emphasize that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an
offense punishable by dismissal from service does not render moot the administrative case against him. The Court's
pronouncement in Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.[13] is instructive on this matter, to wit:
In [OCA] v. Juan  [(478 Phil: 823, 828-829 [2004])], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a
government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative
sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or
she shall still be answerable.
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
80
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions – that of separation
from service – may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she
is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her separation
from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated against him or her. An employee's act of tendering his
or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in
criminal cases.[14] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Here, the Executive Judge of the RTC and the OCA correctly pointed out that respondent's failure to report for work,
which eventually caused him to be declared in AWOL, and his resignation during the pendency of the investigation
against him did not render this administrative case moot and academic, especially so that he is being charged with an
offense punishable by dismissal from service.
In this light, the Court shall now delve into respondent's administrative liability.
"Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
In order to differentiate [grave] misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former."[15]
In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability for such offense, only substantial evidence is required, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[16]
A judicious review of the records of this case reveals substantial evidence showing that respondent indeed solicited and
received the amount of P30,000.00 from complainants, on the pretext that he will facilitate the release of the latter's
relative who is a detention prisoner. This is a direct violation of Section 2, Canon I and Section 2 (e), Canon III of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,[17] which respectively read:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
xxxx
Section 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
CANON III
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
xxxx
Section 2. Court personnel shall not:

xxxx
(e) Solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could
reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official duties.
In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that the acts of soliciting and receiving money from litigants for
personal gain constitute Grave Misconduct, for which the court employee guilty thereof should be held administratively
liable,[18] as in this case.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court notes that Grave Misconduct is classified as a grave
offense punishable by dismissal from service for the first offense. [19] "Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal from
service carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment
in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution."[20] In this instance, since respondent had earlier resigned, the penalty of dismissal from service could
no longer be imposed. Nevertheless, such penalty should be enforced in its full course by imposing the aforesaid
administrative disabilities upon him.[21]
As a final note, "[i]t must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it.
The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone
any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the
people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts
towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public."[22]
WHEREFORE, respondent Ramiro F. Balbona, former Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and would have been DISMISSED from service, had he not earlier
resigned. Accordingly, his civil service eligibility is hereby CANCELLED, his retirement and other benefits, except
accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution.
SO ORDERED.
42. A.M. No.16-12-03-CA, June 06, 2017
RE: LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES ALLEGING ILLICIT ACTIVITIES OF A CERTAIN ATTY. CAJAYON
INVOLVING CASES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
[IPI No. 17-248-CA-J, June 6, 2017]
81
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT OF SYLVIA ADANTE CHARGING HON. JANE AURORA C. LANTION, ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE, COURT OF APPEALS, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, AND ATTY. DOROTHY CAJAYON WITH "SYSTEMATIC
PRACTICES OF CORRUPTION."
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
These consolidated administrative matters arose from the letter-complaints respectively filed by Sylvia Adante (Adante)
and Lucena Ofendoreyes (Ofendoreyes)[1] both charging a certain Atty. Dorothy Cajayon (Atty. Cajayon) from
Zamboanga City and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion (Justice Lantion) of the Court of Appeals in Cagayan De
Oro City (CA-CDO) of illicitly selling favorable decisions involving cases filed in the CA-CDO to the highest bidding
clients.
The Facts
On October 17, 2016, Adante filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a letter,[2] alleging that it was
''intimated to [her]" that Atty. Cajayon, whom she met only once, was in cahoots with Justice Lantion in engaging in the
shameful business of "selling" decisions involving cases from the CA-CDO to the highest bidder.
Subsequently, or on October 25, 2017, Ofendoreyes filed before the same agency a letter,[3] requesting the latter to
investigate and stop the purported partnership of Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion from the business of selling decisions
in exchange for money.
Both letter-complaints were respectively referred by the Ombudsman to this Court on November 22, 2016 [4] and
November 23, 2016,[5] which were, consequently, docketed as IPI No. 17-248-CA-J and A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA. In a
Resolution[6] dated January 10, 2017, the Court referred the administrative matters to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to study the possible consolidation of the same.
The OCA's Report and Recommendation
In a Memorandum[7] dated February 14, 2017, the OCA recommended that the matters be consolidated,[8]considering that
both letter-complaints involve the same respondents, i.e., Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion, and issue, i.e., the sale of
favorable decisions involving cases in the CA-CDO to the highest bidder.
The OCA, however, observed that the letter-complaints were insufficient in form and substance in that they: (1) were not
verified; and (2) lacked affidavits of persons who may have personal knowledge of the facts to prove or substantiate the
letter-complaints' allegations against respondents, as well as supporting documents. Moreover, it echoed the rule that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the
complainant, and that in the absence of evidence against a court employee or magistrate to discipline for a grave
offense, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. [9]
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue is whether or not Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints both against lawyers and judges of regular and special courts as well
as Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by affidavits of persons who
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations.
For lawyers, these requirements are stated in Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by
the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said
facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, for judges and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, the requirements are found in
Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court:[10]
SECTION 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified
complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents
which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable
integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting
violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Courts or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this relation, Section 2 of Rule 140 states that:
SECTION 2. Action on the complaint. — If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be
served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date of
service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied)
In these cases, it is evident that the herein complaints lacked the foregoing requirements. Complainants' respective
single page letter-complaints are indisputably unverified, and bereft of any supporting affidavits or documents that would
support the charges made against herein respondents. Overall, they contain bare allegations that, unfortunately, have no
factual or legal anchorage.
Moreover, it appears that complainants did not have personal knowledge of the acts imputed against respondents as
they merely relied on hearsay to support their claims. For one, Adante clearly stated in her letter complaint that the
alleged offense was only "intimated to [her],"[11] while Ofendoreyes simply asks the Court to "investigate and stop"[12] the
said illicit activities without providing any further details on the information. The Court has emphasized that "to satisfy the
substantial evidence requirement for administrative cases, hearsay evidence should necessarily be supplemented and
corroborated by other evidence that are not hearsay,"[13] which, however, was not presented here.
Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in
their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are
based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense.[14] The same goes with administrative cases
disciplining for grave offense court employees or magistrates. The evidence against the respondent should be competent
and should be derived from direct knowledge.[15]
Thus, considering that the complainants not only failed to comply with the formal requirements provided in the Rules of
Court, but also did not present evidence to lend any ostensible merit to their letter-complaints that accuse herein
respondents of serious ethical violations (i.e., bidding out court decisions in favor of moneyed clients), the Court finds no
proper conclusion other than to dismiss outright the present cases.
WHEREFORE, the complaints are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
43. G.R. No. 211166, June 05, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PORFERIO CULAS Y RAGA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In a Resolution[1] dated July 18, 2014, the Court adopted the Decision[2] dated July 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 finding accused-appellant Porferio Culas y  Raga (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the July 25, 2013 Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 00380 and AFFIRMS said Decision finding accused appellant Porferio
Culas yRaga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Statutory Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A in relation to
Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole, with MODIFICATIONS as to the amounts of civil indemnity and damages awarded. Thus, [accused-appellant]
82
is ordered to pay the following amounts: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary
awards from the dated of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.[3]
However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the Court received a Letter [4] dated
September 16, 2014 from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of accused-appellant's death on February 8,
2014, evidenced by the Certificate of Death[5] attached thereto.
As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside said Resolution dated July 18, 2014 and
enter a new one dismissing the criminal case against accused-appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
In People v. Layag,[6] the Court thoroughly explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability[,] as well as the civil liability[,]
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts 
d) x x x 
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription,
in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that
should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. [7]
Thus, upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarity that
accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than
delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted
by law and procedural rules.[8]
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated July 18, 2014 in connection with this
case; (b) DISMISS Crim. Case No. BN-01-02-3754 before the Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 by
reason of the death of accused-appellant Porferio Culas y  Raga; and (c) DECLARE the instant
case CLOSEDand TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
44. A.M. No. P-17-3676 (formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3985-P), June 05, 2017
ELEANOR OLYMPIA-GERONILLA AND EMMA OLYMPIA GUTIERREZ, REPRESENTED BY ATTY. BEATRIZ O.
GERONILLA-VILLEGAS, COMPLAINANTS, V. RICARDO V. MONTEMAYOR, JR., SHERIFF IV AND ATTY.
LUNINGNING CENTRON, CLERK OF COURT VI AND EX- OFFICIO SHERIFF, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint-Affidavit[1] dated October 15, 2012 for dereliction of duty,
serious misconduct, negligence, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the service filed by complainants Eleanor
Olympia-Geronilla and Emma Olympia-Gutierrez, represented by Atty. Beatriz O. Geronilla-Villegas (complainants)
against respondents Sheriff Ricardo V. Montemayor, Jr. (Sheriff Montemayor) and Clerk of Court Atty. Luningning Y.
Centron (Atty. Centron; respondents), both from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (OCC-RTC) of
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.
The Facts
Complainants alleged that they are the plaintiffs in an ejectment case entitled "Eleanor Olympia and Emma Olympia v.
Carlito Aceveda and Tolentino Malinao," docketed as Civil Case No. 327 (ejectment case) filed before the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Province of Oriental Mindoro (MCTC).[2] On October 29, 2004, Judge Edgardo M. Padilla (Judge
Padilla) of the MCTC rendered a Decision[3] in favor of complainants, directing defendants therein Carlito T. Aceveda
(Aceveda), Tolentino Malinao (Malinao; defendants), and all persons claiming rights under them to: (a) vacate the
property subject of the dispute; (b) remove whatever structures they may have erected thereon, at their own expense; ( c)
pay complainants P50,000.00 every four (4) months beginning November 2002 as reasonable compensation for the
value of the crops being appropriated by defendants until they surrender possession to complainants; and (d) pay
P30,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit.[4]
In view of the MCTC's favorable decision, complainants filed a Motion for Immediate Execution thereof; on the other
hand, defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Branch 40 (RTC).[5]
Meanwhile, on July 1, 2005, the MCTC issued a Writ of Execution[6] directing the implementation of its October 29, 2004
Decision.[7]
Subsequently, in a Decision[8] dated May 4, 2007, the RTC denied defendants' appeal and affirmed the MCTC's
Decision in toto. Defendants' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[9] dated May 28, 2007.[10]
Notwithstanding the RTC's affirmance of the MCTC's Decision and the issuance of a writ of execution, the judgment in
favor of the complainants remained unsatisfied. Thus, they filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution,
which the MCTC granted. An alias writ of execution[11] was issued on July 29, 2010.[12]
Aceveda refused to vacate the premises despite the issuance of the alias writ of execution. Upon Sheriff Montemayor's
instruction, complainants filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Demolition, which the MCTC granted. On May 20,
2011, a Writ of Demolition[13] was issued.[14]
From the issuance of the Writ of Demolition on May 20, 2011 to November 2011, complainants consistently and
religiously coordinated with Sheriff Montemayor for the enforcement of the MCTC Decision. However, the latter informed
them that he could not enforce the said writ upon the portion of the property occupied by Aceveda as the same was
83
excluded from the scope of the judgment. Sheriff Montemayor declared that Aceveda was able to produce "believable"
documents from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) tending to show his ownership over the portion of the land
upon which he had constructed his house. Thus, Sheriff Montemayor advised complainants to conduct a resurvey to
ascertain the boundaries of the property that should be included in the demolition. [15]
Complainants insisted that all issues pertaining to the subject property, particularly the portion being claimed by Aceveda,
had already been settled in the ejectment case. As such, all that Sheriff Montemayor had to do was to enforce the
judgment therein. Unfortunately, the latter refused to do so, prompting complainants to send a letter dated November 22,
2011 to Atty. Centron, informing her of Sheriff Montemayor's unjustified refusal to perform his duty of implementing the
MCTC Decision. In the letter, complainants mentioned Sheriff Montemayor's receipt of the amount of P10,000.00
allegedly as operational expenses for the intended demolition.[16]
On December 23, 2011, Sheriff Montemayor advised complainants that he had scheduled the demolition on December
27, 2011 and asked for additional funds. Acceding to the request in the hope that the favorable decision will finally be
enforced, complainants gave the amount of P15,000.00 to Sheriff Montemayor, for which the latter signed an
acknowledgment receipt.[17]
Unfortunately, the scheduled demolition did not push through because of alleged flooding in Baco, Oriental Mindoro.
Nonetheless, Sheriff Montemayor assured complainants that he will undertake the demolition on January 2, 2012, which
never transpired at all. Instead, he suggested that complainants secure permission from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) to cover the
improvements on the portion of the premises occupied by Aceveda. Despite the cancellation of the demolition, Sheriff
Montemayor failed to return the P15,000.00 given to him as expenses therefor.
Complainants reported[18] the matter to Atty. Centron, who, however, failed to take appropriate action on Sheriff
Montemayor's unwarranted refusal to carry out the demolition. Hence, the instant administrative case against both Sheriff
Montemayor and Atty. Centron for dereliction of duty, serious misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the
service.
In his defense,[19] Sheriff Montemayor denied having received the amount of P10,000.00 as alleged operational funds for
the demolition, maintaining that there was no proof of his receipt thereof other than complainants' bare allegation.
[20]
 However, he admitted receipt of the P15,000.00, which he claimed was distributed as financial assistance among the
Mangyans who voluntarily agreed to vacate and remove their structures on the subject premises. [21] He argued that,
contrary to complainants' allegation, Section 10,[22] Rule 141 of the Rules of Court on sheriffs fees did not apply in this
case as the P15,000.00 that he received and gave as financial assistance to the Mangyans cannot be considered as
sheriff's fees.[23]
As regards his refusal to demolish Aceveda's structure on the premises, he explained that he had doubts on whether
Aceveda's house was truly within complainants' property. It was because of this uncertainty that he advised complainants
to conduct a resurvey of the property, but they never cooperated.[24]
For her part, Atty. Centron asserted[25] that she never tolerated Sheriff Montemayor's alleged dereliction of duty nor did
she fail to act on complainants' concerns after they were brought to her attention. In fact, she gave Sheriff Montemayor
written directives to carry out the writ of demolition and even reminded him of the money judgment contained in the
MCTC's Decision, which he must also enforce in favor of complainants. Likewise, in light of Sheriff Montemayor's advice
to conduct a resurvey, Atty. Centron sought complainants' cooperation by asking that they provide a surveyor for the
expeditious resolution of the matter.[26]
Atty. Centron pointed out that the delays attendant to the demolition were caused by Sheriff Montemayor's belief that
Acevedo's house was not within the property of complainants, at the same time maintaining that he (Sheriff Montemayor)
never deliberately intended to obstruct or cause such delay.[27]
The Report and Recommendation of the 
Office of the Court Administrator
In its Report[28] dated January 13, 2017, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended, inter alia, that Sheriff
Montemayor be found guilty of dereliction of duty, grave misconduct, and dishonesty, and fined in the amount of
P40,000.00 in view of his previous dismissal from the service. Likewise, the OCA recommended that Atty. Centron be
held liable for simple neglect of duty and fined in the amount of P10,000.00, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or any similar act shall be dealt with more severely.[29]
In its evaluation, the OCA held that Sheriff Montemayor exceeded his authority and substituted his own judgment when
he deferred the implementation of the writ of demolition based on his own belief that the property in dispute had to be
resurveyed, forgetting that a sheriff has no discretion on whether to execute a judgment or not. Neither can he choose as
to which portion of a property should be included or excluded in the execution.[30]
With respect to his receipt of the aggregate amount of P25,000.00 from complainants, the OCA found no proof that
Sheriff Montemayor indeed received the initial amount of P10,000.00. With regard, however, to the amount of
P15,000.00 which he admittedly received, the OCA did not give credence to his allegation that the said amount was
distributed to the Mangyans. Instead, it found him liable for violation of the procedural steps that sheriffs are mandated to
comply with relative to the fees and expenses in implementing court processes, pursuant to Section 10, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court. In particular, Sheriff Montemayor did not secure court approval with respect to the P15,000.00 he
admittedly received, which is tantamount to an unlawful exaction, thereby making him administratively liable. [31]
In sum, the OCA found Sheriff Montemayor liable for dereliction of duty on account of his failure and refusal to enforce
the writ of execution and writ of demolition. For demanding and receiving money without court approval in violation of
Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, he is liable as well for grave misconduct and dishonesty, for which the
prescribed penalty is dismissal. However, in light of his previous dismissal from the service, [32] the OCA recommended
that he instead be fined in the amount of P40,000.00, which shall be deducted from the monetary value of his
accumulated leave credits, if sufficient; otherwise, he shall pay said amount directly to the Court. [33]
Similarly, the OCA found Atty. Centron remiss in the performance of her duties as Clerk of Court in view of her failure to
effectively supervise Sheriff Montemayor in carrying out his tasks. While it may be true that she had called his attention
by directing and/or reminding him to enforce the writ of demolition in this case, her failure to effectively address the
matter that complainants had brought to her attention makes her liable for simple neglect of duty, for which the OCA
recommended the alternative penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 in lieu of suspension to prevent undue adverse
effect on public service.[34]
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondents Sheriff Montemayor and Atty. Centron should be
held administratively liable, as recommended by the OCA.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings and conclusions of the OCA.
In Lucas v. Dizon,[35] the Court declared:
The last standing frontier that the victorious litigant must face is often another difficult process - the execution stage. In
this stage, a litigant who has won the battle might lose the war. Thus, the sheriffs, being agents of the court, play an
important role, particularly in the matter of implementing the writ of execution. Indeed, [sheriffs] "are tasked to execute
final judgments of courts. If not enforced, such decisions are empty victories of the prevailing parties. They must
therefore comply with their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and expeditiously. As agents of the
law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court's
writs and processes and implementing its order, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and
the efficient administration of justice."[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Engraved in jurisprudence is the rule that the sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial. Once the writ is
placed in his or her hands, a sheriff is obligated to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter and with reasonable
promptness, taking heed of the prescribed period required by the Rules.[37]
In this case, Sheriff Montemayor's mandated task was to implement the MCTC's Decision in favor of complainants.
However, instead of doing so, he substituted his own judgment and acted on his own belief that a specific portion of the
subject property should be excluded from the execution. He refused to demolish the house of defendant Aceveda and
vehemently insisted that the subject property must first be resurveyed, unduly causing delay in the implementation of the
MCTC Decision, to the prejudice of the prevailing parties, i.e., the complainants.
Sheriff Montemayor's failure to enforce the alias writ of execution and writ of demolition clearly renders him liable for
dereliction of duty. He overstepped his authority and conveniently overlooked the ministerial nature of a sheriffs duty in
the execution of judgments. Instead of enforcing the MCTC's orders, he exercised his discretion and supplanted his own
84
judgment for that of the court's. To reiterate, the duty of a sheriff to execute a writ is purely ministerial, and he has no
discretion to delay the execution thereof.
Absent any instruction by a court to the contrary, he is mandated to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness in
implementing the writ.[38] If for any reason, he cannot do so in part or in full, his duty is outlined in Section 14, [39] Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which, unfortunately, he likewise failed to observe.
As regards the amount of P15,000.00 that Sheriff Montemayor had admittedly received from complainants as additional
expenses for the cancelled demolition and which he claimed had been distributed among the Mangyans who voluntarily
vacated the premises, the Court concurs with the OCA's finding that the said money was beyond the ambit of allowable
fees that a sheriff may receive in the implementation of writs. Moreover, Sheriff Montemayor failed to observe the
following procedure laid down in Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court with respect to sheriff's expenses: (1) the
sheriff is required to secure the court's prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the court
process; (2) the requesting party shall deposit such amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, who shall
disburse the same to the executing sheriff subject to his liquidation within the same period for rendering a return on the
process or writ; and (3) any unspent amount shall be refunded to the requesting party who made the deposit.
Indisputably, the sum of P15,000.00 received by Sheriff Montemayor without the approval of the court cannot be
considered as lawful sheriff's fees. As such, his receipt thereof is tantamount to an unlawful exaction for which he must
be held liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty.[40] A sheriff's conduct of unilaterally demanding sums of money from
a party-litigant purportedly to defray expenses of execution, without obtaining the approval of the trial court for such
supposed expense and without rendering an accounting constitutes dishonesty and extortion and falls short of the
required standards of public service. Such conduct threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice.
[41]
Grave misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses each punishable by dismissal on the first offense under Section 46
(A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). [42] Conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service is likewise a grave offense which carries the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year, and dismissal on the second offense. However, as records show that Sheriff Montemayor had
been previously meted the penalty of dismissal,[43] the Court instead imposes on him the penalty of fine in the amount of
P40,000.00, which amount shall be deducted from the monetary value of his accrued credit leaves, if sufficient;
otherwise, he shall pay the amount directly to the Court.
Similarly, Atty. Centron should be held administratively liable for her failure to take a more decisive action against Sheriff
Montemayor's unwarranted refusal to enforce the MCTC Decision in favor of complainants. Although she may have
advised and/or reminded him with respect to the performance of his duties, her apparently lackadaisical attitude in this
matter evinces a similar failure on her part to perform her duty of effectively supervising him. Moreover, instead of taking
Sheriff Montemayor's stance that a resurvey should be conducted on the subject property based on his groundless belief
that a portion thereof should be excluded from the judgment, she should have firmly reminded him of his mandated
ministerial task of implementing writs promptly and expeditiously, and that he had no discretion with regard to the merits
of the judgment. Atty. Centron's failure in this respect renders her administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of him and signifies a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference,[44] a less grave offense punishable by suspension from
office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense under
Section 46 (D) of the RRACCS. However, the Court, in several cases,[45] imposed the penalty of fine in lieu of suspension
as an alternative penalty in order to prevent any undue adverse effect on public service which would ensue if work were
otherwise left unattended by reason of respondent's suspension. Therefore, the Court imposes on Atty. Centron the
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo V. Montemayor, Jr., Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro is found GUILTY of dereliction of duty, grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In view of his previous dismissal from the service, he is FINEDin the amount
of P40,000.00, to be deducted from the monetary value of his accumulated leave credits, if sufficient; otherwise, he is
ordered to pay the said amount directly to the Court. Likewise, respondent Atty. Luningning Y. Centron, Clerk of Court VI
of the same office is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or any similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
45. G.R. No. 220211, June 05, 2017
EDRON CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION AND EDMER Y. LIM, PETITIONERS, V. THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR VICENTE T. PIMENTEL, JR.,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated November 26, 2014 and the Resolution[3]dated
September 8, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99539, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[4] dated December 28, 2010 and the Order[5]dated September 16, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 77 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-08-63154, and consequently, dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners
Edron Construction Corporation and Edmer Y. Lim (petitioners) against respondent the Provincial Government of Surigao
Del Sur, represented by Governor Vicente T. Pimentel, Jr. (respondent).
The Facts
The instant petition stemmed from a Complaint[6] for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners Edron
Construction Corporation and Edmer Y. Lim (Lim; collectively, petitioners) against respondent before the RTC.
Petitioners alleged that they entered into three (3) separate construction agreements[7] with respondent for the
construction of the Learning Resource Center of Tandag, Tandag Bus/Jeepney Terminal, and Tandag Public Market.
Petitioners claimed that despite their completion and respondent's consequent acceptance of the works as evidenced by
Certificates of Final Acceptance,[8] the latter had yet to pay them the aggregate amount of P8,870,729.67, despite
numerous oral and written demands. Thus, they filed the instant complaint to claim the aforesaid amount, plus
P500,000.00 as actual damages and P250,000.00 as attorney's fees.[9]
In its Answer with Counterclaim[10] dated January 6, 2009, respondent admitted the existence of the aforesaid
construction contracts. However, it nevertheless maintained, inter alia, that: (a) there is no unpaid balance; (b) petitioners
are in fact liable for underruns and defective works; (c) petitioners had already waived or abandoned their right to collect
any amount on the ground of prescription; and (d) petitioners are guilty of non-observance of the specifications indicated
in the construction contracts.[11]
More than a year after the filing of its Answer, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss [12] dated May 24, 2010 on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action. It argued that under Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements, final
payment to petitioners shall be made only after the submission of a sworn statement attesting to the fact that all of the
latter's obligations for labor and materials under the contracts have been fully paid. In this regard, respondent contended
that since petitioners have yet to submit such sworn statement, then the latter do not have a cause of action against it.
[13]
 The motion was, however, denied in an Order[14] dated August 11, 2010.
Meanwhile, during trial, Lim testified that: (a) petitioners referred the instant matter to a Presidential Flagship Committee,
which valued respondent's alleged arrears at P4,326,174.50, and that the former accepted such valuation and agreed to
be paid such reduced amount, but respondent still failed to pay the same;[15] and (b) petitioners no longer executed a
separate affidavit referred to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements, maintaining that everything that
was needed in claiming full payment from respondent were already attached in the final billings they submitted to the
latter.[16] On the other hand, witnesses for respondent testified, among others, that respondent accepted the projects
subject of the construction agreements, free from major defects and deficiencies, but nonetheless resisted making
payments due to discrepancies in the valuations arising from petitioners' alleged deviations from project specifications. [17]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[18] dated December 28, 2010, the RTC ruled in petitioners' favor, and accordingly, ordered respondent to
pay them: (a) P4,326,174.50 with interests of six percent (6%) per annum computed from June 20, 2000, and thereafter,
85
twelve percent (12%) per annum from the filing of the complaint on August 5, 2008; ( b) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and (c) the costs of suit.[19] The RTC found that in light of respondent's admission that the construction works were
satisfactorily completed, free from major defects, and that it has accepted the same, petitioners have amply proven their
entitlement to the payment of their claim in the reduced amount of P4,326,174.50 based on the Presidential Flagship
Committee's valuation, which petitioners had accepted. On the other hand, the RTC pointed out that respondent's
witnesses had not shown the alleged deviations, much less submitted the list of defects and deficiencies on the projects
subject of the construction agreements, on which respondent justified its reason for non-payment of petitioners' claims. [20]
Respondent moved for reconsideration[21] which was denied in an Order[22] dated September 16, 2011. Aggrieved,
respondent appealed to the CA.[23]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[24] dated November 26, 2014, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, and consequently, dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action.[25] It held that by the very terms of the construction agreements, specifically
Paragraph 4.3, Article IV thereof, the contractor's submission of the sworn statement attesting that all its obligations for
labor and materials under the contracts have been fully paid is a condition sine qua non in demanding final payment from
the owner. Hence, in view of petitioners': (a) admission in open court that no such sworn statement was submitted; and
(b) failure to submit evidence showing that a sworn statement was submitted to respondents, petitioners could not validly
make a demand for final payment from respondent. In other words, petitioners' cause of action against respondent has
not yet accrued.[26]
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,[27] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[28] dated September 8,
2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the RTC ruling,
and consequently, dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the CA's dismissal of petitioners' complaint is heavily-grounded on the latter's alleged
non-submission of the sworn statement required in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV[29] of the construction agreements.
Such reliance is misplaced.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
It may be gleaned from the said provision that except for the defenses of: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d) prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an answer or
a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver thereof. Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense
not specifically excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such
defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon the same in further
proceedings.[30]
In the instant case, a judicious review of the records reveals that respondent's Answer with Counterclaim [31] dated
January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners' non-execution of the sworn statement pertained to
in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction agreements. In fact, such matter was only raised in its Motion to
Dismiss[32] filed more than a year later after the Answer, or on May 24, 2010, to support the ground relied upon in the said
Motion, which is failure to state a cause of action. However, it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments
supporting it can no longer be considered since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides that motions to dismiss should be filed "[w]ithin the time for but before the filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim." More importantly, such matter/defense raised in the motion does not fall within
the exceptions laid down in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. As such, respondent was already precluded from
raising such issue/defense. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted in: (a) issuing an Order[33] dated August 11, 2010 denying
the Motion to Dismiss; and (b) not including a discussion of said issue/defense in its Decision [34] dated December 28,
2010 and Order[35] dated September 16, 2011.
In light of the foregoing, the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on a ground belatedly and improperly raised by
respondent. Thus, the Court is constrained to overturn said dismissal and in turn, uphold the RTC's finding of liability on
the part of respondents, especially considering that it issued Certificates of Final Acceptance[36]essentially stating that the
projects were satisfactorily completed, free from major defects, and that it was formally accepting the same. As a result,
respondent is hereby adjudged to be liable to petitioners in the amount of P4,326,174.50, which is the valuation of such
liability according to the Presidential Flagship Committee's valuation accepted by petitioners.
Finally and in line with prevailing jurisprudence, such amount shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum,
computed from first demand on June 20, 2000 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until
finality of the Decision. Said sum, as well as the other amounts awarded by the RTC (i.e., P50,000.00 as attorney's fees
and the costs of suit) shall then earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully
paid.[37]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 2014 and the Resolution dated September
8, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 99539 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Decision dated December 28, 2010 and the Order dated September 16, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 77 in Civil Case No. Q-08-63154 are hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, in that respondent the
Provincial Government of Surigao Del Sur, represented by Governor Vicente T. Pimentel, Jr., is liable to petitioners
Edron Construction Corporation and Edmer Y. Lim for the amounts of: (a) P4,326,174.50 plus legal interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, computed from first demand on June 20, 2000 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of the Decision; (b) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (c) the costs of suit.
Furthermore such amounts shall earn an additional six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
46. G.R. No. 175772[*], June 05, 2017
MITSUBISHI CORPORATION-MANILA BRANCH, PETITIONER, V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
RESPONDENT.  on BIR Ruling No. DA-407-98 dated September 7, 1998,[21] which interpreted paragraph 5 (2) of the Exchange of Notes,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated May 24, 2006 and the Resolution[3] dated
December 4, 2006 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 5, reversing the CTA Division's ruling[4] in
CTA Case No. 6139 which granted the claim for refund of erroneously paid income tax and branch profit remittance tax
(BPRT; collectively, subject taxes) filed by petitioner Mitsubishi Corporation - Manila Branch (petitioner) for the fiscal year
that ended on March 31, 1998.
The Facts
On June 11, 1987, the governments of Japan and the Philippines executed an Exchange of Notes,[5] whereby the former
agreed to extend a loan amounting to Forty Billion Four Hundred Million Japanese Yen (¥40,400,000,000) to the latter
through the then Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF, now Japan Bank for International Cooperation) for the
implementation of the Calaca II Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant Project (Project).[6] In Paragraph 5 (2) of the Exchange
of Notes, the Philippine Government, by itself or through its executing agency, undertook to assume all taxes imposed by
the Philippines on Japanese contractors engaged in the Project:
(2) The Government of the Republic of the Philippines will, itself or through its executing agencies or
instrumentalities, assume all fiscal levies or taxes imposed in the Republic of the Philippines on Japanese firms and
nationals operating as suppliers, contractors or consultants on and/or in connection with any incomethat may accrue
from the supply of products of Japan and services of Japanese nationals to be provided under the Loan.
86
[7]
 (Emphases, underscoring, and italics supplied)
Consequently, the OECF and the Philippine Government entered into Loan Agreement No. PH-P76[8] dated September
25, 1987 for Forty Billion Four Hundred Million Japanese Yen (¥40,400,000,000). Due to the need for additional funding
for the Project, they also executed Loan Agreement No. PH-P141[9] dated December 20, 1994 for Five Billion Five
Hundred Thirteen Million Japanese Yen (¥5,513,000,000).[10]
Meanwhile, on June 21, 1991, the National Power Corporation (NPC), as the executing government agency, entered into
a contract with Mitsubishi Corporation (i.e., petitioner's head office in Japan) for the engineering, supply, construction,
installation, testing, and commissioning of a steam generator, auxiliaries, and associated civil works for the Project
(Contract).[11] The Contract's foreign currency portion was funded by the OECF loans.[12] In line with the Exchange of
Notes, Article VIII (B) (1) of the Contract indicated NPC's undertaking to pay any and all forms of taxes that are directly
imposable under the Contract:
Article VIII (B) (1)
B. FOR ONSHORE PORTION.
1.) [The] CORPORATION (NPC) shall, subject to the provisions under the Contract [Document] on Taxes, pay any and
all forms of taxes which are directly imposable under the Contract including VAT, that may be imposed by the Philippine
Government, or any of its agencies and political subdivisions.[13] (Emphases supplied)
Petitioner completed the project on December 2, 1995, but it was only accepted by NPC on January 31, 1998 through a
Certificate of Completion and Final Acceptance.[14]
On July 15, 1998, petitioner filed its Income Tax Return for the fiscal year that ended on March 31, 1998 with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). Petitioner included in its income tax due[15] the amount of P44,288,712.00, representing
income from the OECF-funded portion of the Project.[16] On the same day, petitioner also filed its Monthly Remittance
Return of Income Taxes Withheld and remitted P8,324,100.00 as BPRT for branch profits remitted to its head office in
Japan out of its income for the fiscal year that ended on March 31, 1998.[17]
On June 30, 2000, petitioner filed with the respondent Commissioner on Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative claim
for refund of Fifty Two Million Six Hundred Twelve Thousand, Eight Hundred Twelve Pesos (P52,612,812.00),
representing the erroneously paid amounts of P44,288,712.00 as income tax and P8,324,100.00 as BPRT corresponding
to the OECF-funded portion of the Project.[18] To suspend the running of the two-year period to file a judicial claim for
refund, petitioner filed on July 13, 2000 a petition for review[19] before the CTA pursuant to Section 229 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), which was docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6139.[20] Petitioner anchored its claim for refund
to wit:
In reply, please be informed that the aforequoted provisions of Notes-NAIA and Notes-Calaca are not grants of direct tax
exemption privilege to Japanese firms, Mitsubishi in this case, and Japanese nationals operating as suppliers,
contractors or consultants involved in either of the two projects because the said provisions state that it is the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines that is obligated to pay whatever fiscal levies or taxes they may be liable
to. Thus, there is no tax exemption to speak of because the said taxes shall be assumed by the Philippine Government;
hence, the said provision is not violative of the Constitutional prohibition against the grants of tax exemption without the
concurrence of the majority of the members of Congress. (Citation omitted)
In view thereof, x x x, this office is of the opinion and hereby holds that Mitsubishi has no liability for income tax and other
taxes and fiscal levies, including VAT, on the 75% of the NAIA II Project and on the 100% of the foreign currency portion
of the Calaca II Project since the said taxes were assumed by the Philippine Government.[22](Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In a Decision[23] dated December 17, 2003, the CTA Division granted the petition and ordered the CIR to refund to
petitioner the amounts it erroneously paid as income tax and BPRT.[24] It held that based on the Exchange of Notes, the
Philippine Government, through the NPC as its executing agency, bound itself to assume or shoulder petitioner's tax
obligations. Therefore, petitioner's payments of income tax and BPRT to the CIR, when such payments should have
been made by the NPC, undoubtedly constitute erroneous payments under Section 229 of the NIRC.[25]
The CTA Division acknowledged that based on Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 42-99 dated June 2, 1999,
amending RMC No. 32-99, the proper remedy for a Japanese contractor who previously paid the taxes directly to the BIR
is to recover or obtain a refund from the government executing agency - the NPC in this case. It held, however, that RMC
No. 42-99 does not apply to petitioner as it filed its ITR on July 15, 1998 or almost a year before the issuance of the
same. It added that RMC No. 42-99 cannot be given retroactive effect as it would be unfair to petitioner. [26]
The CIR moved for reconsideration[27] but was denied in a Resolution[28] dated April 23, 2004; thus, the CIR elevated the
matter to the CTA En Banc.[29]
The CTA En Banc's Ruling
In a Decision[30] dated May 24, 2006, the CTA En Banc reversed the CTA Division's rulings and declared that petitioner is
not entitled to a refund of the taxes it paid to the CIR. It held that, first, petitioner failed to establish that its tax payments
were "erroneous" under the law to justify the refund, adding that the CIR has no power to grant a refund under Section
229 of the NIRC absent any tax exemption. It further observed that by its clear terms, the Exchange of Notes granted no
tax exemption to petitioner.[31] Second, the Exchange of Notes cannot be read as a treaty validly granting tax exemption
considering the lack of Senate concurrence as required under Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. [32] Third, RMC
No. 42-99, which was already in effect when petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on June 30, 2000, specifies
petitioner's proper remedy that is, to recover the subject taxes from NPC, and not from the CIR. [33]
Petitioner sought reconsideration,[34] but the CTA En Banc denied the motion in a Resolution[35] dated December 4, 2006;
hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues before the Court are two-fold: (a) whether petitioner is entitled to a refund; and (b) if in the affirmative, from
which government entity should the refund be claimed.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I.
Sections 204 (C) of the NIRC grants the CIR the authority to credit or refund taxes which are erroneously collected by the
government:[36]
SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate, and Refund or Credit Taxes. The Commissioner may -
xxxx
(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of
internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or
change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit
or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for
credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return filed
showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The authority of the CIR to refund erroneously collected taxes is likewise reflected in Section 229 of the NIRC, which
reads:
SEC. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. — No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court
for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid
under protest or duress."
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, it is fairly apparent that the subject taxes in the amount of P52,612,812.00 was erroneously collected from
petitioner, considering that the obligation to pay the same had already been assumed by the Philippine Government by
87
virtue of its Exchange of Notes with the Japanese Government. Case law explains that an exchange of notes is
considered as an executive agreement, which is binding on the State even without Senate concurrence. In Abaya v.
Ebdane:[37]
An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to
record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid
the process of legislative approval.
It is stated that "treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of
understanding,modus vivendi and exchange of notes" all refer to "international instruments binding at international law."
xxxx
Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes binding through
executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress.[38]
Paragraph 5 (2) of the Exchange of Notes provides for a tax assumption provision whereby:
(2) The Government of the Republic of the Philippines will, itself or through its executing agencies or
instrumentalities, assume all fiscal levies or taxes imposed in the Republic of the Philippines on Japanese firms and
nationals operating as suppliers, contractors or consultants on and/or in connection with any income that may accrue
from the supply of products of Japan and services of Japanese nationals to be provided under the Loan. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
To "assume" means "[t]o take on, become bound as another is bound, or put oneself in place of another as to an
obligation or liability."[39] This means that the obligation or liability remains, although the same is merely passed on to a
different person. In this light, the concept of an assumption is therefore different from an exemption, the latter being the
"[f]reedom from a duty, liability or other requirement" or "[a] privilege given to a judgment debtor by law, allowing the
debtor to retain [a] certain property without liability."[40] Thus, contrary to the CTA En Banc's opinion, the constitutional
provisions on tax exemptions would not apply.
As explicitly worded, the Philippine Government, through its executing agencies (i.e., NPC in this case) particularly
assumed "all fiscal levies or taxes imposed in the Republic of the Philippines on Japanese firms and nationals operating
as suppliers, contractors or consultants on and/or in connection with any income that may accrue from the supply of
products of Japan and services of Japanese nationals to be provided under the [OECF] Loan." The Philippine
Government's assumption of "all fiscal levies and taxes," which includes the subject taxes, is clearly a form of concession
given to Japanese suppliers, contractors or consultants in consideration of the OECF Loan, which proceeds were used
for the implementation of the Project. As part of this, NPC entered into the June 21, 1991 Contract with Mitsubishi
Corporation (i.e., petitioner's head office in Japan) for the engineering, supply, construction, installation, testing, and
commissioning of a steam generator, auxiliaries, and associated civil works for the Project, [41] which foreign currency
portion was funded by the OECF loans.[42] Thus, in line with the tax assumption provision under the Exchange of Notes,
Article VIII (B) (1) of the Contract states that NPC shall pay any and all forms of taxes that are directly imposable under
the Contract:
Article VIII (B) (1)
B. FOR ONSHORE PORTION.
1.) [The] CORPORATION (NPC) shall, subject to the provisions under the Contract [Document] on Taxes, pay any and
all forms of taxes which are directly imposable under the Contract including VAT, that may be imposed by the Philippine
Government, or any of its agencies and political subdivisions.[43] (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, petitioner included in its income tax due the amount of P44,288,712.00, representing income from
the OECF-funded portion of the Project, and further remitted P8,324,100.00 as BPRT for branch profits remitted to its
head office in Japan out of its income for the fiscal year that ended on March 31, 1998.[45] These taxes clearly fall within
the ambit of the tax assumption provision under the Exchange of Notes, which was further fleshed out in the Contract.
Hence, it is the Philippine Government, through the NPC, which should shoulder the payment of the same.
It bears stressing that the CIR had already acknowledged, through its administrative issuances, that Japanese
contractors involved in the Project are not liable for the subject taxes. In RMC No. 42-99, the CIR interpreted the effect of
the tax assumption clause in the Exchange of Notes on petitioner's tax liability, to wit:
The foregoing provisions of the Exchange of Notes mean that the Japanese contractors or nationals engaged in EOCF-
funded projects in the Philippines shall not be required to shoulder all fiscal levies or taxes associated with the project. x
xx
xxxx
x x x Since the executing government agencies are mandated to assume the payment of [income taxes] under the
Exchange of Notes, the said Japanese firms or nationals need not pay taxes due thereunder.[46] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The CIR subsequently affirmed petitioner's non-liability for taxes and entitlement to tax refunds by issuing Revenue
Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 24-2005[47] addressed to specified BIR offices. The RMO provides:
Pursuant to the provisions of [RMC] No. 32-99 as amended by RMC No. 42-99, Japanese contractors and nationals
engaged in OECF-funded projects in the Philippines shall not be required to shoulder the fiscal levies or taxes associated
with the project. Thus, the concerned Japanese contractors are entitled to claim for the refund of all taxes paid and
shouldered by them relative to the conduct of the Project.
You are, therefore, directed to expedite/ prioritize the processing of the claims for refund of Japanese contractors and
nationals so [as] not to delay and jeopardize the release of the funds for OECF funded projects. [48] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Therefore, considering that petitioner paid the subject taxes in the aggregate amount of P52,612,812.00, which it was not
required to pay, the BIR erroneously collected such amount. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to its refund.
II.
As above-stated, the NIRC vests upon the CIR, being the head of the BIR, the authority to credit or refund taxes which
are erroneously collected by the government. This specific statutory mandate cannot be overridden by averse
interpretations made through mere administrative issuances, such as RMC No. 42-99, which - as argued by the CIR -
shifts to the executing agencies (particularly, NPC in this case) the power to refund the subject taxes: [49]
(3) In cases where income taxes were previously paid directly by the Japanese contractors or nationals, the
corresponding cash refund shall be recovered from the government executing agencies upon the presentation of
proof of payment by the Japanese contractors or nationals.[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A revenue memorandum circular is an administrative ruling issued by the CIR to interpret tax laws. It is widely accepted
that an interpretation by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce the law, is entitled to great respect from the
courts. However, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be disregarded if judicially found to be incorrect. [51] Verily,
courts will not tolerate administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the
law they seek to implement,[52] as in this case. Thus, Item B (3) of RMC No. 42-99, an administrative issuance directing
petitioner to claim the refund from NPC, cannot prevail over Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC, which provide that claims
for refund of erroneously collected taxes must be filed with the CIR.
All told, petitioner correctly filed its claim for tax refund under Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC to recover the
erroneously paid taxes amounting to P44,288,712.00 as income tax and P8,324,100.00 as BPRT from the BIR. To
reiterate, petitioner's entitlement to the refund is based on the tax assumption provision in the Exchange of Notes. Given
that this is a case of tax assumption and not an exemption, the BIR is, therefore, not without recourse; it can properly
collect the subject taxes from the NPC[53] as the proper party that assumed petitioner's tax liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 24, 2006 and the Resolution dated December 4, 2006
of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc in C.T.A. EB No. 5 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated December 17, 2003 of the CTA in C.T.A. Case No. 6139 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
88
47. A.C. No. 11663, July 31, 2017
NANETTE B. SISON, REPRESENTED BY DELIA B. SARABIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. SHERDALE M. VALDEZ,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint for Permanent Disbarment[1] (disbarment complaint) dated
September 13, 2013 filed by complainant Nanette B. Sison (complainant), represented by her mother, Delia B. Sarabia
(Sarabia),[2] against respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez (respondent) for violating his professional duties under the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in September 2012, complainant, an overseas Filipino worker in Australia, engaged respondent's legal
services to file an action against Engr. Eddie S. Pua of B.S. Pua Construction (old contractor) and the project manager,
Engr. Dario Antonio (project manager), for failing to construct complainant's house in Nuvali, Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna in due time.[3] Although no written agreement was executed between the parties specifying the scope of legal
services, respondent received the total amount of P215,000.00 from complainant, through Sarabia, on three (3) separate
dates.[4] Respondent acknowledged receipt of the first two (2) installments in a handwritten note, stating that the amount
of P165,000.00 was for litigation expenses, i.e., attorney's fees, filing fees, bond, and other expenses.[5] The last payment
was deposited online to the bank account of respondent's wife, Ma. Analyn M. Valdez.[6]
On January 8, 2013, complainant terminated respondent's legal services via e-mail and text messages[7] with a demand
to return the amount given, which was not heeded notwithstanding several demands. Hence, complainant, through
Sarabia, filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), alleging that despite receipt of her payments: (a) respondent failed to render his legal services and
update her regarding the status of the case; (b) commingled her money with that of respondent's wife; (c)
misappropriated her money by failing to issue a receipt for the last installment of the payment received; and ( d) fabricated
documents to justify retention of her money.[8]
For his part,[9] respondent claimed that he reported the status of the case to complainant through phone and e-mail.
[10]
 After studying the case, he informed complainant of his evaluation via e-mail. [11] On November 1, 2012, respondent
went to his hometown in Hagan, Isabela with one "Atty. Joselyn V. Valeros" to personally serve the demand letter to the
old contractor. However, when they went to the house of the old contractor on November 4, 2012, the person present
thereat refused to receive the letter.[12] Respondent supposedly spent P15,000.00 for his travel to Ilagan, Isabela.[13]
Respondent further averred that he was supposed to personally meet complainant for the first time upon the latter's
arrival in the Philippines in the second week of November 2012. During the meeting, he intended to personally report the
status of the case, have the pleadings signed, and explain how her payments would be applied. However, no phone call
or e-mail was made by complainant to confirm the meeting.[14] Respondent later learned from complainant's new
contractor that she did not want to meet with him for fear that he would only ask for more money. [15]
On the same day his legal services were terminated, respondent sent the demand letters to the old contractor and the
project manager via courier service,[16] allegedly before he found out about the termination.[17] In a letter[18]dated January
10, 2013, respondent, through complainant's sister, Elisea Sison, asked complainant to reconsider the termination and
outlined the services he already rendered, as follows: (a) he sent a demand letter dated November 4, 2012 to the old
contractor; (b) he drafted a complaint for breach of contract and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment; ( c) he
sent a final demand letter dated January 8, 2013 to the old contractor; and (d) while waiting for a response, he proceeded
to investigate the old contractor's real and personal properties to ascertain what can be the subject of preliminary
attachment.[19] Respondent admitted that he opted not to immediately mail the demand letter to the old contractor so that
the latter could not dispose of or hide his properties.[20] Alternatively, respondent offered to return the amount of
P150,000.00 to complainant, explaining that he already studied the case, prepared the complaint, and incurred
expenses.[21] However, complainant refused and proceeded to file the present case.
Instead of filing their respective position papers before the IBP-CBD, the parties filed a Joint Manifestation[22] on February
20, 2014, agreeing to settle the matter amicably and acknowledging that the disbarment complaint was filed because of
"misapprehension of facts due to pure error in accounting and honest mistakes by respondent."[23]Complainant's counsel
acknowledged receipt of P200,000.00 representing partial payment of respondent's obligation, while the balance of
P118,352.00 will be paid subsequently.[24] In turn, complainant undertook not to pursue nor testify against respondent in
this administrative case, as well as in the Estafa case.[25]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation[26] dated June 7, 2014, the IBP CBD Investigating Commissioner (IC) recommended
that respondent be reprimanded for violating his obligations under the CPR with a stem warning never to commit the
same mistakes again.[27]
At the outset, the IC disapproved the Joint Manifestation, noting that a compromise agreement would not operate to
exonerate a lawyer from a disciplinary case. As to respondent's liability, the IC observed that he committed several
violations of the CPR during the period of his engagement with complainant from September 2012 up to January 8,
2013. First, he failed to inform his client about the status of the case. [28] The IC acknowledged that respondent rendered
some legal services to complainant, but only came up with the list of services after his termination, thus, supporting the
conclusion that he indeed failed to update his client about the developments of the case.[29] Second, he asked for
payment of fees from complainant even before he prepared the draft complaint. The IC explained that a prudent lawyer
would first wait for the computation of court fees before seeking payment of filing and bond fees. [30]Third, respondent
failed to issue the proper receipt for the full amount he received from complainant. [31] Fourth, respondent commingled the
funds of his client with that of his wife when he asked that the P50,000.00 be deposited to his wife's bank account. [32]
As to the compensation for legal services, the IC opined that P30,000.00 was reasonable based on quantum meruit, in
view of the limited services respondent rendered during the initiatory stage of the case - i.e., review of the case and
drafting of demand letters, complaint, and special power of attorney.[33] However, citing Nebreja v. Reonal,[34]the IC
declined to recommend restitution of the amount received by respondent, noting the Court's alleged policy that the
collection of money should be made through an independent action.[35] The IC also refused to grant reimbursement to
respondent of the amount of P15,000.00 he incurred for his trip to Isabela for his failure to render an accounting of his
expenses.[36]
Although respondent was found to have violated his duties to his client, herein complainant, the IC considered his active
membership in the IBP-Laguna Chapter from 2007 to 2009 and his continuous service as a law professor in Adamson
University since 2009 as mitigating factors to reduce his recommended penalty to reprimand.[37]
In a Resolution[38] dated January 31, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IC's Report and
Recommendation, but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[39] but was denied in a Resolution[40] dated September 23, 2016.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts
complained of.
89
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious review of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP's finding of administrative liability with some
modifications.
Records show that in September 2012, complainant engaged respondent's services to file a money claim, and pursuant
to such engagement, complainant paid respondent a total of P215,000.00. After a little more than three (3) months,
complainant terminated respondent's legal services due to the latter's failure to render legal services. While it was
acknowledged that respondent did render some legal services to complainant albeit only in the initiatory stage, it was
also established that respondent failed to duly update his client on the developments of the case. As correctly pointed out
by the IBP, respondent's lapses constitute a violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, which reads:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, a lawyer is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence and to attend
to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed upon him.[41] In this relation, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and
developments of the case and all other relevant information.[42]
In this case, respondent alleged that he waited for complainant's arrival in the Philippines in November 2012 to
personally report on his accomplishments, to have the necessary pleadings signed, and to explain how the money given
will be applied. However, the meeting did not push through.
Indeed, respondent cannot justify his non-compliance by shifting the blame to complainant for failing to meet with him,
especially so that he failed to inform his client of the pleadings she needed to sign.
The Court likewise finds that respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which respectively read:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. x x x.
The highly fiduciary nature of an attorney-client relationship imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client.[43] Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the
filing and processing of a case, if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. [44] His failure to return gives
rise to a presumption that he has appropriated it for his own use, and the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes
a gross violation of his professional obligation under Canon 16 of the CPR.[45]
In this case, respondent failed to account for the money received from complainant when he only acknowledged receipt
of P165,000.00 for litigation expenses despite admittedly receiving P215,000.00. When complainant terminated his legal
services, the fact that no case has been filed in court should have prompted him to immediately return to complainant the
amounts intended as filing and bond fees, as these were obviously unutilized.
In fact, respondent admitted that, based on his belief, he was entitled to only P65,000.00 as compensation for his legal
services.[46] As such, he should have returned the excess amount of P150,000.00 out of the P215,000.00 he received
from complainant. Notably, Rule 16.03 of the CPR allows a lawyer to retain the amount necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements.[47] Hence, respondent's persistent refusal to return the money to complainant despite several
demands renders him administratively liable.

Although the IBP correctly found that respondent is entitled to reasonable compensation for the limited services he
rendered, the Court notes that respondent appears to have waived his claim for compensation when he agreed to return
the amount of P200,000.00 in cash and pay an additional P118,352.00 in exchange for complainant's desistance in
the Estafa and disbarment cases filed against him.[48] Thus, the matter of restitution should no longer be an issue.
However, it should be stressed that his administrative liability herein should remain, considering the rule that a
disbarment case is not subject to any compromise.[49]
Anent the penalty, the Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers,[50] and thus, in the exercise of its judicial
discretion, may impose a penalty less than the IBP's recommendation if such penalty would achieve the desired end of
reforming the errant lawyer.[51] Considering the surrounding circumstances of this case, such as the short duration of the
engagement, respondent's return of the money, his expression of humility and remorse, and the fact that this is his first
administrative case, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
sufficient and commensurate to respondent's violations.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sherdale M. Valdez is found GUILTY of violating Rule 18.04, Canon 18, as well as
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in the personal record of
respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
48. [ G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017 ]
GENPACT SERVICES, INC., AND DANILO SEBASTIAN REYES, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIA KATRINA SANTOS-
FALCESO, JANICE ANN* M. MENDOZA, AND JEFFREY S. MARIANO, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioners Genpact Services, Inc. (Genpact) and Danilo
Sebastian Reyes (Reyes; collectively, petitioners) are the Decision [2] dated May 13, 2016 and the Resolution[3]dated
October 12, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 136878 which dismissed outright the petition
for certiorari they filed before the CA solely on procedural grounds.
The Facts
Genpact is engaged in business process outsourcing, particularly servicing various multinational clients, including
Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate).[4] On different dates spanning the years 2007 to 2011, Genpact hired respondents
Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso, Janice Ann M. Mendoza, and Jeffrey S. Mariano (respondents) to various positions to
service its Allstate account.[5] However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account with Genpact,[6] resulting in
respondents being placed on floating status, and eventually, terminated from service.[7] This prompted respondents to file
a complaint[8] before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 12-18013-12
for illegal dismissal, non-payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees against Genpact and/or its Country
Manager, Reyes. Respondents alleged that after Allstate terminated its contract with Genpact, they were initially placed
on "benching" status with pay, and after five (5) months, Genpact gave them the option to either "voluntarily resign" or to
"be involuntarily terminated on the ground of redundancy" with severance pay of one-half (1/2) month basic salary for
90
every year of service, in either case. Left without the option to continue their employment with Genpact, respondents
chose the latter option and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any and all forms of monetary
benefits.[9] In this light, respondents argued that the termination of Genpact and Allstate's agreement neither amounted to
a closure of business nor justified their retrenchment. Respondents further contended that Genpact failed to observe the
requirements of procedural due process as there was no showing that the latter served proper notice to the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) thirty (30) days before they were terminated from service, and that they were not
accorded the chance to seek other employment opportunities.[10]
In their defense, petitioners justified respondents' termination of employment on the ground of closure or cessation of
Allstate's account with Genpact as part of the former's "[g]lobal [d]ownsizing due to heavy losses caused by declining
sales in North America."[11] Further, petitioners claimed that they incessantly pursued efforts to retain respondents within
their organization, but the same proved futile, thus, leaving them with no other choice but to provide respondents with the
option to either resign or be separated on account of redundancy - an option which they reported to the DOLE and
resorted to in the exercise of management prerogative with utmost good faith.[12] Lastly, petitioners pointed out that
respondents were properly given separation pay, as well as unpaid allowances and 13thmonth pay, thus, rendering the
latter's monetary claims bereft of merit.[13]
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated September 23, 2013, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed respondents' complaint for lack of merit.
The LA found that respondents' termination from service was due to the untimely cessation of the operations of
Genpact's client, Allstate, wherein respondents were assigned.[15] In this regard, the LA pointed out that Genpact tried to
remedy respondents' situation by assigning them to other accounts, but such efforts proved futile as respondents were
hired specifically to match the needs of Allstate.[16] Furthermore, the LA took Genpact's act of paying respondents their
separation pay computed at one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service as a sign of good faith. Thus, the LA
concluded that there was an authorized cause in terminating respondents' services, and that Genpact complied with
DOLE's reportorial requirements in doing so.[17]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed[18] to the NLRC, docketed as NLRC LAC No. 11-003359-13.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated May 20, 2014, the NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. It held that Allstate's pullout from Genpact does
not mean an automatic termination of the employees assigned to the Allstate account, such as respondents, but purports
that the employees assigned to the withdrawing client would be "benched" or placed on floating status as contemplated
in Article 286 (now Article 301)[20] of the Labor Code, as amended. In fact, the NLRC pointed out that Genpact recognized
the applicability of the said provision in the case of respondents, as well as other similarly-situated employees,
considering that: (a) it embarked on a Retention Effort Program which resulted in the redeployment of more or less 100 of
its employees affected by Allstate's pullout; (b) it placed respondents and the other similarly-situated employees on
"benching" status with full pay; (c) it only resorted to termination after alleged incessant efforts to find a suitable position
for respondents proved unsuccessful; and (d) such terminations were done during the six (6)-month period within which
employees were allowed to be placed on floating status. Thus, Genpact's acts of placing respondents on "benching" or
floating status, and thereafter, terminating their employment were made in the exercise of its management prerogative in
good faith and in accordance with internal hiring procedures. As such, it cannot be said that respondents were illegally
dismissed from service.[21]
Respondents moved for reconsideration,[22] which was partly granted by the NLRC in a Resolution[23] dated June 30,
2014, and accordingly, increased respondents' entitlement to separation pay to one (1) month salary for every year of
service. In said Resolution, the NLRC held that since respondents' positions were rendered superfluous by the closure of
the Allstate account, then it follows that they were terminated on account of redundancy pursuant to Article 286 (now
Article 301), in relation to Article 283 (now Article 298) of the Labor Code. As such, they should be paid separation pay
amounting to one (1) month salary for every year of service, instead of the one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service.[24] Notably, the NLRC Resolution explicitly stated that "[n]o further motion of similar import shall be
entertained."[25]
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[26] before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[27] dated May 13, 2016, the CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari purely on procedural grounds. It
held that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to elevating the case to the CA is a
fatal infirmity which rendered their petition for certiorari before the latter court dismissible, further noting that petitioners
did not present any plausible justification nor concrete, compelling, and valid reason for dispensing with the requirement
of a prior motion for reconsideration.[28]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration  which was, however, denied in a Resolution  dated October 12, 2016; hence,
[29] [30]
this petition.[31]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition filed by
petitioners before it on procedural grounds.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the
absence of appeal qr any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on
the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [32]
Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must
first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. [33] This notwithstanding, the
foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.[34]
A judicious review of the records reveals that the exceptions in items (d) and (e) are attendant in this case.
The dispositive portion of the NLRC's June 30, 2014 Resolution[35] which partially granted respondents' motion for
91
reconsideration, and accordingly, increased their entitlement to separation pay to one (1) month salary per year of
service - reads in its entirety:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is partly granted. The assailed Decision is modified
in that GENPACT Services LLC is ordered to pay complainants separation pay of one month salary per year of service.
The amounts already received by complainants shall be deducted from the amounts due.
No further motion of similar import shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.[36] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Otherwise worded, the highlighted portion explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer entertain
any further motions for reconsideration. Irrefragably, this circumstance gave petitioners the impression that moving for
reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light of the tribunal's aforesaid warning.
Moreover, Section 15, Rule VII[37] of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended, provides, among others, that the
remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once by each party. In this case, only respondents had
filed a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners also had an opportunity
to file such motion in this case, should they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived
petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to due process.
All told, petitioners were completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorariunder
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. To rule otherwise would be clearly antithetical to the tenets of fair play, not to mention the
undue prejudice to petitioners' rights.[38] Thus, in light of the fact that the CA dismissed outright the petition
for certiorari before it solely on procedural grounds, a remand of the case for a resolution on the merits is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2016 and the Resolution dated October 12, 2016
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 136878 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case
is REMANDED to the CA for a resolution on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
49. G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017
JEFFREY MIGUEL Y REMEGIO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated October 21, 2015 and the Resolution[3]dated
September 5, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318, which affirmed the Decision [4]dated October
1, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 10-912 convicting petitioner
Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio (petitioner) of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Facts
On May 27, 2010, an Information[5] was filed before the RTC charging petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[6] otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," the accusatory portion of which reads:
On the 24th day of May 2010, in the city of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any
dangerous drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control, and custody a total of one point ten (1.10) grams of dried Marijuana leaves, a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:45 in the morning of May 24, 2010, a Bantay Bayan operative of Barangay
San Antonio Village, Makati City named Reynaldo Bahoyo (BB Bahoyo) was doing his rounds when he purportedly
received a report of a man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo and fellow Bantay Bayanoperative
Mark Anthony Velasquez (BB Velasquez) then went to the said street and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which they
later identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an
empty lot. BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez approached petitioner and asked him where he lived, and the latter answered
Kaong Street. BB Bahoyo then said that he also lived in the same street but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he
asked for an identification card, but petitioner failed to produce one. BB Velasquez then repeated the request for an
identification card, but instead, petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of
cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, among others. This prompted BB Bahoyo
and BB Velasquez to seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as well as the seized
items, over to SPO3 Rafael Castillo (SPO3 Castillo). SPO3 Castillo then inventoried, marked, and photographed the
seized items, all in the presence of BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and a
request for qualitative examination of the seized two (2) pieces of rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing.
After examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that petitioner was positive
for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both dangerous drugs.[8]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge, and thereafter, presented a different version of the facts. According to him, he
was just urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay Bayan operatives, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez,
approached and asked him where he lived. Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street, BB Bahoyo and BB
Velasquez then frisked him, took away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the barangay hall.
He was then detained for about an hour before being taken to the Ospital ng Makati and to another office where a bald
police officer questioned him. Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall where they showed him two (2) sticks
of marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him.[9]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[10] dated October 1, 2012, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount
of P300,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[11]
The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as petitioner was scandalously
showing his private parts at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the resultant search incidental to such arrest which yielded
the seized marijuana in petitioner's possession was also lawful. In this regard, since the prosecution has adequately
shown that petitioner freely and consciously possessed such marijuana without authority by law, then he must be
convicted for violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.[12]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[13] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated October 21, 2015, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction. [15] It held that the search made on
petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana was validly made as it was done incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his
private parts on public. As such, the said seized marijuana is admissible in evidence and, thus, sufficient to convict him
for the crime charged.[16] The CA likewise held that the rule on chain of custody was duly complied with and, thus, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were not compromised. [17]
92
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[18] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[19] dated September 5,
2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld petitioner's conviction for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders
such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law."[20]
Proceeding from the foregoing, and as will be explained hereunder, petitioner's conviction must be set aside.
One of the arguments presented in the instant petition is that the search and arrest made on petitioner were illegal and,
thus, the marijuana purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence.[21] In this relation, it is worth noting that his
arresting officers, i.e., BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez, are mere Bantay Bayan operatives of Makati City. Strictly
speaking, they are not government agents like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of
Investigation in charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian volunteers who act as "force multipliers" to assist
the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security within their designated areas.[22]Particularly,
jurisprudence described the nature of Bantay Bayan as "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the
purpose of keeping peace in their community[, which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."[23] In the case of Dela
Cruz v. People[24] involving civilian port personnel conducting security checks, the Court thoroughly discussed that while
the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution generally cannot be invoked against the acts of private
individuals, the same may nevertheless be applicable if such individuals act under the color of a state-related
function, viz.:
With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on state
agents or authorized government authorities.
In People v. Marti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating procedure, opened
packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and detected a peculiar odor from the
packages. The representative from the company found dried marijuana leaves in the packages. He reported the matter to
the National Bureau of Investigation and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory
examination. Agents from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal drugs. Andre
Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained against the accused was not
procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not
govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
xxxx
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within its
ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering that port
personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article III of the
Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related
function.
In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law enforcement officers for
purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution. In People v. Lauga, this court held that a "bantav bayan," in relation to
the authority to conduct a custodial investigation under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"
Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed agents of
government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. x x x.[25] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this light, the Court is convinced that the acts of the Bantay Bayan or any barangay-based or other volunteer
organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the preservation of peace and order in their respective areas
have the color of a state-related function. As such, they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the
purpose of applying the Bill of Rights under Article III of the 1987 Constitution to them. [26]
Having established that the Bill of Rights may be applied to the Bantay Bayan operatives who arrested and subsequently
searched petitioner, the Court shall now determine whether such arrest and search were validly made.
Section 2,[27] Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),[28] Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other
words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.[29]
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the
process cannot be reversed.[30]
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should as a general rule be complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
93
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These
are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.[31]
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other
hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. [32]
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential.Under Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b)
of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.[33]
In this case, the prosecution claims that the BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez simply responded to a purported report of a
man showing off his private parts at Kaong Street which led to petitioner's arrest. On the other hand, petitioner maintains
that he was just urinating in front of his workplace when the Bantay Bayan operatives suddenly approached and
questioned him, and thereafter, frisked and arrested him. BB Bahoyo's testimony on direct and cross-examinations is
enlightening on this matter, to wit:
PROSECUTOR: x x x
xxxx
So, upon seeing Jeffrey Miguel, what did you do?
WITNESS: We approached him and we asked him what was he doing in that place and he appears to be intoxicated,
ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: After questioning him, what did you do?
WITNESS: We asked him from where he is residing and he told us that he is from Caong Street.
PROSECUTOR: What you do next?
WITNESS: Because I also live in Caong and he is not familiar to me, I asked for his I.D, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: Was he able to produce an I.D.? 
WITNESS: He was not able to produce any I.D., ma'am. 
PROSECUTOR: When he failed to produce any I.D., what did you do?
WITNESS: One of my companions asked him if he has any I.D. with him. 
PROSECUTOR: Who was this companion of yours?
WITNESS: Mark Anthony Velasquez, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: What was the response of Jeffrey to the request of Mark Anthony Velasquez?
WITNESS: He brought out the contents of his pocket and he brought out one pack of Fortune with one stick inside and
another pack, Marlboro light pack with one stick of cigarette and two sticks of marijuana.
xxxx
[on cross examination]
ATTY. PUZON: When you saw certain Jeffrey, you were not familiar with him, is that correct?
WITNESS: No, sir, I am not familiar with him.
ATTY. PUZON: And when you saw him, he was already showing his private parts, is that correct?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PUZON: In your "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay" you stated that when you saw Jeffrey, his back was
turned to you and it seemed that he was peeing. Do you remember saying that in your "Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang
Salaysay"?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PUZON: So, is it not true that when you saw him, he was already showing his private parts?
WITNESS: He was showing his private parts, sir. 
ATTY. PUZON: While his back turned to you? 
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. PUZON: How could you see his private parts if his back was turned against you?
WITNESS: He faced us, sir.
xxxx
COURT: Did you charge the accused for urinating in a public place or for showing his private parts?
WITNESS: No, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUZON: And in fact, only a drug case was filed against Jeffrey?
WITNESS: I have no idea, sir. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)[34]
On the other hand, pertinent portions of petitioner's Judicial Affidavit [35] containing his direct testimony read:
Q: Naaalala mo pa ba ang petsang 24 May 2010?
A: Opo. lyon pa ang araw nang aka ay dakpin ng dalawang bantaybayan.
Q: Ano ang naaalala mo bago ka mahuli, kung mayroan man?
A: Mga bandang pasado alas dose ng hating gabi ako ay umihi sa tapat ng pinagtatrabahuhan ko ng may biglang
94
lumapit sa akin na dalawang bantay-bayan.
Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangvari x x x, kung mayroon man?
A: Nagtanong po sila kung saan ako nakatira at sinagot ko 110 nakatira ako sa Kaong St., Brgy. San Antonio Village,
Makati City at pagkatapos ay kinapkapan nila ako.
Q: May nakuha ba sila sa iyo pakatapos kang kapkapan, kung mayroon man?
A: Opo. Nakuha nila ang aking charger, cellphone, lighter at sigarilyong Fortune.
Q: Ano ang sumunod na nangyari, kung mayroon man?
A: Pinosasan nila ako at dinala sa barangay.[36] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On cross-examination, petitioner testified, as follows:
PROSECUTOR: x x x Mr. Witness, you said that at past 12:00 in the midnight of May 24, 2010 you were arrested by
two Bantay Bayan, do you affirm that Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: And how did you know that they are Bantay Bayan complement?
WITNESS: They told me that they were Bantay Bayan personnel, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: What were you doing then, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Urinating in front of my place of work, ma'am.
xxxx
PROSECUTOR: And you were working at that time that you were allegedly arrested by these two Bantay
Bayancomplement, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Not anymore because I was staying in at the company, ma'am. x x x x
PROSECUTOR: You urinated outside because you do not have a comfort room inside, is it not a fact, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: Yes, ma'am.
PROSECUTOR: What is this Fine Home Incorporation doing, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS: I am a caretaker at Fine Home Incorporation I guard the steels, ma'am. [37] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing testimonies, the Court is inclined to believe that at around past 12 o'clock in the early
morning of May 24, 2010, petitioner went out to the street to urinate when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon
him. The latter then approached and questioned petitioner, and thereafter, went on to search his person, which
purportedly yielded the marijuana seized from him. Verily, the prosecution's claim that petitioner was showing off his
private parts was belied by the aforesaid testimonies. Clearly, these circumstances do not justify the conduct of an in
flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit"
warrantless arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner
had just committed an offense.

More importantly, the Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid warrantless arrest was
made on petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private parts because if it was indeed the case, then
the proper charge should have been filed against him. However, records are bereft of any showing that such charge was
filed aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view
that no prior arrest was made on petitioner which led to a search incidental thereto. As stressed earlier, there must first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made and that such process cannot be reversed.
All told, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on the person of petitioner. Consequently, the
marijuana purportedly seized from him on account of such search is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the
exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated marijuana is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability. [38]
WHEREFORE, the petitiOn is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2015 and the Resolution dated September 5,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35318 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner
Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
50. G.R. No. 219501, July 26, 2017
POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAN LA MADRID PURISIMA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner former Police Director General Alan La Madrid
Purisima (Purisima), assailing the Decision[2] dated July 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138296
and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722, which affirmed the Order[3] dated December 3, 2014 issued by respondent Conchita Carpio
Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, preventively suspending Purisima during the pendency of the consolidated
cases against him before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Facts
In 2011,[4] the Philippine National Police (PNP) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement[5] (MOA) with WER
FAST[6] Documentary Agency, Inc. (WER FAST) without going through any public bidding. Under the MOA, the PNP
undertook to allow WER FAST to provide courier services to deliver firearm licenses to gun owners.[7] In turn, WER FAST
agreed to donate equipment for an online application system for the renewal of firearm licenses.[8] PCSupt. Napoleon R.
Estilles (Estilles), then Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) under the Civil Security Group (CSG), signed
the MOA on behalf of the PNP. Based on the records, the incumbent PNP Chief approved the signing of the MOA on
August 24, 2011.[9]
Subsequently, the PNP's Legal Service (LS) was instructed to review the signed MOA vis-a-vis a proposed revised MOA,
noting that the signed MOA had not been implemented. In a Memorandum[10] dated August 7, 2012, the LS opined that
the FEO should first formulate rules for accreditation, by which to evaluate any company offering courier services,
including WER FAST. It further suggested that the rules should include the qualifications of the company to be
accredited, the required scope of courier services, the creation of an accreditation committee, provisions on strict
95
confidentiality, disclaimer, and grounds to terminate accreditation.[11]
Consequently, on November 19, 2012, the FEO Courier Services Accreditation Board (Accreditation Board) was
constituted.[12] In an undated memorandum[13] entitled "Policy on Accreditation of FEO Courier Service" (Accreditation
Policy), then CSG Director Police Director Gil Calaguio Meneses (Meneses) laid down the criteria and procedure for the
accreditation of courier service providers, as follows:
5. QUALIFICATIONS/CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITATION
A Courier Service provided may be accredited under the following conditions:
5.1 Applicant must be a local entity with appropriate business permits and is duly registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)[;]
5.2 It has completed and submitted all its reportorial requirements to the [SEC];
5.3 It has updated permits from [the local government unit (LGU)] where its main office is located[;]
5.4 It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
5.5 It must have secured clearances from Directorate for Intelligence (DI)[;]
5.6 It must have an extensive network all over the Philippines; and
5.7 The application shall be made in the name of the company represented by its President or any of its key directors as
du1y authorized in a board resolution for that purpose.[14] (Emphases supplied)
On December 18, 2012, Purisima was appointed as PNP Chief.[15] Thereafter, or on February 12, 2013, Meneses issued
a Memorandum[16] addressed to Purisima (Meneses Memo), stating that the CSG has accredited WER FAST as the
courier service to deliver the approved firearms license cards to gun owners, and more importantly, recommended that
the delivery of license cards via courier be made mandatory:
7. In compliance [with] the policy guidance of the then TACDS, now the Chief, PNP, to implement the delivery of the
approved firearms license cards to the addresses supplied by the applicants, this office has accredited WER FAST
Documentation Agency for the purpose, after complying with all the documentary requirements stipulated in the FEO
Policy on Accreditation.
RECOMMENDATION
8. Recommend that the delivery of firearms licenses cards of gun owners to their registered addresses, whether newly
purchased firearms or renewed firearm licenses be made mandatory, to give force and effect to this new intervention to
monitor and control firearms in the hands of gun owners.
9. Approval of para 8 above.[17] (Emphases supplied)
Purisima approved this memorandum on February 17, 2013.[18] It was only more than a month after the Meneses Memo
was issued, or on April 1, 2013, that the Accreditation Board issued Resolution Number 2013-027,[19] accrediting WER
FAST as a courier services provider to all FEO clients relative to the licensing of firearms (FEO Resolution).
The Proceedings Before the Ombudsman
In 2014, two (2) complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Purisima, WER FAST, and other PNP
officials relative to the PNP's directive for gun owners to avail of the courier delivery of firearm licenses viaWER FAST.
The first complaint[20] filed by a private complainant charged Purisima, Estilles, and WER FAST of violating Republic Act
(RA) Nos. 6713,[21] 3019,[22] 7080,[23] and 9184.[24] He alleged, among others, that the MOA was not procured through
competitive bidding; it was executed before WER FAST obtained its SEC certificate of registration; WER FAST is not
authorized by the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) to deliver mails/parcels to the public;
Purisima has close personal ties with WER FAST's incorporator and high ranking officer; Purisima made mandatory the
use of courier service for license delivery in favor of WER FAST; and WER FAST was inefficient in delivering the license
cards.[25] He later filed a Manifestation and Motion[26] with attached Joint-Affidavit[27] executed by several PNP officials
positively identifying Purisima as the one who directed FEO-CSG to accommodate WER FAST as the sole courier
delivery service of the firearms license cards.[28] Purisima filed his Counter-Affidavit[29] on July 25, 2014.
On October 9, 2014, the second complaint[30] was filed by the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) - Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) against several PNP officers involved
in the MOA's execution and WER FAST's accreditation as a courier service provider. Attached to the complaint were
certifications from various government agencies attesting that WER FAST failed to meet the qualifications for
accreditation under the Accreditation Policy.[31] As regards Purisima, FFIB-MOLEO prayed that he be administratively
charged for gross negligence and/or gross neglect of duty, with a prayer for preventive suspension. It alleged that
Purisima is administratively liable "for approving the recommendation of Meneses without verifying or checking the
records and capability of [WER FAST]."[32]
Purisima requested  for additional time to file his counter-affidavit and was granted an inextendible period of ten (10)
[33]
days from receipt of the Order[34] dated December 1, 2014.
On December 3, 2014, without waiting for Purisima's counter-affidavit, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order,
[35]
 which preventively suspended Purisima and other PNP officers, for six (6) months without pay. [36]
Purisima and another PNP official[37] filed their respective petitions for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722,[38] which were consolidated in a Resolution dated January 30, 2015.[39] While
these consolidated cases were pending before the CA, Purisima resigned as PNP Chief[40] and the preventive suspension
period had lapsed.[41]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[42] dated July 29, 2015, the CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed the Ombudsman's assailed Order. On
the procedural aspect, the CA held that the petitions are moot in view of the lapse of the six-month period of preventive
suspension. In particular, the CA noted that Purisima received the Order on December 4, 2014. Counting from this date,
his period of preventive suspension lapsed on June 4, 2015. Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the
case.[43]
On the merits, the CA held that the Ombudsman is authorized under Section 24 of RA 6770[44] to preventively suspend
without pay any public officer or employee during the pendency of an investigation. It added that the power to issue
preventive suspension order is undoubtedly a part of the Ombudsman's investigatory and disciplinary authority. [45]
The CA further held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in preventively suspending Purisima for
irregularly accrediting WER FAST as courier service provider, noting that the two (2) requisites [46] for the validity of a
preventive suspension order were present.[47] First, the Ombudsman made a prior determination that the evidence was
strong based on the documents submitted to them and the following circumstances: (a) BIR certificate; (b) Director of
Intelligence certificate; and (c) Department of Science and Technology (DOST) certificate.[48]Particularly, WER FAST was
accredited despite non-payment of taxes for the years 2011 to 2013 as shown by the BIR certification. The Director of
Intelligence likewise issued a certification that it has not given clearances to WER FAST. Additionally, WER FAST's
business permits for the years 2011 to 2012 indicated "consultancy" as its business, while its Articles of Incorporation
stated that the corporation's primary purpose is to act as a business consultant, engage in providing assistance in
documentation and registration. The DOST Postal Regulation Committee also issued a certification that it has not
accredited WER FAST as a courier service provider. Notably, WER FAST had no proven track record in courier service.
It even engaged the services of LBC Express, Inc. precisely because the former lacked the capacity to deliver firearms
licenses. Furthermore, it was not compliant with the DOTC's paid-up capital requirement of P500,000.00 to be accredited
96
to operate as a courier service in two or more administrative regions in the country. To highlight, WER FAST was
accredited by PNP nationwide despite having a paid-up capital of only P65,000.00.[49] Second, the charge filed against
Purisima was Gross Negligence and/or Gross Neglect of Duty, which if proven true, would constitute a ground for his
removal from public office.[50] Thus, the CA concluded that the concurrence of the foregoing elements rendered the
preventive suspension order valid.
Aggrieved, Purisima filed the present petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not the petition has been rendered moot and academic; and, (b) if in the
negative, whether or not the CA correctly held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in preventively
suspending Purisima.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
I.
In Ombudsman v. Capulong[51] (Capulong), the Court ruled that a case questioning the validity of a preventive suspension
order is not mooted by the supervening lifting of the same:
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against Capulong does not render the
petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension
order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
As held in Capulong, the Court, in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, may not be precluded from passing upon
the order's validity so as to determine whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the same. The
result of a finding of a grave abuse of discretion means that the issuance is null and void from its very inception, and
thus, bars the same from producing any legal effects. Indeed, "[n]o legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null
and void."[52] As such, a public officer improperly placed under preventive suspension should be restored to his original
position, and accordingly, should have earned his salaries as if he was not preventively suspended for the pertinent
period.
"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or
use."[53] In Osmeña v. Social Security System of the Phils. [54] the Court explained the consequence of a finding of
mootness:
In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness - save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
[55]
In this case, since the propriety or impropriety of Purisima's preventive suspension would essentially determine his
entitlement to back salaries during the six-month period therefor, the Court holds that despite the lapse of the period of
his preventive suspension, there remains some practical value or use in resolving his petition assailing the Ombudsman's
December 3, 2014 Order. Thus, by the same logic in Capulong, this case cannot be considered as moot and academic
so as to obviate the Court from resolving its merits.
II.

