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Organizations as self-organizing and sustaining systems: A complex and

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DOI: 10.1080/0308107031000135017

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International Journal of General Systems, October 2003 Vol. 32 (5), pp. 459–474

ORGANIZATIONS AS SELF-ORGANIZING AND

SUSTAINING SYSTEMS: A COMPLEX AND
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
CHRIS GOLDSPINKa,* and ROBERT KAYb,†
a
International Graduate School of Management, University of South Australia, Joint Impact,
P.O. Box 591, Tanunda, Australia 5352
b
Department of Information Systems, University of Technology, Sydney, Australia

(Received 21 June 2002; In final form 25 March 2003)

Many alternative theories about organization exist. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, adequate explanation of the
relationship between macro and micro processes of organization, and organizational dynamics remains elusive. In the
recent past there has been growing interest in two areas of systems science that offer a different basis for
understanding the generative and dynamic qualities of organizations. These are autopoietic theory and complex
adaptive systems theory. In this paper, we outline a theory of organization built on a synthesis of these two theoretical
strands. It is argued that the approach provides an improved framework for understanding the nature and dynamics of
organizational phenomena, and as such a more rigorous basis upon which to base future organizational research.

Keywords: Organizational survival, autopoiesis, organizational learning, organizational ecology, complex

systems

1. INTRODUCTION

Making organizations more resilient and better able to survive in turbulent and unpredictable
environments is increasingly recognized as a fundamental strategic challenge. Within the
management literature organizational resilience is commonly assumed to be the result of
deliberate management action. There is, however, growing recognition that chance plays an
important part. Concepts like the “learning organization” purport to provide both a
theoretical and practical basis for improving organizational viability in the face of
uncertainty. Such approaches draw attention to the importance of conscious or directed (i.e.
endogenous) adaptation. By contrast, organizational ecologists argue that deliberate
management action plays little part in determining which organizational forms will be viable.
Advocates of this position argue that management action produces internal permutations that

*Corresponding author. E-mail: chris.goldspink@bigpond.com

†
E-mail: rkay@it.uts.edu.au

ISSN 0308-1079 print/ISSN 1563-5104 online q 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/0308107031000135017
460 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

are selected by exogenous forces (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). The co-existence of such
conflicting views highlights the inadequacy of current theories of organization.
In their work Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis, Burrell and Morgan
(1994) identify two dimensions which underlie differences in organization theory. These are
the subjective – objective dimension and the regulatory – radical dimension. They place most
contemporary organizational and management theory firmly in the category of objective –
regulatory—the category they label as functionalist. From this perspective the social world is
viewed as comprising concrete entities and relations with the assumption that they may be
studied using reductionist approaches in order to identify cause – effect relations and derive
laws governing behavior. Most systems approaches to management and organizations take a
functionalist perspective. This implies that organizations are or can be usefully modeled as
linear systems (Parker and Stacey, 1995; Goldspink, 1999; Marion, 1999). Viewing
organizations as derivative of linear relations presents two serious problems.
The first of these problems is with understanding the relationship between micro and
macro behavior. How do the actions of individuals give rise to complex macro behavior in
organizations which can have distinctly different properties to those of the individuals and,
conversely, how can/do macro behaviors influence the behaviors of individuals?
Organizational sociologists concentrate on understanding how macro phenomena (e.g.
social norms) shape individual behavior; while organizational behaviorists and psychologists
are more concerned with how individual attributes shape social outcomes. Practitioners are
left with alternative and sometimes contradictory theories about either micro-to-macro
causality or the reverse (Coleman, 1994; Smith, 1997).
The second problem is with explaining the dynamical behavior of organizations, in
particular explaining discontinuous change, self-organization and variations in robustness in
the face of changing environmental conditions. Some argue that achieving organizational
coherence (e.g. commonality of purpose), and homogeneity (of culture or values) is
important to such robustness while others argue for difference, diversity and creativity.
Most existing theories of organization fail to deal adequately with one or both of these
problems. Perhaps for this reason some organization theorists and management practitioners
have been giving increasing attention to ideas that are helping to shed light on such properties
in the natural sciences. This body of literature includes the theory of self-producing systems
(autopoiesis) and the theory of non-linear systems (complexity theory). We argue that these
two theories offer a foundation for developing a theory of organization that can overcome
the limitations of most contemporary approaches with regard to the problems described
above.

