1
CANON 9 papers from the office were signed not with the
G.R. No. 3593  March 23, 1907
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff, vs. C.W. NEY
and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta for plaintiff.
C.W. Ney for defendants.
TRACEY, J.:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for
contempt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
In the year 1902 this court decided that the
defendant, J. Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to
admission to practice law in the Philippine
Islands, upon the ground that after the change
of sovereignty he had elected to remain a
Spanish subject and as such was not qualified
for admission to the bar ( In re Bosque, 1 Phil.
Rep., 88), and an order was entered
accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob
les virtual law library
In the year 1904 he made an arrangement with
the defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to
carry on business together, sending out a
circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that
they had established an office for the general
practice of law in all the courts of the Islands
and that Bosque would devote himself
especially to consultation and office work
relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed
"Law Office - Ney & Bosque. Juan G.
Bosque, jurisconsulto español - C.W.
Ney, abogado americano."chanrobles virtual
law library
Since that time the defendant Bosque has not
personally appeared in the courts, and with one
exception, occuring through an inadvertance,
one of agency. ( In re Cooper, 22 N.Y., 67.) We
firm name alone nor with any designation of the
firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney &
Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado."chanrobles virtual
law library
On two occasions, one on May 1, 1905, and the
other on September 15, 1906, this court refused
to consider petitions so singed with the names
of the defendants and the practice being
repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906,
ordered the papers sent to the Attorney-General
to take appropriate action thereon, and he
thereupon instituted this
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
The defendants disclaim any intentional
contempt, and defend their acts as being within
the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure,
providing that every pleading must be
subscribed by the party or his attorney, does
not permit, and by implication prohibits, a
subscription of the names of any other persons,
whether agents or otherwise; therefore a
signature containing the name of one neither a
party nor an attorney was not a compliance
with this section, nor was it aided by the too
obvious subterfuge of the addition of the
individual name of a licensed attorney. The
illegality in this instance was aggravated by the
fact that one of the agents so named was a
person residing in these Islands to whom this
court had expressly denied admission to the
bar. The papers in question were irregular and
were properly rejected. We refuse to recognize
as a practice any signature of names appended
to pleadings or other papers in an action other
than those specified in the statute. A signature
by agents amounts to a signing by non-qualified
attorneys, the office of attorney being originally
do not, however, mean to discountenance the
use of a suitable firm designation by partners,
all of whom have been duly admitted to
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
It is to be noted that we are not now
considering an application for the suspension or
removal of the defendant Ney from his office as
attorney. The defendant Bosque, not being an
officer of the court, could not be proceeded
against in that way, and probably for that
reason the Attorney-General instituted this form
of
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
Should either of these defendants be thus
punished for contempt?chanrobles virtual law
library
Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure
describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or command of
a court, or injunction granted by a court or
judge;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions.
Where the law defines contempt, the power of
the courts is restricted to punishment for acts
so defined. ( Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S.,
505.)chanrobles virtual law library
As to the first subdivision of this section, no
direct order or command of this court has been
disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney.
The only order that the defendant Bosque can
have disobeyed is the one denying him the right
to practice law. This order, however, was