The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue a preventive suspension order under Section 24 of RA 6770 when two
(2) conditions are met. These are: (a) the evidence of guilt is strong based on the Ombudsman's judgment; and (b) any of
the three (3) circumstances are present - (1) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charges would warrant removal from
service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. Section 24 reads:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him.
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the Court need not belabor on the presence of the second condition, considering that (a) one of the charges
against Purisima is gross neglect of duty; and (b) the criminal and administrative charges (i.e., violations of RAs 6713,
3019, 7080, and 9184, as well as gross neglect of duty) against Purisima, if proven, would indeed warrant his removal
from office. Since Section 24 uses the disjunctive "or",[56] then the presence of any of the three (3) stated situations would
be sufficient to comply with this condition.
As regards the first condition, case law states that the strength of the evidence is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before her; hence, the deliberate use of the words "in his judgment."
In Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto:[57]
The rule is that whether the evidence of guilt is strong, as required in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. In the very words of Section 24, the
Ombudsman may preventively suspend a public official pending investigation if "in his judgment" the evidence presented
before him tends to show that the official's guilt is strong and if the further requisites enumerated in Section 24 are
present. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion.[58] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court's deference to the Ombudsman's judgment regarding this condition not only stems from its policy of non-
interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of her prosecutorial and investigatory powers;[59] it is also a conscious
recognition of the preliminary nature and purpose of a preventive suspension order. It is well-established that: [60]
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose
of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after
such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension
or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a preventive measure essentially meant to ensure the proper course of a still ongoing investigation, the
Ombudsman should thus be given ample discretion to determine the strength of the preliminary evidence presented
before her and thereafter, decide whether or not to issue such order against a particular respondent. In Buenaseda v.
Flavier,[61] this Court explained:
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or
prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend
such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in
an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger of tampering or
destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be
given the discretion to decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
[62]
 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
However, as in any governmental power, the Ombudsman's authority to preventively suspend is not unlimited. When a
complaint is virtually bereft of any supporting evidence or the evidence so cited is, on its face, clearly inadmissible, then
no deference ought to be accorded. Under these instances, the Ombudsman may be said to have gravely abused her
97
discretion in finding that the first condition was met.
In the present case, the Ombudsman found that the evidence of guilt against Purisima was strong enough to place him
under preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it was based on
supporting documentary evidence,[63] none of which were questioned to be inadmissible. For one, the Ombudsman
considered the PNP officials' Joint Affidavit,[64] expressing that Purisima exerted pressure and coercion over his
subordinates to coordinate with WER FAST in relation to the courier delivery service. The Ombudsman also cited several
circumstances sourced from the documentary evidence that should have prodded Purisima to verify WER FAST's
credentials and capability to provide courier services for the delivery of firearms licenses before he insisted on the
implementation of the MOA. These circumstances are: (a) the absence of a public bidding before the MOA was
executed; (b) the absence of accreditation from the Accreditation Board when Purisima approved the Meneses Memo;
(c) the Meneses Memo failed to mention the resolution supposedly accrediting WER FAST; (d) the Accreditation Board
accredited WER FAST despite the latter's lack of proof of compliance with the Accreditation Policy; ( e) WER FAST had
no proven track record in courier services and lacked the capacity to deliver the firearms licenses; (f) WER FAST failed to
obtain the DOTC's accreditation for authority to operate courier services; and ( g) WER FAST's failure to donate the
equipment for the online system as stated in the MOA, among others.[65]
Since both conditions for the issuance of a preventive suspension order against Purisima are present in this case, the
Court therefore holds that the Ombudsman acted within her powers when she issued the assailed December 3, 2014
Order. In consequence, Purisima is not entitled to back salaries during the period of his preventive suspension.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that - contrary to Purisima's stance - the Ombudsman did not violate his right to due
process nor did she prejudge the case when she issued the preventive suspension order before he was able to file his
counter-affidavit for the second complaint.[66]
Lastimosa v. Ombudsman[67] already settles that the Ombudsman may issue a preventive suspension order prior to the
filing of an answer or counter-affidavit, considering that the same is but a preventive measure:
Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an
administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia [(106 Phil. 1031, 1034 [1960])]:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to
say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as
a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the
charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation
and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
xxxx
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier [(G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645, 655)], however, whether the
evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him.
A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument
as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide when the evidence of
guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the
"judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. x x x[68] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that the issuance of a preventive suspension order does not amount to a
prejudgment of the merits of the case.[69] Neither is it a demonstration of a public official's guilt as such pronouncement
can be done only after trial on the merits.[70]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
51. G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017
REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE EDGAR R. ERICE, REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, AND REPRESENTATIVE GARY C. ALEJANO,
PETITIONERS, V. SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS, AND
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for mandamus[1] filed by petitioners Representatives Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr., (Rep.
Baguilat), Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman), Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice, Emmanuel A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin,
and Gary C. Alejano (collectively, petitioners), all members of the House of Representatives, essentially praying that
respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker Alvarez), Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Fariñas (Rep. Fariñas), and
Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep. Suarez; collectively, respondents), also members of the House of
Representatives, be compelled to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the 17th Congress of the House
of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the legitimate members of the Minority.
The Facts
The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles surfaced about
Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's
Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives (or the House),
and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after the May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of
President Duterte and the majority partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the
Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its members to feign
membership in the Minority, and thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader.[2]
On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then-Acting Floor
Leader Rep. Fariñas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the Plenary, wherein the latter
elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and
those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority.[3] Thereafter,
the Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)] voting for Rep.
Baguilat, seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(1)] registering a no vote,"[4] thus, resulting in
Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 17th Congress.
Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House – where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-
highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be declared
and recognized as the Minority Leader. However, despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was
never recognized as such.[5]
On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon), manifested before
the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for Speaker Alvarez (including the 21 "abstentionists")
convened and elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.[6]
Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader) Fariñas moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the
Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that various "irregularities" attended Rep.
Suarez's election as Minority Leader, particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for
Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the "abstentionists" who constituted the
bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader are supposed to be considered independent members
of the House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the Minority.[7] However, Rep. Lagman's opposition was overruled,
and consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially recognized as the House Minority Leader.
98
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the Minority
Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing tradition" in the House where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-
highest number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b) the irregularities attending
Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position.
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal matter to the House of
Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot
interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of the govemment.[8] In the same vein, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez and Majority Leader Fariñas contends, inter alia, that the election of
Minority Leader is within the exclusive realm of the House of Representatives, which the Court cannot intrude in pursuant
to the principle of separation of powers, as well as the political question doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues that the
recognition of Rep. Suarez as the House Minority Leader was not tainted with any violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion and, thus, must be sustained.[9]
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for resolution is whether or not respondents may be compelled via a writ of mandamus  to recognize:
(a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only legitimate
members of the House Minority.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done
when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office or which such other
is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[10] In Special People,
Inc. Foundation v. Canda,[11] the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamusis an extraordinary remedy that is
issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.[12]
After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs sought. Records
disclose that prior to the Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Fariñas responded
to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.
Rep. Fariñas then articulated that: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those
who vote for other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered
part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the Minority.[13] Thereafter, the
election of the Speaker of the House proceeded without anyobjection from any member of Congress, including herein
petitioners. Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House is the essential and formative step conducted at the first
regular session of the 17th Congress to determine the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their
respective leaders), considering that the Majority would be comprised of those who voted for the winning Speaker and
the Minority of those who did not. The unobjected procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its Journal No. 1
dated July 25, 2016,[14] which, based on case law, is conclusive[15] as to what transpired in Congress:
PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA
Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza inquired as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives.
REMARKS OF REP. FARIÑAS
In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the house on membership to the Majority and the Minority. He
explained that the Members who voted for the winning candidate for the Speaker shall constitute the Majority and shall
elect from among themselves the Majority Leader, while those who voted against the winning Speaker or did not vote at
all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter elect their Minority Leader.
NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Fariñas,  there being no objection, the Members proceeded to the election of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. The Presiding Officer then directed Deputy Secretary General Adasa to call the Roll for
nominal voting for the Speaker of the House and requested each Member to state the name of the candidate he or she
will vote for.
The result of the voting was as follows:
For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez:
xxxx
For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.
xxxx
For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez
xxxx
Abstained
xxxx
With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez (P.), eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven voting for Rep. Suarez, 21
abstaining and one registering a no vote, the Presiding Officer declared Rep. Alvarez (P.) as the duly elected Speaker of
the House of Representatives for the 17th Congress.
COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION
On motion of Rep. Fariñas, there being no objection, the Body constituted a committee composed of the following
Members to notify Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his election as Speaker of the House of Representatives and to escort the
Speaker-elect to the rostrum for his oath-taking: Reps. Eric D. Singson, Mercedes K. Alvarez, Fredenil "Fred" H. Castro,
Raneo "Ranie" E. Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A. Catamco, Elenita Milagros "Eileen" Ermita-Buhain, Rose Marie "Baby"
J. Arenas, Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Marlyn L. Primicias-Agabas, Emmeline Aglipay-Villar, Sarah
Jane I. Elago and Victoria Isabel G. Noel.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
The Presiding Officer motu proprio suspended the session at 12:43 p.m.[16]
After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of office, he administered the oath of office to all Members of the House of the
17th Congress.[17] On the same day, the Deputy Speakers, and other officers of the House (among others, the Majority
Leader) were elected and all took their respective oaths of office.[18]
During his privilege speech delivered on July 26, 2016, which was a full day after all the above-mentioned proceedings
had already been commenced and completed, Rep. Lagman questioned Rep. Fariñas' interpretation of the Rules.
[19]
 Aside from the belated timing of Rep. Lagman's query, Rep. Suarez aptly points out that the Journal for that session
does not indicate any motion made, seconded and carried to correct the entry in the Journal of the previous session (July
25, 2016) pertinent to any recording error that may have been made, as to indicate that in fact, a protest or objection was
raised.[20]
Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show that the House of Representatives had effectively adopted
Rep. Fariñas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the membership of the Minority, as well as the process of
determining who the Minority Leader would be. More significantly, this demonstrates the House's deviation from the
"legal bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the reliefs sought before this Court, namely: ( a) the "long-standing
tradition" of automatically awarding the Minority Leadership to the second placer in the Speakership Elections, i.e., Rep.
Baguilat; and (b) the rule[21] that those who abstained in the Speakership Elections should be deemed as independent
Members of the House of Representatives, and thus, they could not have voted for a Minority Leader in the person of
Rep. Suarez.[22] As will be explained hereunder, the deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules is not averse
to the Constitution.
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
99
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of
all its respective Members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its entire
membership. Said provision also states that the House of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. [23] In
the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,[24] which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the
11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x x [a
Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the
Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that '[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.'
[As such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House of
Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court."[25]
Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI[26] of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole authority
to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of
a majority [of the House of Representatives]."[27] Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to protect
and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the
Court from prying into the internal workings of the [House of Representatives]."[28]
Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning
an act of the political departments of government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will,
however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.[29] This stems from the expanded concept of judicial
power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, expressly "includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty
and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion: [30]
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. [31]
Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the government."[32]
However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had conducted the questioned proceedings
and its apparent deviation from its traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any attending grave abuse of
discretion which would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case concerns an internal matter of a coequal,
political branch of government which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered
with. To rule otherwise would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own breach of the
separation of powers doctrine.[33] Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal
department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself."[34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

52. G.R. No. 181953*, July 25, 2017
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. RURAL BANK OF HERMOSA (BATAAN), INC.,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated September 28, 2007 and the
Resolution[3] dated February 20, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96701, which affirmed the
Decision[4] dated June 19, 2006 and the Order[5] dated October 4, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 1
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 6428 fixing the just compensation for respondent Rural Bank of Hermosa (Bataan), Inc.'s
(respondent) 1.572 hectares (has.) agricultural land acquired by the government (subject land) at P30.00 per square
meter (sq. m.).
The Facts
Respondent is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated in Saba, Hermosa, Bataan, with a total
area of 2.1718 hectares, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-114713 [6] and T-114714.[7]Respondent
voluntarily offered to sell (VOS) the same to the government but only the subject land was acquired, and placed under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 6657,[8]as amended.[9]
Petitioner the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the subject land at P28,282.09[10] using the formula under
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. (AO) 17, Series of 1989, [11] as amended by DAR AO 03,
Series of 1991 (DAR AO 17, Series of 1989, as amended),[12] i.e.,  LV = (CNI x .70) + (MV x .30),[13] but respondent
rejected the said valuation, prompting the LBP to deposit the said amount in the latter's name.[14]
After the summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation, the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator of Dinalupihan, Bataan rendered a Decision[15] dated December 13, 1994 in DARAB Case No. 035-92
adopting the LBP's valuation.[16] Respondent moved for reconsideration,[17] which was, however, denied in an
Order[18] dated August 8, 1995.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed before the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a petition [19] seeking the
determination of just compensation for the subject land, or in the alternative, to be allowed to withdraw its VOS should
the valuation arrived at be unacceptable to it.[20]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated June 19, 2006, the RTC found the LBP's valuation as too low and unrealistic, and based on a mere
government valuation policy and not on its market value as reflected on the tax declarations for the two (2) parcels of
land. It gave credence to the testimony of the geodetic engineer who made the relocation survey and claimed that he
would be willing to pay the price of P30.00 per sq. m. therefor considering its accessibility to the national road and its
location which is a mere ½ kilometer away from a school and about 50 meters away from a Catholic church.
Consequently, it fixed the just compensation for the subject land at P30.00 per sq. m.[22]
The LBP moved for reconsideration,[23] which was, however, denied in an Order[24] dated October 4, 2006.
Unperturbed, the LBP elevated the matter before the CA.[25]
100
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated September 28, 2007, the CA upheld the RTC's valuation as being in accord with the guidelines set
forth under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, since the RTC considered not only the testimony of the parties'
respective witnesses, but also the nature of the land's use and its assessed value based on the tax declarations. It
rejected the LBP's contention that DAR AO 17, Series of 1989, as amended, should control the computation of just
compensation, holding that the said AOs are mere guidelines to be used by the LBP, and are not binding on the courts.[27]
Aggrieved, the LBP filed a motion for reconsideration,[28] but the same was denied in a Resolution[29] dated February 20,
2008; hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the RTC's
valuation fixing the just compensation for the subject land at P30.00 per sq. m.
The Court's Ruling
"Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, such as in this case where the just
compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined and the process be
concluded under RA 6657,"[30] as amended.
"For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking,"  or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), [31] or Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) are issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated
under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a)  the acquisition cost of the land, (b)  the current value of like
properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d)the owner's sworn
valuation, (e)  the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g)  the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h)  the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally
considered.[32]
It is well to emphasize that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Thus, the "justness" of the
enumeration of valuation factors in Section 17, the "justness" of using a basic DAR formula, and the "justness" of the
components (and their weights) that flow into such formula, are all matters for the courts to decide. [33] Nonetheless, to
settle the perennial objections to the use of Section 17 and the resulting DAR formulas in the valuation of acquired
properties under the CARP, the Court in Alfonso v. LBP (Alfonso)[34] ruled:
For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as the
concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties
covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is
not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided
that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other
words, courts of law possess the power to make a final determination of just compensation. [35]
In the present case, the CA merely upheld the just compensation fixed by the RTC which considered only the nature of
the land's use, and its assessed value based on the tax declarations, without a showing, however, that the other factors
under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, were taken into account or otherwise found to be inapplicable, and
completely disregarded the pertinent DAR formula contrary to what the law requires. On this score alone, the CA clearly
erred in sustaining the RTC's valuation as having been made in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot likewise adopt the LBP's computation. It bears to reiterate that just compensation must be
valued at the time of taking, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic, [36] or CLOAs are issued in favor
of the farmer-beneficiaries. Accordingly, the just compensation for the subject land should have been computed based on
the values prevalent for like agricultural lands[37] in accordance with the pertinent DAR regulations effective during such
time of taking. However, while the subject land was placed under CARP coverage in 1991, records do not bear out the
date when title was issued in the name of the Republic or CLOAs were issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries.
Moreover, during the pendency of the proceedings, DAR AO 17, Series of 1989, as amended, which was used by the
LBP in computing the just compensation for the subject land, was repealed by DAR AO 6, Series of 1992 [38] that was
amended by DAR AO 11, Series of 1994,[39] and subsequently superseded by DAR AO 5, Series of 1998,[40]which was, in
turn, revoked by DAR AO 2, Series of 2009.[41] It must be pointed out, however, that DAR AO 2, Series of 2009
implementing RA 9700[42] expressly declared that all claim folders received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, as in this
case, shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its further amendment by RA
9700.[43]
Records further show that during the summary administrative proceedings before the PARAD, [44] the subject land was
revalued in accordance with DAR AO 6, Series of 1992 and DAR AO 11, Series of 1994, [45] but resulted to a lower
valuation on both instances.[46] Nonetheless, the records are bereft of showing why the LBP insisted upon the applicability
of DAR AO 17, Series of 1989, as amended, instead of the said AOs.
Consequently, despite the propriety of setting aside the just compensation fixed by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, the
Court cannot automatically adopt the LBP's own computation as prayed for in the instant petition. Notably, other than the
Land Valuation Worksheet[47] for the land covered by TCT No. T-114714, and the Field Investigation Reports for the lands
covered by TCT No. T-114713[48] and TCT No. T-114714,[49] no competent evidence was adduced by the LBP to support
the amounts used in arriving at the just compensation, not having attached any certification from the concerned
government agency showing the relevant industry data on the average gross production (AGP) of palay in the locality for
purposes of computing the capitalized net income (CNI),[50] and the tax declarations from which it derived the market
values used.[51] Besides, the veracity of the facts and figures which the LBP used under the circumstances involves the
resolution of questions of fact which is, as a rule, improper in a petition for review on certiorari  since the Court is not a
trier of facts. Thus, a remand of this case for reception of further evidence is necessary in order for the RTC, acting as a
SAC, to determine just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, and the applicable DAR
regulations.[52] To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic or CLOAs were issued in favor of the
farmer-beneficiaries. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the RTC for the valuation of the subject
land must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.[53]
2. Courts should consider the factors in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700, as
translated into the applicable DAR formula. However, if the RTC finds that a strict application of the relevant DAR
formulas is not warranted, it may depart therefrom upon a reasoned explanation.[54]
3. Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing
jurisprudence. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is
delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on
the part of the State. Thus, legal interest on the unpaid balance shall be pegged at the rate of 12% per annum from the
101
date of taking, as shall be determined by the RTC, until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until
fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% per annum [55] in line
with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetery  Board Circular No. 799,[56] Series of 2013.[57]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated February 20, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96701 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 6428 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 1 (RTC) for reception of evidence on the issue of just compensation in
accordance with the guidelines set in this Decision. The RTC is directed to conduct the proceedings in said case with
reasonable dispatch, and to submit to the Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty (60)
days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
53. G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017
CONCHITA S. UY, CHRISTINE UY DY, SYLVIA UY SY, JANE UY TAN, JAMES LYNDON S. UY, IRENE S.
UY,* ERICSON S. UY, JOHANNA S. UY, AND JEDNATHAN S. UY, PETITIONERS, VS. CRISPULO DEL CASTILLO,
SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS PAULITA MANATAD-DEL CASTILLO, CESAR DEL CASTILLO, AVITO DEL CASTILLO,
NILA C. DUEÑAS, NIDA C. LATOSA, LORNA C. BERNARDO, GIL DEL CASTILLO, LIZA C. GUNGOB, ALMA DEL
CASTILLO, AND GEMMA DEL CASTILLO, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Conchita S. Uy (Conchita) and her children,
petitioners Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S. Uy (Ericson),
Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy (Uy siblings; collectively, petitioners), assailing the Decision [2] dated May 26, 2015
and the Resolution[3] dated February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 07120, which affirmed the
twin Orders[4] dated December 9, 2011 and the Order[5] dated May 17, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 55 (RTC) in Civil Case No. MAN-2797, denying petitioners' Omnibus Motion,[6] motion to quash the writ of
execution,[7] and their subsequent motion for reconsideration.[8]
The Facts
The present case is an offshoot of an action[9] for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees involving
a parcel of land, known as Lot 791 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29129, [10] filed by Crispulo Del
Castillo (Crispulo) against Jaime Uy (Jaime) and his wife, Conchita, on November 12, 1996, docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN-2797 (Quieting of Title Case).[11] However, since Jaime had died six (6) years earlier in 1990,[12] Crispulo amended
his complaint[13] and impleaded Jaime's children, i.e., the Uy siblings, as defendants.[14]Meanwhile, Crispulo died[15] during
the pendency of the action and hence, was substituted by his heirs, respondents Paulita Manalad-Del Castillo, Cesar Del
Castillo, Avito Del Castillo, Nila C. Duenas, Nida C. Latosa, Lorna C. Bernardo, Gil Del Castillo, Liza C. Gungob, Alma
Del Castillo, and Gemma Del Castillo (respondents).[16]
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision[17] dated April 4, 2003 (RTC Decision) in respondents' favor, and
accordingly: (a) declared them as the true and lawful owners of Lot 791; (b) nullified Original Certificate of Title No. 576,
[18]
 as well as TCT No. 29129; and (c) ordered petitioners to pay respondents moral damages and litigation costs in the
amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot
791.[19] Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA,[20] and subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for
lack of merit.[21] The ruling became final and executory on April 8, 2010, thus, prompting the Court to issue an Entry of
Judgment[22] dated May 4, 2010.

On August 17, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, [23] manifesting therein that since the
zonal value of Lot 791 at that time was P3,500.00 per square meter (sqm.) and that Lot 791 covers an area of 15,758
sqm., the total zonal value of Lot 791 was P55,153,000.00.[24] Hence, the attorney's fees, computed at twenty-five percent
(25%) thereof, should be pegged at P13,788,250.00.[25]
Acting on the said motion, the RTC ordered[26] petitioners to file their comment or opposition thereto, which they failed to
comply.[27] Accordingly, in an Order[28] dated November 22, 2010, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance
of a writ of execution. On December 13, 2010, a Writ of Execution[29] was issued, to which the sheriff issued a Notice of
Garnishment[30] seeking to levy petitioners' properties in an amount sufficient to cover for the P13,788,250.00 as
attorney's fees and P20,000.00 each as moral damages and litigation costs.
Threatened by the Notice of Garnishment, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion[31] praying that the writ of execution be
quashed and set aside, and that a hearing be conducted to re-compute the attorney's fees.[32] Petitioners maintained that
the Writ of Execution is invalid because it altered the terms of the RTC Decision which did not state that the zonal value
mentioned therein referred to the zonal value of the property at the time of execution.[33] Before the RTC could act upon
petitioners' Omnibus Motion, they filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on Jurisdictional Ground(s) (motion to
quash),[34] claiming that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Uy siblings in the Quieting of Title Case as they were never
served with summons in relation thereto.[35]
The RTC Proceedings
On December 9, 2011, the RTC issued two (2) orders: (a) one granting petitioners' Omnibus Motion, nullifying the Notice
of Garnishment, and setting a hearing to determine the proper computation of the award for attorney's fees; [36] and (b)
another denying their motion to quash, since they never raised such jurisdictional issue in the proceedings a quo.[37]
On January 20, 2012, a hearing was conducted for the determination of attorney's fees.[38] Thereafter, the parties were
ordered to submit their respective position papers,[39] to which respondents complied with,[40] presenting the following
alternative options upon which to base the computation of attorney's fees: (a) P3,387,970.00, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in 1996, the year when the Quieting of Title Case was filed; (b)
P11,424,550.00, equivalent to twentyfive percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791 in 2003, the year when the RTC
rendered its Decision in the same case; or (c) P15,758,000.00, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the zonal value
of Lot 791 in 2010, the year when the RTC Decision became final and executory.[41]
On the other hand, instead of filing the required position paper, petitioners filed a Consolidated Motion for
Reconsideration[42] of the RTC's December 9, 2011 twin Orders. In said motion, petitioners contended that the RTC failed
to definitely rule on the validity of the writ of execution, and that it erred in holding that the RTC Decision was already final
and executory despite the absence of summons on the Uy siblings. [43]
In an Order[44] dated May 17, 2012, the RTC: (a) pegged the attorney's fees at P3,387,970.00,[45] using the zonal value of
Lot 791 in 1996, the year when the Quieting of Title Case was instituted, it being the computation least onerous to
petitioners; and (b) denied petitioners' Consolidated Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[46] with the CA, assailing the RTC's twin Orders dated December 9,
2011 and the Order dated May 17, 2012. Petitioners argued that instead of just declaring the Notice of Garnishment void,
the RTC should have also declared the writ of execution void because the Uy siblings were never served with summons;
and like the Notice of Garnishment, the Writ of Execution also altered the terms of the RTC Decision. Petitioners further
added that the writ of execution was void because it made them liable beyond their inheritance from Jaime. They
maintain that the estate of Jaime should instead be held liable for the adjudged amount and that respondents should
have brought their claim against the estate, in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. [47]
102
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[48] dated May 26, 2015, the CA affirmed the assailed Orders of the RTC. The CA found no merit in the claim
that the Uy siblings were never served with summons, pointing out that in a Manifestation/Motion[49] dated November 26,
1997, their counsel in the trial proceedings, Atty. Alan C. Trinidad (Atty. Trinidad), stated that petitioners received the
summons with a copy of the amended complaint.[50] It likewise refused to give credence to petitioners' denial of Atty.
Trinidad's representation, observing that one of the Uy siblings, Ericson, even testified in court with the former's
assistance, and that none of them showed any concern or apprehension before the court, which they would have if
indeed Atty. Trinidad was not authorized to represent them.[51]
Anent petitioners' argument that they cannot be held personally liable with their separate property for Jaime's liability and
that respondents should have filed a claim against Jaime's estate in accordance with Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the CA held that such provision only applies to contractual money claims and not when the subject matter is some
other relief and the collection of any amount is merely incidental thereto, such as by way of damages, as in this case.
[52]
 Besides, petitioners had all the opportunity to raise such perceived error when they elevated the case to the CA and to
this Court, but they did not.[53] Following the principle of finality of judgment, the CA can no longer entertain such
assignment of errors.[54]
With respect to the validity of the writ of execution, the CA ruled that since the Writ of Execution made express reference
to the RTC Decision without adding anything else, the same was valid, unlike the Notice of Garnishment which expressly
sought to levy P13,788,250.00 in attorney's fees and, in the process, exceeded the purview of the said Decision. [55]
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration,[56] which was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution[57]dated
February 22, 2016; hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the twin Orders dated December 9, 2011
and the Order dated May 17, 2012 of the RTC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it is well to reiterate that petitioners are resisting compliance with the ruling in the Quieting of Title Case, on
the grounds that: (a) they were never served with summons in relation thereto; and (b) they were merely impleaded as
substitutes to Jaime therein, and as such, respondents should have proceeded against his estate instead, pursuant to
Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. However, a judicious review of the records would reveal that such contentions
are untenable, as will be discussed hereunder.
Anent petitioners' claim that they were never served with summons, the CA correctly pointed out that in the November
26, 1997 Manifestation/Motion,[58] petitioners, through their counsel, Atty. Trinidad, explicitly stated, among others, that
they "received the Summons with a copy of the Second Amended Complaint" and that "the Answer earlier filed serves as
the Answer to the Second Amended Complaint."[59] Having admitted the foregoing, petitioners cannot now assert
otherwise. "It is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. They are legally binding
on the party making it, except when it is shown that they have been made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was actually made, neither of which was shown to exist in this case." [60]
Assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the amended complaint, they were nonetheless
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an Answer[61] to the amended complaint and
actively participating in the case.[62] In fact, one of the petitioners and Uy siblings, Ericson, was presented as a witness for
the defense.[63] Moreover, petitioners appealed the adverse RTC ruling in the Quieting of Title Case all the way to the
Court. It is settled that the active participation of the party against  whom the action was brought, is tantamount to an
invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party
from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.[64] After all, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
obtained either by a valid service of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court's authority. [65]
In this regard, petitioners cannot also deny Atty. Trinidad's authority to represent them. As mentioned earlier, one of the
petitioners, Ericson, even testified with the assistance of Atty. Trinidad. [66] Indeed, if Atty. Trinidad was not authorized to
represent them, the natural reaction for petitioners was to exhibit concern. Based on the records, however, there is no
indication that any of the petitioners or Ericson made even the slightest objections to Atty. Trinidad's representation. This
only confirms the CA's finding that such denial was a mere afterthought and a desperate attempt to undo a final and
executory judgment against them.[67]
As to petitioners' contention that respondents should have proceeded against Jaime's estate pursuant to Section 20,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is well to point out that based on the records, the Uy siblings were not merely substituted
in Jaime's place as defendant; rather, they were impleaded in their personal capacities. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, substitution of parties takes place when the party to the action dies pending the resolution of the case
and the claim is not extinguished, viz.:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply
with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. (Emphases supplied)
Here, Jaime died on March 4, 1990,[68] or six (6) years be(ore private respondents filed the Quieting of Title Case. Thus,
after Conchita filed an Answer[69] informing the RTC of Jaime's death in 1990, the complaint was amended[70] to implead
the Uy siblings. Accordingly, the Rules of Court provisions on substitution upon the death of a party do not apply and the
Uy siblings were not merely substituted in place of Jaime in the Quieting of Title Case. Instead, they were impleaded in
their personal capacities.[71] In this regard, petitioners' argument that they cannot be held solidarily liable for the
satisfaction of any monetary judgment or award must necessarily fail. [72]
In this light, petitioners can no longer invoke Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. - When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at
the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A
favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (Emphasis supplied)
A cursory reading of the foregoing provision readily shows that like Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it applies in
cases where the defendant dies while the case is pending and not before the case was even filed in court, as in this
case.
103
At this point, the Court notes that if petitioners truly believed that Jaime's estate is the proper party to the Quieting of Title
Case, they could and should have raised the lack of cause of action against them at the earliest opportunity. Obviously,
they did not do so; instead, they actively participated in the case, adopted the answer earlier filed by Conchita, and even
litigated the case all the way to the Court. Petitioners cannot now question the final and executory judgment in the
Quieting of Title Case because it happened to be adverse to them.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This
principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and ( b) to put an end
to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious
perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As
such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must
be faithfully complied."[73] However, this doctrine "is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative
to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; ( e) the lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby."[74]
In this case, a punctilious examination of the records, especially the Amended Complaint [75] in the Quieting of Title Case
reveals that the disputed Lot 791 was covered by TCT No. 29129 in the names of Jaime and Conchita. Thus, while the
Uy siblings were indeed impleaded in their personal capacities, the fact remains that they are merely succeeding to
Jaime's interest in the said lot and title. As successors-heirs, they cannot be personally bound to respond to the
decedent's obligations beyond their distributive shares.[76] Verily, this is a special or a compelling circumstance which
would necessitate the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment, so as to somehow limit the liability of the Uy
siblings in the payment of the monetary awards in favor of respondents in the Quieting of Title Case - i.e., moral
damages and litigation costs in the amount of P20,000.00 each, as well as attorney's fees, equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the zonal value of Lot 791[77] - within the value of their inherited shares, notwithstanding the finality of
the ruling therein.
In sum, while the courts a quo correctly ruled that the Uy siblings may be held answerable to the monetary awards in the
Quieting of Title Case, such liability cannot exceed whatever value they inherited from their late father, Jaime. For this
purpose, the RTC is tasked to ensure that the satisfaction of the monetary aspect of the judgment in the Quieting of Title
Case will not result in the payment by the Uy siblings of an amount exceeding their inheritance from Jaime. After all, the
other party, i.e., respondents, shall not be unjustly prejudiced by the same since Jaime's spouse, Conchita, is still alive
and the rest of the monetary awards may be applied against her, if need be.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated May 26, 2015 and the Resolution
dated February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07120 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION limiting the adjudged monetary liability of petitioners Christine Uy Dy, Sylvia Uy
Sy, Jane Uy Tan, James Lyndon S. Uy, Irene S. Uy, Ericson S. Uy, Johanna S. Uy, and Jednathan S. Uy to the total
value of their inheritance from Jaime Uy.
SO ORDERED.
54. G.R. No. 225054, July 17, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. AGAPITO DIMAALA Y ARELA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
In a Decision[1] dated May 8, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 4994-C based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
found accused-appellant Agapito Dimaala y Arela (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
Murder, the dispositive portion of which reads: committed, i.e.,  civil liability ex delicto  in senso strictiore."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court renders judgment finding AGAPITO DIMAALA y Arela GUILTYbeyond 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be
reasonable doubt of the crime charged for the treacherous killing of Rodrigo Marasigan. Said accused is hereby predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. x x x.
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole.
xxxx
He is likewise ordered to pay the family of Rodrigo Marasigan the following:

PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity; In this relation, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's civil liability based on sources other than  the subject delict
PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages; survives, and the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by
PhP 36,000.00 as actual damages; law and procedural rules.[15]
PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
PhP 25,000.00 as temperate damages. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a)  DISMISS Crim. Case No. 4994-C before the Regional Trial Court of Calauag,
Quezon by reason of the death of accused-appellant Agapito Dimaala y  Arela; and (b)  DECLARE the instant
SO ORDERED.[2] case CLOSED and TERMINATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before the Court of Appeals (CA). In a Decision [3] dated September 23, 2015
in CA-G.R. CR No. 05595, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged but
deleted the award of temperate damages.[4]
55. A.C. No. 11668, July 17, 2017
Aggrieved, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal  from the CA's Decision, but later on decided not to pursue his
[5]
JOY T. SAMONTE, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, RESPONDENT.
appeal. Thus, he filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal with Prayer for Immediate Issuance of Entry of Judgment, [6]which the
Court granted in its Resolution[7] dated September 21, 2016. Following the closure and termination of the case, the Court
declared the finality of the aforesaid Resolution and issued an Entry of Judgment.[8] PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint[1] dated March 15, 2013, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Meanwhile, the Court received a Letter  dated February 23, 2017 from the Bureau of Corrections informing it that
[9]
by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant) against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent), praying that
accused-appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital, as evidenced by the Certificate of the latter be disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.
Death[10] attached thereto.
The Facts
In view of this development, the criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability exdelicto,
is ipso facto extinguished.[11]
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor Relations
It is settled that the death of accused-appellant prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e.,  NLRC Case
case against him.[12] Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that the criminal liability is totally extinguished by
RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana plantation.[2]Consequently,
the death of the accused, to wit:
complainant engaged the services of respondent to prepare her position paper, and paid him the amount of
P8,000.00[3] as attorney's fees.[4] Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission of her
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same. [5] As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision[6] based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished the total amount of P633,143.68.[7] When complainant confronted respondent about the said ruling, the latter casually told
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; her to just sell her farm to pay the farm workers.[8] Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that she was
left defenseless and without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of the foregoing judgment;[9] hence,
xxxx she filed the instant complaint.

In an Order[10] dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed respondent to submit his
In People v. Culas,[13] citing People v. Layag,[14] the Court explained the effects of the death of an accused pending Answer to the complaint.
appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
In his Answer[11] dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper on behalf of

104
complainant. However, he maintained that said omission was due to complainant's failure to adduce credible witnesses
to testify in her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to prepare an Affidavit [12] for one
Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her witness; nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents
of Romeo's affidavit were not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would not know what he would be
testifying on. Respondent added that complainant's uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness, refused to
execute an affidavit and testify to her lies. Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her conduct and that the
complaint against him should be dismissed for lack of merit.[13]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation[14] dated March 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD found respondent administratively liable and,
accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the
IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.[15]
In a Resolution[16] dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report
and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty in order to
account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients
are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and
whether they accept them for a fee or for free.[17] To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means
to attain lawful objectives.[18] These principles are embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the CPR, which respectively read as follows:
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and respondent when the
105
latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the amount of
P8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences
when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the
latter,[19] as in this case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client with competence
and diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the necessary position
paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e.,  herein complainant. To
be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible witnesses in support of her
position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for respondent to completely abandon his client's cause. By
voluntarily taking up complainant's case, respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter's
interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
[20]
 In Abay v. Montesino,[21] it was explained that regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client's cause:
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the
latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held administratively liable for
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records show that he
indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared[23] and notarized[24] the affidavit of complainant's
intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,[25] the
Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to not only obey the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood, viz.:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood
in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law,
and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated
by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."[26] (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Section
4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. – A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in
these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee
specified by these Rules if:
  (a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document
into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A
notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined."[27]
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.
The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,[28] the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for
his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client. Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,
[29]
 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the
prejudice of his client. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the
IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case
of Dela Cruz v. Zabala,[30] where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the Court hereby revokes
respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUlLY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1)
year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record
as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
56. G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DOMINADOR LADRA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
On appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated June 30, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01160-
MIN, which affirmed the Joint Decision[3] dated February 6, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
106
Branch 22 (RTC) in FC Crim. Case Nos. 2008-426 and 2008-427 finding accused-appellant Dominador Ladra (accused
appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape and Unjust Vexation.
The Facts
Private complainant AAA[4] was born on September 3, 1995[5] and the eldest of five (5) siblings. At the time material to
these cases, she lived with her family in a remote area in Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental.[6]
On the other hand, it was alleged that accused-appellant was a relative of BBB, AAA's mother, who allowed him to stay
with their family out of pity. He ran errands for them and attended to the children when BBB was busy washing clothes
and her husband, CCC, was tending to their farm.[7]
Sometime between 2000 to 2001,[8] when AAA was around five (5) years old, she and her siblings were left at home with
accused-appellant. After their meal, accused-appellant ordered them to sleep. Suddenly, AAA was awakened when she
felt accused-appellant, who was already naked, on top of her, forced his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull
movements, causing her pain. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone. Thereafter, accused-appellant
repeatedly molested her, each time bringing his bolo with him.[9] The sexual abuse ceased in 2002, when accused-
appellant left their house.[10]
Years later, or on the evening of April 16, 2008, AAA - who was already twelve (12) years old at the time - was surprised
when she saw accused-appellant in their kitchen. To her shock, accused-appellant squeezed her vagina and told her that
they were going to visit his house. Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD, about the incident.[11] She also told DDD
about the first rape incident and the subsequent ones committed by accused appellant. Eventually, AAA told BBB about
her traumatic experiences in the hands of accused-appellant when she was five (5) years old. Together, they reported
the incident to the barangay and thereafter, had the incident recorded in the police blotter.[12] Later, AAA filed criminal
cases against accused-appellant, who was subsequently arrested.[13]
On April 19, 2008, Dr. Ma. Josefina Villanueva Taleon (Dr. Taleon), Medical Officer III at the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center, conducted a physical examination on AAA and found the presence of old healed lacerations in her genitalia at
the three (3), eigth (8), and ten (10) o'clock positions.[14]
Hence, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 in an
Information[15] that reads:
Sometime in 2000 up to 2001, when the private complainant is about five to six [5 to 6] years old, at Dumarait,
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused
knowing full well the minority, with obvious ungratefulness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of sexual abuse on one [AAA], five to six years old, by inserting his penis into her vagina, against her will and
without her consent, and which act debases, degrades and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of [AAA] as a child
and as a human being and is prejudicial to the child's development.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Section 5 Paragraph B of RA 7610.[16]
Likewise, accused-appellant was charged with Acts of Lasciviousness in an Information[17] that reads:
On 16 April 2008 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening in Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who knew full well the minority
of the victim, through force and intimidation, actuated by lust or lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit a lascivious conduct on twelve-year [12] old [AAA] by squeezing her vagina against her will and to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.[18]
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offenses charged.[19]
In defense, accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed that AAA's family were angry at him when he left their
house, leaving no one to attend to their errands. He asserted that he left them because he could no longer understand
what they were asking him to do for them.[20]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision[21] dated February 6, 2013, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of: (a) Rape in FC Crim. Case No.
2008-426, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) Unjust Vexationin FC Crim.
Case No. 2008-427, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 30 days of arresto menor and to
pay a fine of P200.00 with accessory penalties.[22]
In finding accused-appellant guilty of Rape in FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, the RTC found that although the
allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a case for child abuse, it also constitutes Statutory Rapeunder
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Relative thereto, it found that AAA's narration of her
defloration in the hands of accused-appellant more than sufficiently established the offense, as well as the identity of the
offender. Despite her tender age, she was straightforward, clear, categorical, and positive in her testimony, indicating that
she was telling the truth. Moreover, her account of the incident was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Taleon, who
testified that there were healed lacerations in AAA's genitalia at the 3, 8, and 10 o'clock positions. [23]
As regards FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, the RTC found that the prosecution has established that on the evening of
April 16, 2008, when AAA went to their kitchen, she encountered accused-appellant who, without warning, "just
squeezed her vagina."[24] The RTC opined, however, that the prosecution failed to establish the element
of lasciviousness or lewdness as would justify accused-appellant's conviction for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.
The overt act of accused-appellant of squeezing AAA's vagina did not show that he intended to gratify his sexual desires
nor was it demonstrative of carnal lust. Nonetheless, AAA was clearly annoyed by the act; perforce, the RTC found
accused-appellant guilty of Unjust Vexation, defined and penalized under Article 287[25] of the RPC.[26]
Conversely, the RTC brushed aside the defense proffered by accused appellant, which it found insufficient to debunk the
positive evidence of the prosecution.[27] Dissatisfied, accused-appellant appealed his conviction.[28]
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision[29] dated June 30, 2015, the CA affirmed in toto[30] the RTC's Joint Decision convicting accused-
appellant of Rape and Unjust Vexation. Apart from concurring with the RTC's findings and conclusions, the CA found no
merit in accused-appellant's contention that it was impossible for him to commit the crime as AAA's younger brother was
sleeping beside her at the time of the alleged rape incident. Disregarding the argument, the CA ruled that the presence of
another person at the scene does not render it impossible for accused-appellant to commit the crime of Rape. As regards
its affirmance of accused-appellant's conviction for Unjust Vexation, the CA did not proffer any justification. [31]
Aggrieved, accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking the reversal of his conviction.[32]
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant's conviction for
Rape and Unjust Vexation.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Time and again, the Court has held that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
107
accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions such as
where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been ignored or misconstrued, or where the
trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.[33]
In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, the Court accords credence to the RTC's finding, as affirmed by the CA, that
accused-appellant indeed committed the crime of Rape against then five (5)-year-old AAA. As astutely observed by the
RTC, which had the opportunity to personally scrutinize AAA's conduct and demeanor during trial, she was a credible
witness whose testimony must be given great weight. The trial judge's evaluation, which the CA sustained, now binds the
Court, leaving to the accused-appellant the burden to bring to the fore facts or circumstances of weight, which were
otherwise overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted that would materially affect the disposition of the case
differently if duly considered.[34] Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he miserably failed to discharge this burden, and the
Court finds no reason to reverse the CA's conclusions.
Moreover, the CA correctly disregarded accused-appellant's argument that he could not have committed the crime in the
presence of AAA's younger brother, who slept beside her.[35] It cannot be denied that the presence of AAA's brother in the
room does not negate the commission of the crime. "Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in
parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the
same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the
victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. It is settled that
lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen in the most unlikely places." [36]
In view thereof, the courts a quo correctly found accused-appellant guilty of Rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, the Court modifies the amounts of damages awarded conformably with
prevailing jurisprudence.[37] Accordingly, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, however, the Court disagrees with the CA's affirmance of the RTC's finding that
accused-appellant can only be held guilty of Unjust Vexation. After a punctilious review of the evidence, the Court finds
that he should instead be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, as charged in the information, in relation to Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610.
Acts of Lasciviousness is defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, which reads:
Article 336. Acts of lasciviousness . - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either
sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned on the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Conviction for such crime requires the concurrence of the following elements: (a) that te offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) through force, threat, or
intimidation, (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, (iii) by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority, and (iv) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (c) that the offended party is
another person of either sex.[38]
Meanwhile, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
x x x x.
Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the requisites of
the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Article 336 of the RPC above-enumerated must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is perfonned with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[39]
A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC
and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have been sufficiently established. The prosecution was able to
prove AAA's minority at the time of the incident through the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth [40]showing that she
was born on September 3, 1995. At the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was then 12 years old. It was
likewise established that accused-appellant, an adult who exercised influence on AAA, committed a lascivious act by
"squeezing" her vagina.
The courts a quo convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Unjust Vexation instead of Acts of Lasciviousness on the
finding that there was no element of lasciviousness or lewdness in accused-appellant's act. In its Decision, the RTC even
pointed out that accused-appellant could not have intended to lie with AAA at that moment considering that she still had
her underwear on, and the act of "squeezing" her private part was not demonstrative of camallust. [41]
The Court disagrees.
"Lascivious conduct" is defined in Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In Amployo v. People,[42] the Court expounded on the definition of the word "lewd," to wit:
The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite
crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the
existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted
as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and
the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a
precise definition. As early as U.S. v. Gomez we had already lamented that -
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct makes one amenable to the
provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code. What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the
circumstances of each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd and
lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say just where the line of demarcation lies between such
conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover.[43]
After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a child - a young girl 12
years of age - could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must not be
forgotten that several years prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was
appropriately convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching - more so, "squeezing," in this case, which
strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have
been done merely to annoy or vex her, as opined by the courts a quo. That AAA was fully clothed at that time, which led
the courts a quo to believe that accused-appellant could not have intended to lie with her, is inconsequential. "'Lewd' is
defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner."[44] As such, accusedappellant's act of squeezing AAA's vagina
108
was a lewd and lascivious act within the definitions set by law and jurisprudence.
Under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the prescribed penalty for lascivious conduct is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence
shall be taken from the medium period[45] thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be
taken within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.[46] Accordingly, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In addition, and conformably with recent jurisprudence,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as fine, all of which shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. [47]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01160-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay private complainant the amounts of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(2) In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Section 5
(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of 10 years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four (4), months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to pay private complainant the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as fine;
(3) Accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is ordered to pay the private complainant interest on all monetary awards at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
57. G.R. No. 223862, July 10, 2017
HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF LUBAO, PAMPANGA, AND
ANGELITO L. DAVID, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE BARANGAY CHAIRMAN OF PRADO SIONGCO, LUBAO,
PAMPANGA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EMMANUEL SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. JAIME C.
DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT, CARMELA R. DIMSON AND IRENE R. DIMSON,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated December 18, 2015 and the
Resolution[3] dated March 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138699, which directed the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 51 to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Cease and
Desist Order[4] (CDO) and the Closure Order[5] of petitioner Mayor Mylyn P. Cayabyab (Mayor Cayabyab) upon posting of
a bond to be determined by the RTC.
The Facts

Respondent Jaime C. Dimson (Dimson) is the owner of a poultry farm located in Barangay Prado Siongco, Lubao,
Pampanga (subject poultry farm) which had been operating for more than 30 years. In January 2014, he applied for a
barangay clearance with the office of petitioner Prado Siongco Barangay Chairman Angelita L. David (Chairman David),
preparatory to his application for a business permit, and was informed that the issuance thereof is conditioned on a prior
ocular inspection of the subject poultry farm by the Office of the Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga, Mayor Cayabyab. However,
despite the conduct of an ocular inspection, Chairman David refused to issue the clearance; hence, no business permit
was issued in favor of Dimson.[6]
On April 29, 2014, Dimson received[7] a CDO[8] dated April 28, 2014 from the Office of Mayor Cayabyab, directing him to
desist from further conducting any poultry farming on the grounds of: (a) lack of a Barangay Business Permit and a
Mayor's Permit; (b) lack of a pollution control officer; (c) foul odor being emitted by the subject poultry farm that offended
passing motorists, and for which complaints were filed by those affected; and (d) the said poultry farm being situated only
five (5) meters away from the national road, in violation of the 500-meter minimum distance requirement under the Code
of Sanitation of the Philippines (Sanitation Code).[9]
In his motion for reconsideration,[10] Dimson denied that there was foul odor coming from his poultry farm, at the same
time, manifesting that he had already employed a pollution control officer.[11] Said motion was denied by Lubao Acting
Mayor Robertito V. Diaz in a letter[12] dated May 20, 2014. Dissatisfied, Dimson filed another motion for reconsideration,
[13]
 contending that the subject poultry farm is not a nuisance per se that can be abated by the local government without
the intervention of the courts.[14] The motion was denied by Mayor Cayabyab in a letter[15] dated June 13, 2014, which
clarified that the CDO was primarily issued on the lack of the requisite Barangay Business Permit and Mayor's Permit.
Thereafter, a Closure Order[16] dated June 20, 2014 was issued by Mayor Cayabyab effectively shutting down the subject
poultry farm.[17]
The RTC Proceedings
Aggrieved, Dimson filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition (With Application for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction)[18] and prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Mayor Cayabyab and Chairman David (petitioners) before the
RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, docketed as Sp. Civil Case No. G-14-685, which was raffled to Branch 52. He maintained
that his poultry farm is not a nuisance per se that can be summarily abated; hence, respondents grossly abused their
discretion when they withheld his permits, and issued the CDO and Closure Order.[19]
In their defense,[20] respondents averred that: (a) the non-issuance of the Barangay Business Permit was based on valid
grounds as there were written complaints against the operation of the poultry farm, and a public hearing was conducted
thereon; (b) the non-issuance of the Mayor's Permit was justified considering the lack of a Barangay Business Permit; ( c)
the issuance of the CDO and Closure Order was justified and in accordance with due process; and (d) the poultry farm
violated not only the Sanitation Code but also the Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance requiring poultry
farms to be 500 meters away from the major roads and/or highways.[21]
In an Order[22] dated October 2, 2014, the RTC denied Dimson's application for TRO for failure to establish a clear and
unmistakable right to the said issuance and to show that he will suffer irreparable injury. Moreover, the RTC opined that
the issue of whether or not petitioners have the right to order the closure of the subject farm is best threshed out in the
main case. It likewise ruled that the TRO can no longer serve its purpose as the act sought to be restrained was
already fait accompli, since a notice of closure was already posted on the concrete wall of the subject poultry farm
effective September 29, 2014.[23]
Due to the Presiding Judge's voluntary inhibition in the case, the same was re-raffied to Branch 51 of the same RTC. [24]
Dimson filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied in an Order[25] dated December 22, 2014.
Unperturbed, Dimson filed a petition for certiorari[26] before the CA, seeking to set aside the Orders dated October 2, 2014
and December 22, 2014, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138699.[27]
109
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[28] dated December 18, 2015, the CA granted the petition, and directed the RTC to issue a TRO against the
implementation of the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab.[29]
The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying Dimson's application for a TRO which was essentially
rooted on a determination of whether the subject poultry farm is a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens.
Considering that poultry farming is a legitimate business, by its nature alone, the same can only be a nuisance per
accidens if in the course of its operations, it should become objectionable to such extent that it offends some laws, public
policy, or should become a danger to public health and welfare. It may only be abated on the strength of judicial fiat.[30]
Consequently, the CA held that Dimson was able to establish the concurrence of the requisites for the issuance of
injunctive relief, to wit: (a) he has the right to engage in poultry farming; (b) the issuance of the CDO and the closure
order would work injustice to him; and (c) the issuance of the said orders which amounted to an abatement of his poultry
enterprise without the required judicial intervention violates his rights, which cannot be justified under the general welfare
clause.[31]
The CA likewise held that the issuance of a TRO cannot be denied on the ground of fait accompli since the acts
complained of is a continuing prohibition on an otherwise legitimate business. Hence, Dimson could still resume his
operations in the meantime, or until a final decision on the merits of the main case is rendered by the RTC, and the
status quo ante may still be attained, and, thereafter, preserved.[32]
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[33] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[34] dated March
21, 2016; hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in directing the issuance
of a TRO against the implementation of the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab.
The Court's Ruling
The Court grants the petition.
"A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights and interests."[35] To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that: (a) there exists a
clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (c) the
invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (d) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious and irreparable damage. The grant or denial of an injunctive relief in a pending case rests on the sound
discretion of the court since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left for
the conclusive determination of the said court.[36] "Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters
must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion."[37] The burden is, thus, on the applicant to
show that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor,[38] since an application for injunctive relief is
construed strictly against him.[39] Here, Dimson failed to sufficiently show the presence of the requisites to warrant the
issuance of a TRO against the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab.
Preliminarily, it must be clarified that contrary to the CA's ruling,[40] the grant or denial of Dimson's application for TRO
was not essentially rooted on a determination of whether the subject poultry farm is a nuisance per se or a nuisance per
accidens, but rather on whether or not there was an ostensible showing of a sufficient justification for the issuance of the
CDO and the Closure Order. Corollary is the issue of whether or not there were prima facie valid reasons for the
withholding of the barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the renewal of Dimson's business permit to operate.

A business permit must be secured from the municipal business permits and licensing office in order for the business to
legally operate in the locality.[41] While poultry farming is admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate without a
business permit, which expires on the 31st of December of every year and must be renewed before the end of January of
the following year.
In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business permit to operate
the subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary barangay clearance which was not
issued based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said farm. Records show that complaints from neighboring
barangays were received by the office of Mayor Cayabyab bewailing the foul odor coming from the said farm, [42] which
was confirmed upon ocular inspection conducted by the Health and Sanitation Office of the Municipality of Lubao,
Pampanga.[43] Settled is the rule that acts of public officers are presumed to be regular and valid, unless sufficiently
shown to be otherwise.[44] In this case, Dimson was unable to refute the finding that foul odor is being emitted by his farm,
having failed to present the inspection report of the sanitary officer who purportedly did not note any such foul smell in
the fann.[45] Not having passed the necessary sanitation standard, there was, therefore, a prima facie valid reason for the
withholding of the required barangay clearance, which is a prerequisite to the renewal of Dimson's business permit to
operate.
Having failed to apply for and secure the necessary business pennit to operate in 2014 on account of his inability to
obtain the required barangay clearance due to non-compliance with a requirement standard,[46] Dimson may not legally
operate in the Municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, thereby, warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and
the Closure Order. Accordingly, no error, much less grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed on the RTC in denying
Dimson's application for the issuance of a TRO against the said orders. In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has
no clear legal right to resume his operations pending final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law, which is not extant in the present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable
damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the issuance of an injunctive relief.[47]
In fine, it was grave error for the CA to order the issuance of a TRO against the implementation of the CDO and the
Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab. A court may issue injunctive relief against acts of public officers only when the
applicant has made out a case of invalidity or irregularity strong enough to overcome the presumption of validity or
regularity, and has established a clear legal right to the remedy sought,[48] which was not shown here.
WHEREFORE, the petltlon is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 21,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138699 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
58. [ G.R. No. 220700, July 10, 2017 ]
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, PETITIONER, VS. EUFROCINA CARLOS DIONISIO AND
WINIFREDO SALCEDO MOLINA, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
(Ombudsman) are the Decision[2] dated April 7, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated September 23, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 135918, which reinstated the Decision[4] dated October 23, 2012 of the Ombudsman in
OMB-L-A-10-0538-H finding respondents Eufrocina Carlos Dionisio (Dionisio) and Winifredo Salcedo Molina (Molina;
collectively, respondents) guilty of Simple Misconduct only and, accordingly, imposed on them the penalty of three (3)
months suspension without pay.
110
The Facts
The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit[5] dated July 30, 2010 filed by spouses Editha and Eduardo Ponce
(complainants) before the Ombudsman against herein respondents and six (6) others for criminal and administrative
violations of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,[6] or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Rule X, Section 1
(f) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 6713,[7] or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, and money laundering.[8]
Complainants averred that they are the owners of Sariling Atin Drug Store, while Dionisio and Molina were the School
Principal of Barasoain Memorial Elementary School (the school) and President of its Teacher's Association, respectively.
In January 2009, upon seeing a drug store near the gate of the school, [9] complainants inquired with Dionisio if they could
lease a portion of the school grounds to open a drug store thereon. Dionisio replied that she would study the matter as it
might take a long and complicated procedure if they follow the rules of the Department of Education (DepEd). Upon
Dionisio's advise, complainants submitted a formal letter[10] offering a monthly rent of P10,000.00, or P120,000.00 per
year. Dionisio purportedly confirmed that she could facilitate the lease agreement, provided that instead of the
P120,000.00 annual rent, only P36,000.00 will be recorded and the same should be in the guise of a donation. Dionisio
allegedly did not want the school's Parents-Teachers' Association (PTA) and the Barangay Council to know the exact
amount involved, but committed that she and the Teachers' Association will handle the excess money. She also told
complainants that she wants an additional P24,000.00 in funds per year without the Teacher's Association, the PTA, or
the Barangay Council knowing about it.[11]
In March 2009, Dionisio allegedly advanced P20,000.00 from the P24,000.00 so that she could go to Manila and confirm
the legality of the lease with DepEd. She also conveyed to complainants that the monthly rent for five (5) years
amounting to P600,000.00 should be paid in advance, and that complainants should donate P700,000.00 to the
Teachers' Association. Thereafter, in May 2009, Dionisio summoned complainants to a meeting where she asked them
to add P200,000.00 more to the donation to the Teachers' Association. However, considering that they could also spend
money for the construction of the drugstore, complainants declined. Complainants also asked for a copy of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) so that they could study it but Dionisio allegedly refused, telling them that it would be
better for them to see the MOA on the date of signing itself.[12]
On May 24, 2009, complainants went to Dionisio's house where they signed the MOA, at which point they brought to her
attention the one-sided nature of the MOA. However, Dionisio assured them that it would not be a problem because she
would still be in active service for the term of the MOA. Dionisio also brought up the additional P200,000.00 donation
which could buy the complainants exclusivity, but complainants emphasized that it would be difficult for them to recoup
their investment if they make such additional donation. Dionisio assured them that even without the P200,000.00,
complainants will still get exclusivity in the sense that they will be the only drug store in that part of the school grounds for
the next two (2) to three (3) years to allow them to recover their investment.[13]
Thus, on May 28, 2009, complainants met with Dionisio at Security Bank, Malolos Branch where complainants withdrew
P1,000,000.00 from their bank account and gave it to Dionisio, together with the P280,000.00 which they already had
with them. Dionisio then gave them a notarized copy of the MOA[14] bearing the signature of Molina as President of the
Teachers' Association.[15]
In June 2009, complainants began the construction of their drug store but barely a month later, Dionisio informed them
that the area beside their drug store will be leased to another drug store. Upon complainants' verification, Molina denied
receiving the money on the Teachers' Association's behalf. Thus, on August 4, 2009, complainants' counsel sent a
letter[16] to Dionisio demanding that she acknowledge receipt of the P680,000.00 in donation. On August 10, 2009, Molina
made a sudden turn-around and issued a Certification[17] confirming receipt of the P680,000.00. This prompted
complainants to write a letter[18] to Dr. Rolando Magno (Dr. Magno), the School Superintendent of Malolos City, seeking
confirmation of the legality of the lease and the propriety of the donation. Meanwhile, complainants requested from
Molina a copy of the Secretary's Certificate of the Teachers' Association authorizing him to sign the MOA. [19] However,
what Molina provided was a document[20] ratifying or confirming his acts, signed by six (6) other members of the
Teachers' Association, namely, Joelito D. Teodoro, Corazon V. De Leon, Ferdinand C. Tenorio, Romeo DelaCruz, Nenita
Manalo, and Jasmin F. Libiran (co-teachers). Thereafter, Complainant's counsel sent a final letter of demand [21] dated
August 14, 2009 to Molina.[22]
On August 27, 2009, complainants met with the DepEd officials in Bulacan where they were informed that the MOA was
illegal as it did not have the proper DepEd approval, and that the school could not enter into any commercial pursuits
because it is not a registered cooperative. Complainants also later learned that the Teachers' Association is not a legal
entity and, hence, could not enter into the MOA.[23] In a Memorandum[24] dated September 1, 2009 (September 1, 2009
Memorandum), Dr. Magno ordered Dionisio to defer the construction of the new drug store beside complainants' and to
hold in abeyance the operation of complainants' drug store. Thus, complainants filed a complaint [25] before the
Ombudsman accusing respondents and their six (6) co-teachers of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 for causing undue
injury to them (complainants) in the discharge of their public duties through manifest bad faith. Complainants also
charged respondents of violating Section 12 of RA 6713 and its IRR by soliciting money from complainants, and of
money laundering for making it appear that the Teachers' Association received complainants' money when no such legal
entity exists.[26]
Pending submission of respondents' counter-affidavit, the Ombudsman issued an Order[27] dated November 19, 2010
directing their preventive suspension. Respondents moved for reconsideration[28] but the same was denied by the
Ombudsman in its Order[29] dated August 3, 2011, prompting respondents to file a Verified Petition with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction[30] with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, which was, however, denied in
an Order[31] dated October 7, 2011 for lack of jurisdiction.[32]
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit[33] dated March 21, 2012, respondents and their co-teachers denied any criminal and
administrative liability and maintained that they did not solicit money from the complainants who offered the donation at
their own instance. They averred that the donation was made to the school, and that the Teachers' Association merely
ratified it, as was customary and regular. Explaining that the school is a public school with a limited budget barely enough
to pay for the teachers' salaries, respondents and their co-teachers claimed that they acted in good faith and without any
unlawful intent in executing the MOA which, in any case, redounded to the benefit of the school's students. Besides, the
acts complained of were not done in their official capacities as teachers but as members of the Teachers' Association
which was a non-government organization.[34] In any case, there was no damage to the complainants since respondents
and their co-teachers are willing to return complainants' money, albeit in an amortized scheme, and the money had
already been used to purchase additional educational materials such as the Audio Visual Device, Digital Light Projectors,
computers, televisions, and DVD Players.[35] Respondents and their co-teachers further added that they are mere laymen
unfamiliar with the law and whose primary concern was the welfare of their students. As such, the legal maxim that
ignorance of the law excuses no one should not apply to them.[36]
The Ombudsman's Ruling
In a Decision[37] dated October 23, 2012, the Ombudsman, inter alia, found herein respondents guilty of Simple
Misconduct and, accordingly, ordered them suspended from government service without pay for a period of three (3)
months.[38]
It found that respondents transgressed an established and definite rule of action when: (a) Dionisio opted not to seek
authority from the DepEd or from the Provincial Government of Bulacan before allowing the lease; and (b) authorized
Molina to enter into the MOA on behalf of the Teachers' Association despite the latter's lack of authority and legal
personality to do so. In this regard, the Ombudsman pointed out that Dionisio not only allowed the Teachers' Association,
particularly Molina, to control and disburse the money received from complainants without any sense of accountability - in
violation of the rule that all moneys and property officially received by a public officer in any capacity or upon any
occasion must be accounted for as government fund - he also extended to Molina the authority to procure services for
the construction of the canteen and acquisition of school equipment which did not go through the procurement process
required by law.[39]
111
With respect to Molina, the Ombudsman observed that he shared a unity of design, intent, and purpose with Dionisio
considering that he actively participated in the consultations conducted and agreed to sign the MOA even if he knew that
the Teachers' Association had no legal personality or authority to do so. While Molina claimed that the money was spent
honestly, he did not present a single official document which would establish where the money was spent, contrary to the
provisions of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. The Ombudsman also noted that it was not clear why
Molina took charge of procuring the services for the construction of the school canteen, as well as the procurement of the
school equipment, when he was not part of the Bids and Awards Committee.[40] Accordingly, Molina was found equally
liable with Dionisio. With respect to respondents' co-teachers, however, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against
them after observing that they merely signed the Ratification and Confirmation and there was no proof of their actual
participation in the questioned transactions.[41]
Upon motion for reconsideration[42] by complainants, the Ombudsman issued an Order[43] dated August 2, 2013 (August 2,
2013 Order) upgrading respondents' liability to Grave Misconduct and, accordingly, meted the penalty of dismissal from
the government service, together with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service.[44] The Ombudsman ruled that
after a careful re-evaluation of the records at hand, there was sufficient evidence to establish corruption and respondents'
flagrant disregard of established rules.[45] In this regard, the Ombudsman noted that respondents failed to explain how the
P600,000.00 in advanced rent and P680,000.00 in donation were disbursed for public purposes; thus, creating the
presumption that they used the money for personal gain. Moreover, the Ombudsman pointed out that respondents
flagrantly disregarded the provisions of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual of the Philippines and the
Government Procurement Act of the Philippines when they failed to issue official receipts acknowledging receipt of the
money from complainants, and caused the construction of the canteen and procurement of school equipment without
public bidding, respectively.[46] Finally, the Ombudsman opined that their acts of taking undue advantage of their official
position and using government property in the commission of the offense aggravated their administrative liability, thus,
further justifying the imposition of the penalty of dismissal on them.[47]
Aggrieved, respondents moved for reconsideration,[48] which was, however, denied in an Order[49] dated April 4, 2014.
Undaunted, respondents elevated the case to the CA.[50]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[51] dated April 7, 2015, the CA granted respondents' appeal and, accordingly, reinstated the Ombudsman's
initial ruling finding respondents guilty of simple misconduct only.[52] It held that the element of corruption, which is
essential to the offense of grave misconduct, was not established in this case considering that respondents acted in good
faith with no material interest, as in fact, they utilized the funds for the construction of the canteen and the purchase of
educational materials.[53] According to the CA, there is no evidence that respondents unlawfully used their positions to
advance their own interest or procure benefits for themselves. [54] Moreover, respondents never concealed the donation;
they even consulted the barangay captain and the president of the PTA about the lease. Further, the construction of the
school canteen and the purchase of computers and educational equipment were also visible to the public. Finally, the CA
stressed that that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan ratified the MOA pursuant to Resolution No. 298-S'13 dated
December 17,2013, thus, clothing respondents with the authority to lease an undivided portion of a vacant lot within the
school premises.[55]
Dissatisfied, the Ombudsman moved for reconsideration,[56] but the same was denied in a Resolution[57] dated September
23, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly held respondents administratively liable only
for Simple Misconduct.
 The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is settled that "findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence"[58] - or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act
or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming."[59] On this note, it is well to emphasize that
the Ombudsman's factual findings are generally accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason
of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. [60]
Guided by the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the CA erred in downgrading respondents' liability from Grave
Misconduct to Simple Misconduct, as will be explained hereunder.
"Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former."[61]
In the instant case, a judicious perusal of the records would readily reveal that the acts of respondents fall under the
jurisprudential definition of Grave Misconduct, and not just Simple Misconduct.
First, the Ombudsman correctly observed that respondents had no authority to lease out a portion of the school
premises, it being owned by the Provincial Government of Bulacan. Under Section 18[62] of RA 7160, otherwise known as
the "Local Government Code of 1991," it is the local government unit which has the authority to lease, encumber,
alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by it in its proprietary capacity. Clearly, respondents
violated this provision when they leased the aforesaid area to complainants.
In this relation, while the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Bulacan passed Resolution No. 298-S'13 ratifying the MOA
between the complainants and the Teachers' Association, it must nevertheless be pointed out that the same was issued
only on December 17, 2013 - more than four (4) years since the MOA was executed and after the Ombudsman already
promulgated its August 2, 2013 Order finding respondents guilty of Grave Misconduct. In this light, the Court cannot help
but conclude that such ratification was sought as a mere afterthought and was issued after perhaps much lobbying from
the respondents. In any case, the issuance of the said resolution does not change the fact that respondents had no
authority to enter into the MOA when the same was executed in May 2009.
In fact, even the DepEd officials themselves found the transaction irregular and beyond the scope of respondents'
authority. In the September 1, 2009 Memorandum, Dr. Magno, the Schools Division Superintendent, told Dionisio that
she had no legal authority to allow the construction of complainants' drugstore within the school premises and, thus,
ordered her to hold in abeyance the operation of complainants' drug store and to stop spending their donation and the
advanced rent paid until the proper authorities have given her permission to do so.
Second, respondents failed to abide by the Constitutionally-prescribed principle of accountability of public officers. [63] As
correctly observed by the Ombudsman, while respondents claim that the money received from the complainants in
connection with the lease were spent for public purposes, they failed to submit official receipts and other documents that
would support their claim. In Pat-og, Sr. v. Civil Service Commission,[64] the Court emphasized that public school teachers
are first and foremost civil servants accountable to the people.[65]
Third, even assuming arguendo that the money received by respondents was used for the construction of the school
112
canteen and the procurement of educational equipment, they nonetheless failed to comply with the requirements of RA
9184,[66] otherwise known as the "Government Procurement Reform Act." One of the most distinguishing features of RA
9184 is the mandate that all government procurement must be done through competitive bidding.[67]While the law allows
for alternative methods of procurement,[68] it has not been shown that respondents were able to justify the resort thereto
in the construction of the school canteen and in the purchase of the educational equipment.
To be sure, respondents cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance or lack of familiarity with the foregoing laws and
policies. It is a basic legal tenet that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. [69] Besides, Dionisio
did not deny that when complainants inquired with her about leasing a portion of the school grounds, she responded that
she will study the matter as it might take a long and complicated procedure if they follow the DepEd rules. Also,
respondents tried to justify their disregard of the relevant rules by arguing that their actions inured to the benefit of the
school and its students. Verily, the foregoing circumstances indicate that respondents knew of existing laws, rules, and
regulations pertaining to the lease of public properties, use of public funds, and procurement of government projects,
among others; and despite these, they still went ahead with their transactions. By and large, these exhibit respondents'
clear intent to violate the law and/or flagrant disregard of established rules, thus, justifying the finding that they are indeed
liable for Grave Misconduct.
As to the proper penalty to be imposed on respondents, it is well to note that Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) [70] classifies Grave Misconduct as a grave offense punishable with
the supreme penalty of Dismissal from the service even for the first offense. In relation thereto, Section 58 (a) of the
URACCS provides that "[t]he penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service x x x." It is well to
clarify, however, that their accrued leave credits, if any, shall not be forfeited, as it is a standing rule that "despite their
dismissal from the service, government employees are entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the
period of their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they
have earned prior to their dismissal."[71]
As a final note, the Court is cognizant of the plight of public schools which almost always suffer from shortage of funds.
However, while respondents' intentions may be noble and may have indeed benefited the school, the Court cannot turn a
blind eye on respondents' blatant disregard of existing rules and regulations lest the Court sets a dangerous precedent.
After all, laws and regulations are in place to regulate society and to protect the people. As such, they must be followed
and complied with. In this case, compliance with the applicable rules and regulations gains even more importance
considering that what is involved is the accountability of public officers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 7, 2015 and the Resolution dated September 23,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135918 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents
Eufrocina Carlos Dionisio and Winifredo Salcedo Molina are found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, and
are DISMISSED from government service. Accordingly, their civil service eligibility is CANCELLED, and their retirement
and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED. Further, they are PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in the government service.
SO ORDERED.
59. G.R. No. 224395, July 03, 2017
DISCIPLINARY BOARD, LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE; ATTY. TEOFILO E. GUADIZ, CHAIRMAN; ATTY.
NOREEN BERNADETTE SAN LUIS-LUTEY; AND PUTIWAS MALAMBUT, MEMBERS; ATTY. MERCY JANE B.
PARAS-LEYNES, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR; AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. CABRERA III, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, PETITIONERS, VS. MERCEDITA E. GUTIERREZ, RESPONDENT.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated January 7, 2016 and the Resolution[3]dated April
26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139436, which set aside the Decision dated November 11,
2014 and the Resolution dated January 29, 2015[4] of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in NDC-2014-09053 and,
accordingly, remanded the case to petitioner Land Transportation Office (LTO) for its Disciplinary Board to conduct a
preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of respondent Mercedita E. Gutierrez (Gutierrez).
The Facts
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. AVT-2014-023[5] implementing the "Do-It-Yourself" Program in the LTO, Gutierrez,
Chief of the LTO Registration Section, received a Memorandum[6] dated February 11, 2014, instructing her to temporarily
relocate her Section's equipment to the Bulwagang R.F. Edu in order to accommodate the renovation of the work stations
in the said program. On even date, Gutierrez sent a reply-Memorandum[7] which, inter alia, raised concerns about the
safety and integrity of the records kept at her office during the transfer; and at the same time, asked the role of the
Registration Section once the aforesaid program kicks off. This prompted the LTO to issue a Memorandum [8] dated
February 20, 2014 directing Gutierrez to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for non-
compliance with the relocation directive (Show Cause Memorandum). In response, Gutierrez sent a letter-reply[9] dated
February 25 2014, maintaining that the Registration Section is ready and willing to comply with the relocation directive
and that their equipment is ready for pick-up whenever the LTO may see fit. Further, Gutierrez reiterated the various
concerns she raised m her earlier reply-Memorandum.[10]
Finding that there is a prima facie case against Gutierrez, the LTO issued a Formal Charge[11] dated June 2, 2014
charging her of Gross Insubordination, Refusal to Perform Official Duties, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, giving her five (5) days from receipt thereof to file her Answer and supporting affidavits, and preventively
suspending her for a period of ninety (90) days.[12] On even date, the LTO issued Office Order No. AVT-2014-
89[13] constituting a Disciplinary Board composed of Atty. Teofilo E. Guadiz, Atty. Noreen Bernadette S. San Luis Lutey,
and Mr. Putiwas M. Malambut, and directing them to conduct a formal investigation in connection with the aforesaid
Formal Charge.[14]
Consequently, Gutierrez filed her Answer[15] dated June 5, 2014 and a Manifestation[16] dated August 20, 2014,
which, inter alia, contested the validity of the Formal Charge against her on the ground of lack of due process. According
to Gutierrez, she was deprived of procedural due process as the LTO issued the Formal Charge against her without the
requisite preliminary investigation.[17]
The LTO and CSC Rulings
In two (2) separate Orders[18] both dated August 22, 2014, the LTO found Gutierrez's claim untenable and, accordingly,
directed the parties to prepare for the pre-hearing conference.[19] It found that the Show Cause Memorandum already
takes the place of a preliminary investigation and, thus, she was not deprived of procedural due process.[20] The foregoing
was reiterated in the LTO's Order[21] dated September 4, 2014 where it was held that the Formal Charge against
Gutierrez was issued following the issuance of the Show Cause Memorandum, as well as the conduct of a preliminary or
fact-finding investigation. On appeal to the CSC, the foregoing LTO Orders were affirmed by the CSC's Decision dated
November 11, 2014 and Resolution dated January 29, 2015.[22]
Aggrieved, Gutierrez filed a petition for review[23] before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[24] dated January 7, 2016, the CA set aside the rulings of the LTO and the CSC and, accordingly, directed
113
the LTO to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses committed by Gutierrez.[25] It held that according to
the Formal Charge, the administrative case was instituted against Gutierrez because of her: (a) defiance of a
Memorandum[26] dated January 28, 2014 regarding the order of construction; (b) noncompliance with the Memorandum
dated February 11, 2014 directing the transfer of equipment; and (c) refusal to and preventing the transfer of computers
at the Registration Section to the Bulwagang R.F. Edu as per the Report dated February 17, 2014. However, the Show
Cause Memorandum only covered Gutierrez's alleged non-compliance with the Memorandum dated February 11,2014.
Thus, the CA opined that Gutierrez was not able to explain her side with respect to the two (2) other acts she was
accused of committing, thereby constituting a violation of her right to procedural due process. [27]
Undaunted, the LTO moved for reconsideration,[28] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[29] dated April 26, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Gutierrez was deprived of her right to
procedural due process in connection with the Formal Charge issued against her.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
"The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be
heard. In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to
explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 'To be heard' does
not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process."[30] This was extensively
discussed in Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation[31] as follows:
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The
essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal
or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court
of Appeals [(565 Phil. 731, 740 [2007])] elaborates on the wel1-established meaning of due process in administrative
proceedings in this wise:
x x x Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged
to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process
is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[32] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, records show that the Formal Charge against Gutierrez was issued following the LTO's issuance of a Show
Cause Memorandum. Under Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), a
Show Cause Memorandum emanating from the disciplining authority or its authorized representative is sufficient to
institute preliminary investigation proceedings, to wit:
Section 16. How conducted. - Within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint sufficient in form and substance, the
person/s complained of shall be required to submit his/her/their counter-affidavit/comment. Where the complaint is
initiated by the disciplining authority, the disciplining authority or his authorized representative shall issue a show-cause
memorandum directing the person/s complained of to explain why no administrative case should be filed against
him/her/them. The latter's failure to submit the comment/counter affidavit/explanation shall be considered a waiver
thereof and the preliminary investigation may be completed even without his/her counter affidavit/comment.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of the Show Cause Memorandum issued by the LTO shows that Gutierrez was directed to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her. The latter then duly complied therewith by submitting her letter-reply
pursuant thereto. Evidently, Gutierrez was accorded her right to procedural due process when she was given an
opportunity to be heard before the LTO found a prima facie case against her, which thus, necessitated the issuance of
the Formal Charge. In fact, even after the issuance of a Formal Charge, the LTO continued to respect Gutierrez's right to
procedural due process as it allowed her to file an Answer to refute the charges of Gross Insubordination, Refusal to
Perform Official Duties, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against her.
In light of the foregoing, the CA erred in finding that Gutierrez's right to procedural due process was violated. To
recapitulate, the CA anchored such finding on the fact that the administrative case was instituted against Gutierrez
because of her defiance of the Memoranda dated January 28, 2014 and February 11, 2014, and her refusal to transfer
the computers of the Registration Section as per the Report dated February 17, 2014; whereas the Show Cause
Memorandum only referenced one of the aforesaid Memoranda. However, a closer scrutiny of the Show Cause
Memorandum and the Formal Charge reveals that their main subject is Gutierrez's continuous failure and/or refusal to
temporarily relocate the equipment of the Registration Section to the Bulwagang R.F. Edu pursuant to Administrative
Order No. AVT-2014-023 implementing the LTO's "Do-Ityourself" Program, with the mention of the aforesaid Memoranda
- whether in the Show Cause Memorandum or the Formal Charge- merely exhibiting such defiance.
Irrefragably, Gutierrez was amply accorded her rights to procedural due process and, thus, there is no more need to
conduct another preliminary investigation on her administrative case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 7, 2016 and the Resolution dated April 26, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 139436 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Land
Transportation Office is DIRECTED to resolve the administrative case against respondent Mercedita E. Gutierrez on the
merits with reasonable dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
60. [ G.R. No. 218384, July 03, 2017 ]
JOHN L. BORJA AND AUBREY L. BORJA/DONG JUAN, PETITIONERS, VS. RANDY B. MIÑOZA AND ALAINE S.
BANDALAN, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated August 29, 2014 and the Resolution[3]dated May
13, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 07103, which set aside the Decision [4] dated March
30, 2012 and the Resolution[5] dated June 29, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case
No. VAC-12-000893-2011 (RAB Case No. VII-05-0827-2011) and, thereby, reinstated the Decision[6] dated September 7,
2011 of the Labor Arbiter, finding respondents Randy B. Miñoza (Miñoza) and Alaine S. Bandalan (Bandalan;
collectively, respondents) to have been constructively dismissed and entitled to backwages, separation pay, 13th month
pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
The Facts
114
Respondents were employed as cooks of Dong Juan, a restaurant owned and operated by petitioners John L. Borja
(John) and Aubrey L. Borja (Aubrey; collectively, petitioners) located in Cebu City. Miñoza and Bandalan were
respectively hired on September 23, 2009 and September 14, 2010.[7]
Respondents alleged that on April 1, 2011, a Friday, Miñoza was absent from work. Because the company implements a
"double-absent" policy, which considers an employee absent for two (2) days without pay if he/she incurs an absence on
a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday, the busiest days for the restaurant, he chose not to report for work the next day, or on
April 2, 2011.[8]
On the other hand, Bandalan reported for work on April 2, 2011, a Saturday, but was later advised by John to go home
and take a rest, with which he complied. Bandalan discovered thereafter that John was angry at him for having drinking
sessions after work on April 1, 2011. Because of the "double-absent" policy, Bandalan purposely absented himself from
work on April 3, 2011.[9]
On April 3, 2011, at around ten o'clock in the morning, the company called a meeting of its employees, including
respondents. When asked about his absence on April 1, 2011, Miñoza explained that he had an argument with his wife,
who had been demanding for his payslips. As for Bandalan, who managed to be present at the meeting despite his
intention to be absent from work, he answered that it would be pointless to report for work that day, as he would not be
paid anyway, considering that he was not allowed to work the day before.[10]
The following day, or on April 4, 2011, petitioners summoned respondents once again. Angrily, John accused
respondents of planning to extort money from the company and told them that if they no longer wish to work, they should
resign. He then gave them blank sheets of paper and pens and ordered them to write their own resignation letters.
Respondents replied that they will decide the next day.[11]
On April 5, 2011, the day after, respondents alleged that they reported for work but were barred from entering the
restaurant. Instead, petitioners brought them to another restaurant where they were forced to receive separate
memoranda asking them to justify their unexplained absences. Thereat, a certain "Mark" was present, who appeared to
respondents as an intimidating and ominous person.[12]
When respondents reported for work on April 6, 2011, they were purportedly refused entry once more. At closing time
that day, respondents were invited to go inside the restaurant and were subjected to an on-the-spot drug test, the results
of which yielded negative. To his humiliation, Bandalan had to undergo a second test, which also came out negative.[13]
Thereafter, when Bandalan went outside to buy food, he saw "Mark" and a group of unfamiliar people standing in a dark
area near the restaurant. Later, when he and Miñoza were on their way home, they heard some people, presumably
"Mark" and his hired goons, shouting at them, "[y]ou fools, do not come back here as something bad will happen to
you."[14]
Out of fear, respondents no longer reported for work the following day, April 7, 2011, and instead, filed a complaint [15]for
illegal dismissal, with claim for monetary benefits, against petitioners, docketed as RAB-VII-05-0827-2011. [16]
In defense, petitioners explained that the "double-absent" policy was actually proposed by respondents themselves, in
reaction to the absences incurred by one of their co-employees, Josephus Sablada (Sablada), who failed to report for
work on two (2) busy weekends. On March 14, 2011, after explaining the "double-absent" policy to the restaurant
employees, who were all amenable thereto, petitioners enforced the said policy.[17]
Petitioners likewise claimed that from April 1 to 3, 2011, Miñoza failed to report for work. Thus, in a memorandum [18]dated
April 4, 2011, Aubrey sought an explanation for his absences. Miñoza justified his absence on April 1 by explaining that
he had a quarrel with his wife. The following day, he opted not to report for work anymore on account of the "double--
absent" policy. On April 3, he claimed that he was allowed to skip work.[19]