2. THE BASIS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE SCIENCE OF ORGANIZATION

While both autopoietic theory and complex systems theory have had an impact on thinking
about organizations, no major work appears to have been done to establish a synthesis of the
two. We argue that such a synthesis is not only possible but desirable, leading to the
emergence of fresh insights with the potential to resolve many of the long-standing dilemmas
in organization theory. Before setting out the foundations of such a synthesis a brief
discussion of these two bodies of work is provided.

2.1 Autopoietic Theory

Autopoietic theory was developed by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela to provide
an explanation of the characteristics of living systems. As such, it provides description and
 ORGANIZATIONS AS SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 461

explanation of biological processes at the cellular and meta-cellular levels of organisms.

Maturana and Varela subsequently extended the theory to explain cognition and the origin of
language. Unfortunately the theory is couched in very idiosyncratic language making it
difficult to access and interpret their ideas. The summary provided here is limited, covering
only the basic concepts needed to appreciate the framework that follows. A glossary of terms
is provided at the end of the paper for those readers less familiar with the central concepts.
The central idea of the theory is that:
. . .living beings are characterized in that, literally, they are self-producing (Maturana and Varela, 1992: 42).

This self-production is the defining character of an autopoietic system. It means that the
primary output of an autopoietic system is itself. Self-production occurs in an environment
and gives rise to a boundary between the system and that environment. It has become
common in systems theory to emphasize that a “system” is distinguished by an observer
(Beer, 1995), i.e. is the result of an epistemological act. An autopoietic system may also
be so distinguished, but more importantly, it distinguishes itself in a physical (ontological)
space.
Self-production leads to self-reference. Autopoietic systems are “operationally closed”,
meaning that no “information” is taken in from outside. For this reason it is common to refer
to autopoietic systems as autonomous systems or “unities”. Being autonomous, the behavior
of autopoietic systems is determined by internal states or structure alone although they may
be influenced by external events to the extent that those events impinge on or perturb them.
Maturana and Varela account for the relationship between “unities” and their environment
through the concept of structural coupling. Within an autopoietic system structural change is
triggered by interactions with the environment or by its own internal dynamics (Maturana
and Varela, 1992). So while environmental perturbations may trigger changes in structure
they have no control over the results of those changes. When an autopoietic system interacts
with its environment either or both may be changed by the encounter. When these
interactions become “recurrent”, autopoietic unities can become structurally coupled to one
another and/or to the environment.
These basic concepts have a number of implications for understanding how an organism
may come to know about itself and its environment. Maturana and Varela’s theories of
cognition are essentially based on the nervous system, its ability to change over time, and the
processes that such change involves. The notion that nervous system activity is in
“operational closure”, is central to the theory. The assumption is that, in all cases, nervous
activity results from and leads to further nervous activity in a closed cycle (Maturana and
Varela, 1992: 164). What will trigger a change in one autopoietic system will not necessarily
trigger a change in another, or if it does, that change will not be the same, due to the differing
triggering agencies within the structure of each individual nervous system. Furthermore, the
same perturbation experienced at a different point in time may elicit a different response even
in the same individual as the state (structure) of its nervous system will not be the same from
one time to the next.
Although the nervous system is operationally closed, it is “plastic” in that its structure
changes over time. It is this quality which allows for changes in behavior and subsequently
what is described as “learning” (Mingers, 1991). The plasticity of the nervous system is
significant, as the way in which a person learns is not to build a “representation” of the way in
which the world really is, but rather a result of the constant triggering of changes to the
structure of the nervous system. As such, learning is not a process of “getting information”
from the environment. The individual co-adapts with the environment through continuous
structural changes and hence behavioral changes, in order to remain viable within it.
Cognition from this view point takes place in domains of interaction between individuals and
462 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

between individuals and environments—not “in brains” as is commonly assumed (Varela

et al., 1992).
Language becomes possible when the plasticity of the nervous system exceeds a critical
threshold. Once it has arisen it becomes possible for the organism to coordinate its
own behavior in and through language. As language only arises in a social domain (a domain
of structural coupling) language becomes the means by which interacting organisms
coordinate the coordination of each others behavior (Maturana and Varela, 1980).
Language considerably expands the basis for and plasticity of interactions and hence is a
major contributor to the potential for structural coupling. As part of the structure of the
human nervous system, it is possible for humans to generate a domain of “self ” or to become
self-conscious. This is referred to as reflexivity. A central tenet of autopoietic theory is that
this domain can only exist through language and in a linguistic domain.
Arguably, autopoietic theory provides a crucial link between the behavior of individuals
and the development of social phenomena. In it we have an internally consistent theory,
which can explain how social structures can arise from the inherent biological qualities of
living entities. We have a framework for understanding the reciprocal relationship between
the individual and social structures. The recognition of these attributes has tempted some
researchers to claim that systems other than biological ones are autopoietic. There has been
considerable debate (see Mingers, 1991; 1995; Kay, 2001) about whether social systems,
including organizations, are themselves autopoietic or whether they are simply comprised of
autopoietic entities, i.e. people. We take the position here that social systems are not in
themselves autopoietic (Kay, 1999; Goldspink, 2000), as applying the concept more broadly
not only conflicts with the original conception of the theory, but is inconsistent with many of
its core elements.