directly binding upon him, notwithstanding
proceedings taken for its review, and any hope
on his part of ultimately reversing it furnished
no excuse for its violation. Even had he been
entitled under the statute to practice law
without any license from the court and without
an application to it, yet its order made on his
own petition. A mandate of the court, while in
force, must be obeyed. The irregular signature
to papers, though affixed by his associate, had
his authorization and constitutes a substantial
attempt to engage in practice. Moreover the
firm circular in setting forth the establishment
of an office for the general practice of law in all
the courts of the Islands, amounted to an
assertion of his right and purpose, not
effectively qualified by the addition that he
would devote himself to consultation and office
work relating to Spanish law. Spanish law plays
an important part in the equipment of a lawyer
in the Archipelago, standing on a different
footing from the law of other foreign countries,
in regard to which a skilled person might as a
calling, advise without practicing law. The fact
stated on the circular that he was a Spanish
lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his
professional character in the Islands.
Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner
is not by reason of his status disqualified from
practicing law. One of the most eminent
American advocates was an alien barrister
admitted to the bar after a contest in the court
of New York State. ( In re Thomas Addis
Emmett, 2 Cain's Cases, 386.) Consequently the
conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to
disobedience of an order made in a proceeding
to which he was a affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December
party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Under the second subdivision of the section
cited, Bosque is obviously not answerable,
inasmuch as he was not an officer of the court.
On the other hand, under this subdivision, the
defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is
liable if his conduct amounted to misbehavior.
We are of the opinion that it did. In the offense
of Bosque in holding himself out as a general
practitioner Ney participated, and for the
improper signature of the pleadings he was
chiefly and personally responsible. It is
impossible to say that the signature itself was a
violation of the law, and yet hold guiltless the
man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover we
regret to add that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court has not
commended him to our indulgence, while the
offensive character of certain papers recently
filed by him forbids us from presuming on the
hope of his voluntarily conforming to the
customary standard of members of the
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The judgment of the court is that each of the
defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to
be paid into the office of the clerk of this court
within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J.
RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY.
JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a
Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay)
2
and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees
of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against
Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and
Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation
of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism,
Falsification of Public Document, Gross
Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia
received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring
them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint
for usurpation of authority, falsification of
public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias
Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee
in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office based in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally
chanced upon each other, the latter informed
Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia since he had yet to meet
Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed
him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that
the signature appearing above his name as
counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus,
Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an
2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying
his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman and submitted six specimen
signatures for comparison. Using Atty.
Bancolo’s affidavit and other documentary
evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-

affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the
signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office
of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the
counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question
to the Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of
the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases
for Falsification of Public Document 2 and
Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-
Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he
falsified the signature of his former lawyer,
Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as
evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by
Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty.
Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the
Complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary
per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia
asked that the Office of the Ombudsman
dismiss the cases for falsification of public
document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the
original Complaint for various offenses that he
filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the
Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
criminal case for falsification of public
document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for
insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence,
without prejudice to the re-filing by
Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for
violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-
A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
a complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected
to a harassment Complaint filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman with the forged
signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated
further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in
the Complaint was not the only one that was
forged. Complainants attached a Report6 dated
1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three
other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo
for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. The report concluded that the
questioned signatures in the letter-complaints
and the submitted standard signatures of Atty.
Bancolo were not written by one and the same
person. Thus, complainants maintained that not
only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they
were also involved in falsification of documents
used to harass and persecute innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a
Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due
to Additional Information. They alleged that a
certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the
signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the
disbarment complaint, respondents admitted
that the criminal and administrative cases filed
by Divinagracia against complainants before
the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
3
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged
that after being informed of the assignment of
the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and
draft all the necessary pleadings and
documents. However, due to some minor
lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his
name by the secretary of the law office.
Respondents added that complainants filed the
disbarment complaint to retaliate against them
since the cases filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary
evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary
Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of
their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer
dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties
were directed by the Commission on Bar
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference
scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was
reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents
failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25
September 2006 for the last time. Again,
respondents failed to appear despite receiving
notice of the conference. Complainants
manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents
submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also
deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference.
Further, both parties were directed to submit
their respective position papers. On 27 October
2006, the IBP received complainants’ position
paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’
position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing,
the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,

submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found
that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo
be suspended for two years from the practice of
law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
failure to exercise certain responsibilities in
their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the
Investigating Commissioner opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing
in the complaint filed against complainants’
Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He
did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released
from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly
breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member
to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that
respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse
for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed
of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court
has ruled that this practice constitute
negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign
of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover,
respondents ignored the notices sent by
undersigned. That showed patent lack of
respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
Commission on Bar Discipline and its
proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a
senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo
and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise
certain responsibilities over matters under the
charge of his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he
failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a
seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in
1995 and practicing law up to the present. He
holds himself out to the public as a law firm
designated as Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to
exert ordinary diligence to find out what is
going on in his law firm, to ensure that all
lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code
of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is
his responsibility to provide efficacious control
of court pleadings and other documents that
carry the name of the law firm. Had he done
that, he could have known the unethical
practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed
to perform this task and is administratively
liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-
2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent Atty.
Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
4
Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against
Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to
AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL
of the case for lack of merit.8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed
his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22
December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed
his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to
Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and
Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29
January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June
2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner and affirmed
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19
September 2007.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the
case, we agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board and find
reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he
filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a
violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 delegate the signing of a pleading to another
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of
Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very
least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice
of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law
be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct.
The purpose is to protect the public, the court,
the client, and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice
law and not subject to the disciplinary control
of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see
that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons
and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to
be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development
Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and
signing of a pleading constitute legal work
involving the practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for members of the legal profession.
Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a
pleading are personal to him. Although he may
lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s
signature serves as a certification that (1) he
has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good
ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed
for delay.11 Thus, by affixing one’s signature to
a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the
responsibility to certify to these matters and
give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22
December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to
believe that he was a victim of circumstances or
of manipulated events because of his
unconditional trust and confidence in his former
law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty.
Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the
situation, save for the affidavit he gave to
Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty.
Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint
Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January
2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that
prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer,
Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case
against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he
was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare
the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed
the verification without seeing the contents of
the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically
stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against
Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty.
Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix
his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for
disciplinary action.
5
The complainants did not present any evidence
that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing
or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for
him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively
liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty.
Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of
the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint
against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo
administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year effective upon
finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in
this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of
this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,

Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a
sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a
real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court
of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a
contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing
units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on
December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter
to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of
the termination of his contract with the
company. He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from
and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me
and your company, as represented by your
Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch office here in Cagayan
de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by
the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting
in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests. He then proceeded to expound in
considerable detail and quite acerbic language
on the "grounds which could evidence the bad
faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with
the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the
mutual rescission of our contract, even as I
inform you that I categorically state on record
that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I
do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against
my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled
by your sales agent, hence the need to annul
the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-
President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing
it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee,
the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been
typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya
also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for
cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary
deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month.
Among other things, he said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am
terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind
and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered
into between me and the E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said
contract and unlawfully secured and pursued
6
the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that
there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed
the real facts from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he
narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga
of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for
the same reasons already cited, he insisted on
the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on
account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18,
1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the
Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to
stop deductions from his salary in relation to
the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly
duped into entering into the contracts by "the
scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC
wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996." and began negotiating
with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . .
(Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . .
(his) payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co.
of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January
25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of
the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage -

PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya
of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges
with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her
honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of
free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which
only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as
"unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator,
etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth
(sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible,
"all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She
closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined
(sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment
on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from
the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution  in this case was signed
by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant
Division Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary
Comment"3 in which he questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div.
Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk
of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and
voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the
result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and
Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that
the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was
envious of him for being not only "the Executive
Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff
and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a
Royal Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but
this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former
to give him a copy of the complaint in order that
he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his
acts as clerk of court were done in good faith
and within the confines of the law; and that
Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co.
had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his
salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under
date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and
untold financial suffering," considering that in
six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.7 He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied
any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that
he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free
Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the
comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use
7
of the money he had given for postage, and if
those letters were indeed mixed with the official
mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest
mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney,"
by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title
to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging
that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was
manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a
classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign
a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she
would show the completed document to him
later for correction, but she had since avoided
him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
he still does not know where the property —
subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's
principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from
his wife, and although she promised to return it
the next day, she did not do so until after
several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa &
Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the
down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the
key of the house, salary deduction, none of
which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were
done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it
consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless

allegations." and complainant Alawi having
come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being
apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two
(2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and
his two (2) earlier letters both dated December
15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5,
1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his
aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to
(her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts
in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . .
illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to .
. (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and
"swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co.,
and unlawfully secured and pursued the
housing loan without . . (his) authority and
against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real
facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making
these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering, considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4
of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees . . at all times respect the rights
of others, and . . refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest." 17 More than once has this
Court emphasized that "the conduct and
behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in the administration of justice,
from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at
all times be characterized by, among others,
strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and
keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent
with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to
couch denunciations of acts believed —
however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent
or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is
evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he
8
exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication
of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a
member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a
Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct
more stringent than for most other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use
language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is
expected that he accord respect for the person
and the rights of others at all times, and that
his every act and word should be characterized
by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His
radical deviation from these salutary norms
might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he
had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of
"Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a
Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law
before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in