As for Bandalan, petitioners averred that he was absent on April 3, 2011, a Sunday, and when required[20] to explain, he
clarified that he opted not to report for work anymore because he will no longer receive any salary for that day on account
of the "double-absent" policy, having been absent on March 25, 2011 and asked to go home on April 2, 2011.[21]
On April 4, 2011, when respondents were summoned for a meeting, they expressed their intention to resign. However,
the following day, they arrived at the restaurant and insisted that they wanted to work. To maintain order in the restaurant
and to keep the other employees from being harassed, petitioners called on a certain Mark Opura (Opura) to stay in the
restaurant and keep watch.[22]
Petitioners further claimed that respondents worked undertime on April 5, 2011. Then, Miñoza stopped reporting for work
on April 7, 2011, while Bandalan ceased working on April 8, 2011.[23] Thus, Aubrey sent separate memoranda[24] to
respondents on April 18, 2011 requiring them to explain their absence without official leave (AWOL), which they both
failed to do. Subsequently, they were dismissed from employment. [25]
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated September 7, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found respondents to have been illegally and
constructively dismissed and ordered petitioners to pay them the total amount of P169,077.20,[27] inclusive of backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.[28]
Giving more credence to respondents' version of the facts, the LA found that Miñoza and Bandalan were placed in a
difficult situation and left with no choice but to leave their employment on April 7 and 8, 2011, respectively.
[29]
Respondents were brought to another restaurant on April 5, 2011 merely for the purpose of handing to them the
memoranda despite evidence showing that they reported for work at the restaurant on said day. Thereat, they first
encountered Opura, who they claimed was a dubious and intimidating person. Likewise, respondents were singled out to
undergo an on-the-spot drug test, which yielded negative results. Respondents also decided to forego their employment
when they were threatened by Opura's group.[30] As such, the LA found that respondents were able to establish the
existence of threats to their security and safety, which were the bases for the finding of constructive dismissal. [31]
Furthermore, the LA rejected the assertion that respondents went on AWOL beginning April 7, 2011 for Miñoza and April
8, 2011 for Bandalan, considering that they already filed the instant complaint on April 7, 2011. As such, the memoranda
dated April 18, 2011, which required them to justifY their unexplained absences was a mere afterthought.[32]
Having been constructively dismissed, respondents are entitled to reinstatement to their former positions with backwages
from April 7, 2011. However, as reinstatement is no longer feasible, the LA instead awarded separation pay equivalent to
one month pay for every year of service with a fraction of at least six (6) months service to be credited as a full year
service.[33]
Likewise, the LA awarded 13  month pay and service incentive leave pay to which respondents were entitled but were
th
not paid. It also awarded moral and exemplary damages on the ground that petitioners created a hostile work
environment that was detrimental to respondents' security of tenure, as well as attorney's fees, since respondents were
compelled to engage the services of counsel to protect their rights.[34] As to the other monetary claims sought by
respondents, the same were dismissed for lack of basis.[35]
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed[36] to the NLRC, docketed as NLRC Case No. VAC-12-000893-2011.
The NLRC's Ruling
In a Decision[37] dated March 30, 2012, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's Decision and entered a new one
finding neither constructive dismissal nor abandonment in this case.[38] Accordingly, it directed petitioners to pay: (a)
115
Miñoza the amounts of P14,820.00 as separation pay, P10,983.05 as 13th month pay, and P2,194.50 as service incentive
leave pay; and (b) Bandalan the amounts of P7,410.00 as separation pay, and P4,199.00 as 13th month pay.[39]
The NLRC found that respondents were not constructively dismissed on the basis of the following circumstances: first,
there was nothing wrong or irregular for an employer to hold meetings with its employees if only to monitor their
performance or allow them an avenue to air their grievances; second, there was likewise nothing wrong if an employer
issues memoranda to its employees, as a means of exercising control over them; and third, similarly, the conduct of a
drug test is within the prerogative of the employer in order to ensure that its employees are fit to remain in its employ.
The NLRC stressed that petitioners also have a business interest to protect and recognized that employers have free rein
to regulate all aspects of employment including the prerogative to instill discipline and to impose penalties on errant
employees.[40]
As regards respondents' allegations that they were threatened, intimidated, and barred entry into the restaurant, the
NLRC rejected them for lack of substantiation.[41] The presence of Opura was a preventive measure that the NLRC found
justified to avert possible harassment in the work premises which cannot be construed as a means to specifically
threaten or intimidate respondents. The NLRC noted the evidence[42] presented by petitioners that Bandalan had
previously burned and threatened a co employee; hence, petitioners cannot be blamed for wanting to ensure a safe and
orderly work place. Thus, the NLRC concluded that Opura's presence did not create a hostile work environment for
respondents; neither was it proven that they hurled threats against respondents, having been rebutted by evidence
presented by petitioners.[43] Perforce, no constructive dismissal transpired in this case.
However, the NLRC held that respondents did not go on AWOL beginning April 7, 2011. Citing jurisprudence, the NLRC
ruled that a charge of abandonment is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for constructive dismissal. Moreover,
respondents' prayer for reinstatement belies petitioners' claim of abandonment.[44]
Considering that neither constructive dismissal nor abandonment existed in this case, the NLRC held that reinstatement
is in order. However, under the doctrine of strained relations, separation pay may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement, as
in this case.[45]
Finally, finding the absence of constructive dismissal, the NLRC deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees. However, it affirmed the awards for 13th month pay for both respondents and service incentive leave pay
for Miñoza alone.[46]
Respondents moved for reconsideration,[47] which the NLRC denied in a Resolution[48] dated June 29, 2012; hence, the
recourse to the CA via petition for certiorari,[49] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07103.
The CA's Ruling
In a Decision[50] dated August 29, 2014, the CA set aside the NLRC issuances and reinstated the LA's Decision, finding
respondents to have been constructively dismissed, with the modification imposing interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum on the monetary awards granted in respondents' favor, computed from the finality of the CA Decision until full
payment.[51]
Contrary to the NLRC's findings, the CA held that petitioners made employment unbearable for respondents on account
of the following circumstances: first, petitioners formulated and implemented a "double-absent" policy, which is offensive
to sound labor-related management prerogative and actually deters employees from reporting to work;[52] second,
respondents did not resign or go on AWOL - instead, they reported for work, showing their intention to keep their
employment;[53] and finally, the hiring of Opura caused a hostile and antagonistic environment for respondents.[54]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[55] was denied in a Resolution[56] dated May 13, 2015; hence, this petition.
 The Issue Before the Court
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the NLRC's issuances and
reinstating the LA's Decision, which found respondents to have been constructively dismissed.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the appellate
court.[57]The Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court.
[58]
 The rule, however, is not without exception. In New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC,[59] the Court recognized the following
exceptions to the general rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[60]
The exception, rather than the general rule, applies in the present case. When the findings of fact of the CA are contrary
to those of the NLRC, which findings also differ from those of the LA, the Court retains its authority to pass upon the
evidence and, perforce, make its own factual findings based thereon.[61]
In this case, the CA, concurring with the LA, found that respondents were constructively dismissed. The Court is not
convinced.
Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain on the part of the employer has
become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment,[62] or when there is
cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, as an offer involving
a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.[63] The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the
employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his job under the circumstances.[64]
After a punctilious examination of this case, the Court finds that respondents - as correctly concluded by the NLRC were
not constructively dismissed, in view of the glaring dearth of evidence to corroborate the same. Despite their allegations,
respondents failed to prove through substantial evidence that they were discriminated against, or that working at the
restaurant had become so unbearable that they were left without any choice but to relinquish their employment. Neither
were they able to prove that there was a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay such that they were forced to give up
their work.
In its reversed decision, the NLRC pointed out that respondents claimed to have been constructively dismissed when
petitioners called several meetings where they inquired about respondents' absences, for which the latter were issued
separate memoranda; they were subjected to an on-the-spot drug test; they were barred entry into the restaurant; and
they were threatened and intimidated by the presence of Opura, a stranger, in the restaurant. The foregoing
circumstances, however, do not constitute grounds amounting to constructive dismissal. As the NLRC correctly opined,
petitioners were validly exercising their management prerogative when they called meetings to investigate respondents'
absences, gave them separate memoranda seeking explanation therefor, and conducted an on-the-spot drug test on its
employees, including respondents. Likewise, respondents failed to substantiate their allegation that they were prohibited
116
from entering the restaurant, or that they were threatened and intimidated by Opura as to keep them away from the
premises. Instead, and as the NLRC aptly observed, respondents failed to prove that Opura's presence created a hostile
work environment, or that the latter threatened and intimidated them so much as to convince them to leave their
employment. As the Court sees it, petitioners found it necessary to enforce the foregoing measures to control and
regulate the conduct and behavior of their employees, to maintain order in the work premises, and ultimately, preserve
their business.
Be that as it may, however, the Court finds that respondents did not go on AWOL, or abandon their employment, as
petitioners claimed. To constitute abandonment, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not
sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume
his employment without any intention of returning.[65] Abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.[66]
In this case, records show that respondents wasted no time in filing a complaint against petitioners to protest their
purported illegal dismissal from employment. As the filing thereof belies petitioners' charge of abandonment, the only
logical conclusion, therefore, is that respondents had no such intention to abandon their work.
Therefore, since respondents were not dismissed and that they were not considered to have abandoned their jobs, it is
only proper for them to report back to work and for petitioners to reinstate them to their former positions or substantially-
equivalent positions. In this regard, jurisprudence provides that in instances where there was neither dismissal by the
employer nor abandonment by the employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate the employee to his former position, but
without the award of backwages.[67] However, since reinstatement was already impossible due to strained relations
between the parties, as found by the NLRC, each of them must bear their own loss, so as to place them on equal footing.
At this point, it is well to emphasize that "in a case where the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his
abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must
bear his own loss."[68]
In sum, the NLRC ruling holding that respondents were not constructively dismissed and that they did not abandon their
jobs must be reinstated, subject to the modification that the award of separation pay in their favor must be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 29, 2014 and Resolution dated May 13,
2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07103 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated June 29, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
Case No. VAC-12-000893-2011 (RAB Case No. VII-05-0827-2011) are REINSTATED, with MODIFICATIONS: (a)
deleting the awards of separation pay in favor of respondents Randy B. Miñoza and Alaine S. Bandalan (respondents) in
the amounts of P14,820.00 and P7,410.00, respectively; and (b) imposing interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum on the remaining monetary awards granted in respondents' favor, computed from the finality of this Decision until
full payment.
SO ORDERED.
61. G.R. No. 224515, July 03, 2017
REMEDIOS V. GEÑORGA, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF JULIAN MELITON, REPRESENTED BY ROBERTO
MELITON AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, IRENE MELITON, HENRY MELITON, ROBERTO MELITON, HAIDE * MELITON,
AND MARIA FE MELITON ESPINOSA, RESPONDENTS.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] on certiorari assailing the Decision[2] dated October 7, 2015 and the
Resolution[3] dated April 12, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103591, which affirmed the
Decision[4] dated July 28, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 24 (court a quo) in Civil Case No.
2013-0036, directing petitioner and/or the Register of Deeds of Naga City (RD-Naga) to deliver or surrender possession
of the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8027 to respondents.
The Facts
Julian Meliton (Julian), Isabel Meliton, and respondents Irene, Henry, Roberto, Haide, all surnamed Meliton, and Ma. Fe
Meliton Espinosa (Ma. Fe; respondents) are the registered owners of a 227,270-square meter parcel of land, identified as
Lot No. 1095-C located in Concepcion Pequeña, Naga City, covered by TCT No. 8027[5] (subject land).[6] Julian owns
8/14 portion of the land, while the rest of the co-owners own 1/14 each.[7] During his lifetime, Julian sold portions of the
subject land to various persons, among others, to petitioner Remedios V. Geñorga's (petitioner) husband,[8] Gaspar
Geñorga, who took possession and introduced improvements on the portions respectively sold to them.[9]
However, Julian failed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 to enable the buyers, including
petitioner's husband, to register their respective deeds of sale, which eventually led to the filing of a Petition [10] for the
surrender of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 and/or annulment thereof, and the issuance of new titles
pursuant to Section 107 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529[11] before Branch 23 of the RTC of Naga City, docketed as
Civil Case No. RTC '96-3526.
In a Decision[12] dated July 17, 1998, the RTC of Naga City decided in favor of the buyers. Accordingly, it ordered the
administratrix of the estate of Julian, Ma. Fe, or any of Julian's heirs or any person holding the owner's duplicate of TCT
No. 8027 (holder) to surrender possession thereof to the RD-Naga; and the RD-Naga to enter on the said title the buyers'
respective deeds of sale, and to issue the corresponding certificates of title after compliance with the requirements of the
law.[13] It further held that should the holder fail or refuse to comply with the court's directive: (a) TCT No. 8027 shall be
declared null and void; and (b) the RD-Naga shall issue a new certificate of title in lieu thereof, enter the deeds of sale,
and issue certificates of title in favor of the buyers.[14]
The said decision became final and executory on September 10, 2006 but remained unexecuted due to the sheriff's
failure to locate and serve the writ of execution on Ma. Fe despite diligent efforts.[15] Thus, in an Order[16] dated October 2,
2008, the RTC declared TCT No. 8027 null and void, resulting in the issuance of a new one, bearing annotations of the
buyers' adverse claims. The new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 8027 (subject owner's duplicate title) was given to
petitioner in 2009.[17]
On April 22, 2013, respondents filed a Complaint[18] against petitioner before the court a quo, seeking the surrender of the
subject owner's duplicate title with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 2013-0036. They claimed that they are entitled
to the possession thereof as registered owners, and suffered damages as a consequence of its unlawful withholding,
compelling them to secure the services of counsel to protect their interests. [19]
In her Answer,[20] petitioner averred that she and the other buyers are in the process of completing all the requirements
for the registration of the sales in their favor, and have paid the estate taxes thereon. They had likewise caused the
survey of the land but the first geodetic engineer they hired to conduct the same failed to deliver his services, prompting
them to file a complaint against him, and to hire another geodetic engineer. Considering that their possession of the
subject owner's duplicate title was by virtue of a court decision, and for the legitimate purpose of registering the sales in
their favor and the issuance of titles in their names, they should be allowed to retain possession until the completion of
the requirements therefor.[21] The said title was eventually submitted to the RD-Naga[22] on September 13, 2013.[23]
117
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[24] dated July 28, 2014, the RTC granted respondents' petition, and ordered petitioner and/or the RD-Naga
to deliver or surrender possession of the subject owner's duplicate title to respondents, considering the long period of
time that had lapsed for the annotation of the buyers' deeds of sale.[25]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[26] which was denied in an Order[27] dated September 11, 2014,
and, thereafter, appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 103591.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[28] dated October 7, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It noted the long length of time that had lapsed
for the annotation of the buyers' deeds of sale and the issuance of the corresponding certificates of title, and found no
valid and plausible reason to further withhold custody and possession of the subject owner's duplicate title from
respondents. Thus, it adjudged respondents to have the preferential right to the possession of the said title, considering
that the bigger portion of the subject property belongs to them.[29]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[30] but the same was denied in a Resolution[31] dated April 12, 2016; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the court a quo's Decision
directing the surrender and delivery of possession of the subject owner's duplicate title to respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject land was an undivided co-owned property when Julian sold different
portions thereof to various persons. However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale[32] reveals that definite
portions of the subject land were eventually sold, and the buyers took possession and introduced improvements thereon,
[33]
 declared the same in their names, and paid the realty taxes thereon,[34] all without any objection from respondents who
never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently, the Court finds that there is, in this case, a partial factual
partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles the buyers to the segregation of their respective portions, and
the issuance of new certificates of title in their names[35] upon compliance with the requirements of law.
Section 58 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," provides the procedure for the
registration of deeds or conveyances, and the issuance of new certificates of titles involving only certain portions of a
registered land, as in this case. Said provision reads:
Section 58. Procedure Where Conveyance Involves Portion of Land. - If a deed or conveyance is for a part only of the
land described in a certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate to the grantee until
a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided and the corresponding technical
descriptions shall have been verified and approved pursuant to Section 50 of this Decree. Meanwhile, such deed may
only be annotated by way of memorandum upon the grantor's certificate of title, original and duplicate, said memorandum
to serve as a notice to third persons of the fact that certain unsegregated portion of the land described therein has been
conveyed, and every certificate with such memorandum shall be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantee's title to
the portion conveyed to him, pending the actual issuance of the corresponding certificate in his name.
Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions, the original of the plan, together with a certified copy of the
technical descriptions shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for annotation in the corresponding certificate of title and
thereupon said officer shall issue a new certificate of title to the grantee for the portion conveyed, and at the same time
cancel the grantor's certificate partially with respect only to said portion conveyed, or, if the grantor so desires, his
certificate may be cancelled totally and a new one issued to him describing therein the remaining portion: Provided,
however, that pending approval of said plan, no further registration or annotation of any subsequent deed or other
voluntary instrument involving the unsegregated portion conveyed shall be effected by the Register of Deeds, except
where such unsegregated portion was purchased from the Government or any of its instrumentalities. If the land has
been subdivided into several lots, designated by numbers or letters, the Register of Deeds may, if desired by the grantor,
instead of cancelling the latter's certificate and issuing a new one to the same for the remaining unconveyed lots, enter
on said certificate and on its owner's duplicate a memorandum of such deed of conveyance and of the issuance of the
transfer certificate to the grantee for the lot or lots thus conveyed, and that the grantor's certificate is canceled as to such
lot or lots. (Emphases supplied)
In this relation, Section 53[36] of PD 1529 requires the presentation of the owner's duplicate title for the annotation of
deeds of sale.
Records show that the subject owner's duplicate title had already been surrendered to the RD-Naga on September 13,
2013, and some of the buyers had secured Certificates Authorizing Registration [37] and paid the corresponding fees[38] for
the registration of the sales in their favor. Nonetheless, while the rights of the buyers over the portions respectively sold
to them had already been recognized by the RTC of Naga City in its July 17, 1998 Decision in Civil Case No. RTC '96-
3526 which had attained finality on September 10, 2006,[39] there is no showing that the other affected buyers have
similarly complied with the necessary registration requirements.
Notably, from the time petitioner received possession of the subject owner's duplicate title in 2009, a considerable
amount of time had passed until she submitted the same to the RD-Naga on September 13, 2013. But even up to the
time she filed the instant petition before the Court on May 6, 2016,[40] she failed to show any sufficient justification for the
continued failure of the concerned buyers to comply with the requirements for the registration of their respective deeds of
sale and the issuance of certificates of title in their names to warrant a preferential right to the possession of the subject
owner's duplicate title as against respondents who undisputedly own the bigger portion of the subject land.
Consequently, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the RTC Decision directing petitioner
or the RD-Naga to deliver or surrender the subject owner's duplicate title to respondents.
Moreover, it bears to stress that the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds is only
ministerial in nature.[41] Thus, the RD-Naga cannot be expected to retain possession of the subject owner's duplicate title
longer than what is reasonable to perform its duty. In the absence of a verified and approved subdivision plan and
technical description duly submitted for registration on TCT No. 8027, it must return the same to the presenter, in this
case, petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to establish a better right to the possession of the said owner's duplicate title as
against respondents.
As a final point, it must, however, be clarified that the above-pronounced delivery or surrender is without prejudice to the
rights of the concerned buyers who would be able to subsequently complete the necessary registration requirements and
thereupon, duly request the surrender of the subject owner's duplicate title anew to the RD-Naga.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 7, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 12, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 103591 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Remedios V. Geñorga or the Register
of Deeds of Naga City is hereby DIRECTED to deliver or surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 8027 to respondents Heirs of Julian Meliton, through their attorney-in-fact, Roberto Meliton, within sixty (60)
days from notice of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of Naga City.
SO ORDERED.
118
62. G.R. No. 223731, August 30, 2017
ROBELITO MALINIS TALAROC, PETITIONER, VS. ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORPORATION, EPIDAURUS S.A.,
AND/OR NATIVIDAD PAPPAS, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated October 9, 2015 and the Resolution[3]dated
March 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138842, which reversed and set aside the
Decision[4] dated September 17, 2014 and the Resolution[5] dated November 28, 2014 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. OFW-M-07-000582-14, and instead, reinstated the Decision [6]dated May 30, 2014
of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC NCR OFW Case (M)-08-12057-13 dismissing the complaint for total and permanent
disability benefits but ordered respondents to solidarity pay petitioner Robelito Malinis Talaroc (petitioner) his unpaid
sickness allowance, with modification deleting the award of attorney's fees.
The Facts
Petitioner was employed by respondent Arpaphil Shipping Corporation (ASC) for its foreign principal Epidaurus S.A. as
Third Officer on board the vessel MV Exelixis under a six (6)-month contract[7] that was signed on February 18, 2013, with
a basic monthly salary of US$1,113.00 exclusive of overtime and other benefits.[8] After undergoing the required pre-
employment medical examination (PEME) where he was declared fit for sea duty[9] by the company designated physician,
petitioner boarded the vessel on March 8, 2013.[10]
On March 16, 2013, the Ship Master informed respondent Epidaurus S.A. that petitioner could not perform his duties due
to fever and back pain.[11] Petitioner claimed that while he was collecting the mooring rope, he felt a sudden click in his
lower back accompanied with pain.[12] He was examined by a port doctor in Algeria and injected with pain reliever for his
back. He was also treated for sore throat that caused his fever and given medication for his hypertension. [13] Thereafter,
petitioner also complained of stomach pain and dizziness, for which the Ship Master recommended that he be confined
in a hospital for further treatment and opined that he was not fit to work.[14] In a Medical Report[15] dated March 24, 2013,
petitioner was found to be suffering from lumbago with stomach pains, in addition to his hypertension, and recommended
that he be repatriated for further medical treatment.
Upon arrival in Manila, or on March 26, 2013, petitioner was referred to the company-designated physician of ASC, Dr.
Esther G. Go (Dr. Go), and was diagnosed to have hypertension, "[t]o [c]onsider Gastrointestinal Bleeding [p]robably
[secondary to Gastric Ulcers," and lumbar muscle strain.[16] After undergoing a series of laboratory tests and
examinations, petitioner was found to be suffering from gastric ulcer, duodenitis, and hypertension. [17] His lumbosacral x-
ray showed an "L3-L4 and L4-L5 Generalized Disc Bulge," while his MRI of the lumbar spine showed an "L5-S1, Left
Paracentral Disc Protrusion."[18] He was advised by Dr. Go to undergo rehabilitation and continue his medications.[19]
On April 29, 2013, petitioner was again admitted to the hospital due to "left facial asymmetry, loss of balance and left leg
weakness" and referred to a neurologist who found him to have "Right Brainstem Infarct."[20] He underwent physical
therapy on an in-patient basis until his discharge on May 2, 2013, after which he was directed to continue his prescribed
medications, as well as rehabilitation as an out-patient.[21]
Thereafter, in a confidential medical report[22] dated May 14, 2013 (May 14, 2013 medical report), the company
designated physician assessed petitioner's condition as follows:
This is with regards to your query regarding the case of 3rd Officer Robelito M. Talaroc who was initially seen here at
Metropolitan Medical Center on March 27, 2013 and was diagnosed to have Gastric Ulcer; Duodenitis; Hypertension; L-3
- L-4 and L4 - L-5 Generalized Disc Bulge; L5 - S1, Left Paracentral Disc Protrusion.
Gastric Ulcer and Duodenitis are part of the spectrum of acid-related diseases listed under Section 32-a Item # 22 of the
amended POEA Contract.

The etiology/cause of Hypertension is not work-related. It is multifactorial in origin which includes genetic predisposition,
poor lifestyle, high salt intake, smoking, Diabetes Mellitus, age and increased sympathetic activity. This is already pre-
existing.
Disc bulge and disc protrusion can be precipitated/aggravated by heavy work or lifting/pushing or pulling heavy objects.
This is degenerative in nature.
Patient also had acute onset of headache and diplopia with left leg weakness on the last week of April 2013.
He was then noted with acute brainstem infarction on CT Scan. This occurred while he is currently undergoing treatment
here in the Philippines for his Gastric Ulcer, Hypertension and back pain.
Risk factors for Lacunar Infarct are age, smoking, alcohol intake, Hypertension and Hypercholesterolemia. All of which
are not work-related. This is not work-related.
The specialists opine that patient's prognosis for returning to sea duties is guarded and fitness to work is unlikely due to
risk of another cerebrovascular event.
His estimated length of further treatment is approximately 3 more months before he reached his maximum medical
improvement.
He will also undergo repeat Gastroscopy once neurologically and cardiac stable for treatment monitoring of his gastric
ulcer.
xxxx
If patient is entitled to a disability, his suggested disability grading is Grade 10 - slight brain functional disturbance that
requires little attendance or aid and which interferes to a slight degree with the working capacity of the patient.
[23]
 (Emphases supplied)
Accordingly, petitioner was directed to appear in a series of follow-up check-ups by Dr. Go on May 16 and 20, 2013,
June 3 and 20, 2013, July 11, 2013, and August 1 and 22, 2013.[24] In all of the follow-up sessions, petitioner persistently
complained of left leg weakness, low back pain and occasional dizziness, to which Dr. Go merely advised him to
continue his medications and rehabilitation program. In a medical report[25] dated August 22, 2013 (August 22, 2013
medical report), petitioner was cleared by the specialist, Dr. Chen Pen Lim, of his gastric ulcer and gastro-intestinal
disorder.
Unconvinced of the true state of his condition, petitioner consulted an independent physician, Dr. Manuel Fidel M.
Magtira (Dr. Magtira), who, in a Medical Report[26] dated September 20, 2013, found him unfit to return to work as a
seafarer after evaluating his previous MRI and upon physical examination, pointing out that in view of his persistent back
pain, he has lost his pre-injury capacity that rendered him permanently disabled.[27]
In the interim, or on August 28, 2013, petitioner filed a complaint [28] for underpayment of sick leave pay, non-payment of
salaries/wages, reimbursement of transportation expenses, payment of sickness allowance, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees against ASC, its Owner/Manager/President Natividad A. Pappas, and Epidaurus S.A.
(respondents), before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case (M)-08-12057-13. The complaint was
subsequently amended[29] on October 2, 2013 to include a claim for total and permanent disability benefits in view of Dr.
Magtira's independent medical report finding petitioner unfit to resume his usual work as a seafarer.[30]
In support of his claim, petitioner averred that from the time he was repatriated for his back injury, he was no longer
capable of resuming work as a seafarer that lasted for more than 240 days despite medical treatment and therapy. By
reason thereof, he had lost his capacity to obtain further sea employment and an opportunity to earn an income, thus
119
entitling him to payment of total disability compensation in the full amount of US$90,000.00 pursuant to the P.N.O "TCC"
Collective Agreement for Crews on Flag of Convenience Ships[31] (CBA) that was enforced during his last employment
contract. Petitioner also sought for the payment of moral and exemplary damages in view of respondents' unjustified
refusal to settle the matter and their evident bad faith in dealing with him, as well as attorney's fees pursuant to Article
2208, paragraphs (2) and (8) of the Civil Code.[32]
For their part,[33] respondents maintained that petitioner was not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits under
the CBA since the latter's illness did not arise from an accident.[34] They contended that petitioner's diagnosed illnesses,
namely, Gastric Ulcer and Duodenitis, were already resolved as shown in the August 22, 2013 medical report, while his
other illnesses, namely, hypertension, generalized disc bulge and left paracentral disc protrusion, and lacunar infarct,
were all declared by Dr. Go to be not work-related, hence, not compensable. [35] Finally, they argued that petitioner's
action was premature as the 240-day extended medical treatment has not yet expired at the time he filed his complaint
and that he failed to comply with the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) in case of conflict in medical findings by the parties' respective doctors. [36] They
further denied petitioner's other monetary claims asserting that his sickness allowance had already been paid, while his
claim for reimbursement of transportation expenses was unsupported by receipts. Petitioner was also not entitled to
moral and exemplary damages having been treated fairly and in good faith, as well as to attorney's fees for lack of basis.
[37]
The LA Ruling
In a Decision[38] dated May 30, 2014, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, holding that the claim for
disability benefits was filed before the lapse of the allowable 240-day extended medical treatment period. The LA pointed
out that Dr. Go's assessment on May 14, 2013 giving petitioner a Grade 10 disability rating was only interim and that the
latter's resort to an independent physician was premature as the former has yet to issue his final assessment within the
agreed extended 240-day extended treatment period.[39] Nevertheless, the LA found merit in petitioner's claim for
sickness allowance, noting that he was paid for a period of 93 days only and not 120 days as provided under the POEA-
SEC.[40] The other claims for unpaid salaries, medical expenses and damages were denied for lack of basis, while an
award of ten (10%) percent attorney's fees was found reasonable under the circumstances as petitioner was compelled
to litigate to protect his interest in accordance with Article 2208 (7) of the Civil Code, as well as Article 111 of the Labor
Code and Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.[41]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal[42] to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision[43] dated September 17, 2014, the NLRC set aside the LA decision,[44] ruling that the 240-day extended
medical treatment was not an automatic application in case of disability claim. It pointed out that there must be a need for
further medical treatment before the 120-day period may be extended which Dr. Go failed to show. It observed that the
May 14, 2013 medical report, which showed that the estimated length of petitioner's treatment was approximately three
(3) months, was self-serving and devoid of any probative value as there was no mention of the particular treatment or
rehabilitation needed. It added that while there was no question as to his medications, there was, however, no proof
showing that petitioner, in fact, underwent rehabilitation, or if there was, that it went beyond the 120-day period. On the
contrary, it held that the company's specialists' opinion that the "prognosis for returning to sea duties is guarded and
fitness to work is unlikely due to risk of another cerebrovascular event" was an indication that there was no need to
extend the 120-day period since the unlikeliness of working was due to the fact that (a) petitioner was permanently
disabled, and (b) that an extended treatment was unnecessary considering that it would no longer restore petitioner to his
pre-injury condition. It ruled that Dr. Go's assessment of a Grade 10 disability was not interim or conditional absent any
similar import suggesting the same, and that there was no need to await a final assessment given that it referred to
petitioner's slight brain functional disturbance, and not his lumbar spondylosis, that incapacitated him to resume work for
more than 120-days.[45]
Further, the NLRC found that petitioner's incapacity is work-related, stating that it is of no moment that his work as a
Third Officer or even his working conditions on board respondents' vessel was not the sole or direct cause of his lumbar
spondylosis, as it suffices that his work, at the very least, aggravated his illness. [46]
Accordingly, the NLRC ordered respondents to jointly and severally pay petitioner total and permanent disability benefits
in the amount of US$60,000.00 pursuant to the provisions of the POEA-SEC and not the CBA, as the disability did not
arise from an accident, as well as ten percent (10%) attorney's fees.[47]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,[48] while petitioner moved to reconsider[49] the amount of his disability
benefits asserting that he was entitled to US$90,000.00 pursuant to the overriding provisions of the existing CBA. [50]
In a Resolution[51] dated November 28, 2014, the NLRC denied both motions prompting respondents to file a petition
for certiorari[52] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138842.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[53] dated October 9, 2015, the CA gave due course to the petition finding the NLRC to have gravely abused
its discretion,[54] and reinstated the LA's Decision dated May 30, 2014 with modification deleting the award of attorney's
fees.[55] It ruled that since petitioner was advised to continue with his rehabilitation program in the medical report [56] dated
August 1, 2013 and to undergo laboratory examinations and gastroscopy on his next check-up scheduled on August 22,
2013, the company-designated physician, Dr. Go, had until November 22, 2013 (240thday) to determine with finality the
former's fitness to work or disability. There being no final assessment yet, the complaint for total and permanent disability
benefits was premature. The CA added that assuming the company designated physician's assessment in the May 14,
2013 medical report was final, petitioner committed a breach of his contractual obligation when he failed to resort to the
opinion of a third doctor as mandated in Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. Consequently, the CA deleted the
award of attorney's fees holding that there was no unlawful withholding of benefits.[57]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[58] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[59] dated March
21, 2016; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled
that petitioner was entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of
which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[60]
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.[61]
120
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting
respondent's certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in awarding petitioner total and
permanent disability benefits.
The Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation (AREC) provide that the seafarer is declared to
be on temporary total disability during the 120-day period within which the seafarer is unable to work.[62]However, a
temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules, is
considered as a total and permanent disability.[63]
The exception referred to above pertains to a situation when the sickness "still requires medical attendance beyond the
120 days but not to exceed 240 days" in which case the temporary total disability period is extended up to a maximum of
240 days.[64] Note, however, that for the company-designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he must
first perform some significant act to justify an extension (e.g., that the illness still requires medical attendance beyond the
initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days); otherwise, the seafarer's disability shall be conclusively presumed to be
permanent and total.[65]
In sum, the following guidelines are observed when a seafarer claims permanent and total disability benefits:
1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a
period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;
2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable
reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient
justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-
designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and
4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the
seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification.[66]
In this case, the Court finds that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that there was no sufficient
justification for the extension of petitioner's treatment from the initial 120-day period to 240 days.
Records disclose that respondents issued a confidential medical report on May 14, 2013, which was within 120 days
from the time petitioner was repatriated on March 26, 2013. In this report, the company-designated physician, Dr. Go,
pointed out that petitioner suffered from numerous illnesses, namely: (a) Gastric Ulcer; (b) Duodenitis; (c) Hypertension;
(d) L3 - L4 and L4 - L5 Generalized Disc Bulge; (e) L5 - S1 Left Paracentral Disc Protrusion; and (f) acute brainstem
infarction, and suggested that "[i]f [petitioner] is entitled to a disability, his suggested disability grading is Grade 10 - slight
brain functional disturbance that requires little attendance or aid and which interferes to a slight degree with the working
capacity of the patient."[67]
While the May 14, 2013 medical report states that "[petitioner's] estimated length of further treatment [for his temporary
total disability] is approximately 3 more months before he reached his maximum medical improvement," [68] the NLRC
correctly pointed out that aside from simply alleging "maximum medical improvement," the same report failed to indicate
what kind of further treatment the seafarer would be subjected to. At most, it mentions that petitioner would be made to
undergo gastroscopy (for his ulcer), which is not only unrelated to his temporary total disability for "slight brain functional
disturbance" but was likewise recommended for monitoring purposes only. Moreover, while petitioner's medical progress
reports mention that he was "advised to continue his rehabilitation and medication," they nonetheless failed to indicate
what kind of rehabilitation he has to undergo. In fact, there is no proof that petitioner actually underwent any rehabilitation
or further treatment.[69] On the contrary, respondents themselves concede that petitioner was not treated as he
unilaterally abandoned his medical treatment.[70] Notably, however, respondents' claim of medical abandonment was not
substantiated by any evidence.
Thus, for all these reasons, the Court agrees with the NLRC that respondents failed to sufficiently show that further
medical treatment would address petitioner's alleged temporary total disability, which therefore, discounts the proffered
justification to extend the 120-day period to 240 days. As such, petitioner had rightfully commenced his complaint for
disability compensation. In C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok,[71] the Court held that "a seafarer may pursue an
action for total and permanent disability benefits if x x x the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration
as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication
that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to
240 days x x x,"[72] as in this case.
Additionally, it deserves mentioning that aside from the lack of substantiation on the further treatment petitioner
supposedly needed, the May 14, 2013 medical report was, in itself, riddled with material inconsistencies. For one, while
the report states that petitioner is suffering from "slight brain functional disturbance that requires little attendance or aid
and which interferes to a slight degree with the working capacity of the patient," the same report contradictorily states that
"[t]he specialists opine that patient's prognosis for returning to sea duties is guarded and fitness to work is [already]
unlikely due to risk of another cerebrovascular event."[73] The specialists' finding insinuates that petitioner's disability was
not only temporary and total, but rather, permanent and total. The Court observes that this latter statement, in fact, finds
more bearing in the records as petitioner's medical reports show that he still complained of lower back pain during
prolonged sitting, residual left leg weakness and instability in balancing, as well as dizziness. [74] On this score, the case
of Fil-Star Maritime Corporation v. Rosete[75] illumines that:
A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is
that the injury must be such that the employee cannot pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. On the other hand, a
total disability is considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. What is crucial is whether the
employee who suffers from disability could still perform his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. [76]
It should also be pointed out that the Grade 10 disability rating was given for petitioner's slight brain functional
disturbance, which risk factors, however, were inconsistently stated to be not work-related. As the NLRC aptly mused,
"[w]hy would the company doctor even base his disability assessment on an incapacity which is not even work-related?
His assessment should have focused on the incapacity brought about by [petitioner's] Lumbar Spondylosis (disc bulge
and disc protrusion) which is the illness which [the latter] averred in his Position Paper and Memorandum of Appeal and
by reason of which he now seeks compensation."[77]
II.
In similar vein, the Court finds that the NLRC correctly ruled that petitioner's illnesses were work-related.
As a rule, a seafarer shall be entitled to compensation if he suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of
his contract. Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, a "work-related illness" is defined as "any sickness as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied ." Corollarily,
Section 20 (A) (4) thereof further provides that "[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably
presumed as work-related."
Records reveal that petitioner's back pain - generalized disc bulge and disc protrusion, non-listed illnesses - occurred
only while he was on board the vessel. While said illness was claimed to be degenerative in nature, the company doctor
herself acknowledged that it may be aggravated or precipitated by heavy work or lifting/pushing or pulling of heavy
objects, a manual task basically demanded from a seafarer. Since there was no proof to show that these activities were
not performed by petitioner while he was on board or were not part of his duties while the ship was at berth as advanced
by respondents,[78] it can be safely concluded that the arduous nature of his job may have caused or at least aggravated
his condition more so since he was declared fit to work prior to his deployment, hence, work-related.[79] Jurisprudence
provides that "[p]robability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. And
probability must be reasonable; hence it should, at least, be anchored on credible information,"[80] as in this case.
121
III.
Finally, respondents contend that petitioner failed to observe the third-doctor-referral provision under the 2010 POEA-
SEC, which thus similarly negates his claim for disability benefits.
Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC reads:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
xxxx
3. x x x. 
xxxx
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
In Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,[81] the Court held that the seafarer's non-compliance with the said
conflict-resolution procedure results in the affirmance of the fit-to-work certification of the company-designated physician.
[82]
However, it should be pointed out that "[a] seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes that the company-
designated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-
day or 240-day periods." In Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar:[83]
In addition, that it was by operation of law that brought forth the conclusive presumption that Munar is totally and
permanently disabled, there is no legal compulsion for him to observe the procedure prescribed under Section 20-B(3) of
the POEA-SEC. A seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes that the company-designated physician
came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day
periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the seafarer has nothing to
contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent. [84] (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, there was no showing that petitioner duly received a conclusive and definitive assessment for his lumbar
spondylosis. The May 14, 2013 medical report was a confidential document, which was not shown to have been received
by him. In fact, respondents did not respond to his initial query regarding the true state of his condition and whether or
not he would be able to return to his pre-injury capacity and resume work despite his back pain.[85]Thus, although
petitioner did consult an independent physician regarding his illness, the lack of a conclusive and definite assessment
from respondents left him nothing to properly contest and perforce, negates the need for him to comply with the third-
doctor referral provision under Section 20 (A) (3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. As case law states, without a valid final and
definite assessment from the company-designated physician, the law already steps in to consider petitioner's disability as
total and permanent.
All told, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in granting respondents' certiorari petition since the NLRC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in awarding total and permanent disability benefits in favor of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 9, 2015 and the Resolution dated March 21, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138842 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 17, 2014 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
LAC No. OFW-M-07-000582-14 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
63. G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES RAMON AND ANNABELLE SABADO, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (petitioner) assailing
the Decision[2] dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated April 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 135922, which reversed and set-aside the Decision[4] dated November 28, 2013 and the Order[5] dated April 28,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 (RTC) in SCA Case No. 13-1290 and ordered that Haus Talk
Project Managers, Inc. (HTPMI) be impleaded as an indispensable party to the unlawful detainer case against
respondents spouses Ramon and Annabelle Sabado (respondents).
The Facts
On May 3, 2007, HTPMI and respondents entered into a Contract to Sell[6] whereby HTPMI agreed to sell a real property
located at Lot 26, Block 1, Eastview Homes, Barangay Balimbing, Antipolo City (subject property) to respondents. In
consideration therefor, respondents paid HTPMI the total amount of P869,400.00, consisting of a P174,400.00
downpayment and the balance of P695,000.00 payable in 120 equal monthly instalments. The parties further agreed that
respondents' failure to pay any amount within the stipulated period of time shall mean the forfeiture of the downpayment
and any other payments made in connection thereto, as well as the cancellation and rescission of the Contract to Sell in
accordance with law.[7] Shortly thereafter, or on August 16, 2007, HTPMI executed a Deed of Assignment [8] in favor of
petitioner assigning, among others, its rights and interests as seller in the aforesaid Contract to Sell with respondents,
including the right to collect payments and execute any act or deed necessary to enforce compliance therewith. [9]
On October 14, 2009, petitioner, through a Notice of Cancellation by Notarial Act,[10] cancelled or rescinded respondents'
Contract to Sell due to the latter's failure to pay their outstanding obligations thereunder. Consequently, petitioner
demanded that respondents vacate the subject property, but to no avail. Thus, petitioner was constrained to file the
Complaint[11] dated August 20, 2010 for ejectment or unlawful detainer against respondents before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Antipolo City, Branch 1 (MTCC), docketed as SCA Case No. 093-10.[12]
In their defense,  respondents argued that petitioner is not the real party in interest to institute such complaint, since
[13]
ownership over the subject property remained with HTPMI. They expounded that under the Deed of Assignment, only the
rights and interests pertaining to the receivables under the Contract to Sell were assigned/transferred to petitioner and
not the ownership or the right to the possession of the subject property.[14]
The MTCC Ruling
In a Decision[15] dated April 3, 2013, the MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and, accordingly, ordered respondents to
vacate the subject property, and pay petitioner the amounts of P661,919.47 as rent arrears from July 31, 2008 up to July
31, 2010, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, including costs of suit.[16]
The MTCC held that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment, petitioner was subrogated to the rights of HTPMI under the
Contract to Sell and, hence, is a real party in interest entitled to institute the instant suit against respondents for the
purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Contract to Sell. Further, the MTCC found petitioner's claim for compensation
in the form of rental just and equitable, pointing out that the same is necessary to prevent respondents from unjustly
enriching themselves at petitioner's expense. Finally, the MTCC awarded petitioner attorney's fees and costs of suit since
it was compelled to litigate the instant complaint.[17]
Aggrieved, respondents appealed[18] to the RTC.
122
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated November 28, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MTCC's ruling in toto.[20] It ruled that by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment executed by HTPMI in petitioner's favor, the latter acquired not only the right to collect the balance
of the purchase price of the subject property, but also all the rights of the assignor, including the right to sue in its own
name as the legal assignee.[21]
Respondents moved for reconsideration,[22] which was, however, denied in an Order[23] dated April 28, 2014. Undaunted,
they elevated the case to the CA.[24]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[25] dated October 29, 2015, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's ruling, and accordingly: ( a) remanded
the case to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded therein; and (b) directed the MTCC to proceed with the trial of the case
with dispatch.[26] Initially, it upheld petitioner's right as real party in interest to file the instant suit as HTPMI's assignee.
However, since legal title to the subject property was retained by HTPMI pursuant to the provisions of the Deed of
Assignment, the latter is not only a real party in interest, but also an indispensible party which should have been
impleaded as a plaintiff thereon and without which no final determination can be had in the present case.[27]
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,[28] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[29] dated April 20, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that HTPMI is an indispensable party to petitioner's
ejectment suit against respondents and, thus, must be impleaded therein.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a suit, viz.:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had
of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
Case law defines an indispensable party as "one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in
the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding
is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which
is effective, complete, or equitable."[30] "Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present."[31] In Regner v. Logarta,[32] the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether or not one is an
indispensable party, viz.:
An indispensable party is a party who has x x x an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not only an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence
there cannot be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the
interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does
complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit
complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the
action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple
litigation.[33] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Guided by the foregoing parameters and as will be explained hereunder, the CA erred in holding that HTPMI is an
indispensable party to the ejectment suit filed by petitioner against respondents.
Under the Deed of Assignment, HTPMI assigned its rights - save for the right of ownership - to petitioner under the
Contract to Sell:
2. RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACTS TO SELL. By this assignment, the ASSIGNEE hereby acquires all rights of the
ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell and under the law, including the right to endorse any and all terms and
conditions of the Contracts to Sell and the right to collect the amounts due thereunder from the purchaser of the Property.
The ASSIGNOR for this purpose hereby names, constitutes and appoints the ASSIGNEE [as its] attorney-in-fact to
execute any act and deed necessary in the exercise of all these rights. Notwithstanding the assignment of the Contracts
to Sell and the Receivables thereunder to the ASSIGNEE, the legal title to the Property and obligations of the
ASSIGNOR under the Contracts to Sell, including the obligation to complete the development of the property and the
warranties of a builder under the law, shall remain the ASSIGNOR'S. x x x.[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Verily, HTPMI's assignment of rights to petitioner must be deemed to include the rights to collect payments from
respondents, and in the event of the latter's default, to cancel or rescind the Contract to Sell, and resultantly, recover
actual possession over the subject property, as follows:
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
b) the [respondents] herein agree to perform and undertake the [HTPMI] Payment Plan with the following terms:
i) Downpayment x x x of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS ONLY
(P174,400.00) to be paid within twelve (12) months after payments [sic] of the reservation. Failure to pay two (2)
consecutive monthly installments will mean cancellation of this contract and forfeiture of all payments.Discount terms
shall be based on [HTPMI] Agreed Payment Plan.
 
xxxx
iii) Failure to pay any amount within the stimulated [sic] period of time shall mean forfeiture of the down payment and any
other payments made and the Contract to Sell shall be cancelled and rescinded in accordance with law. [35] (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the findings of the courts a quo that petitioner had the right to institute the
instant suit against respondents.
However, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's conclusion that since HTPMI retained ownership over the subject
property pursuant to the Deed of Assignment, it is an indispensable party to the case. As adverted to earlier, an
indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy which is inseparable from the
interest of the other parties, and that a final adjudication cannot be made without affecting such interest. Here, the only
issue in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who between the litigating parties has the better right to possess de facto the
subject property.[36] Thus, HTPMI's interest in the subject property, as one holding legal title thereto, is completely
separable from petitioner's rights under the Contract to Sell, which include the cancellation or rescission of such contract
and resultantly, the recovery of actual possession of the subject property by virtue of this case. Hence, the courts can
certainly proceed to determine who between petitioner and respondents have a better right to the possession of the
subject property and complete relief can be had even without HTPMI's participation.
In sum, both the MTCC and the RTC are correct in ruling on the merits of the instant unlawful detainer case even without
the participation of HTPMI.
123
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated April
20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135922 are hereby REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. The Decision
dated November 28, 2013 and the Order dated April 28, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 98 in
SCA Case No. 13-1290, affirming in toto the Decision dated April 3, 2013 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Antipolo
City, Branch 1 in SCA Case No. 093-10, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
64. G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017
JOSELITO PERALTA Y ZARENO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Joselito Peralta y Zareno (Peralta) assailing the
Decision[2] dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated December 8, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 35193, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated July 31, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. 2008-0659-D finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866,[5] as amended by Republic Act No. (RA)8294.[6]
The Facts
The instant case arose from an Information[7] dated November 20, 2008 charging Peralta of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition, defined and penalized under PD 1866, as amended, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 18th day of November, 2008, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JOSELITO PERALTA y Zareno, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, have in his possession, custody, and control one (1) cal. 45 with Serial No. 4517488 with magazine with five
(5) live ammunitions, without authority to possess the same.
Contrary to PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294.[8]
The prosecution alleged that at around 11 o'clock in the evening of November 18, 2008, a team consisting of Police
Officer 3 Christian A. Carvajal (PO3 Carvajal), one Police Officer Lavarias, Police Officer 2 Bernard Arzadon (PO2
Arzadon), and Police Officer 3 Lucas Salonga (PO3 Salonga) responded to a telephone call received by their desk
officer-on-duty that there was a man firing a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in Pantal District, Dagupan City. [9]Upon
arrival thereat, the police officers saw two (2) men walking, later identified as Peralta and his companion, Larry Calimlim
(Calimlim), holding a gun and a knife respectively.[10] Upon seeing the police officers, the men became uneasy, which
prompted the police officers to swoop in. Upon apprehension, they recovered a caliber .45 pistol with Serial Number
4517488 containing a magazine with five (5) live ammunitions from Peralta and a knife from Calimlim. [11] The men were
then brought to the Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City, and later, to the community precinct for paraffin and gun
powder residue test. Meanwhile, the pistol and the magazine with live ammunitions were endorsed to the duty
investigator.[12]
In his defense, Peralta denied the accusation against him and presented a different narration of facts. According to him,
he was riding a motorcycle with Calimlim when they were flagged down by the police officers. While admitting that the
latter recovered a knife from Calimlim, Peralta vigorously denied having a firearm with him, much less illegally
discharging the same.[13] He pointed out that it was impossible for him to carry a gun at the time and place of arrest since
they were near the barangay hall and the respective residences of Police Officer Salonga and mediaman Orly Navarro.
[14]
 Further, Peralta averred that upon arrival at the police station, he was forced to admit possession of the gun allegedly
recovered from him, and that they were subjected to a paraffin test but were not furnished with copies of the results
thereof.[15] Finally, Peralta claimed that he and Calimlim were merely framed up, after his brother who operated a "hataw"
machine went bankrupt and stopped giving "payola" to the police officials.[16]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[17] dated July 31, 2012, the RTC found Peralta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.[18]
The RTC found that the prosecution had established the existence of the elements of the crime charged, considering that
PO3 Carvajal positively identified him walking at the Pantal District, Dagupan City carrying a firearm and that he had no
license to carry the same, as per the Certification[19] issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office in Camp Crame,
Quezon City.[20]
Aggrieved, Peralta appealed[21] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[22] dated May 29, 2015, the CA affirmed Peralta's conviction in toto.[23] It concurred with the RTC's finding
that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged, namely, the existence of firearm and
ammunitions, and the lack of the corresponding license/s by the person possessing or owning the same. In this relation,
the CA held that the police officers conducted a valid warrantless arrest on Peralta under the plain view doctrine,
considering that the latter was walking at the Pantal District carrying a firearm in full view of the arresting policemen, who
arrived at the scene in response to a call they received at the police station.[24]
Further, for lack of substantiation, it did not lend any credence to Peralta's claim that he was only set up by the police
officers as revenge for his brother's failure to give "payola" to the police officials in connection with his operation of the
"hataw" machine.[25] Finally, the CA ruled that the results of the paraffin test were immaterial to Peralta's conviction of the
crime charged since what is being punished by the law is the possession of a firearm and ammunitions without any
license or permit to carry the same.[26]
Undaunted, Peralta moved for reconsideration,[27] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[28] dated December 8,
2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's Resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Peralta's conviction for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, the Court reiterates that Peralta was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for
carrying a .45 caliber pistol with a magazine containing five (5) live ammunitions, a crime defined and penalized under
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, pertinent portions of which read:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition . - The penalty of xxx shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any xxx firearm, xxx part of firearm,
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition xxx.
124
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the
firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .
357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
xxxx
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or permit to possess or
carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the
burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists; and (b) the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same.[29]
In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements, considering
that: (a) the police officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a .45 caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488
with magazine and live ammunitions, which was seized from him and later on, marked, identified, offered, and properly
admitted as evidence at the trial; and (b) the Certification[30] dated August 10, 2011 issued by the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the Philippine National Police which declared that Peralta "is not a licensed/registered firearm holder
of any kind and calibre, specifically Caliber .45 Pistol, make (unknown) with Serial Number 4517488 per verification from
the records of this office as of this date."[31]
That the prosecution failed to present the results of the paraffin test made on Peralta is inconsequential since it is not
indicative of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. In People v. Gaborne,[32] the Court discussed the probative value
of paraffin tests, to wit:
Paraffin tests, in general, have been rendered inconclusive by this Court. Scientific experts concur in the view that the
paraffin test was extremely unreliable for use. It can only establish the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the
hand; however, the test alone cannot determine whether the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The presence of nitrates should be taken only as an indication of a possibility or even of a probability but not of
infallibility that a person has fired a gun, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder. [33]
Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no
indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact,
the trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties,
and hence, due deference should be accorded to the same.[34]
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Peralta questioned the legality of the warrantless arrest and
subsequent search made on him. According to him, there was no reason for the police officers to arrest him without a
warrant and consequently, conduct a search incidental thereto. As such, the firearm and ammunitions purportedly
recovered from him are rendered inadmissible in evidence against him.[35]
Such contention is untenable.
Section 2, Article III[36] of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III[37] of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other
words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.[38]
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the
process cannot be reversed.[39]

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should - as a general rule - be complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to
the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These
are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.[40]
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other
hand, Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. [41]
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential.Under Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b)
of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.[42]
In this case, records show that upon the police officers' arrival at Pantal District, Dagupan City, they saw Peralta carrying
a pistol, in plain view of everyone. This prompted the police officers to confront Peralta regarding the pistol, and when the
latter was unable to produce a license for such pistol and/or a permit to carry the same, the former proceeded to arrest
him and seize the pistol from him. Clearly, the police officer conducted a valid in flagrante delictowarrantless arrest on
Peralta, thus, making the consequent search incidental thereto valid as well. At this point, it is well to emphasize that the
offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum punished by special law and, in order that one may be
found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm,
and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
[43]
 In People v. PO2 Abriol,[44] the court ruled that the carrying of firearms and ammunition without the requisite
authorization - a clear violation of PD 1866, as amended - is enough basis for the conduct of a valid in flagrante
delicto warrantless arrest.[45] Given these, Peralta can no longer question the validity of his arrest and the admissibility of
the items seized from him on account of the search incidental to such arrest.
As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Peralta, the courts a quo en-ed in sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. As may be gleaned from Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended, the prescribed penalties for the crime
Peralta committed is "prision mayor in its minimum period," or imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) day
up to eight (8) years, and a fine of P30,000.00. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the
125
penalty provided therein is taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v.
People,[46] the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties found in special penal laws vis-a-
vis Act No. 4103,[47] otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the
offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate
sentence shall not be beyond what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark
ruling of People v. Simon that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the penalty
therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the
system of penalties native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.[48]
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of
the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC. [49]
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the Court deems it proper to adjust the indeterminate period of imprisonment
imposed on Peralta to four (4) years, nine (9) months, and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.[50] Finally, the imposition of fine in the amount
of P30,000.00 stands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 8, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35193, which upheld the Decision dated July 31, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 in Crim. Case No. 2008-0659-D finding petitioner Joselito Peralta y Zareno
(petitioner) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, defined and penalized
under Section 1, paragraph 2 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
sentencing petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, nine (9) months,
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
65. G.R. No. 216491, August 23, 2017
THE HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, THROUGH THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE, FELIPE G. CAPULONG,
PETITIONERS, VS. DUANE STIER AND EMILY MAGGAY, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 13, 2014 and the Resolution[3] dated
January 21, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97138, which affirmed the Decision [4]dated
December 14, 2009 and the Order[5] dated May 4, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 (RTC)
dismissing the complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages originally filed by now-
deceased[6] Peter Donton (Donton), the predecessor of herein petitioners Heirs of Peter Donton (petitioners), for
insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land with improvements located at No. 33, Don Jose Street, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City, consisting of 553.60 square meters,[7] more or less (subject property). It was previously covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-137480[8] of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City under the name of Donton until its
registration in the names of respondents Duane Stier (Stier) and Emily Maggay (Maggay; collectively, respondents)
under TCT No. N-225996.[9]

Sometime in June 2001, while Donton was in the United States, he discovered that herein respondents took possession
and control of the subject property, as well as the management of his business operating thereat.[10]Donton's lawyers in
the Philippines made demands upon respondents to vacate the subject property and to cease and desist from operating
his business, but to no avail.[11] Thus, Donton was forced to return to the Philippines, where he learned that respondents,
through alleged fraudulent means, were able to transfer the ownership of the subject property in their names.
[12]
 Accordingly, his title, TCT No. N-137480, had been cancelled and a new one, TCT No. N-225996, had been issued in
respondents' names.
Hence, he filed the instant complaint[13] for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages against
respondents and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale [14]dated
July 16, 2001, by virtue of which he purportedly sold the subject property to respondents, was a forgery. [15] He denied
signing or executing the document in favor of respondents, especially considering that on the date of its purported
execution, i.e., July 16, 2001, he was allegedly still in the United States, having departed from the Philippines on June
27, 2001 and returned only on August 30, 2001.[16] He averred that respondents conspired with the employees of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to defraud him, and that Stier is an American citizen and a non-resident alien who is,
therefore, not allowed by law to own any real property in the Philippines. [17] Accordingly, he prayed that TCT No. N-
225996 in respondents' names be annulled and cancelled; that a new title be issued in his name as the rightful owner of
the subject property; and that respondents be ordered to pay him P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.[18]
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[19] respondents claimed that the subject property had been lawfully transferred to
them, asserting that on September 11, 1995, Donton executed an Occupancy Agreement[20] whereby he acknowledged
that Stier had been residing thereat since January 5, 1995; that Stier had extended a loan to him in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 on July 5, 1997, secured by a mortgage over the subject property and its improvements; and that until full
payment thereof, Donton allowed Stier to occupy the same. Respondents likewise claimed that Donton executed a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated September 11, 1995 in favor of Stier, giving him full authority to sell, mortgage, or
lease the subject property.[21] Unfortunately, Donton failed to pay his obligation to Stier; thus, they initially executed a
"unilateral contract of sale"[22] dated June 25, 2001 over the subject property. Eventually, however, they executed the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 2001. As such, respondents argued that Donton cannot feign ignorance of the sale
of the subject property to them. By way of counterclaim, respondents prayed for the awards of moral damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00, and P400,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
litigation expenses.[23]
During trial, Donton presented the findings of Rosario C. Perez (Perez), Document Examiner II of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, who, after comparing the alleged signature of Donton on the Deed of
Absolute Sale to his standard ones,[24] found "significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke
structure, and other individual handwriting characteristics" between them, and concluded that they were not written by
one and the same person.[25] Perez herself testified on the results of her examination.
In an Order[26] dated February 9, 2004, the RTC allowed the substitution of petitioners as plaintiffs after Donton passed
away on November 22, 2003.
On the other hand, respondents waived[27] their right to present their evidence.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[28] dated December 14, 2009, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence,
[29]
 finding that the Deed of Absolute Sale, being a public and notarial document, enjoys the presumption of regularity, and
thus cannot be simply defeated by Danton's bare allegation of forgery of his signature thereon. [30]
Likewise, the RTC refused to give probative weight to the expert testimony offered by Perez after the latter admitted that
126
she conducted the examination of the sample signatures not by virtue of a court order, but at the instance of Donton and
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG).[31] She also admitted that she did not know the source of the
documents procured by the CIDG that she used in her examination. On this score, the RTC held that the forensic
examination and testimony of Perez were self-serving,[32] further explaining that it was not bound to accept the findings of
a handwriting expert.[33] Therefore, the same cannot be used to invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale and the title issued
to respondents.
Petitioners moved[34] to set aside the RTC Decision, which the RTC treated as a motion for reconsideration and which it
subsequently denied in an Order[35] dated May 4, 2011. In denying petitioners' motion, the RTC reiterated the
disquisitions in its Decision and added that petitioners failed to prove that Stier is an American citizen. [36] It explained that
the only evidence that petitioners presented was a Certification[37] from the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) certifying that
one Duane Otto Stier, an American citizen, visited the Philippines on September 2, 2001 and left on October 6, 2001. As
such, the RTC reasoned that the same was not sufficient to prove Stier's citizenship; at most, it merely proved the
alleged travel of the latter.[38] Similarly, petitioners failed to show that Stier is married, as alleged in the complaint. With
respect to petitioners' contention that Maggay had no capacity to acquire real property, the RTC found the same to be
bereft of probative value, being merely an opinion.[39] Finally, the allegation that Donton was in the United States from
June 27, 2001 until August 30, 2001, and therefore not in the Philippines on July 16, 2001 at the time of the execution of
the sale lost its credibility in the face of his admission that he was in the Philippines in the last week of July 2001. [40]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed[41] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[42] dated June 13, 2014, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the assailed RTC Decision and Order,
finding that petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was
forged.[43] It held that the aforesaid document was notarized and therefore enjoys the presumption of validity, which can
only be overturned by clear and convincing evidence.[44] Further, upon examination of Donton's passport stamps, which
petitioners offered in evidence to prove that Donton could not have signed the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 16, 2001,
the CA held that although he departed from the Philippines on June 27, 2001, there was no entry stamp of his admittance
to the United States sometime between said date and August 30, 2001, the date of his return to the Philippines. [45]
As regards the findings and testimony of Perez, the CA held that "[n]otwithstanding Perez's expert testimony that the
questioned signature and the standard signatures [of Donton] were not signed by the same person,"[46] the RTC was
correct in declaring her testimony as self-serving. It considered that Perez did not know the source of the documents, and
that it was the CIDG that provided her with Donton's standard signatures. She admitted that she had no actual
knowledge of whether the documents given to her for examination came from Donton, and that she merely proceeded to
examine them without verifying the source.[47] Thus, the source of the documents being unverified, it cannot be concluded
that the signatures thereon are the genuine signatures of Donton.
Finally, the CA sustained the RTC in ruling that petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that Stier is an American
citizen and married, and that Maggay had no capacity to purchase real property. On this score, the CA quoted with
approval the RTC's findings that the BOI-issued Certification procured and presented in evidence by petitioners was
insufficient to prove Stier's alleged American citizenship, and that there was dearth of evidence to further prove their
allegation that he is married, or that Maggay had no capacity to purchase real property.[48]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[49] was denied in a Resolution[50] dated January 21, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners failed to discharge the
burden of proof required to be entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this case, namely, the annulment of title and
reconveyance of property with damages.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court deems it necessary to underscore that a reexamination of factual findings cannot be done acting
on a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions of law.[51] Thus, in
petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be put into issue.
This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record and when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[52] Finding a
confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the
evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.[53]
In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible
evidence." It is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth, or evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. [54]
The main thrust of petitioners' contention in this case is that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale is a
forgery. They maintain that it was not possible for him to have signed the said document considering that he was not in
the Philippines on July 16, 2001, the date of execution and notarization thereof, he being in the United States at the time.
To bolster this argument, they offered in evidence, among others, the immigration stamps on Donton's passport,
[55]
 showing that the latter departed from the Philippines on June 20, 2001 and returned on August 30, 2001.
However, as the courts a quo have aptly opined, the foregoing immigration stamps are insufficient to prove that Donton
was physically absent from the country to have been able to appear before the notary public on July 16, 2001, the date of
the acknowledgment of the Deed of Absolute Sale. It is well to point out, as the RTC did, that petitioners failed to prove
Donton's arrival or entry in the United States, where he alleged to have gone, and his departure therefrom to return to the
Philippines on August 30, 2001. Without evidence of such admittance to and departure from the United States between
June 27, 2001 and August 30, 2001, the Court cannot discount the possibility that Donton may have returned to the
Philippines anytime between those dates to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale. This is especially so in light of his own
admission in the complaint that he returned to the Philippines "sometime in the last week of July 2001"[56] allegedly to
ascertain the truth and veracity of the information he received that the subject property had been transferred to
respondents. These inconsistencies heavily militate against him, effectively tainting his credibility as a witness and
rendering doubtful the veracity of his testimony.
Furthermore, forgery, as a rule, cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery - in this case, petitioners. The fact of forgery can only be established
by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized to have been forged.[57] Pertinently, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to
be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. (Emphasis supplied)
127
In Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato,[58] the Court explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of
handwritings in this wise:
x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities
or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in
the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are
not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with
the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be
taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned
signature is written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an
important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence,
or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much
weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an
authentic one.[59]
To prove forgery, petitioners offered in evidence the findings and testimony given by expert witness Perez, who declared
that she found "significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke structure and other individual
handwriting characteristics" between the signature that appears on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the standard
signatures of Donton, thereby concluding that they were not written by one and the same person.[60] On cross-
examination, however, Perez admitted that she had no actual knowledge of the source of the specimen signatures given
to her for examination, as it was the CIDG personnel who provided her with the same.[61] Thus, as the CA correctly
observed, Perez's findings deserve little or no probative weight at all, considering that the signatures which she used for
comparison came from an unverified source. Perforce, petitioners are left with no conclusive evidence to prove their
allegation that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.
It bears stressing that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert's function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. This principle holds true especially
when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does
not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. [62]
In fine, the Court, therefore, upholds the findings of the courts a quo in this respect.
Be that as it may, the Court, however, differs from the findings of the courts a quo with respect to Stier's citizenship. More
than the Certification[63] issued by the BOI, which clearly states that Stier is an American citizen, the records contain other
documents validating the information. For instance, in paragraph 1[64] of respondents' Answer with Counterclaim,
[65]
 they admitted paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Complaint insofar as their personal circumstances are concerned, and
paragraph 2 of the Complaint states:
"2. Defendant DUANE STIER is of legal age, married, an American citizen, a non-resident alien with postal address at
Blk. 5, Lot 27, A, B, Phase 1, St. Michael Home Subd., Binangonan, Rizal; x x x"[66] (Emphases supplied)
Similarly, one of the attachments to the Manifestation[67] filed by respondents before the RTC is an Affidavit[68]executed by
Stier himself, stating:
"I, DUANE STIER, of legal age, married, American citizen x x x"[69] (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing statements made by Stier are admissions against interest and are therefore binding upon him. An
admission against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute since no man
would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the
person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset it,[70] especially so in this case where respondents failed to present even one piece of evidence
in their defense.[71]
Hence, the courts a quo erred in ruling that Stier's American citizenship was not established in this case, effectively
rendering the sale of the subject property as to him void ab initio, in light of the clear proscription under Section 7, Article
XII of the Constitution against foreigners acquiring real property in the Philippines, to wit:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Thus, lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or
entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain as well as private lands.[72]
In light of the foregoing, even if petitioners failed to prove that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was a
forgery, the sale of the subject property to Stier is in violation of the Constitution; hence, null and void ab initio. A contract
that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all.[73] Furthermore, Stier is barred from recovering any amount that he paid for the subject property, the
action being proscribed by the Constitution.[74]
Nevertheless, considering that petitioners failed to prove their allegation that Maggay, the other vendee, had no capacity
to purchase the subject property, the sale to her remains valid but only up to the extent of her undivided one-half share
therein.[75] Meanwhile, the other undivided one-half share, which pertained to Stier, shall revert to Donton, the original
owner, for being the subject of a transaction void ab initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale, together with TCT
No. N-225996 issued in respondents' favor, must be annulled only insofar as Stier is concerned, without prejudice,
however, to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 13, 2014 and the Resolution dated January
21, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97138, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint filed by
petitioners on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is
entered: (1) annulling the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 2001 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is concerned; (2)
annulling Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-225996 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is concerned; and (3) directing the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a new title in the name of Peter Donton and Emily Maggay, all without
prejudice to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject property.
SO ORDERED.
66. G.R. No. 222711, August 23, 2017
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, JANET C. LEY,
PETITIONER, VS. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE "LOLA TABA
LOLO PATO PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA SEASIDE," RESPONDENT.
MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE "LOLA TABA LOLO PATO
PALENGKE AT PALUTO SA SEASIDE," RESPONDENT (THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF), VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, RESPONDENT (THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT).
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Orders dated June 15, 2015[2] and January 27, 2016[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 (Valenzuela-RTC) in Civil Case No. 40-V-12, which dismissed
128
petitioner Ley Construction and Development Corporation's (as represented by its President, Janet C. Ley; petitioner)
complaint for collection of sum of money and damages, without prejudice, on the ground of improper venue.
The Facts
On March 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages[4] against respondent
Marvin Medel Sedano (respondent), doing business under the name and style "Lola Taba Lolo Pato Palengke at Paluto
sa Seaside," before the Valenzuela-RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 40-V-12. In its complaint, petitioner alleged that on
January 14, 2005, it leased[5] a 50,000-square meter (sq.m.) parcel of land located at Financial Center Area, Pasay City
(now, Lot 5-A Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard, Pasay City) from respondent third-party defendant, the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC).[6] On September 11, 2006, petitioner subleased[7] the 14,659.80-sq.m. portion
thereof to respondent for a term often (10) years beginning November 15, 2005, for a monthly rent of P1,174,780.00,
subject to a ten percent (10%) increase beginning on the third year and every year thereafter (lease contract).
[8]
 Respondent allegedly failed to pay the rent due for the period August 2011 to December 2011, amounting to a total of
P8,828,025.46, and despite demands,[9] refused to settle his obligations;[10] hence, the complaint.
In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint,[11] respondent countered that he religiously paid rent to petitioner until PNCC
demanded[12] that the rent be paid directly to it, in view of the petitioner's eviction from the subject property by virtue of a
court order.[13] Thus, during the period from August 2011 until December 2011, he remitted the rentals to PNCC.
[14]
 Should he be found liable to petitioner, respondent maintained that the RTC should hold PNCC liable to reimburse to
him the amounts he paid as rentals; hence, the third-party complaint. [15]
Respondent likewise pointed out that the venue was improperly laid since Section 21[16] of the lease contract provides
that "[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with this case shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
exclusive of all others."[17] Hence, the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
Finally, respondent argued that he paid petitioner the amounts of P3,518,352.00 as deposit and advance rentals under
the lease contract, and that he made a P400,000.00 overpayment, all of which amounts were not liquidated or credited to
respondent during the subsistence of the lease contract. Thus, respondent interposed a counterclaim, seeking petitioner
to reimburse the said amounts to him, and to pay him moral and exemplary damages, including litigation expenses, in
view of petitioner's filing of such baseless suit.[18]
In its Comment/Opposition[19] to respondent's affirmative defense of improper venue, petitioner argued that Section 21 of
the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. [20] This is because such
stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the Municipal Trial Courts, of jurisdiction over cases which, under the law, are
within its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as an action for unlawful detainer.[21] Petitioner further posited that
respondent had already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Valenzuela-RTC and had waived any objections on
venue, since he sought affirmative reliefs from the said court when he asked several times for additional time to file his
responsive pleading, set-up counterclaims against petitioner, and impleaded PNCC as a third-party defendant.[22]
Meanwhile, in its Answer to Third Party Complaint with Counterclaim, [23] PNCC contended that respondent has no cause
of action against it, since he acknowledged PNCC's right to receive rent, as evidenced by his direqt payment thereof to
PNCC.[24] Respondent also entered into a contract of lease with PNCC after learning that petitioner had been evicted
from the premises by virtue of a court ruling.[25]
The Valenzuela-RTC Ruling
In an Order[26] dated June 15, 2015, the Valenzuela-RTC granted respondent's motion and dismissed the complaint on
the ground of improper venue. It held that Section 21 of the lease contract between petitioner and respondent is void
insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the RTC of Pasay City, even when the subject matter jurisdiction over the case
is with the Metropolitan Trial Courts.[27] However, with respect to the filing of cases cognizable by the RTCs, the
stipulation validly limits the venue to the RTC of Pasay City.[28] Since petitioner's complaint is one for collection of sum of
money in an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, petitioner should have filed the case with the RTC of Pasay
City.[29]
The Valenzuela-RTC also found no merit in petitioner's claim that respondent waived his right to question the venue
when he filed several motions for extension of time to file his answer. It pointed out that improper venue was among the
defenses raised in respondent's Answer. As such, it was timely raised and, therefore, not waived. [30]
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration[31] which was, however, denied by the Valenzuela-RTC in its
Order[32] dated January 27, 2016; hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
Valenzuela-RTC erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court governs the rules on venue of civil actions, to wit:
Rule 4
VENUE OF ACTIONS
Section 1. Venue of real actions. - Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. - If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the
Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found.
Section 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue
thereof. (Emphases supplied)
Based on these provisions, the venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.[33] As an exception, parties may,
through a written instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. [34] In Briones v. Court of
Appeals,[35] the Court explained:
129
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon,
or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by
law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the
matter.
As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other
venue," "shall only" preceding the designation of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import,
the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified
place.[36]
In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. Tecson,[37] the Court held that an exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding,
provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by
the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into before the filing of the suit.[38]
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are present and that the questioned
stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a valid venue stipulation that limits the venue of the cases to
the courts of Pasay City. It states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be liable
for damages. All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, exclusive of all others.[39] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to limit the place where actions or cases arising from a violation
of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be instituted. This is evident from the use of the phrase
"exclusive of all others" and the specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where such cases may be filed.
Notably, the fact that this stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind shall be filed with the
RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does not mean that the same is a stipulation which attempts to
curtail the jurisdiction of all other courts. It is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to
stipulation of the parties.[40] Hence, following the rule that the law is deemed written into every contract,[41]the said
stipulation should not be construed as a stipulation on jurisdiction but rather, one which merely limits venue. Moreover,
"[t]he parties are charged with knowledge of the existing law at the time they enter into the contract and at the time it is to
become operative."[42] Thus, without any clear showing in the contract that the parties intended otherwise, the questioned
stipulation should be considered as a stipulation on venue (and not on jurisdiction), consistent with the basic principles of
procedural law.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner's action was one for collection of sum of money in an amount [43] that falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.[44] Since the lease contract already provided that all actions or cases involving
the breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, and that petitioner's complaint purporting the said breach
fell within the RTC's exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation and
filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City. However, it is undeniable that petitioner filed its complaint with the
Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue, without prejudice, however, to
its refiling in the proper court.
That respondent had filed several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading, or that he interposed a
counterclaim or third-party complaint in his answer does not necessarily mean that he waived the affirmative defense of
improper venue. The prevailing rule on objections to improper venue is that the same must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, as in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed waived. [45] Here, respondent timely raised the
ground of improper venue since it was one of the affirmative defenses raised in his Answer with Third-Party Complaint.
[46]
 As such, it cannot be said that he had waived the same.
Further, it should be pointed out that the case of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. v. Yatco (Pantranco)[47] cited in the
instant petition[48] should not apply to this case, considering that the invocation of the ground of improper venue therein
was not based on a contractual stipulation, but rather on respondent Elpidio O. Dizon's alleged violation of the Rules of
Court, as he filed his case for damages before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV (Quezon City), despite
testifying that he was actually a resident of Dagupan City. In that case, the Court ruled that the filing of a counterclaim
and third party-complaint, and additionally, the introduction of evidence of petitioner Pantranco (respondent in the case
for damages) after the denial of its motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, "necessarily implied a submission
to the jurisdiction of [the trial court therein], and, accordingly, a waiver of such right as Pantranco may have had to object
to the venue, upon the ground that it had been improperly laid."[49] The rationale for the Pantranco ruling is that a party
cannot invoke a violation of a rule on venue against his counter-party, when he himself is bound by the same rule, but
nonetheless, seeks his own relief and in so doing, violates it.
In contrast, the counterclaim of respondent was alleged to be a compulsory counterclaim, [50] which he was prompted to
file only because of petitioner's complaint for collection of sum of money, else the same would be barred.[51] In fact, his
counterclaim only sought reimbursement of his overpayment to petitioner in the amount of P400,000.00, as well as
damages for the filing of a purported baseless suit. Thus, his counterclaim is not covered by the venue stipulation, since
he is not asserting a violation of the terms and conditions of the lease contract, but rather an independent right which
arose only because of the complaint. The same goes for his third-party complaint, whereby he only pleaded that the
rental payments remitted to PNCC for the period August 2011 to December 2011 be reimbursed to him in the event that
petitioner's complaint is found to be meritorious. Since his counterclaim and third-party complaint are not covered by the
venue stipulation, respondent had, therefore, every right to invoke the same whilst raising the ground of improper venue
against petitioner's complaint, which action was, on the contrary, covered by the stipulation. Thus, there is no
inconsistency in respondent's posturing, which perforce precludes the application of the Pantranco ruling, as well as
negates the supposition that he had waived the defense of improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Orders dated June 15, 2015 and January 27, 2016 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 75 in Civil Case No. 40-V-12 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
67. G.R. No. 224631, August 23, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RUPERTO RUBILLAR, JR. Y GABERON, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Ruperto Rubillar, Jr. y Gaberon (Rubillar) assailing
the Decision[2] dated August 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01219-MIN, which affirmed
the Judgment[3] dated June 22, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 11 (RTC) in Crim. Case No.
61,680-07 finding Rubillar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,[4] otherwise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information[5] filed before the RTC charging Rubillar of Rape, the accusatory portion of
which states:
That on or about October 12, 2006, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, with force and intimidation, [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of
[AAA[6]] against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
The parties presented conflicting versions of facts.
130
Based on AAA's testimony, the prosecution alleged that at around one (1) o'clock in the afternoon of October 12, 2006,
AAA was waiting for a jeepney to go to the public market when Rubillar, her father's kumpare, arrived and offered her a
ride, to which AAA assented.[8] About four (4) kilometers from where they left, Rubillar stopped the motorcycle and made
AAA wear a helmet supposedly to avoid apprehension by the traffic police. However, said helmet had a heavily-tinted
face shield, thereby making it difficult for AAA to see. Thereafter, Rubillar drove at a fast speed without stopping at traffic
lights. This prompted AAA to tell Rubillar to already drop her off, but the latter drove faster and told her to shut up. They
eventually reached a place unfamiliar to AAA - later ascertained as Davao Motel - where Rubillar then drove his
motorcycle inside and thereupon, was assisted by a man. AAA wanted to ask for help from the man but he immediately
left. When they were left alone, Rubillar dragged her upstairs and pushed her to the bed. Despite AAA's resistance,
Rubillar placed himself on top of her, forcibly held her hands, undressed her, and kissed her. He then inserted his penis
into AAA's vagina and made a push and pull motion. Afterwards, Rubillar told her to wash herself in the comfort room
and, subsequently, to put on the helmet. Rubillar allegedly threatened to kill her should she tell anyone about what
happened. They then rode the motorcycle and Rubillar dropped her off at the public market. AAA proceeded to buy
groceries and rode a jeepney going home. Thereafter, AAA ran away from home due to fear and embarrassment. Her
sister took her home in January 2007 and only then did AAA tell her parents what happened. They reported the incident
to the police.[9]
The prosecution presented other witnesses to testify on subsequent events. Senior Police Officer 1 Annabelle Dacudao
testified that she accompanied AAA to the motel to conduct an ocular inspection. It was then that AAA found out the
name of the motel and the room where she was brought, i.e., Room 6. Further, Dr. Margarita Isabel Amoroso Artes
stated that she examined AAA and found a "definitive penetrating injury" on her hymen.[10]
For his part, Rubillar admitted having carnal knowledge of AAA, but maintained that they were sweethearts since August
2006[11] and their sexual act was consensual. He narrated that per AAA's request, they met at ten (10) o'clock in the
morning on the day of the incident to go to AAA's on-the-job training office[12] in Calinan. Rubillar noted that AAA brought
her own helmet and that he stopped at the red traffic lights on their way there. After AAA's errand at the office, they
proceeded to the machine shop in Cabaguio Street where Rubillar paid for the repairs of a jeepney. As it was about
noontime already, he asked AAA to lunch. However, AAA invited him to go to the motel in front of the machine shop
instead, to which he agreed. Thus, they checked in at the motel where a room boy met them and led them to a room. In
his counter-affidavit,[13] Rubillar alleged that AAA paid for the motel[14] but in his testimony, he claimed to have paid the
room boy while AAA went up to the second floor.[15] After receiving the payment, the room boy closed the door and left
them. Rubillar then followed AAA upstairs where they talked, kissed, and later on engaged in sexual intercourse twice.
He emphasized that the sexual acts were done without force. They left soon thereafter because that day was his
daughter's birthday.[16]
Rubillar's claim that he had a relationship with AAA was thereafter corroborated by numerous witnesses.[17] First, Dioter
Odiongan (Odiongan), AAA's ex-boyfriend, testified that on September 30, 2006, he attended the festivities in Tagakpan
where he saw AAA with Rubillar. AAA then introduced Rubillar to him as her boyfriend and that he saw them hugging
each other.[18] Second, Wilson Laguardia (Laguardia), Rubillar's neighbor, stated that in a disco event on October 4,
2006, Rubillar introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend and thereafter borrowed his motorcycle for them to use.[19] Third,
Maria Jeneza Kalan (Kalan), who is allegedly AAA's best friend since elementary, narrated that in September 2006, AAA
confided to her and Yvonne Calo (Calo) that she was Rubillar's girlfriend. Kalan added that in January 2007, AAA stayed
at her house for two days when the latter ran away from home. When Kalan asked why she ran away, AAA replied that
"she cannot take any more her mother" and that she is going to elope with Rubillar to Bukidnon.[20] On cross-examination,
Kalan clarified that AAA showed no letter, token, or any gift from the accused[21] and that she never saw them together in
public either before or after the alleged rape incident.[22] Lastly, Calo, who was allegedly AAA's best friend in high school
and half-sister of Rubillar's wife, rebutted AAA's statement that she never talked (had no encounter) with Rubillar prior to
the incident and that she was unfamiliar with the places where the motorcycle passed by going to the motel in Davao
City, such as the GSIS building, considering that they used to pass by it whenever they went to the main branch of their
school during special school activities. According to Calo, Rubillar used to fetch her and AAA several times from their on-
the-job training office in Calinan in July 2006, and she noticed that AAA was "very close" to Rubillar and always sat
beside him in the jeepney.[23]

Another witness, Pastor Minn Baon (Baon) testified that at around 1:30 in the afternoon of October 12, 2006, along
Cabaguio Street, she saw AAA and Rubillar aboard a motorcycle, which passed by quickly about ten meters away from
her. She noticed that AAA was embracing Rubillar, with her head on his right shoulder and her eyes looking directly
ahead. Baon added that AAA wore a pink blouse underneath a black jacket and a blue helmet with a transparent
cover/face shield.[24]
Finally, the defense presented the motel manager and the cashier on duty at the time of the incident. The motel manager
explained that the motel has a policy that whenever one of the customers appears forced to enter a room, the room boy
must first ask for payment before the customers are led to an assigned room to give enough time to verify and alert the
guard or call the Sta. Ana Police. The cashier on duty testified that there was no unusual incident reported to her on that
day.[25] The cashier added that the room boy assigned to Room No. 6 on the day of the incident had passed away.[26]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[27] dated June 22, 2012, the RTC found Rubillar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape and, accordingly,
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.[28]
The RTC found AAA's testimony straightforward and credible as she positively recounted the incidents that led to the
commission of the crime against her. On the other hand, it did not give credence to Rubillar's defense of sweetheart
theory, opining that he was not able to satisfactorily prove their relationship through love letters, photos, or even saved
text messages between them. The RTC added that even if it were true that they were clandestine lovers, conviction is
still warranted as long as the element of force or intimidation attended the sexual act. In this relation, it disagreed with
Rubillar's claim that AAA's lack of resistance amounted to consent, pointing out that while testifying, the latter recounted
several times how she attempted to resist Rubillar's advances. The RTC further noted that Rubillar had moral
ascendency over AAA considering the former's advanced age and relationship with her father.[29]
Aggrieved, Rubillar appealed[30] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[31] dated August 24, 2015, the CA upheld Rubillar's conviction, finding the prosecution to have established
all the elements of the crime charged. More particularly, the CA held that Rubillar employed force and intimidation from
the moment he drove the motorcycle at a high speed, frightened her that he would bump the motorcycle if she would not
shut up, dragged her to the room, pushed her to the bed, and pinned her down to insert his penis. The CA also gave
credence to the medical examination conducted on AAA showing attenuation of hymen. Further, it ruled that even
assuming that Rubillar and AAA were lovers, it would not exculpate Rubillar from the crime of rape, explaining that in
rape cases, the complainant's testimony is credible where no strong motive for falsely testifying against the accused is
shown, as in this case.[32]
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Rubillar's conviction for Rape should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
131
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[33] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."[34]
In deciding Rape cases, it is well to emphasize that such crime is a serious transgression with grave considerations and
consequences both to the accused and the complainant. On the one hand, the accused is presumed innocent and shall
not be convicted unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, in which case, he shall be meted with a severe
penalty. On the other hand, the Court is ever mindful that a young woman would not publicly announce that she was
raped if it were not true. No woman would want to expose herself to the process, the trouble, and the humiliation of a
rape trial unless she actually has been a victim of abuse and her motive is but to seek atonement for her abuse. In these
lights, a painstaking review of the judgment of conviction is required.[35]
Relatedly, three (3) principles guide the Court in reviewing rape cases: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with
facility, and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to
disprove; (b) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[36] Following these
legal precepts, the victim's sole testimony must stand the test of credibility.
Guided by the foregoing principles and after meticulously evaluating the entire case records, the Court holds that the
victim's sole testimony examined in light of the other evidence presented in court, failed to establish Rubillar's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, as will be explained hereunder.
Rape under Article 226-A (1) (a) of the RPC, as amended, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
    a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
To be convicted of Rape under this provision, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond reasonable
doubt: (a) offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) such act was accomplished through force, threat, or
intimidation.[37]
In the present case, Rubillar's invocation of the "sweetheart theory" is essentially an admission of him having carnal
knowledge with AAA, albeit maintaining that the same was consensual. Thus, it is crucial to determine whether or not
AAA indeed consented to the sexual act, considering that the gravamen of Rape is sexual congress with a woman
without her consent.[38] Stated differently, the only question left for the Court to resolve is whether the prosecution has
proven the second element beyond reasonable doubt.[39]
The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-attendance of force or intimidation. As
afore-stated, it is "effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-
appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence."[40] In People v. Patentes(Patentes)
[41]
 the Court discussed the evidence required in order to support such defense, to wit:
We are mindful that appellant's bare invocation of the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be corroborated by
documentary, testimonial, or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies
of those who know the lovers.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The "sweetheart theory" operates to impair the victim's testimony or create doubt on her version of the facts when the
defense presents sufficient evidence of a relationship between the accused and the victim but the latter simply denies it.
Notably, a woman who was sexually abused by a lover has no practicable reason to deny her relationship with the
accused in a rape trial because admitting such relationship would not negate her allegation of rape, as the Court has
consistently ruled that "a 'love affair' does not justify rape, for the beloved cannot be sexually violated against her xxxx
will."[43] Nonetheless, if she denies the relationship but it was found existing, she runs the risk of tainting her testimony
when her version of the facts is inconsistent with the presence of an intimate relationship between them. The Court
proceeds to resolve this case with this mindset.
Q: The complainant in this case [AAA] filed a case against the accused for rape which was allegedly committed on
In this case, Rubillar's allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly corroborated by his other witnesses. First,
October 12, 2006. Now, the accused and this [AAA], if you know, what are [sic] they to each other beforeOctober
Odiongan testified that prior to the alleged incident, AAA introduced Rubillar to him as his new boyfriend and that he saw
12, 2006?
them in an intimate embrace.[44] Second, Laguardia recalled that Rubillar introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend through
a text message, then, borrowed his motorcycle, which Rubillar and AAA used for about an hour.[45]Third and most
relevant is the testimony of Kalan, AAA's long time friend, who testified that AAA xxxx
explicitly told her that Rubillar was his boyfriend once before the alleged incident and a
second time after AAA ran away from home, to wit:
ATTY. PANTOJAN
A: They are (sic) sweethearts.

The testimony of the witness is being offered to prove that she knows the accused in this case being a neighbor in
Tagakpan, Tugbok, Davao City; that she also knows [AAA,] the complaining witness in this case and being a long Q: Who told you that the accused and [AAA] were sweethearts?
time friend and likewise a neighbor at [Davao City]; that [AAA] sometime in September of 2006 confided and told
her that she is the girlfriend of the accused and after the alleged incident that took place on October 12, 2006, A: [AAA.]
[AAA] again informed the witness that she is the accused fsic] girlfriend and at that time, they both decided to elope
to Bukidnon. That would be the gist of the [witness's] testimony this morning, Your Honor.

Q: When did [AAA] tell you that she and the accused were sweethearts?
xxxx
A: September 2006, I forgot the exact date.

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF MARIE JENEZA KALAN

Q: Where did [AAA] tell you of that?

A: In our house.
xxxx

Q: Who were with you at that time that [AAA] told you that she is the sweetheart of the accused?
Q: The complaining witness is [AAA], do you know her?
A: My other best friend.
A: Yes, I know her.

Q: What is the name of your other best friend?

Q: Why do you know her?
A: Ivon Calo.
A: She is my best friend.

132
 Calo further rebutted AAA's statement that she was unfamiliar with Davao City proper
xxxx
before October 12, 2006, in this wise:
Q: This time, it was Atty. Pantojan who asked [a] question and the question appears on page 33 of the transcript of
the stenographic notes and it goes this way, "Do you recognize GSIS Davao City, when you passed by GSIS on
your way where the accused brought you?" Answer: "I don't know if we passed by Ulas, how will I know if we
Q: How many times did [AAA] tell you that she is the girlfriend of the accused? passed by GSIS, to be frank, I am not familiar with the places in downtown. I just ..... from the truck I was riding and
looked outside because the place was far. The relatives of Birang knew that I am not familiar with downtown." What
A: Twice. can you say to this Answer of [AAA] to the question of Atty. Pantojan?
A: It is not true because our school is located at Bajada and we passed by GSIS so it's impossible that she does not
know the place.

Q: When was the second time that [AAA] told you that she is the girlfriend of the accused?
Q: This school in Bajada, when did [AAA] go to that school in Bajada?
A: January 2007.
A: Everytime we have activities like Foundation, we usually go there with [AAA].

Q: Where?
Q: What particular month and year did you go there with [AAA]?
A: The same in our house.[46] (Emphases supplied)
A: December 2005.
It appears from these testimonies that Rubillar and AAA mutually acknowledged their clandestine relationship and
revealed it to some people close to them. The Court stresses that the finding of a then subsisting relationship between
the complainant and the accused raises suspicions on the truthfulness of AAA's testimony, wherein she vehemently
denied having a relationship with the accused. Q: In the year 2005, if you can remember, how many times did you and [AAA] go to Bajada?
Considering that the defense had sufficiently established the fact of relationship, AAA's version of what happened on the
A: Several times.
day of the incident now appears incredulous vis-a-vis Rubillar's version. On the one hand, AAA stated that she had not
talked with her father's friend, Rubillar, prior to the alleged incident and that he was merely waiting for a jeepney when
Rubillar offered her a ride.[47] She then went on board the motorcycle and later on, got scared when Rubillar drove at a
fast speed, seemingly without stopping at traffic lights, and went directly to a motel room, wherein they were assisted by
a room boy. She alleged that she was too scared to tell the room boy or even attempt to escape even though she felt that Q: Of course everytime you go with [AAA] to Bajada, what were the places that you passed by from Tagakpan to
she was about to be sexually abused. She added that Rubillar dragged her up the stairs and chased her around the room Bajada?
before he eventually caught up with her, let her lie down on the bed, placed himself on top of her, and undressed them A: We passed by Ulas and then GSIS and that we passed by Aldevinco and then going to Bajada. [49] (Emphasis
both. supplied)
The Court adds that the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is significant in
On the other hand, Rubillar narrated that AAA asked for a ride on his motorcycle to go to her on-the-job training office in
establishing the truth or falsity of the charge of rape.[50] In this case, while about to leave the motel, AAA
Calinan, and after she finished her errand there, they went to a repair shop so that Rubillar could pay for the repairs of
his jeepney. Thereafter, AAA invited him to the motel across the shop wherein they talked and had their first and only could have ran away instead of boarding Rubillar's motorcycle. Also, getting off at the
sexual encounter. Rubillar added that they left soon because that day was his daughter's birthday. public market to do the errands of her mother is not usual for someone who has been
raped. Moreover, AAA stated that she left her family's house because she did not want
Assessing both versions and considering the established fact of relationship between them, there is reasonable doubt as
to whether or not the element of force or intimidation attended the sexual act. To reiterate, AAA's denial of the her mother and others to be involved in the alleged rape incident, but Kalan testified
relationship in her version of the facts created doubt on the credibility of her story. that she left the house to elope with "Berang" (Rubillar's alias). Plainly, AAA's act of
leaving home to elope with her alleged malefactor is uncharacteristic of one who has
The truthfulness of AAA's testimony is also rendered questionable by Calo's testimony. While AAA claimed that she
never talked to Rubillar prior to October 12, 2006, Calo rebutted the same when she testified that Rubillar used to fetch been raped and seeks retribution for it. Kalan continued her testimony as follows:
her and AAA from their on-the-job training office in Calinan in July 2006 and that she observed that they appeared "very Q: When was the second time that [AAA] told you that she is the girlfriend of the accused?
close" during the trips.[48]

133
A: January 2007. A: The first thing I asked her [was] why she ran away from home.

Q: Where? Q: And what was her answer to you?