2.2 Complexity Theory

Complexity science is a multi-disciplinary endeavor that has also given rise to its own arcane
language. Again only a few key terms are introduced in the text with further explanation
provided in the glossary.
Complexity theory is comprised of a set of theoretical constructs which can be applied to
any system made up of large numbers of elements, connected in webs and that produce
chains of interaction, at least some of which are non-linear. Non-linearity simply implies that
a system or sub-system’s output will vary in a manner which is not directly proportional to its
input. Where systems are comprised of components with a high level of connectivity, it may
take only a few sub-systems or components to exhibit non-linear or discontinuous
characteristics for the whole system to then behave in a non-linear way. High levels of
interconnection between dissimilar entities (i.e. heterogeneity) will also be a sufficient
condition for non-linearity to emerge. All “real world” systems, such as economies and
ecologies, contain many non-linear components and relationships.
Systems containing significant non-linearity can demonstrate a wide range of behaviors.
One of the contributions of complex systems theory is that it has expanded our capacity to
distinguish classes of behavior characteristic of non-linear systems and provided insights into
the micro conditions associated with the emergence of those classes of behavior. Complexity
theorists are concerned with the identification of behavior attributable to the nature of a
systems organization and which is independent of the particularities of the constitutive
agents. Thus complexity has shown that there are broadly similar behaviors between weather
systems (Lorenz, 2001), ecologies (Kauffman, 1993), traffic flows, and behavior (Resnick,
1997) and physical and chemical systems (Prigogine, 1997). This science has concentrated,
however, on understanding natural complex systems or physical entities interacting in
 ORGANIZATIONS AS SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 463

physical space. Extension to the social sciences has been limited and tentative, with many
contributions being metaphorical rather than substantive. There is a need to understand
the distinctive qualities of social systems and how these can be accommodated within a
complexity derived theory.
The challenge of applying complexity to social systems is twofold. Firstly, there is a
need to appreciate the implications of reflexivity. Natural agents in complex systems
do not change their behavior based on a notion of “self”. Secondly, in natural
complex systems macro behavior is a complex (emergent—see glossary) product of
micro interactions and these interactions are influenced only by local conditions.
In social systems, micro actors (humans) may observe macro consequences and
change their behavior accordingly. In other words, in human social systems the
possibility exists for direct feedback from macro to micro—something not present in
natural systems.
Three broad categories of dynamics are commonly attributed to non-linear systems. These
are stable, quasi-stable and unstable or chaotic. A complex system is described as stable in
response to a class of triggers if the dynamics show little or no change within a finite time
following such a trigger. Despite constant turnover of individuals, for example, organizations
typically display many stable characteristics.
It is also possible for a system to display characteristics that we would label as quasi-
stable. A quasi-stable system may be described as having multiple stable states but be
sensitive to certain triggers. When a trigger event occurs, the system bifurcates or becomes
temporarily unstable before moving to a new pattern (labeled an attractor within complexity
theory).
A system would be deemed unstable where it demonstrates no discernable stable pattern of
behavior. In such systems an observer would determine that there is constant change and no
apparent order.
Importantly, the order and disorder observed within non-linear systems arise from the
operation of that system itself. Processes that give rise to order in the absence of an
external directive agent are referred to as self-organizing processes and are common in
complex systems (Kauffman, 1993). These processes may be observable at different
levels of a systems operation so a system may show pattern at one level but not at
another.
McKelvey (1997) has argued that explanations of order are typically reduced to
physical laws (physical order), order arising from natural selection (organic order) or
conscious purpose (rational order). The idea of rational order has been and continues to
be the primary explanation of social order, including providing the basis of most
orthodox definitions of organization, i.e. as a system identifiable by “common purpose”.
The recognition of self-organization as a product of complexity points to an additional
source of order and one which is still little understood. Recognition is growing that self-
organization may be the norm rather than the exception in sufficiently complex systems
(Holland, 1998). This runs counter to the assumptions on which a great deal of
management theory is based. Complexity in the absence of command and control has
long been assumed to lead to disorder. How rational and complexity order might interact
is not well understood.
An important contribution of the synthesis we propose here is that it makes this interplay
between organic, rational and complexity order more researchable. Without such a synthesis
each source of order is approached using concepts and theories which are logically
inconsistent and difficult if not impossible to reconcile. The implication of the framework set
out below is that both organic and rational order may be observed to correspond with the
rules of complexity order.
464 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