good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
"counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in
his region, there are pejorative connotations to
the term, or it is confusingly similar to that
given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination
to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant
his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged
unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is
hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney;
and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11754
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE
KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified
Affidavit-Complaint1 filed before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by complainant
Joaquin G. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) against
respondents Atty. Edgardo O. Era (Atty. Era)
and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas (Atty. Bragas)
for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was
lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid
Engine Rebuilders Corporation entitled Gil
Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito
Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador
Villanueva v. Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation and/or
Joaquin G. Bonifacio, docketed as NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-05- 05953-03. Complainants
therein (Abucejon Group) were represented by
Era and Associates Law Office through Atty.
Era.2
On June 15, 2004, the Labor Arbiter found
Bonifacio and the corporation liable for illegal
dismissal and, consequently, ordered them to
pay Abucejo Group their separation pay, full
backwages and pro-rated 13th month pay. More
specifically, Bonifacio and his corporation were
ordered to pay a partially computed amount of
₱674,128 for the separation pay and full
backwages, and ₱16,050.65 for the 13th month
pay.3 Bonifacio and the corporation brought
their case up to the Supreme Court but they
suffered the same fate as their appeals and
motions were decided against them.4
Thus, on January 26, 2006, a Writ of
Execution5 was issued to implement the June
15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of Garnishment
dated February 6, 2006 was likewise
issued.6 Two alias writs dated May 8, 2008 7 and
April 16, 20138 were later on issued, directing
the sheriff to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43,
representing the judgment award plus interest
and attorney's fees.
9
Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was
filed against Atty. Era for representing
conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A.
Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as
A.C. No. 6664.9 In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this
Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and
imposed the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two years, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and
PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty
of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for two years effective upon his receipt of this
decision, with a warning that his commission of
a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this decision be included in the
personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA and
entered m [sic] his file in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to
all lower courts by the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for its guidance.
SO ORDERED.10
On November 28, 2013, the scheduled public
auction over Bonifacio's and/or the
corporation's properties in the business
establishment was conducted to implement the
alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated
therein. He attended the public auction and
tendered a bid for his clients who were
declared the highest bidders. On the same day,
a certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era
presented to the corporation's officers and
employees who were there at that time. Armed

with such documents, Atty. Era led the pulling
out of the subject properties but eventually
stopped to negotiate with Bonifacio's children
for the payment of the judgment award instead
of pulling out the auctioned properties. Atty.
Era summoned Bonifacio's children to continue
with the negotiation in his law office. On behalf
of his clients, their counter-offer for the
satisfaction of the judgment award went from
₱6 Million to ₱9 Million.11
As the parties were not able to settle, on
December 3, 2013, Attys. Era and Bragas went
back to Bonifacio's business establishment
together with their clients and several men, and
forced open the establishment to pull out the
auctioned properties. This was evidenced by the
videos presented by Bonifacio in the instant
administrative complaint.12
This prompted Bonifacio to file a criminal
complaint for malicious mischief, robbery, and
trespassing with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Pasay City. In its Resolution 13 dated
March 31, 2014, the Office of the City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Attys.
Era and Bragas for grave coercion.14
Meanwhile, Atty. Era's name remains to appear
in pleadings filed before the NLRC and this
Court sometime in February and April, 2014
with regard to the subject labor case.15
On August 8, 2014, Bonifacio filed the instant
administrative complaint.16
In their Answer,17 Attys. Era and Bragas alleged
that Bonifacio has no personal knowledge as to
what transpired on November 28, 2013 and
December 3, 2013 as the latter was not present
therein at that time.18 Hence, his allegations of
force, threat, and intimidation in the execution
of the judgment is without basis. 19 In his
defense, Atty. Era further argued that he did
not violate the Court's order of suspension from
the practice of law as he merely acted as his
clients' attorney-in-fact pursuant to a Special
Power of Attomey20 (SPA) dated May 3, 2006. It
is Atty. Era's theory that with such SP A, he was
not engaged in the practice of law in
representing his clients in the implementation
of the alias writ. He added that he never signed
any document or pleading on behalf of his
clients during his suspension. For Atty. Bragas,
being an associate of Era and Associates Law
Firm, she was merely representing the Abucejo
Group as said law firm's clients. Anent the Php
6 Million to 9 Million counter-offer that they
made, Attys. Era and Bragas explained that the
parties were still on negotiation, hence, both
parties are free to have their own computations,
which they could respectively accept or
otherwise.21
In his Report and Recommendation 22 dated
March 17, 2015, Investigating Commissioner
Jose Villanueva Cabrera recommended the
dismissal of the instant administrative
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
The Investigating Commissioner found nothing
wrong with the indication of a suspended
lawyer's name in a pleading considering that
the same was not signed by the latter. There
was also no proof that a pleading was prepared
by Atty. Era. On the other hand, there was no
impediment against Atty. Bragas to sign the
pleadings. There was also no proof that in doing
so, Atty. Bragas was assisting suspended Atty.
Era in filing a pleading. Neither the presence of
Atty. Era during the public auction and the
negotiations was an implication or proof that
Atty. Era was engaging in the practice of law
during his suspension. According to the
Investigating Commissioner, anybody, not
exclusively lawyers, can be present at an
auction sale or negotiation.
10
As to whether Attys. Era and Bragas violated
any rules/laws in the implementation of the
judgment by using force, threat, and
intimidation, the Investigating Commissioner
noted that complainant contradicted such
imputations by filing the following pleadings, to
wit: (1) a Motion to Close and Terminate
Case23 dated December 18, 2013,
acknowledging the full satisfaction of the
judgment award and even prayed for Attys. Era
and Bragas' clients to take possession of the
remaining machines in his business
establishment; (2) a Manifestation 24 dated
March 12, 2014, wherein complainant stated
that he has surrendered the vehicles listed in
the certificate of sale; (3) an Omnibus Motion
with Entry of Appearance (Motion to Withdraw
and Motion to Reiterate Motion to Close and
Terminate Case and release of TRO
Bond25 dated February 4, 2014; (4) A Motion for
Consignation with Motion to Lift Levy 26 dated
October 29, 2014; and (5) a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint27 dated December 10, 2013 on the
criminal case for Malicious Mischief, Robbery,
and Trespassing against Attys. Era and Bragas.
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner
ratiocinated that in acknowledging the
satisfaction of the judgment in the labor case
and withdrawing the criminal case that he filed
against Attys. Era and Bragas with regard to
the implementation of the said judgment,
complainant contradicted and demolished his
own allegation that the satisfaction of the
judgment was improperly and unlawfully
implemented.28
Thus, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the administrative charges
against Attys. Era and Bragas be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.29
The IBP Board of Governors (Board), in its
Resolution No. XXI- 2015-27030 dated April 18,