A: The same in our house. A: First, she answered that first, she said, that she cannot take any more her mother.

Q: How come that [AAA] was in your house at that time? Q: And what else did she tell you about her?

A: She went to our house at that time because she ran away from, home. A: She told me that she is going to elope with Berang at Bukidnon.

Q: How did you know that? Q: And what else?

A: She herself told me that and to my parents. A: Those are the things she told me.

Q: When you saw her in your house in January 2007, what did she bring with her? Q: When [AAA] told you this, what was your reaction, if any?

A: I advised her.

xxxx

Q: What did you advise her?

A: Suit case. A: I told he that[, AAA,] that is not good because Berang is married.

Q: Who were with you at that time when [AAA] was there with [a] suit case? Q: What did she tell you with regards (sic) to your advised (sic)?

A: My parents and my siblings. A: She said she doesn't care.

Q: And for how long did [AAA] stay in your house at that time? Q: When for the first time that [AAA] told you that she is the girlfriend of the accused, what did you say to her by way
of reply, if any?
A: For two days. A: I told her that [AAA] (sic) she knows his wife.

Q: And on the first time that you saw her in your house, what, if any, did you talk about? Q: And what was her reply to that?

134
A: She said that she cannot stand parting with the man because she loves him so much.[51] (Emphases supplied)
The value of a witness's testimony should be compatible with human knowledge, observation, and common experience,
such that whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and must lie outside judicial cognizance.[52] While
it is true that not all victims react the same way after suffering forced coitus, [53] it appears highly unlikely for a victim of
rape to cry out that she was sexually abused and, thereafter, to elope with her offender. Otherwise stated, the
testimonies of Kalan and Caio rendered AAA's testimony highly suspect. At this point, it is worthy to note that AAA failed
to give any reason why her two close friends would testify against her claim of rape in court.
Considering the totality of the evidence presented in this case, the Court doubts whether Rubillar employed force or
intimidation upon AAA during their sexual encounter. It must be clarified, however, that the Court's finding does not mean
absolute certainty that Rubillar did not coerce AAA to engage in the act. It is simply that the evidence presented by the
prosecution falls short of the quantum of proof required to support a conviction. Jurisprudence has consistently held that
"[a] conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt, which means a moral certainty
that the accused is guilty; the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution." [54] If the prosecution fails to do so, "the
presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the
prosecution's evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense,"[55] as in this case.
As a final note, the Court reminds the members of the bench of their solemn duty to decide cases based on the law and
to "free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman claiming to have been sexually abused
and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape
victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render
justice according to law."[56] As elucidated in Patentes:
The testimony of the offended party x x x should not be received with precipitate credulity for the charge can easily be
concocted. Courts should be wary of giving undue credibility to a claim of rape, especially where the sole evidence
comes from an alleged victim whose charge is not corroborated and whose conduct during and after the rape is open to
conflicting interpretations. While judges ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation that a rape victim
undergoes as she seeks justice, they should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the
law.[57]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 24, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 01219-MIN is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellant Ruperto Rubillar, Jr. y Gaberon is ACQUITTEDon the
ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered unless he is detained for some
other charge.
SO ORDERED.
68. G.R. No. 192442, August 09, 2017
BENEDICT N. ROMANA, PETITIONER, V. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION / EDUARDO U. MANESE
AND/OR PRINCESS CRUISE LINE, LTD., RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution[3]dated
May 27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108036, which affirmed the Decision [4] dated March 28,
2008 and the Resolution[5] dated November 28, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR
CA No. 049079-06 / NLRC NCR OFW (M) 04-12-03296-00, dismissing petitioner Benedict N. Romana's (petitioner) claim
for disability benefits.
The Facts
135
Petitioner was employed[6] by respondents Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Eduardo Manese and/or Princess Cruise
Lines, Ltd. (respondents) as a Mechanical Fitter and boarded the vessel M/V Golden Princess[7] on August 7, 2003.[8] He
claimed that while he and fellow shipmates Alexander Mapa and Rogelio Acdal were walking along the ship alley on April
20, 2004, the metal ceiling fell and wounded his head.[9] A few days thereafter, he experienced persisting headache and
blurring of vision and consulted the ship's doctor who prescribed him medicines. [10] As his condition did not improve, he
was referred to a specialist in Barbados, West Indies, and was found to have a tumor (or hemangioblastoma) at the left
side of his brain, for which he underwent left posterior fossa craniectomy.[11]
He was repatriated on May 23, 2004 and the company-designated physician, in a medical report[12] dated May 24, 2004,
issued a finding that petitioner's illness is not work-related[13] given that the same is an "abnormal growth of tissues in the
brain's blood vessels."[14] He was later cleared and discharged on May 27, 2004.[15] No further consultations were made.
On October 12, 2004, petitioner consulted an independent physician, who on the other hand, declared his illness to be
work-related and gave him a Grade 1 impediment after finding him unfit to resume work as a seaman and incapable of
landing a gainful employment because of his medical background.[16] As a result, petitioner filed a complaint,[17] seeking
payment of his disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees,
[18]
 docketed as NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 04-12-03296-00.
For their part, respondents denied petitioner's claim, contending that brain tumor is not listed as an occupational disease
under Section 32-A of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (2000
POEA-SEC), and that the company-designated physician declared said illness to be not work-related, hence, not
compensable.[19]
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated March 30, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint, finding that petitioner failed to
establish that his illness is work-related.[21] In so ruling, the LA gave more credence to the findings of the company-
designated physician that his employment did not increase the risk of contracting his illness, nor did his working
conditions contribute to his illness.[22]
Thus, petitioner appealed[23] the LA ruling, contending that Section 20 (B) (4)[24] of the 2000 POEA-SEC expressly
provides that his illness shall be disputably presumed to be work-related, and that it is compensable since the nature of
his work constantly exposed him to harmful chemicals, extreme changes of temperature in the engine room, as well as to
harsh sea weather conditions.[25] He likewise maintained that his injury on the head after having been hit by a falling metal
ceiling on board the vessel may have contributed to his brain tumor.[26]
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision[27] dated March 28, 2008, the NLRC affirmed the LA ruling, holding that there was no evidence to support
petitioner's claim that the nature of his work exposed him to risks of contracting a brain tumor. [28]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[29] but the same was denied in a Resolution[30] dated November 28, 2008. Hence,
petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a petition for certiorari.[31]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[32] dated February 11, 2010, the CA dismissed the certiorari petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC. It debunked petitioner's claims that he was hit on the head by a falling metal while on board the
vessel, and that he was exposed to different chemicals that aggravated his condition, for lack of substantiation. [33] The CA
likewise did not give credence to the independent physician's finding that petitioner's illness is work-related, noting that
said physician is a specialist in internal medicine and not in diseases of the brain.[34] Besides, petitioner failed to observe
the conflict resolution procedure on the appointment of a third doctor as provided under the 2000 POEA-SEC.[35]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[36] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[37] dated May 27,
2010; hence this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability benefits pursuant to the 2000 POEA-SEC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
The Court affirms the CA's ruling that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion as it, in fact, correctly dismissed
petitioner's claim for disability benefits. Nonetheless, the Court finds it opportune to elucidate on certain principles
relevant to the matter of seafarers' compensation.
Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied" is deemed to be a "work-related
illness."[38] On the other hand, Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC declares that "[t]hose illnesses not listed in
Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related." The legal presumption of work-relatedness was
borne out from the fact that the said list cannot account for all known and unknown illnesses/diseases that may be
associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to signify
that the non-inclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability
benefits.[39] Given the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue. "The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail." [40]
Thus, in Racelis v. United Philippine Lines, Inc.[41] and David v. OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc.,[42] the Court held
that the legal presumption of work-relatedness of a non-listed illness should be overturned only when the employer's
refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined, is "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."[43]
Nonetheless, the presumption provided under Section 20 (B) (4) is only limited to the "work-relatedness" of an illness.
It does not cover and extend to compensability. In this sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an
illness and the matter of compensability. The former concept merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer's illness,
albeit not listed as an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in connection with one's work,
whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a showing that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. This can be gathered from Section 32-A of the
2000 POEA-SEC which already qualifies the listed disease as an "occupational disease" (in other words, a "work-related
disease"), but nevertheless, mentions certain conditions for said disease to be compensable:
SECTION 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must
be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;  there is only a possibility that the employment caused the disease.[52] (Emphasis supplied)
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract
it;  compensability.
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As differentiated from the matter of work-relatedness, no legal presumption of compensability is accorded in favor of the
seafarer. As such, he bears the burden of proving that these conditions are met.
Thus, in Tagle v. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management, Phils., Inc.,[44] the Court ruled that while work-relatedness is indeed
presumed, "the legal presumption in Section 20 (B) (4) of the [20001 PQEA-SEC should be read together with the
requirements specified by Section 32-A of the same contract."[45]
Similarly, in Licayan v. Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc.,[46] it was explicated that the disputable presumption does
not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim, and that while the law disputably presumes an
illness not found in Section 32-A to be also work-related, the seafarer/claimant nonetheless is burdened to present
substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish its compensability.[47] The proof of
136
work conditions referred thereto effectively equates with the conditions for compensability imposed under Section 32-A of
the 2000 POEA-SEC.
In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena,[48] it was likewise elucidated that there is a need to satisfactorily show the four (4)
conditions under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC in order for the disputably presumed disease resulting in disability
to be compensable.[49]
To note, while Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC refers to conditions for compensability of an occupational disease
and the resulting disability or death, it should be pointed out that the conditions stated therein should also apply to non-
listed illnesses given that: (a) the legal presumption under Section 20 (B) (4) accorded to the latter is limited only to
"work-relatedness"; and (b) for its compensability, a reasonable connection between the nature of work on board the
vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated must be shown.[50]
The absurdity of not requiring the seafarer to prove compliance with compensability for non-listed illnesses, when proof of
compliance is required for listed illnesses, was pointed out by the Court in Casomo v. Career Philippines
Shipmanagement, Inc.,[51] to wit:
A quick perusal of Section 32 of the [2000 POEA-SEC], in particular the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries
Suffered and Diseases including Occupational Diseases or Illnesses Contracted, and the List of Occupational Diseases,
easily reveals the serious and grave nature of the injuries, diseases and/or illnesses contemplated therein, which are
clearly specified and identified.
We are hard pressed to adhere to Casomo's position as it would result in a preposterous situation where a seafarer,
claiming an illness not listed under Section 32 of the [2000 POEA-SEC] which is then disputably presumed as work-
related and is ostensibly not of a serious or grave nature, need not satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 32-A of
the [2000 POEA-SEC]. In stark contrast, a seafarer suffering from an occupational disease would still have to satisfy four
(4) conditions before his or her disease may be compensable.
xxxx
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Cuntapay  [576 Phil. 482, 492 (2008)] iterates that the burden of
proving the causal link between a claimant's work and the ailment suffered rests on a claimant's shoulder:
The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease was brought about largely
by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct
causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Probability, not the
ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. And probability must be reasonable; hence
it should, at least, be anchored on credible information. Moreover, a mere possibility will not suffice; a claim will fail if
Therefore, it is apparent that for both listed occupational disease and a non-listed illness and their resulting injury to be
compensable, the seafarer must sufficiently show by substantial evidence compliance with the conditions for
At this juncture, it is significant to point out that the delineation between work-relatedness and compensability in relation
to the legal presumption under Section 20 (B) (4) has been often overlooked in our jurisprudence. This gave rise to the
confusion that despite the presumption of work-relatedness already accorded by law, certain cases confound that the
seafarer still has the burden of proof to show that his illness, as well as the resulting disability is work-related.
Among these cases is Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc.,[53] wherein the Court failed to discern that the
presumption of work-relatedness did not extend or equate to presumption of compensability, and concomitantly, that the
burden of proof required from the seafarer was to establish its compensability not the work-relatedness of the illness:
At any rate, granting that the provision of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in Section 20
(B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable
presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be
entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have
existed during the term of his contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to the respondent
company.[54] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Later, in Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel,[55] Section 20 (B) (4) (which pertains to a presumption of work-
relatedness) was mischaracterized as a presumption of compensability  which stands absent contrary proof:
Anent the issue as to who has the burden to prove entitlement to disability benefits, the petitioners argue that the burden
is placed upon Laurel to prove his claim that his illness was work related and compensable. Their posture does not
persuade the Court.
True, hyperthyroidism is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Nonetheless,
Section 20(B), paragraph (4) of the said POEA-SEC states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this contract
are disputably presumed work-related." The said provision explicitly establishes a presumption of
compensability although disputable by substantial evidence. The presumption operates in favor of Laurel as the burden
rests upon the employer to overcome the statutory presumption. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the
seafarer's employer/s, this disputable presumption stands.[56] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in Dohle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Gazzingan,[57] a "presumption of compensability" was declared for
illnesses not listed as an occupational disease:
More importantly, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a presumption of compensability for those illnesses which are not
listed as an occupational disease. Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this
Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." Concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon the
claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the
disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish compensability
of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases.[58] (Emphasis supplied)
To address this apparent confusion, the Court thus clarifies that there lies a technical demarcation between work-
relatedness and compensability relative to how these concepts operate in the realm of disability compensation. As
discussed, work-relatedness of an illness is presumed; hence, the seafarer does not bear the initial burden of proving the
same. Rather, it is the employer who bears the burden of disputing this presumption. If the employer successfully proves
that the illness suffered by the seafarer was contracted outside of his work (meaning, the illness is pre-existing), or that
although the illness is pre-existing, none of the conditions of his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating such
illness, then there is no need to go into the matter of whether or not said illness is compensable. As the name itself
implies, work-relatedness means that the seafarer's illness has a possibleconnection to one's work, and thus, allows the
seafarer to claim disability benefits therefor, albeit the same is not listed as an occupational disease.
The established work-relatedness of an illness does not, however, mean that the resulting disability is automatically
compensable. As also discussed, the seafarer, while not needing to prove the work-relatedness of his illness, bears the
burden of proving compliance with the conditions of compensability under Section 32 (A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Failure
to do so will result in the dismissal of his claim.
Notably, it must be pointed out that the seafarer will, in all instances, have to prove compliance with the conditions for
compensability, whether or not the work-relatedness of his illness is disputed by the employer:
On the one hand, when an employer attempts to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-relatedness
(i.e., by either claiming that the illness is pre-existing or, even if pre-existing, that the risk of contracting or aggravating the
same has nothing do with his work), the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer to prove otherwise (i.e., that the
illness was not pre-existing, or even if pre-existing, that his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating the
illness). In so doing, the seafarer effectively discharges his own burden of proving compliance with the first three (3)
conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that (1) the seafarer's work must involve
the risks described herein; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
and (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it.
Thus, when the presumption of work-relatedness is contested by the employer, the factors which the seafarer needs to
prove to rebut the employer's contestation would necessarily overlap with some of the conditions which the seafarer
needs to prove to establish the compensability of his illness and the resulting disability. In this regard, the seafarer,
therefore, addresses the refutation of the employer against the work-relatedness of his illness and, at the same time,
discharges his burden of proving compliance with certain conditions of compensability.
On the other hand, when an employer does not attempt to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-
relatedness, the seafarer must still discharge his own burden of proving compliance with the conditions of
137
compensability, which does not only include the three (3) conditions above-mentioned, but also, the distinct fourth
condition, i.e., that there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Thereafter, the burden of evidence
shifts to the employer to now disprove the veracity of the information presented by the seafarer. The employer may also
raise any other affirmative defense which may preclude compensation, such as concealment under Section 20 (E) [59] of
the 2000 POEA-SEC or failure to comply with the third-doctor referral provision under Section 20 (B) (3) [60]of the same
Contract.
Subsequently, if the work-relatedness of the seafarer's illness is not successfully disputed by the employer, and the
seafarer is then able to establish compliance with the conditions of compensability, the matter now shifts to a
determination of the nature and, in turn, the amount of disability benefits to be paid to the seafarer.
In this case, petitioner's illness, hemangioblastoma or brain tumor, is a benign tumor, slow-growing and well-defined.
Medical studies show that brain tumors arise from cells in the linings of blood vessels. The most common symptoms
include headache, nausea and vomiting, gait disturbances, and poor coordination of the limbs.[61] Its exact cause is
unknown and no risk factor accounting for the majority of brain tumors has been identified. However, exposure to ionizing
radiation increases the risk of developing brain tumor.[62]
As records show, the company-designated physician, after due assessment of petitioner's condition, found that his illness
was caused by an abnormal growth of tissue in the brain's blood vessels (brain tumor) and therefore not work-related. To
refute the same, petitioner argued that he accidentally injured his head when a metal ceiling fell on his head that caused
lesion and bleeding.[63] However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, no evidence was presented to substantiate the said
incident.[64]
For another, petitioner asserted that the nature of his work may have contributed to his illness having been previously
employed on board the same vessel under two (2) contracts, and that as a fitter, he was constantly exposed to inhalation
of and direct contact to harmful chemicals, formaldehyde, hydrocarbons, fumes, and other deleterious emissions,
changes of temperature of extreme hot and freezing colds at the engine room and deck areas and as the vessel crossed
ocean boundaries.[65] However, there is no showing that the foregoing work conditions increased the risk of contracting
his illness. While petitioner pointed out that brain tumors are linked to a genetic syndrome called Von Hippel-Lindau
disease (the risk factors of which include radiation or chemical exposure),[66]and in such regard, had been recommended
by the Neurosurgeon specialist to undergo screening for said illness,[67]petitioner failed to establish that he underwent
such screening. It is therefore speculative to conclude that his exposure to "benzene, formaldehyde, hydrocarbons,
chemicals, crude oil, gasoline, lubricants and other harmful cleaning solutions"[68] may have caused, aggravated, or
contributed to his brain tumor. Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in disability
compensation proceedings. Nevertheless, probability must be reasonable; hence it should, at least, be anchored
on credible information. A mere possibility will not suffice, and a claim will fail if there is only a possibility that the
employment caused the disease.[69]
In fine, petitioner's claim for disability benefits should be denied, considering that respondents were able to successfully
debunk the presumption of work-relatedness and concomitantly, petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence his
compliance with the conditions for compensability set forth under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution dated May 27, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108036 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
69. G.R. No. 197797, August 09, 2017
HEIRS OF JOSE PEÑAFLOR, NAMELY: JOSE PEÑAFLOR, JR. AND VIRGINIA P. AGATEP, REPRESENTED BY
JESSICA P. AGATEP, PETITIONERS, V. HEIRS OF ARTEMIO AND LYDIA DELA CRUZ, NAMELY: MARILOU,
JULIET, ROMEO, RYAN, AND ARIEL, ALL SURNAMED DELA CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated February 18, 2011 and the Resolution[3]dated
July 8, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110392, which annulled and set aside the Writ of
Possession[4] dated June 27, 2008 and Notice to Vacate[5] dated June 18, 2009 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 72 in Other Case No. 38-0-93, thereby reinstating herein respondents heirs of Artemio and Lydia
dela Cruz, namely: Marilou, Juliet, Romeo, Ryan, and Ariel, all surnamed dela Cruz (respondents), to the possession of
the subject property.
The Facts
Respondents are the successors-in-interest of the late Artemio dela Cruz (Artemio), who is the son of Nicolasa dela
Cruz, the original owner of a parcel of land situated at No. 11, Ifugao St., Brgy. Barretto, Olongapo City, including a two-
storey building erected thereon (subject property).[6]
On April 15, 1991, Nicolasa authorized her daughter, Carmelita C. Guanga (Carmelita), Artemio's sister, to
mortgage[7] the subject property to Jose R. Penaflor (Penaflor), the predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, Jose
Peñaflor, Jr. and Virginia P. Agatep (represented by Jessica P. Agatep; collectively, petitioners) in order to secure a loan
in the amount of P112,000.00.[8] As Nicolasa failed to settle her loan obligation when it fell due, Peñaflor filed an
application for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage[9] before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72
(RTC), docketed as Case No. 07-0-91.[10] After the requirements of posting, notices, and publication were complied with,
the subject property was sold at a public auction, where Peñaflor emerged as the highest bidder.[11] A Certificate of
Sale[12] was thus issued in his favor. The period of redemption expired without the subject property being redeemed;
hence, a Final Bill of Sale[13] was issued and registered in Peñaflor's name. Thereafter, the latter executed an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership.[14] This notwithstanding, Nicolasa persisted in her occupancy of the subject property and
refused to deliver possession to Peñaflor.[15]
The RTC Proceedings
Seeking to enforce his right to possess the subject property, Peñaflor filed a petition for the  ex parte issuance of a writ of
possession[16] before the RTC, docketed as Other Case No. 38-0-93.[17] On November 19, 1993, the RTC granted[18] the
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Nicolasa and Carmelita did not appeal the decision; [19] thus, the same
lapsed into finality.[20]
However, the writ of possession was not enforced as Artemio filed a complaint for annulment of judgment [21] before the
same trial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 15-0-94 (annulment of judgment case), claiming to be the lawful owner and
possessor of the subject property even prior to the mortgage.[22] Artemio's complaint was eventually dismissed without
prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[23]
In April 1998 (and thus after the mortgage of the subject property in April 1991), Artemio filed a separate complaint for
ejectment against Carmelita before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Olongapo City, Branch 5 (MTCC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 4065 (ejectment case).[24] In support of his complaint, he submitted: (1) Miscellaneous Sales Application
No. (1-4) 3407 filed with the Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City; (2) Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage signed by Artemio,
mortgaging the said property to one "Rosita Bonilla"; and (3) Certifications attesting that he had declared the subject
property in his name for taxation purposes.[25] Also, he submitted a notarized deed dated May 3, 1989 denominated as
"Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights"[26] (May 3, 1989 Waiver) executed by Nicolasa, waiving and transferring all
her rights and interests over the subject property in favor of Artemio. [27] The MTCC granted Artemio's ejectment complaint
against Carmelita, which was eventually affirmed by the Court in G.R. No. 150187.[28]
In the meantime, the proceedings in Other Case No. 38-0-93 continued. On June 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Amended
Order[29] granting Peñaflor's application for a writ of possession anew.[30] On even date, the RTC issued the Writ of
Possession.[31] Thereafter, the RTC issued a Notice to Vacate[32] dated July 11, 2008, ordering Artemio to vacate the
subject property.[33] However, on July 23, 2008, Artemio and his wife, Lydia dela Cruz (Sps. dela Cruz), filed a motion to
quash the writ of possession and notice to vacate,[34] claiming that the said writ could not be enforced against them as
they are strangers to Other Case No. 38-0-93 who are holding the subject property adversely to the judgment obligor,
[35]
 i.e., Nicolasa. Artemio's siblings, Sotero, Mario, and Clarita, all surnamed dela Cruz, and Charlie Guanga (Carmelita's
son)[36] likewise filed separate motions to quash the aforesaid writ and notice, claiming their rights over the subject
property.[37] Their motions were, however, denied by the RTC in an Order[38] dated December 5, 2008. Consequently,
Sotero, Mario, and Charlie filed a joint motion for reconsideration[39] of the said Order, which was likewise denied by the
RTC.[40] Subsequently, the RTC issued another Notice to Vacate[41] dated June 18, 2009, ordering the children of Nicolasa
to vacate the subject property. Said motions having been denied, herein respondents, in substitution of their parents, filed
138
another motion[42]praying that the implementation of the writ of possession be held in abeyance as they are third persons
in actual possession of the subject property who are asserting rights adverse to the judgment obligor. [43] The RTC
likewise denied respondents' motion in an Order[44] dated August 14, 2009; hence, prompting them to elevate this case to
the CA via a petition for certiorari,[45] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 110392.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[46] dated February 18, 2011, the CA annulled and set aside the writ of possession and notice to vacate
issued by the RTC.[47] It held that respondents are holding the subject property adverse to Nicolasa, the judgment obligor.
[48]
 As basis, it pointed out that the evidence submitted by Artemio in the ejectment case, all indicate that he was claiming
ownership of the subject property, which was in his possession at that time.[49] Further, the CA gave credence to the May
3, 1989 Waiver, which showed that Nicolasa had already renounced all her rights over the subject property in 1989, or
two (2) years before she authorized Carmelita to mortgage the subject property.[50]Hence, finding that Artemio's claim of
ownership as against Nicolasa is "at the very least, bona fide and made in good faith," the CA ruled that the RTC should
have desisted from enforcing the writ of possession against Artemio's heirs, herein respondents.[51] The remedy,
according to the CA, "is not the implementation of the writ of possession but for the purchaser or the redemptioner to
institute ejectment proceedings or a reinvindicatory action."[52]
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,[53] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[54] dated July 8,
2011; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erroneously set aside the Writ of Possession and
Notice to Vacate issued by the RTC in favor of herein petitioners.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
"It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property becomes the absolute owner of the
property if no redemption is made within one [(1)] year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those entitled to
redeem. As absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the
New Civil Code, not least of which is possession, or jus possidendi[.]"[55]
"Possession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the other attendant rights of
ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right.
This is why Section 7 of Act No. 3135,[56] as amended by Act No. 4118,[57] imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to
issue a writ of possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. Section 7 reads:
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the
province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption
period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex partemotion in the registration
or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under
the Mortgage Law or under Section 194 of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a
mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the
clerk of court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph 11 of Section 114 of Act No.
496, as amended by Act No. 2866, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue,
addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
In Spouses Arquiza v. CA,[58] it was reiterated that simply on the basis of the purchaser's ownership of the foreclosed
property, there is no need for an ordinary action to gain possession thereof:
Indeed, it is well-settled that an ordinary action to acquire possession in favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property is not necessary. There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriffs sale
of real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one-year period for
redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriffs final certificate of sale. The basis of this right to possession
is the purchaser's ownership of the property. The mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ of
possession would suffice, and no bond is required."[59]
In Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc.,[60] the Court observed that the ex parte  application for [a] writ of
possession is a non-litigious summary proceeding without need to post a bond, except when possession is being sought
even during the redemption period:
It is a time-honored legal precept that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer's name, for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a matter of right. As the confirmed owner, the purchaser's right to
possession becomes absolute. There is even no need for him to post a bond, and it is the ministerial duty of the courts to
issue the same upon proper application and proof of title. To accentuate the writ's ministerial character, the Court has
consistently disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the
foreclosure itself.
The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135 has been described as a non-
litigious proceeding and summary in nature. As an ex parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and
without notice to or consent by any person adversely interested.[61](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, in BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc.[62] (BPI Family), the Court remarked
that not even a pending action to annul the mortgage or the foreclosure sale will by itself stay the issuance of the writ of
possession:
Furthermore, it is settled that a pending action for annulment of mortgage or foreclosure sale does not stay the issuance
of the writ of possession. The trial court, where the application for a writ of possession is filed, does not need to look into
the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. The purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without
prejudice to the outcome of the pending annulment case.[63]
However, Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court - which is applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages per
Section 6 of Act No. 3135 - provides that upon the expiration of the redemption period, the possession of the property
shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner, unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor.
"In China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Lozada,[64] it was held that for the court's ministerial duty to issue a writ of
possession to cease, it is not enough that the property be held by a third party, but rather the said possessor must have a
claim thereto adverse to the debtor/mortgagor:
Where a parcel levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the
court to order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. Similarly, in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
real property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the said real
property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be done ex parte. For the exception to apply, however, the property
need not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to the debtor/mortgagor.[65]
Specifically, the Court held that to be considered in adverse possession, the third party possessor must have done so in
his own right and not merely as a successor or transferee of the debtor or mortgagor:
The exception provided under Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which a
third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. x x x. [66]
Thus, in BPI Family, the Court ruled that it was an error to issue an ex parte  writ of possession to the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure, or to refuse to abate one already granted, where a third party has raised in an opposition to the
writ or in a motion to quash the same, his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or a right adverse to that
of the debtor or mortgagor. The procedure, according to Unchuan v. CA,[67] is for the trial court to order a hearing to
determine the nature of the adverse possession, conformably with the time-honored principle of due process."[68]
In this case, respondents, in their Comment and/or Opposition[69] submitted before this Court, claim that "Artemio Dela
Cruz validated his ownership of the subject property, including the [two-storey] house erected thereon and other
improvements, through a deed of waiver and transfer of possessory rights executed by his mother, Nicolasa Dela Cruz in
May 3, 1989 which is attached and made [an] integral part hereof."[70]
However, it is apparent from the face of this document that the same was not an effective mode of transferring Nicolasa's
ownership to Artemio, which could have thus given the latter an independent right over the subject property prior to its
mortgage to Peñaflor. The May 3, 1989 Waiver reads:
139
That I, NICOLASA DELA CRUZ, of legal age x x x and residing at No. 11, Ifugao St., Barretto, Olongapo City,
Philippines, do hereby by these presents, freely and irrevocably WAIVE, RENOUNCE, TRANSFER and QUITCLAIM all
my rights, interests and participation over a parcel of residential lot including all the existing improvements thereon, more
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of residential lot situated at No. 11, Ifugao St., Barretto, Olongapo City, containing an area of 450 square meters
more or less, x x x
in favor of my son ARTEMIO DELA CRUZ, likewise of legal age x x x and residing at No. 11, Ifugao St., Barretto,
Olongapo City, Philippines, the above-described property free from all liens and encumbrances.
That I hereby warrant peaceful possession of the above-described property herein waived, binding myself to defend him,
his heirs, successors, assigns from any lawful claims of any person whomsoever.
x x x x[71]
By virtue thereof, Nicolasa supposedly waived, renounced, transferred, and quitclaimed all her rights, interests, and
participation over the subject property to Artemio. However, a mere waiver of rights is not an effective mode of
transferring ownership under our Civil Code.
In Acap v. CA (Acap),[72] it was ruled that "[u]nder Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are
generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law
or intellectual creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain
contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).[73]
By its terms, the May 3, 1989 Waiver cannot be classified as any of these kinds of contracts from which Artemio could
derive ownership of the subject property. It cannot be classified as a sale (because there is no price certain in money or
its equivalent);[74] as a barter (because of the lack of any other thing given as consideration);[75] a donation (because of the
lack of animus donandi and even a formal acceptance);[76] an assignment (because of the lack of price);[77] and/or
a mutuum (because it is not a loan).[78] Neither can it be considered as an assignment either by onerous or gratuitous
title[79] so as to conclude that Nicolasa had already lost her right to possess the subject property to Artemio prior to its
mortgage.
Notably, in Acap, the Court debunked the lower court's characterization of a certain Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of
Rights to a contract of sale, holding that the private respondent therein cannot conclusively claim ownership of the
property subject of that case on the sole basis of a waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale or
a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership:
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and
Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same.
In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent.
Upon the other hand, a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the
Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as
they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first
presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of
extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its
existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent,
being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other
derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
Quite surprisingly, both the trial court and public respondent Court of Appeals concluded that a "sale" transpired between
Cosme Pido's heirs and private respondent and that petitioner acquired actual knowledge of said sale when he was
summoned by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to discuss private respondent's claim over the lot in question. This
conclusion has no basis both in fact and in law.[80] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, while the nature of the document in Acap is different from the May 3, 1989 Waiver, the principle remains the
same. Artemio cannot claim any independent right over the subject property by virtue of a document that does not even
purport to be an effective mode of transfer.
According to the CA, the totality of evidence shows that Artemio is an adverse third party-possessor of the subject
property.[81] Aside from the May 3, 1989 Waiver, the evidence consist of the following:
(1) Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (1-4) 3407 over the subject property filed with the Bureau of Lands, Olongapo
City on October 2, 1968;
(2) Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage dated May 30, 1973 and October 30, 1968, signed by Artemio and mortgaging the
subject property and the parcel of land on which it stands to one "Rosita Bonilla"; and
(3) Certifications dated January 7, 1969 and May 22, 1989 of the Office of the City Assessor, Olongapo City, attesting
that respondent had declared the subject property in his name for taxation purposes.[82]
After much reflection, the Court finds that these pieces of evidence are actually inadmissible to prove Artemio's
independent right of ownership in this case against the mortgagee, Peñaflor and his heirs, as they were never submitted
as evidence before the RTC in Other Case No. 38-0-93. These pieces of evidence were those submitted and considered
in Civil Case No. 4065, which is the ejectment case against his sister, Carmelita. Therefore, Peñaflor was not given an
opportunity to contest the genuineness and authenticity of these documents in these proceedings and also, with his own
evidence, to rebut the same. Hence, to consider these documents against him in this case would surely violate his right
to due process.
Moreover, it should be highlighted that these pieces of evidence were offered to prove one thing, and one thing alone:
that Artemio had the better right to possess the subject property only as against his sister, Carmelita. The Court, in G.R.
No. 150187, entitled "Carmelita Guanga v. Artemio dela Cruz" which stemmed from Civil Case No. 4065, recognized that
"the only question to resolve in ejectment suits such as in this case is who between the parties has the better right of
possession de facto over the disputed property."[83] While the Court did inquire into the question of the property's
ownership, it explicitly clarified that it did so "only for the limited purpose of determining prior possession."[84] Thus, with
this established limitation on ejectment cases in mind, it cannot be denied that the aforementioned evidence cannot bind
even Carmelita - the opposing party herself in Civil Case No. 4065 - on issues regarding ownership and much more,
Peñaflor and his heirs, in a totally different case, i.e., Other Case No. 38-0-93, from which the present petition emanated.
At the very least, the fundamental right of due process demands that Peñaflor (and now, his heirs) be given an
opportunity to challenge such evidence before they may be considered in any respect against him. In fact, the RTC in
Other Case No. 38-0-93 implicitly touched on this conundrum in its Order dated August 14, 2009 when it held that:
Oppositors Heirs of Artemio and Lydia dela Curz cited case pertains to an unlawful [detainer] case filed against them by
Carmelita Guanga which issue of possession had been ruled in favor of the said heirs and herein petitioners is not a
party to the said case. Hence, said Decision of the Supreme Court in that G.R. No. 150187 does not affect yet herein
petitioners not being in possession of the property then.[85]
In any event, none of those pieces of evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 4065 would even satisfactorily show that
Artemio had an independent title to the subject property enough to dispossess the mortgagee, Peñaflor, who had already
consolidated his own title over the same. First, Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (1-4) 3407 is only a sales patent
application, which was not clearly shown to have been granted so as to vest in him title over the property. Second, the
Deeds of Real Estate Mortgage are not documents which show the original source of the mortgagor's own title; on the
contrary, these documents already assume that the mortgagor is the owner of the property and thus, could mortgage the
same. And finally, the Certifications attesting that Artemio had declared the subject property in his name for taxation
purposes (i.e., tax declarations) only constitute "proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property,"[86] and are
therefore, not valid documents which would show his source of title. In fact, Nicolasa too had tax declarations in her
140
name, showing that she had a claim of title over the same property.[87]To note, these documents were her own proof of
ownership through which she was able to mortgage the subject property (appearing to be an unregistered land) in favor
of Peñaflor,
As above-discussed, where a third party has raised in an opposition to the writ of possession or in a motion to quash the
same his actual possession thereof upon a claim of ownership or a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor - as in
this case - the procedure is for the trial court to order a hearing to determine the nature of the adverse possession,
conformably with the time-honored principle of due process. Notably, when this opposition is made, the proceeding for
the issuance of a writ of possession loses its nature of being an ex parte, and instead, turns adversarial, so as to give:
On the one hand, the third party claimant the opportunity to present evidence of his title showing his independent right
over the subject property adverse to the judgment obligor/mortgagor; and
On the other hand, the mortgagee the opportunity to rebut said evidence in order to sustain the issuance of the writ and
gain possession of the subject property pursuant to his consolidated title.
Jurisprudence describes that "[a]n ex parte proceeding merely means that it is taken or granted at the instance and for
the benefit of one party, and without notice to or contestation by any party adversely affected."[88] Clearly, this is not the
case when an opposition is made by a third party claimant against the issuance of a writ of possession, from which the
court is compelled to now order a hearing to determine the nature of the former's adverse possession.
In this case, the CA improperly considered the evidence submitted in a totally different proceeding ( i.e., the ejectment
case) taken against an entirely different party (Carmelita) in reversing the RTC's issuance of a writ of possession in favor
of Peñaflor. In fact, even if we were to feign ignorance of this clear due process violation, such evidence were,
nonetheless, ostensibly insufficient to prove that Artemio has an independent right over the subject property adverse to
Nicolasa, the judgment obligor/mortgagor. Thus, whether the May 3, 1989 Waiver is the true source of title of Artemio or
merely one which fortifies his claim of independent title, the "totality of evidence" is still not enough to prove the same.
In addition, records are replete with circumstances which diminish the veracity of Artemio's claim against Peñaflor:
(1) In the annulment of judgment case, Artemio claimed that he applied for a sales patent in 1960 which was allegedly
approved in 1968 by the Bureau of Lands, per the Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (1-4) 3407 dated October 2,
1968;[89] he likewise claimed in that same case that his mother Nicolasa does not own the property.[90]
(2) Yet, Artemio (and herein respondents) asserted that Nicolasa transferred her rights over the property in 1989 by
virtue of the May 3, 1989 Waiver.[91]
(3) Sotero, Mario, and Clarita (siblings of Artemio), and Charlie Guanga (Carmelita's son) filed two (2) separate motions
to quash the writ of possession, wherein they claimed that they, with Artemio and Nicolasa, co-owned the subject
property. They alleged that said property was part of the conjugal partnership of Sps. dela Cruz. When Ireneo died in
1985, they became pro-indiviso heirs of Ireneo's share to the property.[92]
(4) Mario, however, testified for Artemio in the annulment of judgment case, stating that Nicolasa does not own the
subject property.[93]
Taken together, these events would show that: (a) Artemio's claim over the subject property is riddled with material
inconsistencies; and (b) Nicolasa's children (among others, Artemio) appear to have been taking several steps to prevent
Peñaflor from taking possession of the subject property and defeating his consolidated ownership rights thereto, thus
further casting doubt on Artemio's claim of ownership. In fact, it deserves mentioning that Artemio filed the ejectment suit
in Civil Case No. 4065 only in April 1998, or seven (7) long years after the property had already been mortgaged to
Peñaflor in April 1991; thus, it is equally doubtful that he even had possession of the subject property at the time it was
mortgaged to Peñaflor. In addition, the RTC had already granted the petition for the issuance of writ of possession in
favor of Peñaflor on November 19, 1993, or almost five (5) years prior to the filing of the ejectment suit in April 1998,
which decision therein respondents Nicolasa and Carmelita did not appeal.[94]
Hence, for all these reasons, Artemio cannot be considered as a "third party who is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor," i.e., Nicolasa, so as to defeat Peñaflor's right to possess the subject property, which
is but an incident to the consolidation of his ownership over the same.
As a final word, it should be clarified that the purpose of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is to expeditiously accord the mortgagee who has already shown a prima facie right
of ownership over the subject property (based on his consolidated title over the same) his incidental right to possess the
foreclosed property. To reiterate, "[p]ossession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the
other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title[,] the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may demand
possession as a matter of right."[95] Thus, it is only upon a credible showing by a third party claimant of his independent
right over the foreclosed property that the law's prima facie  deference to the mortgagee's consolidated title should not
prevail. Verily, a mere claim of ownership would not suffice. As jurisprudence prescribes, the demonstration by the third
party-claimant should be made within the context of an adversarial hearing, where the basic principles of Evidence and
Civil Procedure ought to be followed, such as: (1) it is the claimant who has the burden of proving his claim; (2) the claim
must be established through a preponderance of evidence; and (3) evidence not presented or formally offered cannot be
admitted against the opposing party. In this case, none of these principles were followed for the CA considered evidence
that were not only submitted in a totally different case against an entirely different party, but are also innately inadequate
to - at least - prima facie show the source of the third party-claimant's independent title, all to the detriment of the
mortgagee who had already consolidated his title to the contested property. The reversal of its ruling is therefore in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 18, 2011 and the Resolution dated July 8, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110392 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Writ of
Possession dated June 27, 2008 and Notice to Vacate dated June 18, 2009 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City, Branch 72 through its Decision dated November 19, 1993 in Other Case No. 38-0-93 in favor of
petitioners heirs of Jose Peñaflor, namely: Jose Peñaflor, Jr. and Virginia P. Agatep, represented by Jessica P. Agatep,
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
70. G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),[*] JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO
BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR
HERSELF AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., PETITIONERS, V. QUEZON CITY,
AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH
ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued
ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local
governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this
case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA)
9344,[2] or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating
the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."[3]
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,[4] dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan
na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,[5] dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through
Ordinance No. 8046[6] entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as
'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and
for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301,
[7]
 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M.
to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014
(Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).[8]
141
Petitioners,[9] spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young adults
and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth
and minors[10] - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: ( a) result
in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; ( c) deprive minors of the right
to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right
in rearing the youth without substantive due process.[11] In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance
contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.[12]
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as
there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the
age of the alleged curfew violators.[13] They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his
physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew
violator.[14]
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the
operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend that
the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be
out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. [15]
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;[16] and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being
narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.[17] They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se  protect and promote the social and moral welfare of
children of the community.[18]
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4[19] thereof, contravenes Section 57-A[20] of
RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment,
reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that
no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations.[21]
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative
to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling
interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street
lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law
enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the
government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars
informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.[22]
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the
petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts
doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review. [23]
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."[24] Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
law. mota of the case."[34] In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence of
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
an actual case or controversy."[35] "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalitv of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring
difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on
supplied)
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."'[36] According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was
jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave
confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."[37]
enforceable."[25]
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
In Araullo v. Aquino III,[26] it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution."[27] It was explained that "[w]ith respect to
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."[38]
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case given the evident
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents'
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their
expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited
asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima
above]."[28]
facie  case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc .,[29]it was
is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued
expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
the TRO[39] enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for
hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules -
2. Legal Standing.
allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"[30]
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the governmental
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City,
act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a
Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining,
Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their
some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act."[40] "'[I]nterest' in the
children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as
question involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act — as distinguished
amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave
from being merely incidental or general."[41]
abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."[31] In light of the foregoing, petitioners
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari  and prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing." [42]
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of
Since petitions for certiorari  and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and
minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related
executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.
to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
affecting the minor's right to travel,[43] because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [44]
 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at
[(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and
night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other
important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition[.]"[32] This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage.
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"[33] as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is
Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a
justified.
consequence thereof.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands
as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.

142
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in court.
[45]
 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized
by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More particularly,
Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged
violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court
has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is
involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability
of the petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government
act."[46]
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial
review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their
children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate
these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which,
therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must
first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient enforcement parameters,
which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of
procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they
were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders
based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age. [47]
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."[48]
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair
warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.[49] The void for
vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case,
it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves
cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its
143
prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness
doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary
interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness." [50]
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms
related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political
branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in
a void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems
from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is
prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because agents of
the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown,[51] it was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hocand
subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
personal predilections.[52]
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for
vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as
amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from
the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
(Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA
9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.[53] Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630,[54] minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.[55] It
is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal
ordinance."[56] Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related
statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating
the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any
competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law authorizes
enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done
ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue
the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes
the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late
outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in
imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.[57]
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the
development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This
means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally
obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's
independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens
of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty
to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship."[58] "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example
is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."[59]
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's children."[60] In Ginsberg
v. New York,[61] the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."[62] As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described
as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the
upbringing of their children.[63] The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their children was explained
by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),[64] as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a] mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a
relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order,
or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the
upbringing of their children."[67]
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v.
Lorenzo,[68] this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or
individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a vis other parties. Unable as they are to
take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the
state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae  is inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."[69] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children ,
[70]
 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[l]egal
restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution,
144
the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."[71]
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their
children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State interests
(particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on
the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience,
are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-
being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.[72]
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when
they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is
the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew
hours.[73] In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their
minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.[74] As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at home.
Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children's
upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),[75] the US court observed that the city government "was
entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids
the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the
nocturnal behavior of those children."[76] Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
time on their studies than on the streets."[77] Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less
applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on
parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim
that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test.
Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the
protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest. [78] In
addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours.[79]
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere) ,[80] this Court explained that
"the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"[81] viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications
on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only
assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of
third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on
third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.[82] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court,
in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment,[83] and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was held that rarely, if ever,
will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-
related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression."'[85]
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,[86] it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on
the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations
of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of
freedom of expression."[87]
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under
the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right[88] under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest ofnational security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines.[89] It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.[90] Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes
the power of locomotion[91] and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work
where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.[92]
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to
education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.[93] The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,[94] as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require one to move
about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment. Restricting movement in those
circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a
denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel and
movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason,
people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are
sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First
Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental
rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
absolute.[95] As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State[96] may impose limitations on the exercise of this right,
provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2)are provided by law.[97]
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of
145
the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that
the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,[98] as amended, RA 9775,[99] RA 9262,[100] RA 9851, [101] RA 9344,[102] RA 10364,
[103]
 RA 9211,[104] RA 8980,[105] RA 9288,[106] and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,[107] as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their
city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may
be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and
the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this
case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this
relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,[108] but the exercise of these rights
is not co-extensive as those of adults.[109] They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their
parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.[110] As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the
minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, [111] the right to execute contracts,
[112]
 and the right to engage in gainful employment.[113] With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to
obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign country
by themselves or with a person other than their parents.[114] These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader
authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,[115]and overall, reflect the State's general interest in
the well-being of minors.[116] Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these
limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions
in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:[118]
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for
children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...sympathy, and ... paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
x x x x 
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.
[119]
 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,[120] the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to
minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity
as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of
selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in
public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is
too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether
against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in such usestreets
afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be
magnified.[121] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they
are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.[122] The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
[123]
 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights,
but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy. [124] Lastly, the rational basis
test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests. [125]
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the
strict scrutiny test[126] is the applicable test.[127] At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger
the application of a lower level of scrutiny.[128] In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),[129] the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less
"fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,]
indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children than of adults. x x x. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a
greater range of interests that justify the infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for
the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellottiframework enables courts to
determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that
[a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x. [130] (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification
that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.[131] Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest.[132]
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies. [133] This Court has ruled that
children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae  constitute compelling interests
to justify regulations by the State.[134] It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties
must give way.[135] As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in
imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this
compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
146
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews
on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and moral
development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing
criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and
member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places,
whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering or
wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national
laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children during night time
by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial
or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency
of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of
criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their
nefarious activities[.][136]
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,[137] as regards the information gathered by the City Council to support its
passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own treatment of the present
case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a
safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when
left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest—that
of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources, including
records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United States
Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence,
elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a
safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day.
Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may
lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence.
"[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an
early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the
point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce
through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences, the City was directly
advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.[138] (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical
data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or
perpetrators, in their respective localities.[139]
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power
under the general welfare clause.[140] In this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed
but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a
compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set
forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling
State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted,
the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's
compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.[141]
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still accorded
the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic. [142] Thus, in the present case,
each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel
but also on their other constitutional rights.[143]
In In Re Mosier,[144] a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn,
resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech. [145] It observed
that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic
Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from
attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles,
aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council meetings if they ran
past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a
deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance
of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It
specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct
route from religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance
meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied
by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines,
using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by
virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at
night.[146]
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at
night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; ( d) those
traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents,
147
guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It
also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve,
New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday,
Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.[147]
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the
rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.[148] However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still
provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-
school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or
church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.[149] This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors'
right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city
council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the
Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such
proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night,
such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any
reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila
Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the
above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as
such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence[150] of any separability clause.[151]
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors'
constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be
covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities
of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such
minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper
authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization,
road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home from the same
place of employment activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
communitv or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is
going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in
the evening or that he/she is a working student.[152] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly
drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and
of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these aforementioned
rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities
not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free
expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious
organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of
religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even
during curfew hours. In relation to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the
places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the
locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage
in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission
is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance,  i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its
constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile
the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to
parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only
natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare
of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand
the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of
fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to
take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. [153]
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the same
against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the
curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence,
constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the
lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
148
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the validity of its
penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or guardian under Section 8 thereof,[154] does not
impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s
or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the
minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.[155]Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance
imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as
follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in case
of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint
shall be filed by the Punong Barangay  with the office of the City Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not
be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status
offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking
laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly
conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be
imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at
the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for
in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children,
and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the
similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit
is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew
ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" [157] is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine";
[158]
"[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act."[159]Punishment,
in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed
against a person who has violated the law."[160]
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the
regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate
intervention programs, such as community-based programs[161] recognized under Section 54[162] of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote
accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light,
these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them
the opportunity to become productive members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with
their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as
it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is
generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."[163]The Black's Law
Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";[164] while the Philippine Law Dictionary
defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight,
an expression of authoritative advice or warning."[165] Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall
not be considered a penalty."[166]
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as
they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their
objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided
so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City
of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."[167] The Black's Law Dictionary
defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law"; [168]while the
Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault
by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition." [169]In other words,
reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize
and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public against repeating or
committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp
disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,
[170]
 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be
imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine,
and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and
irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other
hand, the impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute
penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that
is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the
Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights
during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the
said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental
permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the
manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City
Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
149
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local
government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULLand VOID; while
Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
71. G.R. No. 228894, August 07, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOHN PAUL CERALDE Y RAMOS, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant John Paul Ceralde y  Ramos (Ceralde) assailing the
Decision[2]  dated August 4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06100, which affirmed the Joint
Decision[3] dated February 18, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38 (RTC) in Crim. Case
Nos. L-9245 and L-9246, finding Ceralde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4]  otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations[5] filed before the RTC charging Ceralde of the crime of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165, the accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. L-9245
The undersigned accuses JOHN PAUL CERALDE y RAMOS in the commission of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs as
follows:
"That on or about July 23, 2011 along Artacho St., Brgy. Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there [willfully] and unlawfully sell three (3) small
transparent plastic sachet containing dried Marijuana leaves, a dangerous and prohibited drug, worth P200.00 to SPO1
Jolly V. Yanes, acting as poseur-buyer, without any lawful authority.["]
Contrary to Art. II, Sec. 5 of RA 9165.[6]
Criminal Case No. L-9246
The undersigned accuses JOHN PAUL CERALDE y  RAMOS in the commission of Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs as follows:
"That on or about July 23, 2011 along Artacho St., Brgy. Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing
0.480 grams, without any necessary license or authority to possess the same."
Contrary to Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.[7]
The prosecution alleged that at around one (1) o'clock in the morning of July 23, 2011, the buy-bust team composed of
Senior Police Officer I (SPO1) Jolly Yanes (SPO1 Yanes), a certain SPO1 Santos, Police Officer 3 Marday Delos Santos
(PO3 Delos Santos), and one Police Officer 2 Dizon proceeded to the target area to conduct an entrapment operation on
Ceralde. Shortly after, Ceralde arrived and handed three (3) plastic sachets of suspected marijuana leaves to the poseur-
buyer, SPO1 Yanes, who, in turn, gave Ceralde the marked money. Thereafter, SPO1 Yanes raised his right hand to
signal the rest of the team that the transaction was completed and, consequently, Ceralde was apprehended. PO3 Delos
Santos conducted a body search on Ceralde and found another plastic sachet of marijuana in his pants. He then secured
the remaining three (3) confiscated plastic sachets of marijuana leaves from SPO1 Yanes and told him to "go
ahead."[8] PO3 Delos Santos immediately marked all four (4) plastic sachets at the place of arrest and in the presence of
Ceralde, and subsequently, brought the latter, together with the marked money and the confiscated plastic sachets, to
the police station for further investigation and proper documentation. Thereat, PO3 Pedro Vinluan (PO3 Vinluan), the
alleged duty investigator, received the confiscated plastic sachets from PO3 Delos Santos and prepared the request for
laboratory examination. At around 12 o'clock noon of the same day, PO3 Delos Santos delivered the request for
laboratory examination, together with the seized items, to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in
Urdaneta City, where they were tested positive for the presence of marijuana by Police Chief Inspector and Forensic
Chemist Emelda B. Roderos (PCI Roderos). Afterwards, the seized drugs were submitted to Records and Evidence
Custodian Mercedita Velasco (REC Velasco) for safekeeping until such time that they were presented to the court as
evidence.[9]
For his part, Ceralde denied the charges against him but opted not to present any evidence during trial, invoking his
constitutional right of presumption of innocence. Consequently, he moved to submit the case for decision. [10]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision[11]  dated February 18,2013, the RTC found Ceralde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced him as follows: (a)  in Crim. Case No. L-9245, to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, with costs; and (b)  in Crim. Case No. L-9246, to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with costs. [12]  It held that the
prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs as it was able to prove
that: (a)  an illegal sale marijuana, a dangerous drug, actually took place during a valid buy-bust operation; (b)  Ceralde
was positively identified by witnesses as the seller of the said dangerous drug; and (c) the said dangerous drug was
presented and duly identified in open court as the subject of the sale. It also ruled that Ceralde had no right to possess
the 0.480 gram of marijuana incidentally recovered from him during his arrest, thus, necessitating his conviction for
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165.[13]
Aggrieved, Ceralde appealed [14] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[15]  dated August 4, 2016, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.[16]  It declared that prior surveillance is
not required for the validity of an entrapment operation, the conduct of which is best left to the discretion of the police
officers, noting too that there were verified reports of Ceralde being involved in the sale of illegal drugs prior to his arrest.
[17]
  Moreover, the CA observed that all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were adequately
150
proven, and that the chain of custody rule was substantially complied with, given that: (a)  the seized items were properly
marked immediately upon confiscation and in the presence of Ceralde, and(b)  the absence of representatives from the
media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official during the inventory was justified as time was of
the essence.[18]  More importantly, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved from the time of
their seizure by PO3 Delos Santos until their presentation in court as evidence. PO3 Delos Santos turned over the seized
items to PO3 Vinluan at the police station for further investigation and documentation. Thereafter, the latter returned
them to PO3 Delos Santos, who delivered them to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. After the conduct of qualitative
examination by PCI Roderos, the drugs were submitted to REC Velasco for safekeeping until their presentation in court.
[19]
  Finally, the CA held that the marijuana was validly confiscated from him after he was bodily searched during an in
flagrante delicto arrest.[20]
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Ceralde's conviction for illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[21] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."[22]
Here, Ceralde was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, respectively defined
and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. Notably, in order to properly secure the conviction of an
accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.[23]  Meanwhile, in
instances wherein an accused is charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the
following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the said drug. [24]
Case law states that in both instances, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral
certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over
the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of thecorpus delicti.[25]
Pertinently, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police
officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. [26]  Under the
said section, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and theDepartment of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination.
   In the case of People v. Mendoza[28] the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative
[27]
from the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)  again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and
credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti,  and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses
would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."[29]
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA 9165 may not always be possible.[30] In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 – which is
now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640[31]  – provide that the said inventory and photography
may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure,
and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 – under justifiable grounds – will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.[32] In other words, the failure of the apprehending team
to strictly comply with the  procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto  render the seizure
and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a)  there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and(b)  the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.[33] In People v. Almorfe,[34] the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.[35]  Also, in People v. De Guzman[36]  it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
[37]
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule were
unjustified, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Ceralde.
An examination of the records reveals that while the prosecution was able to show that the seized items were properly
marked by PO3 Delos Santos immediately upon their confiscation at the place of the arrest and in the presence of
Ceralde, the same was not done in the presence of any elected public official and a representative from the DOJ and the
media. In an attempt to justify such absence, PO3 Delos Santos testified that:
[PROSECUTOR PORLUCAS]: Can you tell us the reason, at the time of the taking of the photograph the absence
accused, the absence of the Department of Justice as well as the representative from the Media and the Barangay
Kagawad of the place?
[PO3 Delos Santos]: Because this is a case of a buy-bust operation and it is a confidential matter and we are not allowed
to tell other person about it because it might be leaked and it will not prove productive and also we are running out of
time to inform.[38]
Based on the aforesaid testimony, the justification given by PO3 Delos Santos was insufficient for the saving-clause to
apply. His claim that the instant buy-bust operation is a "confidential matter" which requires them "not to tell other person
about it," not even an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ or the media, cannot be given credence,
as the law mandates their presence to ensure the proper chain of custody and to avoid the possibility of switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence. Moreover, PO3 Delos Santos did not satisfactorily explain why compliance with
said rule "will not prove productive," not to mention the exigent circumstances which would actually show that they were
"running out of time to inform" the said required witnesses. In fact, there is dearth of evidence to show that the police
officers even attempted to contact and secure the other witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that buy-bust operations are
usually planned out ahead of time. Neither did the police officers provide any other explanation for their non-compliance,
such as a threat to their safety and security or the time and distance which the other witnesses would have had to
consider. Thus, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA
9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized
151
from Ceralde were already compromised. Perforce, Ceralde's acquittal is in order.
"As a final note, it is fitting to mention that '[t]he Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon
our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. x x x.'" [39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06100 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant John Paul Ceralde y  Ramos
is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
72. G.R. No. 191049, August 07, 2017
TOMAS P. ATIENZA, PETITIONER, V. OROPHIL SHIPPING INTERNATIONAL CO., INC., ENGINEER TOMAS N.
OROLA AND/OR HAKUHO KISEN CO., LTD., RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated September 30, 2009 and the Resolution[3]dated
January 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106186, which affirmed the Decision [4]dated April 22,
2008 and the Resolution[5] dated August 26, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR OFW M-06-
03-01004-00 / NLRC NCR CA No. 052872-07, dismissing petitioner Tomas P. Atienza's (petitioner) complaint for
disability benefits.
The Facts
Petitioner was employed as an Able Seaman by respondent Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc. (Orophil) on behalf
of its principal, respondent Hakuho Kisen Co., Ltd. (Hakuho), and was assigned at the M/V Cape Apricot. [6] In the course
of his employment contract, petitioner complained of severe headaches, nausea, and double vision which the foreign port
doctors diagnosed to be right cavernous sinus inflammation or Tolosa Hunt Syndrome (THS).[7] As a result, petitioner was
repatriated on February 4, 2005 and referred to a company-designated physician, Doctor Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz),
who confirmed the findings and advised him to continue the medication prescribed by the foreign doctors.[8] On June 28,
2005, Dr. Cruz issued a certification[9] declaring petitioner fit to resume work.[10]Dissatisfied, petitioner consulted an
independent physician, Dr. Paul Matthew D. Pasco (Dr. Pasco), who, on the other hand, assessed his illness as a Grade
IV disability and declared him unfit for sea duty.[11] Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint[12] against Orophil, Engineer
Tomas N. Orola, and Hakuho (respondents) before the NLRC for payment of disability benefits, reimbursement of
medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees, docketed as NLRC NCR OFW M-06-03-01004-00.
For their part, respondents opposed the claim for disability benefits, asserting that petitioner was declared fit to work by
the company-designated physician and that his illness is not work-related, adding too that he maliciously concealed the
fact that he had previously suffered from THS that effectively barred him from claiming disability benefits under the 2000
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).[13] They likewise
contended that petitioner had been paid his sickness allowance, while the claims for damages and benefits are without
basis.[14]
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In a Decision[15] dated April 30, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ordered respondents to pay petitioner the amount equivalent
to US$34,330.00 for his Grade IV disability and ten percent (10%) attorney's fees, while the rest of the claims were
denied for lack of basis.[16] The LA found petitioner's illness to be work-related and that he cannot be faulted for not
declaring his previous treatment for the same illness given that it had occurred way back in 1996 and has not recurred
despite several contracts.[17] The LA did not give merit to the company-designated physician's finding of fitness to work,
noting that petitioner was subsequently declared unfit for sea duty in a medical certificate dated March 14, 2006.
[18]
 Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the case to the NLRC.[19]
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated April 22, 2008, the NLRC set aside the LA's Decision and dismissed the complaint for petitioner's
failure to establish that his illness is work-related.[21] In so ruling, it did not give credence to the certificate issued by Dr.
Pasco as the finding of petitioner's unfitness to resume work was not supported by any explanation. [22]
His motion for reconsideration[23] having been denied by the NLRC in a Resolution[24] dated August 26, 2008, petitioner
elevated his case to the CA via a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 106186.[25]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated September 30, 2009, the CA affirmed the NLRC, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
latter's part in dismissing petitioner's complaint for disability benefits, allowances, and damages. It held that petitioner
failed to prove that his illness was caused or aggravated by his employment conditions.[27] Further, the CA pointed out
that petitioner was also declared fit to work by the company-designated physician and that while his independent
physician found otherwise, the said assessment was made after the lapse of a considerable period of time. [28]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution[29] dated January 22,
2010; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits pursuant to
the 2000 POEA-SEC.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has merit.
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.
In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevance evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.[30] Likewise, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[31]
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing
petitioner's certiorari  petition since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner is not entitled to total
and permanent disability benefits.
Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied" is deemed to be a "work-related
illness."[32] On the other hand, Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC declares that "[t]hose illnesses not listed in
Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related." The legal presumption of work-relatedness was
borne out from the fact that the said list cannot account for all known and unknown illnesses/diseases that may be
associated with, caused or aggravated by such working conditions, and that the presumption is made in the law to signify
that the non-inclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability
152
benefits.[33] Given the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue. "The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail."[34]
Thus, in Racelis v. United Philippine Lines, Inc.[35] and David v. OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc.,[36] the Court held
that the legal presumption of work-relatedness of a non-listed illness should be overturned only when the employer's
refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined, is "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."[37]
Nonetheless, the presumption provided under Section 20 (B) (4) is only limited to the "work-relatedness" of an illness.
It does not cover and extend to compensability. In this sense, there exists a fine line between the work-relatedness of an
illness and the matter of compensability. The former concept merely relates to the assumption that the seafarer's illness,
albeit not listed as an occupational disease, may have been contracted during and in connection with one's work,
whereas compensability pertains to the entitlement to receive compensation and benefits upon a showing that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. This can be gathered from Section 32-A of the
2000 POEA-SEC which already qualifies the listed disease as an "occupational disease" (in other words, a "work-related
disease"), but nevertheless, mentions certain conditions for said disease to be compensable:
SECTION 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must
be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As differentiated from the matter of work-relatedness, no legal presumption of compensability is accorded in favor of the
seafarer. As such, he bears the burden of proving that these conditions are met.
Thus, in Tagle v. Anglo-Eastern Crew Management, Phils., Inc.,[38] the Court ruled that while work-relatedness is indeed
presumed, "the legal presumption in Section 20 (B) (4) of the [2000] POEA-SEC should be read together with the
requirements specified by Section 32-A of the same contract.”[39]
Similarly, in Licayan v. Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc.,[40] it was explicated that the disputable presumption does
not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim, and that while the law disputably presumes an
illness not found in Section 32-A to be also work-related, the seafarer/claimant nonetheless is burdened to present
substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish its compensability. The proof of
work conditions referred thereto effectively equates with the conditions for compensability imposed under Section 32-A of
the 2000 POEA-SEC.
In Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena[42] it was likewise elucidated that there is a need to satisfactorily show the four (4)
conditions under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC in order for the disputably presumed disease resulting in disability
to be compensable.[43]
To note, while Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC refers to conditions for compensability of an occupational disease
and the resulting disability or death, it should be pointed out that the conditions stated therein should also apply to non-
listed illnesses given that: (a) the legal presumption under Section 20 (B) (4) accorded to the latter is limited only to
"work-relatedness"; and (b) for its compensability, a reasonable connection between the nature of work on board the
vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated must be shown.[44]
The absurdity of not requiring the seafarer to prove compliance with compensability for non-listed illnesses, when proof of
compliance is required for listed illnesses, was pointed out by the Court in Casomo v. Career Philippines
Shipmanagement, Inc.,[45] to wit:
A quick perusal of Section 32 of the [2000 POEA-SEC], in particular the Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries
Suffered and Diseases including Occupational Diseases or Illnesses Contracted, and the List of Occupational Diseases,
easily reveals the serious and grave nature of the injuries, diseases and/or illnesses contemplated therein, which are
clearly specified and identified.
We are hard pressed to adhere to Casomo's position as it would result in a preposterous situation where a seafarer,
claiming an illness not listed under Section 32 of the [2000 POEA-SEC] which is then disputably presumed as work-
related and is ostensibly not of a serious or grave nature, need not satisfy the conditions mentioned in Section 32-A of
the [2000 POEA-SEC]. In stark contrast, a seafarer suffering from an occupational disease would still have to satisfy four
(4) conditions before his or her disease may be compensable.
xxxx
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Cuntapay [576 Phil. 482, 492 (2008)] iterates that the burden of
proving the causal link between a claimant's work and the ailment suffered rests on a claimant's shoulder:
The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease was brought about largely
by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not a direct
causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Probability, not the
ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. And probability must be reasonable; hence
it should, at least, be anchored on credible information. Moreover, a mere possibility will not suffice; a claim will fail if
there is only a possibility that the employment caused the disease.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, it is apparent that for both listed occupational disease and a non-listed illness and their resulting injury to be
compensable, the seafarer must sufficiently show by substantial evidence compliance with the conditions for
compensability.
At this juncture, it is significant to point out that the delineation between work-relatedness and compensability in relation
to the legal presumption under Section 20 (B) (4) has been often overlooked in our jurisprudence. This gave rise to the
confusion that despite the presumption of work-relatedness already accorded by law, certain cases confound that the
seafarer still has the burden of proof to show that his illness, as well as the resulting disability is work-related.
Among these cases is Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc.,[47] wherein this Court failed to discern that
the presumption of work-relatedness did not extend or equate to presumption of compensability, and concomitantly, that
the burden of proof required from the seafarer was to establish its compensability not the work-relatedness of the illness:
At any rate, granting that the provision of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in Section 20
(B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable
presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be
entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have
existed during the term of his contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to the respondent
company.[48] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Later, in Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel,[49] Section 20 (B) (4) (which pertains to a presumption of work-
relatedness) was mischaracterized as a presumption of compensability which stands absent contrary proof:
Anent the issue as to who has the burden to prove entitlement to disability benefits, the petitioners argue that the burden
is placed upon Laurel to prove his claim that his illness was work-related and compensable. Their posture does not
persuade the Court.
True, hyperthyroidism is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Nonetheless,
Section 20(B), paragraph (4) of the said POEA-SEC states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this contract
are disputably presumed work-related." The said provision explicitly establishes a presumption of
compensability although disputable by substantial evidence. The presumption operates in favor of Laurel as the burden
rests upon the employer to overcome the statutory presumption. Hence, unless contrary evidence is presented by the
seafarer's employer/s, this disputable presumption stands.[50] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in DOHLE-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Gazzingan,[51] a "presumption of compensability" was declared for
illnesses not listed as an occupational disease:
More importantly, the 2000 POEA-SEC has created a presumption of compensability for those illnesses which are not
listed as an occupational disease. Section 20 (B), paragraph (4) states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this
Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." Concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon the
claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the
disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish compensability
of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases.[52] (Emphasis supplied)
To address this apparent confusion, the Court thus clarifies that there lies a technical demarcation between work-
relatedness and compensability relative to how these concepts operate in the realm of disability compensation. As
discussed, work-relatedness of an illness is presumed; hence, the seafarer does not bear the initial burden of proving the
same. Rather, it is the employer who bears the burden of disputing this presumption. If the employer successfully proves
that the illness suffered by the seafarer was contracted outside of his work (meaning, the illness is pre-existing), or that
although the illness is pre-existing, none of the conditions of his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating such
illness, then there is no need to go into the matter of whether or not said illness is compensable. As the name itself
implies, work-relatedness means that the seafarer's illness has a possibleconnection to one's work, and thus, allows the
seafarer to claim disability benefits therefor, albeit the same is not listed as an occupational disease.
The established work-relatedness of an illness does not, however, mean that the resulting disability is automatically
compensable. As also discussed, the seafarer, while not needing to prove the work-relatedness of his illness, bears the
burden of proving compliance with the conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Failure
to do so will result in the dismissal of his claim.
Notably, it must be pointed out that the seafarer will, in all instances, have to prove compliance with the conditions for
compensability, whether or not the work-relatedness of his illness is disputed by the employer:
On the one hand, when an employer attempts to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-relatedness
(i.e., by either claiming that the illness is pre-existing or, even if pre-existing, that the risk of contracting or aggravating the
same has nothing do with his work), the burden of evidence now shifts to the seafarer to prove otherwise (i.e., that the
illness was not pre-existing, or even if pre-existing, that his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating the
illness.) In so doing, the seafarer effectively discharges his own burden of proving compliance with the first three
conditions of compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that (1) the seafarer's work must involve
the risks described herein; (2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
and (3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it.
Thus, when the presumption of work-relatedness is contested by the employer, the factors which the seafarer needs to
prove to rebut the employer's contestation would necessarily overlap with some of the conditions which the seafarer
needs to prove to establish the compensability of his illness and the resulting disability. In this regard, the seafarer,
therefore, addresses the refutation of the employer against the work-relatedness of his illness and, at the same time,
discharges his burden of proving compliance with certain conditions of compensability.
On the other hand, when an employer does not attempt to discharge the burden of disputing the presumption of work-
relatedness, the seafarer must still discharge his own burden of proving compliance with the conditions of
compensability, which does not only include the three (3) conditions above-mentioned, but also, the distinct fourth
condition, i.e., that there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Thereafter, the burden of evidence
shifts to the employer to now disprove the veracity of the information presented by the seafarer. The employer may also
raise any other affirmative defense which may preclude compensation, such as concealment under Section 20 (E) [53] of
the 2000 POEA-SEC or failure to comply with the third-doctor referral provision under Section 20 (B) (3) [54]of the same
Contract.
Subsequently, if the work-relatedness of the seafarer's illness is not successfully disputed by the employer, and the
seafarer is then able to establish compliance with the conditions of compensability, the matter now shifts to a
determination of the nature (i.e., permanent and total or temporary and total) and in turn, the amount of disability benefits
to be paid to the seafarer.
In this case, petitioner claims entitlement to total and permanent disability benefits. Under Article 198 (c) (1) [55] of the
Labor Code, as amended, in relation to Rule VII, Section 2 (b) and Rule X, Section 2 (a) of the Amended Rules on
Employees' Compensation[56] (AREC), the following disabilities shall be deemed as total and permanent:
Art. 198. Permanent Total Disability. - x x x.
xxxx

153
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided
for in the Rules[.]
Rule VII
Benefits
Sec. 2. Disability - x x x.
xxxx
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
Rule X
Temporary Total Disability
xxxx
Sec. 2. Period of entitlement - (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused
by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still
requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit
for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time
after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of
physical or mental functions as determined by the System.(Emphases supplied)
Based on the foregoing provisions, the seafarer is declared to be on temporary total disability during the 120-day period
within which he is unable to work. However, a temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120
days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules, is considered as a total and permanent disability.[57] This exception
pertains to a situation when the sickness "still requires medical attendance beyond the 120 days but not to exceed 240
days" in which case, the temporary total disability period is extended up to a maximum of 240 days.[58]
It should be pointed out that these provisions are to be read hand in hand with the 2000 POEA-SEC, whose Section 20
(3) reads:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic
wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.[59]
In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Vergara).[60] the Court explained how the provisions of the Labor
Code/AREC and the 2000 POEA-SEC harmoniously operate:
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case
to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic
wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by
applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum
of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability
already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
medical condition.[61]
Note, however, that prior to the promulgation of Vergara  on October 6, 2008, the rule which was followed was the
doctrine laid down in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad (Crystal Shipping) .[62] Essentially, Crystal Shipping holds that
"[p]ermanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not
he loses the use of any part of his body,"[63] and "[w]hat is important is that [the seafarer] was unable to perform his
customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability." [64]
154
The apparent conflict between Crystal Shipping (120-day rule) and Vergara (120/240-day rule) was later clarified in the
case of Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar (Kestrel),[65] wherein the Court held that if the seafarer's complaint was filed
prior to the promulgation of Vergara on October 6, 2008, the Crystal Shipping doctrine should be applied, viz.:
This Court's pronouncements in Vergara presented a restraint against the indiscriminate reliance on Crystal
Shippingsuch that a seafarer is immediately catapulted into filing a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits
after the expiration of 120 days from the time he signed-off from the vessel to which he was assigned. Particularly, a
seafarer's inability to work and the failure of the company-designated physician to determine fitness or unfitness to work
despite the lapse of 120 days will not automatically bring about a shift in the seafarer's state from total and temporary to
total and permanent, considering that the condition of total and temporary disability may be extended up to a maximum of
240 days.
Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his
complaint and observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his
cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of his continued inability to perform
his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment.[66]
In the case at bar, petitioner was found by both the company-designated and independent physicians to have THS during
the term of his employment contract that caused his eventual repatriation on February 4, 2005. THS is a rare neurologic
disorder characterized by severe headache and pain often preceding weakness and painful paralysis of certain eye
muscles. Its exact cause was unknown but the disease was thought to be associated with inflammation of the area
behind the eyes.[67] A possible risk factor for THS is a recent viral infection.[68]
Records show that petitioner, as an Able Seaman, was called to keep watch at sea during navigation, and to observe
and record weather and sea conditions, among others[69]. It was also not disputed that in the performance of his
duties, petitioner was constantly exposed to cold, heat, and other elements of nature.[70] It was likewise in the exercise of
his functions that he experienced major symptoms of THS, namely, severe headache, nausea, and double vision.
[71]
 Clearly, while the exact cause of THS is unknown, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner's illness was most
probably aggravated due to the peculiar nature of his work that required him to be on-call twenty-four (24) hours a day
to observe and keep track of weather conditions and keep watch at sea during navigation. These activities necessarily
entail the use of eye muscles that can cause an eye strain as in fact, he experienced headache, nausea, and double
vision that worsened when he looked at his right side. Considering further his constant exposure to different temperature
and unpredictable weather conditions that accompanied his work on board an ocean-going vessel, the likelihood to suffer
a viral infection - a possible risk factor - is not far from impossible, more so when no less than petitioner's independent
physician, Dr. Pasco, diagnosed him to be suffering from cavernous sinus inflammation.[72]
Accordingly, it is apparent that while petitioner's illness appears to have been pre-existing, his work exposed him to the
risk of aggravating the same. Further, it is also shown that the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it. As the LA aptly observed:
Respondents further argued that [petitioner] failed to disclose that he suffered from frequent headaches, stiffness, and
eye trouble before he boarded the vessel.
[Petitioner] cannot be faulted in answering so when called to answer whether he suffered those conditions because it is
possible that indeed he did not suffer from said conditions before boarding the [vessel, because] the history of his illness
was way back in 1996 and has not recurred despite his several contracts with the respondents. It is only during his last
contract that he experienced the said illness and it is unavoidable that his illness called "Right cavernous Sinus
Inflammation" was aggravated by his working conditions on board including the lifestyle on board the vessel.
[73]
 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. These findings square with the conditions of
compensability under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, and hence, all appear to attend to this case. By and large,
the tasks performed by petitioner and his constant exposure to the varying elements of nature have contributed to the
development or aggravation of his illness while on board the M/V Cape Apricot and therefore, rendered his illness and
resulting disability compensable. In Canuel v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation,[74] it was held that the pre-existing nature
of the seafarer's illness does not bar compensation if the same was aggravated due to his working conditions:
Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment
but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very
least, the arduous nature of [the seafarer's] employment had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was
pre-existing at the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary,
in order for an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he
received the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain infirmities,
and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them, and assumes
the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal,
healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought, the
previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury independent of any pre-
existing weakness or disease.[75] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
At any rate, records show that it was only on June 28, 2005 [76] that the company-designated physician issued a Medical
Certificate declaring petitioner fit to work, which was 144 days after petitioner's repatriation on February 4, 2005.
Considering that petitioner's complaint was filed on March 29, 2006, during which time the 120-day rule pronounced
in Crystal Shipping was the prevailing doctrine, the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final
assessment within the 120-day period gave rise to a conclusive presumption that petitioner's disability is total and
permanent.
In this case, the NLRC failed to account for the foregoing rules on seafarers' compensation and instead, cavalierly
dismissed petitioner's claim on the supposition that petitioner failed to show a reasonable connection between his illness
and his work as an Able Seaman, even if the records show otherwise. More significantly, the NLRC did not account for
the employer's failure to comply with the 120 day-rule, by virtue of which the law conclusively presumes the seafarer's
disability to be total and permanent. Thus, for these reasons, the Court finds that the NLRC's ruling is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and hence, should have been corrected by the CA through certiorari. Accordingly, the CA's ruling
must be reversed and set aside.
In fine, petitioner should be paid by respondent Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc. (his employer) the maximum
disability amount of US$60,000.00 under the 2000 POEA-SEC, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, as prayed
for in his Position Paper[77] and pursuant to existing jurisprudence:
Pursuant to the ruling in Crystal Shipping, the fact that the assessment was made beyond the 120-day period prescribed
in the Labor Code is sufficient basis to declare that respondent suffered permanent total disability. This condition entities
him to the maximum disability benefit of USD 60,000 under the POEA-SEC.[78] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court likewise grants petitioner attorney's fees of US$6,000.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, since
he was forced to litigate to protect his valid claim. Case law states that "[w]here an employee is forced to litigate and
incur expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees equivalent to [ten percent]
(10%) of the award."[79]
On the other hand, as the LA ruled, all other claims in petitioner's Position Paper are dismissed for lack of merit. [80]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009 and the Resolution dated
January 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106186 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
one is ENTERED ordering respondent Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc. to pay petitioner Tomas P. Atienza the
aggregate amount of US$66,000.00, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. On the other hand, all other claims
are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
73. G.R. No. 224549, August 07, 2017
SPOUSES JANET URI FAHRENBACH AND DIRK FAHRENBACH PETITIONERS, VS. JOSEFINA R. PANGILINAN,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated September 21, 2015 and the Resolution[3]dated
April 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 133552, which affirmed with modification the
155
Decision[4] dated August 30, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4924,
ordering petitioners Spouses Janet Uri Fahrenbach and Dirk Fahrenbach (petitioners) to vacate the parcel of land
claimed by respondent Josefina R. Pangilinan (respondent), but remanding the case to the RTC for the determination of
the proper amount of monthly rentals petitioners should pay respondent.
The Facts
On September 6, 1995, respondent acquired a parcel of unregistered land (subject lot) from her aunt, Felomina Abid
(Abid), through a Waiver of Rights.[5] The said lot measured 5.78 hectares and was covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056.
[6]
 However, unknown to respondent, Abid also executed a Deed of Sale[7] on July 15, 1995 in favor of Columbino Alvarez
(Alvarez) covering the same piece of land.[8] The Deed of Sale to Alvarez contained the following description:
An area of 5.7800 hectares, unirrigated riceland, more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 0056; Property Index No. 066-
02-020-07-002; Bounded on the North: Mindoro Strait; East: Ass. Lot No. 005, Sec. 06; South AL No. 003; West: AL No.
Oil; with an assessed value of "P8,290.00."[9]
On August 2, 2005, after purportedly learning that the description of the property he bought under the Deed of Sale was
erroneous, Alvarez executed a handwritten letter stating that the subject lot, with an area of 5.78 hectares and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 0056, belonged to respondent.[10] Alvarez also executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on July 14,
2006, stating that the said land is not the property he had intended to buy from Abid but the one with an area of eight (8)
hectares under Tax Declaration No. 019-0233-A.[11]
In September 2005, respondent learned that petitioners were occupying the 5.78-hectare subject lot she acquired from
Abid and built structures thereon without respondent's consent.[12] Despite demands, petitioners refused to vacate the
premises.[13] Thus, after the barangay conciliation proceedings failed, respondent filed a complaint[14] for forcible entry
against petitioners before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Coron-Busuanga, Palawan (MCTC), which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 601.[15] Among others, respondent prayed that petitioners be ordered to vacate the premises, pay a
monthly rent of P10,000.00 from September 2005 up to the termination of the case, and pay P125,000.00 as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.[16]
In their Answer,[17] petitioners maintained that the land they were occupying is different from respondent's land which is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056. According to petitioners, the area they were occupying is the eight (8)-hectare
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 0052, which they allegedly acquired from Alvarez in 2005 by virtue of a Deed of
Sale. Petitioners further averred that Alvarez had been in possession of the same parcel of land since 1974 after Abid
allowed him to cultivate it. On the other hand, respondent neither physically possessed the said property nor introduced
improvements thereon.[18]
The MCTC Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated November 6, 2012, the MCTC dismissed respondent's complaint and upheld petitioners'
possession. The MCTC observed that while the parties claim to have bought different properties, i.e., the 5.78-hectare
property for the respondent and the eight (8)-hectare property for the petitioners, it was found and agreed that they were
in fact claiming one and the same lot.[20] In resolving the issue of prior possession, the MCTC took judicial notice of the
written report[21] issued by the City Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Coron, Palawan, as well as
the report[22] of the Office of the Municipal Assessor which conducted the ocular inspection and public hearing relative to
respondent's and Alvarez's conflicting claims back in 2005 and 2006.[23]The MCTC noted that their findings clearly state
that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Alvarez, was the actual occupant of the area being claimed by respondent. [24]
Anent the casual visits to the property respondent allegedly made, the MCTC ruled that the same was not sufficient to
constitute actual possession contemplated by law in ejectment cases. The MCTC observed that since respondent's
alleged acquisition of the property in 1995, she has not hired a caretaker nor fenced the same as an overt manifestation
of her claim of ownership. Thus, respondent's action for forcible entry cannot prevail over petitioners whose possession
can be traced to their predecessor-in-interest.[25]
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the RTC.[26] In a Decision[42] dated September 21, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings insofar as it held that respondent was the
prior possessor of the subject lot, but remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the proper amount of
The RTC Ruling monthly rentals payable to respondent.[43]