3. CONSTRUING ORGANIZATIONS AS NON-LINEAR SYSTEMS OF

BIOLOGICAL ORIGIN

3.1 The Constitutive Nature of Organization

Having set out the fundamental concepts of autopoietic and complex systems theory, it
remains to explain the basis for their synthesis. This is presented in the form of a foundation
for an alternative theory of organization. We concentrate first on explaining the means by
which organizations arise and persist in time. This aspect of the framework is derived directly
from autopoietic theory.
The primary agent of any organization is the human individual—an autopoietic unity.
Maturana and Varela (1992:180) depict autopoietic unities in a general form as illustrated in
Fig. 1.
There are, however, some distinguishing features of humans which are of fundamental
importance to understanding social systems that are not captured in this representation.
Unlike most other biological (autopoietic) entities, humans have attained a level of structural
plasticity that allows for language. Language makes possible reflexive self-awareness, i.e. we
can distinguish “self” from “other” and become observers of self. Furthermore, we can
observe our environment and adjust our operational structure on the basis of such
observation. These capacities are represented in the following diagram (Fig. 2).
These unities (people) may enter into recurrent interaction with their environment and
with each other. Where two or more people interact recurrently, they may become
structurally coupled (Fig. 3).
The extent of the coupling will depend on the individual structures of the people and their
environment. Coupling may occur on one or many dimensions. These dimensions can be
physical (e.g. behavioral) or non-physical (e.g. linguistic). The coupling may be of limited
extension or may lead to development of a co-dependence. People that have become
structurally coupled can be considered as having formed higher order systems. Each such
higher order system may be treated as operationally closed in that the recurrent interaction
which gives rise to it is uniquely determined by the structures of the participants and their
individual and collective histories of interaction. As higher order operationally closed systems
they may become distinguished as new entities. Thus, in social systems individuals come
together in many potentially intersecting structures (work groups, families, sports clubs),
which are a part of larger more extensive structures (corporations, sub-cultures, nations). The
domains of interaction formed between the structurally coupled individuals, become self-
maintaining and referring, and as such begin to define their own unique history (Fig. 4).
If a new individual enters an existing network (e.g. joins the work-group) the new arrival
interacts with the existing individuals in the space of their shared physical and non-physical
environments. Both the physical and non-physical environments will have been influenced, if
not constructed, by the history of interaction of the participating entities. The arrival of a new

FIGURE 1 Representation of an autopoietic unity. From “The Tree of Knowledge” by Humberto R. Maturana, PhD
and Francisco J. Varela, PhD q 1987 by Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela. Reprinted by arrangement
with Shambhala Publications, Inc., Boston, www.shambhala.com
 ORGANIZATIONS AS SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 465

FIGURE 2 A reflexive autopoietic unity.

entity acts as a perturbation which may or may not be readily accommodated within the
existing pattern of interaction. It may trigger a new and distinct history of interaction more or
less divergent from what would have occurred. Alternatively it may have little to no impact,
depending on the mix of structures involved.
In human social systems, language plays a critical role in the formation of a non-physical
space of interaction or environment
. . .whenever we engage in social interactions that we label as dialogue or conversation, these constitute
autonomous aggregates, which exhibit all the properties of other autonomous units (Varela, 1979: 269).

Thus in human systems, domains of interaction are primarily brought forth and maintained in
language. An observer can now distinguish between two domains: that in which the
autopoietic entities exist and the linguistic domain. The former is a physical domain—it
contains real entities. The second is an emergent domain—it arises from the interactions (in
language) of the entities in the physical domain. An observer would say that the linguistic
structures that arise from the interaction in the linguistic domain are “not real”—they are not
made of “physical stuff”. The real entities (people) which give rise to the linguistic
phenomena are however changed by it—the two domains intersect. We argue here that all
social systems are comprised of both these domains.
This view of social systems as networks of intersecting systems of operationally closed
and structurally coupled unities makes it possible to approach any level or scale of social
systems in essentially the same way and to analyze them in much the same manner. Hence a
team can be approached in much the same way as a nation state. All social systems are
comprised of nestings of these forms of social structures. It is important to recognize that
because the “team” or “organization” being described is non-physical, the relative
correlation between the description of an observer and the actual (i.e. real) interactions may
be more or less metaphorical. In other words, even though the process and emergent
behaviors that an observer notices and uses to distinguish an “organization” take place in a
physical domain, the distinction itself is that of an observer, it is made in a linguistic domain

FIGURE 3 Two autopoietic unities in structural coupling.