2015 reversed and set aside the Investigating
Commissioner's findings and conclusions:
RESOLUTION No. XXI-2015-270 CBD Case No.
14-4300 Joaquin G. Bonifacio vs. Atty. Edgardo
O. Era and Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and considering Atty. Era's
continuedengagement in the practice of law
during the period of his suspension by
admittedly participating in the negotiation for
the payment of money judgment including
pegging of interest he acted as his clients
advocate instead as an agent in view of the
presence also of his client in the negotiation,
for holding office and admittedly summoned the
complainant's children to determine the money
judgment. Hence, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) years.
RESOLVED FURTHER, for her assistance in the
unauthorized practice of law of Atty.
Edgardo O. Era, Atty. Diane Karen B. Bragas is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) month.
In its Extended Resolution31 dated October 17,
2016, the IBP Board of Governors found Atty.
Era's argument that he merely acted pursuant
to an SP A given to him untenable. The Board
explained that the invoked SP A gave Atty. Era
the authority to appear and represent the
Abucejo Group only on the May 4, 2006 auction
and did not include the November 28, 2013
auction. Also, while he was authorized to
receive payment on behalf of his clients, the SP
A specifically stated that said payments should
be made in the form of checks and not
machinery or property. Thus, Atty. Era had no
authority under the SP A to represent his
clients during the November 28, 2013 auction
and to pull out and receive the corporation's
machines as payment of the judgment award. At
any rate, according to the Board, Atty. Era's
clients relied on his legal knowledge in having
the judgment award satisfied. Clearly, Atty. Era
violated Section 28,32 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.33
Corollary to this, the Board also found Atty.
Bragas liable for allowing and assisting Atty.
Era to engage in an unauthorized practice of
law. The Board concluded that Atty. Bragas
ought to know that Atty. Era's acts during the
satisfaction of the alias writ could be performed
only by a member of the bar in good standing. 34
Pursuant to Section 12(b),35 Rule 139-B of the
Rules, the records of the instant case were
transmitted to this Court.
No motion for reconsideration or petition for
review was filed by either party as of June 29,
2017.
Necessarily, the Court will now proceed to give
its final action on the instant administrative
case, the issues being: (1) Did Atty. Era engage
in the practice of law during his suspension
therefrom that would warrant another
disciplinary action against him?; and (2) In the
affirmative, is Atty. Bragas guilty of directly or
indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal
practice of law that would likewise warrant this
Court's exercise of its disciplining authority
against her?
We sustain the findings and recommendations
of the Board of Governors.
11
Atty. Era's acts constituted ''practice of law".
On this matter, Our pronouncement in the
landmark case of Renato L. Cayetano v.
Christian Monsod, et. al. 36 is on point. Thus, We
quote herein the relevant portions of the said
Decision, viz.:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of
another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to
clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in
the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating
with opposing counsel about pending litigation,
and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate." (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N .E. 650)
A person is also considered to be in the practice
of law when he:
"xxx for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their rights under the law,
or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or

prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of
their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose,
is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. CS. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177)
stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of
legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions." (5 Am. Jur. pp. 262, 263).
xxxx
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counselling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following
any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and
is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law
within the meaning of the statute." (Barr v.
Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.1âwphi1 "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)37 (Emphasis supplied)
In Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana v. Atty. Yolando
F. Bustamante,38We succinctly ruled that the
term practice of law implies customarily or
habitually holding oneself out to the public as a
lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of services.
Holding one's self out as a lawyer may be
shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such
as identifying oneself as an attorney, appearing
in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office
for the general practice of law.39
12
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Era
committed the following acts: (1) appeared on
behalf of his winning clients in the public
auction of the condemned properties; (2)
tendered bid in the auction for his clients; (3)
secured the certificate of sale and presented
the said document to the corporation's officers
and employees present in the premises at that
time; (4) insisted that his clients are now the
new owners of the subject properties, hence,
should be allowed entry in the premises; (5)
initiated the pull out of the properties; and (6)
negotiated with Bonifacio's children in his law
office as regards the payment of the judgment
award with interest instead of pulling out the
properties.40
It is true that being present in an auction sale
and negotiating matters relating to the same
may not be exclusively for lawyers, as opined by
the Investigating Commissioner. However, in
this case, as aptly put by the Board in its
Resolution, Atty. Era's acts clearly involved the
determination by a trained legal mind of the
legal effects and consequences of each course
of action in the satisfaction of the judgment
award.41 Precisely, this is why his clients chose
Atty. Era to represent them in the public
auction and in any negotiation/settlement with
the corporation arising from the labor case as
stated in the SPA being invoked by Atty.
Era.42 Such trained legal mind is what his
clients were relying upon in seeking redress for
their claims. This is evident from the fact that
they agreed not to enter into any amicable
settlement without the prior written consent of
Atty. Era, the latter being their lawyer. 43 It
could readily be seen that the said SPA was
executed by reason of Atty. Era being their
legal counsel. Thus, We are one with the
Board's submission that the said SPA cannot be
invoked to support Atty. Era's claim that he was
not engaged in the practice of law in
performing the acts above-cited as such SP A