In a Decision[27] dated August 30, 2013, the RTC reversed the ruling of the MCTC and ordered petitioners to vacate the
subject lot.[28] The RTC pointed out that before one can be adjudged to have a better right of possession over another, it
is necessary to first ascertain the actual premises of the property subject of actual and prior possession. [29] In this case,
the RTC observed that the identity of the property petitioners were actually occupying was not clear. [30]
In this regard, the RTC observed that based on the Deed of Sale, it would appear that petitioners purchased an eight (8)-
hectare lot bounded by the seashore on the east; however, the relevant tax declaration, i.e., Tax Declaration No. 0052,
did not include "seashore" as a boundary.[31] This, according to the RTC, was the cause of the confusion anent the
identity of the property in dispute, considering that Alvarez held another eight (8)-hectare property bounded by the
seashore and covered by Tax Declaration No. 019-0233-A:[32]
Tax Declaration No. 0052 Tax Declaration No. 019-0233-A
North: ASS LOT #005 North: Seashore
South: ASS LOT #007 South: AL# 017
East: ASS LOT #007 East: AL# 003, 016
West: ASS LOT #011, Sec. 07 West: AL# 001[33]
Thus, since the word "seashore" was somehow inserted in the Deed of Sale, it would appear that what the property
petitioners bought and were occupying was the lot that was previously occupied by Alvarez and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 019-0233-A. However, in truth, the RTC found out that petitioners were actually occupying respondent's
property covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056.[34] Notably, the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056[35] was also
bounded by the seashore as the Mindoro Strait lies on its northern side:[36]
Tax Declaration No. 0056
North: Mindoro Strait
South: Ass. Lot No. 003
East: AL# 005, Sec. 6
West: Ass. Lot No. 011[37]
In view of the foregoing, the RTC concluded that petitioners acted in bad faith and, accordingly, ordered them to vacate
the property and pay respondent: (a) rent in the amount of P5,000.00 per month from September 2005, plus legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum until respondent is restored to its possession; and (b) attorney's fees and litigation
expenses amounting to P125,000.00.[38]
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,[39] which was, however, denied in an Order[40] dated November 18,
2013, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari.[41]
The CA Ruling
The CA noted that the parties in this case are claiming one and the same property, i.e. the lot covered by Tax Declaration
No. 0056,[44] and that respondent's prior possession de facto thereof has been proven as she occasionally visited the
same, paid realty taxes, and even requested for a survey authority thereon.[45] Thus, since a person need not have
his/her feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said that he/she is in possession of the land, the CA
ruled that respondent did not lose her possession of the subject lot, although she resided somewhere else and only
occasionally visited the same.[46]
Meanwhile, the CA rejected petitioners' argument that their possession of the subject lot from the time they purchased
the same in August 2005 should be tacked to Alvarez's possession. According to the CA, the concept of tacking refers to
legal possession and does not apply to physical possession, which is the issue in suits for forcible entry such as this
case.[47] The CA also echoed the RTC's observation that petitioners' documentary evidence are replete with
inconsistencies, such as the boundary description of the property they acquired from Alvarez, as stated in the Deed of
Sale vis-a-vis Tax Declaration Nos. 0052 and 019-0233-A.[48]
Anent the award of monthly rent to the respondent, the CA noted that the RTC did not cite any document showing realty
assessment of the land, justify the award of P5,000.00 monthly rental in favor of respondent. [49] In this regard, the CA
remanded the case to the RTC for the determination of the monthly rentals due respondent.[50]
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,[51] which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution[52]dated April
14, 2016; hence, the present petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in holding that respondent was in prior
possession of the subject lot.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that as a rule, the Court is not a trier of facts [53] and does not normally embark in the
evaluation of evidence adduced during trial.[54] This Rile, however, allows exceptions, such as instances when the
findings of fact of the trial court are conflicting or contradictory with those of the CA, [55] as in this case where the
conflicting findings of facts of the MCTC on one hand, and the RTC and the CA on the other, warrant a second look for
the proper dispensation of justice.
After a thorough study of this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the CA and the RTC that respondent was the
prior possessor of the subject lot.
The present controversy involves two (2) properties which are separate and distinct from each other. The first property is
the 5.78-hectare lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056, while the second is the eight (8)-hectare parcel of land under
Tax Declaration No. 0052 (now under Tax Declaration No. 019-0233-A). Petitioners contend that they are in possession
of the second lot, as the same was purportedly acquired by them from Alvarez through a Deed of Sale. However, it was
uncovered that due to the anent the identity of the property sold, petitioners were actually occupying the first subject lot
and, hence, were erroneously claiming the same.[56] In truth, the subject lot was not the property sold to petitioners by
Alvarez, but was the one which respondent acquired from Abid in September 1995 by virtue of a Waiver of Rights. [57] In

156
fact, this first lot was the subject of Alvarez's handwritten letter [58] dated August 2, 2005 and Sinumpaang
Salaysay[59] dated July 14, 2006, acknowledging respondent's ownership over it. With the true identity of the subject lot
having been established, it must nonetheless be determined whether or not respondent had prior de facto possession
over the same, considering that this case stemmed from a forcible entry complaint.
It is well-settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is who
between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute. [60] The main issue is
possession de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may set forth in his
pleading. The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to
such issue.[61] In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that it was in prior physical possession of the premises until it was
deprived thereof by the defendant.
In this case, respondent had sufficiently proven her prior possession de facto of the subject lot. Records disclose that
respondent occasionally visited the subject lot since she acquired the same from Abid in September 1995. She even paid
the lot's realty taxes, as well as requested for a survey authority thereon. [62] In fact, she submitted old
photographs[63] showing herself on the subject lot, the identity of which petitioners did not contend. Notably, jurisprudence
states that the law does not require a person to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before it can be said
that he is in possession thereof.[64] In Bunyi v. Factor,[65] the Court held that "visiting the property on weekends and
holidays is evidence of actual or physical possession. The fact of her residence somewhere else, by itself, does not result
in loss of possession of the subject property."[66] In contrast, petitioners themselves claim that they began occupying the
subject lot only in August 2005, after Alvarez executed the corresponding Deed of Sale in their favor.[67] Hence, in light of
the foregoing, there is no doubt that respondent had prior de facto possession.
At this juncture, the Court finds it proper to dispel petitioners' mistaken notion that their possession should be tacked onto
that of Alvarez who allegedly occupied the property since 1974. In Nenita Quality Foods Corporation v. Galabo,[68] the
Court clarified that tacking of possession only applies to possession de jure, or that possession which has for its purpose
the claim of ownership, viz.:
True, the law allows a present possessor to tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in
possession of the property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to possession de
jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership through
prescription. We reiterate - possession in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal
possession.[69] (Emphases supplied)
As earlier stated, possession de jure is irrelevant because the only question in forcible entry - as it is here - is prior
physical possession or possession de facto.
Finally, the Court clarifies that the written report issued by the CENRO of Coron, Palawan, [70] as well as the report of the
Office of the Municipal Assessor[71] which - conducted the ocular inspection and public hearing relative to respondent's
and Alvarez's conflicting claims back in 2005 and 2006,[72] are of no consequence to this case. As the records show, the
MCTC took judicial notice of the foregoing documents in rendering a ruling favorable to petitioners. Nevertheless, the
MCTC itself stated that the said reports deal with the conflict between Alvarez and respondent — not between petitioners
and respondent. In fact, the report of the Office of the Municipal Assessor states:
DATE: August 30, 2006
FOR: Hon. Mario T. Reyes, Jr., Municipal Mayor
THRU: Hon. Eliseo B. Buenaflor, Municipal Vice[-]Mayor
FROM: Mr. Reynario R. Labrador, Municipal Assessor
SUBJECT: BACK TO OFFICE REPORT RE: TRAVEL TO BARANGAY SAN JOSE THIS MUNICIPALITY TO ATTEND
157
PUBLIC HEARING REGARDING CONFLICT OF OWNERSHIP OF A PARCEL OF LAND BETWEEN JOSEFINA
REYES PANGILINAN AND COLUMBINO ALVAREZ [73] (Emphasis supplied)
Meanwhile, the report of the CENRO of Coron, Palawan[74] states:
With sufficient documents to prove the claim of [Alvarez] and our findings that the area is actually occupied and cultivated
by his family, [Janet Uri Fahrenbach] [,] with her desire to purchase the land, had it surveyed to be sure of the total area
of the land[,] considering that it is covered by Tax Declaration, [and if it is] smaller or bigger than the declared area.
Hence, a Survey Authority was issued on July 25, 2005.
xxxx
The inspection was done with positive results that [respondent] and [Alvarez], right then and there[,] agreed that her
claim is 5.78 [hectares] covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056. A copy of the handwritten document dated August 2, 2005
is herewith attached.
Based on the certification of the Municipal Assessor[,] the Tax Declaration for [the] 5.78 [-hectare lot] was transferred to
[respondent] by virtue of a Waiver of Rights dated September 6, 1995[;] [the same lot] was also conveyed by [Abid] to
[Alvarez] by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated July 15,1995, almost two months ahead of the Waiver of Rights.
x x x x[75] (Emphases supplied)
Thus, these reports clearly relate to the conflict between Alvarez and respondent regarding the ownership of the lot
covered by Tax Declaration No. 0056, and not with respect to the possession between petitioners and respondent. In this
light, the Court cannot therefore subscribe to the MCTC's conclusion that these reports established petitioners' prior
possession of the subject lot. In fact, this conclusion cannot be inferred from the subject reports, which only state that
Alvarez was the actual occupant of the area being claimed by respondent.[76] As already explained, Alvarez's possession
is irrelevant, considering that petitioners' alleged possession over the subject lot cannot be tacked onto that of Alvarez in
suits for forcible entry, as in this case.
With regard to the rent due respondent, the CA correctly held that since petitioners disturbed respondent's possession of
the subject lot, rent is due respondent from the time petitioners intruded upon her possession. Under Section 17, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, the judgment in cases for forcible entry shall include the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. However, in Badillo v. Tayag,[77] the Court clarified
that reasonable amount of rent in suits for forcible entry must be determined not by mere judicial notice, but by
supporting evidence.[78] Here, since the RTC indeed failed to cite any document showing the assessment of the subject
lot, any increase in the realty taxes, and the prevailing rental rate in the area, the CA correctly remanded this aspect to
the RTC for proper determination.
Anent the award of attorney's fees, the Court finds the same in order, considering that petitioners' intrusion on
respondent's property has compelled the latter to incur expenses to protect her interests.[79]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 21, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 14, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133552 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
74. G.R. No. 218592, August 02, 2017
CHRISTOPHER FIANZA A.K.A. "TOPEL," PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated November 24, 2014 and the Resolution[3]dated
May 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35293, which upheld the Decision [4] dated September 6,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 52 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. T-5144 and T-5145,
finding petitioner Christopher Fianza a.k.a. "Topel" (Fianza) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of violation
of Section 5 (b),[5] Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,[6] otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
The Facts
Fianza was charged with two (2) counts of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 under two (2)
Informations[7] dated April 6, 2011 filed before the RTC.[8] The prosecution's version of the incidents are as follows:
Sometime in July 2010,[9] AAA,[10] who was then 11 years old, was called by Fianza to his house and thereupon, was
asked to wash his clothes. After AAA was finished with the laundry, Fianza asked her to go with him to the kamalig.
Thereat, they proceeded to the second floor where Fianza removed his pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to
hold his penis and masturbate him. After ejaculating, Fianza put on his clothes, and gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter,
went home.[11]
On November 30, 2010, while AAA was home, Fianza called her to his house, and asked her to clean the same. After
she was done sweeping the floor, they proceeded to the second floor of the kamalig. Thereat, Fianza again removed his
pants and briefs, lied down, and ordered AAA to fondle his penis. After the deed, he gave P20.00 to AAA who, thereafter,
went home.[12]
After the second incident, AAA related the matter to her cousin, CCC, [13] who, in turn, told BBB,[14] AAA's mother, who
reported the matter to the police.[15]
For his part, Fianza interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that he lived with his uncle in Andalasi,
Pangasinan (Andalasi), while the rest of his family resided in Sapinit, Pangasinan (Sapinit), and were neighbors with
AAA. He averred that in July 2010, he went to Sapinit to gamble all night, and went to his parents' house the following
morning to sleep before going home to Andalasi.[16] As for the November 30, 2010 incident, he maintained that he was in
Andalasi drinking with his friends as he had just sold a carabao. The next day, he went to get the carabao that he sold,
and bought more liquor. He proceeded to Sapinit to have another drinking session that lasted until December 4, 2010.[17]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[18] dated September 6, 2012, the RTC found Fianza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and ordered him to pay AAA the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages for each count.
The RTC held that for an accused to be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years
old, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336[19] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) must be met in
addition to the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA 7610,[20] which the prosecution was able to establish. It
gave full faith and credence to the testimony of AAA who remained steadfast in her claim and who was not shown to
have been impelled by any ill-motive to testify falsely against Fianza.[21] On the other hand, it declared that Fianza's
actions showed that he took advantage of AAA's naivete and innocence to satisfy his lewd designs. [22]
Aggrieved, Fianza elevated[23] his conviction to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 35293.
The CA Ruling
158
In a Decision[24] dated November 24, 2014, the CA upheld Fianza's conviction for two (2) counts of violation of Section 5
(b), Article III of RA 7610.
The CA observed that while Fianza was charged with violations of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 (sexual abuse), the
proper appellation of the crimes should be violations of Article 336 of the RPC (Acts of Lasciviousness), in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, and found that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for both Acts of
Lasciviousness and sexual abuse. It declared that Fianza, a 35-year old adult, had moral ascendancy over 11-year-old
AAA; hence, his act of coercing AAA to engage in lascivious conduct falls within the meaning of the term sexual abuse. [25]
However, the CA reduced the award of moral damages to P25,000.00, and further ordered Fianza to pay a fine in the
amount of P15,000.00 for each count of sexual abuse, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the
amounts due from the finality of judgment until full payment.[26]
Dissatisfied, Fianza moved for reconsideration,[27] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[28] dated May 29, 2015;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Fianza's conviction.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court deems it appropriate to correct the appellation of the crime with which Fianza was charged to
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC considering that the victim, AAA, was only 11 years old at the time
of the incidents. In instances where the child subjected to sexual abuse through lascivious conduct is below twelve (12)
years of age, the offender should be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but suffer the higher penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period in accordance with Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently reads:
SECTION 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims [sic] is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporalin its medium period x x
x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a
minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse thereunder.[29]
The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC are: (a) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) the lascivious act is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) by using force or
intimidation; (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party
is under twelve (12) years of age; and (c) the offended party is another person of either sex.[30] On the other hand, sexual
abuse, as defined under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 has three (3) elements: ( a) the accused commits an act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse; and (c) the child is below eighteen (18) years old.[31]
The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite
crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the
existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted
as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and
the environmental circumstances. Hence, whether or not a particular conduct is lewd, by its very nature, cannot be
pigeonholed into a precise definition.[32]
Lascivious conduct, on the other hand, is defined under Section 2 (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child Abuse Cases) as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person;
In the present case, the existence of all the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as well as
the first and third elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, remains undisputed. Records
disclose that on two (2) occasions in July 2010 and on November 30, 2010, Fianza induced AAA, an 11-year-old minor,
to hold his penis and masturbate him. The only point of dispute is with regard to the existence of the second element of
sexual abuse, i.e., whether or not the lascivious conduct was performed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse.
A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. Case law further clarifies that lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists
when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's
free will.[33] Corollory thereto, Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the
element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
[T]he employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person
to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children x x x
The term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and
substitutes another's objective." On the other hand, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to
submit to the wishes of one who wields it."[34]
With the foregoing parameters considered, the Court finds that Fianza's acts were attended by coercion or influence
within the contemplation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610.
It is undisputed that AAA was only 11 years old at the time of the incidents, hence, considered a child under the law.
Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610 defines children in this wise:
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition[.]
Case law states that a child, such as AAA in this case, is presumed to be incapable of giving rational consent to any
lascivious act. In Malto v. People,[35] the Court explained:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of
fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to
take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her than a
bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to
surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against
159
abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly
tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be
incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.[36]
Records likewise indicate that Fianza was about 35 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, [37] or 24 years
older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between them clearly placed Fianza in a stronger position over AAA
which enabled him to wield his will on the latter.[38]
However, Fianza assails his conviction for the prosecution's failure: (a) to specify in the Information in Criminal Case No.
T-5144 the date of the commission of the offense;[39] and (b) to indicate in the information in both cases that the
complained acts were performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse[40] in violation of
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
In this relation, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Rules), which lays down the guidelines in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
xxxx
As to the sufficiency of the allegation on the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules
adds:
SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date
the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not
be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date
within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. [41]
In this case, Fianza had been fully apprised of the charges against him since the Informations stated the approximate
date of the commission of the offense to be "sometime during the month of July 2010." Indeed, the precise date and time
of the incidents are not among the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. [42]
It is likewise well-settled that it is sufficient that the acts or omissions constituting the offense be stated in the information
in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, albeit in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and for the court to pronounce
judgment.[43]
In the instant case, the Informations not only referred to the specific section of RA 7610 that was violated, but also stated
that: (a) AAA was an 11-year-old minor at the time of the offense; and (b) Fianza committed lascivious conduct
by forcing AAA to masturbate his penis.[44]
To reiterate, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under
the coercion or intimidation,[45] or influence of any adult.[46]
Force or intimidation in cases involving prosecutions for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness is defined as "power, violence
or constraint exerted upon or against a person."[47] In People v. Maceda,[48] the Court explained the standards for
evaluating the force or intimidation employed in rape, which equally applies to Acts of Lasciviousness [49] as well as
violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610:[50]
[I]t is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could
not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the
accused had in mind. The intimidation must be judged in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of
the commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule.[51](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The allegation that Fianza committed lascivious conduct by forcing AAA to masturbate his penis was sufficient to apprise
him of the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged to enable him to prepare his defense. Contrary to his
protestations, the Informations sufficiently alleged the second element of sexual abuse, albeit not employing the exact
language of the law, i.e., that the lewd acts being complained of were performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.
Notably, Fianza failed to refute AAA's claim that she was compelled to do as he instructed because he threatened to
humiliate her and her family.[52] In Amployo v. People,[53] a case involving a similar prosecution for lascivious conduct
committed on an eight-year-old minor, the Court held that intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible, especially in
the case of young girls, thus:
[I]ntimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or
subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in the case of young, innocent and
immature girls who could not be expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls
cannot be expected to act like adults under the same circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard
the threat.[54] (Emphasis supplied)
It is not hard to imagine 11-year-old AAA being intimidated and cowed into silence and submission by her neighbor, a full
grown adult male old enough to be her parent,[55] with threat of humiliation, should she not give in to his dastardly desires.
She is still a child not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions. Verily, in almost all cases of
sexual abuse, the credibility of the victim's testimony is crucial in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only the
persons involved can testify as to its occurrence. Hence, the Court accords a high degree of respect to the assessment
of the trial court which is in the best position to observe the declarations and demeanor of the witnesses, and evaluate
their credibility, even more so when the same is affirmed by the CA,[56] as in this case.
Accordingly, the Court finds the prosecution to have sufficiently established Fianza's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum.[57] However, in line with recent jurisprudence, the Court modifies the awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages, and hereby orders Fianza to pay the amounts of P15,000.00 as fine, P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P15,000.00 as moral damages, for each count, plus legal interest thereon at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this judgment until full payment.[58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2014 and the Resolution dated May 29, 2015
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35293 are hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is entered finding petitioner
Christopher Fianza a.k.a. "Topel" (Fianza) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610. Fianza is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as maximum, and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P15,000.00 as fine, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P15,000.00 as moral damages, for each count, plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
75. G.R. No. 186050, August 01, 2017
160
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, AND BEVERLY LONGID,
PETITIONERS, VS. EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN.
ALEXANDER YANO, GEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, LT. P/DIR. EDGARDO DOROMAL,
MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE AFP-ISU BASED IN BAGUIO CITY, PSS
EUGENE MARTIN, AND SEVERAL JOHN DOES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 186059]
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,SECRETARY GILBERTOTEODORO,SECRETARY RONALDOPUNO,SECRETARY
NORBERTOGONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU,
MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA, AND POL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN, PETITIONERS, VS. ARTHUR BALAO,
WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, AND BEVERLY LONGID, RESPONDENTS. *
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is the Report[1] dated June 13, 2017 submitted by the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 63 (RTC) in compliance with the Court's directives contained in the Resolution[2] dated June 21, 2016 in the
above-captioned consolidated cases.
The Facts
The present matter arose from a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo filed by the relatives of James M. Balao
(James) before the RTC, alleging that he was abducted by five (5) unidentified men on September 17, 2008 in La
Trinidad, Benguet because of his activist/political leanings as founding member of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA).
[3]
 The RTC granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, thereby commencing the conduct of several investigations by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to determine the whereabouts and the
circumstances behind the disappearance of James.[4] In its Formal Report[5] dated November 12, 2014 submitted to the
RTC, the PNP stated that they encountered problems in gathering evidence that would lead to the resolution of the case,
and thus, proposed that their investigation be terminated. Meanwhile, the AFP overturned the suspicions behind the
involvement of an active service officer of the army, i.e., Major Ferdinand Bruce Tokong, in James's abduction, which
likewise led to a standstill in its own investigation.[6] As a result, the RTC recommended, among others, the archiving of
the case, considering that the ongoing investigation had reached an impasse.[7] Eventually, the consolidated cases were
brought to the Court.[8]
The Court's Ruling in the June 21, 2016 Resolution
In a Resolution[9] dated June 21, 2016, the Court partially adopted the RTC's recommendations, and accordingly: (a)
rejected the recommendation of the RTC to archive the cases; (b) relieved the AFP and the Commission on Human
Rights from their respective obligations to investigate James's abduction; and (c) directed the PNP to further investigate
the angle presented by Bryan Gonzales (Gonzales) and to ascertain the identities of "Uncle John" and "Rene" who are
persons of interest in these cases.[10] In light of the foregoing, the Court gave the PNP a period of six (6) months to
complete its investigation on the aforesaid matter, and thereafter, turn over its results to the RTC. The RTC, in turn, shall
then submit its full report and recommendation to the Court.[11]
The Court held that while it may appear that the investigation conducted by the AFP had reached an impasse, records
disclose that the testimony of Gonzales, an asset of the Military Intelligence Group 1 and a cousin of James, alluded to
the possibility that James could have been abducted by members of the CPA. In the same testimony, "Uncle John" and
"Rene" were mentioned as CPA members who were James's housemates. Thus, there was still an active lead worth
pursuing by the PNP, which means that the recommendation to archive the case was premature.[12]
Proceedings after the June 21, 2016 Resolution

On June 20, 2017, the RTC submitted its Report[13] dated June 13, 2017 to the Court.
Collating the findings of the PNP in its Compliance Report[14] dated March 14, 2017, and the attached Investigation
Report[15] dated March 10, 2017 and Investigation/Compliance Report[16] dated May 18, 2017, the RTC disclosed that the
PNP, through Senior Police Officer 2 Franklin Dulawan, interviewed Gonzales and presented thirty-two (32) photographs
of James, most of them taken between the years 1992 to 2001, in order to allow him to review the faces therein and
reveal the identities of "Uncle John" and "Rene." Unfortunately, Gonzales was unable to give any information regarding
their identities due to the lapse of time. Similarly, other witnesses named Florence Luken (Luken) and Danette Balao
Fontanilla (Fontanilla) could neither identify the said persons of interest.[17]
As such, the RTC concluded that the investigation has reached another impasse for failure to uncover relevant leads,
[18]
 and once more recommended to archive the cases, to be revived upon motion by any of the parties should a
significant lead arise. Further, the RTC asked the Court to relieve the PNP of its mandate to investigate the matter and to
submit reportorial requirements until new witnesses or relevant evidence appear or are discovered.[19]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not it should adopt the recommendations of the RTC in its Report dated
June 13, 2017 relative to these cases.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the recommendations of the RTC.
As mentioned in the Court's June 21, 2016 Resolution, "archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to
temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their
outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in
which action thereon can be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is
impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar analogous
causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings x x x."[20] Section 20
of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, entitled "The Rule on the Writ of Amparo,"[21]reads:
Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its
determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on
their lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by
any party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon
failure to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this
Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.
Based on the report submitted by the RTC, it appears that the PNP had indeed conducted the required investigation on
the angle presented by Gonzales and further attempted to ascertain the identities of "Uncle John" and Rene" who are
persons of interest in these cases. This notwithstanding, none of the material witnesses, namely, Gonzales himself,
Luken, and Fontanilla, could provide any information on the identities of these persons, despite having been presented
with various photographs of James and his companions. As such, the investigation of the PNP on James's case has
once more reached an impasse without, this time, any other active leads left to further pursue. Given this situation, the
Court therefore concludes that the archiving of the case is now appropriate and perforce, adopts and approves the
recommendations of the RTC in its June 13, 2017 Report.
161
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to ADOPT and APPROVE the recommendations of the Regional Trial Court of
La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 in its Report dated June 13, 2017.
Let these cases be ARCHIVED without prejudice to their revival upon due motion by any of the parties; and the
Philippine National Police be RELIEVED from its mandate to investigate the case and to submit reportorial requirements
until new witnesses or relevant evidence appear or are discovered.
SO ORDERED.
76. G.R. Nos. 224308-09, September 27, 2017
FABRICATOR PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. JEANIE ROSE Q. ESTOLAS, *RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated September 14, 2015 and the Resolution[3]dated
May 2, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833, which, inter alia, ruled that petitioner
Fabricator Philippines, Inc. (petitioner) illegally dismissed respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas (respondent).
The Facts
The instant case arose from a complaint[4] for illegal dismissal with claims for moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by respondent against petitioner, a
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of motorcycle parts,[5] and its President, Victor Lim (Lim).
Respondent alleged that petitioner hired her as a welder.[6] Before break time of July 2, 2011, while waiting for a
replacement part she requested to be installed on the welding machine she was using, respondent took a seat and
rested.[7] At that time, another employee, Rosario Banayad (Banayad), passed by and saw her sitting, then uttered "Ayos
ka ha." The matter was brought to the attention of Assembly Action Team Leader, Warlito Abaya (Abaya), who
confronted respondent about the said incident.[8] Thereafter, while Abaya and Banayad were talking to each other,
respondent told the latter in the vernacular "Ang kitid ng utak mo[.] [B]akit hindi mo muna ako tinanong kung bakit ako
nakaupo[?] [B]akit hindi mo muna tinanong kung ano [ang] nasa likod ng nakita mo?" Banayad retorted, saying,
"Matapang ka ha! Matapang ka!" Respondent replied, "Candy, ikaw pa naman ang nagdadasal araw-araw, tapos ganyan
ang ugali mo!"[9]
Consequently, Abaya directed respondent to see Lim in his office. During their meeting, the latter allegedly asked what
she would feel if he would hit her ear, then proceeded to hit her ear.[10] Respondent reasoned out that she did not hit
Banayad's ear and that it was the latter who provoked her. However, Lim insisted that respondent was rude towards
Banayad.[11] Thus, on July 13, 2011, respondent was issued a suspension order effective the following day for a period of
three (3) days. While she was in the locker area, the company guard on duty informed respondent to report for work the
following day.[12]
A few months later, or on October 17, 2011, Lim told respondent to resign and that his lawyer will see her on October 19,
2011.[13] On November 25, 2011, respondent was again instructed not to report for work until she and Lim have talked.
On November 28, 2011, Lim directed respondent to sign a paper, which she refused as it pertained to the promotion of
Banayad as Strategy and Control Group-Senior Assistant 1. On November 30, 2011, respondent received a letter [14] from
Lim directing her to seek the assistance of a lawyer for the hearing on December 7, 2011. At the scheduled hearing,
respondent was required to sign the statements of Banayad and other witnesses, which she refused to follow.
[15]
 Thereafter, on December 16, 2011, respondent was served a notice[16] of termination effective December 17, 2011,
finding her guilty of serious misconduct. Hence, respondent filed the aforementioned complaint. [17]

For their part,[18] petitioner and Lim maintained that respondent was validly dismissed for gross misconduct, as: (a) she
was caught sitting down during office hours; and (b) she insulted and uttered offensive language towards her superior,
Banayad.[19] They further pointed out that they sent respondent various memoranda regarding the incident, but the latter
refused to receive the same. Thus, they were constrained to terminate her employment.[20]
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated September 17, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of respondent, and accordingly, ordered
petitioner and Lim to pay her separation pay with full backwages in the total amount of P167,324.29.[22]
The LA found that while respondent may have indeed committed acts of misconduct, the same were not willful and
intentional in character. The LA added that there was no wrongful intent, but a mere spur of the moment incident
prompted by a simple miscommunication among workmates.[23] As such, the penalty meted on respondent, i.e.,
dismissal, was not commensurate to the offense charged against her.[24]
Aggrieved, petitioner and Lim appealed[25] to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
Initially, the NLRC issued a Resolution[26] dated January 31, 2013 dismissing the appeal on technical grounds. Upon
reconsideration, however, the NLRC promulgated a Decision[27] dated August 30, 2013 modifying the LA ruling by
deleting the award of separation pay and backwages, and in lieu thereof, ordered respondent's reinstatement to her
former position without loss of seniority rights.[28]
The NLRC agreed with the LA's finding that while respondent indeed committed an act of misconduct, the same was not
of a serious and grave character so as to warrant respondent's dismissal for a just cause. [29] However, the NLRC found it
appropriate to delete the award of backwages in respondent's favor, opining that this is a commensurate penalty for the
latter's act of professional misconduct.[30]
Both parties moved for reconsideration,[31] which were, however, denied in a Resolution[32] dated November 29, 2013.
Dissatisfied, they elevated the matter to the CA via their respective petitions for certiorari.[33]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[34] dated September 14, 2015, the CA reinstated the LA ruling with modifications: (a) ordering petitioner to
pay respondent backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed until finality of the ruling less her salary for fifteen
(15) days corresponding to her suspension, and separation pay computed from the time respondent was hired until
finality of the decision, plus legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid; ( b)
absolving Lim from any personal liability arising from respondent's illegal dismissal; and (c) ordering the LA to make a
recomputation of the total monetary benefits awarded and due respondent.[35]
Agreeing with the findings of the labor tribunals a quo, the CA held that respondent's acts did not amount to gross
misconduct that would have justified her termination from work.[36] In this regard, it found that the NLRC gravely abused
its discretion in deleting the award of backwages, pointing out that respondent was already suspended for three (3) days
for her misconduct, and thus, a second disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in her dismissal, as well as the
consequent filing of the instant case, was no longer warranted.[37] Nonetheless, the CA opined that respondent's
infraction was minor, for which a fifteen (15)-day suspension would have sufficed.[38]
Anent respondent's claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, the CA pointed out that she
never appealed the LA ruling which did not grant her such monetary awards, rendering the same final as to her.
162
[39]
Moreover, she failed to present competent evidence to support her claims. [40]
Finally, the CA absolved Lim from any personal liability as it was not shown that he acted with malice and bad faith in
dismissing respondent from service.[41]
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[42] but the same was denied in a Resolution[43] dated May 2, 2016;
hence, this petition.[44]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's Resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Article 297 (formerly Article 282)[45] of the Labor Code,[46] as amended, lists serious misconduct as one of the just causes
for an employee's dismissal from work, pertinent portions of which read:
Article 297 [282]. Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
xxxx
Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of the foregoing provision, the
following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the
employee's duties, showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must
have been performed with wrongful intent.[47]
In this case, the tribunals a quo aptly observed that while respondent indeed committed some sort of misconduct when
she engaged in a verbal tussle with Banayad during work hours and in front of their superior, Abaya, the same was not
serious enough to warrant respondent's dismissal. Neither was it shown that respondent performed such act of
misconduct with wrongful intent nor did the same render her unfit to continue working for petitioner. As such, the
tribunals a quo correctly concluded that petitioner illegally dismissed respondent. It is settled that "where the factual
findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by the CA, the same are accorded respect and
finality and are binding upon this Court,"[48] as in this case.
Moreover, it is well to stress that on July 13, 2011, petitioner already issued an order suspending respondent for a period
of three (3) days on account of her misconduct.[49] Thus, petitioner could no longer subject respondent to another
disciplinary proceeding based on the same act of misconduct. Clearly, respondent could not have been validly terminated
from work.
As the fact of illegal dismissal has already been established, respondent is entitled to two (2) separate and distinct reliefs,
namely: (a) backwages; and (b) reinstatement or the payment of separation pay if the reinstatement is no longer viable.[50]
As to backwages, the Court upholds the CA's award of the same in respondent's favor, as "the payment of backwages is
a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal. [51] However, the CA erred in
imposing on respondent a fifteen (15)-day suspension for the latter's acts, with the equivalent monetary value
corresponding to such suspension to be deducted from respondent's award of backwages. To reiterate, respondent was
already meted a three (3)-day suspension for her act of misconduct and hence could no longer be further penalized for
the same,[52] which thus renders such further penalty from the CA without any legal basis. In this light, the Court deems it
appropriate to delete the aforesaid erroneous imposition, and consequently, award full backwages to respondent.
Anent the issue of reinstatement or payment of separation pay, it must be stressed that "[r]einstatement is a restoration
to a state from which one has been removed or separated."[53] However, "[u]nder the doctrine of strained relations, the
payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer
desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its
employ a worker it could no longer trust."[54] In this case, while the LA and the CA did not discuss the basis for awarding
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, the Court nonetheless deems such award proper, considering that the underlying
circumstances which led to respondent's unlawful termination, which had certainly created an atmosphere of animosity
and antagonism between the employer and the employee, and hence, warrants the application of the doctrine of strained
relations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated September 14, 2015 and the Resolution dated
May 2, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833 are
hereby AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION, deleting the deduction of salary/wages for fifteen (15) days from the award of
backwages in favor of respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas. The rest of the CA ruling STANDS.
SO ORDERED.
77. G.R. No. 224973, September 27, 2017
GINA LEFEBRE, JOINED BY HER HUSBAND, DONALD LEFEBRE, PETITIONERS, VS. A BROWN COMPANY, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated July 8, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated May 24,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04582-MIN, which set aside the Decision [4] dated May 10, 2011 of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)-Board of Commissioners (BOC) in HLURB Case No. REM-A-
110224-01374 and, instead, reinstated the Decision[5] dated January 5, 2011 of the Housing and Land Use (HLU) Arbiter
in HLURB Case No. REM-x-33010-001 ordering respondent A Brown Company, Inc. (respondent) to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 6552[6] on the prior payment of cash surrender value before the actual cancellation of
the contract to sell subject of this case could be effected.
The Facts
Sometime in 1998, petitioner Gina Lefebre (Lefebre) made a reservation to buy a residential lot in Xavier Estates
developed by respondent in view of the latter's representation that a Manresa 18-Hole All Weather Championship Golf
Course would be developed. From the original reservation for a 576-square meter parcel of land, Lefebre upgraded her
reservation to a 1,107-square meter lot that was priced at P5,313,600.00 as her husband, petitioner Donald Lefebre
(collectively, petitioners), a Belgian businessman, plays golf.[7] Thus, a Contract to Sell[8] was executed with the following
stipulations: (a) 30% down payment of P1,594,080.00 which included the P10,000.00 reservation fee paid on December
31, 1998; and (b) the balance to be amortized equally in 84 months.[9] However, contrary to respondent's representation,
the golf course was not developed and the Contract to Sell was cancelled for failure of Lefebre to pay the remaining
balance which the latter offered to settle in a period of six (6) months. [10]
Consequently, Lefebre filed a Complaint[11] for Misleading and Deceptive Advertisement, Annulment of Rescission of
163
Contract to Sell, Damages and Other Relief against respondent before the HLURB, Regional Office No. X. She claimed
that she had already paid a total of P8.1 million including interests and surcharges and that her unpaid balance was only
P1,345,722.18.[12] Thus, Lefebre prayed that respondent comply with its obligation to develop the golf course or refund in
full their payments with interest, among others.[13]
For its part,[14] respondent countered that as early as 2001, Lefebre had already been remiss in her monthly obligations
and that despite the grace periods accorded, she still failed to settle the same, prompting respondent to cancel the
reservation application and contract to sell. Respondent further claimed that the misleading and deceptive advertisement
regarding the golf-course was never raised by Lefebre and was merely brought up as an afterthought to justify her
default.[15]
The HLU Arbiter's Ruling
In a Decision[16] dated January 5, 2011, the HLU Arbiter ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the claim of misleading
and deceptive advertisement of the promised golf-course was only raised by Lefebre after she failed to settle her
obligations, and after several notices of cancellation have been sent. Thus, the HLU Arbiter held that Lefebre cannot find
refuge in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957[17] relative to the nonforfeiture of installment payments since the
latter failed to give prior notice of the decision to discontinue payment due to non-development of the golf course.
However, the HLU Arbiter stated that Lefebre was entitled to the cash surrender value of the payments made before the
Contract to Sell may be actually cancelled pursuant to Section 3 of RA 6552. Lastly, in view of respondent's admission
that it had not developed the advertised golf course, the case was indorsed to the Monitoring Section for further
investigation and evaluation so that appropriate sanctions, if any, may be imposed. [18]
Dissatisfied, Lefebre filed an appeal.[19]
The HLURB BOC Ruling
In a Decision[20] dated May 10, 2011, the HLURB BOC set aside the HLU Arbiter's decision. [21] It ruled that the Contract to
Sell was not validly cancelled for failure of the respondent to tender the cash surrender value of the payments made, and
therefore, still subsists. With the contract still in effect, Lefebre had the right to continue with it. [22] However, since
respondent already averred that it no longer intends to develop the promised golf course, Lefebre is entitled to a full
refund of the payments made in the amount of P8.1 Million with interest, less penalties or surcharges. Respondent was
further ordered to pay P20,000.00 each as moral damages and attorney's fees, plus the cost of suit, as well as the
administrative fine of P10,000.00 for failure to provide the said amenity.[23]
Respondent moved for reconsideration,[24] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[25] dated August 26, 2011. Hence,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari[26] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The Proceedings Before the CA
In a Resolution[27] dated February 6, 2012, the CA dismissed the certiorari petition for failure of respondent to exhaust the
available administrative remedy,[28] i.e., an appeal to the Office of the President, among other procedural grounds. On
motion for reconsideration,[29] the dismissal of the petition was vacated, holding that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not ironclad and may be dispensed with when such requirement would be unreasonable
and given that there were circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[30]
In a Decision[31] dated July 8, 2015, the CA set aside the HLURB BOC's decision and reinstated the HLU Arbiter's
decision.[32] It held that while respondent did not tender the cash surrender value of the payments made in view of the
post-cancellation negotiations initiated by Lefebre, the rescission of the Contract to Sell was not invalid per seconsidering
that Lefebre's failure to settle her outstanding obligations was a valid ground to rescind the Contract to Sell. Moreover,
the CA opined that Lefebre was estopped from claiming that the non-payment of her amortizations was due to the failed
golf-course given that from 2001 to 2008, Lefebre never informed respondent that she was withholding payment unless
the golf course be developed. Thus, it ruled that Lefebre was only entitled to the cash surrender value provided under
Section 3 of RA 6552.[33]
Aggrieved, Lefebre filed a motion for reconsideration,[34] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[35] dated May 24,
2016; hence, the instant petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA's reinstatement of the HLU Arbiter's Decision was
proper, despite respondent's direct filing of a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 60 (b), Rule 17 of the 2011 Revised Rules of Procedure of the HLURB[36] (HLURB Rules) provides that the
decision or resolution of the HLURB BOC shall become final and executory within 15 days after receipt thereof unless an
appeal has been filed:
Rule 17  correct ruling in this case.
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
Section 60. Finality of Judgment. - Decisions or orders of the Arbiter and the Board of Commissioners shall be deemed
final and executory in accordance with the following:
xxxx
(b) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Board of Commissioners shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days
after the receipt thereof by the parties and no appeal has been filed within the said period.
In this relation, Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, Series of 2004 prescribes that the decisions of the
HLURB-BOC may be appealed to the Office of the President:
Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the
Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with
P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.[37]
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent did not interpose an appeal before the Office of the President as it
proceeded to file a petition for certiorari before the CA; hence, respondent clearly violated the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. In Teotico v. Baer,[38] the Court upheld the dismissal of therein petitioner's appeal on the ground
of failure to exhaust the same administrative remedy before the HLURB:
The HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. It is charged with encouraging greater private
sector participation in low-cost housing through liberalization of development standards, simplification of regulations and
decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses. The HLURB has established rules of procedure in the adjudication
of the cases before it. Any party who is aggrieved by its decision "may file with the Regional Office a verified petition for
review of the arbiter's decision within 30 calendar days from receipt thereof." The regional officer shall then elevate the
records to the Board of Commissioners together with the summary of proceedings before the arbiter within 10 calendar
days from receipt of the petition. If the party is still dissatisfied with the decision of the Board, he may appeal to the Office
of the President within 15 calendar days from receipt of the decision.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all
such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this
should be resorted to before resort can be made to courts. It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying
164
the dismissal of the complaint.
Here, petitioner failed to exhaust her administrative remedies when she directly elevated to the CA the HLURB arbiter's
decision without appealing it first to the Board and then later, the Office of the President. She has failed to convince us
that her case is one of those exempted from the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Her
petition must necessarily fall.[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, while there are exceptions to the above-discussed doctrine, respondent's motion for reconsideration before the
CA did not raise any of the same. Thus, the CA erred in considering two of these exceptions [40] upon respondent's mere
general invocation of the doctrine of equity jurisdiction, which should not even apply in this case.
The doctrine states that "where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the strict
application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction."[41] As a general rule
therefore, "[t]he rules of procedure must be faithfully followed, except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply within the prescribed
procedure."[42] However, case law states that "[c]oncomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be
an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules."[43]
In this case, not only did respondent fail to adequately explain its failure to abide by the rules; more significantly, there is
also no palpable persuasive reason to relax the rules of procedure considering that the HLURB-BOC actually rendered a
As the HLURB-BOC aptly pointed out, the Contract to Sell between the parties remained valid and subsisting in view of
respondent's failure to observe the proper procedure in cancelling the said contract, particularly on the full payment of the
cash surrender value to Lefebre as prescribed under Section 3 (b) of RA 6552, which reads:
Section 3. In all transactions or contracts involving the sale or financing of real estate on installment payments, including
residential condominium apartments but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants under
Republic Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred forty-four, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty-three hundred
eighty-nine, where the buyer has paid at least two years of installments, the buyer is entitled to the following rights in
case he defaults in the payment of succeeding installments:
xxxx
(b) If the contract is canceled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the
property equivalent to fifty per cent of the total payments made and, after five years of installments, an additional five per
cent every year but not to exceed ninety per cent of the total payments made:Provided, That the actual cancellation of
the contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for
rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.
Down payments, deposits or options on the contract shall be included in the computation of the total number of
instalment payments made.
In Active Realty & Development Corp. v. Daroya,[44] the Court held that the failure to cancel the contract in accordance
with the provisions of Section 3 of RA 6552 renders the contract to sell between the parties valid and subsisting. The
Court emphasized that the mandatory requirements of notice of cancellation and payment of cash surrender value is
needed for a "valid and effective cancellation" under the law.[45] In Leano v. CA,[46] it was ruled that there is no actual
cancellation of the contract to sell between the parties as the seller did not give to the buyer the cash surrender value of
the payments that the buyer made,[47] as in this case.
Thus, as the Contract to Sell remained valid, Lefebre was well within her right to invoke Section 20, in relation to Section
23, of PD 957 which respectively read:
Section 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any
form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium
project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
xxxx
Section 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium
project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after
due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to
develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying
with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but
excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate.
In Tamayo v. Huang, the Court explained that:[48]
In case the developer of a subdivision or condominium fails in its obligation under Section 20, Section 23 gives the buyer
the option to demand reimbursement of the total amount paid, or to wait for further development of the subdivision, and
when the buyer opts for the latter alternative, he may suspend payment of installments until such time that the owner or
developer had fulfilled its obligation to him.[49]
In this case, both the HLU Arbiter and HLURB-BOC observed that respondent could not anymore deliver on its promise
of developing a Manresa 18-Hole All Weather Championship Golf Course, as advertised in its various promotion
materials. Accordingly, Lefebre, as the buyer, may exercise her option to be reimbursed of the total amount she had paid
to the developer, less penalties or surcharges, pursuant to the above cited provisions of PD 957.
To be sure, Lefebre could not have exercised the first option of withholding further payments upon prior notice
considering that respondent had ceased with its intention to develop the promised golf course. Moreover, it should be
noted that Lefebre was not estopped in invoking the ground of misrepresentation considering that she never conceded to
respondent the non-development of the said golf course as in fact, the same was the motivation behind the purchase.
Besides, while it was only in 2008 that respondent raised the same, it cannot be denied that respondent's obligation to
develop the project in accordance with its published representations was a continuing one and, hence, should not be
affected by respondent's belated insistence on the same.
Also, notwithstanding Lefebre's failure to abide by her own obligation to timely pay the amortizations due, the fact
remains that respondent also had its own obligation to deliver on its promise. As the HLURB-BOC correctly observed,
respondent had indeed represented in its advertisements that the golf course was one of its amenities and as such,
formed part of the warranties under Section 20 of PD 957. Unfortunately for respondent, it failed to properly invoke
Lefebre's delinquency as a ground to cancel their contract, whereas Lefebre was able to properly invoke her ground
against respondent.
In any event, the HLURB-BOC's ruling in favor of Lefebre had already attained finality in view of respondent's failure (in
addition to its violation of the exhaustion doctrine) to avail of the proper mode of elevating its case to the CA. Records
show that it did not file an appeal before the CA as prescribed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Instead, it resorted to
an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Jurisprudence dictates that the "perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the
right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case."[50] Notably, "[t]he
right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost."[51]
While there are indeed exceptions to this rule, the reasons above-discussed clearly militate against the liberal application
of the rules. Thus, there being no appeal taken by respondent from the adverse judgment of the HLURB-BOC, its
Decision has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by the CA. Finality of a judgment or an
order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected,[52] as in this case.
165
Apropos thereto, the well-settled rule is that [c]ertiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a
judgment despite the availability of that remedy. [Verily,] [c]ertiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal."[53]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 8, 2015 and the Resolution dated May 24, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04582-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 10,
2011 of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board - Board of Commissioners in HLURB Case No. REM-A-110224-
01374 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
78. G.R. No. 225500, September 11, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. JONAS GERONIMO Y PINLAC, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Jonas Geronimo y Pinlac (Geronimo) assailing the
Decision[2] dated December 18, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06405, which affirmed the
Joint Decision[3] dated October 7, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127 (RTC) in Crim. Case
Nos. C-83928 and C-83929, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from two (2) Informations[5] filed before the RTC accusing Geronimo of the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which state:
Criminal Case No. C-83928
"That on or about the 12th day of April, 2010 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell and deliver to 101 Crisanto L. Lorilla, a [bona fide] member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who posed
as poseur buyer, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) and MEFENOREX, dangerous drugs, weighing
0.1076 gram, without the corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be such.
Contrary To Law."[6]
Criminal Case No. C-83929
"That on or about the 12th day of April, 2010 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control One (1) self-sealing transparent plastic bag with marking EXH B 04-12-10
CLL containing dried MARIJUANA leaves and fruiting tops weighing 4.1283 grams, which when subjected for laboratory
examination gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Marijuana, a dangerous drugs [sic], in gross violation of the above-
cited law.
Contrary To Law."[7]
The prosecution alleged that at around ten (10) o'clock in the morning of April 12, 2010, a tip was received from a
confidential informant that Geronimo was peddling illegal drugs in Caloocan City. Acting on the said tip, Intelligence
Agent 1 Joshua V. Arquero (IA1 Arquero) immediately organized a buy-bust operation, which was coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Regional Office and the Philippine National Police (PNP). IA1 Arquero then
instructed the informant to order P500.00 worth of shabu from Geronimo.[8] At around nine (9) o'clock in the evening, the
buy-bust team composed of IA1 Arquero, Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Crisanto Lorilla (IO1 Lorilla), IO 2 Lorenzo Advincula
(IO2 Advincula),[9] a certain IO1 Camayang, and one IO1 Mellion reached the target area in Narra Street, Barangay 171,
Caloocan City and conducted a quick surveillance thereof. Moments later, Geronimo arrived, took out from his right
pocket a transparent plastic sachet containing a suspected shabu, and handed it over to the poseur-buyer, IO1 Lorilla,
who, in turn, paid him with the buy-bust money.[10] Shortly after, IO1 Lorilla lit a cigarette to signal the rest of the team that
the transaction was completed, prompting IO2 Advincula to rush towards the scene to arrest Geronimo. Subsequently,
IO1 Lorilla and IO2 Advincula frisked Geronimo's pockets. IO1 Lorilla recovered the buy-bust money, while IO2 Advincula
recovered the marijuana leaves wrapped in a newspaper and gave them to the former. The team proceeded to the
headquarters in Quezon City, and the confiscated items were supposedly marked, photographed, and inventoried by IO1
Lorilla in the presence of Geronimo and Barangay Kagawad Jose Y. Ruiz.[11] After conducting the inventory, IO1 Lorilla
secured the letter-request for laboratory examination from IO1 Jay son R. Albao and delivered the specimens to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for testing. Consequently, the specimens were received and examined by Forensic Chemist Jappeth
M. Santiago, who later on revealed that the substance found in the plastic sachet tested positive for the presence
of methamphetamine hydrochloride and mefenorex, while the other wrapped specimen tested positive for the presence
of marijuana, all dangerous drugs.[12]
For his part, Geronimo interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up, maintaining that at the time of the incident, he
was drinking at the house of his friend Julian Faura, Jr. (Faura) when three (3) unidentified armed men suddenly arrived
and forced him to board a white Toyota Revo. There, he noticed that his girlfriend Elaine Cabral (Cabral), whom he
recently had an argument with, was inside the vehicle as well. According to Geronimo, Cabral suddenly slapped him,
while the other men repeatedly hit him. Geronimo claimed that he was then brought to the PDEA office, where he was
forced to drink something and urinate in a small bottle. Subsequently, the police officers allegedly brought out several
plastic sachets, placed them on the table, and instructed Geronimo to stand before it while they took pictures of the
same. During trial, Geronimo pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged and presented Faura as his witness.[13]
The RTC Ruling
In a Joint Decision[14] dated October 7, 2013, the RTC found Geronimo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced him as follows: ( a) in Crim. Case No. C-83928, to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; and (b) in Crim. Case No. C-83929, to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and eight (8)
months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.[15] It held that all the essential elements of the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were duly proven. On the other hand, Geronimo's defenses of denial and
frame-up failed to create reasonable doubt in view of his positive identification as the culprit, as well as the presumption
of regularity accorded to police officers in the discharge of their duties.[16]
Moreover, the RTC declared that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were shown to have been
preserved from the time of seizure to receipt by the forensic chemist up to presentation in court. It added that the
requisite marking of seized items immediately upon their confiscation at the place of arrest is not absolute and can thus
be done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team, given that there is no exact definition of the
phrase "immediately upon confiscation in Philippine Jurisprudence.[17]
Aggrieved, Geronimo elevated his conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA).[18]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated December 18, 2014, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC,[20] finding that all the necessary
elements of the crimes charged have been adequately proven. Moreover, Geronimo failed to prove that the evidence
was tampered or meddled with, and that the police officers improperly performed their duties; and on the contrary, it was
shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were preserved.[21]
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Geronimo's conviction for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, as respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be
upheld.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[22] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."[23]
166
In this case, Geronimo was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. For the successful prosecution of
unauthorized sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the essential elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable
doubt, to wit: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.[24] On the other hand, in cases wherein an accused is charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements to warrant his conviction: (a) the accused was in
possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[25]
In both cases, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to
obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain
of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from
the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.[26]
Relatedly, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers
must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[27] Under the said
section, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscationconduct a physical
inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were
seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized
drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from confiscation for examination. [28 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,[29] the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media
or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils
of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the
seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the  corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected
the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have
preserved an unbroken chain of custody."[30]
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA 9165 may not always be possible.[31] In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is
now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640[32] - provide that the said inventory and photography may
be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and
that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds -will not render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.[33] In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure
and custody over the items void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
[34]
 In People v. Almorfe,[35] the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved.[36] Also, in People v. De Guzman,[37] it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.[38]
In his Brief,[39] Geronimo prayed for his acquittal in light of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165
and its IRR and their failure to proffer a plausible explanation therefor.[40] In particular, he claims that the inventory and
certification was neither done in the presence of nor signed by a representative from the DOJ and the media. [41]
The appeal is meritorious.
An examination of the records reveals that although the requisite inventory and photography of the seized items were
conducted in the presence of Geronimo and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of the
representatives from the DOJ and the media. In an attempt to justify such absence, IA1 Arquero testified that:
ATTY QUILAS:
Q: You said you are a team leader and you knew for a fact the requirements that in the subsequent inventory, an elected
official, a representative from the Media, a representative from the Department of Justice, you know for a fact that they
are required, is not that correct?
[IA1 ARQUERO]:
A: In Section 21 of RA 9165 that is a requirement and prior to that operation is a buy-bust operation. So, in the buy-bust
operation we don't need to comply with the requirements, we don't need to call the Media Representative, an elected
official and a Representative from the D.O.J. unless there is a search warrant were taken briefly to go with the
apprehending officers in entering the house. In the buy-bust operation we don't do that, sir.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)[42]
Based on the foregoing testimony, the justification given by IA1 Arquero was grossly insufficient and without legal basis.
It appears that he clearly misunderstood the law and its application in buy-bust operations. The law mandates the
apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 mainly to ensure the proper chain of
custody and avoid the possibility of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. There is nothing in the law which
exempts the apprehending officers from securing the presence of an elected public official and a representative from the
DOJ or media, particularly in instances when they are not equipped with a search warrant as claimed by IA1 Arquero. In
fact, RA 9165 and its IRR explicitly provide that non-compliance with the required procedure can only be allowed under
exceptional circumstances, provided that justifiable grounds are given and proven as a fact therefor by the apprehending
officers, which IA1 Arquero likewise failed to show in this case.
Moreover, records reveal that the said inventory and photography of the seized items were not done at the place of arrest
but at the office of the apprehending officers in Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon City. During IA1 Arquero's direct
examination, he maintained that since the area of operation was "so dark" and "risky," he decided to instruct the buy-bust
team to conduct said processes at their office, to wit:
PROS CANSINO:
Q: You said after effecting the arrest and apprising the accused of his violation and constitutional rights and you
proceeded to your office, why did you not conduct the required inventory, photograph and marking at the place of
operation?
[IA1 ARQUERO:]
A: Because the area is so dark and there are many people there may be the cohorts of the suspect so being the team
leader and the area may be risky, I ordered them to withdraw and conduct the inventory and photography of the said item
to the nearest station which is in our office at [Brgy.l Pinyahan, Quezon City, sir. x x x x (Underscoring supplied)[43]
On the contrary, I02 Advincula earlier testified that the apprehending team went directly to their office to conduct the
inventory even if there was no threat to their security and safety at the place of Geronimo's arrest:
[ATTY. QUILAS:]
Q: And despite of the fact that you were armed you just left the area after the arrest of the suspect?
[IO2 ADVINCULA:] A: Yes, sir.
Q: And went ahead directly to your office and conduct inventory?
167
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There was not even a threat, serious threat on your team after the arrest of the suspect, is not that right?
A: None, sir.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)[44]
Clearly, there were inconsistencies in the statements of the members of the apprehending team as to why the requisite
inventory and photography were not done immediately after seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs and at the
place of Geronimo's arrest. While the law allows that the same may be done at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team, the police officers must nevertheless provide justifiable grounds therefor in order for the saving
clause to apply. Here, the apprehending officers failed to discharge that burden.
Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.[45] It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of
RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse,
ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.[46] As such, since the prosecution failed to provide
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR,
Geronimo's acquittal is perforce in order.
As a final note, it is fitting to mention that "the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon
our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty."[47]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 18, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 06405 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Jonas Geronimo y Pinlac
is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate
release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
79. G.R. No. 221620, September 11, 2017
TERESA R. IGNACIO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ROBERTO R. IGNACIO, PETITIONER, V.
OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, VICTOR B. ENDRIGA, OFFICE OF THE CITY ASSESSOR
OF QUEZON CITY, THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, ATTY. FELIXBERTO F. ABAD, AND
ALEJANDRO RAMON AND RACQUEL DIMALANTA, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Resolutions dated January 26, 2015[2] and November
24, 2015[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102111, which affirmed the Resolution [4]dated June 3, 2013 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC), Branch 85 (RTC-Br. 85) in Civil Case No. Q-12-70759 dismissing the
complaint[5] filed by petitioner Teresa R. Ignacio (Teresa) for annulment of warrant of levy, public auction sale, recovery of
ownership and possession, and damages on the ground of res judicata.
The Facts
On February 9, 2012, Teresa, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Roberto R. Ignacio, filed before the RTC-Br. 85 a
Complaint[6] for Annulment of Warrant of Levy, Public Auction Sale, Sheriffs Certificate of Sale, Recovery of Ownership
and Possession, and Damages (Annulment Complaint), docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-70759 (Annulment Case),
against the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City, Victor B. Endriga (Endriga), the Office of the City Assessor of
Quezon City, the Registrar of Deeds (RD) of Quezon City, and Atty. Felixberto F. Abad (Abad; collectively, public
respondents), and Spouses Alejandro Ramon and Racquel Dimalanta (Sps. Dimalanta). Teresa alleged that she is the
registered co-owner of a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 60125[7] which public
respondents, with malice and bad faith, sold at a public auction in 2009 to Sps. Dimalanta without notice of the levy and
auction sale proceedings, thereby depriving her of said property without due process of law.[8] She added that public
respondents were in bad faith as they did not return to her the difference between the bid price paid by Sps. Dimalanta
and her alleged tax liability.[9]
Accordingly, she prayed that judgment be rendered ordering: (a) the annulment and cancellation of the Warrant of
Levy[10] and Notice of Levy,[11] as well as of the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property to Purchaser[12] and the public
auction sale proceedings; (b) the City Treasurer of Quezon City to allow her to pay real estate taxes for the periods
stated in the Statement of Delinquency [13] and the succeeding tax periods until updated, excluding interest and penalties
for the succeeding periods; (c) the City Treasurer of Quezon City, Endriga and/or Abad to pay jointly and severally actual
damages; and (d) Sps. Dimalanta, with the public respondents, to jointly and severally pay moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.[14]
In response,[15] public respondents argued that they had strictly complied with the legal and procedural requirements for
the conduct of the public auction sale, particularly pointing out that they sent the auction sale notice[16] to the address she
provided the Office of the City Assessor, i.e., Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, which the City Assessor used in the
Tax Declaration[17] and which Teresa has not changed to date.[18]
For their part, Sps. Dimalanta moved[19] to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Teresa's cause of action is barred by the
final judgment[20] in LRC Case No. Q-31505 (11)[21] (Cancellation Case) rendered by the RTC-Branch 83, acting as a land
registration court (LRC), which upheld and confirmed the validity of the auction sale, including their ownership of the
property, and ordered the issuance of a new title in their name.[22] They added that the complaint states no cause of
action, as Teresa has no interest in the property;[23] and that she did not comply with Section 267,[24] Chapter V, Title II,
Book II of the Local Government Code,[25] which requires a deposit with the court of the amount for which the real
property was sold so that an action OA assailing the validity of the auction sale may be entertained. [26]
Public respondents subsequently filed a Manifestation,[27] similarly moving for the dismissal of the Annulment Complaint
on the same ground of res judicata.
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2012, Teresa filed a Motion for Leave to File Petition for Relief from Judgment (with Motion to
Set Aside Decision and Certificate of Finality)[28] and the corresponding Petition for Relief[29] before the LRC in the
Cancellation Case, seeking to set aside the Decision dated December 22, 2011[30] and the Certificate of Finality[31] dated
February 6, 2012 on the ground that the LRC did not make any ruling on the validity of the auction sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 60125;[32] and that she was deprived of her right to due process when she was not notified of the
notice/statement of delinquency and the warrant of levy.[33] In an Order[34] dated August 7, 2013, the LRC granted the
aforesaid motion, allowing the parties to "file additional pleadings or memoranda x x x [a]fterwhich x x x the Petition for
Relief from judgment will be submitted for resolution x x x."[35]
The RTC-Br. 85 Ruling
In a Resolution[36] dated June 3, 2013, the RTC-Br. 85 dismissed with prejudice the Annulment Complaint on the ground
of res judicata, and declared that the LRC's December 22, 2011 Decision in the Cancellation Case, which involved the
same property covered by the present complaint, has already attained finality per the February 6, 2012 Certificate of
Finality;[37] thus, it is conclusive on all issues that could be raised in the Annulment Case in relation thereto.[38]
Teresa moved for reconsideration,[39] which the RTC-Br. 85 denied in a Resolution[40] dated December 19, 2013.
Aggrieved, Teresa appealed[41] to the CA which public respondents and Sps. Dimalanta opposed essentially on
jurisdictional and procedural grounds.[42]
The CA Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
In a Resolution[43] dated January 26, 2015, the CA upheld the RTC-Br. 85's dismissal of the Annulment Complaint,
declaring that the issue involving the subject property in the Annulment Case had already been decided with finality by
the LRC Decision in the Cancellation Case; hence, barred by res judicata.[44]
Dissatisfied, Teresa moved[45] for reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution[46] dated November 24, 2015;
hence, this petition.
168
In the interim, the LRC, in the Cancellation Case, issued a Resolution[47] dated February 9, 2015 denying Teresa's motion
for leave to file the Petition for Relief. However, in a Resolution [48] dated June 11, 2015, the LRC admitted her motion for
reconsideration[49] and ordered Sps. Dimalanta to comment on Teresa's Petition for Relief.
The Issues Before the Court
The essential issues for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over Teresa's appeal from
the RTC-Br. 85's Decision; (b) assuming the CA has jurisdiction, whether or not it erred in upholding the RTC-Br. 85 's
dismissal of the Annulment Case on the ground of res judicata; and (c) whether or not Teresa committed forum shopping
when she filed the Petition for Relief in the Cancellation Case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
On the issue of jurisdiction, public respondents argue[50] that the RTC-Br. 85's Resolution dismissing with prejudice the
Annulment Case on the ground of res judicata has already become final, maintaining that Teresa should have elevated
the case to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), and not to the CA,[51] pursuant to Section 7 (a) (3) of Republic Act (RA) No.
9282,[52] viz.:
SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved
by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction[.]
The Court disagrees, as the CA properly assumed jurisdiction over Teresa's appeal.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. [53] In order for the court or an
adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Case law holds that jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined from the nature of action pleaded
as appearing from the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[54] Once the nature of
the action is determined, it remains the same even on appeal until a decision rendered thereon becomes final and
executory.
Based on the above-cited provision of law, it is apparent that the CTA's appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the RTCs becomes operative only when the RTC has ruled on a local tax case. Thus, before the case can
be raised on appeal to the CTA, the action before the RTC must be in the nature of a tax case, or one which primarily
involves a tax issue. In National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas:[55]
Indeed, the CTA, sitting as Division, has jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, rulings and resolutions of the RTC
over local tax cases, which includes real property taxes. This is evident from a perusal of the Local Government Code
(LGC) which includes the matter of Real Property Taxation under one of its main chapters. Indubitably, the power to
impose real property tax is in line with the power vested in the local governments to create their own revenue sources,
within the limitations set forth by law. As such, the collection of real property taxes is conferred with the local treasurer
rather than the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[56]
Thus, cases decided by the RTC which involve issues relating to the power of the local government to impose real
property taxes are considered as local tax cases, which fall under the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA. To note, these
issues may, inter alia, involve the legality or validity of the real property tax assessment; protests of assessments;
disputed assessments, surcharges, or penalties; legality or validity of a tax ordinance; claims for tax refund/credit; claims
for tax exemption; actions to collect the tax due; and even prescription of assessments.
In this case, a reading of the Annulment Complaint shows that Teresa's action before the RTC-Br. 85 is essentially one
for recovery of ownership and possession of the property, with damages ,[57] which is not anchored on a tax issue, but on
due process considerations. Particularly, she alleged that: (a) public respondents sent the Notice of Delinquency in July
2008, and the corresponding Warrant of Levy in May 2009, to a wrong address;[58] (b) they knew her correct address as
early as March 2007, or before they sent the Notice and Warrant;[59] (c) she had in fact already filed an action against
them involving a different property, for likewise sending the notice to a wrong address; [60] and (d) their willful violation of
her right to notice of the levy and auction sale deprived her of her right to take the necessary steps and action to prevent
the sale of the property, participate in the auction sale, or otherwise redeem the property from Sps. Dimalanta. [61] In other
words, the Annulment Complaint's allegations do not contest the tax assessment on the property, as Teresa only bewails
the alleged lack of due process which deprived her of the opportunity to participate in the delinquency sale proceedings.
As such, the RTC-Br. 85's ruling thereon could not be characterized as a local tax case over which the CTA could have
properly assumed jurisdiction on appeal. In fine, the case was correctly elevated to the CA.
Proceeding to the next issue, the Court finds that the Annulment Case was not barred by res judicata.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. It also refers to the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on
the points and matters in issue in the first suit.[62]
For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or
order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[63]
In this case, the Court disagrees with the conclusion reached by the RTC-Br. 85 and the CA that the December 22, 2011
Decision in the Cancellation Case barred the filing of the complaint in the Annulment Case as there is no identity of
causes of action between these two (2) cases.
To recap, in the Cancellation Case, Sps. Dimalanta, as the petitioners, sought to compel the registered owners to
surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, or, in the alternative, to cancel or annul TCT No. 60125 issued by the
Quezon City-RD in the name of Sps. Krause Ignacio and Teresa Reyes, among others,[64] and issue new TCTs in their
favor on the ground that the one-year redemption period had lapsed without the owners having redeemed the property
which they bought during an auction sale held on June 21, 2007 and July 2, 2009, where they emerged as the highest
bidders.[65] At the initial hearing held on September 16, 2011, the LRC noted that the jurisdictional requirements were
established with the marking in evidence of the petition, the notice of hearing, the proofs of service on the parties duly
required by law to be notified, and the Certificate of Posting.[66] It then granted the petition after finding, during the ex-
parte  hearing, that Sps. Dimalanta purchased the subject property via said auction sale and that Teresa failed to redeem
the same within the one-year redemption period therefor;[67] thus, they were adjudged to be entitled to the issuance of a
new TCT in their names and to a writ of possession.[68]
In contrast, Teresa, in the Annulment Case, sought the annulment of the warrant and notice of levy, the auction sale, the
certificate of sale, and the recovery of ownership and possession of the property, with damages [69] on the ground that she
was not given notice of the levy and auction sale thereby depriving her of the property without due process of law. As
earlier noted, Teresa alleged and argued in her complaint that public respondents sent the notice of the levy and auction
sale proceedings to a vague and unspecified address, i.e., Tandang Sora, Quezon City, even while they knew, as early
as March 2007, that her correct address is No. 48 Broadway Street, New Manila, Quezon City; [70] and thus, effectively
depriving her of her right to take the necessary steps to prevent the sale of her property or otherwise redeem it from Sps.
Dimalanta.[71]
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the causes of action in the two (2) cases are different: in the Cancellation Case,
the cause is the expiration of the one-year redemption period without the landowners having redeemed the property;
whereas in the Annulment Case, the cause is the alleged nullity of the auction sale for denial of the property owners' right
to due process. Moreover, the issues raised and determined in these cases differ: in the former, the issue is whether
Sps. Dimalanta is entitled to the cancellation of Teresa's TCT and the issuance of a new one in their favor; while in the
latter, the issue is whether she is entitled to recover the property, and to damages. The LRC, in the Cancellation Case,
granted Sps. Dimalanta's petition based simply on a finding that there was indeed a failure to redeem the property within
the one-year period therefor, without ruling on whether the property's owners were duly notified of the auction sale. In
other words, the validity of the auction sale raised as an issue in the Annulment Case was never an issue, nor was it
determined with finality, in the Cancellation Case. Since the validity of the auction sale was not raised or resolved in the
December 22, 2011 Decision in the Cancellation Case, the subsequent filing of the complaint in the Annulment Case was
not barred by res judicata.
Finally, the Court likewise finds that the filing of the Petition for Relief did not amount to forum shopping.
169
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved by some other court,
to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.[72] To determine whether a
party violated the rule against forum shopping, it is crucial to ask whether the elements of litis pendentia  are present, or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount to  res judicata in another.[73]
As compared to the doctrine of res judicata, which had been explained above, litis pendentia, as a ground for the
dismissal of a civil action, pertains to a situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Its requisites are:  (a) identity of
parties or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.[74]
In this case, the Court finds that no litis pendentia exists between the Annulment Case and the Petition for Relief, as the
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, even though based on similar set of facts, essentially differ. Moreover, any
judgment rendered in one will not necessarily amount to res judicata in the action under consideration: on one hand, a
ruling in the Annulment Case may result in the recovery of the property's ownership and possession; on the other hand, a
favorable ruling in the Petition for Relief will result only in the setting aside of the LRC Decision in the Cancellation Case.
[75]
In fine, absent any valid ground for the dismissal of the Annulment Case, the Court therefore orders that it be reinstated
and, consequently, remanded to the RTC-Br. 85, which is hereby directed to proceed with and resolve the same with
reasonable dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 26, 2015 and November 24, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 102111 are hereby SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-12-70759 is hereby REINSTATED and
consequently, REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85, in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
80. G.R. No. 180969*, September 11, 2017
NOEL NAVAJA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO OR HIS SUCCESSOR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA & GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, JAGNA,
BOHOL, AND ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 26, 2007 and the Resolution[3] dated
November 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354, which affirmed the Order [4] dated September
21, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50 (RTC) in Sp. Civil Action No. 0357, and accordingly,
sustained the denial of petitioner Noel Navaja's (petitioner) motion to quash filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol (MCTC-Jagna).
The Facts
The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol (OPP-Bohol) in Tagbilaran City, charging its then-Regional Sales
Manager for Visayas, Ana Lou B. Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of falsification of a Private Document, docketed as
I.S. Case No. 04-1238.[5] In the course of the said proceeding, a certain Ms. Marilyn Magsigay (Ms. Magsigay), a material
witness for DKT, was subpoenaed to appear in a hearing before the OPP-Bohol on March 15, 2004 in order to shed light
on the official receipt allegedly falsified by Ana Navaja.[6] On March 9, 2004, petitioner, who is Ana Navaja's husband,
allegedly went to Ms. Magsigay's workplace in Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and told her that as per instruction from Ana
Navaja's lawyer, Atty. Orwen Bonghanoy (Atty. Bonghanoy), her attendance in the scheduled hearing is no longer
needed (March 9, 2004 incident).[7] Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing where
petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms. Magsigay and notarized by a certain
Atty. Rolando Grapa (Atty. Grapa) in Cebu City, supporting Ana Navaja's counter-affidavit (March 15, 2004 incident).
[8]
 Resultantly, I.S. Case No. 04-1238 was dismissed. [9]
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Edgar Borje (Atty. Borje), DKT's counsel, found out from Ms. Magsigay herself that: (a) she
would have attended the scheduled March 15, 2004 hearing were it not for the misrepresentation of petitioner that her
presence therein was no longer required; (b) she was merely told by her superior in Garden Cafe to sign the affidavit and
that she did not personally prepare the same; and (c) she could not have gone to Cebu to have it notarized before Atty.
Grapa as she was at work on that day.[10] This prompted Atty. Borje to file the following criminal complaints before the
OPP-Bohol and the City Prosecution Office of Tagbilaran City: the first one, [11]charging petitioner of Obstruction of
Justice, specifically, for violation of Section 1 (a) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1829 [12] in connection with the March 9,
2004 incident; and the second one,[13] charging petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy of Obstruction of Justice as well,
specifically, for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law in connection with the March 15, 2004 incident. [14] After due
proceedings, separate Informations were filed. The case relating to the March 9, 2004 incident was filed before the
MCTC-Jagna,[15] while that relating to the March 15, 2004 incident was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Tagbilaran City, Bohol (MTCC-Tagbilaran).[16]
Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash Information (Motion to Quash)[17] before the MCTC-Jagna,
principally arguing that the charge of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 pending before it should have been absorbed
by the charge of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran, considering that: (a) the
case pending before the latter court was filed first; (b) the criminal cases filed before the MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-
Tagbilaran arose from a single preliminary investigation proceeding, involving the same set of facts and circumstances,
and flowed from a single alleged criminal intent, which is to obstruct the investigation of I.S. Case No. 04-1238; and ( c) to
allow separate prosecutions of the foregoing cases would be tantamount to a violation of his right to double jeopardy. [18]
The MCTC-Jagna Ruling
In an Order[19] dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to Quash. It held that petitioner had
no right to invoke the processes of the court, since at the time he filed said motion, the MCTC-Jagna has yet to acquire
jurisdiction over his person.
On reconsideration, the MCTC-Jagna issued a Resolution[20] dated January 24, 2006 upholding the denial of the Motion
to Quash. It ruled that in the criminal case before it, petitioner is being charged with violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829,
an offense separate and distinct from violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law, which is pending before the MTCC-
Tagbilaran. As such, said offenses may be prosecuted independently from each other.[21]
element of the other.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the CA.[25]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated June 26, 2007, the CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that petitioner allegedly committed several
acts which constitute violations of different provisions of PD 1829, namely: ( a) the March 9, 2004 incident where he
prevented Ms. Magsigay from attending the scheduled hearing in I.S. Case No. 04-1238 by means of deceit and
misrepresentation, which is a violation of Section 1 (a) of the law; and (b) the March 15, 2004 incident where he, along
with Atty. Bonghanoy, submitted a purported spurious affidavit of Ms. Magsigay in the scheduled hearing in I.S. Case No.
04-1238, which is a violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law. Moreover, the CA pointed out that the foregoing acts were
committed in distinct places and locations. As such, there is more than enough basis to try petitioner for two (2) separate
crimes under two (2) distinct Informations.[27]
Unperturbed, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[28] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[29] dated November 12,
2007; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately tried for
different acts constituting violations of PD 1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same law allegedly
committed during the pendency of a single proceeding.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the pertinent portions
of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or
the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated[22] his case to the RTC.

xxxx  
The RTC Ruling

In an Order[23] dated September 21, 2006, the RTC denied the petition, thereby, affirming the MCTC-Jagna Ruling. It held
that the criminal cases pending before the MCTC-Jagna for violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 and MTCC-Tagbilaran (f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to
for violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law are two (2) separate offenses, considering that: (a) the case in MCTC-Jagna affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
has only one (1) accused, i.e., petitioner, while the one pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran has two (2), i.e., petitioner
and Atty. Bonghanoy; and (b) the places of commission are different, as the March 9, 2004 incident happened in Jagna,
Bohol, while the March 15, 2004 incident occurred in Tagbilaran City, Bohol. Further, the RTC opined that while both
xxxx
offenses arose from substantially the same set of facts, each crime involves some important act which is not an essential

170
The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of PD 1829; and ( b)
that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.[30]
In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated September 22,
2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 before the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly preventing Ms.
Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing;[31] and (b) an Information dated August 27,
2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a
false affidavit.[32] While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different locations, the Court
holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged
acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary
investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol. [33] The
foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through
a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.[34] In Santiago v. Garchitorena,[35] the Court explained the
principle of delito continuado as follows:
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of
time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of
the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same
criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed).
Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one
crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and
Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law,
1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
xxxx
The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized
under special laws, e.g. violation of [Republic Act] No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following
up claims for war veteran's benefits x x x.
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide
the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to
crimes punished under special laws.[36] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed separate crimes and thus, may be tried separately, the CA cited
the case of Regis v. People (Regis),[37] wherein it was held that the malversation committed through falsification of
document performed on different dates constitute independent offenses which must be punished separately.[38] However,
a closer perusal of Regis shows that its factual milieu is not on all fours with the instant case. In Regis, the accused, then
municipal treasurer of Pinamungahan, Cebu, signed payrolls on two (2) different dates, i.e., April 30, 1931 and May 2,
1931, making it appear that certain workers worked as laborers in a municipal project when in truth, there were no such
workers and that he and his co-accused misappropriated the payroll amounts to themselves. The Court ruled that the
accused may be held liable for two (2) separate crimes, considering that when the accused committed the first act
constituting malversation committed through falsification of document, it did not appear that he was already predisposed
to committing the second act constituting the same crime.[39]Clearly, when the accused in Regis falsified the payroll of
April 30, 1931, and later, the payroll of May 2, 1931, he -though committing similar acts - could not be said to have been
motivated by a single criminal impulse as he was working towards discernibly distinct criminal objectives.
In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary
investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse in
order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S.
171
Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count
of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from
appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a
false affidavit in the same case.[40] However, since he was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment[41] dated
July 3, 2007 - in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired in
Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design. The Court's
pronouncement in Gamboa v. CA[42] is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito continuado'" or "continuous
crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits
diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular
delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." In order that it may exist, there should be
"plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity
of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one
and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."[43]
Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to
double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 26, 2007 and the Resolution dated November 12,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP. No. 02354 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Criminal
Case No. 2878 pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
81. G.R. No. 225808, September 11, 2017
SPOUSES EDGARDO M. AGUINALDO AND NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO, PETITIONERS, VS. ARTEMIO T.
TORRES, JR.,** RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated May 20, 2015 and the
Resolution[3] dated July 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96014, which (a) affirmed the
Decision[4] dated January 21, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23 (RTC), dismissing the
complaint for annulment of sale, cancellation of title, and damages filed by petitioners Spouses Edgardo M. Aguinaldo
and Nelia T. Torres-Aguinaldo (Nelia; collectively, petitioners) against respondent Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (respondent);
and (b) ordered petitioners to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in favor of respondent within thirty (30) days
from the finality of the CA Decision, in accordance with Articles 1357 and 1358 (1) of the Civil Code. [5]
The Facts
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a complaint[6] for annulment of sale, cancellation of title, and damages against
respondent before the RTC. They claimed that they are the registered owners of three (3) lots covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765 situated in Tanza, Cavite (subject properties). [7]Sometime
in December 2000, they discovered that the titles to the subject properties were transferred to respondent who, in bad
faith, and through fraud, deceit, and stealth, caused the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale[8] dated July 21, 1979
(1979 deed of sale), purportedly selling the subject properties to him, for which he was issued TCT Nos. T-305318, T-
305319, and T-305320[9] (subject certificates of title).
Respondent filed his Answer with Counterclaim,[10] denying participation in the execution of the 1979 deed of sale, and
averring that the subject properties were validly sold by petitioners to him through a Deed of Absolute Sale [11]dated March
10, 1991 (1991 deed of sale).[12] He claimed that petitioners caused the registration of the 1979 deed of sale with the
Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City, and the transfer of title in his name, hence, they are estopped from impugning
the validity of his title. Moreover, the action has prescribed, having been filed beyond four (4) years from discovery of the
averred fraud, reckoned from the registration of the said deed on March 26, 1991.[13]He further alleged that petitioners
only filed the instant baseless suit to harass him in view of their acrimonious relationship, and thus, interposed a
counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.[14]
The RTC Proceedings
On respondent's motion,[15] a copy of the 1991 deed of sale was transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Questioned Documents Department for examination and determination of its genuineness. [16] The NBI thereafter
submitted reports concluding that petitioners' questioned signatures thereon and their sample signatures were written by
the same persons.[17]
Thus, in a Decision[18] dated January 21, 2010, the RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that petitioners failed to
establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.[19] It found that petitioners validly sold the subject properties to
respondent,[20] considering too Nelia's admission of the sale in her letter[21] dated November 12, 1998 (November 12,
1998 letter) to respondent.[22]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed[23] before the CA.[24]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[25] dated May 20, 2015, the CA denied the appeal and upheld the RTC's findings and conclusions.[26]While it
ruled that the 1979 deed of sale was spurious after conducting its own examination of petitioners' signatures thereon and
on other pertinent documents, and thus, did not transfer title over the subject properties to respondent, it declared that
there was, nonetheless, a valid sale to the latter,[27] considering that: (a) petitioners failed to rebut the authenticity and due
execution of the 1991 deed of sale on account of their genuine signatures thereon as established by the NBI reports,
[28]
 and the CA's own independent examination of their signatures on various documents submitted before the court;[29] (b)
Nelia admitted the existence of the sale of the subject properties in her November 12, 1998 letter to respondent;[30] and
(c) respondent's religious payment of real property taxes on the subject properties from 1993 to 2003 supports his claim
of ownership, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property if he does not claim possession in the
concept of an owner.[31]
However, the CA observed that despite its authenticity and due execution, the 1991 deed of sale was improperly
notarized, given that it was signed by respondent and witness Lalaine Bucapal (Bucapal) in Makati City, and by
petitioners in the United States of America (USA), but notarized in Tanza, Cavite; [32] as such, the same could not be
properly registered by the Register of Deeds.[33] Accordingly, the CA found it equitable to compel petitioners to execute a
registrable deed of conveyance in favor of respondent within thirty (30) days from finality of the Decision, in accordance
with Articles 1357 and 1358 (1) of the Civil Code.[34]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,  which the CA denied in a Resolution  dated July 14, 2016; hence, this
[35] [36]
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ruling that there was
a valid conveyance of the subject properties to respondent and directing petitioners to execute a registrable deed of
conveyance in his favor within thirty (30) days from the finality of the decision.
172
The Court's Ruling
In the present case, the complaint was filed assailing the validity of the 1979 deed of sale, the execution of which was
denied by both parties. However, while the CA found that petitioners' signatures on the said deed were manifestly
different from their signatures on other pertinent documents before it, and thus, declared the said deed as spurious and
did not validly transfer title to the subject properties, it failed to nullify the subject certificates of title issued pursuant to the
said deed. Settled is the rule that a forged deed of sale is null and void and conveys no title. [37] Notably, the complaint
prayed for the nullification of the said certificates of title based on the spurious 1979 deed of sale.[38] Hence, finding the
foregoing in order, the CA's ruling must be modified accordingly.
Nonetheless, save for the above modification, the Court agrees with the CA's conclusion that a valid conveyance of the
subject properties to respondent was established.
While respondent denied participation in the execution of the 1979 deed of sale, he claimed that the subject properties
were validly sold by petitioners to him through the 1991 deed of sale.[39] On the other hand, petitioners denied the
existence and due execution of the said deed, claiming that they could not have signed the same as they were in the
USA when it was supposedly executed.[40]
Thus, central to the resolution of the instant controversy is the determination of the authenticity of the 1991 deed of sale
which, however, is a question of fact rather than of law.[41] It bears to stress that it is not the function of the Court to re-
examine, winnow, and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence of the parties,[42] absent a showing that they fall under
certain recognized exceptions,[43] none of which are present here.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the 1991 deed of sale was improperly notarized, having been signed by
respondent and witness Bucapal in Makati City and by petitioners in the USA, but notarized in Tanza, Cavite, [44]which is
in violation of the notarial officer's duty to demand that the party acknowledging a document must appear before him,
[45]
 sign the document in his presence,[46] and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated therein.[47]As aptly observed
by the CA, the evidence on record amply shows that Nelia could not have been in the Philippines at the time the said
deed was signed.[48]
The improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale stripped it of its public character and reduced it to a private
instrument.[49] Hence, it is to be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
which pertinently provides that "[b]efore any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) [b]y anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) [b]y
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker."[50]Emphases supplied.
In relation thereto, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides the manner by which the genuineness of
handwriting may be proved, i.e.: (a) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged;
(b) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
In this case, the CA made an independent examination of petitioners' signatures on the 1991 deed of sale (questioned
signatures), and concluded that they are the same signatures found on other pertinent documents (standard/sample
signatures),[51] which is the same conclusion arrived at by the NBI.[52] The due execution and authenticity of the said deed
having been ostensibly established by the finding that the signatures of petitioners thereon were genuine, the burden was
shifted upon the latter to prove by contrary evidence that the subject properties were not so transferred [53] - especially in
light of Nelia's admission of the sale[54] in her November 12, 1998 letter to respondent, as well as respondent's payment
of the real property taxes for the same[55] - which petitioners, however, failed to discharge convincingly.
The Court has held in a number of cases that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and
convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery to establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. [56] In
this case, the claimed forgery was ruled out by a comparison of petitioners' questioned signatures with their
standard/sample signatures, but other than their own declaration that their signatures on the 1991 deed of sale were
forged, petitioners failed to present any evidence to corroborate their claim.
Although the improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale did not affect the validity of the sale of the subject properties
to respondent, the same, however, rendered the said deed unregistrable, since notarization is essential to the
registrability of deeds and conveyances.[57] Bearing in mind that the legal requirement that the sale of real property must
appear in a public instrument is merely a coercive means granted to the contracting parties to enable them to reciprocally
compel the observance of the prescribed form,[58] and considering that the existence of the sale of the subject properties
in respondent's favor had been duly established, the Court upholds the CA's directive for petitioners to execute a
registrable deed of conveyance in respondent's favor within thirty (30) days from finality of the decision, in accordance
with the prescribed form under Articles 1357[59] and 1358[60] (1) of the Civil Code. Notably, if petitioners fail to comply with
this directive within the said period, respondent has the option to file the proper motion before the court a quo to issue an
order divesting petitioners' title to the subject properties under the parameters of Section 10 (a), [61] Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
To be sure, the directive to execute a registrable deed of conveyance in respondent's favor - albeit not specifically prayed
for in respondent's Answer with Counterclaim - is but a necessary consequence of the judgment upholding the validity of
the sale to him, and an essential measure to put in proper place the title to and ownership of the subject properties and to
preclude further contentions thereon. As aptly explained by the CA, "[t]o leave the [1991 deed of sale] as a private one
would not necessarily serve the intent of the country's land registration laws[, and] resorting to another action merely to
compel the [petitioners] to execute a registrable deed of sale would unnecessarily prolong the resolution of this case,
especially when the end goal would be the same."[62] In this relation, case law states that a judgment should be complete
by itself; hence, the courts are to dispose finally of the litigation so as to preclude further litigation between the parties on
the same subject matter, thereby avoiding a multiplicity of suits between the parties and their privies and successors-in-
interests.[63]
As a final note, it must be clarified that while the Court has declared TCT Nos. T-305318, T-305319, and T-305320 null
and void, the duty to process the cancellation of the said titles devolves upon respondent's heirs. Likewise, it is the
latter's duty to register the new deed of sale as herein compelled so as to secure the issuance of new certificates of title
over the subject properties in their names.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 20, 2015 and the Resolution dated July 14, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96014 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 21, 1979, as well as Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-305318, T-
305319, and T-305320 in the name of respondent Artemio Torres, Jr. NULL and VOID. Petitioners are DIRECTED to
execute a registrable deed of conveyance in respondent's favor within thirty (30) days from finality of this Decision, in
accordance with the prescribed form under Articles 1357 and 1358 (1) of the Civil Code. In case of non-compliance with
this directive within the said period, respondent has the option to file the proper motion before the court a quo to issue an
order divesting petitioners' title to the subject properties under the parameters of Section 10 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
SO ORDERED.
82. G.R. No. 225402, September 04, 2017
ENCARNACION CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, V. PHOENIX READY MIX
CONCRETE DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, INC., RESPONDENT.
173
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated July 22, 2015 and the
Resolution[3] dated June 29, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102671, which affirmed the
Decision[4] dated December 4, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3547-
10 granting the complaint for sum of money filed by respondent Phoenix Ready Mix Concrete Development and
Construction, Inc. (Phoenix) against petitioner Encarnacion Construction & Industrial Corporation (ECIC), and dismissing
the latter's counterclaim for damages.
The Facts
On January 27 and March 25, 2009, Phoenix entered into two (2) separate Contract Proposals and Agreements
(Agreement)[5] with ECIC for the delivery of various quantities of ready-mix concrete.[6] The Agreement was made in
connection with the construction of the Valenzuela National High School (VNHS) Marulas Building. [7] ECIC received the
ready-mix concrete delivery in due course. However, despite written demands from Phoenix, ECIC refused to pay.
Hence, Phoenix filed before the RTC the Complaint[8] for Sum of Money against ECIC for the payment of P982,240.35,
plus interest and attorney's fees.[9]
In its Answer with Counterclaim,[10] ECIC claimed that it opted to suspend payment since Phoenix delivered substandard
ready-mix concrete, such that the City Engineer's Office of Valenzuela (City Engineer's Office) required the demolition
and reconstruction of the VNHS building's 3rd floor.[11] It contended that since the samples taken from the 3rd floor slab
failed to reach the comprehensive strength of 6,015 psi in 100 days,[12] the City Engineer's Office ordered the dismantling
of the VNHS building's 3rd floor, and thus, incurred additional expenses amounting to P3,858,587.84 for the dismantling
and reconstruction.[13]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated December 4, 2013, the RTC ordered ECIC to pay Phoenix the amount of P865,410.00, with twelve
percent (12%) interest per annum, reckoned from November 5, 2009, the date ECIC received the demand, as well as
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.[15]
Primarily, the RTC found that Phoenix fully complied with its obligation under their Agreement to deliver the ready-mix
concrete, with the agreed strength of 3000 and 3500 psi G-3/4 7D PCD,[16] which ECIC used to complete the 3rd floor
slab of the VNHS building.[17] Moreover, it pointed out that the alleged sub-standard quality of the delivered ready-mix
concrete did not excuse ECIC from refusing payment, noting that under Paragraph 15 of the Agreement, any claim it has
on the quality and strength of the transit mixed concrete should have been made at the time of delivery. Since ECIC
raised the alleged defects in the delivered concrete only on June 16, 2009, or 48 days after the last delivery date on April
29, 2009,[18] it considered ECIC to have waived its right to question the quality of the delivered concrete under the
principle of estoppel in pais.[19] It added that under Paragraph 15 of the Agreement, ECIC does not have the right to
suspend or refuse payment once delivery has been made; thus, ECIC's refusal to pay despite demand constitutes breach
of their Agreement, entitling Phoenix to attorney's fees, but at the reduced amount of P50,000.00.[20] Lastly, it reduced the
rate of the stipulated interest from 18% to 12% per annum, counted from November 5, 2009.[21]
Meanwhile, the RTC denied ECIC's counterclaim for failure to pay the necessary docket fees.[22]
Aggrieved, ECIC appealed[23] to the CA, arguing that it paid the necessary docket fees for its counterclaim well within a
reasonable time from its filing or on June 18, 2010[24] and that it did not waive its right to question the strength of the
delivered concrete which, based on various tests, was substandard.[25]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated July 22, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling holding ECIC liable for the payment of the delivered
ready-mix concrete.
At the outset, the CA agreed with ECIC that the docket fees for its counterclaim was paid well within a reasonable time
from the prescriptive date; thus, the RTC should not have automatically dismissed its counterclaim. [27]Nonetheless, it
ruled that ECIC is bound by their Agreement to pay for the delivered ready-mix concrete. Moreover, it observed that
before ECIC signed and bound itself to the Agreement, it should have questioned the condition set under Paragraph
15, i.e., that complaints about the quality of the concrete should be made upon delivery.[28] Further, there is no showing
that ECIC was at a disadvantage when it contracted with Phoenix so as to render the Agreement void on the ground that
it is a contract of adhesion. Thus, the CA concluded that ECIC's failure to make any claim on the strength and quality of
the ready-mix concrete upon delivery, pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the Agreement, constitutes a waiver thereof on its No terms and conditions shall be valid and binding except those stipulated herein and/or the reverse sidethereof. No
part.[29] modifications, amendments, assignments or transfer of this contract or any of the stipulation herein contained shall be
Dissatisfied, ECIC moved[30] for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution[31] dated June 29, 2016; hence, this valid and binding unless agreed by writing between the PARTIES herein.
petition. x x x x[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Issue Before the Court Thus, by having its representative affix his signature on the first page of the Agreement and thereby accepting Phoenix's
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in denying ECIC's counterclaim for damages. proposed contract, ECIC likewise signified its conformity to the entirety of the stipulated terms and conditions, including
the stipulations on the Agreement's reverse side. Verily, ECIC positively and voluntarily bound itself to these terms and
conditions and cannot now claim otherwise.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Finally, it should be noted that ECIC failed to raise the alleged defect in the delivered concrete well within a reasonable
time from its discovery of the hairline cracks, as it notified Phoenix thereof only 48 days after the last delivery date on
In the present petition, ECIC maintains that it is entitled to its counterclaim because the Agreement it signed with
April 29, 2009, and days after it was already notified thereof by the City Engineer's Office. [40] The lack of justifiable
Phoenix, particularly Paragraph 15 thereof, is void for being a contract of adhesion; and, the ready-mix concrete Phoenix
explanation for this delay all the more bolsters the conclusion that ECIC indeed waived its right to make its claim.
delivered for the 3rd floor slab of the VNHS building was substandard, causing it to incur additional expenses to
The other issues raised by ECIC on this matter are essentially factual in nature, and thus, not proper for a petition for
reconstruct the building's 3rd floor.
review on certiorari. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which governs this kind of petition, requires that only questions of law
A contract of adhesion is one wherein one party imposes a ready-made form of contract on the other. It is a contract
should be raised.[41] Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari as it is not the Court's function
whereby almost all of its provisions are drafted by one party, with the participation of the other party being limited to
to once again analyze and calibrate evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.[42] While there are
affixing his or her signature or "adhesion" to the contract.[32] However, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se as they
recognized exceptions to this rule that warrant review of factual findings, ECIC, as the party seeking review, however,
are binding as ordinary contracts.[33] While the Court has occasionally struck down contracts of adhesion as void, it did so
failed to demonstrate that a factual review is justified under the circumstances prevailing in this case. [43]
when the weaker party has been imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party and reduced to the
In any event, the evidence on record do not support ECIC's claim that the hairline cracks that appeared on the 3rdfloor
alternative of taking it or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.[34] Thus, the validity
slab of the VNHS building resulted from the substandard quality of the delivered ready-mix concrete. While it was shown
or enforceability of the impugned contracts will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances obtained in each
that the City Engineer's Office inspected the site and approved the structural design before the delivered concrete for the
case and the situation of the parties concerned.[35]
3rd floor slab was poured, and that the results of the test conducted by the Philippine Geoanalytics Testing Center [44] from
In this case, there is no proof that ECIC was disadvantaged or utterly inexperienced in dealing with Phoenix. There were
the samples taken showed that the hardened concrete failed to reach the required comprehensive strength days after the
likewise no allegations and proof that its representative (and owner/proprietor) Ramon Encarnacion (Encarnacion) was
pouring, ECIC, however, failed to account for the period that intervened from the time the delivered concrete was poured
uneducated, or under duress or force when he signed the Agreement on its behalf. In fact, Encarnacion is presumably an
to the time the hairline cracks were observed. As the claiming party, it was incumbent upon ECIC to prove that the
astute businessman who signed the Agreement with full knowledge of its import. Case law states that the natural
hairline cracks were truly caused by the inferior quality of the delivered concrete. Besides, Phoenix offered a more
presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences.
plausible explanation, i.e., that ECIC failed to observe the proper procedure for applying and curing the delivered
[36]
 This presumption has not been debunked.
concrete during the intervening period. This resulted in what Phoenix's witness described as "plastic (cement) shrinkage
Moreover, it deserves highlighting that apart from the January 27 and March 25, 2009 Contract Proposals and
caused by the rapid evaporation of the water component and other factors."[45]
Agreements, ECIC and Phoenix had entered into three (3) similar Agreements under the same terms and
All told, ECIC failed to convincingly prove its counterclaim against Phoenix and thus, the same was correctly denied by
conditions[37] for the supply of ready-mix concrete. Thus, the Court is hard-pressed to believe that Encarnacion had no
the CA.
sufficient opportunity to read and go over the stipulations of the Agreement and reject or modify the terms had he chosen
to do so.
Further, the Court finds that the terms and conditions of the parties' Agreement are plain, clear, and unambiguous and WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 22, 2015 and the Resolution dated June 29, 2016 of the
thus could not have caused any confusion. Paragraph 15 of the Agreement provides that: Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102671 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
x x x x Any claim on the quality, strength, or quantity of the transit mixed concrete delivered must be made at the time of
delivery. Failure to make the claim constitutes a waiver on the part of the SECOND PARTY for such claim and the FIRST
PARTY is released from any liability for any subsequent claims on the quality, strength or [sic] the ready mixed concrete.
[38]