466 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

FIGURE 4 Structurally coupled unities may give rise to a domain of recurrent interaction.

and hence is epistemic in nature. As a consequence it is possible to be a member of an

“organization” and yet not to identify with “its” actions on the basis that they were not
your own.
The institutions are now experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual
as an external and coercive fact (Berger and Luckman, 1972: 76).

The above framework describes a means whereby social systems emerge and organize
without the need for conscious intent or design although it can explain the nature and origin
of conscious will. Attempts by any individual to influence the networks that they participate
in by deliberate change of behavior based on their local or global observation has the
potential to affect the behavior of the network. The effect will not, however, be predictable.
This is because no observer, not even those who are a part of the observed network, can fully
deduce the relationship between micro behavior, structure and macro consequences due to its
emergent nature. Here, we see the intertwining of rational and complexity order in social
systems. The framework avoids reification of higher order social structures, providing a
means for viewing them as emergent, while helping explain their history dependence and
their origin in physical processes. These properties provide a basis for understanding the
relationship and interplay between macro and micro phenomena through the specification of
the generative processes which link the two. We therefore have the basis of a theory for
explaining the origins and defining characteristics of an organization. What remains is to
develop the dynamical aspect of the framework.

3.2 Dynamics of Organization

Having defined organizations as networks of structurally coupled unities we have
characterized them in a way directly compatible with the theory of complex systems. As has
been noted, however, social systems, including organizations, are unlike natural complex
systems in important ways. They comprise autopoietic agents with a capacity for reflexive
self-awareness and language. This will no doubt lead to behaviors unique to their class of
organization. In other respects however, they may be expected to share some of the
characteristic behaviors of all complex systems. This is the point McKelvey (1997) makes
when he observes that complexity order exists alongside other forms of order, including
rational and evolutionary order.
 ORGANIZATIONS AS SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 467

Stuart Kauffman (1993) has established that two key variables influence the broad
dynamical behavior of complex systems. These are:
. the number of agents present;
. the density of their connectedness.
The more agents and the greater the connectedness the more the systems behavior changes
from stable to quasi stable and then to chaotic—not as a steady progression but through
critical thresholds. Kauffman has also noted that living systems (e.g. ecologies) that are
poised on the threshold between stable and chaotic behavior (quasi-stable) enjoy
considerable advantages. This “self-organized criticality” (Bak, 1996) provides them with
the maximum potential to conserve their adaptation in response to the widest possible range
of environmental perturbations. This observation may also hold for organizations and other
social systems. It remains to be established what factors in social systems can influence these
two key variables and thus influence social dynamics.

3.2.1 Convergent or Ordering Processes

Sociologists have observed that humans are creatures of habit. Habit development, “norms”,
“rituals” and “conventions” are indicative of stable patterns of interaction and behavior. In the
context of the arguments in this paper, their effect may be to reduce the dimensionality of
coupling in the non-physical space of human social systems. As such they may serve as a
basis of control of the dynamical characteristics for an organization. The more norms
constrain interaction, the more stable the organization (and conversely the less adaptive or
responsive to perturbation) it would be if Kauffman’s findings were to hold. Note that from
the perspective of the framework set out here, these mechanisms need not be the product of
rational choice but the product of the operation of the system—they are illustrative of a self-
organizational potential. It should be clear that “norms” can be viewed as patterns of
recurrent interaction which inevitably arise through structural coupling in a behavioral and/or
linguistic domain. The effectiveness of such structures in regulating social interaction does
not require rational choice or voluntary participation. Some individuals may choose to adopt
the “norm”, perhaps seeing its social value, for example the pursuit of democracy, or may
adopt a pattern of “blind following”.
Hejl (1984) has pointed out that the subjugation of human interaction to the fulfillment of
self-preservation has its own limitations, however. A central characteristic of the framework
under development here is that humans and organizations exist through the interaction of two
realities—the physical and the non-physical. Hejl has argued that the ability to generate new
realities presents the system with a competitive advantage due to an increased ability to
secure the “occupation of new niches”. The increasing cognitive capacity of such a system,
however, also presents threats to this self-preservation through the creation of realities and
“norms” that threaten autopoiesis—at least as it occurs in the physical space. This has been
graphically demonstrated in recent times by “martyrdom”, as a pattern of behavior.
Norms, routines and conventions then, whether consciously adopted or not, may constitute a
means for regulating the overall stability of social structures and systems of societies including
organizations. Thus we can explain order-generating processes in social systems using this
approach. What remains, however, is the need to explain disorder and discontinuous change.
As Burrell and Morgan have argued, this is where contemporary theory is at its weakest.