cunningly undermines the suspension ordered
by this Court against Atty. Era, which We
cannot countenance.
Atty. Era was engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law during his suspension
As mentioned, Atty. Era was suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two years in
this Court's Decision dated July 16, 2013. He
performed the above-cited acts on the same
year, specifically November to December 2013.
Indubitably, Atty. Era was engaged in an
unauthorized law practice.
Atty. Era's acts constitute willful disobedience
of the lawful order of this Court, which under
Section 27,44 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
Further, Atty. Era's intentional maneuver to
circumvent the suspension order not only
reflects his insubordination to authority but also
his disrespect to this Court's lawful order which
warrants reproach. Members of the bar, above
anyone else, are called upon to obey court
orders and processes. 45 Graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to
uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to their processes.46
This case is not novel. We had previously
disciplined erring lawyers who continue in their
practice despite being suspended by the Court.
In Rodrigo A. Molina v. Atty. Ceferino R.
Magat,47this Court suspended Atty. Magat from
the practice of law for practicing his profession
despite this Court's previous order of
suspension. Likewise in another case, We
suspended a lawyer for continuing in her
practice despite the clear language of this
Court's suspension order.48
In view of the foregoing, We agree with the
Board of Governors' Resolution, finding Atty.
Era guilty of willfully disobeying the lawful
order of this Court warranting the exercise of
Our disciplining authority. We also adopt the
Board's recommendation as to the penalty to be
imposed upon Atty. Era, i.e., three years
suspension from the practice of law, taking into
account that this is his second infraction.
Atty. Bragas is guilty of assisting Atty. Era in
his unauthorized practice of law and, thus,
must likewise be reproved.
There is no question that Atty. Bragas has
knowledge of Atty. Era's suspension from the
practice of law and yet, she allowed herself to
participate in Atty. Era's unauthorized practice.
Clearly, Atty. Bragas violated the CPR,
specifically:
CANON 9 - A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the
very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law. Such duty is founded upon
public interest and policy, which requires that
law practice be limited only to individuals found
duly qualified in education and character.49
As correctly observed by the Board, Atty.
Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era's acts
constitutive of law practice could be performed
only by a member of the Bar in good standing,
which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence,
she should have not participated to such
transgression.
Being an associate in Atty. Era's law firm
cannot be used to circumvent the suspension
order. The factual circumstances of the case
13
clearly shows that Atty. Bragas did not act to
replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the
law firm's clients during the latter's suspension.
Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who
admittedly was the one actively performing all
acts pertaining to the labor case he was
handling.
Considering the foregoing, We also adopt the
Board's recommendation as regards Atty.
Bragas' guilt in the violation of the CPR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty.
Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully
disobeying this Court's lawful order and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of
violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) month, effective
immediately from receipt of this Decision. Also,
both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense, or a
commission of another offense will warrant a
more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
personal records of respondents as members of
the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 9.01
G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA, petitioner,
vs.

THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA,
RICARDO G. CARLOS and DOMINGO
FORTEZA, JR., respondents.
SANTOS, J:
In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary
Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977,
denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment
and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil
Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.
The factual antecedents may be recited as
follows:
Petitioner is an operator of a public utility
vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971,
in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by
private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a
consequence thereof, a complaint for damages
was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII),
docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer
thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by
Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida
Enriquez, Mercado & Associates. 1
Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear
at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972,
despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in
default and private respondent was allowed to
present his evidence ex parte. A decision was
thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of
private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for
Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner
seeking the lifting of the order of default, the
reopening of the case for the presentation of his
evidence and the setting aside of the decision.
Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by
Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law
firm. The same was denied by the lower Court
and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:
a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying
defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by
declaring him in default, it being contrary to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;
b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case;
c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more
particularly award of moral damages is contrary
to law; and
d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable
defenses.2
The appealed case was handled by Atty.
Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law
firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed
in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed
by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty.
Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was
denied and the decision became final on June
29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower
Court, presided by respondent Judge for
execution. 3
A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by
private respondent with the lower Court which
was granted by respondent Judge. 4
On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty.
Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief
from Judgment alleging his discovery that
Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to
the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine
Bar and that consequently, his rights had not
been adequately protected and his properties
are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied
upon without due process of law. 5
14
In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent
Judge denied the Petition and directed the
issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons
that said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory
tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-
appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the
grounds relied upon ". . . could have been
ventilated in the appeal before the Court of
Appeals ... " 6
On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff
Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of
execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied
on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the
satisfaction of the judgment. 7
Hence the instant Petition.
Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the
Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory
maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must
be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact
that the person who represented petitioner at
the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing
of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings,
turned out to be not a member of the Bar 8 did
not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in
court. It should be noted that in the subsequent
stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of
the judgment by default, petitioner was duly
represented by bona fide members of the Bar in
seeking a reversal of the judgment for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence and the
existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses.
In other words, petitioner's rights had been
amply protected in the proceedings before the
trial and appellate courts as he was
subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover,
petitioner himself was at fault as the order of
treatment as in default was predicated, not only
on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the
pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but
likewise on his own failure to attend the same,
without justifiable reason. To allow this petition