Based on these terms, it is apparent that any claim that ECIC may have had as regards the quality or strength of the
delivered ready-mix concrete should have been made at the time of delivery. However, it failed to make a claim on the
quality of the delivered concrete at the stipulated time, and thus, said claim is deemed to have been waived.
83. G.R. No. 227425, September 04, 2017

In this relation, the Court clarifies that the absence of the signature of Encarnacion on the second page of the Agreement
did not render these terms inoperative. This is because the first page of the Agreement - on which the signature of
Encarnacion appears - categorically provides that the terms and conditions stipulated on the Agreement's reverse side
form part of their contract and are equally binding on them, viz.:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. BRAHIM LIDASAN, NHOKIE MOHAMAD, ROCKY
MOCALAM, TENG USMAN, ALI MATOC, MUSLIMEN WAHAB, JIMMY ALUNAN, ROWENA AMAL RAJID, ACCUSED,
OMAR KAMIR, ALEX DALIANO, AND BAYAN ABBAS ADIL ALIAS "JORDAN," ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

174
Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated September 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01937, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated August 15, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City,
Branch 275 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 98-1379, and accordingly, upheld the conviction of, inter alia, accused-appellants
Omar Kamir (Kamir), Alex Daliano, and Bayan Abbas Adil alias "Jordan" (Adil; collectively, accused-appellants) for
Kidnapping for Ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information[4] filed before the RTC charging accused-appellants, along with co-
accused Brahim Lidasan (Lidasan), Nhokie Mohamad (Mohamad), Rocky Mocalam (Mocalam), Teng Usman (Usman),
Ali Matoc (Matoc), Muslimen Wahab (Wahab), Jimmy Alunan (Alunan), Rowena Amal Rajid (Rajid), Sofia Hassan
(Hassan), Saimona Camsa (Camsa), Sumulong Lawan (Lawan), Tadioden Bauting (Bauting), Roy Bansuan (Bansuan),
and Alvin Diang (Diang) of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about October 30, 1998 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and sometime subsequent thereto, in the City
of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation kidnap MICHELLE RAGOS for the purpose of extorting P30 million ransom, and where she was brought to
two (2) safe-houses both situated at Las Piñas City, where she was detained and deprived of her liberty until she was
finally rescued by the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force on November 7, 1998 after the
payment of P4.83 million.[5]
Of the named-accused: (a) Diang was tried separately for having been arrested only on July 20, 2004; (b) Bansuan
remained at large; (c) Bauting was discharged as a state witness; and (d) the rest pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6]
The prosecution alleged that at around ten (10) o'clock in the evening of October 30, 1998, private complainant Michelle
Ragos (Ragos) was in her family's office/residential compound at No. 5063 Modesto St., Mapulang Lupa, Valenzuela City
which was being guarded by security guards Bauting and Daliano, when suddenly, Bansuan and two (2) companions
entered her bedroom and declared "kidnapping ito." Adil served as lookout, while the other men tied Ragos's hands,
sealed her mouth with packaging tape, ransacked all the cabinets and drawers, and took with them cash and personal
items amounting to P200,000.00. Ragos was first brought to Novaliches, Quezon City and, eventually, to a bungalow
house located at No. 3 St. Joseph Street, St. Joseph Subdivision, Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City where she spent the
night. Thereat, around six (6) persons took turns guarding her, four (4) of whom she later identified as Adil, Kamir,
Camsa, and Rajid. Between ten (10) and eleven (11) o'clock in the evening of the following day, October 31, 1998, she
was transferred to a house located in Samantha Village, Las Piñas City, and kept in a room on the second floor
alternately guarded by around ten (10) to 20 persons, some of whom were identified to be Matoc, Kamir, Camsa, Rajid,
Wahab, Hassan, Usman, Lawan, Mocalam, Mohamad, and Lidasan. The kidnappers initially demanded ransom money
in the amount of P30 million, but they eventually settled to a reduced amount of P4.83 million. As security guards Daliano
and Bauting no longer reported for work following the kidnapping, the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) formed a team headed by P/Supt. Vicente Arnado (P/Supt. Arnado) who monitored the activities of the
kidnappers until the agreed pay-off date.[7]
At one (1) o'clock in the early morning of November 7, 1998, the PAOCTF team proceeded to Kitanlad Street, Quezon
City to witness the pay-off. P/Supt. Arnado saw Alunan and Adil arrive on board a motorcycle and take the bag
containing the ransom money from someone inside a "Nissan Blue Bird" car. Immediately thereafter, the PAOCTF team
chased the kidnappers, resulting in a shoot-out and the eventual arrest of the kidnappers, except for Bansuan who
remained at large, while the rest were brought to Camp Crame for investigation. On the same day, PAOCTF operatives
swooped in the kidnappers' safe-house, resulting in Ragos's rescue, as well as the arrest of other suspects. [8]
In their defense, all the accused denied the charges against them. They likewise offered separate, albeit similar
narrations that they were based in Mindanao and just went to Metro Manila to attend to certain matters when they were
arrested by the authorities and were made to answer for the aforesaid crime. [9]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[10] dated August 15, 2005, the RTC ruled as follows: (a) Alunan and accused-appellants were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged as principals, and were sentenced to suffer the capital punishment of
death; (b) Lidasan, Mohamad, Mocalam, Usman, Matoc, Wahab, and Rajid were found guilty of the crime charged as
accomplices, and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and (c) Camsa, Hassan, and Lawan were
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.[11]
175
The RTC found that the elements of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom were established in this case as it was
undisputed that Ragos was deprived of her liberty and that ransom money was demanded by and delivered to the
perpetrators in exchange for her freedom. In this regard, the RTC tagged Alunan and accused-appellants as principals,
considering that: (a) the actual taking of Ragos was done by Bansuan and two unidentified men, with Adil acting as look-
out; (b) Daliano knew about the criminal plot way in advance, and aside from no longer reporting for work after the
incident, he was seen going to the kidnappers' safe-house in Las Piñas; (c) during Ragos's first day of captivity, Adil and
Kamir were among those who questioned Ragos as to whom to contact for ransom; and (d) Alunan and Adil were the
ones who collected the P4.83 million ransom money in Quezon City.[12]
As to Lidasan, Mohamad, Mocalam, Usman, Matoc, Wahab, and Rajid, the RTC found them guilty as accomplices to the
crime as they were positively identified by Ragos as those who guarded her during her captivity until she was rescued by
PAOCTF operatives.[13]
Finally, Camsa, Hassan, and Lawan were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due to the insufficiency of
evidence presented by the prosecution to establish their participation to the criminal design of the other accused. [14]
Aggrieved, Wahab, Rajid, Mohamad, Lidasan, Usman, Matoc, Mocalam, Alunan, and accused-appellants appealed[15] to
the CA.[16] Later on, Rajid withdrew her appeal,[17] thus, making her conviction final.
The CA Proceedings
In a Decision[18] dated September 24, 2008 (September 24, 2008 Decision), the CA affirmed the respective convictions of
Adil, Alunan, Daliano, and Kamir as principals, and Wahab and Matoc as accomplices, with modification lowering the
sentence of the principals to reclusion perpetua and that of the accomplices to reclusion temporal.[19]
In upholding the convictions, the CA gave more credence to the testimonies of victim Ragos and state witness Bauting -
which positively identified the perpetrators to the crime and narrated in detail the events constituting the same - over the
self-serving and unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi by the accused. However, in light of the passage of Republic
Act No. (RA) 9346,[20] the death penalty originally meted to the principals was lowered toreclusion perpetua. In this light,
the penalty meted to the accomplices was likewise downgraded to reclusion temporal.[21]
After the CA's promulgation of the September 24, 2008 Decision, it received an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Notice to File Appeal with Leave of Court[22] dated November 26, 2008 filed by Usman, Mocalam, Mohamad, and
Lidasan. In said Motion, Usman, Mocalam, Mohamad, and Lidasan explained that at the trial court level, they, along with
Alunan, Wahab, and Matoc, were represented by one Atty. Rogelio Linzag (Atty. Linzag). As such, they were of the
understanding that Atty. Linzag will also represent them before the CA, especially after his secretary assured them of the
same. However, Atty. Linzag inexplicably omitted their names in the appeal documents, and effectively represented only
Alunan, Wahab, and Matoc. In this light, Usman, Mocalam, Mohamad, and Lidasan prayed that they be allowed to
appeal the RTC's judgment of conviction against them.[23] As such motion was unopposed by either the Public Attorney's
Office[24] and the Office of the Solicitor General,[25] the CA granted such motion in a Resolution[26] dated November 20,
2009 on the ground that Atty. Linzag's omission of their names can be deemed as gross negligence of counsel which
cannot bind the client.[27]
In a Decision[28] dated March 5, 2014, the CA affirmed Usman, Mocalam, Mohamad, and Lidasan's convictions as
accomplices. Similar to its findings in the September 24, 2008 Decision, the CA held that Usman, Mocalam, Mohamad,
and Lidasan's bare denials and alibis cannot prevail over Ragos's positive identification of them as among those who
guarded her during her captivity.[29]
Hence, the instant appeal by accused-appellants. As it appears that Alunan, Matoc, Wahab, Usman, Mocalam,
Mohamad, and Lidasan no longer appealed, their respective convictions became final as well.[30]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the convictions of accused-appellants for Kidnapping for Ransom
should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, defines and penalizes the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, the
entirety of which reads:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him
shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female, or a
public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: i) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
than three days; ii) it is committed by simulating public authority; iii) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or iv) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer. Notably, the duration of detention is immaterial if the victim is a minor, or if the purpose of the
kidnapping is to extort ransom.[31]
Otherwise stated, the prosecution must establish the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above-mentioned
circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same.There must be a purposeful or
knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent.[32]
In this case, the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements as it is
undisputed that accused-appellants, among others, illegally detained the victim Ragos against her will for the purpose of
extorting ransom from her family. Moreover, the collective testimonies of prosecution witnesses, such as victim Ragos
and state witness Bauting, positively identified the perpetrators to the kidnapping - including accused-appellants Adil,
Daliano, and Kamir - as well as narrated in detail the events that transpired from Ragos's abduction up to her rescue.
These easily trump accused-appellants' denial and alibi which are inherently weak defenses that cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration by credible witnesses.[33] Perforce, the Court finds no reason to
deviate from the factual findings of the courts a quo as there is no indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA
affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. As such, the
Court defers to the factual findings of the trial court, especially considering that it was in the best position to assess and
determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.[34]
As to the proper penalties to be imposed on accused-appellants, Article 267 of the RPC originally prescribes the death
penalty for the commission of said crime made for the purpose of extorting ransom. Hence, the RTC meted such penalty
on the principals, and the penalty one (1) degree lower — i.e., reclusion perpetua — on the accomplices pursuant to
Article 52[35] of the RPC. However, and as the CA correctly pointed out in its September 24, 2008 Decision, the passage
of RA 9346 effectively lowered the imposable penalty to the principals, e.g., accused-appellants, to reclusion perpetua,
[36]
 without eligibility for parole.[37] Resultantly, the imposable penalty to the accomplices must likewise be lowered
to reclusion temporal, thereby entitling them to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[38] Thus, the accomplices
must be sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of ten (10) years of  prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
176
At this point, it is worthy to note that none of the accomplices made any appeal to the Court. This notwithstanding, the
Court deems it proper to adjust their sentence as it is favorable and beneficial to them,[39] in accordance with Section 11,
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the pertinent part of which reads:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. -
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
xxxx
Finally, the Court deems it proper to impose civil liability ex delicto against accused-appellants in the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[40] To clarify, however, only accused-appellants Adil, Daliano, and Kamir, or those who pursued the
present appeal, are held jointly and solidarity liable for such amounts, since such imposition is clearly not favorable to
their co-accused who no longer appealed their conviction before the Court.[41]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decisions dated September 24, 2008 and March 5, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01937, which upheld the Decision dated August 15, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of
Las Piñas City, Branch 275 in Crim. Case No. 98-1379, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
(a) Accused Jimmy Alunan and accused-appellants Omar Kamir, Alex Daliano, and Bayan Abbas Adil are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole;
(b) Accused Brahim Lidasan, Nhokie Mohamad, Rocky Mocalam, Teng Usman, Ali Matoc, Muslimen Wahab, and
Rowena Amal Rajid are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accomplices of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. They are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period often (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
(c) Accused-appellants Omar Kamir, Alex Daliano, and Bayan Abbas Adil are ordered to solidarity pay the victim
Michelle Ragos civil liability ex delicto in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
84. A.C. No. 9832, September 04, 2017
LOLITA R. MARTIN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JESUS M. DELA CRUZ, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint[1] dated February 10, 2013 filed by complainant Lolita R. Martin
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz (respondent) for the latter's failure to return the acceptance
fee in the amount of P60,000.00 he received from complainant, despite several demands.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in 2012, she engaged respondent's legal services in relation to several pending
cases she filed before the following agencies: (a) the Professional Regulation Commission; (b) the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC); and (c) the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.[2] After giving photocopies of
the cases' files, complainant paid respondent P60,000.00 as acceptance fee, evidenced by the Official Receipt [3] dated
August 23, 2012.[4]
From December 21, 2012 to February 6, 2013, complainant repeatedly went to respondent's office to inquire on the
status of the cases, but respondent was not there.[5] Thus, complainant wrote several letters[6] to him requesting the return
of the money she paid as acceptance fee due to respondent's failure to take any action on her cases. He even failed to
appear in the hearing for preliminary investigation before the OCP-QC on January 16, 2013, causing it to be reset on
February 20, 2013.[7] Respondent also refused to answer any of her calls.[8]
After several months, respondent finally contacted complainant, and told her not to worry as he would still handle the
other cases, particularly the Estafa case pending before the OCP-QC. However, respondent still failed to attend the
scheduled preliminary investigation. Aggrieved, complainant went to respondent's office, but the latter only answered
"[k]asi alam ko alas dose ng hapon ang hearing."[9] Angered by his response, complainant reiterated her demand for the
return of the acceptance fee, but the latter refused.[10] Thus, she wrote letter-complaints for respondent's disbarment to
the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as to the Presidential Action Center of the Office of the President, which were
indorsed to the Court.[11]
On June 17, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution   requiring respondent to comment on the letter-complaint, but he
[12]
failed to comply.[13]
On January 13, 2014, the Court dispensed with respondent's comment and, instead, referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. [14]
On June 2, 2014, the IBP conducted a mandatory conference, but only complainant appeared. On even date, it issued an
Order[15] directing the parties to file their position papers within ten (10) days, to which only complainant complied. [16]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation[17] dated August 18, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner (IC) recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and ordered to return to complainant the
amount of P60,000.00 he received as acceptance fee with twelve percent (12%) interest per annum. [18]
The IC held that respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 16.01, Canon 16, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) due to his failure to: (a) render any legal service despite his
engagement and receipt of P60,000.00 as acceptance fee; (b) appear in two (2) preliminary investigation hearings before
the OCP-QC; and (c) return the money complainant paid him despite written and verbal demands.[19] The IC also found
respondent liable for willful disobedience to the Court's lawful orders for his failure to file his comment to the letter-
complaint, as well as to the IBP's processes when he failed to file a mandatory conference brief, to appear during the
mandatory conference hearing, and to file his position paper.[20]
In a Resolution[21] dated February 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IC's Report and
Recommendation.
On October 29, 2015, respondent filed his motion for reconsideration,[22] explaining that he was not aware of the
administrative case against him, as he was out of the country for most of the period from 2013 to 2015, [23] and that the
notices of the IBP proceedings were sent to the IBP-QC, rather than to his office address in Scout Borromeo, QC, and
that the staff in the former office did not apprise him about the notices. [24]
Respondent averred that, during their first meeting, he and complainant only discussed six (6) administrative cases,
which did not include the pending criminal investigation case before the OCP-QC.[25] Nevertheless, respondent admitted
that complainant had asked him to attend an on-going investigation in the prosecutor's office, for which he requested for
177
the case documents, which were, however, not given to him.[26] He insisted that complainant informed him that the
hearing was at two o'clock in the afternoon, which was the reason why he instructed complainant to give him the
documents before noon on that date so he can go over them during lunch break.[27]
While he opined that the acceptance fee is not refundable since he already prepared pleadings for complainant, he also
manifested that he will nonetheless comply with the order to return the money to complainant but requested that he be
allowed to pay in installments within three (3) months.[28]
The IBP denied his motion in a Resolution[29] dated September 23, 2016.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the IBP's findings insofar as it found respondent administratively liable for violating Rules 18.03
and 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR.
A judicious review of the records shows that complainant secured respondent's legal services for several cases and paid
P60,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, respondent failed to perform legal services on any of these cases, and upon
demand, refused to return the acceptance fee paid by complainant. He also failed to respond to complainant's letters and
calls inquiring on the status of said cases. These acts indubitably constitute violations of Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon
18 of the CPR, which respectively read:
CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
Under these provisions, a lawyer is duty-bound to competently and diligently serve his client once the former takes up the
latter's cause. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Hence, his neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him amounts to inexcusable negligence for which he must be
administratively liable,[30] as in this case. The Court finds no credence to respondent's defense that he prepared
pleadings for complainant given that he failed to provide any proof to substantiate his claim.
The Court, however, does not find respondent liable for violating Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates
lawyers to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." Consistent with this duty,
respondent accounted for his receipt of P60,000.00 as acceptance fee from complainant when he issued the Official
Receipt dated August 23, 2012.[31] He also cannot be held liable for failure to account complainant's alleged payment of
P2,500.00 as research fee for lack of proof that such amount was paid to respondent.
Anent the penalty, in similar cases wherein lawyers were found to have neglected their clients' causes, the Court
imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. [32] Consistent with
these cases, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
As regards restitution, the Court has, in several cases, allowed the return of acceptance fees when a lawyer completely
fails to render legal service.[33] As applied to this case, the order for respondent to return the P60,000.00 is, therefore,
proper. Indeed, an acceptance fee is generally non-refundable,[34] but such rule presupposes that the lawyer has
rendered legal service to his client.[35] In the absence of such service, the lawyer has no basis for retaining complainant's
payment, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jesus M. Dela Cruz (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The suspension in the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt by respondent. Respondent
is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy furnished all courts
and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in respondent's personal record
as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
85. G.R. No. 223556, October 09, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL LIM CHING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal[1] is the Decision[2] dated June 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01724, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated June 17, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar,
Branch 19 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. C-3522, C-3523, and C-3533 finding accused-appellant Manuel Lim Ching
(Ching) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 11, 12, and 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165,[4] otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," respectively.
The Facts
This case stemmed from four (4) Informations filed before the RTC charging Ching of violating Sections 11, 12, 5, and 6,
Article II of RA 9165, the accusatory portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. C-3522
That on or about the 29th of June 2003, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, in Purok 4, Barangay Jose
Abad Santos, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the said provision of the law, did then and
there, [willfully], unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following items, to wit[:]
1. One (1) sachet of "shabu" with estimated weight of (0.2) grams worth P300.00
2. One (1) sachet of "shabu" with an estimated weight of (0.2) grams worth P500.00
3. Five (5) sachets of "shabu" with an estimated weight of (5.3) grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly known as "shabu" a regulated drug without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same from competent authority which therefore is an open violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, in particular Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
178
Criminal Case No. C-3523
That on or about the 29th day of June 2003, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon more or less, in Purok 4, Barangay
Jose Abad Santos, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the said provisions of the law, did then and
there, [willfully], unlawfully, [and] feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following drug
paraphernalia, to wit:
1.) Twenty three (23) pcs. of aluminum foils;
2.) Six (6) pcs. improvised aluminum tooters;
3.) One (1) pc. plastic tooter;
4.) One (1) pc. alcohol lamp;
5.) One ( l) pc. plastic case color blue;
6.) Seven (7) pcs. disposable lighters;
7.) One (1) pc. scissor;
8.) Two (2) pcs. cutter blade;
without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the dangerous drugs' Paraphernalia, Tools and
instruments the same from competent authority which therefore is an open violation of Section 12, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. C-3533
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2003 at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, at Purok 4, Barangay Jose Abad
Santos, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the above provisions of the law, did then and there,
[willfully], unlawfully and feloniously sold to police poseur-buyer PO1 Mauro Ubaldo Lim one (1) sachet of
methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly known as "shabu" a regulated drug weighing 0.2 gram valued at Three
Hundred (P300.00) Pesos and other sachet of the same substance weighing 0.2 gram valued at Five Hundred (P500.00)
Pesos to a total of Eight Hundred (P800.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency without first securing the necessary permit or
license from any competent authority to do the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal Case No. C-3524
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2003, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon more or less, in Purok 4, Barangay
Jose Abad Santos, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Northern Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to violate the said provision of the law, did then and
there, intentionally, unlawfully and feloniously maintain and keep a drug den in his residence where methamphetamine
hydrochloride popularly known as "shabu" are stored, distributed, traded and used by his visitors and where drug
paraphernalia/tools/instruments are kept without first securing the necessary permit or license to maintain and sell the
same from competent authority which therefore is an open violation of Section 6, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or
Maintenance of a Drug Den.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
The prosecution alleged that on June 29, 2003, and after the conduct of surveillance on the suspected illegal drug
activities of Ching, as well as a test-buy wherein a civilian asset purchased one (1) sachet of suspected shabu worth
P300.00, Police Superintendent Isaias B. Tonog (P/Supt. Tonog), formed a buy-bust team composed of, among others,
Police Officer 1 Mauro Ubaldo Lim (PO1 Lim), the designated poseur-buyer, with the rest of the members serving as
backup officers.[9] At around four (4) o'clock in the afternoon of even date, the team proceeded to Ching's house located
at Purok 4, Barangay Jose Abad Santos, Catarman, Northern Samar and upon arrival thereat, PO1 Lim approached
Ching and bought a sachet of suspected shabu worth P500.00, handing as payment the marked money. As soon as PO1
Lim received the sachet, he gave the pre-arranged signal and the other team members, who were stationed more or less
15-20 meters from the target area, approached, causing Ching to run and hide in his room. The team followed Ching
inside his house where he was eventually arrested for selling shabu.[10] A subsequent search of the premises produced
the following: two (2) sachets in a chicken cage outside the house, two (2) sachets on the wooden frames nailed to a wall
inside the house, and one (1) sachet found in a pail outside the house. Similarly, the following drug paraphernalia were
recovered in an adjacent makeshift structure outside the house: twenty-three (23) pieces of aluminum foil, six (6) pieces
of improvised tooters, one (1) piece of plastic tooter, seven (7) pieces of disposable lighters, one (1) pair of scissors, two
(2) pieces of cutter blade, one (1) piece of alcohol lamp and one (1) piece of color blue plastic case.[11] The sachets
of shabu were sealed and labeled "MLC-1 to MLC-9" after which, they were brought to the Northern Samar Police
Provincial Office, Camp Carlos Delgado,[12]where P/Supt. Tonog signed four (4) Receipts for Property Seized[13] as
witnessed by barangay officials Benito Calindong, Leon Rosales, and Felipe Aurel.[14]
Days after, at around 10:35 in the morning of July 9, 2003, P/Supt. Tonog delivered the drug specimens to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) office in Tacloban where it was received and acknowledged by a certain Police
Officer 3 Bernardo Bautista (PO3 Bautista),[15] who, in turn, turned over the items on the same day to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office 8 and were received by Forensic Chemist Police Senior
Inspector Benjamin Aguirre Cruto, Jr. (P/Sr. Insp. Cruto) for examination.[16] In Chemistry Report No. D-300-2003,[17] P/Sr.
Insp. Cruto confirmed that the substance inside eight (8) out of the nine (9) sachets (marked as MLC-1 through MLC-6,
MLC-8 and MLC-9) were positive for methylamphetamine hyrdrochloride or shabu, an illegal drug.[18]
Upon arraignment, Ching pleaded not guilty  and proceeded to deny the charges leveled against him. He claimed that
[19]
on said date, he was in his house with his nephews and was about to leave when policemen, including P/Supt. Tonog,
together with some barangay officials, arrived and roamed around his residence. He later saw one of the men insert a
plastic inside the chicken cage and thereafter, gathered some things and placed them on top of a table. Not long after,
a pedicab arrived and he was brought to the police station and detained. Ching further claimed that he was veclose with
P/Supt. Tonog, but the latter bore personal grudges against him.[20]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated June 17, 2013, the RTC ruled as follows: (a) in Criminal Case No. C-3522, Ching was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11 of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and to pay a
fine in the amount of P100,000.00;[22] (b) in Criminal Case No. C-3523, Ching was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia under Section 12 of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00;
[23]
 (c) in Criminal Case No. C-3533, Ching was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under
Section 5 of RA 9165 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine in the
amount of P500,000;[24] and (d) in Criminal Case No. C-3524, Ching was acquitted on reasonable doubt.[25]
The RTC found all the elements for the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs present as drugs were
found within the premises of Ching's residence, i.e., in the chicken cage, the wooden frames inside the house, and in a
pail outside the house.[26] Moreover, the prosecution was able to show that the drug paraphernalia confiscated from the
premises of Ching's residence were used in smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting or introducing dangerous
179
drugs into the body.[27] Likewise, all the elements for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs were proven, noting that the sale
of the shabu was consummated and Ching was positively identified as the seller.[28]
Aggrieved, Ching elevated his conviction before the CA.[29]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[30] dated June 30, 2015, the CA upheld the RTC ruling, holding that all the elements of the crimes for which
Ching was convicted were present. More importantly, it ruled that the apprehending officers duly complied with the chain
of custody rule and the mandatory requirements under Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as P/Supt. Tonog narrated in detail the conduct of the buy-bust operation and the due
diligence he exercised to ensure that the very same confiscated sachets of shabu were the ones submitted to the PDEA
for examination and eventually presented in court.[31] The CA did not give credence to Ching's defenses of denial and
frame-up, absent any ill-motive on the part of the police officers.[32]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Ching is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 11,
12, and 5, Article II of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling
Preliminarily, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine the records anew and revise the judgment appealed from, among others.[33]
In this case, Ching was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, illegal possession of drug paraphernalia,
and illegal sale of dangerous drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 11, 12, and 5, Article II of RA
9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove: (a) that the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b)
such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
[34]
 Similarly, a violation of illegal possession of paraphernalia is deemed consummated the moment the accused is found
in possession of said articles without the necessary license or prescription.[35] Finally, the prosecution must establish the
following elements to convict an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.[36]
Jurisprudence states that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the seized drug/paraphernalia be established
with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an
unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti.[37]
Pertinently, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police
officers must follow in handling the seized drugs/paraphernalia, in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.
[38]
 Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom
the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice,
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same,
and the seized items must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation
for examination.[39]

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21,
Article II of 9165 may not always be possible.[40] In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 -
which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 [41] - provide, among others, that non-
compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.[42] In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure
and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: ( a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.[43] In People v. Almorfe,[44] the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved.[45] Also, in People v. De Guzman,[46] it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.
[47]
In this case, Ching prayed for his acquittal in view of the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) in that: (a) the sachets of drugs seized from his house were not
properly identified as to which among them were connected to his particular offense; (b) no photographs were taken of
the items taken from his house; (c) no sealing of the seized drugs took place; and, (d) it was not established who was
entrusted with the safekeeping of the specimens before their presentation in court and what precautions were taken to
ensure their integrity and value.[48]
Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous
drugs/paraphernalia which were left unjustified, thereby casting reasonable doubt on their integrity, as will be explained
hereunder.
First, after Ching's arrest, P/Supt. Tonog marked the seized shabu. His testimony on this matter is as follows:
Q: Before going to Tacloban City purposely to submit the shabu that were confiscated during the buy-bust operation at
the place or residence of accused Manuel Lim Ching, did you exercise due diligence to see to it that the same specimen
or shabu confiscated from Manuel Lim Ching were the same specimen that were submitted to the PDEA?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what way did you exercise due diligence and effort to see to it that the very same shabu that were submitted to the
PDEA?
A: The sachet of shabu was placed in a plastic and it was sealed, then it was placed also in another brown envelope and
together with the request and it was sealed and after that in the evening, we rode early for Tacloban and submitted it to
the PDEA.
Q: Did you make any specific markings to see to it that the same shabu that you were able to confiscate from Manuel Lim
Ching were the same shabu to be submitted at the PDEA?
A: Yes, sir because before we submitted it to the PDEA, we wrote a letter on the shabu, the name of the suspect for
example, Manuel Lim Ching, we put it MLC 1 up to how many numbers of shabu confiscated, if for example MLC 1 MLC
2 up to MLC 9.[49]
While the fact of marking of the seized items was clear from such testimony and the inventory evidenced by the attached
Receipt for Property Seized, the same was glaringly silent as to the taking of photographs and the conduct of an
inventory in the presence of a representative from the media and the DOJ. In the case of People v. Mendoza,[50] the Court
stresses that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media [and] the Department of Justice, or
any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or
180
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-bust conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the
[said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain
of custody."[51]
Second, it is well to note that the delivery of the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory was made way beyond the
prescribed twenty four (24)-hour period from seizure. To reiterate, the drugs/paraphernalia were seized during the buy-
bust operation on June 29, 2003, but were delivered to the PDEA and the PNP crime laboratory only ten (10) days later,
or on July 9, 2003. In People v. Gamboa,[52] the Court explained that "[w]hen police officers do not turn over dangerous
drugs to the laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from seizure, they must identify its custodian, and the latter must be
called to testify. The custodian must state the security measures in place to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated items were preserved,"[53] which did not take place in this case.
All told, the breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the
accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Case law states that the
procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a
simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For indeed,
however, noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still a
governmental action that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.[54]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01724 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Manuel Lim Ching is ACQUITTED in
Criminal Case Nos. C-3522, C-3523, and C-3533 for violations of Sections 11, 12, and 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, respectively. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is
being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
86. G.R. No. 214866, October 02, 2017
APEX BANCRIGHTS HOLDINGS, INC., LEAD BANCFUND HOLDINGS, INC., ASIA WIDE REFRESHMENTS
CORPORATION, MEDCO ASIA INVESTMENT CORPORATION, ZEST-O CORPORATION, HARMONY BANCSHARES
HOLDINGS, INC., EXCALIBUR HOLDINGS, INC., AND ALFREDO M. YAO, PETITIONERS, VS. BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS AND PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioners Apex Bancrights Holdings, Inc., Lead Bancfund
Holdings, Inc, Asia Wide Refreshments Corporation, Medco Asia Investment Corporation, Zest-O Corporation, Harmony
Bancshares Holdings, Inc., Excalibur Holdings, Inc., and Alfredo M. Yao (petitioners) assailing the Decision [2] dated
January 21, 2014 and the Resolution[3] dated October 10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129674, which
affirmed Resolution No. 571 dated April 4, 2013 of the Monetary Board of respondent Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
ordering the liquidation of the Export and Industry Bank (EIB).
The Facts
Sometime in July 2001, EIB entered into a three-way merger with Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI) and Urbancorp Investments,
Inc. (UII) in an attempt to rehabilitate UBI which was then under receivership.[4] In September 2001, following the said
merger, EIB itself encountered financial difficulties which prompted respondent the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) to extend financial assistance to it. However, EIB still failed to overcome its financial problems,
thereby causing PDIC to release in May 2005 additional financial assistance to it, conditioned upon the infusion by EIB
stockholders of additional capital whenever EIB's adjusted Risk Based Capital Adequacy Ratio falls below 12.5%.
Despite this, EIB failed to comply with the BSP's capital requirements, causing EIB's stockholders to commence the
process of selling the bank.[5]
Initially, Banco de Oro (BDO) expressed interest in acquiring EIB. However, certain issues derailed the acquisition,
including BDO's unwillingness to assume certain liabilities of EIB, particularly the claim of the Pacific Rehouse Group
against it. In the end, BDO's acquisition of EIB did not proceed and the latter's financial condition worsened. Thus, in a
letter[6] dated April 26, 2012, EIB's president and chairman voluntarily turned-over the full control of EIB to BSP, and
informed the latter that the former will declare a bank holiday on April27, 2012.[7]
On April 26, 2012, the BSP, through the Monetary Board, issued Resolution No. 686 [8] prohibiting EIB from doing
business in the Philippines and placing it under the receivership of PDIC, in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act
No. (RA) 7653, otherwise known as "The New Central Bank Act."[9] Accordingly, PDIC took over EIB.[10]
In due course, PDIC submitted its initial receivership report to the Monetary Board which contained its finding that EIB
can be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business; provided, that a bidding for its rehabilitation would be conducted,
and that the following conditions would be met: (a) there are qualified interested banks that will comply with the
parameters for rehabilitation of a closed bank, capital strengthening, liquidity, sustainability and viability of operations,
and strengthening of bank governance; and (b) all parties (including creditors and stockholders) agree to the
rehabilitation and the revised payment terms and conditions of outstanding liabilities. [11] Accordingly, the Monetary Board
issued Resolution No. 1317 on August 9, 2012 noting PDIC's initial report, and its request to extend the period within
which to submit the final determination of whether or not EIB can be rehabilitated. Pursuant to the rehabilitation efforts, a
public bidding was scheduled by PDIC on October 18, 2012, but the same failed as no bid was submitted. A re-bidding
was then set on March 20, 2013 which also did not materialize as no bids were submitted.[12]
On April 1, 2013, PDIC informed BSP that EIB can hardly be rehabilitated. [13] Based on PDIC's report that EIB was
insolvent, the Monetary Board passed Resolution No. 571 on April 4, 2013 directing PDIC to proceed with the liquidation
of EIB.[14]
On April 29, 2013, petitioners, who are stockholders representing the majority stock of EIB, [15] filed a petition
for certiorari[16] before the CA challenging Resolution No. 571. In essence, petitioners blame PDIC for the failure to
rehabilitate EIB, contending that PDIC: (a) imposed unreasonable and oppressive conditions which delayed or frustrated
the transaction between BDO and EIB; (b) frustrated EIB's efforts to increase its liquidity when PDIC disapproved EIB's
proposal to sell its MRT bonds to a private third party and, instead, required EIB to sell the same to government entities;
(c) imposed impossible and unnecessary bidding requirements; and (d) delayed the public bidding which dampened
investors' interest.[17]
In defense, PDIC countered[18] that petitioners were already estopped from assailing the placement of EIB under
receivership and its eventual liquidation since they had already surrendered full control of the bank to the BSP as early
as April 26, 2012.[19] For its part, BSP maintained[20] that it had ample factual and legal bases to order EIB's liquidation.[21]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[22] dated January 21, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the Monetary Board
did not gravely abuse its discretion in ordering the liquidation of EIB pursuant to the PDIC's findings that the rehabilitation
of the bank is no longer feasible. In this regard, the CA held that there is nothing in Section 30 of RA 7653 that requires
the Monetary Board to make its own independent factual determination on the bank's viability before ordering its
liquidation. According to the CA, the law only provides that the Monetary Board "shall notify in writing the board of
directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the liquidation of the institution,"[23] which it did in this case.
181
Undaunted, petitioners moved for reconsideration[24] which was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution[25]dated
October 10, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue before the Court is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Monetary Board did not gravely abuse its
discretion in issuing Resolution No. 571 which directed the PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of EIB.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Section 30 of RA 7653 provides for the proceedings in the receivership and liquidation of banks and quasi-banks, the
pertinent portions of which read:
Section 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. - Whenever, upon report of the head of the
supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-
bank:
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, That this shall not
include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community;
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or
(d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or
transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary
Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines
and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.
xxxx
The receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the institution, administer the
same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers of a receiver under the Revised Rules of Court x x
x[.]
If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business in accordance with
the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in writing the board of directors of its findings and direct
the receiver to proceed with the liquidation of the institution. The receiver shall:
xxxx
The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory,
and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken
was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within
ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or
conservatorship.
The designation of a conservator under Section 29 of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this section shall be
vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. Furthermore, the designation of a conservator is not a precondition to the
designation of a receiver. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
It is settled that "[t]he power and authority of the Monetary Board to close banks and liquidate them thereafter when
public interest so requires is an exercise of the police power of the State. Police power, however, is subject to judicial
inquiry. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably and could be set aside if it is either capricious, discriminatory,
whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or is tantamount to a denial of due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution."[26] Otherwise stated and as culled from the above provision, the actions of the Monetary Board shall be final
and executory and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the
action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. "There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and
evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism."[27]
In line with the foregoing considerations, the Court agrees with the CA that the Monetary Board did not gravely abuse its
discretion in ordering the liquidation of EIB through its Resolution No. 571.
To recount, after the Monetary Board issued Resolution No. 686 which placed EIB under the receivership of PDIC, the
latter submitted its initial findings to the Monetary Board, stating that EIB can be rehabilitated or permitted to resume
business; provided, that a bidding for its rehabilitation would be conducted, and that the following conditions would be
met: (a) there are qualified interested banks that will comply with the parameters for rehabilitation of a closed bank,
capital strengthening, liquidity, sustainability and viability of operations, and strengthening of bank governance; and ( b) all
parties (including creditors and stockholders) agree to the rehabilitation and the revised payment terms and conditions of
outstanding liabilities.[28] However, the foregoing conditions for EIB's rehabilitation "were not met because the bidding and
re-bidding for the bank's rehabilitation were aborted since none of the pre-qualified Strategic Third Party Investors (STPI)
submitted a letter of interest to participate in the bidding,"[29] thereby resulting in the PDIC's finding that EIB is already
insolvent and must already be liquidated - a finding which eventually resulted in the Monetary Board's issuance of
Resolution No. 571.
In an attempt to forestall EIB's liquidation, petitioners insist that the Monetary Board must first make its own independent
finding that the bank could no longer be rehabilitated - instead of merely relying on the findings of the PDIC before
ordering the liquidation of a bank.[30]
Such position is untenable.
As correctly held by the CA, nothing in Section 30 of RA 7653 requires the BSP, through the Monetary Board, to make an
independent determination of whether a bank may still be rehabilitated or not. As expressly stated in the afore-cited
provision, once the receiver determines that rehabilitation is no longer feasible, the Monetary Board is simply obligated
to: (a) notify in writing the bank's board of directors of the same; and (b) direct the PDIC to proceed with liquidation, viz.:
If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume business in accordance with
the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in writing the board of directors of its findings and direct
the receiver to proceed with the liquidation of the institution.  Vincent B. Baidoz. Odelio C. Gasmen, Cirilo A. Arruejo, Romeo E. Torres, Renato P. Velasco, Rex D. Villaruz,Celso V.
x x x[31]
Suffice it to say that if the law had indeed intended that the Monetary Board make a separate and distinct factual
determination before it can order the liquidation of a bank or quasi-bank, then there should have been a provision to that
effect. There being none, it can safely be concluded that the Monetary Board is not so required when the PDIC has
182
already made such determination. It must be stressed that the BSP (the umbrella agency of the Monetary Board), in its
capacity as government regulator of banks, and the PDIC, as statutory receiver of banks under RA 7653, are the
principal agencies mandated by law to determine the financial viability of banks and quasi-banks, and facilitate the
receivership and liquidation of closed financial institutions, upon a factual determination of the latter's insolvency. [32] Thus,
following the maxim verba legis non est recedendum  which means "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure" - a statute that is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity must be given its literal meaning and applied without
any attempted interpretation,[33] as in this case.
In sum, the Monetary Board's issuance of Resolution No. 571 ordering the liquidation of EIB cannot be considered to be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it was amply supported by the factual circumstances at hand and made in
accordance with prevailing law and jurisprudence. To note, the "actions of the Monetary Board in proceedings on
insolvency are explicitly declared by law to be 'final and executory.' They may not be set aside, or restrained, or enjoined
by the courts, except upon 'convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith,'"[34]which is absent
in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January 21, 2014 and the Resolution dated October
10, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129674 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
87. G.R. No. 227505, October 02, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ERLINDA RACHO Y SOMERA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Erlinda Racho y Somera (Racho) assailing the
Decision[2] dated October 15, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06932, which affirmed the
Decision[3] dated May 28, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 05-
1935, 05-1938, 05-1941, 05-1943, 05-1945, 05-1948, 05-1949, and 05-1951 convicting Racho of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale, as defined and penalized under Section 6 (l) and (m), in relation to Section 7 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA)
8042,[4] otherwise known as the Migrant Workers Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, and six (6) counts of Estafa under Article
315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Facts
This case stemmed from, among others, an Information[5] dated August 19, 2005 charging Radio for the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in Large Scale, docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-1935, the accusatory portion of which reads:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-1935
That in or about during [sic] the period from November, 2004 up to February 07, 2005 or prior thereto, in the City of
Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
without first obtaining a license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit and promise employment/job placement and
collect fee[s] from complainants Bernardo Pena, Arsenio N. Sevania, Maximo V. Gambon, Simeon Adame Filarca,
Doctolero, Renato L. Pescador, Rodolfo C. Pagal, William D. Villaruz, Franklin B. Delizo[,] and Dominador S. Pena as
contract workers, without any license/authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) or by
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to recruit workers for overseas employment.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Racho was also charged with sixteen (16) counts[6] of Estafa, of which only six (6) cases prospered and eventually, were bio-data forms, and pay placement fees, which they did. They then left the Philippines on different dates and stayed in
appealed before the Court. The Informations for these six (6) cases are similarly worded, except for the details pertaining East Timor while waiting for their working visas. However, two to three months passed and yet no working visas were
to the date of commission of the offense, name of the complainant, job recruited for, and the amount involved. Among issued despite Radio's promises. Thus, they went back to the Philippines, and after failing to find Racho, filed their
others, the accusatory portion of the Information[7] for Criminal Case No. 05-1938 involving the complainant Odelio C. complaints before the Presidential Anti-Illegal Recruitment Task Force Hunter.[14]
Gasmen (Odelio) reads:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-1938 In the course of the proceedings, Racho moved that some cases be provisionally dismissed [15] due to the failure of the
other complainants to give their testimonies despite due notice. In an Order[16] dated September 17, 2012, the RTC
That on or about the 26th of November, 2004 or prior thereto, in Makati, The Philippines, the above-named accused, did provisionally dismissed nine (9) Estafa cases,[17] leaving the following cases to proceed: (a) the Illegal Recruitment in
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one Odelio C. Gasmen in the following manner, to wit: The Large Scale case, i.e., Crim. Case No. 05-1935; (b) the above-stated six Estafa cases - Criminal Case Nos. 05-1938, 05-
said accused by false pretenses or fraudulent acts committed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, 1941, 05-1945, 05-1948, 05-1949, and 05-1951; and (c) an additional Estafa case, namely Criminal Case No. 05-
to the effect that she can recruit workers for overseas employment and deploy complainant as construction worker in 1943 filed by complainant Dominador S. Pena (Dominador), who, same as William, failed to give his testimony.
East Timor for a fee of Php100,000.00, which representation [she] well knew to be false and was only made to induce the
aforementioned complainant to give and deliver, as in fact the said complainant gave and delivered, to her the said As to the cases which proceeded, the defense countered with the sole testimony of Racho, who denied the charges
amount of [Php100,000.00], to the damage and prejudice of the said Odelio C. Gasmen in the aforementioned amount of against her and argued that she was an auditor of PET Plans, Inc. from March 23, 2000 to August 31, 2005, making it
Php100,000.00. highly unlikely for her to have engaged in the business of recruitment and promised employment abroad. She also belied
the claim that she received the amounts allegedly paid by the complainants and insisted that the latter only found out
CONTRARY TO LAW. about the employment abroad from another person over the radio.[18]
The variations in the Informations for the other five (5) criminal cases, i.e., Criminal Case Nos. 05-1941, 05-
1945, 05-1948, 05-1949, and 05-1951, are summarized below: The RTC Ruling
Criminal Case Date of Commission of the In a Decision[19] dated May 28, 2014, the RTC found Racho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of: (a) Illegal Recruitment in
Complainant Job Recruited For Amount Involved
No. Offense Large Scale in Criminal Case No. 05-1935, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine
Simeon Adame Filarca of P1,000,000.00; and (b) six (6) counts of Estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1938, 05-1941, 05-1945, 05-1948, 05-
05-1941 January 13, 2005 Carpenter P80,000.00
(Simeon) 1951, including Criminal Case No. 05-1949, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer imprisonment for indeterminate
Bernardo Peña periods[20] and to pay[21] complainants the amounts they paid as placement fees plus twelve percent (12%) per annum
05-1945 January 13, 2005 Plumber/electrician P80,000.00 from the filing of the information until finality of its judgment. [22]
(Bernardo)
Renato L. Pescador At the outset, the RTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 05-1943 involving Dominador for failure of the prosecution to
05-1948 January 17, 2005 Carpenter P100,000.00
(Renato) present any evidence.[23]
William D. Villaruz
05-1949 January 18, 2005 Contract worker P80,000.00
(William) On the other hand, in the Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale case, the RTC was convinced that Racho offered and
Rodolfo C. Pagal promised employments in East Timor to complainants despite not having any license to recruit them. It found that Racho
05-1951 February 24, 2005 Contract worker P60,000.00 indeed required the complainants to submit their bio-data, birth certificates, and passports, as well as pay placement
(Rodolfo)
fees.[24] As to the six (6) Estafa cases, the RTC held that the prosecution has proven Racho's misrepresentation that she
All of the cases against Radio were consolidated and tried jointly. [8] On May 24, 2011, Racho was arraigned and pleaded
could provide jobs to complainants in East Timor despite lack of authority from the POEA and that she demanded
not guilty to all the charges against her.[9]
payment of placement fees. It added that Radio's deceit was underscored by the fact that complainants were stranded in
East Timor without any jobs and upon their return to the country, could not find her to recover their payments. [25]
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Bella Diaz (Bella), a senior Labor and Employment Officer from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, as well as of the complainants in the above-cited criminal cases
Aggrieved, Racho appealed[26] to the CA.
(i.e., Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, and Rodolfo), with the exception of William, the complainant in Criminal Case
No. 05-1949, who failed to appear despite his receipt of the Subpoenas dated February 28, 2012 and June 20, 2012
(Subpoenas).[10] Another witness, Rex Villaruz (Rex), who was the complainant in Criminal Case No. 05-1937, gave his The CA Ruling
testimony in court.[11] However, this latter case was provisionally dismissed by the RTC and as such, did not reach this
Court.[12] In a Decision[27] dated October 15, 2015, the CA affirmed Racho's convictions in toto.[28] It held that Racho's
representation that she had the authority to deploy workers in East Timor for employment despite the absence of the
In particular, Bella Diaz confirmed that Racho was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for employment required license or authority from the POEA, as well as her demand for payment of placement fees from the complainant,
abroad as certified in a document dated July 12, 2012.[13] proved her guilt in the Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) Estafa cases;[29] hence, the instant appeal involving
these cases.
Meanwhile, Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, Rodolfo, and Rex uniformly alleged that they heard either from a radio
advertisement or a friend about an employment opportunity in East Timor linked to Racho. On separate dates, they went The Issue Before the Court
to meet with Racho either at her residence in Vigan, Ilocos Sur or her office in Makati City where they were briefed about
the available position for them and the corresponding compensation. They were then asked to provide documents, fill out

183

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Racho is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment
in Large Scale and of Estafa.
The Court's Ruling
Settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on
grounds other than those raised as errors by the parties.[30] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over
the case and renders such court competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."[31]
In this light, the Court affirms Racho's convictions in Criminal Case No. 05-1935 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, as
well as the Estafa cases docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 05-1938, 05-1941, 05-1945, 05-1948, and 05-1951, but acquits
her in Crim. Case No. 05-1949, i.e., the Estafa case filed by William, for lack of evidence. Moreover, the Court reduces
the damages awarded to Rodolfo, the complainant in Criminal Case No. 05-1951, from P60,000.00 to P35,000.00 to
conform with the amount proven in court. Finally, the Court adjusts the penalties imposed on Racho as regards the
Estafa cases in view of the recent amendment under RA 10951,[32] as well as the interest rate pursuant to law.
I.
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale is defined under Section 6 of RA 8042, to wit:
Section 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contact services-promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13 (f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following
acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The elements of the offense are: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority to enable him to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; (b) he undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code (now Section 6 of RA 8042); and (c) he commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.[33] Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage.[34]
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that all these elements are present. The POEA certification, [35] as confirmed
by Bella Diaz, sufficiently established that Racho is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Clearly, a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the requisite authority is
engaged in illegal recruitment.[36] The definition of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code
includes promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement. Thus, Racho's act of offering and promising to deploy the complainants to East Timor for
work and collecting placement fees from more than three (3) persons, despite not being authorized to do so, renders her
liable for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. In this relation, her defense of denial cannot overcome complainants'
184
categorical and positive testimonies against her.[37] Therefore, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the lower
courts' findings on this score. Racho is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and penalized with a
fine of P1,000,000.00.
As to the penalty, although Section 7 of RA 8042 has been amended by Section 6 of RA 10022[38] which, accordingly,
increased the penalty for the crime, the old law, i.e., RA 8042 - which is more advantageous to the accused - still applies
considering that the crime was committed from 2004 to 2005 when the old law was still in effect.[39] Thus, the courts a
quo correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P1,000,000.00.[40]
II.
Racho's conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1938, 05-1941, 05-1945, 05-1948, and 05-1951 is likewise
warranted. Article 315 of the RPC states:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: 
 
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxxx
Under this provision, Estafa by means of deceit is committed when these elements concur: (a) the accused used fictitious
name or false pretense that he possesses power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or other similar deceits; (b) he used such deceitful means prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party relied on such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and (d)
the offended party suffered damage.[41]
Case law holds that the same pieces of evidence that establish liability for illegal recruitment in large scale confirm
culpability for Estafa. In People v. Chua:[42]
[W]e agree with the appellate court that the same pieces of evidence which establish appellant's liability for illegal
recruitment in large scale likewise confirm her culpability for estafa.
It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa.
The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first,
the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using
fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.
[43]
Records show that Racho defrauded Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, and Rodolfo by representing that she can
provide them with jobs in East Timor even though she had no license to recruit workers for employment abroad. She
even collected the irrelevant documents and placement fees of varying amounts. Although complainants were able to fly
to East Timor, they remained unemployed there due to Racho's failure to obtain their working visas. When they returned
to the country and looked for Racho, complainants could not locate her to recover the amounts they paid. Undeniably,
the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Racho committed Estafa against the five (5)
complainants. One (1) year and one (1) month of prision
05-1941 P80,000.00 Four (4) months of arresto mayor
correccional
However, the Court acquits Racho in Criminal Case No. 05-1949 due to the prosecution's failure to present any evidence
to prove the crime charged. Records show that William, the complainant in this particular Estafa case, failed to testify One (1) year and one (1) month of prision
05-1945 P80,000.00 Four (4) months of arresto mayor
before the RTC despite receipt of two Subpoenas ordering him to appear and testify. No documentary or other correccional
testimonial evidence was also presented. Therefore, an acquittal is warranted for this particular case and, accordingly, One (1) year and one (1) month of prision
05-1948 P100,000.00 Four (4) months of arresto mayor
the award of actual damages to William is deleted. Therefore, Racho's conviction for Estafa is affirmed only for five (5) correccional
counts.
05-1951 P35,000.00 Six (6) months of arresto mayor
III. IV.

For another, the Court reduces the actual damages awarded to Rodolfo in Criminal Case No. 05-1951 to P35,000.00.
Even though the amount alleged in the Information was P60,000.00,[44] Rodolfo's testimony revealed that he paid only
P35,000.00 as placement fee.[45] "A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually
suffered and duly proved."[46]
Furthermore, the Court modifies the penalties for the five (5) counts of Estafa pursuant to the recently-enacted RA
10951, which adjusted the base amounts that determine the incremental penalties to be imposed in Estafa cases and
effectively reduced the imposable penalties. Notably, Section 100[47] of RA 10951 echoes the rule that a penal law may
have retroactive effect when it is favorable to the accused,[48] as in this case.
The defrauded amounts involved in this case are: P100,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1938 and 05-1948; P80,000.00
in Criminal Case Nos. 05-1941 and 05-1945; and P35,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 05-1951.[49]
Prior to RA 10951, the imposable penalty when the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is the maximum period
of prision correccional in its maximum, as minimum, to prision mayor in its minimum (i.e., six [6] years, eight [8] months,
and twenty one [21] days to eight [8] years), as maximum, plus one year for each additional P10,000.00.
With the enactment of RA 10951,[50] the imposable penalties were effectively reduced. For instance, when the amount
involved is over P40,000.00 but not exceeding P1,200,000.00, the prescribed penalty is only arresto mayorin its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (i.e., four [4] months and one [1] day to two [2] years and
four [4] months), which applies to Criminal Case Nos. 05-1938, 05-1941, 05-1945, and 05-1948 in this case. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),[51] the minimum term should be taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods (i.e., one [1] month and one [1] day to four [4] months), while the maximum term should be within the medium
period of the prescribed penalty (i.e., one [1] year and one [1] day to one [1] year and eight [8] months) there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case. In view of the circumstances in the above-cited criminal
cases, the Court finds it proper to impose a penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and
one (1) month of prision correccional, as maximum.
On the other hand, if the amount involved is less than P40,000.00, the imposable penalty is only arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods (i.e., two [2] months and one [1] day to six [6] months), as is applicable to Criminal Case
No. 05-1951. The ISL no longer applies because the imposable penalty is less than one (1) year.[52] Thus, a straight
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor is proper.
In sum, the Court modifies the penalties imposed on Racho as follows:
Criminal Case No. Amount Defrauded Minimum Penalty Maximum Penalty
One (1) year and one (1) month of prision
05-1938 P100,000.00 Four (4) months of arresto mayor
correccional
Finally, the Court adjusts the interest imposed. Records show that the CA affirmed the RTC's imposition of interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, reckoned from the filing of the Information until finality of judgment. In line with
the Court's ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames[53] applying Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary
Board, the interest rate should, however, be modified to the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the filing of the
Informations in said cases on October 18, 2005 until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013
until full payment.[54] The amounts owed to complainants constitute forbearances of money whose corresponding
interests are treated under the said parameters.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated October 15, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 06932, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Erlinda Racho y Somera (Racho) is found GUILTY of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in Criminal Case No. 05-1935
and, accordingly SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ORDERED to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00
therefor;
(2) Racho is likewise found GUILTY of five (5) counts of Estafa. Accordingly, she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 05-1938, four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) month
of prision correccional, as maximum;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 05-1941, four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) month
of prision correccional, as maximum;
(c) In Criminal Case No. 05-1945, four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) month
of prision correccional, as maximum;
(d) In Criminal Case No. 05-1948, four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) month
of prision correccional, as maximum; and
(e) In Criminal Case No. 05-1951, six (6) months of arresto mayor.
(3) Moreover, Racho is ORDERED to pay the following complainants actual damages in these amounts: (a) P100,000.00
to Odelio Gasmen; (b) P80,000.00 to Simeon Filarca; (c) P80,000.00 to Bernardo Pena; and (d) P100,000.00 to Renato
Pescador; and (e) P35,000.00 to Rodolfo Pagal. These monetary awards are subject to interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the filing of the Informations on October 18, 2005 until June 30, 2013, and six percent
(6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.
(4) Finally, Racho is ACQUITTED of the Estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 05-1949 for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.

185
88. G.R. No. 230682, November 29, 2017 positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges; deleted the awards for payment of backwages, separation pay,
and moral and exemplary damages; and affirmed the rest of the awards.[19] For this purpose, the NLRC attached a
JOLO'S KIDDIE CARTS/ FUN4KIDS/ MARLO U. CABILI, PETITIONERS, V. EVELYN A. CABALLA AND ANTHONY M. Computation of Monetary Award[20] detailing the monetary awards due to respondents, as follows: (a) for Caballa,
BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS. P15,623.00 as holiday pay, P109,870.80 as wage differential, and P75,156.12 as 13th month pay; (b) for Bautista,
P15,623.00 as holiday pay, P112,294.00 as wage differential, and P74,480.12 as 13th month pay; and (c) attorney's fees
amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary value awarded.[21]
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Anent the procedural matters raised by petitioners, the NLRC ruled that: (a) petitioners waived the issue of improper
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Resolutions dated July 28, 2016[2] and February 22, 2017[3]of the venue when they failed to raise the same before the filing of position papers; and (b) respondents substantially complied
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 146460 which dismissed the petition for certiorari[4] filed by petitioners Jolo's with the requirement of verifying their position papers, and thus, the same is not fatal to their complaint. [22]As to the
Kiddie Carts/Fun4Kids/Marlo U. Cabili (petitioners), due to a technical ground, i.e., non-filing of a motion for merits, while the NLRC agreed with the LA's finding that there was no abandonment on the part of respondents, the latter
reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari. were unable to adduce any proof that petitioners indeed committed any overt or positive act operative of their dismissal.
The Facts [23]
 In view of the finding that there was neither dismissal on the part of petitioners nor abandonment on the part of
The instant case stemmed from a complaint[5] for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salaries/wages and 13th month pay, respondents, the NLRC ordered the latter's reinstatement but without backwages. Finally, the NLRC held that
non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, and separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees filed by Evelyn A. Caballa respondents should be entitled to their holiday pay as it is a statutory benefit which payment petitioners failed to prove. [24]
(Caballa), Anthony M. Bautista (Bautista; collectively, respondents), and one Jocelyn [6] S. Colisao (Colisao) against Dissatisfied, petitioners directly filed a petition for certiorari[25] before the CA, without moving for reconsideration before
petitioners before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Respondents and Colisao alleged that petitioners the NLRC.
hired them as staff members in the latter's business; Caballa and Bautista were assigned to man petitioners' stalls in SM The CA Ruling
Bacoor and SM Rosario in Cavite, respectively, while Colisao was assigned in several SM branches, the most recent of In a Resolution[26] dated July 28, 2016, the CA denied the petition due to petitioners' failure to file a motion for
which was in SM North EDSA.[7] They were paid a daily salary that reached P330.00 for a six (6)-day work week from reconsideration before the NLRC prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari before the CA. It held that the prior filing of
9:45 in the morning until 9:00 o'clock in the evening.[8] They claimed that they were never paid the monetary value of their such motion before the lower tribunal is an indispensable requisite in elevating the case to the CA via certiorari, and that
unused service incentive leaves, 13th month pay, overtime pay, and premium pay for work during holidays; and that when petitioners' failure to do so resulted in the NLRC ruling attaining finality.[27] Petitioners moved for reconsideration,[28] but
petitioners found out that they inquired from the Department of Labor and Employment about the prevailing minimum the same was denied in a Resolution[29] dated February 22, 2017; hence, this petition.[30]
wage rates, they were prohibited from reporting to their work assignment without any justification. [9] The Issue Before the Court
For their part,[10] petitioners denied dismissing respondents and Colisao, and maintained that they were the ones who The issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not the CA was correct in: (a) dismissing the petition
abandoned their work.[11] They likewise maintained that they paid respondents and Colisao their wages and other benefits for certioraribefore it due to petitioners' non-filing of a prior motion for reconsideration before the NLRC; and (b)
in accordance with the law and that their money claims were bereft of factual and legal bases.[12] effectively affirming the NLRC ruling, which not only increased respondents' awards of wage differential and 13th month
The Labor Arbiter's (LA) Ruling pay, but also awarded an additional monetary award as holiday pay.
In a Decision[13] dated November 27, 2015, the LA dismissed the case insofar as Colisao is concerned for failure to The Court's Ruling
prosecute.[14] However, the LA ruled in favor of respondents, and accordingly, ordered The petition is partly meritorious.
petitioners to solidarity pay them the following, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the total monetary awards: I.
Separation Backwages Wage 13th month Moral Exemplary Total As a rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari.[31] The
  Pay Differential pay Damages damages rationale for this requirement is that "the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the
errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had."[32] Notably, however, there
Caballa 60,580.00 109,870.80 75,156.12 10,608.00 10,000.00 5,000.00 P271,214.92 are several recognized exceptions to the rule, one of which is when the order is a patent nullity. [33]
In this case, records show that the LA ruled in favor of respondents, and accordingly,
Bautista 60,580.00 112,294.00 74,480.12 10,608.00 10,000.00 5,000.00 272,962.12 ordered petitioners to pay them the following monetary awards:
              544,177.04
Separation Backwages Wage 13th month Moral Exemplary Total
  Pay Differential pay Damages damages
          Plus 10% Attorney's Fees  54,417.70
Caballa 60,580.00 109,870.80 75,156.12 10,608.00 10,000.00 5,000.00 P271,214.92
          GRAND TOTAL P598,594.74[15]
The LA found that respondents' adequate substantiation of their claim that they were no longer given any work Bautista 60,580.00 112,294.00 74,480.12 10,608.00 10,000.00 5,000.00 272,962.12
assignment and were not allowed to go anywhere near their respective workstations, coupled with petitioners' failure to
prove abandonment, justifies the finding that respondents were indeed dismissed without just cause nor due process.               544,177.04
[16]
 Aggrieved, petitioners appealed[17] to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling           Plus 10% Attorney's Fees 54,417.70
In a Decision[18] dated April 28, 2016, the NLRC modified the LA ruling, finding no illegal dismissal nor abandonment of
work. Accordingly, the NLRC ordered petitioners to reinstate respondents to their former or substantially equivalent