3.2.2 Divergent or Disordering Processes

What distinguishes human social systems from natural complex systems is the advent of non-
physical domains as a basis for coupling between agents. As discussed, linguistic coupling is
468 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

notable for the inherent plasticity it offers. People couple in language on many dimensions.
Every linguistic exchange will invoke and establish a dynamic pattern of interactions which
is unique, while being constrained by the consensual aspect of language in the context and
history of that social structure. A larger consensual community may share some of the
constraints. Hence whether the exchange is in English or Chinese may be important. The
vocabulary shared by the participants may be important and the history of use and response
triggered by particular words in the context of the exchange may be important. In human
social systems then, recurrent interaction is being continually maintained in a flux of
intertwining webs of linguistic, behavioral and emotional interaction. This is highly
dynamic, never being the same from one instance to another. The combined effect of
heterogeneity (difference in experience and behavior) of individuals and this highly plastic
basis of interaction adds significant non-linearity and dimensionality. Following Kauffman’s
observations we might reasonably expect social systems to be chaotic most of the time. From
this perspective the effect of the simultaneous emergence of ordering and dimension
reducing processes discussed above becomes particularly important. Thus, structural
coupling provides a highly plastic system with an inherent capacity for divergent and
convergent dynamics.
There is another ordering and disordering mechanism that comes to light from work on
complex systems. This relates to the broader social system within which any given
organization may exist. Any given individual will commonly participate in the generation
and maintenance of several social structures (work team, sports club, and family)
concurrently. The presence of an individual common to many networks represents a point of
intersection between these networks. Where domains intersect, each individual agent
participates in giving rise to and integrating different domains of social interaction. As this
occurs through structural coupling, it must be appreciated that structural changes and
deformations made to maintain viability or in response to perturbations triggered in one
domain may spill over into the other domains. What helps maintain integration in one
domain may be dysfunctional in another. Thus, the domains will continually disrupt each
other at points of intersection. The potential importance of this domain intersection was
noted by Hejl.
Although social systems are conservative systems due to their organization, they generate phenomena of social
change. This can be explained as resulting from the multi-component character of the individuals that
constitute them. The inner feedback of a social system is very often a conservative factor. . . In internally
differentiated societies, social change seems to originate mostly from the interaction of social systems. Social
systems always interact through the interactions of their components, i.e. the individuals that constitute the
systems (Hejl, 1993: 76).

This intersection of multiple systems through the interaction of common individuals (viewed
as components) is illustrated below (Fig. 5).
In human systems it is inevitable that people will participate in many and different
domains of action at the same time giving rise to multiple points of intersection. Intersecting
domains have the potential to exhibit much more irregular and “far from equilibrium
behavior” than isolated domains. Again then the potential for divergent, indeed chaotic,
dynamics is very substantial and we might therefore expect to find some self-organizational
potential for containing it at this level also. As Kauffman and Macready (1995) have pointed
out, regulation at the inter-group level may be achieved by controlling the degree of cross-
membership. These authors have shown the importance of patch size for the stability of
systems involving groups interacting with other groups and it is conceivable that as the
number of groups in which agents participate rises, the size of intersecting social groupings
overall must fall to maintain some order. This reduction in “patch” size, combined with
a possible reduction in the dimensional coupling between “patches” can serve to stabilize
otherwise unstable systems involving intersecting social domains.
 ORGANIZATIONS AS SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 469

FIGURE 5 Systems of structurally coupled agents give rise to domains of interaction.

In conclusion, it is significant to note that, contrary to the assumptions underpinning most

organization and management theories, fundamental ordering and disordering processes
within social systems and organizations can be seen to arise as a consequence of the nature
and structure of such systems. From the perspective of the framework presented in this paper,
rational order coexists with this “complexity order”. Rationality and conscious action is one
influence on behavior but it is neither the only nor necessarily the principle basis for order or
disorder in social systems.