due course is to countenance further delay in a
proceeding which has already taken well over
six years to resolve,
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for
certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby
dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez,
Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita
Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to
explain, within ten (10) days from notice this
Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was
permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No.
680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a
member of the Bar.
RULE 9.02  problems that beset their individual lives.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S.
ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and
GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S.
Armamento filed this special civil action
for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of
respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay
private respondents Domingo Maldigan and
Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits
and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at
the legal rate from the date of promulgation of
judgment to the date of actual payment, and
10% of the total amount as and for attorney's
fees.
We have given due course to this petition for,
while to the cynical the de minimis  amounts
involved should not impose upon the valuable
time of this Court, we find therein a need to
clarify some issues the resolution of which are
important to small wage earners such as
taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore
repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not
exist only for the rich or the powerful, with
their reputed monumental cases of national
impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and
Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners
as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4
days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule.
Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for
air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-
conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay
P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a
P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in
their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired
as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already
failed to report for work for unknown reasons.
Later, petitioners learned that he was working
for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect
to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of
petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held
up by his armed passenger who took all his
money and thereafter stabbed him. He was
15
hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to
his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by
petitioners as a taxi driver under the same
terms and conditions as when he was first
employed, but his working schedule was made
on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only
every other day. However, on several occasions,
he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to
remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the
previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in
Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00.
Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him
to report for work, he adamantly refused.
Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving
a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested
petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily
cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners
told him that not a single centavo was left of his
deposits as these were not even enough to
cover the amount spent for the repairs of the
taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the
practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the
expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab
units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of
his deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his
termination from employment was effected
when he refused to pay for the washing of his
taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents
filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration
Office of the National Labor Relations
Commission charging petitioners with illegal
dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint
was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it
took private respondents two years to file the

same and such unreasonable delay was not
consistent with the natural reaction of a person
who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the
filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere
afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings,
with the observation that private respondents
failed to controvert the evidence showing that
Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company from February 10, 1987 to December
10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab
on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily
left their jobs for similar employment with other
taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the
ruling of the labor arbiter that private
respondents' services were not illegally
terminated. It, however, modified the decision
of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to
pay private respondents the awards stated at
the beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now
before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like
the NLRC, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only
respect but, at times, finality if such findings
are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where,
however, such conclusions are not supported by
the evidence, they must be struck down for
being whimsical and capricious and, therefore,
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily
deposits made by respondents to defray any
shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the
general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor
Code against requiring employees to make
deposits, and that there is no showing that the
Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as
a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently,
the deposits made were illegal and the
respondents must be refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as
follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or
damage. — No employer shall
require his worker to make
deposits from which deductions
shall be made for the
reimbursement of loss of or
damage to tools, materials, or
equipment supplied by the
employer, except when the
employer is engaged in such
trades, occupations or business
where the practice of making
deposits is a recognized one, or is
necessary or desirable as
determined by the Secretary of
Labor in appropriate rules and
regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said
article provides the rule on deposits for loss or
damage to tools, materials or equipments
supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same
does not apply to or permit deposits to defray
any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur
in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when
private respondents stopped working for
petitioners, the alleged purpose for which
petitioners required such unauthorized deposits
no longer existed. In other case, any balance
due to private respondents after proper
accounting must be returned to them with legal
interest.
16
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard
to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from
1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his
deposits through vales  or he incurred
shortages, such that he is even indebted to
petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With
respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was
mentioned questioning the same even in the
present petition. We accordingly agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General that
since the evidence shows that he had not
withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed
the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the
labor arbiter had this to say in his decision:
"Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is
no dispute that as a matter of practice in the
taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is
incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit
he has driven to the same clean condition when
he took it out, and as claimed by the
respondents (petitioners in the present case),
complainant(s) (private respondents herein)
 17

were made to shoulder the expenses for
washing, the amount doled out was paid
directly to the person who washed the unit,
thus we find nothing illegal in this practice,
much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by
the driver as illegal deduction in the context of
the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
Consequently, private respondents are not
entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash
payments they made. It will be noted that there
was nothing to prevent private respondents
from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they
wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the
Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing
after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi
industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of
respondent National Labor Relations
Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting
the awards for reimbursement of car wash
expenses and attorney's fees and directing said
public respondent to order and effect the
computation and payment by petitioners of the
refund for private respondent Domingo
Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon
from the date of finality of this resolution up to
the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service

fees for private respondents' authorized
representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code,
as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear
before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if
they represent themselves, or (2) if they
represent their organization or the members
thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H.
Pulia was the authorized representative of
private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who
did not fall in either of the foregoing categories.
Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an

attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client a reasonable compensation for
his services 7 necessarily imports the existence
of an attorney-client relationship as a condition
for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
relationship cannot exist unless the client's
representative is a lawyer. 8