186

          GRAND TOTAL P598,594.74
Upon petitioners' appeal to the NLRC, the LA ruling was modified, deleting the awards for separation pay, backwages,
moral damages, and exemplary damages, while affirming the awards for wage differential and 13thmonth pay. In the
Computation of Monetary Award[34] attached to the NLRC ruling - which according to the NLRC itself, shall form part of its
decision[35] - it was indicated that Caballa's awards for wage differential and 13th month pay are in the amounts of
P109,870.80 and P75,156.12, respectively; while the awards in Bautista's favor were pegged at P112,294.00 and
P74,480.12, respectively. However, a simple counterchecking of the NLRC's computation with the LA ruling readily
reveals that: (a) the amounts of P109,870.80 and P112,294.00 clearly pertain to the awards of backwages, which were
already deleted in the NLRC ruling; (b) the amounts of P75,156.12 and P74,480.12 pertain to the awards of wage
differential; and (c) the amount of P10,608.00 which pertain to the awards of 13th month pay for both respondents, were
no longer reflected in the NLRC computation. While this is obviously just an oversight on the part of the NLRC, it is not
without any implications as such oversight resulted in an unwarranted increase in the monetary awards due to
respondents. Clearly, such an increase is a patent nullity as it is bereft of any factual and/or legal basis.
Verily, the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it based on the aforesaid technical ground, as
petitioners were justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA even without first moving for reconsideration before the
NLRC. In such instance, court procedure dictates that the case be remanded to the CA for a resolution on the merits.
However, when there is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had, as in this case, the
Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of
the case and to better serve the ends of justice.[36] In view of the foregoing - as well as the fact that petitioners pray for a
resolution on the merits[37] - the Court finds it appropriate to exhaustively resolve the instant case.
II.
It must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show
that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion
connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be
considered "grave," discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.[38]
In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and
jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the
petition.[39]
Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be explained hereunder, the Court finds that the NLRC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in ruling that: (a) petitioners are barred from raising improper venue and that the verification
requirement in respondents' position paper was substantially complied with; and (b) respondents were neither dismissed
by petitioners nor considered to have abandoned their jobs. However and as already discussed, the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it awarded respondents increased monetary
benefits without any factual and/or legal bases.
III.
Anent the first procedural issue, petitioners insist that since respondents worked in Cavite, they should have filed their
complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV of the NLRC and not in Manila, pursuant to Section 1, Rule IV of the
2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. As such, the LA in Manila where the complaint was filed had no jurisdiction to rule on
the same.[40] However, such insistence is misplaced as the aforesaid provision of the 2011 Rules of Procedure clearly
speaks of venue and not jurisdiction. Moreover, paragraph (c) of the same provision explicitly provides that "[w]hen
venue is not objected to before the first scheduled mandatory conference, such issue shall be deemed waived." Here, the
NLRC aptly pointed out that petitioners only raised improper venue for the first time in their position paper,[41] and as
such, they are deemed to have waived the same.
In this relation, Article 224 (formerly Article 217)[42] of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly provides that the LAs shall
have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide, inter alia, termination disputes and money claims arising from
employer-employee relations, as in this case. As such, the LA clearly had jurisdiction to resolve respondents' complaint.
187
Another procedural issue raised by petitioners is that respondents signed the Verification and Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to their Position Paper a day earlier than the date such pleading was filed by their counsel. In this
regard, petitioners assert that such is a fatal infirmity that necessitates the dismissal of respondents' complaint.
[43]
However, the NLRC correctly ruled that respondents' substantial compliance with the requirement, coupled with their
meritorious claims against petitioners, necessitates dispensation with the strict compliance with the rules on verification
and certification against forum shopping in order to better serve the ends of justice. In Fernandez v. Villegas,[44] the Court
held:
The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to non-compliance with the requirements on or submission of a
defective verification and certification against forum shopping, viz.:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification,
and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied  with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those
who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when
all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and involve a common cause of action or defense, the signature
of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
xxxx
Besides, it is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement intended to secure
the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the
correction of the pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules, as in this case.
xxxx
Similar to the rules on verification, the rules on forum shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice; hence, it should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict compliance with the provisions on certification against forum shopping
merely underscores its mandatory nature to the effect that the certification cannot altogether be dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. It does not prohibit substantial compliance with the rules under justifiable
circumstances, as also in this case.[45](Emphases and underscoring supplied)
IV.
In Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. v. Tanguin,[46] the Court was faced with a situation where, on the one hand, the employee
claimed she was illegally dismissed by her employer; on the other, the employer denied ever dismissing such employee
and even accused the latter of abandoning her job, as in this case. In resolving the matter, the Court extensively
discussed:
In cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause. But before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employees
must first establish by substantial evidence that indeed they were dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be
no question as to the legality or illegality thereof. In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc., the Court enunciated:
The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their
allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. If must be stressed that the evidence to prove this
fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal
cases finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.
xxxx
The Court further agrees with the findings of the LA, the NLRC[,] and the CA that Tanguin was not guilty of
abandonment. Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan City v. Escudero  extensively discussed abandonment in labor cases:
As defined under established jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. It constitutes neglect of duty and is a just cause for termination of employment under paragraph
(b) of Article 282 [now Article 296] of the Labor Code. To constitute abandonment, however, there must be a clear and
deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two elements must
concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. Otherwise stated, absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the
employee simply does not want to work anymore. It has been ruled that the employer has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
[47]
 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As aptly ruled by the NLRC, respondents failed to prove their allegation that petitioners dismissed them from work, as
there was no indication as to how the latter prevented them from reporting to their work stations; or that the petitioners
made any overt act that would suggest that they indeed terminated respondents' employment.[48] In the same vein,
petitioners failed to prove that respondents committed unequivocal acts that would clearly constitute intent to abandon
their employment. It may even be said that respondents' failure to report for work may have been a direct result of their
belief, albeit misplaced, that they had already been dismissed by petitioners. Such mistaken belief on the part of the
employee should not lead to a drastic conclusion that he has chosen to abandon his work.[49] More importantly,
respondents' filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal negates any intention on their part to sever their employment
relations with petitioners.[50] To reiterate, abandonment of position is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly inferred,
much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal acts.[51]
In light of the finding that respondents neither abandoned their employment nor were illegally dismissed by petitioners, it
is only proper for the former to report back to work and for the latter to reinstate them to their former positions or a
substantially-equivalent one in their stead. In this regard, jurisprudence provides that in instances where there was
neither dismissal by the employer nor abandonment by the employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate the employee to
his former position but without the award of backwages.[52]
As for respondents' money claims for holiday pay, wage differential, and 13th month pay, the NLRC properly observed
that petitioners failed to show that payment has been made. As such, they must be held liable for the same. It is well-
settled that "with respect to labor cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer, the
rationale being that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents - which will
show that overtime, differentials, service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid - are not in the
possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer."[53]However and as already adverted to
earlier, the awards of wage differential and 13th month pay due to respondents must be adjusted to properly reflect the
computation made by the LA, in that: (a) Caballa is entitled to wage differential and 13th month pay in the amounts of
P75,156.12 and P10,608.00, respectively; while (b) Bautista's entitlement to such claims are in the amounts of
P74,480.12 and P10,608.00, respectively.
In the same manner, the NLRC correctly awarded attorney's fees to respondents, in light of Article 111 (a) of the Labor
Code which states that: "[i]n cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of wages recovered," as in this case.
188
Finally, all monetary awards due to respondents shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the finality of this Decision until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[54]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 28, 2016 and February 22, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146460 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 28, 2016 of
the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, ordering petitioners Jolo's
Kiddie Carts/Fun4Kids/Marlo U. Cabili to pay:
a) Respondent Evelyn A. Caballa the amounts of P15,623.00 as holiday pay, P75,156.12 as wage differential, and
P10,608.00 as 13th month pay, plus attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the aforesaid monetary
awards. Further, said amounts shall then earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of the Decision until fully paid; and
b) Respondent Anthony M. Bautista the amounts of P15,623.00 as holiday pay, P74,480.12 as wage differential, and
P10,608.00 as 13th month pay, plus attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the aforesaid monetary
awards. Further, said amounts shall then earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of the Decision until fully paid.
Finally, the Temporary Restraining Order dated May 26, 2017 issued in relation to this case is hereby LIFTED. The
Decision dated April 28, 2016 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. 03-03168-15 (NLRC
LAC No. 02-000701-16), as modified, shall be implemented in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
89. G.R. No. 229335, November 29, 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
(DPWH), PETITIONER, V. BELLY H. NG, REPRESENTED BY ANNABELLE G. WONG, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated July 1, 2016 and the
Resolution[3] dated January 23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102033, which affirmed the
Decision[4] dated November 26, 2013 and the Order[5] dated January 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City, Branch 270 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 38-V-13, fixing the just compensation for the subject lots at P15,000.00/square
meter (sq. m.) and the replacement cost of the improvements thereon at P12,000.00/sq.m., but deleting the award of
consequential damages and reducing the legal rate of interest on the obligation from twelve percent (12%) to six percent
(6%) per annum (p.a.).
The Facts
On February 12, 2013, petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH; petitioner), filed before the RTC a complaint[6] against respondent Belly H. Ng (respondent),
represented by Annabelle G. Wong[7], seeking to expropriate the lots registered in the name of respondent under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. V-92188[8] and V-92191[9] with a total area of 1,671 sq. m. (subject lots), together with the
improvements thereon with an aggregate surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m. (collectively, subject properties), located in
Kowloon Industrial Compound, Tatalon Street, Brgy. Ugong, Valenzuela City,[10] for the construction of the Mindanao
Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City to Caloocan City).[11] Petitioner manifested that it is able and ready
to pay respondent the amounts of P6,684,000.00 (i.e., at P4,000.00/sq. m.) and P11,138,362.74,[12] representing the
combined relevant zonal value of the subject lots and the replacement cost of the improvements thereon, respectively. [13]
In her answer,[14] respondent contended that the offer price is unreasonably low, and that she should be compensated the
fair market value of her properties at the time of taking, estimated to be at P25,000.00/sq. m. Moreover, the fair and just
replacement cost of the improvements on the subject lots should be in the amount of P22,276,724.00,[15] pursuant to
Section 10 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 8974.[16]
Petitioner was eventually granted a Writ of Possession,[17] after respondent received the amount of P17,822,362.74,
representing 100% of the zonal value of the subject properties.[18]
The RTC appointed a board of commissioners to determine the just compensation for the properties[19] which, thereafter,
submitted its Commissioner's Report[20] dated June 10, 2013, recommending the amounts of P7,000.00/sq. m. and
P12,000.00/sq. m. as the just compensation for the subject lots and the improvements thereon, respectively, and the
payment of six percent (6%) legal interest therefor, reckoned from the time of taking. [21]
Dissatisfied, respondent objected[22] to the recommended just compensation of P7,000.00/sq. m. for the subject lots,
contending that the same "is not [the] real, substantial, full, ample[,] and fair market value" of her lots, [23] considering that
the just compensation for nearby properties[24] expropriated for the C-5 Northern Link Project[25] had been fixed by the
same RTC at P15,000.00/sq. m.[26] She likewise objected to the imposition of six percent (6%) interest, insisting that the
same should be pegged at twelve percent (12%) interest p.a.,[27] in line with the rulings in Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) v. Imperial[28] and in Republic of the Philippines (Republic) v. Ker & Company, Limited.[29] However, she accepted
the value of P12,000.00/sq. m. fixed as the replacement cost of the improvements. [30]
On the other hand, petitioner filed its comment,[31] interposing no objection to the P7,000.00/sq. m. valuation for the
subject lots and the imposition of six percent (6%) legal interest recommended by the board of commissioners, [32]citing
the letter[33] dated July 30, 2013 of the Office of Director Patrick B. Gatan, Project Director, Infrastructure Right-of-Way
and Resettlement - Project Management Office, DPWH.[34] However, it failed to attach a copy of the said letter.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[35] dated November 26, 2013, the RTC fixed the just compensation for the subject lots at P15,000.00/sq. m.
or the total amount of P25,065,000.00, taking into account: (a) the classification of the subject lots as industrial, their
location, shape, and their being not prone to flood;[36] and (b) a previous case[37] involving a neighboring property
expropriated for the C-5 Northern Link Project which was valued at P15,000.00/sq. m. by the same RTC. [38] It adopted the
replacement cost of P12,000.00/sq. m. recommended by its appointed commissioners or the total amount of
P25,460,400.00, noting that respondent accepted said recommendation.[39] Consequently, it ordered petitioner to pay
respondent the aforesaid amounts with twelve percent (12%) legal interest p.a., reckoned from the time of taking of the
properties, less the provisional deposit of P17,822,362.74, plus consequential damages and attorney's fees.[40]
Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[41] but was denied in an Order[42] dated January 16, 2014, prompting it
to file an appeal[43] before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[44] dated July 1, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC rulings, but deleted the award of consequential damages
and reduced the legal interest to six percent (6%) p.a., computed from the date of the RTC Decision until full satisfaction.
[45]
The CA upheld the just compensation of P15,000.00/sq. m. fixed by the RTC for the subject 1,671-sq. m. lots on the
basis of relevant factors, such as the BIR zonal valuation of the land, tax declarations and the Commissioner's Report, as
well as the market value of the properties within the area.[46] It likewise sustained the value of P12,000.00/sq. m. fixed as
the replacement cost of the improvements with an aggregate surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m. or the total amount of
P25,460,400.00, holding that: (a) the amount of P11,138,362.74 proposed by petitioner was inconceivably lower than the
current construction cost of a commercial/warehouse which was at P32,000.00/sq. m., even as early as November 2009;
and (b) petitioner did not interpose any objection to the said amount.[47]
However, the CA ruled that the award of consequential damages was improper, considering that the entirety of the
subject properties is being expropriated, hence, there is no remaining portion that may suffer an impairment or decrease
in value.[48] It likewise reduced the legal interest to six percent (6%) p.a., in line with the amendment introduced by
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB Circular No. 799,[49] Series of 2013.[50]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[51] which was, however, denied in a Resolution[52] dated January 23,
2017; hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in affirming the
replacement cost for the improvements fixed by the RTC, and the award of attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
189
The construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C (Valenzuela City to Caloocan City) involves the
implementation of a national infrastructure project. Thus, for purposes of determining the just compensation, RA
8974[53] and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), which were effective at the time of the filing of the complaint,
shall govern.[54]
Under Section 10 of the IRR, the improvements and/or structures on the land to be acquired shall be appraised using
the replacement cost method, thus:
Section 10. Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. — Pursuant to Section 7 of [RA 8974], the Implementing
Agency shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be acquired using the
replacement cost method. The replacement cost of the improvements/structures is defined as the amount necessary to
replace the improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractor's
profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs associated with the acquisition and installation in place of the affected
improvements/structures. In the valuation of the affected improvements/structures, the Implementing Agency shall
consider, among other things, the kinds and quantities of materials/equipment used, the location, configuration and other
physical features of the properties, and prevailing construction prices. (Emphasis supplied)
The replacement cost method is premised on the principle of substitution, which means that "all things being equal, a
rational, informed purchaser would pay no more for a property than the cost of building an acceptable substitute with like
utility."[55]
Accordingly, the Implementing Agency should consider: (a) construction costs or the current market price of materials,
equipment, labor, as well as the contractor's profit and overhead; and (b) attendant costs or the cost associated with the
acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute in place of the affected improvements/structures. [56] In addition, the
case of Republic v. Mupas (Mupas)[57] instructs that in using the replacement cost method to ascertain the value of
improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant standards provided under Section 5[58] of RA 8974, as well
as equity consistent with the principle that eminent domain is a concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the
landowner whole. Thus, it is not the amount of the owner's investment, but the "value of the interest" in land taken by
eminent domain, that is guaranteed to the owner.[59]
While there are various methods of appraising a property using the cost approach, among them, the reproduction cost,
the replacement cost new, and the depreciated replacement cost, Mupas declared that the use of the depreciated
replacement cost method[60] is consistent with the principle that the property owner shall be compensated for his actual
loss,[61] bearing in mind that the concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone, but
must likewise be just to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. The property owner is entitled to
compensation only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of the
taking.[62] Hence, even as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its
overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.[63]
It must be emphasized that in determining just compensation, the courts must consider and apply the parameters set by
the law and its implementing rules and regulations in order to ensure that they do not arbitrarily fix an amount as just
compensation that is contradictory to the objectives of the law.[64] Be that as it may, when acting within the parameters set
by the law itself, courts are not strictly bound to apply the formula to its minutest detail, particularly when faced with
situations that do not warrant the formula's strict application. Thus, the courts may, in the exercise of their discretion,
relax the formula's application,[65] subject to the jurisprudential limitation that the factual situation calls for it and the courts
clearly explain the reason for such deviation.[66]
In this case, the RTC and the CA upheld the recommendation of the court-appointed commissioners, fixing the just
compensation for the improvements on the expropriated properties at P12,000.00/sq. m., which merely considered their
location, classification, value declared by the owner, and the zonal valuation of the subject lots. However, there is no
competent evidence showing that it took into account the prevailing construction costs and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute in place of the affected
improvements/structures as required by the IRR. Consequently, the Court cannot uphold and must, perforce, set aside
the said valuation as the just compensation for the subject improvements.
On the other hand, it is unclear how the parameters set by the IRR have been factored-in in petitioner's proposed
valuation of P11,138,362.74.[67] Thus, the Court cannot automatically adopt petitioner's own computation as prayed for in
the instant petition. Neither can the Court accept respondent's submitted valuation[68] which claimed to have used the
prevailing replacement cost method for lack of proper substantiation to support the correctness of the values or data
used in such computation.
It must be emphasized that the veracity of the facts and figures which the parties used in their respective computations
involves the resolution of questions of fact which is, as a rule, improper in a petition for review on certiorari since the
Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, a remand of this case for reception of further evidence is necessary in order for the
RTC to determine just compensation for the subject improvements in accordance with the guidelines set under RA 8974
and its IRR.
In relation thereto, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to be imposed on the unpaid balance
of the just compensation, which shall be computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the date of taking, i.e.,
from April 10, 2013 when the RTC issued a writ of possession[69] in favor of petitioner,[70] until June 30, 2013. Thereafter,
or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due respondent shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) p.a.,[71] in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
Finally, the Court finds the award of attorney's fees to be improper and should be, accordingly, deleted. Even when a
claimant is compelled to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney's fees may still be withheld where no sufficient
showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a suit other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.[72] The case of Republic v. CA (Republic)[73] cited by the CA to justify the award is inapplicable
because, unlike in this case where petitioner only acquired possession of the expropriated properties after paying
respondent the amount of P17,822,362.74, representing the 100% zonal valuation thereof, the petitioner in Republic took
possession of the landowner's real property without initiating expropriation proceedings, and over the latter's objection.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated July 1, 2016 and the Resolution dated January
23, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102033 are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it upheld the just
compensation fixed by the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 270 (RTC) for the subject 1,671-square meter
(sq. m.) lots at P15,000.00/sq. m. However, the valuation of P12,000.00/ sq. m. fixed by the lower courts as the
replacement cost of the subject improvements with an aggregate surface area of 2,121.7 sq. m. is hereby SET ASIDE,
and Civil Case No. 38-V-13 is REMANDED to the RTC for reception of evidence on the issue of just compensation
therefor in accordance with the guidelines set under Republic Act No. 8974 and its implementing rules and regulations.
Legal interest is hereby imposed on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, as determined by the RTC, at twelve
percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) reckoned from April 10, 2013 to June 30, 2013 and, thereafter, at six percent (6%) p.a.
until full payment. Finally, the award of attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of factual and legal bases.
The RTC is directed to conduct the proceedings in said case with reasonable dispatch, and to submit to the Court a
report on its findings and recommended conclusions within sixty (60) days from notice of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
90. G.R. No. 220685, November 29, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ERNESTO L. DELOS SANTOS, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Amended Decision[2] dated November 21, 2014 and the
Resolution[3] dated August 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128625, which (a)  dismissed for
lack of probable cause the complaint charging respondent Ernesto L. Delos Santos (respondent) with qualified theft,
and (b)  quashed the arrest warrant against him.
The Facts
In May 2007, respondent undertook the construction of the CTTL Building in Baguio City, adjacent to the Benguet Pines
Tourist Inn (BPTI) which is a business establishment owned and operated by the University of Manila (UM). At that time,
190
respondent's father, Virgilio Delos Santos (Virgilio), who was the President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees (BOT)
of UM, allegedly ordered the employees of BPTI to assist respondent in all his needs in the construction. Specifically,
respondent was permitted to tap into BPTI's electricity and water supply.[4]
Respondent's father died on January 21, 2008, and was succeeded by Emily Dodson De Leon (De Leon) as President of
UM. On July 8, 2011, UM, represented by De Leon, filed a criminal complaint [5] against respondent for the qualified theft
of the electricity and water supply of BPTI for the period 2007 to 2011, with a total value of P3,000,000.00 more or less,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.[6] In his defense,[7] respondent argued that his family aggregately
owns 98.79% of UM; that he was explicitly allowed by his father to use the electricity and water supply of BPTI for the
construction of the CTTL Building for which no opposition was aired by anyone; and that the complaint was filed as a
result of his own opposition to the probate of his father's alleged holographic will, which was initiated by his sister, Maria
Corazon Ramona Llamas De Los Santos, whom respondent claims is the live-in partner of De Leon.[8]
In a Resolution[9] dated July 29, 2011, the investigating prosecutor dismissed the complaint in view of the absence of the
element of "lack of consent or knowledge of the owner," considering that Virgilio, while being the President and Chairman
of the BOT of UM, explicitly allowed respondent to use the electricity and water supply of BPTI. It was likewise noted that
Virgilio was a very generous father to his children; and that, while Virgilio was still alive, no complaint was filed against
the respondent for his use of the electricity and water supply of BPTI.[10]
However, the aforestated Resolution was subsequently reversed upon the UM's motion for reconsideration.[11] In a
Resolution on Review[12] dated September 23, 2011, Assistant City Prosecutor Rolando T. Vergara (ACP Vergara) found
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for qualified theft (attended by the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse
of confidence),[13] pointing out that respondent's defense of being expressly allowed by his father is barred under the
Dead Man's Statute. Nonetheless, ACP Vergara held that the express consent of Virgilio, if there was any, was only
limited to the period of the construction of the CTTL Building. However, even after the completion thereof, respondent did
not disconnect the electrical and water connections to the damage and prejudice of UM. Moreover, considering that
respondent was, at the time in question, not only the manager and operator of BPTI, but a stockholder and trustee of UM
which owns BPTI, he was said to have had access to the BPTI premises and, thus, gravely abused the confidence
reposed upon him by UM.[14]
The September 23, 2011 Resolution on Review was affirmed in the Second Resolution on Review[15] dated November 23,
2011, which denied respondent's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[16] Meanwhile, an Information[17] dated
September 23, 2011 charging respondent with qualified theft was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 7 (RTC). Consequently, respondent was arrested on September 27, 2011.[18]
Respondent challenged via  a petition for review[19] before the Department of Justice (DOJ) the (a)  September 23, 2011
Resolution on Review, and (b)  November 23, 2011 Second Resolution on Review. Said petition was, however,
dismissed in a Resolution[20] dated June 8, 2015.
Eventually, respondent filed before the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause; (2) To Lift/Quash Warrant of Arrest; and (3) To Suspend/Defer Arraignment and/or any Proceeding,[21]alleging
that the Information filed against him and the documents appended thereto failed to show proof sufficient to warrant the
finding of probable cause for the crime of qualified theft.[22]
The RTC Ruling
In an Order[23] dated February 1, 2012, the RTC denied the Urgent Omnibus Motion upon a finding that probable cause
indeed exists for the indictment of respondent, considering his admission that he caused the tapping of the electricity and
water supply of BPTI.[24]
Aggrieved, respondent elevated said ruling to the CA on certiorari,[25] arguing, among others, that the testimonies
attesting to the fact of Virgilio's consent to the tapping and diversion of the electrical and water connections are not
barred under the Dead Man's Statute;[26] and that the RTC erred in declaring that proof of absence of the elements of the
crime may be passed upon only in a full blown trial.[27]
The Proceedings Before the CA
In a Decision[28] dated July 30, 2013, the CA Special Tenth Division affirmed in toto  the questioned Orders of the RTC,
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. [29] Consequently, respondent moved for
reconsideration[30] of the foregoing Decision. He likewise filed a motion for inhibition [31] attributing irregularities on the part
of the members of the Special Tenth Division, which was granted amidst strong denial of respondent's accusations. [32]
The case was re-raffled to the CA Fourth Division (Division of Five), which issued on November 21, 2014, an Amended
Decision[33] setting aside the Orders of the RTC, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for qualified theft and quashing
the warrant of arrest against respondent.[34]
The CA Fourth Division categorically held that Virgilio, as majority stockholder, President, and Chairman of the BOT of
the UM, had apparent authority to give consent to respondent's use of the electricity and water supply of BPTI. Hence,
the element of lack of owner's consent was absent. Even if Virgilio was not, in fact, duly authorized by the BOT to give his
consent to respondent's acts, the latter nonetheless acted in good faith on the basis of the permission given to him by his
father, which negated another element of the crime, i.e.,  the intent to gain.[35] In view of the "clear absence" of said
elements, the CA Fourth Division declared that subjecting respondent to the rigors of trial would just be a futile exercise
and a waste of the trial court's precious time and resources.[36]
Undaunted, UM filed a motion for reconsideration[37] of the Amended Decision dated November 21, 2014, which was,
however, denied in a Resolution[38] dated August 28, 2015 for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari  filed by the People of the Philippines (petitioner) insisting on the existence of probable cause against
respondent for the crime of qualified theft.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in holding that probable cause exists against respondent for qualified theft.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not impressed with merit.
"A public prosecutor's determination of probable cause – that is, one made for the purpose of filing an [I]nformation in
court – is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny."[39]
However, Section 5 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may
immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause, viz.:
Section 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. –  (a) By the Regional Trial Court.  – Within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused had already been arrested,
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
191
was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In De Los Santos-Dio v. CA,[40] the Court explained that "the judge's dismissal of a case [under the authority of the
aforesaid provision] must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable
cause – that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record [show] that, more likely than
not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not
dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of
action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence."[41]
In this case, the Court concurs with the CA Fourth Division's finding that there was no probable cause against herein
respondent for the crime of qualified theft, considering the glaring absence of certain key elements thereof. Notably, "for
the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present.
This is based on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no
criminal offense."[42]
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310, in relation to Articles 308 and 309, of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), are as follows: (a)  the taking of personal property; (b)  the said property belongs to another; (c)  the said
taking be done with intent to gain; (d)  it be done without the owner's consent; (e)  it be accomplished without the use of
violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances
enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e.,  with grave abuse of confidence.[43]
As correctly ruled by the CA, the elements of lack of owner's consent and intent to gain are evidently absent in this case.
To recount, UM, which owns BPTI, is an educational institution established and owned by respondent's family. His father,
Virgilio, owned 70.79%[44] of the entire shares of stock of the UM, and respondent himself claims 9.85%[45]share thereof.
Virgilio was the President and Chairman of the BOT of UM at the time material to this case, and respondent himself was
a board member and stockholder. Records disclose that respondent was permitted by Virgilio to tap into BPTI's electricity
and water supply. As such, respondent had no criminal intent – as he, in fact, acted on the faith of his father's authority,
on behalf of UM – to appropriate said personal property.
It has been held that in cases where one, in good faith, "takes another's property under claim of title in himself, he is
exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. And the same is true where the
taking is on behalf of another, believed to be the true owner. The gist of the offense is the intent to deprive another of his
property in a chattel, either for gain or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This
cannot be where the taker honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take
possession of it for himself or for another,"[46] as in this case.
The fact that respondent's shares of stock in UM represents only a proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the
corporation, or that his interest was only equitable or beneficial in nature[47] does not negate respondent's belief that he
and his family own UM, and that the consent of his father was sufficient for the use of BPTI's electricity and water supply.
As correctly reasoned by the CA, "(e)ven assuming arguendo that Virgilio was not duly authorized by the Board of
Trustees of UM to give its consent to [respondent] and the latter erred when he solely relied on his father's consent
without further securing the authority of the [BOT] of UM, his bona fide  belief that he had authority from the real owner of
the electricity and water supply will not make him culpable of the crime of qualified theft because he was acting with a
color of authority or a semblance of right to do such act."[48]

Respondent's bona fide  reliance on the consent of his father was bolstered by the material fact – which was likewise
disregarded by the RTC – that Virgilio had utilized the resources of UM to shoulder the expenses of respondent's
children. On this point, the Court quotes with approval the following disquisition of the CA:
Indeed, the records show that UM's Board of Trustees clothed Virgilio with such apparent authority to act on behalf of
UM. Private respondent admitted this when it adduced the affidavit (used during the preliminary investigation stage of the
complaint a quo)  of petitioner's sister, Ramona, who is the current Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the UM, to wit:
"They failed to appreciate the fact that it was even my father who shouldered his grandchildren's expenses. This was
evidenced by a certification issued by the President and Chief of Academic Officer, x x x attesting that my brother's
second mistress has been receiving monthly allowance from the University in the amount of Nine Thousand Eight
Hundred Twenty Five Pesos, x x x"
By giving Virgilio an apparent authority, UM's Board of Trustees cannot now deny and repudiate the legal effect of
Virgilio's consent given to the petitioner to use the electricity and water supply of BPTI. The element of lack of owner's
consent is thus glaringly absent in this case.[49]
In addition to the clear absence of the elements of intent to gain  and lack of owner's consent,  the RTC failed to take into
consideration that the instant case stems from a bitter feud between siblings. The CA, on the other hand, found that it
was only when respondent and his other sister, Cynthia, opposed the probate proceedings of the estate of their father,
which was initiated by their youngest sister, Ramona, that the BOT of UM filed the complaint a quo.[50] In fact, respondent
alleged in his Counter-Affidavit submitted before the investigating prosecutor that Ramona had filed "a number of
malicious, revengeful and unfounded criminal complaints which were all dismissed."[51] Thus, the possibility that Ramona
may have only dragged the BOT of UM into her personal vendetta against respondent is not farfetched.
The Court reiterates that "[w]hile probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine
the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right to liberty and the
guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges."[52] This, the RTC failed to do.
Hence, the CA correctly reversed the finding of probable cause against respondent.
All told, the RTC gravely erred when it denied respondent's motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Instead, it
should have granted the same and, accordingly, dismissed the case pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 112 as cited above.
In this light, the assailed CA rulings are affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Amended Decision dated November 21, 2014 and the Resolution dated
August 28, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 128625 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
91. A.C. No. 11822, November 22, 2017
192
VICKA MARIE D. ISALOS, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint [1] for disbarment filed by complainant Vicka Marie D. Isalos
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal (respondent) for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rules
16.01, 16.02, and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) arising from respondent's alleged
failure to account for the money entrusted to her.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that she is the Director and Treasurer of C Five Holdings, Management & Consultancy, Inc. (C
Five), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office in Libis, Quezon
City. Respondent was C Five's Corporate Secretary and Legal Counsel who handled its incorporation and registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).[2]
Sometime in July 2011, when C Five was exploring investment options, respondent recommended the purchase of a
resort in Laguna, with the assurances that the title covering the property was "clean" and the taxes were fully paid.
Relying on respondent's recommendation, C Five agreed to acquire the property and completed the payment of the
purchase price.[3]
Respondent volunteered and was entrusted to facilitate the transfer and registration of the title of the property in C Five's
name. On September 5, 2011, complainant personally handed the sum of P1,200,000.00 to respondent at her office in
Makati City, as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 1038[4] of even date. The said amount was intended to cover the
expenses for the documentation, preparation, and notarization of the Final Deed of Sale, as well as payment of capital
gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other fees relative to the sale and transfer of the property. [5]
More than a year thereafter, however, no title was transferred in C Five's name. It was then discovered that the title
covering the property is a Free Patent[6] issued on August 13, 2009, rendering any sale, assignment, or transfer thereof
within a period of five (5) years from issuance of the title null and void. Thus, formal demand [7] was made upon
respondent to return the P1,200,000.00 entrusted to her for the expenses which remained unheeded, prompting C Five
to file a criminal complaint for Estafa before the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, i.e., NPS No. XV-05-INV-13D-1253,[8] as
well as the present case for disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, i.e., CBD Case No. 14-4321.
In defense,[9] respondent claimed that she paid the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) registration, Mayor's Permit,
business licenses, documentation, and other expenses using the money entrusted to her by complainant,[10] as itemized
in a Statement of Expenses[11] that she had prepared, and that she was ready to turn over the balance in the amount of
P885,068.00. However, C Five refused to receive the said amount, insisting that the entire P1,200,000.00 should be
returned.[12] Moreover, she pointed out that the criminal case for Estafa filed against her by C Five had already been
dismissed[13] for lack of probable cause.[14] As such, she prayed that the disbarment case against her be likewise
dismissed for lack of merit.[15]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After due proceedings, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (CBD-IBP) issued a Report and
Recommendation[16] dated June 29, 2015, finding respondent administratively liable and thereby, recommending her
suspension from the legal profession for a period of three (3) years.[17] The CBD-IBP found that respondent actually
received the amount of P1,200,000.00 from complainant, which amount was intended to cover the expenses and
payment of taxes for the sale and transfer of the property to C Five's name. Likewise, it was undisputed that despite
demands from the company to return the said amount, respondent failed to do so. Worse, she offered a Statement of
Expenses with "feigned expenditures" in an attempt to prove that a portion of the money had already been spent. Thus,
the CBD-IBP concluded that there was dishonesty on the part of respondent and accordingly, recommended the penalty
of suspension.[18]
In a Resolution[19] dated June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the
CBD-IBP's Report and Recommendation dated June 29, 2015, meting upon respondent the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year and directing the return of the amount of P1,200,000.00 to complainant.
In respondent's motion for reconsideration,[20] she maintained that there was no intention on her part to retain the money
and that she was willing to return the amount of P885,068.00, as shown in her Statement of Expenses, which she
claimed was accompanied by corresponding receipts. Moreover, she averred that on September 30, 2015, in order to
buy peace, she delivered the amount of P1,200,000.00 to Atty. Anselmo Sinjian III, counsel for complainant, [21] as
evidenced by an Acknowledgment Receipt[22] of even date. As a consequence, complainant filed a Withdrawal of
Complaint for Disbarment[23] before the IBP.
In a Resolution[24] dated January 26, 2017, the IBP denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not grounds exist to hold respondent administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious review of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and conclusions of the IBP that respondent
should be held administratively liable in this case.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who possess and continue to possess the
legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.[25]"Lawyers may,
thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private
capacity."[26]
The CPR, particularly Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, provides:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
RULE 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
RULE 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for
the purpose, should be immediately returned.[27] A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.[28]
In this case, it is indubitable that respondent received the amount of P1,200,000.00 from complainant to be used to cover
the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject property under C Five's name. Respondent admitted having received
the same, but claimed that she had spent a portion of it for various expenses, such as documentation, permits, and
licenses, among others, as evidenced by the Statement of Expenses with attached receipts. However, it has been
established that the registration of the property in C Five's name could not have materialized, as the subject property was
covered by a Free Patent issued on August 13, 2009 which, consequently, bars it from being sold, assigned, or
transferred within a period of five (5) years therefrom. Thus, and as the CBD-IBP had aptly opined, [29] there was no longer
193
any reason for respondent to retain the money. Furthermore, the expenditures enumerated in the Statement of
Expenses, except for the documentation and notarization fees for which no receipts were attached, do not relate to the
purposes for which the money was given, i.e., the documentation and registration of the subject property. As such, even
if official receipts had been duly attached for the other purposes which, the Court notes, respondent failed to do despite
the opportunity given - the expenditures are not legitimate ones. Hence, the Court finds respondent to have violated the
above-cited rules, to the detriment and prejudice of complainant.
Respondent's assertion that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed, in view of the return of the full amount to
complainant and the latter's withdrawal of the complaint against her is specious. Such are not ample grounds to
completely exonerate the administrative liability of respondent. It is settled that a case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant, [30] the latter not being a direct party to the case, but a
witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.[31] A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent-lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. "The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct x x x has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice."[32] The real question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar. [33]
With regard to the proper penalty to be meted upon respondent, the Court has, in several similar cases, imposed the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years against erring lawyers. In Jinon v. Jiz,[34] the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services, which he never
performed. Similarly, in Agot v. Rivera,[35] the Court suspended respondent for the same period for his failure to handle
the legal matter entrusted to him and to return the legal fees in connection therewith, among others. Considering,
however, the return of the full amount of P1,200,000.00 to C Five, respondent is instead meted the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal is found guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
The suspension in the practice of law shall take effect immediately upon receipt by respondent. Respondent
is DIRECTED to immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that her suspension has started, copy furnished all courts
and quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance as counsel.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered in respondent's personal records
as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
92. G.R. No. 227069, November 22, 2017
HILARIO LAMSEN, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Hilario Lamsen (Lamsen) assailing the
Decision[2] dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35283, which affirmed the
Decision[3] dated March 28, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 11-288590
sustaining the Judgment[4] dated July 5, 2011 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (MeTC) in Crim. Case
No. 400192-CB finding Lamsen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents, as
defined and penalized under Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
An Information[5] dated September 30, 2003 was filed before the MeTC, charging Lamsen of the crime of Falsification of
Public Documents, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about April 21, 1993, and for sometime prior or  subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused,  being then a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully  and feloniously commit acts of
falsification of public/official document, in  the following manner, to wit: the said accused prepared, forged and  falsified,
or caused to be prepared, forged and falsified, a Deed of  Absolute Sale dated April 21, 1993 notarized and
acknowledged before  Santiago R. Reyes, Notary Public for and in the City of Manila and  docketed in his notarial
registry Book as Doc. No. 88 Book No. 133, Page  No. 19 and Series of 1993, and therefore a public document, by then
and  there stating therein[,] among others[,] that spouses Aniceta Dela Cruz and  Nestor Tandas, the registered owner of
a parcel of land containing an area  of 43 square meters, more or less, located in Barrio Malabo, Municipality  of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.  V-16641 was sold[,] transferred and coveyed to
the said accused for and in  consideration of P150,000.00, by feigning, simulating and counterfeiting  the signatures of
said spouses Aniceta Dela Cruz and Nestor Tandas  appearing on the lower left portion of said document[,] above the 
typewritten words "ANICETA DELA CRUZ" and "NESTOR TANDAS"  thus making it appear as it did appear that said
spouses Aniceta Dela Cruz  and Nestor Tandas had transferred ownership of the said parcel of land  subject matter of
said deed of sale of herein accused, and that the said  spouses Aniceta Dela Cruz and Nestor Tandas participated and
intervened  in the signing of the said document, when in truth and in fact, as the said  accused well knew that such was
not the case[,] and that the said spouses  Aniceta Dela Cruz and Nestor Tandas did not sell the said property to the  said
accused and that they did not participate and intervene in the signing  of the said deed of sale, much less did they
authorized the said accused or  anybody else to sign their names or affix their signatures thereon, to the  damage and
prejudice of public interest.
Contrary to law.[6]
The prosecution alleged that Aniceta dela Cruz (Aniceta) owned a parcel of land with an area of around forty-three (43)
square meters located at Barrio Malabo, Valenzuela City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-16641, and
registered under the name of "Aniceta dela Cruz, married to Nestor Tandas" (subject property).[7] On September 7, 2001,
[8]
 Aniceta passed away, leaving behind her nieces and surviving heirs, Teresita dela Cruz Lao (Teresita) and Carmelita
Lao Lee (Carmelita).[9] After Aniceta's death, Teresita went to the former's house to look for the owner's duplicate title of
the subject property, but the same was allegedly nowhere to be found. Accordingly, Teresita executed an affidavit of loss,
which was annotated on the title on file with the Registry of Deeds of Valenzuela City (RD) on October 19, 2001.
[10]
 Concurrently, Teresita and Carmelita executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Aniceta.[11] Teresita also filed
a petition for the issuance of second owner's duplicate copy before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch
75. The said petition, however, was dismissed on the basis of the opposition of Lamsen, who claimed that the original
copy of the owner's duplicate title could not have been lost because it was with him. Meanwhile, the RD informed
Teresita through a letter dated May 9, 2002 that somebody requested for the registration of a deed of sale (subject deed)
involving the subject property. Thus, she proceeded to the RD but was informed that the requesting party had withdrawn
all the papers; hence, she asked for the Book of the RD to photocopy the withdrawal aforementioned. Thereafter, she
went to the Notarial Section of Manila to get a certified true copy of the subject deed but was given a mere photocopy
thereof, since the original was no longer on file. She then submitted the photocopy of the deed to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, as the signatures of Aniceta and Nestor Tandas (Nestor) thereon
appeared to be forged. Upon examination, Document Examiner II Alex Batiles (Batiles) confirmed that the subject deed
194
was indeed falsified. He revealed that there were dissimilarities between the questioned and standard signatures of
Aniceta and Nestor (spouses Tandas), and that they were not written by one and the same person.[12]
For his part, Lamsen interposed the defense of denial, claiming that while he was renting the place of his uncle Nestor
sometime in 1993, he validly bought and acquired the subject property from spouses Tandas in the amount of
P150,000.00. He added that the subject deed was executed, signed, and notarized by spouses Tandas in the presence
of a certain Nicasio Cruz and Francisco Capinpin in the GSIS Office, Manila. He averred that he subsequently left a
xerox copy of the subject deed at the Notary Public and took the original with him. Ultimately, he contended that he no
longer informed the relatives of Aniceta about the sale, as they already have a gap.[13]
The MeTC Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated July 5, 2011, the MeTC found Lamsen guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification
of Public Document and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor  in its maximum
period, as minimum period of imprisonment i.e., two [2] years and four [4] months), to prision correccional  in its medium
and maximum period (i.e.,  four [4] years, nine [9] months, and ten [10] days), as maximum period of imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of P5,000.00.[15] It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that the signatures of spouses Tandas were
forged on account of the expert testimony of Batiles. [16] Conversely, Lamsen failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the genuineness and authenticity of Aniceta's signature on the subject deed.[17]
With the subsequent denial[18] of his motion for reconsideration,[19] Lamsen filed an appeal[20] before the RTC.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated March 28, 2012, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto.[22] Prefatorily, it discredited Lamsen's
claim that the offense had already prescribed, given that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period only commenced from the
time the supposed forgery was discovered on May 9, 2002, the date of receipt of the letter of even date from the RD, and
not from the time the Notary Public submitted the Notarial Report with the Office of the Clerk of Court of Manila sometime
in April 1993. The submission of the Notarial Report is not considered an act of registration which would operate as a
constructive notice to the whole world, since the Office of the Clerk of Court is not a public registry in the first place. [23]
Apart from the findings of the handwriting expert, the RTC also relied on the following circumstantial evidence in
convicting Lamsen of the crime charged: (a)  the subject deed was notarized in Manila even if Lamsen and spouses
Tandas were residents of Valenzuela; (b)  Lamsen failed to show when the alleged witnesses signed the subject
deed; (c)  the subject deed was executed and notarized sometime in April 1993, but was registered with the RD only after
the death of Aniceta sometime in May 2002; (d)  the corresponding capital gains and documentary stamp taxes were paid
only on April 11, 2002; and (e)  the original copy of the subject deed, which was purportedly retained by Lamsen, was
neither presented nor produced during trial.[24]
Undaunted, Lamsen filed a motion for reconsideration,[25] which was, however, denied in an Order[26] dated May 31, 2012.
Aggrieved, he filed an appeal[27] before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[28] dated January 30, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling, holding that all the elements of the crime of
falsification of public document were attendant.[29]
Expectedly, Lamsen filed a motion for reconsideration[30] dated February 26, 2015. On September 7, 2015, Teresita and
Carmelita filed a Manifestation[31] containing their joint affidavit of desistance and retraction. On the same day, Lamsen
filed a Supplement to the motion for reconsideration dated February 26, 2015 (Supplement)[32] asking the court to dismiss
the case in light of the aforesaid joint affidavit.
In a Resolution[33] dated September 4, 2015, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration dated February 26, 2015.
Subsequently, it received the Manifestation and Supplement and noted the same without action.[34]
Unyielding, Lamsen filed a motion for new trial[35] on October 19, 2015, which was denied in a Resolution[36] dated May
31, 2016. The CA held that the original copy of the subject deed could not be considered newly discovered evidence,
considering that Lamsen had every opportunity to produce and present it during trial.[37]
With the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration/new trial[38] on August 8, 2016,[39] Lamsen filed the instant
petition[40] before the Court.
Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Lamsen's conviction for the crime of falsification of public
documents, as defined and penalized under Article 172 (1) of the RPC, should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[41] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."[42]
"In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind." [43]
Here, Lamsen was charged of the crime of falsification of public document under Article 172 (1) of the RPC:
Article 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.  – x x x:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in
any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document;
xxxx
The elements of the said crime are as follows: (a)  the offender is a private individual; (b)  the offender committed any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (c) the falsification was committed in a public document.[44]
Relatedly, the prosecution must likewise establish the fact of falsification or forgery by clear, positive, and convincing
evidence, as the same is never presumed. Withal, the fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have
been forged.[45] "Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the
following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
195
person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom
the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states
that the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence
consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal
knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best." [46]
In this case, the prosecution presented an expert witness, Batiles, to prove its allegation of falsification or forgery. While
Batiles testified during cross-examination that the questioned signatures were not written by one and the same person,
and that there is a certainty that the subject deed was falsified,[47] the Court, however, finds this declaration unreliable and
inconclusive, as it is inconsistent with the Questioned Document Report No. 130-03. In the said Report, which Batiles
himself issued after examining the allegedly falsified subject deed, Batiles found that no definite conclusion can be
rendered because the documents submitted by the prosecution were mere photocopies of the original, viz.:
1. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned and the standard signatures of ANICETA
TANDAS reveal dissimilarities in stroke structures, slant, lateral spacing, a strong indication that they were not by
one and the same person. However, no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact the questioned
signatures are photocopies (Xerox) wherein minute details are not clearly manifested.
2. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the questioned and the standard signatures of NESTOR
TANDAS reveal dissimilarities in stroke structure, slant, lateral spacing, a strong indication that they were not by one
and the same person. However, no definite conclusion can be rendered due to the fact the questioned signatures
are photocopies (Xerox) wherein minute details are not clearly manifested.[48] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Batiles further clarified that there are other handwriting elements which could not be determined in the photocopy, such
as minor details which could not be visibly detected by the naked eye, i.e.,  handwriting movement, line quality, and
emphasis.[49]
Notably, the genuineness and due execution of a photocopy could not be competently established without a copy of the
original. Photocopies are considered secondary evidence which can be rendered inadmissible absent any proof that the
original was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered.
[50]
 Here, not only did the prosecution fail to present the original copy of the subject deed in court, it likewise did not
provide ample proof that the same was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of Lamsen. Since mere
photocopies of the subject deed were used to examine the questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas, no
valid comparison can be had between them, thereby rendering Batiles' declaration inconclusive to support a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen.
Aside from the findings of Batiles, the courts a quo  also relied on circumstantial evidence to convict Lamsen of the crime
of falsification of public document. It was pointed out that: (a)  the subject deed was notarized in Manila even if Lamsen
and spouses Tandas were residents of Valenzuela; (b)  Lamsen failed to show when the alleged witnesses signed the
subject deed; (c)  the subject deed was executed and notarized sometime in April 1993, but was registered with the RD
only after the death of Aniceta sometime in May 2002; (d)  the corresponding capital gains and documentary stamp taxes
were paid only on April 11, 2002; and (e)  the original copy of the subject deed, which was purportedly retained by
Lamsen, was neither presented nor produced during trial.[51] Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts
and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is
sufficient for conviction if: (a)  there is more than one circumstance; (b)  the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c)  the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. The circumstantial evidence presented must therefore constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. Stated differently, the
test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the
series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be
consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.[52]
While it is true that the courts can rely on circumstantial evidence in order to establish the guilt of the accused, the
circumstantial evidence which the courts a quo  relied upon in this case did not sufficiently create moral certainty, since
they appear to be too insignificant and unconvincing. Firstly,  the Notarial Law does not require the parties to have the
subject deed notarized in the place of their residence. Secondly,  the issue on the date when the supposed witnesses
signed the subject deed is immaterial. In fact, Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that an instrument,
such as a notarized document, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. Thirdly,  having the subject deed
registered with the RD after an unreasonable length of time from its execution and notarization does not necessarily
imply that the subject deed was actually forged. Lastly,  the supposed belated payment of the corresponding capital gains
and documentary stamp taxes has no relevance at all with the supposed act of falsification. By and large, the prosecution
presented no adequate circumstantial evidence which would warrant Lamsen's conviction for the crime of Falsification of
Public Document.
As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to grant the present petition, it is henceforth unnecessary
to delve on the other ancillary issues raised herein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 35283 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Hilario Lamsen is ACQUITTED of the crime of Falsification
of Public Document on the ground of reasonable doubt. The bail bonds posted for his provisional liberty are consequently
cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
93. G.R. No. 214673, November 20, 2017
RIZALDO L. ORSOS, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 21, 2013 and the Resolution[3] dated
September 3, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01574, which affirmed with
modification the Decision[4] dated October 5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Mambusao, Capiz, Branch 20 (RTC)
finding petitioner Rizaldo L. Orsos (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for acts of lasciviousness, defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
two (2) years and five (5) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Facts
At the time material to this case, the minor victim (AAA[5]) was only fourteen (14) years old, having been born on July 6,
1992, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth.[6] She was then a third year high school student at Dumalag Central
National High School (DCNHS) in Dumalag, Capiz, where petitioner was then working as a teacher and Citizen's Army
Training (CAT) Commandant.[7] AAA was one of petitioner's students.[8]
At around 9:30 in the morning of April 21, 2007, while the CAT trainees, including AAA, were at the Sohot Spring in
Dumalag for a clean-up drive, petitioner called AAA and asked her if she had decided on becoming a CAT officer, to
which she answered yes.[9] Petitioner then instructed her to go to his house at 1:00 in the afternoon of the same day for
her supposed initiation. As she did not know where petitioner's house was located, she went back to the school at around
196
12:30 in the afternoon instead and waited for him to arrive. When petitioner saw AAA, he told her to follow him to his
house and keep a little distance between them.[10]
Upon arrival thereat, petitioner instructed her to take a seat while he went to the bathroom for a few minutes. AAA
noticed that except for the two of them, no one else was in the house. Thereafter, he emerged from the bathroom and
asked her if she was really determined to become a CAT officer, to which she replied yes. [11] Petitioner then told her that
he had a crush on her, that he wanted her to become his mistress, and that he will give her all her needs.[12]Then, he
pulled her to his lap and asked her to kiss him. Thinking it was part of the initiation rites, AAA kissed his right cheek.
Thereafter, petitioner asked her to sit on the sofa and proceeded to kiss her on the lips, leading her to cry. Petitioner then
instructed her to lie down on the sofa, lifted her shirt and underwear, and sucked her right breast for about two minutes.
[13]
 AAA was frightened and could not complain. Petitioner was about to unzip her pants when she pleaded for him not to
do so as she had her menstrual period then.[14] At this point, petitioner stood up and went back to the bathroom. When he
re-emerged, he told her to stop crying and not to report the incident if she truly wanted to become a CAT officer.
[15]
 Although AAA told her friend about the incident, she decided not to tell her family. [16] Instead, she told her parents that
she wanted to rest, quit school, and spend some time with her sisters in Manila. [17] After a year in Manila, she went back
to Dumalag, Capiz and enrolled in fourth year high school.[18]
Sometime in July 2008, several female CAT officers in DCNHS revealed that petitioner had molested them and filed
cases against him in court.[19] Prompted by her mother's inquiry if petitioner had also molested her, AAA finally disclosed
the details of the incident to her and the reason why she did not do so sooner.[20]
Consequently, a complaint[21] charging petitioner with acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of
the RPC, as amended, in relation to Republic Act (RA) No. 7610, was filed on October 6, 2008, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
"That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 21 April 2007, in Brgy. Poblacion, Municipality of Dumalag, Province of
Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kiss the lips and suck the breasts of one [AAA], a female and minor of
16 years old without her consent and against her will, and which acts of the former likewise constitute other child abuse.
By reason of the unlawful acts of the accused, the victim is entitled for damages pursuant to the provision of the New
Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[22]
When arraigned with the assistance of counsel, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."[23] During trial, he denied the
charges against him and claimed that when he was a teacher and the CAT Commandant in DCNHS, AAA never became
his student and that he did not meet her as an applicant to become a CAT officer.[24] He averred that CAT initiation rites
were conducted during the school year and inside the school premises.[25] Moreover, it was the senior CAT officers who
recruited the new ones, and that AAA did not apply to become a CAT officer in 2007.[26] He asserted that no initiation rites
were conducted in April 2007 nor did he invite AAA to his house for any such initiation.[27] On the contrary, he claimed to
be in his house in Malonoy, Dao, Capiz in April 2007, for a summer vacation.[28]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[29] dated October 5, 2010, the RTC convicted petitioner of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor medium, as
minimum, to two (2) years and five (5) months of prision correccional  medium, as maximum, and to pay AAA the amount
of P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.[30]
In so ruling, the RTC gave more credence to the clear and straightforward testimony of AAA on how petitioner sexually
abused her. Citing the well-settled rule that no girl would concoct a story of sexual assault nor subject herself and her
family to trauma and embarrassment unless she was speaking the truth, the RTC found no evidence that AAA and her
family fabricated the story in order to humiliate petitioner, who was then the CAT Commandant of DCNHS. [31] Conversely,
the RTC rejected petitioner's defense of denial, finding the same insufficient to absolve him of criminal liability. [32]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed[33] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[34] dated June 21, 2013, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction for acts of lasciviousness, with modification
as to damages. The CA found that AAA's testimony clearly and categorically established petitioner's identity as the
person who molested her.[35] As such, there being no showing that AAA was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that she was not so actuated and her testimony is entitled to full faith and credence.[36]Moreover, petitioner
failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis  or its immediate vicinity at the time of
the commission of the crime. Although he testified that he and his wife were at their residence in Malonoy, Dao, Capiz for
a summer vacation, it was not impossible for him to be at Dumalag, Capiz at the time of the incident, the two places
being proximate to each other.[37]
Further, the CA found that petitioner committed lewd acts against AAA when he kissed her on the lips and sucked her
right breast.[38] Rejecting petitioner's argument that the elements of force and intimidation were not established by the
prosecution, the CA held that petitioner's moral ascendancy or influence, being AAA's teacher, substitutes for the
element of force and intimidation.[39]
Accordingly, the CA sustained the penalty imposed by the RTC but modified the amount of damages, awarding the sum
of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as civil indemnity.[40] However, it deleted the award for exemplary
damages in the absence of any aggravating circumstances in this case.[41]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[42] was denied in a Resolution[43] dated September 3, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming petitioner's conviction for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, as amended.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize the recognized rule in this jurisdiction that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe the deportment and
demeanor of a witness on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts; and when his findings have been affirmed
by the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. While there are recognized exceptions to the rule,
the Court found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter
of AAA's credibility.[44]
Acts of lasciviousness is defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, which reads:
Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of
either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
There must be a confluence of the following elements before conviction can be had for such crime: (1) that the offender
commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) through
force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (3) that the offended party is
another person of either sex.[45]
On the other hand, RA 7610 finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation or discrimination are children or
those "persons below 18 years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition."[46] Section 5 (b) thereof provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.- Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal  in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
197
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.] (Emphases supplied)
The requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are as follows: ( 1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[47]"Lascivious conduct" is defined
in Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 7610, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.[48] (Emphases supplied)
A meticulous perusal of the records reveals that all the elements of both acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have been sufficiently established in this case. AAA's
minority, as she was only 14 years old at the time of the incident, had been sufficiently established with the presentation
of her Certificate of Live Birth,[49] showing that she was born on July 6, 1992. It was likewise established that petitioner,
who was then a teacher and CAT Commandant in AAA's school, and therefore, a person who exercised moral
ascendancy and influence upon her, committed lascivious or lewd conduct against her by kissing her lips and sucking her
right breast.
Petitioner insists that force and intimidation as an element of acts of lasciviousness was not established in this case.
[50]
 In Quimvel v. People,[51] however, the Court clarified that "force and intimidation" is subsumed under "coercion and
influence," and that "x x x lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form
of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. x x x [T]he term
'influence' means the 'improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another's objective.' Meanwhile, 'coercion' is the 'improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes
of one who wields it.'"[52]
In this case, it has been established that petitioner, who was AAA's teacher and then the CAT Commandant in her
school, was able to carry out his lewd acts by asking her twice if she was determined to become a CAT officer.
Petitioner's inquiry strongly suggested that if AAA really wanted to become a CAT officer, she should accede to his
demands and allow him to commit lascivious conduct upon her person. Therefore, petitioner exercised influence and
coercion upon AAA in order to commit the crime against her, thereby satisfying the element of force and intimidation in
this case. Besides, although petitioner was not armed nor did he threaten AAA, his moral ascendancy over her is a
sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation, [53] as pointed out by the CA.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's conviction is upheld not for the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, but for "lascivious conduct'' under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, considering
that she was 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. [54]
To note, petitioner separately argued that the RTC that convicted him is a regular court, not a family court, and therefore,
had no jurisdiction over the case.[55] Although it is true that Branch 20 of the RTC of Mambusao, Capiz is a regular court,
it has jurisdiction over the instant case considering that there is no family court constituted in the area where the crime
was committed; moreover, the only family court designated in Capiz is RTC Branch 14 in Roxas City, Capiz. [56] Thus, in
accordance with Section 17[57] of RA No. 8369,[58] which provides that in areas where there are no family courts, the cases
falling under the jurisdiction of the said family courts[59] shall be adjudicated by the regular courts, the RTC correctly
exercised jurisdiction over this case.
Under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the prescribed penalty for lascivious conduct is reclusion temporal  in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence
shall be taken from the medium period[60] thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be
taken within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor  in its medium period to reclusion
temporal  in its minimum period.[61] Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from a period often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum. to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Likewise, and conformably with prevailing
jurisprudence, [62] he is directed to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages,
P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as fine, all of which shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Rizaldo L. Orsos is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and accordingly, SENTENCED to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and further ORDERED to pay private complainant the
amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P15,000.00 as fine. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of finality of this Decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
94. G.R. No. 230230, November 20, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NIÑO CALIBOD Y HENOBESO, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appcal[1] filed by accused-appellant Niño Calibod y Henobeso (Calibod) assailing the
Decision[2] dated August 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07191, which affirmed the
Judgment[3] dated October 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City, Branch 37 (RTC) in Criminal Case No.
9894-2002-C, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
[4]
 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information  filed before the RTC, charging Calibod of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
[5]
drugs, the accusatory portion of which states:
Criminal Case No. 9894-2002-C
"That at around 6:20 o'clock in the evening of August 18, 2002 at Brgy. Parian, City of Calamba, Province of Laguna and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously sell and deliver to a poseur buyer one (1) plastic sachet containing
methampethamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu", (sic) a dangerous drug, weighing 0.01 gram, in violation of
the aforementioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[6]
The prosecution alleged that at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 18, 2002, a tip was received from a
confidential informant that a certain "Toto," who was later identified as Calibod, was selling shabu along the railroad
tracks in Barangay Parian, Calamba City, Laguna.[7] After verifying the said tip, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target
area and arrived thereat at around 5:30 in the afternoon.[8] Upon seeing Calibod, Police Officer 2 Gregorio A. Oruga (PO2
Oruga), the designated poseur buyer, approached him and said, "To, pakuha ako ng piso."[9] PO2 Oruga handed over the
buy-bust money in the amount of P100.00 to Calibod, who, in turn, gave him one (1) plastic sachet of shabu. After
receiving the sachet, PO2 Oruga introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Calibod, and retrieved the buy-bust
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money from him, prompting the buy-bust team to approach the scene.[10] PO2 Oruga then marked the seized sachet with
his initials, "GAO."[11] After the marking, PO2 Oruga immediately brought Calibod, the buy-bust money, and confiscated
sachet, to the crime laboratory at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna (crime laboratory) for examination. [12] After
examination, Forensic Chemical Officer Donna Villa Huelgas (FCO Huelgas) confirmed that the confiscated sachet
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride,[13] and that Calibod's hands tested positive for ultra-violet powder.[14]
For his part, Calibod interposed the defenses of denial and frame-up, claiming that at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening
of August 18, 2002, he was at home with his common-law wife, Rhodora Ligpitan, and nephew, Jun Cris Cruzado, when
five (5) unidentified armed men suddenly barged into his house and accused him of selling illegal drugs.[15] Calibod
averred that the men ordered them to stay on one side of the house while they searched for illegal drugs. Calibod
maintained that while the men did not find any illegal drugs, they nevertheless brought and detained him inside the
municipal hall.[16] Thereafter, he was allegedly taken out of detention and was forced to hold a P100.00 bill on his hand.
He was then brought to the crime laboratory for examination.[17]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[18] dated October 10, 2014, the RTC found Calibod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.[19] It ruled that the prosecution proved with moral certainty all the elements of the crime charged,
considering that: (a) the identities of PO2 Oruga as the buyer and of Calibod as the seller were clearly established; (b)
the object of the sale, which was the shabu, was successfully delivered to PO2 Oruga; and (c) the consideration of the
sale, which was the P100.00 buy-bust money, was simultaneously given to Calibod. [20] On the contrary, Calibod's
uncorroborated defenses of denial and frame-up failed to overcome the positive testimonies of the police officers, who, at
the time of the incident, were found to be in the regular discharge of their duties and without any ill motive to testify
falsely against him.[21]
Moreover, the RTC found that the identity of the corpus delicti was sufficiently established, as the integrity and
evidentiary value thereof were shown to have been preserved from the time they were bought and seized from Calibod
until they were delivered to the crime laboratory for examination, up to the time they were offered in evidence. [22]
Aggrieved, Calibod appealed[23] to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[24] dated August 26, 2016, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the totality of evidence
adduced by the prosecution adequately established the essential elements of the crime charged.[25] It further held that the
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs was unbroken and, thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs were adequately preserved.[26]
Hence, the instant appeal.[27]
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Calibod's conviction for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and thus, it is the duty
of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[28] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."[29]
Calibod was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165. In order to properly secure the conviction of an accused charged with the said crime, the prosecution must
prove: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment.[30] Further, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty,
considering that the dangerous drug itself forms an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime. Thus, in order to
remove any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drug, the prosecution must show an unbroken chain of
custody over the same, accounting for each link thereof from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.[31]
As held in the Dela Riva v. People,[32] the chain of custody is divided into four (4) links: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.[33]
In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when
handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.[34] Under the said section, the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs
must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. [35] In
the case of People v. Mendoza,[36] the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and
credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs) that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus
adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses
would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody."[37]
Notably, the Court declared that while the chain of custody rule demands utmost compliance from the police officers,
strict adherence with the prescribed procedure may not always be possible under varied field conditions.[38] In fact, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of
RA 10640[39] provide that the requisite inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office
of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section
21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds  will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer or team.[40] Simply put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section
21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid,
provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.[41] In People v. Almorfe,[42] the Court explained
that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and
that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.[43] Moreover, in People v. De
Guzman,[44] it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the
Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.[45]
After a judicious study of the case, the Court finds that there were unjustified gaps in the prescribed chain of custody of
199
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod, thereby putting into serious question the integrity and evidentiary
value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Calibod.
An examination of the records reveals that the police officers committed a procedural lapse in the first link of the chain.
While the prosecution was able to show that PO2 Oruga was able to mark the seized shabu with his initials "GAO," it did
not establish whether or not the requisite inventory and photography were properly conducted by the police officers.
During the direct examination of PO2 Oruga, he claimed that he marked the seized shabuimmediately after the conduct
of buy-bust operation and subsequently brought the item, together with Calibod, to the crime laboratory, to wit:
PROS. DE LEON:
Q: What happened to the plastic sachet, did you immediately bring that to crime laboratory for examination?
WITNESS (PO2 ORUGA):
A: Yes, sir, before I brought it, I put an initial at the plastic sachet.
Q: Immediately after the buy bust operation and after getting th plastic sachet, you [placed] markings with initials?
A: Yes. sir.
x x x x[46] (Underscoring supplied)
Q What happened to the plastic sachet that you bought from @ "Toto"?
A: I brought it to Crime Laboratory with Toto to check his hands, if it is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.
x x x x[47] (Underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing testimony, PO2 Oruga immediately proceeded to the crime laboratory after marking the
seized shabu. He did not state if the marking was done within the view of Calibod, an elected public official, and a
representative from the DOJ or media. He likewise did not mention whether the said witnesses were present during the
buy-bust operation or immediately thereafter.
Moreover, it was not shown if PO2 Oruga actually conducted a physical inventory and photography of the seized shabu -
either at the place of the arrest or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team - and in the presence of
Calibod, an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ or the media. Despite the non-observance of these
requirements, the prosecution did not even proffer a plausible explanation therefor. Perforce, the Court is constrained to
rule that the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165
constitutes a fatal flaw which affects the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
Furthermore, it appears that there were also procedural lapses on the second and third links of the chain. Since PO2
Oruga immediately went to the crime laboratory without conducting the requisite inventory and photography after the buy-
bust operation, there was no showing that the confiscated shabu was initially turned over to an investigating officer for
further investigation. Additionally, the prosecution was silent as to how the specimen shabu was subsequently received
at the crime laboratory, considering that PO2 Oruga did not state if he submitted the same directly to FCO Huelgas. No
details were given as to the identity of the person who received the specimen shabu on behalf of the crime laboratory, as
well as how it was handled, preserved, and managed before FCO Huelgas conducted an examination thereon. According
to PO2 Oruga, he simply left the plastic sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money at the crime laboratory and brought
Calibod to the police station, where he was charged of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, viz.:
xxxx
Q: After that, where did you proceed?
A: After he was examined, I left the money including the plastic sachet with methamphetamine hydrochloride and brought
the accused to the police station, sir.
Q: What happened to (sic) the police station?
A: He was charge (sic) of a criminal complaint, sir.
x x x x[48] (Underscoring supplied)
By and large, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militates against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.[49] It is well-settled that the procedure in
Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality;
or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.[50] As such, since the prosecution failed to
provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR,
Calibod's acquittal is perforce in order.
As a final note, it is fitting to mention that 'the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon
our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are supposed to enforce the law
are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. For indeed, order is too high a price for the
loss of liberty.'[51]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 07191 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Niño Calibod y Henobeso
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Provincial Jail Warden of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology of
Calamba, Laguna is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other
reason.*
SO ORDERED.
95. [ G.R. No. 225995, November 20, 2017 ]
TEODORO V. VENTURA, JR., PETITIONER, V. CREWTECH SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., [*] RIZZO-
BOTTIGLIERI-DE CARLINI ARMATORI S.P.A., AND/OR ANGELITA ANCHETA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated March 1, 2016 and the Resolution[3] dated July
4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142802 which reversed and set aside the Decision [4]dated June
30, 2015 and the Resolution[5] dated August 27, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC
(OFW-M)-06-000514-15, and instead, reinstated the Labor Arbiter's (LA) Decision[6] dated April 30, 2015 dismissing the
complaint for total and permanent disability benefits, but ordered respondent Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. to pay
petitioner Teodoro V. Ventura, Jr. (petitioner) his unpaid sickness allowance and 10% attorney's fees.
The Facts
Petitioner was employed by respondent Crewtech Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. (Crewtech), for its principal, Rizzo-
Bottiglieri-De Carlini Armatori S.P.A. (Rizzo), as Chief Cook on board the vessel MV Maria Cristina Rizzo under a nine
(9)-month contract[7] that was signed on October 18, 2013, with a basic monthly salary of US$710.00 exclusive of
200
overtime pay and other benefits. After undergoing the required pre-employment medical examination (PEME) where he
was declared fit for sea duty[8] by the company-designated physician, petitioner boarded the vessel on October 31, 2013.
[9]
 Petitioner claimed to have been consistently employed as such by Crewtech for the past three (3) years and assigned
at its different vessels.[10]
On April 4, 2014, the vessel MV Maria Cristina Rizzo was transferred to respondent Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc.
(Elburg) which assumed full responsibility for all contractual obligations to its seafarers that were originally recruited and
processed by Crewtech.[11]
Sometime in April 2014, petitioner complained to the Chief Mate that he was having a hard time urinating that was
accompanied by lower abdominal pain. He was given pain relievers and advised to take a substantial amount of water.
Upon reaching the port of Singapore on April 30, 2014, petitioner was brought to a specialist at the Maritime Medical
Centre and was diagnosed to have "prostatitis"[12] and declared "unfit for duty."[13] Petitioner disclosed to the foreign doctor
that he: (a) has a history of prostatitis that occurred three (3) years ago; ( b) was treated for kidney stone in August 2013;
and (c) was not under any regular medication.[14]
Thus, on May 1, 2014, petitioner was medically repatriated[15] and referred to a company-designated physician for further
evaluation and treatment. His ultrasound[16] revealed "Cystitis with Cystolithiases; Prostate Gland Enlargement, Grade III
with Concretions; and Bilateral Renal Cortical Cysts," while his CT stonogram[17] showed "Cystolithiases; Bilateral Non-
Obstructing Nephrolithiases; Bilateral Renal Cortical Cysts; Prostatomegaly."  In a Medical Report[18] dated May 5, 2014,
the company-designated physician eventually diagnosed petitioner's illnesses to be "Cystitis with Cystolithiases; and
Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia (BPH)," which he declared to be not work-related[19] explicating that cystitis (inflammation of
the urinary bladder) secondary to cystolithiasis (urinary stone formation in the urinary bladder) was usually on account of
a combination of genetic predisposition, diet, and water intake, while BPH involved changes in hormone levels that occur
with aging.[20]
Notwithstanding this finding, petitioner was consistently monitored by the company-designated physician and was even
recommended to undergo "Open Prostatectomy with possible Transurethral Resection of the Prostate"[21] for his BPH and
"Open Cystolithotripsy with Possible Laser Intracorporeal Lithotripsy and Endoscopic Extraction Bladder Stones" [22] for his
Cystolithiasis. Thereafter, he is subjected to three (3) sessions of "Extracorporeal Shockwave Lithotripsy." [23] The length
of treatment was estimated at three (3) months barring unforeseen circumstances. [24] While awaiting approval of the
foregoing procedures, the company-designated physician noted petitioner's increasing complaints of pain during urination
that was accompanied with blood, for which he was prescribed medications.[25] He was also inserted with an Indwelling
Foley Catheterization to address his persistent hypogastric pain and difficulty in urination. [26]
On July 10, 2014, petitioner underwent Open Prostatectomy with possible Transurethral Resection of the Prostate, [27] as
well as Open Cystolithotomy on his own account.[28] On July 14, 2014, petitioner also underwent "Cystoscopy, Evacuation
of Blood Clots and Coagulation of Bleeders."[29] He was also subjected to continuous cystoclysis (bladder irrigation).
[30]
 However, despite the foregoing procedures, petitioner still suffered from intermittent pain on his hypogastric
area[31] and attempts to remove his indwelling foley catheter were shown to be unsuccessful.[32] The specialist further
opined that petitioner was suffering from urethral stricture and possible urinary bladder neck contracture, for which he
was recommended to undergo "Urethroscopy, Visual Internal Urethrotomy, Cystoscopy, Transurethral Resection of
Bladder Neck Contracture."[33] Meanwhile, in the letters[34]dated August 4, 2014 and September 18, 2014, the company-
designated physician reiterated that petitioner's illnesses were not work-related, while his subsequent urethral stricture
was only secondary to the series of surgeries he had undergone and as such, was likewise not work-related.
On October 8, 2014, or prior to the expiration of the 240-day period reckoned from his repatriation on May 1, 2014,
petitioner claimed that he was verbally informed by the company-designated physician that it would be his last check-up
session and that subsequent consultations would be for his own account.[35] Considering that petitioner's illnesses
remained unresolved and he was still on catheters,[36] the latter was compelled to seek an independent physician of his
choice, Dr. May S. Donato-Tan (Dr. Tan), who, in a Medical Certificate[37] dated October 20, 2014, declared him to be
permanently disabled, in view of his existing indwelling catheter that caused frequent urinary tract infection and rendered
him incapable of performing his job effectively.
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint[38] for total permanent disability benefits, sickness allowance, transportation and
medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees against Crewtech, Rizzo, and its President/Manager, respondent
Angelita Ancheta (Ancheta) before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. (M)-10-13052-14.
For their part, Crewtech, Rizzo, and Ancheta denied petitioner's claim for disability benefits, contending that the latter
was guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation when he failed to disclose his previous medical history of prostatitis and kidney
stone treatment during his last PEME, and as such, was disqualified from any compensation and benefits under Section
20 (E)[39] of the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract[40] (2010 POEA-
SEC).[41] They likewise contended that petitioner's ailments, Cystitis with Cystolithiases and BPH, have no causal
connection to his work and were declared by the company-designated physician to be not work-related, hence, not
compensable.[42] They added that petitioner's independent physician did not contradict the finding that his illnesses were
not work-related, and that his failure to observe the procedure for the joint appointment of a third doctor under Section 20
(A) (3)[43] of the 2010 POEA-SEC was fatal to his cause.[44] They denied petitioner's claim for sickness allowance, in view
of his concealment, and averred that they had shouldered all the necessary treatments, surgery, laboratory, hospital,
professional fees and medicines.[45] They likewise denied the claim for moral and exemplary damages as petitioner was
treated fairly despite the finding that his illnesses were not work-related, and attorney's fees for lack of basis. [46] Lastly,
they prayed that Crewtech be dropped as party-respondent to the case and be substituted by Elburg.[47]
The LA Ruling
In a Decision[48] dated April 30, 2015, the LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, ruling that petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of proving that his illnesses were work-related. The LA pointed out that since petitioner had a
history of prostatitis in 2011 and did not take regular medication for it, he merely suffered from a recurrence of a pre-
existing illness. The LA added that there was no clear and convincing indication that petitioner's work as Chief Cook has
aggravated his condition given that it was his duty and responsibility to prepare safe and quality meals to the crew and
that he was charged with the planning and requisition of food and catering supplies.[49] Moreover, petitioner's non-
disclosure of a previous illness during his last PEME legally barred him from availing of the disability benefits pursuant to
Section 20 (E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC.[50] Nevertheless, the LA ordered Elburg to pay petitioner his sickness allowance
which was computed at US$2,840.00, as well as 10% attorney's fees since the latter was clearly compelled to litigate to
protect his rights and interests.[51]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal[52] to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision[53] dated June 30, 2015, the NLRC partly ruled in favor of petitioner, directing Crewtech, Rizzo, and
Ancheta, in solidum, to pay him his total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00, and further
sustained the award of sickness allowance and 10% attorney's fees.[54] Contrary to the findings of the LA, the NLRC ruled
that there was no fraudulent concealment on the part of petitioner given that Crewtech was well aware of his past
medical history as reflected in the Medical Report[55] dated May 2, 2014 and thus, cannot feign ignorance of his true
condition.[56] The NLRC likewise ruled that petitioner's illness was work-related, holding that as Chief Cook, the latter
cannot just excuse himself to obey the call of nature more so when preparing and cooking food of the officers and crew
of the vessel, and that the limited water provisions for the entire voyage and their diet may have increased the
development, if not aggravation of his illness.[57] As petitioner's illness rendered him incapable of resuming work, he was
entitled to total and permanent disability or Grade 1 impediment pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC and not the FIT/CISL-
SIRIUS SHIP management SRL - Genoa 2012-2014 IBF Model CBA that covered only those disabilities arising from an
accident.[58] Finally, the NLRC ruled that since the complaint was not amended to implead Elburg, no jurisdiction was
acquired over said corporation and as such, Crewtech, Rizzo, and Ancheta, were ordered, in solidum, to pay petitioner
his disability benefits subject to reimbursement by Elburg on account of the assumption of responsibility agreement.
[59]
 The latter's motion for reconsideration[60] was denied in a Resolution[61]dated August 27, 2015.
Dissatisfied, Elburg elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari,[62] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 142802.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[63] dated March 1, 2016, the CA partly granted the petition and set aside the NLRC Decision in so far as it
ordered the payment to petitioner of total permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00.[64]Contrary to the
findings of the NLRC, the CA ruled that petitioner willfully concealed his previous treatment for prostatitis in 2011 during
his 2013 PEME. Moreover, he ticked the box "no" in answer to the question of whether or not he was suffering from any
medical condition likely to be aggravated by sea service.[65] The CA further held that petitioner failed to discharge the
burden of proving that his illness was work-related. It observed that petitioner merely enumerated his duties and
responsibilities as Chief Cook without establishing a reasonable connection between the nature of his work and his
illness and how his working conditions contributed to and/or aggravated his condition.[66] It added that the company-
designated physician's assessment of non-work relatedness was supported by medical studies, given that petitioner's
BPH was a common condition for aging men due to their hormonal imbalance.[67] It noted that even petitioner's
independent physician failed to provide any medical explanation that would establish reasonable connection between his
201
working condition and illness.[68] Finally, the CA ruled that since Elburg, Rizzo, and Ancheta (respondents) failed to
appeal the LA's Decision granting petitioner his claim for sickness allowance and attorney's fees, the same can no longer
be modified or reviewed, and thus, was sustained.[69]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[70] which was denied in a Resolution[71] dated July 4, 2016; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that petitioner was entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
It is basic that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is governed by the medical
findings, the law, and the parties' contract. The material statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199[72] (formerly Articles
191 to 193)[73] of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X[74] of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation (AREC),[75] while the relevant contracts are the POEA-SEC, the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer. In this case, petitioner executed
his employment contract with respondents during the effectivity of the 2010 POEA-SEC; hence, its provisions are
applicable and should govern their relations.
Pursuant to the 2010 POEA-SEC, the employer is liable for disability benefits when the
seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract. In
this regard, Section 20 (E) thereof, mandates the seafarer to disclose all his pre-existing
illnesses in his PEME, failing which, shall disqualify him from receiving the same, to wit:
E. A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination
(PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits. This is
likewise a just cause for termination of employment and imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions.
Here, contrary to the findings of the C A, there was no concealment on the part of petitioner when he failed to disclose in
his 2013 PEME that he was previously treated for prostatitis in 2011. As culled from the records, respondents were well
aware of petitioner's past medical history given that the company-designated physician was able to provide a detailed
medical history of the latter in the Medical Report dated May 2, 2014 which showed all of his past illnesses, the year he
was treated and where he obtained his treatment.[76] Moreover, since petitioner's prostatitis was shown to have been
treated in 2011 with no indication that he was required to undergo further medical attention or maintenance medication
for the same, he cannot be faulted into believing that he was completely cured and no longer suffering from said illness.
This is further bolstered by the fact that he was rehired by respondents the following year in 2012 and no longer found to
be suffering from prostatitis during his PEME. Evidently, petitioner's non-disclosure of the same in his PEME in 2013 did
not amount to willful concealment of vital information and he was in fact, truthful in answering "no" to the query on
whether or not he was "suffering" from any medical condition likely to be aggravated by sea service or render him unfit for
such service on board the vessel.
Be that as it may, the CA is nevertheless correct in holding that petitioner's illnesses, Cystitis with Cystolithiases and
BPH, were not work-related, hence, not compensable.
Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC is explicit that the employer is liable for disability benefits only when the seafarer
suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract. Thus, work-relation must be established. As a
general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that the disease in question must be one of those listed as an
occupational disease under Section 32-A thereof. Nevertheless, should it not be classified as occupational in nature,
Section 20 (A) paragraph 4[77] thereof provides that such diseases are disputably presumed as work-related. However,
the presumption does not necessarily result in an automatic grant of disability compensation. The claimant still has the
burden to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the
illness.[78]
In this case, records reveal that petitioner was repatriated after having been diagnosed with prostatitis. Prostatitis is the
swelling and inflammation of the prostate gland[79] and among its risk factors are: (a) a catheter or other instrument
recently placed in the urethra, (b) an abnormality found in the urinary tract, or (c) a recent bladder infection. Upon further
examination, the company-designated physician found petitioner to have cystitis, or inflammation of the bladder, which is
commonly caused by a bacterial infection known as urinary tract infection (UTI),[80] and BPH, an enlargement of the
prostate gland that is common among aging men[81] which can block the flow of urine out of the bladder and cause
bladder, urinary tract or kidney problems.[82] Although the foregoing illnesses became manifest only while petitioner was
on board the vessel, such circumstance alone is not sufficient to entitle him to disability benefits. It bears stressing that
for a disability to be compensable, the seafarer must show a reasonable link between his work and his illness in order for
a rational mind to determine that such work contributed to, or at least aggravated, his illness. It is not enough that the
seafarer's injury or illness rendered him disabled; rather, he should be able to establish a causal connection between his
injury or illness, and the work for which he is engaged.[83]
Here, petitioner's general averments that he was exposed to stressful demands of his duties and responsibilities and
subjected to hazardous condition of his station are mere allegations couched in conjectures. There was no evidence
presented to establish how and why petitioner's working conditions increased the risk of contracting his illness. In the
absence of substantial evidence, the Court cannot just presume that petitioner's job caused his illness or aggravated any
pre-existing condition he might have had. Mere possibility will not suffice and a claim will still fail if there is only a
possibility that the employment caused the disease.[84] Probability of work-connection must at least be anchored on
credible information and bare allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof,[85] as in this case.
Moreover, the Court notes that even petitioner's physician of choice, Dr. Tan, failed to refute the company-designated
physician's pronouncement that his illness was not work-related. In the Medical Certificate dated October 20, 2014, Dr.
Tan merely reiterated petitioner's medical history of his illness and declared him permanently disabled on the justification
that he would not be able to perform his job effectively, in view of the presence of the catheter that caused frequent
episodes of urinary tract infection. It is significant to point out at this stage that in determining the work-causation of a
seafarer's illness, the diagnosis of the company-designated physician bears vital significance given that the latter is
mandated by the 2010 POEA-SEC to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent
disability. And while the seafarer is not irrevocably bound by the findings of the company-designated physician as he is
allowed to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice, Section 20 (A) (3) thereof further provides that any
disagreement in the findings may be referred to a third doctor jointly agreed upon by the parties, whose findings shall be
final and binding between them. The Court has consistently held that non-observance of the requirement to have the
conflicting assessments determined by a third doctor would mean that the assessment of the company-designated
physician prevails.[86]
Considering that petitioner failed to observe the conflict-resolution procedure provided under the 2010 POEA-SEC, the
Court is inclined to uphold the opinion of the company-designated physician that petitioner's illnesses were not work-
related, hence, not compensable.
Accordingly, no error can be imputed against the CA in granting respondents' certiorari  petition as the findings and
conclusions reached by the NLRC are tainted with grave abuse of discretion since the claim for disability benefits
remains unsupported by substantial evidence. Verily, while the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the
seafarer, it cannot allow claims for compensation based on whims and caprices. When the evidence presented negates
compensability, the claim must fail, lest injustice be caused to the employer.[87]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 1, 2016 and the Resolution dated July 4, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR. SP No. 142802 are hereby AFFIRMED as afore-discussed.
SO ORDERED.
96. G.R. No. 216788, November 20, 2017
UNITED INTERIOR MANGGAHAN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DANIEL
CALILUNG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AMBROSIO B. DE LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
202
PALAWAN AND PUERTO PRINCESA CITY - BRANCH 51, SPOUSES EDILBERTO VILLON AND HELEN PE-VILLON,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR HEIRS NAMELY: EMEE PE-VILLON, EMMANUEL PE-VILLON, ELSIE VILLON-CABRERA,
ELMA VILLON-AUSTRIA, AND ELLEN FERRERO, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the Orders dated September 19, 2014[2] and December 12,
2014[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 51 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3442,
expunging from the records of the case the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner United Interior Manggahan Homeowners
Association (petitioner) for lack of authority from its Board of Directors to initiate the filing of the same.
The Facts
Sometime in early 2000, petitioner, as represented by its President, Daniel Calilung (Calilung), filed before the RTC a
Complaint[4] for Specific Performance with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction with Damages against respondents Spouses Edilberto Villon and Helen Pe-Villon (Sps. Villon), now
represented by their heirs Emee Pe-Villon, Emmanuel Pe-Villon, Elsie Villon-Cabrera, Elma Villon-Austria, and Ellen
Ferrero (respondents). After petitioner rested its case, Sps. Villon filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss on
Demurrer to Evidence[5] which the RTC eventually granted in an Order[6] dated March 5, 2014,[7] and thereby dismissed
petitioner's complaint.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration,[8] but was denied in an Order[9] dated May 6, 2014. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.[10] For their part, Sps. Villon filed an Omnibus Motion to Strike Out Notice of Appeal
and Issue Certificate of Finality,[11] claiming that petitioner failed to attach a board resolution authorizing Calilung to file
the Notice of Appeal on its behalf, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9904. [12] They also claimed that
petitioner no longer exists and that it failed to comply with the reportorial requirements mandated by Section 46, Rule
8[13] and Section 63, Rule 10[14] of Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Resolution No. 877, Series of 2011,[15] and
furthermore, did not show proof of payment of the required appeal fees.[16]
The RTC Ruling
On September 19, 2014, the RTC ordered[17] petitioner's Notice of Appeal expunged from the records "for lack of
authority from [its] Board of Directors to initiate the appeal,"[18] pursuant to Section 12 of RA 9904. It, however, found
that "[petitioner] has paid the appeal fee within the reglementary period."[19]
Dissatisfied, petitioner sought reconsideration,[20] attaching therewith a copy of Board Resolution No. 01, Series of 2013,
[21]
 confirming Calilung's authority to, among others, represent petitioner in the case.[22] For their part, Sps. Villon opposed,
[23]
 reiterating that petitioner did not attach a board resolution authorizing Calilung to file the Notice of Appeal on its behalf;
and had failed to show proof of payment of the required appeal fees. They added that petitioner's motion for
reconsideration failed to comply with the three (3)-day notice rule under Sections 4,[24] 5,[25]and 6,[26] Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court.[27]
In an Order[28] dated December 12, 2014, the RTC denied petitioner's motion on the same ground,[29] adding that
petitioner failed to "present proof that the required docket and other court fees were paid"[30] and to comply with Section 4,
Rule 15 of the same Rules that requires at least three (3) days prior notice for the hearing of its motion for
reconsideration.[31] Accordingly, the RTC declared the September 19, 2014 Order final and executory.[32]
Undaunted, petitioner filed the present certiorari  petition against the heirs of Sps. Villon, i.e.,  herein respondents.
 The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in expunging
petitioner's Notice of Appeal from the records of the case.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, respondents assail[33] petitioner's present resort to a certiorari  action arguing that: being final, the
September 19, 2014 and December 12, 2014 Orders are not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari;[34] and, in any
case, direct filing of the petition to the Court violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. [35]
The Court finds petitioner's resort to a certiorari  petition before the Court proper.
Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari  when "any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."[36] Section 1, Rule 41 of the same Rules provides that no appeal
may be taken from, among others, an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; the aggrieved party may, however, file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
In this case, the assailed September 19, 2014 Order – expunging petitioner's Notice of Appeal from the records of the
case– is effectively an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal that precludes resort to an appeal. Hence, pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 41, its only recourse is via the present certiorari  action.
Moreover, certiorari  is the proper remedy when the assailed orders were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess thereof. Grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower
court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, existing law, or jurisprudence. As will be discussed in detail
below, the RTC's order, expunging from the records petitioner's Notice of Appeal was a grave legal error and contradicts
established procedural rules.
In this relation, it should be observed that while strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been the long
standing policy of the courts, it is not without exception as the Court possesses full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it. A direct resort to the Court is allowed when the
questions involved are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice,[37] as in this case.[38]
Proceeding to the main issue, petitioner argues that pursuant to Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, once an appeal
is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction all over the judgment and the action in which it is rendered so far as
the rights of the parties under the judgment are concerned.[39] Thus, it has no power to do anything which affects the
substantial rights of the parties therein.[40]
The Court disagrees. Under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, "[i]n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time  and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties."[41] In fact, under Section 13 of the same Rules, the trial court, prior to the transmittal of the original
record or record on appeal, may, motu propio  or on motion, order the dismissal of the appeal on the grounds specified
therein. In other words, the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not automatically divest the trial court of its jurisdiction,
since the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appellant only; it is not "deemed perfected," for purposes of divesting the
court of its jurisdiction, "before the expiration of the period to appeal of the other parties." Thus, contrary to petitioner's
position, the RTC has yet to lose its jurisdiction over the case when it filed its Notice of Appeal as respondents' period to
203
appeal had not yet expired by then.
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it expunged from the
records petitioner's Notice of Appeal for "lack of authority from its Board of Directors to initiate the appeal."[42] Under the
Rules, an appeal from cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be made to the Court of
Appeals by "filing a notice of appeal [(or record of appeal in cases required by law)] with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party."[43] The appeal shall be taken,
with the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees paid, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.[44]
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that a board resolution authorizing the representative to initiate the appeal is not
required for the purpose of filing a notice of appeal. This is because a notice of appeal is not a pleading, initiatory or
otherwise, that, when required by the law or the rules,[45] must contain, among others, a verification and certification
against forum shopping to be signed by the party or his/her representative, and, in the case of a representative, proof of
his/her authority to file the action, i.e.,  power of attorney or secretary's certificate with copy of the board resolution.
Besides, if only to put to rest any doubts anent respondents' objection against Calilung's authority to represent petitioner
in the case,[46] the latter in fact submitted, with its motion for reconsideration, a copy of Board Resolution No. 01, Series of
2013[47] to this effect. Thus, when the RTC in this case expunged petitioner's Notice of Appeal for lack of authority from
petitioner's Board of Directors to initiate the appeal, it not only effectively expanded the procedural requirements for
initiating an appeal; more than anything, it effectively deprived petitioner of further recourse to the higher courts by asking
for the submission of documents which neither the law nor the Rules and jurisprudence require.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that petitioner's failure to present proof of payment of the appeal fees, as ruled by the
RTC in the December 12, 2014 Order, is not fatal to petitioner's appeal especially considering its earlier finding that
petitioner "has paid the appeal fee within the reglementary period."[48] Under the Rules, it is the non-payment of the
docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period that would justify the court in dismissing the appeal. [49]
Finally, it should be reiterated that procedural rules are meant to facilitate, not defeat, the attainment of justice.
[50]
Considering the grave legal error it had committed in expunging petitioner's Notice of Appeal from the records on
grounds which neither the law nor the Rules and jurisprudence require, it behooved the RTC to set aside the procedural
infirmity in petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the September 19, 2014 Order, i.e.,  failure to comply with the three
(3)-day notice rule, and instead give due course to its appeal. The purpose, after all, of this notice requirement is to
provide respondents with the opportunity to be heard, and to meaningfully oppose petitioner's motion or participate in the
hearing thereof,[51] which respondents were sufficiently able to do so through their Comment/Opposition[52] to petitioner's
motion.
All told, in acting as it did, the RTC clearly committed grave legal error that far exceeds the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated September 19, 2014 and December 12, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 51 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3442 are hereby SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner's Notice of Appeal. SO ORDERED.
97. G.R. No. 226454, November 20, 2017
DIGNA RAMOS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated March 29, 2016 and the Resolution[3]dated
August 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36970, which affirmed with modification the conviction
of petitioner Digna Ramos (Ramos) for the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, defined and penalized under Article 358 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
 The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information[4] filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Piat-Sto. Niño, Cagayan
Province (MCTC) charging Ramos of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation,[5] the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on about 4:20 o'clock (sic) in the afternoon of 17th September 2003 at barangay Centro Norte, Sto. Niño, Cagayan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with ill motive, did then and there(,)
wil(l)fully, unlawfully, and feloniously, uttered defamatory remarks against the honor and reputation of the undersigned
complaint Mrs. Patrocinia R. Dumaua, the following words and/or phrases address (sic) to the undersigned
complainant "UKININAM, PUTA, AWAN AD-ADAL MO"  which if translated in the English language would mean, "VULVA
OF YOUR MOTHER, PROSTITUTE, ILLITERATE."
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The prosecution alleged that at around four (4) o'clock of September 17, 2003, private complainant Patrocinia Dumaua
(Dumaua) was watering her plants in her yard, when suddenly, she noticed five (5) schoolchildren pick up dried leaves
and throw them into her yard. When Dumaua called the attention of the schoolchildren, the latter ran towards the
direction of Sto. Nino Elementary School, where Ramos works as a public school teacher. A little later, Ramos arrived,
picked up dried banana leaves, and allegedly threw them into Dumaua's yard, while saying "ta sinnu ti pabasulem nga
agilappak ti bulung, siguro dakayo ta nagpabirthday kayo"  which means "Whom do you blame throwing leaves? Maybe
you did because you hosted a birthday party." This prompted a quarrel between Ramos and Dumaua, during the course
of which Ramos uttered to the latter, "Ukininam, puta, awan ad-adalmo, nagbalay kayo ti nagdakkelan, magaburan
daytoy balay kon"  which translates to "Vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate, you built a very big house, it
overshadows my house." This was corroborated by Orlando Baltazar and Babileo Dumaua, who testified that they were
watching television inside Dumaua's house when the commotion ensued. According to them, when they went out of the
house to check the incident, they saw the verbal altercation between Ramos and Dumaua already at its height, with
onlookers observing the same.[7]
In her defense, Ramos denied making any derogatory remarks against Dumaua, particularly "ukininam, puta, awan ad-
adal mo."  She then narrated that on the time and date in question, she was traversing a pathway located between
Dumaua's house and that of another neighbor when she saw Dumaua standing at her yard. Suddenly, Dumaua got angry
at her, blamed her for the garbage in her yard, and threatened her not to use the pathway or else something will happen.
Irked, Ramos asked Dumaua the basis for prohibiting her to use the pathway and demanded that she be shown her title
over the pathway, but the latter could not produce anything. Ramos then proceeded to the Sto. Niño Police Station to
report the incident and file a case of grave coercion against Dumaua. Ramos's testimony was then corroborated by her
husband, who stated that he was waiting for his wife to go home when he noticed a commotion involving her. Upon
arriving thereat, he pulled Ramos away as Dumaua was already armed with two (2) stones and about to grab his wife.[8]
The MCTC Ruling
In a Decision[9] dated May 15, 2009, the MCTC found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Oral
Defamation, and accordingly, sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year and one (1) day, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months, as maximum, of prision correccional  and ordered to pay Dumaua the
amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, as well as the costs of suit.[10]
Ramos separately moved for a new trial and for reconsideration, both of which were denied in Resolutions dated
September 28, 2009 and November 16, 2009, respectively. Aggrieved, she appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Tuao,
Cagayan, Branch 11 (RTC).[11]
204
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[12] dated September 4, 2014, the RTC affirmed the MCTC ruling in toto[13] It found that the prosecution has
indeed established the fact that Ramos uttered defamatory statements of a serious and insulting nature against Dumaua
through the positive testimonies not only of the latter, but also of the latter's corroborative witnesses. As such, Ramos's
bare denial that she did not say anything defamatory against Dumaua cannot be given any credence for being
unsubstantiated and self-serving.[14]
Dissatisfied, Ramos filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA. [15]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[16] dated March 29, 2016, the CA affirmed the rulings of the courts a quo,  with modification, adjusting
Ramos's period of imprisonment to four (4) months of arresto mayor,  as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional,  as maximum, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[17]
Agreeing with the findings of the courts a quo,  the CA ruled that Ramos's bare denials could not stand against the clear
and positive testimony of the witnesses that she indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta, awan ad-adal mo"  which
means "vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate" against Dumaua. In this regard, the CA held that such words were
defamatory and serious in nature as the scurrilous imputations strike deep into the victim's character. [18]
Undaunted, Ramos moved for reconsideration[19] but the same was denied in a Resolution[20] dated August 10, 2016;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Ramos's conviction for the crime of Grave
Oral Defamation.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and it is the duty of
the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.[21] "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."[22]
Moreover, while it is a general rule that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review
on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as in this case, since petitions of this nature are limited only to
questions of law,[23] this rule admits of various exceptions, such as when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts or when the factual findings are contrary to the evidence on record.[24]
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court deems it proper to modify Ramos's conviction, as will be explained
below.
Article 358 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crimes of Serious Oral Defamation and Slight Oral Defamation, to wit:
Article 358. Slander. – Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correctional  in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto
menor  or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
In De Leon v. People,[25] the Court thoroughly discussed the nature of Oral Defamation and the parameters for classifying
the same as either Grave or Slight:
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking
of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of
livelihood." The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to
a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or
put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain,
natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that
they were used and understood in another sense. It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not
actionable as libel or slander per se,  and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious,
whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for
special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
xxxx
As to Ramos's civil liability, while Dumaua is still entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 (7)[29] of the Civil
Code, the Court deems it proper to reduce the same to P5,000.00[30] in light of the downgrading of Ramos's conviction to
Slight Oral Defamation. Further, such amount shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. [31]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29, 2016 and the Resolution dated August
10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRNo. 36970 is hereby MODIFIED, finding petitioner Digna
Ramos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation defined and penalized under
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, she is meted with the penalty of a FINE in the amount of P200.00,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and ordered to pay private complainant Patrocinia Dumaua the
amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
98. G.R. No. 225146, November 20, 2017
ROGELIO B. ANTONE, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated July 31, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated April
22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01327, which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Rogelio
B. Antone (Antone) for two (2) counts of the crime of Statutory Rape.