3.3 Implications
The implication of this discussion for the way in which we view and think about organizations
relates to the distinction between the phenomenological aspects of organization and the
physical, or in this case, biological dimensions. By viewing organizations as emergent from
structurally coupled autonomous unities, we would argue it is possible to account for both the
physical (i.e. biological, cognitive) dimensions of organization and the phenomenological
(i.e. social, cultural, political).
This implies a shift from viewing the organization as something that is “out there” and
reified, as is common within organization theory (see Fig. 6) to a view where an organization
is internal to each of us yet mutually derived in having arisen in a linguistic domain (Fig. 7).
Figure 6 depicts what we would consider to be a traditional view of organization, where
the interaction of individuals in the physical space gives rise to a reified entity in the
non-physical.
The distinction that can be usefully restated at this point is that humans exist in the
physical space, whilst organizations exist in and through the interaction of the physical and
non-physical domains of interaction. Although humans (as observers) may distinguish
organizations as entities, an organization is unable to distinguish anything, as it is itself

FIGURE 6 Traditional conceptualization of an organization (Kay, 1999).

470 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

FIGURE 7 Organization as emergent from structurally coupled autonomous unities (Kay, 1999).

a distinction. The perceived ability of an organization to distinguish something from its

environment is nothing more than a description given by an observer, and does not represent
an internal correlation of the system (organization).
The conceptualization of organization presented in Fig. 7 overcomes the inconsistencies of
Fig. 6. The organization continues to exist in the non-physical space of distinctions, however,
the non-physical space is now represented as a function of the internal correlations of the
autopoietic unities who could be said to be members of the organization. As such, the
organization may be commonly distinguished by the individuals who comprise it and/or by
other observers who can notice the coherence and pattern in physical and non-physical
domains of coordination which characterize it.
The organization as depicted in Fig. 7 is no longer seen as an entity external to the
individual, it becomes an embodied aspect of the individual’s worldview. As such it both
influences and is influenced by the continuous functioning of internal correlations within
the individual’s nervous system. Here the emergent (phenomenological) dimensions of
organization have been brought together with the physical (biological) dimensions into a
single process for study.

4. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have argued that there are pervasive theoretical and practical difficulties that
arise from the diverse and alternative ways of thinking about social organization. We have
argued that the two perspectives of autopoietic theory and complexity theory provide a
foundation for a substantive theory of organization that avoids the difficulties of
contemporary approaches. While other writers have applied either one or the other of these
perspectives to organization, none appear to have argued for the possibility of a synthesis of
the two. We have put the position that a synthesis is not only possible but valuable.
Autopoiesis provides a basis for understanding the means by which organizations emerge
from the interactions of the people who are their constitutive agents. Complexity provides a
basis for understanding the interplay of convergent and divergent dynamics orchestrated by
self-organization and mediated by natural and rational order.
Organizations have typically been defined as a system formed for a purpose. This implies
that the order that characterizes them is conscious, deliberate and rational (even if bounded).
The synthesis presented here not only points to significant order that is the product of
complex organization, but also places this as primary. Rational order is itself a product of
self-organization among autopoietic unities. Using this synthesis then we have constructed a
logically consistent framework which allows the interplay between various sources of order
to be studied. This is not possible using alternative conceptions.
 ORGANIZATIONS AS SELF-ORGANIZING SYSTEMS 471

Some of the self-organizational dynamics that may be observed in any organization

serve to integrate and stabilize it. These include what sociologists refer to as norms and
rituals but are to be understood differently following the logic presented in this paper.
Other self-organization is divergent. Particularly important in this regard is the high
heterogeneity of social systems (brought about in large part by the high structural plasticity
and reflexivity afforded by language) and the intersection of alternative social domains
through common “nodes” (people). Self-organization of “patch” size may serve to keep the
overall social system under higher order control and sufficiently stable to maintain
life while sufficiently unstable to maintain adaptability in the face of uncertainty in
the environment. These patterns and processes are not yet well understood. However, the
contribution of the framework offered here is to render them more readily subject to
systematic study.