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the sense and grammatical The Facts
meaning of the utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced
age of the offended party. "The gravity depends upon; (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the accused
and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate Informations[4] filed before the Regional Trial Court of Guihulngan,
offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule Negros Oriental, Branch 64 (RTC) each charging Antone of raping his then eleven (11)-year old niece-in-law, AAA, [5]the
that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes accusatory portions of which reads:
only a light felony."[26] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case FC No. 99-028-G

A judicious review of the records of this case reveals that Ramos indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta, awan ad-
adal mo"  which means "vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate," against Dumaua. However, no evidence was That on August 1997, in the Municipality of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
presented to show that Ramos indeed started the altercation by instructing her schoolchildren to throw leaves into Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force
Dumaua's yard, and eventually, throwing dried banana leaves therein as well. It must be pointed out that Dumaua's claim and intimidation did lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor child, the
to that effect was not supported by her corroborative witnesses whose testimonies only pertain to matters transpiring accused being the husband of her Aunt Aniceta Bontigao, the elder sister of the father of AAA.
during the height of the verbal altercation as they were inside the house when the fight started. Absent such evidence,
the Court is inclined to lend more credence to Ramos's narration that she was just passing through a pathway adjacent to Criminal Case FC No. 99-029-G
Dumaua's house when the latter got mad at her; started blaming her for the garbage in her yard; and warned her not to
use the pathway anymore or else something will happen to her – all of which resulted in the two of them hurling
invectives against one another. Thus, it may safely be concluded that while Ramos indeed said defamatory words That on November 1997, in the Municipality of Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
against Dumaua, the utterances were made in the heat of anger and were with some sort of provocation on the part of Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force
the latter. As such, the Court is constrained to hold that Ramos is only guilty of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation. and intimidation did lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with AAA, an eleven (11) year old minor child, the
accused being the husband of her Aunt Aniceta Bontigao, the elder sister of the father of AAA. [6]
Since the crime committed is only Slight Oral Defamation which is punishable by arresto menor  or a fine of P200.00,
[27]
 the Court deems it proper to impose on Ramos the latter penalty instead, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.[28]
205
The prosecution alleged that starting 1995, AAA started living in the house of her Aunt Aniceta and her husband, Antone.
AAA's mother and brother, BBB and DDD,[7] lived in another house about 200 meters away, while her father, CCC,[8] lived
in Mandaue City where he worked as a security guard and only came home about twice a month. At around three o'clock
in the afternoon of a Saturday in August 1997, AAA was preparing dinner when she saw Antone staring strangely at her.
Initially, AAA ignored what Antone was doing, but after a while, Antone approached her, grabbed her hand, and carried
her into the master's bedroom. Thereat, Antone locked the door, approached AAA, and removed her shorts and
underwear. He then removed his own lower garments, separated AAA's legs and mounted her. However, since his penis
remained flaccid, he made AAA hold his penis, and thereafter, repositioned himself on top of her and made pumping
motions. At this point, AAA surmised that Antone's penis was already erect at that time as she felt it penetrate her vagina,
causing her to feel pain. After Antone ejaculated, he got a rag then used the same to wipe his penis as well as AAA's
vagina before instructing the latter to put her shorts and underwear back on. Before leaving the room, Antone threatened
AAA to kill her should she tell what just happened.[9]
A similar incident happened in November 1997 when Antone commanded AAA to give him a massage, to which the latter
obliged. After a while, Antone again brought AAA to the master's bedroom, locked the door, removed AAA's shorts and
panty, had carnal knowledge of her until he ejaculated, and threatened to kill her if she revealed to anyone about what
happened.[10]
According to AAA, the incident happened several times more and she eventually started to like what Antone was doing to
her. When AAA returned to her parents' house, she started missing her sexual activities, which caused her to seduce her
own brother, DDD. Eventually, word came out of their incestuous relationship, prompting BBB to confront her about it. It
was only then that AAA admitted to her mother about her sexual encounters with Antone. Accordingly, AAA's parents had
her medically examined and filed the instant criminal cases against Antone.[11]
In his defense, Antone denied the charges against him, averring that it was impossible for him to rape AAA as there were
a lot of people residing in their house. He then claimed that AAA and DDD were caught red handed by their grandmother
engaging in incestuous relations and BBB and CCC only made it appear that he was the one who abused AAA in order
to cover up the family embarrassment.[12]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[13] dated January 6, 2011, the RTC found Antone guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
Simple Statutory Rape, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  for each count of
rape, and ordered him to indemnify AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of rape, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[14]
Aggrieved, Antone appealed[15] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a the Decision[16] dated July 31, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification, adjusting the award of
damages in favor of AAA to P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of the ruling until fully paid.
[17]
The CA held that AAA's clear and straightforward testimony positively identifying Antone as her assailant is enough to
establish the fact of statutory rape, considering that she was just eleven (11) years of age when the sexual abuses
occurred. The CA noted that as a minor who has no ill motive to falsely testify against Antone, AAA's testimony must be
given full faith and credence.[18]
206
Dissatisfied, Antone moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution[19] dated April 22, 2016; hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Antone's conviction must be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The petition must be dismissed.
At the outset, the Court notes that Antone made a procedural lapse in elevating the case before the Court via  a petition
for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 3 (e), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure (Rules) especially provides that "[e]xcept as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45. In this regard, Section 13, Rule
124 of the Rules states:
Section 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court. –  (a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the
penalty of death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain from making an entry of judgment and
forthwith certify the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out
of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the
accused appeals, the appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render
and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, the CA affirmed the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua  to Antone for each count of Statutory
Rape committed against AAA. As such, he should have filed a notice of appeal before the CA instead of filing a petition
for review on certiorari  before the Court.
Accordingly, Antone's failure to timely file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the latter court's Decision dated
July 31, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 22, 2016 lapsing into finality. Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held
that "a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of
judgment, has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a)  to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b)  to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional
errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that the rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality
to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied." [20]
While the Court notes that there are exceptions to the application of this principle, none of which properly obtains in this
case. In fine, Antone's conviction remains.
 The RTC-Valenzuela held that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged, considering that:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. (a) Calderon allowed petitioner to drive the subject motorcycle, which was then attached to a sidecar; ( b) Casanas did
not return the subject motorcycle within the agreed period; and (c) Casanas continued to use the same for his personal
use, thereby exhibiting his intent to gain. In this regard, the RTC-Valenzuela ruled that while Casanas's possession of the
subject motorcycle was lawful in the beginning, such possession became unlawful when he failed to return the same to
99. G.R. No. 223833, December 11, 2017 Calderon in accordance with their agreement.[17]
Aggrieved, Casanas appealed [18] to the CA.
JOSHUA CASANAS Y CABANTAC A.K.A. JOSHUA GERONIMO Y LOPEZ, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE
The CA Ruling
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
In a Decision[19] dated July 28, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC Valenzuela ruling in toto. Aside from upholding the RTC-
Valenzuela's findings, the CA likewise pointed out that initially, Casanas borrowed a tricycle from Calderon; but when he
was apprehended, only the subject motorcycle without the sidecar was recovered from him.[20] In this regard, the CA ruled
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
that such removal of the sidecar from the subject motorcycle bolsters the conclusion that Casanas indeed intended to
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated July 28, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated
appropriate for himself the subject motorcycle. Further, the CA disregarded Casanas's excuses for failing to return the
January 11, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35835, which affirmed the Decision [4] dated May 15,
subject motorcycle on time, as he did not bother to get in touch with Calderon either to ask permission for an extended
2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 269 (RTC-Valenzuela) in Criminal Case No. 874-V-12 finding
possession of the subject motorcycle, or for assistance when the police officer apprehended him for being unable to
petitioner Joshua Casanas y  Cabantac, a.k.a. Joshua Geronimo y  Lopez (Casanas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
present the motorcycle's registration papers.[21]
the crime of Carnapping, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6539, otherwise known as the
Undaunted, Casanas moved for reconsideration[22] but the same was denied in a Resolution[23] dated January 11, 2016;
"Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972," as amended.
hence, this petition.[24]
The Facts
The Issues Before the Court
On August 22, 2012, an Information[5] was filed before the RTC Valenzuela charging Casanas of the crime of
The issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not: (a) the RTC-Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the case; and (b)
Carnapping, the accusatory portion of which reads:
the CA correctly upheld Casanas's conviction for the crime of Carnapping.
That on or about August 12, 2012, in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
The Court's Ruling
named accused, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away with him
In the petition, Casanas primarily argues that the RTC-Valenzuela had no jurisdiction over the case, as the alleged
one (1) Racal motorcycle with plate number 7539IJ without the consent of its owner CHRISTOPHER CALDERON y
carnapping happened in Marilao, Bulacan, and not in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila where he was arrested, charged,
DORIGON, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant.
and tried.[25] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that Casanas is already estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC-Valenzuela as he not only failed to move for the quashal of the Information based
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6] on such ground, he also voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC-Valenzuela by freely participating in
The prosecution alleged that at around 9 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 2012, private complainant Christopher the trial of the instant case.[26]
Calderon (Calderon) was about to go inside the public market in Marilao, Bulacan when a passenger arrived and wanted The petition is meritorious.
to ride his tricycle, made up of a Racal motorcycle with plate number 7539IJ (subject motorcycle) and a sidecar.
[7]
 Casanas volunteered to drive Calderon's tricycle for the passenger, to which Calderon obliged. However, Casanas no
Time and again, it has been held that "the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. Lack
longer returned the tricycle to Calderon, prompting the latter to report the incident to police authorities in the afternoon of
of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it
the next day.[8]
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in
A few days later, or on August 19, 2012, the Valenzuela Police Station received a report that a suspected stolen
the answer or in a motion to dismiss. So that, whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
motorcycle was being sold in Karuhatan, Valenzuela City.[9] When Police Officer 2 Harvy Arañas (PO2 Arañas) and
matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final
Police Officer 1 Elbern Chad De Leon (PO1 De Leon) responded to the report, they saw a man, later on identified as
judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the
Casanas, standing beside what turned out to be the subject motorcycle.[10] The police officers introduced themselves to
parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside."[27]
Casanas and asked for proof of ownership of the motorcycle, but Casanas could not provide any. PO1 De Leon then
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
frisked Casanas and found a knife in the latter's possession.[11] Thereafter, they brought Casanas, the subject motorcycle,
committed outside its limited territory.[28] As such, when it becomes apparent that the crime was committed outside the
and the knife to the police station. Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered that the subject motorcycle
territorial jurisdiction of the court, the case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. [29] In Navaja v. De Castro,[30] the
was registered under Calderon's name. The next day, Calderon went to the police station and recovered the subject
Court held:
motorcycle.[12]
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been
For his part, while Casanas admitted that Calderon owned the subject motorcycle, he denied stealing the same. He
committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
averred that he only borrowed the subject motorcycle on August 18, 2012, but he was unable to return it on that date as
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
he had a drinking session with his friends.[13] The next day, he was on his way home onboard the subject motorcycle
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
when policemen blocked his way and forcibly took him to the police station. Thereat, a police officer purportedly took a
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
knife from his drawer, which led petitioner to believe that he was being investigated and detained because of the said
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
knife.[14]
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed
The RTC-Valenzuela Ruling
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[31](Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In a Decision[15] dated May 15, 2013, the RTC-Valenzuela found Casanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
In this relation, Sections 10 and 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, also state that:
charged, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum. [16]

207
Section 10. Place of commission of the offense.- The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its Q: What happened next when the passenger was about to board the tricycle? 
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the A: I lend the key of my motorcycle.
jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the Q: To whom did you lend the key of your motorcycle? 
offense charged or is necessary for its identification. A: To Joshua, sir.
xxxx Q: Could you tell us the full name of this Joshua? 
A: Joshua Casanas.
Q: If this Joshua Casanas to whom you lend the key of your motorcycle would be shown to you, would you be able to
Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. -
identify Joshua? 
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
A: Yes, sir.
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
Q: Could you please point to this Joshua? 
A: Him, sir.
The venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases shall be placed either where the offense was committed or where any of xxxx
its essential ingredients took place. Otherwise stated, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently
alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a
Q: What happened next after you lend the key to Joshua Casanas? 
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[32]
A: I waited for him, sir.
In this case, the Information[33] alleges that Casanas committed the crime of Carnapping within the territorial jurisdiction of
Q: Where did you wait? 
the RTC-Valenzuela. However, such allegation in the Information was belied by the evidence presented by the
A: In the market, sir.
prosecution, particularly, Calderon's own statements in the Sinumpaang Salaysay[34] dated August 21, 2012 he executed
Q: What happened next when you were waiting for Joshua Casanas in the same market? 
before the Valenzuela City Police Station as well as his testimony during trial. Pertinent portions of the Sinumpaang
A: He did not return, sir.
Salaysay read:
Q: How long did you wait? 
TANONG: Bago ang lahat ay maari mo bang sabihin sa akin ang iyong tunay na pangalan at iba pang
A: The whole night, sir.
mapapagkakilanlan sa iyong tunay na pagkatao? 
Q: When Joshua did not return anymore, what did you do next? 
SAGOT: Ako po si Christopher Calderon y Doligon, 25 taong gulang, may-asawa, tricycle driver, nakatira sa B3 L5
A: The following day in the afternoon I went to the city hall.
Northville 4B Lamabakin, Marilao, Bulacan.
Q: Of what town or city did you go to? 
T: Bakit ka naririto ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng salaysay? 
A: Marilao, sir.
S: Para po magsampa ng demanda.
Q: What happened when you went to the City Hall of Marilao?
T: Sino naman ang idedemanda mo? 
A: I gave a statement, sir.[36] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
S: Siya po. (At this juncture, affiant is pointing to [a] male person who when asked replied as Joshua Casanas y
From the foregoing, it is evident that the crime of Carnapping, including all the elements thereof - namely, that: ( a) there
Cabantac, 21 years old, tricycle driver, of Manzano Subdivision, Ibayo, Marilao, Bulacan)
is an actual taking of the vehicle; (b) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself; (c) the taking is
T: Kailan at saan naman ninakaw nitong si Joshua ang tricycle mo? 
without the consent of the owner thereof, or that the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
S: Noon pong ika 14 ng Agosto 2012 sa ganap ng ika 9:00 ng gabi sa palengke ng Marilao, Bulacan.
persons, or by using force upon things; and (d) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle[37] - did not
T: Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito, maari mo bang isalaysay ang tunay na pangyayari? 
occur in Valenzuela City, but in Marilao, Bulacan. While the Court notes that Casanas was indeed arrested in Valenzuela
S: Bale ganito po kasi iyon, sa oras, lugar at petsa na nabanggit ko sa itaas ay bumili ako ng ulam sa loob ng palengke,
City while in the possession of the subject motorcycle, the same is of no moment, not only because such is not an
nakaparada ang tricycle ko sa labas ng palengke. Nilapitan ako ni Joshua at hiniram sa akin ang susi ng aking tricycle at
element of the crime, but more importantly, at that point in time, the crime had long been consummated. Case law
sinabi na mayroon daw sasakay kaya ang ginawa ko ay ipinahiram ko sa kanya at umalis na siya at magmula noon ay
provides that '"unlawful taking' or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or
hindi na siya muling bumalik dala ang aking tricycle.
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed complete from the
T: Ano ang ginawa mo pagkatapos kung meron man? 
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same."[38]
S: Hinanap ko po siya at nang hindi ko na siya makita sa lugar narnin ay nagreport ako sa himpilan ng pulisya sa
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC-Valenzuela had no authority to take cognizance of the instant case as the
Marilao, Bulacan kung saan naiblotter ang pangyayari.[35] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
crime was committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Consequently, the RTC-Valenzuela ruling convicting Casanas of
During his direct examination, Calderon similarly stated:
the crime charged, as well as the CA ruling upholding the same, is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled
that "where there is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment is
Q: Do you still remember where you were on August 14, 2012 at around 9:00 in the evening?  in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor
A: In a market. bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It is not a decision in contemplation
Q: In what market where (sic) you then?  of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to
A: Marilao, sir. another case by reason of res judicata,"[39] as in this case.
Q: What happened when you were in Marilao?  In fine, Criminal Case No. 874-V-12 is hereby dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The dismissal of this case,
A: I was about to go to the market to buy something. however, shall not preclude the re-filing of the same criminal case against Casanas before the proper tribunal which has
Q: What happened next when you were at the market to buy something? territorial jurisdiction over the same, i.e.,  the courts in Marilao, Bulacan.
A: There is a passenger. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated January 11, 2016
Q: Who is that passenger?  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35835 are hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 874-V-12 filed
A: About to board the tricycle.

208
in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 269 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice and negotiating the property with any person for any purpose; prohibit or prevent them from obstructing and preventing
to its re-filing in the proper court having territorial jurisdiction over the case. the free passage, possession, use, and appropriation of the property and its fruits; declare him as the absolute owner of
SO ORDERED. the property; and order petitioners to vacate the property and remove all structures and improvements introduced
thereon at their expense.[24]
Petitioners, for their part, filed an Answer with Counterclaim and Affirmative Defenses[25] invoking res judicata,
prescription and laches. In support thereof, they pointed out that the October 17, 2003 CA Decision stemming from Civil
100. G.R. No. 227124, December 06, 2017 Case No. S-606 had already become immutable. Likewise, they moved to hear and resolve the affirmative defense.[26]
The RTC Ruling
HEIRS OF VICTOR AMISTOSO, NAMELY: VENEZUELA A. DELA CRUZ, FLORA A. TULIO, WILFREDO D.
In a Resolution[27] dated May 28, 2014, the RTC denied petitioners' Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses for
AMISTOSO, RUFINO D. AMISTOSO, VICENTE D. AMISTOSO, MAXIMO D. AMISTOSO, AND ZENAIDA D.
lack of merit, declaring that the principle of res judicata would not apply in view of the lack of identity of causes of action.
AMISTOSO, PETITIONERS, V. ELMER T. VALLECER, REPRESENTED BY EDGAR VALLECER, RESPONDENT.
It held that in contrast to Civil Case No. S-606, which involves recovery of possession, Civil Case No. L-298 is essentially
one for declaration of ownership. It also ruled that since the land is covered by a Torrens title, it can no longer be
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
acquired by prescription or be lost by laches.[28]
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated February 24, 2016 and the Resolution[3]dated
Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration[29] which the RTC denied in an Order[30] dated December 3, 2014.
August 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 06720, which upheld the Resolution [4] dated May 28,
Undaunted, they elevated the case before the CA via a petition for certiorari,[31] arguing that Civil Case No. L-298 for
2014 and the Order[5] dated December 3, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 28
quieting of title is barred by res judicata, and that respondent lacked cause of action.[32]
(RTC) in Civil Case No. L-298, denying the Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses filed by petitioners Heirs of
The CA Ruling
Victor Amistoso, namely: Venezuela A. Dela Cruz, Flora A. Tulio, Wilfredo D. Amistoso, Rufino D. Amistoso, Vicente D.
In a Decision[33] dated February 24, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
Amistoso, Maximo D. Amistoso, and Zenaida D. Amistoso (petitioners) for their failure to substantiate their affirmative
discretion in holding that Civil Case No. L-298 is not barred by res judicata, considering that Civil Case No. S-606filed by
defenses of res judicata, prescription, and laches.
respondent is anchored on his right to possess the real property as the registered owner; while Civil Case No. L-298 was
The Facts
filed in order to clear his title over the land and remove all adverse claims against it.[34]
Sometime in March 1996, respondent Elmer T. Vallecer (respondent), through his brother Dr. Jose Benjy T. Vallecer
Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,[35] additionally arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to cancel their
(Benjy), filed a Complaint[6] for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. S-
CLT. The CA denied petitioners' motion in a Resolution[36] dated August 10, 2016; hence, this petition.
606,[7] involving a 2,265-square meter parcel of land, located in Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, described as Lot C-7-A
The Issues Before the Court
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-44214[8] (TCT T-44214) and Tax Declaration No. 93-7329[9]under
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Civil Case No. L-298 is barred by res judicata.
respondent's name. He claimed that he purchased the property sometime in June 1990 after confirming with the
The Court's Ruling
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that the property was not tenanted. When he started making preparations for the
The petition lacks merit.
construction of a commercial building on the property, petitioners, with the aid of their workers, agents, representatives,
and/or employees, stopped or barred him by force, threats, and intimidation. Despite repeated demands [10] and
explanations made by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) [11] of the DAR during a pre litigation conference that Preliminarily, petitioners insist, albeit belatedly, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint in Civil Case No. L-
no landlord-tenancy relationship ever existed between them as regards the property, petitioners continued to refuse him 298, considering that what is sought to be cancelled is their CLT; hence, an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction
from entering and enjoying possession of his property.[12] Thus, he prayed for the court to, among others, order of the DARAB.[37]
petitioners, with their representatives, agents, employees, and assigns, to vacate the property and pay damages. [13] The argument is specious.
In their defense,[14] petitioners claimed that they have been in actual, peaceful, and continuous possession of the land as
evidenced by Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-002623[15] (CLT) issued in November 1978 to their predecessor-in-
In order to classify a matter as an agrarian dispute which falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB, it must be first shown
interest Victor Amistoso (Victor) by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. [16]
that a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. For such relationship to be proven, it is essential to establish all its
On January 8, 2001, the RTC declared respondent as the absolute owner of the subject property under his name.[17]On
indispensable elements, namely: (a) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (b) that the
appeal, the CA rendered a Decision[18] dated October 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 70128 (October 17, 2003 CA
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (c) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
Decision) reversing the RTC ruling. It found that Benjy failed to show proof of his capacity to sue on respondent's behalf
(d) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (e) that there is personal cultivation on the
and that the CLT issued by the DAR acknowledges petitioners as "deemed owner" of the land after full payment of its
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
value. Having proven full compliance for the grant of title, petitioners have a right to the land which must be respected.
agricultural lessee.[38]
[19]
 This CA Decision became final and executory on November 4, 2003,[20] and consequently, a Writ of Execution[21] was
Moreover, it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
issued on May 9, 2005.
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced, irrespective of whether or not
Thereafter, or on July 18, 2012, respondent filed a Complaint[22] for quieting of title, ownership, possession, and damages
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein and regardless of the defenses set up
with preliminary injunction against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. L-298, subject of the present case. Asserting
in the court or upon a motion to dismiss by the defendant.[39]
ownership over the property under TCT No. T-44214 and tax declarations, and citing petitioners' unlawful possession and
In this case, a reading of the material allegations of respondent's complaint in Civil Case No. L-298 and even petitioners'
occupation thereof despite repeated demands to vacate, respondent claimed that: petitioners' CLT does not contain the
admissions readily reveals that there is neither a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent, nor had
technical description of the property which it purportedly covers; the tenancy relationship from which petitioners anchor
petitioners been the tenant of respondent's predecessors in-interest. In fact, respondent did not even question the validity
their possession pertains to the portion of the adjacent land that belongs to Maria Kho Young with whom they admittedly
of petitioners' CLT nor sought for its cancellation. Rather, what respondent sought was for a declaration that the property
have the tenancy relationship; and the October 17, 2003 CA Decision involving Civil Case No. S-606, annotated on his
covered by his Torrens title is different from the property covered by petitioners' CLT in order to quiet his title and remove
TCT No. T-44214, constitutes a cloud on his title.[23] Thus, respondent prayed for the court to: restrain and prohibit
all adverse claims against it. Clearly, this is not an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB's jurisdiction.
petitioners from continuing to usurp his real rights on the property as owner thereof; prevent or prohibit them from dealing

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Proceeding to the main issue, petitioners contend that Civil Case No. S-606 and Civil Case No. L-298 were founded on
the same facts, allegations, and arguments, and sought the same relief, i.e., to cancel their CLT. Considering that the
October 17, 2003 CA Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606  had already attained finality, the same
constitutes res judicata to Civil Case No. L-298.[40]
The Court disagrees.
"Res judicata literally means 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment."' It also refers to the "rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on
the points and matters in issue in the first suit."[41]
For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or
order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[42]
In this case, the Court finds that Civil Case No. S-606 did not bar the filing of Civil Case No. L-298 on the ground of res
judicata  as the causes of action in the two cases are not the same.
In particular, in Civil Case No. S-606, respondent alleged that he purchased the property after confirming with the DAR
that it was not tenanted; that petitioners, with their workers and/or representatives, stopped or barred him by force,
threats, and intimidation from entering and occupying the property; and that despite repeated demands[43] and
explanations made by the MARO[44] that no landlord-tenant relationship ever existed between them as regards the
property, petitioners continued to prohibit him from entering and enjoying possession of his property. He thus prayed for
the court to order petitioners, with their representatives, et al., to vacate the property and pay damages.[45]
At this point, it is apt to clarify that the CA erroneously classified Civil Case No. S-606 as an accion reivindicatoria, or a
suit which has for its object the recovery of possession of real property as owner and that it involves recovery of
ownership and possession based on the said ownership.[46] As plaintiff in Civil Case No. S-606, respondent never asked
that he be declared the owner of the land in question, but only prayed that he be allowed to recover possession thereof
from petitioners. As such, Civil Case No. S-606 should have instead, been properly classified as an accion publiciana, or
a plenary action to recover the right of possession of land.[47] Hence, while petitioners were acknowledged by the DAR as
"deemed owners" of the land in Civil Case No. S-606, such declaration was merely provisional as it was only for the
purpose of determining possession. In Gabriel, Jr. v. Crisologo,[48] the Court thoroughly discussed the nature and purpose
of an accion publiciana:
Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right
of possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. When parties, however,
raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to
possess the property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it
is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.
[49]
 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. L-298, respondent asserted his ownership over the property by virtue of his Torrens
title, and alleged that petitioners' tenancy relationship actually pertains to the portion of the adjacent land that belongs to
Maria Kho Young with whom petitioners admittedly have the tenancy relationship. Respondent also claimed that
petitioners' CLT does not contain the technical description of the property which it purportedly covers and therefore does
not show that their alleged tenancy right falls on his property.[50] Thus, the October 17, 2003 CA Decision stemming
from Civil Case No. S-606 and petitioners' unlawful possession and claim of ownership constitute a cloud on his title over
the property. Accordingly, respondent prayed for the court to declare him as the absolute owner of the property, and
restrain and prohibit petitioners from performing and/or continuing to perform act/s that affect his possession and
enjoyment thereof as owner.[51]
Clearly, the complaint in Civil Case No. L-298 is, as indicated herein, one for quieting of title pursuant to Article 476[52] of
the Civil Code. In Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Cabral,[53] the Court discussed:
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such
cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no
rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has
the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie  appearance of validity or legal efficacy.[54] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. S-606 and L-298  are different from each
other. And thus, the ruling in the former would not operate as res judicata on the latter.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that petitioners' attack on the validity of respondent's Torrens title in Civil Case No. S-
606 by claiming that their father Victor became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the CLT issued to him in
1978 constitutes a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the
property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action aimed at impugning the validity of the judgment granting the title.
[55]
 Time and again, it has been held that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and that the issue of
the validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. [56] Hence, any declaration the
CA may have made in its October 17, 2003 Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606cannot affect respondent's
ownership over the property nor nullify his Torrens title, as the adjudication was only for the purpose of resolving the
issue of possession.
All told, the October 17, 2003 CA Decision involving Civil Case No. S-606 did not bar the filing of Civil Case No. L-
298 that seeks to determine the issue of the property's ownership, clear respondent's title over the property, and remove
all adverse claims against it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 24, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 10, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 06720 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
101. G.R. No. 228449, December 06, 2017
GRACE R. ALUAG, PETITIONER, V. BIR MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, NORMA L. LIPANA, AND ESTELITA V.
DATU, RESPONDENTS.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated August 25, 2016 and the Resolution[3]dated
November 9, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 144608, which reversed the Decision [4]dated October
16, 2014 and the Resolution[5] dated December 29, 2015 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and
accordingly, reinstated the Decision[6] dated May 26, 2014 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) finding petitioner Grace R. Aluag
(Aluag) to have been validly dismissed from service by respondent BIR Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BIRMPC).
The Facts
This case arose from a complaint[7] for, inter alia, illegal dismissal filed by Aluag against BIRMPC and its officers,
respondents Norma L. Lipana and Estelita V. Datu (respondents). Aluag alleged that she was employed as BIRMPC's
cashier from November 16, 1994 until her termination on October 31, 2013.[8] Her duties, among others, were to receive
remittances and payments, deposit all collections daily, record fixed deposits, determine cash positions, issue checks for

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loans, collect cash receipts, and perform such other duties that the general manager may assign to her. [9] She claimed
that from the time of her employment, she was tasked to give only verbal weekly reports on BIRMPC's funds until 2010
when she was required to put them into writing. In 2011, BIRMPC's loan processors started accepting post-dated checks
with the prior approval of the general manager, who then was Gerardo Flores (Flores).[10] She added that in July 2013,
upon Flores' instruction, she submitted a report of bounced checks and deposited the remaining checks in her
possession.[11]
On July 16, 2013 or ten (10) days before she gave birth, Aluag received a letter[12] from BIRMPC's Board of Directors
temporarily relieving her from her position pending an investigation against her and two (2) loan processors involving
several suspicious loans, requiring her to submit an answer within ten (10) days.[13] She complied only after she gave
birth or on July 29, 2013, wherein she admitted that she: (a) was tasked to have all collections deposited everyday; (b)
received verified post-dated checks for safekeeping and deposit to the bank when due; and (c) opted not to deposit
matured checks upon request of the debtors.[14] She then went on a maternity leave from July 30 to September 30, 2013,
during which period, she received another letter from BIRMPC preventively suspending her from August 1 to October 31,
2013.[15] Claiming that the suspension was illegal, she filed a complaint for illegal suspension with the NLRC. While the
case was pending, Aluag received another letter[16] dated October 31, 2013 terminating her employment; hence, she
amended the complaint to one for illegal dismissal.[17]
For their part, respondents averred that Aluag was legally dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. They
narrated that while reviewing loan documents in June 2013, they found rampant violations of BIRMPC's by-laws, rules,
and regulations. When they interviewed Aluag, the latter admitted the infractions, but claimed that Flores had full
knowledge of them.[18] Thereafter, respondents sent letters to Aluag and other concerned employees to explain why no
charges should be filed against them and, later on, placed them under preventive suspension. To validate the extent of
the irregularities and financial damage, they engaged the services of an external accountant who, in her report, observed
that the cashier failed to regularly report post-dated checks received and did not observe proper monitoring of the checks'
due dates to be deposited. The accountant also pointed out that some checks were not deposited at all.[19] In light of the
foregoing, BIRMPC terminated Aluag's employment effective November 1, 2013 on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence for the following infractions: (a) acceptance of accommodation checks; (b) failure to deposit checks on due
dates, pursuant to a member/debtor's request; (c) not reporting to the manager those checks with no sufficient funds or
which accounts had already closed; and (d) failure to act upon returned checks.[20]
The LA Ruling
In a Decision[21] dated May 26, 2014, the LA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit. Nonetheless, it
ordered BIRMPC to pay Aluag the amounts of P15,416.48 and P3,557.65, representing her 13thmonth pay and service
incentive leave pay for the year 2013, respectively. [22]
The LA found that as a company cashier, Aluag held a position of trust and confidence. Thus, her commission of various
infractions, which substantially contributed damages to BIRMPC's financial position in the amount of P35,526,599.77,
constituted sufficient basis for loss of trust and confidence. [23] Further, the LA found that BIRMPC accorded Aluag her
procedural due process rights, as two (2) notices were accordingly served on her, namely: (a) the written notice
containing a statement of the cause of her dismissal, in order to afford her an opportunity to be heard and defend herself;
and (b) the written notice of dismissal dated October 31, 2013, stating clearly the reasons therefor. [24] The foregoing
notwithstanding, the LA still ordered BIRMPC to pay Aluag her 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay for 2013,
absent any showing that the latter had already paid the same.[25]
Aggrieved, Aluag appealed[26] to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision[27] dated October 16, 2014, the NLRC reversed the LA ruling, and found Aluag to have been illegally
dismissed. Accordingly, it ordered BIRMPC to pay Aluag the amounts of P250,187.18 as backwages, P370,000.00 as
separation pay, P15,416.48 as 13th month pay, P3,557.65 as service incentive leave pay, and ten percent (10%) of the
total monetary awards as attorney's fees.[28]
Contrary to the LA's findings, the NLRC found that Aluag's perceived infractions were insufficient to dismiss her on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence because they were not violations of her ministerial duties as cashier. [29]First, she
merely received the accommodation checks which were previously verified by the loan processors and approved by the
general manager. The NLRC noted that Aluag was neither clothed with the authority to inquire into the validity of the
checks nor authorized to exercise discretion in receiving them.[30] Second, Aluag's tasks did not include depositing the
checks and no evidence was presented to show that the general manager assigned this task to her. The NLRC added
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that no evidence was presented to prove that the non-deposit of checks was due to debtors' requests. [31] Third, Aluag did
submit a report on dishonored checks to the general manager upon his request. The NLRC observed that this function is
not among the routine duties of a cashier.[32] Fourth, the NLRC stated that acting upon returned or dishonored checks is
not among Aluag's duties, but is a discretionary function of the general manager.[33] As regards the external accountant's
report, the NLRC added that regular submission of reports and monitoring of the checks' status are not part of Aluag's
routine responsibilities.[34]
Respondents moved for reconsideration,[35] which was denied in a Resolution[36] dated December 29, 2015. Dissatisfied,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari[37] before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[38] dated August 25, 2016, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling and reinstated that of the LA. It
held that Aluag was validly dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence, which were
applicable because she served as a cashier - a position requiring trust and confidence.[39] The CA rejected Aluag's
argument that she was not liable for the charges levelled against her as these were beyond her duties as a cashier. It
explained that Aluag could have been more circumspect by refusing to accept accommodation checks which appear to
be unfunded based on BIRMPC's records, and denying to issue checks after verifying that the loan applicant still had
unpaid loans with BIRMPC. Most importantly, she is tasked to deposit the checks on their due dates, which she failed to
do.[40] Thus, the CA concluded that it would already be inimical to BIRMPC's interests should it be compelled to keep
Aluag within its employ.[41]
Further, the CA held that BIRMPC complied with the two (2)-notice rule, as the evidence show that Aluag was properly
notified of the charges against her to enable her to respond thereto, and of her eventual termination from service.[42]
Aluag moved for reconsideration,[43] but was denied in a Resolution[44] dated November 9, 2016; hence, the instant
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, and
accordingly held that BIRMPC had just cause to terminate Aluag's employment.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
I.
At the outset, the Court notes that, as aptly pointed out by respondents in their Comment, [45] Aluag failed to serve a copy
of the instant petition to the CA as required by Section 3, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [46] Resultantly, the CA issued a
Resolution[47] dated March 24, 2017 stating that its Decision had become final and executory on December 17, 2016,
and, consequently, the Entry of Judgment[48] was issued in due course. While Aluag filed a Motion and
Manifestation[49] dated June 13, 2017 before the CA explaining that the aforesaid omission was merely due to
inadvertence and praying that the Entry of Judgment be set aside, records are bereft of any showing that the CA acted
on the same.
Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 45, in relation to Section 5 (d) of Rule 56,[50] of the Rules of Court, and item 2 of Revised
Circular No. 1-88[51] require a proof of service to the lower court concerned to be attached to the petition filed before the
Court. The first two (2) provisions read:
Sec. 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition. - Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner shall
pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the amount of
P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy thereof on the lower court
concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition.
Sec. 5. Dismissal or denial of petition. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
In the present case, Aluag failed to serve a copy of the petition to the CA, thereby giving the Court sufficient ground to
deny her petition. Her omission even led to the CA's issuance of the resolution declaring the finality of its Decision. Verily,
Aluag's procedural mishap is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of her petition, especially since the rules themselves
expressly say so.[52] "Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the
right to appeal is invariably lost,"[53] as in this case.
In any event, the Court deems it appropriate to address the issue anent the validity of Aluag's dismissal so as to finally
resolve the main controversy at hand.
II.
Preliminarily, "the Court stresses the distinct approach in reviewing a CA's ruling in a labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the
Court examines the correctness of the CA's Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65.
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In ruling for legal correctness, the Court views the CA
Decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari was presented to the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the
CA's Decision from the prism of whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision.[54]
Case law states that grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[55]
In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and
jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the
petition."[56]
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA correctly ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC, as the latter tribunal's finding that BIRMPC illegally dismissed Aluag patently deviates from the
evidence on record, as well as settled legal principles of labor law.
A valid dismissal necessitates compliance with both substantive and procedural due process requirements. Substantive
due process mandates that an employee may be dismissed based only on just or authorized causes under the Labor
Code. On the other hand, procedural due process requires the employer to comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing before effecting the dismissal.[57]
In the present case, BIRMPC alleged that Aluag's employment was terminated on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence under Article 297 (c) (formerly Article 282 [c])[58] of the Labor Code. The requisites for the existence of such
ground are as follows: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence; and (b) he performs an act
that would justify such loss of trust and confidence. [59]
Anent the first requisite, case law instructs that "[t]here are two (2) classes of positions of trust: first, managerial
employees whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a
department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-
and-file employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are
routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as occupying
positions of trust and confidence."[60] Being a cashier charged with the collection of remittances and payments, Aluag
undoubtedly occupied a position of trust and confidence. Notably, in holding a position requiring full trust and confidence,
Aluag "gave up some of the rigid guarantees available to ordinary employees."[61]
As regards the second requisite, the employee's act causing the loss of confidence must be directly related to her
duties rendering her woefully unfit to continue working for the employer.[62] "In dismissing a cashier on the ground of loss
of confidence, it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has a reasonable ground to
believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct, thus making [her] unworthy of the trust and confidence
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reposed in [her]."[63] If there is sufficient evidence showing that the employer has ample reason to dismiss her, labor
tribunals should not deny the employer the authority to dismiss her from employment.[64]
In the present case, one of the infractions that BIRMPC cited in justifying Aluag's dismissal is her failure to deposit
checks on due dates, pursuant to a member/debtor's request.[65] While the NLRC held that Aluag was not directly
responsible for depositing the checks on their due dates and that no evidence was presented showing that her failure to
deposit the checks resulted from the request of debtors,[66] a more thorough and circumspect review of the records
reveals that the task of depositing checks on due dates definitely falls within Aluag's scope of responsibilities. For one,
the list of Aluag's responsibilities as cashier stated that she was tasked to "have all collections deposited
everyday."[67] For another, she admitted in her explanation that she received verified post-dated checks for safekeeping
and deposit to the bank when due.[68] More relevantly, she likewise admitted in her explanation that she opted not to
deposit matured checks upon request of the debtors.[69] The external auditor's report[70] also confirmed Aluag's infraction,
thus:
The cashier failed to regularly report Post-Dated Checks (PDC) received and did not observe proper monitoring of
checks due to be deposited. There are checks which were not deposited at all. [71] (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, her failure to deposit the checks on their due dates means that she failed to deliver on her task to safeguard
BIRMPC's finances. It is also well to note that she was not given any discretion to determine whether or not to deposit the
checks. Under these circumstances, BIRMPC had ample reason to lose the trust and confidence it reposed upon her and
thereby, terminate her employment. Indeed, it would be most unfair to require an employer to continue employing a
cashier whom it reasonably believes is no longer capable of giving full and wholehearted trustworthiness in the
stewardship of company funds,[72] as in this case. In fine, BIRMPC had just cause for Aluag's dismissal.
On the issue of procedural due process, the Court exhaustively discussed the matter in Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig,
Inc.[73] as follows:
Anent the issue of procedural due process, Section 2 (I), Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code provides for the required standard of procedural due process accorded to employees who stand to be
terminated from work, to wit:
Section 2. Standard of due process; requirements of notice. - In all cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 [now Article 297] of the Labor Code:
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so
desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him;
and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
The foregoing standards were then further refined in Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera[74] as follows:
To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for termination
against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that
management must accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be
construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to
study the accusation against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the
defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their
explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve as
basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should
specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being
charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference wherein the
employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present
evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the management. During the
hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a
representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an
opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the employees a written notice
of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered;
and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of their employment."[75] (Emphases and underscoring in
the original)
Proceeding from the foregoing parameters, the Court finds that BIRMPC sufficiently observed the standards of
procedural due process in effecting Aluag's dismissal, considering that it: (a) issued a written notice specifying her
infractions; (b) granted her ample opportunity to be heard or explain her side when she was required to submit an
explanation; and (c) served a written notice of termination after verifying the infraction committed. Notably, the Court held
in Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company[76] that procedural due process is met even without an actual
hearing as long as the employee is accorded a chance to explain her side of the controversy, as what happened here.
All told, the CA correctly held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion, and hence, reinstated the LA ruling,
considering that BIRMPC observed Aluag's procedural and substantive due process rights in dismissing her from
employment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 25, 2016 and the Resolution dated
November 9, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144608 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
102. G.R. No. 230975, December 04, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. RICO NIEBRES Y REGINALDO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by accused-appellant Rico Niebres y Reginaldo (Niebres) assailing the
Decision[2] dated August 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06374, which affirmed with
modification the Judgment[3] dated June 28, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. P-4532, and found Niebres guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape, as
defined and penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
On June 24, 2011, an Information[4] was filed before the RTC charging Niebres of Rape, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That sometime in the month of August 2010 and the days thereafter at Barangay Panoypoyan, Municipality of Bula
Province of Camarines Sur, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, through force, intimidation and influence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, undress and
succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA[5]], a sixteen (16) year-old lass, who is suffering from mild mental
retardation which fact of retardation is known to the accused and with a mental age of nine (9) yearold, without her
213
consent and against her will, an act by deed which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
said victim as a human being, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The prosecution alleged that sometime in October 2010, Niebres, together with his wife (AAA's sister) and six (6)
children, went to the house of his parents-in-law in La Victoria, Bula, Camarines Sur (La Victoria) to participate in a
traditional palay  harvesting called "basok/hasok."[7] When they arrived at the house of his parents-in-law at around eight
(8) o'clock in the morning, they momentarily took a rest. Thereafter, Niebres joined the other members of the family on
the fields and began the "basok/hasok," which lasted until 4:30 in the afternoon. After dinner, Niebres went out to drink
with his father-in-law and brother-in-law and came home at around midnight. He directly went to the room where AAA
and his family were sleeping and lied beside her to sleep.[8] At about five (5) o'clock in the morning of the following day,
AAA suddenly woke up and noticed Niebres kissing her on the cheeks, neck, and down her body. Niebres then pulled
down her shorts, unzipped his pants, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. After repeatedly making a push
and pull motion on AAA, Niebres finally pulled out his penis and dismounted from her. AAA claimed that the incident
produced so much pain, and it caused her vagina to bleed profusely. This notwithstanding, she could not tell anyone
about it, as she was afraid of what Niebres and her parents would do to her. According to AAA, this was not the first time
Niebres sexually abused her, claiming that Niebres also raped her several weeks before the said incident in his house at
Panoypoyan, Bula, Camarines Sur (Panoypoyan).[9]
Subsequently, when AAA complained of abdominal pains, her mother, BBB,[10] brought her to Naga Health Care
Diagnostic Center on March 25, 2011. After conducting an ultrasound examination on AAA, the doctors discovered that
she was approximately five (5) to six (6) months pregnant. When AAA finally admitted to BBB that Niebres raped her,
they reported the matter to the police and filed the instant Complaint. On February 7, 2012, AAA went to a psychiatrist
named Dr. Edessa Parde Laguidao (Dr. Laguidao), who revealed that she was suffering from a mild mental retardation
with an intelligence quotient (I.Q.) equivalent to a nine (9)-year old child.[11]
For his part, while Niebres admitted that he and his family went to the house of his parents-in-law in La Victoria sometime
in October 2010, he verbally denied raping AAA therein. Niebres maintained that at the time of the incident, he went out
of the room of his parents-in-law's house, drank coffee, and proceeded to continue harvestingpalay  without waiting for
his other companions. When Niebres was done harvesting, he and his family supposedly left La Victoria in the afternoon
and never came back. Moreover, Niebres averred that the only time AAA slept in their house in Panoypoyan was when
he was in Batangas from March to August 2010. Ultimately, Niebres insisted that the filing of case against him was
actuated by ill motive, considering that his parents-in-law were angry at him when he demanded his share in the
proceeds of the cow, which was purportedly sold to cover the wedding expenses of his brother-in-law. [12]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[13] dated June 28, 2013, the RTC found Niebres guilty of the crime of Simple Rape in relation to Section 5
(b) of RA 7610 and, accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amounts
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.[14] It held that the prosecution was able to
present testimonial and documentary evidence to support AAA's claim of rape against Niebres. Meanwhile, Niebres's
unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi failed to create reasonable doubt in light of the positive and categorical
testimony and identification of AAA.[15]
Furthermore, the RTC did not appreciate the qualifying circumstance of relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA
even if it was proven in court, given that the same was not alleged in the Information. [16]
Aggrieved, Niebres appealed[17] to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a the Decision[18] dated August 17, 2015, the CA upgraded Niebres's conviction to that of Qualified Rape, finding
Niebres not eligible for parole and ordering him to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all
damages awarded from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.[19]
The CA upheld the RTC's finding of rape, further noting that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA were too minor
and inconsequential to acquit Niebres of the crime charged. Further, it was highly improbable for AAA to fabricate the
charges against Niebres, considering that a traumatizing experience like rape would definitely leave a lasting impression
on her given her mental condition.[20] However, the CA ruled that Niebres should be convicted for Qualified Rape,
considering that: (a) the state of mental retardation of AAA was competently established on account of the testimony and
psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Laguidao on AAA; and (b) Niebres failed to dispute AAA's mental retardation during trial.
Accordingly, the CA deemed it proper to hold Niebres guilty of Qualified Rape.[21]
Unyielding, Niebres filed the present appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Niebres's conviction for the crime of Rape should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is denied.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.[22]
As will be explained hereunder, the Court deems it proper to modify Niebres's conviction for the crime of Qualified Rape
to Simple Rape.
Here, a plain reading of the Information reveals that Niebres was charged of the crime of Qualified Rape, as defined and
penalized under Article 266-A (1), in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC, to wit:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - x x x.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at
the time of the commission of the crime.
214
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For the successful prosecution of the crime of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, it is
necessary that the elements thereof are proven beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge
of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when the victim was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when the victim is
under 12 years of age or is demented.[23] Moreover, case law states that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a
mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape.[24] In People v. Deniega,[25] the Court
clarified that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the
rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph 1 (b), Article 266-A of the RPC. Thus, it ruled
that:
Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as capable of making decisions and
giving consent as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving
rational consent because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability
to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality. Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence,
person's capacity to decide whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is determined not by his
or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in determining whether a person is "twelve (12) years of
age" under Article 266-A(1)(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of the child if
he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age if intellectual disability is established. [26] (Emphasis
in the original)
In this instance, the prosecution competently established the elements of the crime of Rape, as it was shown that: ( a)
AAA was suffering from mild mental retardation, which has an I.Q. equivalent to a nine (9)-year old child; ( b) Niebres
successfully had carnal knowledge of AAA sometime in October 2010; and (c) Niebres was able to accomplish the said
act because AAA, being a mental retardate, was deprived of reason at the time of the incident.
However, the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Niebres's knowledge of AAA's mental disability at
the time of the commission of the crime, there being no sufficient and competent evidence to substantiate the same.
Notably, knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape is a
special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death.[27] Such qualifying circumstance, however, must be
sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial court.[28] It must be
proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no conviction of the crime in its
qualified form.[29]
In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of Niebres of AAA's mental retardation was specifically
alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was adduced by the prosecution. The fact that Niebres did not dispute
AAA's mental retardation during trial is insufficient to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral
certainty that he knew of her disability at the time of its commission. It is settled that the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[30] On that score, the prosecution cannot simply profit from Niebres's omission, as it must rely on its own
evidence to prove his knowledge of AAA's mental disability beyond reasonable doubt.
Additionally, mere relationship by affinity between Niebres and AAA does not sufficiently create moral certainty that the
former knew of the latter's disability. In People v. Ramos,[31] the Court ruled that "while private complainant was the niece
of accused-appellant and they were neighbors before and at the time of the commission of the crime[, the same] do not
constitute conclusive proof that accused-appellant had knowledge of the mental retardation of private complainant absent
evidence of external manifestations of her mental condition."[32] Here, the prosecution did not present any evidence that
AAA exhibited external manifestations of her mental condition. On the contrary, records reveal that the mental retardation
of AAA only became noticeable the moment Dr. Laguidao conducted the requisite psychological test on her. When AAA
engaged in other activities, she actually performed and functioned like a normal person. Thus, Dr. Laguidao testified that:
[PROS. AGATON FAJARDO]: Also in your assessment, you stated "mental retardation, mild", tell us Doctor what method
did you use or take that you were able to say the mental retardation of patient is mild?
DR. LAGUIDAO: The patient has to undergo psychological test to determine the IQ or intelligence quotient of the patient.
Q: From the basis of the IQ you conducted you can now determine the mental retardation of the patient?
A: The level of the retardation.
Q: And the level is mild?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: Is the mental retardation of the patient manifests (sic)?
A: It was seen during the psychological test however during the activities she was able to function appropriately
regarding her communication and self-care.
Q: So she performs normally?
A: Yes, your honor. [33] (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
[ATTY. ART TEOXON]: Based on your examination this patient [AAA] is duly cognizant of whatever is happening around
her especially the time?
[DR. LAGUIDAO]: Yes, sir.
Q: She was certain based on your questioning her that is happened sometimes (sic) in September 2010?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: When you examined the patient you did not observe any abnormality on her?
A: The way she answered it seems that there is something wrong with the intelligence and the manner she presented.
[34]
 (Underscoring supplied)
By and large, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Niebres was aware of AAA's mental disability
at the time he committed the crime and, thus, he should be convicted of the crime of Simple Rape only.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds it necessary to modify the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA
in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.[35] Accordingly, Niebres is ordered to pay AAA the amount of
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Meanwhile, the awards of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral
damages are affirmed. In addition, the Court imposes, on all monetary awards, interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. [36]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06374 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Rico Niebres y  Reginaldo is
foundGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 266-A (1)
(d) of the Revised Penal Code and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as exemplary
215
damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
103. G.R. No. 222366, December 04, 2017
W LAND HOLDINGS, INC., PETITIONER, V. STARWOOD HOTELS AND RESORTS WORLDWIDE, INC.,
RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 22, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated
January 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 133825 affirming the Decision [4] dated January 10, 2014
of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) - Director General (IPO DG), which, in turn, reversed the Decision [5]dated May 11,
2012 of the IPO Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) in Inter Partes Case No. 14-2009-00143, and accordingly, dismissed
petitioner W Land Holdings, Inc.'s (W Land) petition for cancellation of the trademark "W" registered in the name of
respondent Starwood Hotels and Resorts, Worldwide, Inc. (Starwood).
The Facts
On December 2, 2005, Starwood filed before the IPO an application for registration of the trademark "W" for Classes
43[6] and 44[7] of the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of
Marks[8] (Nice Classification).[9] On February 26, 2007, Starwood's application was granted and thus, the "W" mark was
registered in its name.[10] However, on April 20, 2006, W Land applied[11] for the registration of its own "W" mark for Class
36,[12] which thereby prompted Starwood to oppose the same.[13] In a Decision[14] dated April 23, 2008, the BLA found
merit in Starwood's opposition, and ruled that W Land's "W" mark is confusingly similar with Starwood's mark,[15] which
had an earlier filing date. W Land filed a motion for reconsideration[16] on June 11, 2008, which was denied by the BLA in
a Resolution[17] dated July 23, 2010.
On May 29, 2009, W Land filed a Petition for Cancellation[18] of Starwood's mark for non-use under Section 151.1[19]of
Republic Act No. 8293 or the "Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines" (IP Code),[20] claiming that Starwood has
failed to use its mark in the Philippines because it has no hotel or establishment in the Philippines rendering the services
covered by its registration; and that Starwood's "W" mark application and registration barred its own "'W" mark
application and registration for use on real estate.[21]
In its defense,[22] Starwood denied having abandoned the subject mark on the ground of non-use, asserting that it filed
with the Director of Trademarks a notarized Declaration of Actual Use [23] (DAU)[24] with evidence of use on December 2,
2008,[25] which was not rejected. In this relation, Starwood argued that it conducts hotel and leisure business both directly
and indirectly through subsidiaries and franchisees, and operates interactive websites for its W Hotels in order to
accommodate its potential clients worldwide.[26] According to Starwood, apart from viewing agents, discounts, promotions,
and other marketing fields being offered by it, these interactive websites allow Philippine residents to make reservations
and bookings, which presuppose clear and convincing use of the "W'' mark in the Philippines. [27]
The BLA Ruling
In a Decision[28] dated May 11, 2012, the BLA ruled in W Land's favor, and accordingly ordered the cancellation of
Starwood's registration for the "W" mark. The BLA found that the DAU and the attachments thereto submitted by
Starwood did not prove actual use of the "W" mark in the Philippines, considering that the "evidences of use" attached to
the DAU refer to hotel or establishments that are located abroad.[29] In this regard, the BLA opined that "the use of a
trademark as a business tool and as contemplated under [Section 151.1 (c) of RA 8293] refers to the actual attachment
thereof to goods and services that are sold or availed of and located in the Philippines." [30]
Dissatisfied, Starwood appealed[31] to the IPO DG.
The IPO DG Ruling
In a Decision[32] dated January 10, 2014, the IPO DG granted Starwood's appeal, [33] thereby dismissing W Land's Petition
for Cancellation. Contrary to the BLA's findings, the IPO DG found that Starwood's submission of its DAU and
attachments, coupled by the acceptance thereof by the IPO Bureau of Trademarks, shows that the "W" mark still bears a
"registered" status. Therefore, there is a presumption that Starwood sufficiently complied with the registration
requirements for its mark.[34] The IPO DG likewise held that the absence of any hotel or establishment owned by
Starwood in the Philippines bearing the "W" mark should not be equated to the absence of its use in the country, opining
that Starwood's pieces of evidence, particularly its interactive website, indicate actual use in the Philippines, [35] citing Rule
205[36] of the Trademark Regulations, as amended by IPO Office Order No. 056-13.[37] Finally, the IPO DG stressed that
since Starwood is the undisputed owner of the "W" mark for use in hotel and hotel-related services, any perceived
damage on the part of W Land in this case should be subordinated to the essence of protecting Starwood's intellectual
property rights. To rule otherwise is to undermine the intellectual property system.[38]
Aggrieved, W Land filed a petition for review[39] under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[40] dated June 22, 2015, the CA affirmed the IPO DG ruling. At the onset, the CA observed that the hotel
business is peculiar in nature in that the offer, as well as the acceptance of room reservations or bookings wherever in
the world is an indispensable element. As such, the actual existence or presence of a hotel in one place is not necessary
before it can be considered as doing business therein.[41] In this regard, the CA recognized that the internet has become a
powerful tool in allowing businesses to reach out to consumers in a given market without being physically present
thereat; thus, the IPO DG correctly held that Starwood's interactive websites already indicate its actual use in the
Philippines of the "W" mark.[42] Finally, the CA echoed the IPO DG's finding that since Starwood is the true owner of the
"W" mark - as shown by the fact that Starwood had already applied for the registration of this mark even before W Land
was incorporated - its registration over the same should remain valid, absent any showing that it has abandoned the use
thereof.[43]
Unperturbed, W Land moved for reconsideration,[44] but was denied in a Resolution[45] dated January 7, 2016; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the IPO DG's dismissal of W
Land's Petition for Cancellation of Starwood's "W'' mark.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The IP Code defines a "mark" as "any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services (service
mark) of an enterprise."[46] Case law explains that "[t]rademarks deal with the psychological function of symbols and the
effect of these symbols on the public at large."[47] It is a merchandising short-cut, and, "[w]hatever the means employed,
the aim is the same to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears."[48] Thus, the protection of trademarks as intellectual property is intended not only to preserve the
goodwill and reputation of the business established on the goods or services bearing the mark through actual use over a
period of time, but also to safeguard the public as consumers against confusion on these goods or services. [49] As viewed
by modern authorities on trademark law, trademarks perform three (3) distinct functions: (1) they indicate origin or
ownership of the articles to which they are attached; (2) they guarantee that those articles come up to a certain standard
of quality; and (3) they advertise the articles they symbolize. [50]
In Berris Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Abyadang,[51] this Court explained that "[t]he ownership of a trademark is acquired by its
registration and its actual use by the manufacturer or distributor of the goods made available to the purchasing public. x x
x. A certificate of registration of a mark, once issued, constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of
the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the same in connection with the
goods or services and those that are related thereto specified in the certificate."[52] However, "the prima facie presumption
brought about by the registration of a mark may be challenged and overcome, in an appropriate action, by proof of[,
among others,] non-use of the mark, except when excused."[53]
The actual use of the mark representing the goods or services introduced and transacted in commerce over a period of
time creates that goodwill which the law seeks to protect. For this reason, the IP Code, under Section 124.2, [54]requires
the registrant or owner of a registered mark to declare "actual use of the mark" (DAU) and present evidence of such use
within the prescribed period. Failing in which, the IPO DG may cause the motu propio removal from the register of the
mark's registration.[55] Also, any person, believing that "he or she will be damaged by the registration of a mark," which
216
has not been used within the Philippines, may file a petition for cancellation. [56] Following the basic rule that he who
alleges must prove his case,[57] the burden lies on the petitioner to show damage and non-use.
The IP Code and the Trademark Regulations have not specifically defined "use." However, it is understood that the "use"
which the law requires to maintain the registration of a mark must be genuine, and not merely token. Based on foreign
authorities,[58] genuine use may be characterized as a bona fide use which results or tends to result, in one way or
another, into a commercial interaction or transaction "in the ordinary course of trade."[59]
What specific act or acts would constitute use of the mark sufficient to keep its registration in force may be gleaned from
the Trademark Regulations, Rule 205 of which reads:
RULE 205. Contents of the Declaration and Evidence of Actual Use. — The declaration shall be under oath, must refer to
only one application or registration, must contain the name and address of the applicant or registrant declaring that the
mark is in actual use in the Philippines, list of goods where the mark is attached; list the name or names and the exact
location or locations of the outlet or outlets where the products are being sold or where the services are being rendered,
recite sufficient facts to show that the mark described in the application or registration is being actually used in the
Philippines and, specifying the nature of such use. The declarant shall attach five labels as actually used on the goods or
the picture of the stamped or marked container visibly and legibly showing the mark as well as proof of payment of the
prescribed fee. [As amended by Office Order No. 08 (2000)] (Emphases supplied)
The Trademark Regulations was amended by Office Order No. 056-13. Particularly, Rule 205 now mentions certain
items which "shall be accepted as proof of actual use of the mark:"
RULE 205. Contents of the Declaration and Evidence of Actual Use.—
(a) The declaration shall be under oath and filed by the applicant or registrant (or the authorized officer in case of a
juridical entity) or the attorney or authorized representative of the applicant or registrant. The declaration must refer to
only one application or registration, shall contain the name and address of the applicant or registrant declaring that the
mark is in actual use in the Philippines, the list of goods or services where the mark is used, the name/s of the
establishment and address where the products are being sold or where the services are being rendered. If the goods or
services are available only by online purchase, the website must be indicated on the form in lieu of name or address of
the establishment or outlet. The applicant or registrant may include other facts to show that the mark described in the
application or registration is actually being used in the Philippines. The date of first use shall not be required.
(b) Actual use for some of the goods and services in the same class shall constitute use for the entire class of goods and
services. Actual use for one class shall be considered use for related classes. In the event that some classes are not
covered in the declaration, a subsequent declaration of actual use may be filed for the other classes of goods or services
not included in the first declaration, provided that the subsequent declaration is filed within the three year period or the
extension period, in case an extension of time to file the declaration was timely made. In the event that no subsequent
declaration of actual use for the other classes of goods and services is filed within the prescribed period, the classes
shall be automatically dropped from the application or registration without need of notice to the applicant or registrant.
(c) The following shall be accepted as proof of actual use of the mark: (1) labels of the mark as these are used;
(2) downloaded pages from the website of the applicant or registrant clearly showing that the goods are being sold or the
services are being rendered in the Philippines; (3) photographs (including digital photographs printed on ordinary paper)
of goods bearing the marks as these are actually used or of the stamped or marked container of goods and of the
establishment/s where the services are being rendered; (4) brochures or advertising materials showing the actual use of
the mark on the goods being sold or services being rendered in the Philippines; (5) for online sale, receipts of sale of the
goods or services rendered or other similar evidence of use, showing that the goods are placed on the market or the
services are available in the Philippines or that the transaction took place in the Philippines; (6) copies of contracts for
services showing the use of the mark. Computer printouts of the drawing or reproduction of marks will not be accepted as
evidence of use.
(d) The Director may, from time to time, issue a list of acceptable evidence of use and those that will not be accepted by
the Office. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Office Order No. 056-13 was issued by the IPO DG on April 5, 2013, pursuant to his delegated rule-making authority
under Section 7 of the IP Code.[60] The rationale for this issuance, per its whereas clauses, is to further "the policy of the
[IPO] to streamline administrative procedures in registering trademarks" and in so doing, address the need "to clarify
what will be accepted as proof of use." In this regard, the parameters and list of evidence introduced under the amended
Trademark Regulations are thus mere administrative guidelines which are only meant to flesh out the types of acceptable
evidence necessary to prove what the law already provides, i.e., the requirement of actual use. As such, contrary to W
Land's postulation,[61] the same does not diminish or modify any substantive right and hence, may be properly applied to
"all pending and registered marks,"[62] as in Starwood's "W" mark for hotel / hotel reservation services being rendered or,
at the very least, made available in the Philippines.
Based on the amended Trademark Regulations, it is apparent that the IPO has now given due regard to the advent of
commerce on the internet. Specifically, it now recognizes, among others, "downloaded pages from the website of the
applicant or registrant clearly showing that the goods are being sold or the services are being rendered in the
Philippines," as well as "for online sale, receipts of sale of the goods or services rendered or other similar evidence of
use, showing that the goods are placed on the market or the services are available in the Philippines or that the
transaction took place in the Philippines,"[63] as acceptable proof of actual use. Truly, the Court discerns that these
amendments are but an inevitable reflection of the realities of the times. In Mirpuri v. CA,[64] this Court noted that
"[a]dvertising on the Net and cybershopping are turning the Internet into a commercial marketplace:" [65]
The Internet is a decentralized computer network linked together through routers and communications protocols that
enable anyone connected to it to communicate with others likewise connected, regardless of physical location. Users of
the Internet have a wide variety of communication methods available to them and a tremendous wealth of information
that they may access. The growing popularity of the Net has been driven in large part by the World Wide Web,  i.e., a
system that facilitates use of the Net by sorting through the great mass of information available on it. Advertising on the
Net and cybershopping are turning the Internet into a commercial marketplace.[66](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as modes of advertising and acquisition have now permeated into virtual zones over cyberspace, the concept of
commercial goodwill has indeed evolved:
In the last half century, the unparalleled growth of industry and the rapid development of communications technology
have enabled trademarks, tradenames and other distinctive signs of a product to penetrate regions where the owner
does not actually manufacture or sell the product itself. Goodwill is no longer confined to the territory of actual market
penetration; it extends to zones where the marked article has been fixed in the public mind through advertising. Whether
in the print, broadcast or electronic communications medium, particularly on the Internet, advertising has paved the way
for growth and expansion of the product by creating and earning a reputation that crosses over borders, virtually turning
the whole world into one vast marketplace.[67](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Cognizant of this current state of affairs, the Court therefore agrees with the IPO DG, as affirmed by the CA, that the use
of a registered mark representing the owner's goods or services by means of an interactive website may constitute proof
of actual use that is sufficient to maintain the registration of the same. Since the internet has turned the world into one
vast marketplace, the owner of a registered mark is clearly entitled to generate and further strengthen his commercial
goodwill by actively marketing and commercially transacting his wares or services throughout multiple platforms on the
internet. The facilities and avenues present in the internet are, in fact, more prominent nowadays as they conveniently
cater to the modern-day consumer who desires to procure goods or services at any place and at any time, through the
simple click of a mouse, or the tap of a screen. Multitudinous commercial transactions are accessed, brokered, and
consummated everyday over websites. These websites carry the mark which represents the goods or services sought to
be transacted. For the owner, he intentionally exhibits his mark to attract the customers' interest in his goods or services.
The mark displayed over the website no less serves its functions of indicating the goods or services' origin and
symbolizing the owner's goodwill than a mark displayed in the physical market. Therefore, there is no less premium to
recognize actual use of marks through websites than their actual use through traditional means. Indeed, as our world
evolves, so too should our appreciation of the law. Legal interpretation - as it largely affects the lives of people in the here
and now - never happens in a vacuum. As such, it should not be stagnant but dynamic; it should not be ensnared in the
obsolete but rather, sensitive to surrounding social realities.
217
It must be emphasized, however, that the mere exhibition of goods or services over the internet, without more, is not
enough to constitute actual use. To reiterate, the "use" contemplated by law is genuine use - that is, a bona fide kind of
use tending towards a commercial transaction in the ordinary course of trade. Since the internet creates a borderless
marketplace, it must be shown that the owner has actually transacted, or at the very least, intentionally targeted
customers of a particular jurisdiction in order to be considered as having used the trade mark in the ordinary course of his
trade in that country. A showing of an actual commercial link to the country is therefore imperative. Otherwise, an
unscrupulous registrant would be able to maintain his mark by the mere expedient of setting up a website, or by posting
his goods or services on another's site, although no commercial activity is intended to be pursued in the Philippines. This
type of token use renders inutile the commercial purpose of the mark, and hence, negates the reason to keep its
registration active. As the IP Code expressly requires, the use of the mark must be "within the Philippines." This is
embedded in Section 151 of the IP Code on cancellation, which reads:
SECTION 151. Cancellation. — 151.1. A petition to cancel a registration of a mark under this
Act may be filed with the Bureau of Legal Affairs by any person who believes that he is
or will be damaged by the registration of a mark under this Act as follows:
(a) Within five (5) years from the date of the registration of the mark under this Act.
(b) At any time, if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for
which it is registered, or has been abandoned, or its registration was obtained fraudulently or contrary to the
provisions of this Act, or if the registered mark is being used by, or with the permission of, the registrant so as to
misrepresent the source of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used. If the
registered mark becomes the generic name for less than all of the goods or services for which it is registered, a
petition to cancel the registration for only those goods or services may be filed. A registered mark shall not be
deemed to be the generic name of goods or services solely because such mark is also used as a name of or to
identify a unique product or service. The primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather
than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic
name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been used.
(c) At any time, if the registered owner of the mark without legitimate reason fails to use the mark within the
Philippines, or to cause it to be used in the Philippines by virtue of a license during an uninterrupted period of
three (3) years or longer. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The hotel industry is no stranger to the developments and advances in technology. Like most businesses nowadays,
hotels are utilizing the internet to drive almost every aspect of their operations, most especially the offering and accepting
of room reservations or bookings, regardless of the client or customer base. The CA explained this booking process in
that the "business transactions commence with the placing of room reservations, usually by or through a travel agent who
acts for or in behalf of his principal, the hotel establishment. [The] reservation is first communicated to the reservations
and booking assistant tasked to handle the transaction. After the reservation is made, the specific room reserved for the
guest will be blocked and will not be offered to another guest. As such, on the specified date of arrival, the room reserved
will be available to the guest."[68]
In this accord, a hotel's website has now become an integral element of a hotel business. Especially with the uptrend of
international travel and tourism, the hotel's website is now recognized as an efficient and necessary tool in advertising
and promoting its brand in almost every part of the world. More so, interactive websites that allow customers or clients to
instantaneously book and pay for, in advance, accommodations and other services of a hotel anywhere in the world,
regardless of the hotel's actual location, dispense with the need for travel agents or hotel employees to transact the
reservations for them. In effect, the hotel's website acts as a bridge or portal through which the hotel reaches out and
provides its services to the client/customer anywhere in the world, with the booking transaction completed at the
client/customer's own convenience. It is in this sense that the CA noted that the "actual existence or presence of a hotel
in one place is not necessary before it can be considered as doing business therein."[69]
As earlier intimated, mere use of a mark on a website which can be accessed anywhere in the world will not
automatically mean that the mark has been used in the ordinary course of trade of a particular country. Thus, the use of
mark on the internet must be shown to result into a within-State sale, or at the very least, discernibly intended to target
customers that reside in that country. This being so, the use of the mark on an interactive website, for instance, may be
said to target local customers when they contain specific details regarding or pertaining to the target State, sufficiently
showing an intent towards realizing a within-State commercial activity or interaction. These details may constitute a local
contact phone number, specific reference being available to local customers, a specific local webpage, whether domestic
language and currency is used on the website, and/or whether domestic payment methods are accepted. [70] Notably, this
paradigm of ascertaining local details to evince within-state commercial intent is subscribed to by a number of
jurisdictions, namely, the European Union, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, Germany, France, Russia,
and the United Kingdom.[71] As for the U.S. - where most of our intellectual property laws have been patterned[72] - there
have been no decisions to date coming from its Trademark Trial and Appeal Board involving cases challenging the
validity of mark registrations through a cancellation action based on the mark's internet use. However, in  International
Bancorp LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco,[73] it was ruled that mere advertising in
the U.S. combined with rendering of services to American customers in a foreign country constituted "use" for the
purpose of establishing trademark rights in the U.S.
In this case, Starwood has proven that it owns Philippine registered domain names,
[74]
 i.e., www.whotels.ph, www.wreservations.ph, www.whotel.ph, www.wreservation.ph, for its website that showcase its
mark. The website is readily accessible to Philippine citizens and residents, where they can avail and book amenities and
other services in any of Starwood's W Hotels worldwide. Its website also readily provides a phone number [75] for
Philippine consumers to call for information or other concerns. The website further uses the English language [76] -
considered as an official language in this country[77] - which the relevant market in the Philippines understands and often
uses in the daily conduct of affairs. In addition, the prices for its hotel accommodations and/or services can be converted
into the local currency or the Philippine Peso.[78] Amidst all of these features, Starwood's "W" mark is prominently
displayed in the website through which consumers in the Philippines can instantaneously book and pay for their
accommodations, with immediate confirmation, in any of its W Hotels. Furthermore, it has presented data showing a
considerably growing number of internet users in the Philippines visiting its website since 2003, which is enough to
conclude that Starwood has established commercially-motivated relationships with Philippine consumers.[79]
Taken together, these facts and circumstances show that Starwood's use of its "W" mark through its interactive website
is intended to produce a discernable commercial effect or activity within the Philippines, or at the very least, seeks to
establish commercial interaction with local consumers. Accordingly, Starwood's use of the "W" mark in its reservation
services through its website constitutes use of the mark sufficient to keep its registration in force.
To be sure, Starwood's "W" mark is registered for Classes 43, i.e., for hotel, motel, resort and motor inn services, hotel
reservation services, restaurant, bar and catering services, food and beverage preparation services, cafe and cafeteria
services, provision of conference, meeting and social function facilities, under the Nice Classification. [80] Under Section
152.3 of the IP Code, "[t]he use of a mark in connection with one or more of the goods or services belonging to the class
in respect of which the mark is registered shall prevent its cancellation or removal in respect of all other goods or
services of the same class." Thus, Starwood's use of the "W" mark for reservation services through its website
constitutes use of the mark which is already sufficient to protect its registration under the entire subject classification from
non-use cancellation. This, notwithstanding the absence of a Starwood hotel or establishment in the Philippines.
Finally, it deserves pointing out that Starwood submitted in 2008 its DAU with evidence of use which the IPO, through its
Director of Trademarks and later by the IPO DG in the January 10, 2014 Decision, had accepted and recognized as
valid. The Court finds no reason to disturb this recognition. According to jurisprudence, administrative agencies, such as
the IPO, by means of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling within their jurisdiction are in a better
position to pass judgment on this issue.[81] Thus, their findings are generally accorded respect and finality, as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence. In this case, there is no compelling basis to reverse the IPO DG's findings - to
keep Starwood's registration for the "W" mark in force - as they are well supported by the facts and the law and thus,
deserve respect from this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 22, 2015 and the Resolution dated January 7, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133825 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
104. G.R. No. 217426, December 04, 2017
218
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC., PETITIONER, V. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated July 11, 2014 and the Resolution[3] dated
February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451, which affirmed with modification the
Decision[4] dated December 15, 2011 and the Order dated May 25, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 211 (RTC) in SCA Case No. MC11-879 (Civil Case No. 21881), and thereby ordered herein petitioner St. Martin
Polyclinic, Inc. (petitioner) to pay respondent LWV Construction Corporation (respondent) temperate damages in the
amount of P50,000.00.
The Facts
Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia.[5] On the other
hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved Medical Centers Association
(GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment.
[6]
On January 10, 2008, respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to petitioner for a
pre-deployment medical examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. [7] After undergoing the required
examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by a Medical Report[8] dated
January 11, 2008 (Medical Report).[9]
Based on the foregoing, respondent deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly incurring expenses in the amount of
P84,373.41.[10] Unfortunately, when Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary
of Saudi Arabia (General Care Dispensary) on March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C
virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of Raguindin,
which the General Care Dispensary conducted on April 28, 2008.[11] However, the results of the re-examination remained
the same, i.e., Raguindin was positive for HCV, which results were reflected in a Certification [12] dated April 28, 2008
(Certification). An undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report[13] likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such
finding, thereby leading to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.[14]
Claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that Raguindin is "fit for employment" when a
subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia revealed that he was positive for HCV, respondent filed a Complaint [15] for sum of
money and damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60 (MeTC).
Respondent essentially averred that it relied on petitioner's declaration and incurred expenses as a consequence. Thus,
respondent prayed for the award of damages in the amount of P84,373.41 representing the expenses it incurred in
deploying Raguindin abroad.[16]
In its Answer with compulsory counterclaim,[17] petitioner denied liability and claimed that: first, respondent was not a
proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract between them; second, the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case
as it involves the interpretation and implementation of a contract of employment; third, the action is premature as
Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-employment medical examination following his repatriation; and fourth, the
complaint failed to state a cause of action as the Medical Report issued by petitioner had already expired on April 11,
2008, or three (3) months after its issuance on January 11, 2008.[18]
The MeTC Ruling
In a Decision[19] dated December 17, 2010, the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to
pay the amount of P84,373.41 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. [20]
At the onset, the MeTC held that it had jurisdiction over the case, since respondent was claiming actual damages
incurred in the deployment of Raguindin in the amount of P84,373.41.[21] It further ruled that respondent was a real party
in interest, as it would not have incurred expenses had petitioner not issued the Medical Report certifying that Raguindin
was fit to work.
On the merits, the MeTC found that respondent was entitled to be informed accurately of the precise condition of
Raguindin before deploying the latter abroad and consequently, had sustained damage as a result of the erroneous
certification.[22] In this relation, it rejected petitioner's contention that Raguindin may have contracted the disease after his
medical examination in the Philippines up to the time of his deployment, there being no evidence offered to corroborate
the same.[23]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the RTC, contending,[24] among others, that respondent failed to comply with the
requirements on the authentication and proof of documents under Section 24,[25] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
considering that respondent's evidence, particularly the April 28, 2008 Certification issued by the General Care
Dispensary and the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health, are foreign documents issued in
Saudi Arabia.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[26] dated December 15, 2011, the RTC dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the MeTC Decision in its
entirety.[27] Additionally, the RTC pointed out that petitioner can no longer change the theory of the case or raise new
issues on appeal, referring to the latter's argument on the authentication of respondent's documentary evidence.[28]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration[29] was denied in an Order[30] dated May 25, 2012. Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated
the case to the CA.[31]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[32] dated July 11, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with the modification deleting the award of actual
damages and instead, awarding temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00.[33]
The CA held that petitioner failed to perform its duty to accurately diagnose Raguindin when it issued its Medical Report
declaring the latter "fit for employment", considering that he was subsequently found positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia.
[34]
 Further, the CA opined that the Certification issued by the General Care Dispensary is not a public document and in
such regard, rejected petitioner's argument that the same is inadmissible in evidence for not having been authenticated.
Moreover, it remarked that petitioner's own Medical Report does not enjoy the presumption of regularity as petitioner is
merely an accredited clinic.[35] Finally, the CA ruled that petitioner could not disclaim liability on the ground that Raguindin
tested positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia after the expiration of the Medical Report on April 11, 2008, noting that the
General Care Dispensary issued its Certification on April 28, 2008, or a mere seventeen (17) days from the expiration of
petitioner's Medical Report.[36] Hence, the CA concluded that "it is contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed
overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would immediately contract a serious virus at the very beginning of a
deployment."[37]
However, as the records are bereft of evidence to show that respondent actually incurred the amount of P84,373.41 as
expenses for Raguindin's deployment, the CA deleted the award of actual damages and instead, awarded temperate
damages in the amount of P50,000.00.[38]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration,[39] which the CA denied in a Resolution[40] dated February
27, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical
Report declaring Raguindin "fit for employment" and hence, should be held liable for damages.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is granted.
I.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done acting on a petition for
review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions of law.[41] Thus, in petitions for
review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be put into issue. This rule, however, admits of certain
exceptions, such as "when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible"; or "when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based."[42] Finding a confluence of certain exceptions
in this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court would not apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw
conclusions therefrom.[43]
II.
An action for damages due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis of Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which defines a quasi-delict:
219
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault or negligence in the performance or
non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a causal connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-
existing contractual relation.[44]
As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Article 2176 gives rise to a cause of action under
quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a claim of damages.[45] Notably, quasi-delict is one among several sources of
obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code states:
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts; 
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts.
However, as explained by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) in his opinion in Alano v. Magud-
Logmao[46] (Alano), "Article 2176 is not an all-encompassing enumeration of all actionable wrongs which can give rise to
the liability for damages. Under the Civil Code, acts done in violation of Articles 19, 20, and 21 will also give rise to
damages."[47] These provisions - which were cited as bases by the MTC, RTC and CA in their respective rulings in this
case - read as follows:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
"[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties." [48]Case law
states that "[w]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social
order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would [then] be proper."[49] Between these two provisions as worded, it is Article 20 which applies to both willful and
negligent acts that are done contrary to law. On the other hand, Article 21 applies only to willful acts done contra bonos
mores.[50]
In the Alano case, Justice Leonen aptly elaborated on the distinctive applications of Articles 19, 20 and 21, which are
general provisions on human relations, vis-a-vis Article 2176, which particularly governs quasi-delicts:
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an actionable
tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with
Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows recovery should the act have been willful or
negligent. Willful may refer to the intention to do the act and the desire to achieve the outcome which is considered by
the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a situation where the act was consciously done but without
intending the result which the plaintiff considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by law.
This article requires that the act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the
outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve around whether such outcome should be considered a legal under the same medical state at the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on January 11, 2008. In this regard, it was
injury on the part of the plaintiff or whether the commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of care therefore incumbent upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was
required in Article 19. issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not carefully observed or that there
were already palpable signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case
when respondent only proffered evidence which demonstrate that months after petitioner's Medical Report was issued,
Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens through an act or omission of the defendant. When it involves a
Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for
positive act, the intention to commit the outcome is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a breach of an existing law or a
employment".
pre-existing contractual obligation. What will be considered is whether there is "fault or negligence” attending the
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the HCV only after his medical examination
commission of the act which necessarily leads to the outcome considered as injurious by the plaintiff. The required
with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based on published reports from the World Health Organization, HCV or the
degree of diligence will then be assessed in relation to the circumstances of each and every case. [51] (Emphases and
hepatitis C virus causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV infection is usually asymptomatic,[63] and is only
underscoring supplied)
very rarely associated with life-threatening diseases. The incubation period[64] for HCV is two (2) weeks to six (6) months,
Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore be discerned that Article 20 of the Civil Code
and following initial infection, approximately 80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms.[65] Indisputably, Raguindin was
concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an injury", whereas Article 2176 applies when the negligent act causing
not deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after petitioner's medical examination and hence, could have possibly
damage to another does not constitute "a breach of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation."
contracted the same only when he arrived thereat. In light of the foregoing, the CA therefore erred in holding that "[h]ad
In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of
petitioner more thoroughly and diligently examined Raguindin, it would likely have discovered the existence of the HCV
the Civil Code. This is because respondent did not proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which
because it was contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin, would
damages may be recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its amended complaint, respondent mainly avers
immediately have contracted the disease at the beginning of his deployment"[66]
that had petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical Report to Raguindin, respondent would not have processed
While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an expiration of April 11, 2008, the Court finds it fitting to clarify that the same
his documents, deployed him to Saudi Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent findings that Raguindin was
could not be construed as a certified guarantee coming from petitioner that Raguindin's medical status at the time the
positive for HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered actual damages in the amount of P84,373.41. [52]Thus, as the claimed
report was issued on January 11, 2008 (i.e., that he was fit for employment) would remain the same up until that date
negligent act of petitioner was not premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no
(i.e., April 11, 2008). As earlier intimated, the intervening period could very well account for a number of variables that
pre-existing contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21
could have led to a change in Raguindin's condition, such as his deployment to a different environment in Saudi Arabia. If
- of the Civil Code should govern.
at all, the expiration date only means that the Medical Report is valid - and as such, could be submitted - as a formal
III.
requirement for overseas employment up until April 11, 2008; it does not, by any means, create legal basis to hold the
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
issuer accountable for any intervening change of condition from the time of issuance up until expiration. Truly, petitioner
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. [53]
could not be reasonably expected to predict, much less assure, that Raguindin's medical status of being fit for
As early as the case of Picart v. Smith,[54] the Court elucidated that "the test by which to determine the existence of
employment would remain unchanged. Thus, the fact that the Medical Report's expiration date of April 11, 2008 was only
negligence in a particular case is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
seventeen (17) days away from the issuance of the General Care Dispensary's April 28, 2008 Certification finding
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
Raguindin positive for HCV should not - as it does not - establish petitioner's negligence.
negligence."[55] Corollary thereto, the Court stated that "[t]he question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
IV.
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been properly established since the courts a
facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value x x x: Reasonable men govern
their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
quo, in the first place, erred in admitting and giving probative weight to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary,
which was written in an unofficial language. Section 33, Rule 132 ofthe Rules of Court states that:
omniscient of the future. Hence[,] they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. - Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be
suggest or warn of danger."[56]
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of
Under our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private
proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial.[67]
transactions have been fair and regular.[57] In effect, negligence cannot be presumed, and thus, must be proven by him
A cursory examination of the subject document would reveal that while it contains English words, the majority of it is in an
who alleges it.[58] In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.:[59]
unofficial language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino provided by respondent, the same should not have been
[T]he negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon [the
admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not be given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts
plaintiff]. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
stated therein.
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." It
is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the
plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not proven in accordance with Section 20,
of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
required is preponderance of evidence.[60] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by respondent to establish petitioner's
negligence are: (a) the Certification[61] dated April 28, 2008; and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test Report.[62] However, these Section 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is
issuances only indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own medical examination of received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
Raguindin finding him to be positive for HCV. Notably, the examination conducted by the General Care Dispensary, (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
which was later affirmed by the Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at least two (2) months
after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11, 2008. Hence, even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
HCV was correct, the fact that he later tested positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already

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 (c) Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall within the classes of public documents under
Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court[68] - and hence, must be considered as private. It has been settled that
an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value.[69] In addition, case law states that
"since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be
given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. It is precluded
because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to
whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the
other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the
author of the medical certificate renders its contents suspect and of no probative value,"[70] as in this case.
Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia should have also been
excluded as evidence. Although the same may be considered a public document, being an alleged written official act of
an official body of a foreign country,[71] the same was not duly authenticated in accordance with Section 24,[72]Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court. While respondent provided a translation[73] thereof from the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos,
Bureau of External Relations, Office of the President, the same was not accompanied by a certificate of the secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in Saudi Arabia, where the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. [74]
To be sure, petitioner - contrary to respondent's contention[75] - has not changed its theory of the case by questioning the
foregoing documents. As petitioner correctly argued, it merely amplified its defense[76] that it is not liable for negligence
when it further questioned the validity of the issuances of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health.
In Limpangco Sons v. Yangco[77], the Court explained that "[t]here is a difference x x x between a change in the theory of
the case and a shifting of the incidence of the emphasis placed during the trial or in the briefs." "Where x x x the theory of
the case as set out in the pleadings remains the theory throughout the progress of the cause, the change of emphasis
from one phase of the case as presented by one set of facts to another phase made prominent by another set of facts x x
x does not result in a change of theory x x x".[78] In any case, petitioner had already questioned the validity of these
documents in its Position Paper[79] before the MeTC.[80] Hence, there is no change of theory that would preclude
petitioner's arguments on this score.
All told, there being no negligence proven by respondent through credible and admissible evidence, petitioner cannot be
held liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as above-discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 11, 2014 and the Resolution dated
February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW
ONE is entered, DISMISSING the complaint of respondent LWV Construction Corporation for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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