GLOSSARY

Attractor: This is a state of a dynamical system, which represents a long term (as opposed to
transient) behavior. It represents a subset of the range of possible behaviors and has some
pattern or recurrence. An attractor may be mapped as a trajectory in the systems state or
phase space.
Autonomy: “The condition of subordinating all changes to the maintenance of the
organization [of the unity]. Self-asserting capacity of living systems to maintain their identity
through the active compensation of deformations.” (Maturana and Varela, 1980)
Bounded rationality—Williamson (1996) cites Simon as defining this as “intendedly
rational, but only limitedly so.”
Cognition and cognitive domain: From the perspective of autopoiesis, cognition is not
restricted to unities which possess a central nervous system. Rather it is an intrinsic
characteristic of all living systems. The existence of a nervous system provides the organism
with a higher level of structural plasticity than would otherwise be possible and therefore
expands its cognitive domain. The cognitive domain of an autopoietic system is the domain
of all of the structural configurations it can adopt in response to perturbation while remaining
viable as a unity.
Domains—from Whitaker (1996)
“A domain is a description for the “world brought forth”—a circumscription of
experiential flux via reference to current states and possible trajectories. Maturana and
Varela define a number of domains in developing autopoietic theory’s formal aspects into a
phenomenological framework:
Domain of interactions
“. . .the set of all interactions into which an entity can enter. . .”
Domain of relations
“. . .the set of all relations (interactions through the observer) in which an entity can be
observed. . .”
Phenomenological domain
That set of actions and interactions “. . .defined by the properties of the unity or unities that
constitute it, either singly or collectively through their transformations or interactions.”
Cognitive domain
the set of “. . . all the interactions in which an autopoietic system can enter without loss of
identity. . .‘ An observer’s cognitive domain circumscribes ’. . .all the descriptions which it
can possibly make.”
472 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

Consensual domain
“. . .a domain of interlocked. . .sequences of states, established and determined through
ontogenic interactions between structurally plastic state-determined systems.”
Linguistic domain
“. . .a consensual domain of communicative interactions in which the behaviorally coupled
organisms orient each other with modes of behavior whose internal determination has
become specified during their coupled ontogenies.”
Enactive cognition: Moving beyond cognitivist and connectionist models of cognition
Varela, Thompson and Rosch note that:
“. . .[autopoietic] systems do not operate by representation. Instead of representing an
independent world, they enact a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from
the structure embodied by the cognitive system (Varela et al., 1992: 140).”
They argue for approaching cognition as “enaction”, an intertwining of experience and
conceptualization which results from the structural coupling of an autonomous organism and
its environment.
Ontogeny: “Ontogeny is the history of structural change in a unity without loss of
organization in that unity” (Maturana and Varela, 1992: 74).
Open system: The concept of open system was developed to describe a system which was
open to exchanges with its environment. This was important in the early adoption of systems
concepts in social science as closed systems had commonly been studied in the natural
sciences, particularly thermodynamics. The characteristics of systems which are open to
energy exchange with the environment and those which are not are markedly different.
Operational Closure—an operationally closed system is one where the identity of the
system is specified by a network of relations and processes the effects of which do not extend
beyond the network. The operation of such a system is such that any change in relations
between components will be reflected by changes in relations between others. The system
may be configured such that the structure tends to maintain certain relations constant in
response to changes in others. As a minimum, those relations which define the organization
of the system must be held constant if the system is to continue to exist. Thus, it may
maintain a dynamical homeostasis between components in response to other internally
generated change and in response to perturbation.
State space: The space of all possible states that the variables of a system may take up. The
space will have as many dimensions as there are variables.
Structural coupling: “We speak of structural coupling whenever there is a history of
recurrent interactions leading to the structural congruence between two (or more) systems.”
(Maturana and Varela, 1992: 75)

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Dr. Chris Goldspink has 15 years’ experience as an internal and

external consultant in organization and management development.
He also has experience as a senior manager in a variety of line and
Human Resource positions and a background in public sector
reform. He gained his PhD in Social attractors, an examination of
the applicability of complexity theory to social and organisational
analysis from the University of Western Sydney in 2000. Chris
currently delivers programs for the University of South Australia’s
International MBA and Professional Doctorate. His subjects
include strategic management and systems concepts as well as
qualitative research methods. His research interests are in the
applicability of complex systems theory to better understand social
and organizational processes. This is pursued both theoretically
and by applied research.
 474 C. GOLDSPINK AND R. KAY

Robert Kay is a Senior Lecturer in Information Systems at the

University of Technology, Sydney. He received his PhD in Towards
an autopoietic perspective on knowledge and organisation, from
the University of Western Sydney in 2000. His main fields of
interest include the application of autopoietic theory to educational
and organisational contexts, with particular reference to the use of
information systems and the development of knowledge manage-
ment approaches.

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