Professional Documents
Culture Documents
International Organizations
Self-determination
1. General
- ‘responsibility’ implies a position of trust.
- The Council is a TRUSTEE.
o Art 24 – the ‘members confer’ the responsibility on the Council and ‘agree’
that it acts ‘on their behalf’.
- States themselves are the actual principal of the Council, and not the United
Nations (as an international organization) itself.
- 2 opposing views
o The members, who have ‘delegated’ parts of their sovereignty, remain the
source of authority of the Council. This means that the States, being the
trust givers, are in consequence also the principals.
§ From that perspective, ‘the predominant accountability-holder in the
case of the SC acting under Chapter VII is neither the membership
of the Organization constituted as a Plenary organ, nor the public at
large or the individuals affected by the exercise of its power, but
rather each and every member state’
o In contrast, the Council’s authority and its powers arise from a constituent
act, the Charter, but not from members’ parallel delegations
§ the founding act has severed the ‘umbilical cord’ between members
and organization. Powers exercised by the latter’s organs are not a
mere prolongation of the members’ powers, but qualitatively different
from the former; they are a new type of public authority. The
consequence would seem to be that the Security Council is
accountable not to the members individually, but to the Plenary organ
in which these are represented.
§ The General Assembly is, from that perspective, the proper
institutional (p. 776) frame which has swallowed the individual
States, and is therefore the rightful recipient of the Council’s
accounts.
- Sociologically speaking, the United Nations, as any other international
organization, is to some extent both, in varying degrees: an alter ego of its
members, but also an autonomous actor
- Although the Organization is supposed to work in the interests of its members,
the whole point of setting up an organization is to render it to a certain extent
autonomous from its individual members, with the objective to fulfil certain public
functions more effectively.
- From a strictly legalist perspective, the principal of the Council is the
Organization itself. The Security Council, being an organ of the United Nations,
formally acts on behalf of that legal person and not on behalf of the members
individually
o Still, doctrinally, acts of the Council are imputable to the Organization.77
Any decision of the Council taken in discharge of its responsibilities must,
therefore, be considered as an action taken by the Organization as a
whole.
a. General
- The reporting obligation enshrined in Art. 24 (3) is a corollary to the principle that
the Security Council acts, under Art. 24 (1), on behalf of all members
- Its counterpart is Art. 15 (1), under which the General Assembly shall ‘receive
and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council’. Article 15 (1)
also requires ‘an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided
upon or taken to maintain international peace and security’.
- These two provisions underscore the idea that the Security Council is a trustee of
the membership (or of the ‘international community’), institutionalized in the
General Assembly, which must render its ‘accounts’ to the trust givers.
- The rapid growth in Council activity from 1989 onwards was accompanied by its
increased reliance on informal consultations to which non-members of the
Council were not admitted.
- The exclusionary and closed character of the action was deemed unfair by those
non-members especially as the effects of decisions, such as economic sanctions,
affected many States.
- The delivery of the report by the Council provided an opportunity for States to
express their frustration.
- The quality of the reports is ‘descriptive rather than analytical in nature’.88 The
lack of analysis has been defended by Council members as an inherent feature
of the report, because it is impossible for the fifteen members of the Security
Council to agree on a common understanding of the action and on a shared
analysis.
c. Special Reports
- Under Art. 24 (3), the Council shall ‘when necessary’ submit special reports to
the General Assembly. This has been done only rarely
- The Council must submit a special report if it does not recommend an applicant
State for membership or postpones the consideration of the application
- The reports are submitted ‘for the consideration’ of the General Assembly.
- It does not give the General Assembly the right to take specific action, let alone
to adopt any political or legal sanctions against the Security Council, upon a
report.
- Secondly, Art. 24 (3) does not convey to the General Assembly the power to hold
Security Council responsible for failing to report or for presenting a deficient
report.
- In order to fulfil its accountability function, the report should be analytical and not
purely enumerative, and it must contain explanations for the decisions taken (or
not taken).1
o Giving reasons for legal acts (and for their omission) is instrumental in
enabling members to exercise scrutiny and to formulate critique.
o Giving reasons to that extent has a quasi-democratic function. It is also a
requirement of the rule of law, because it clarifies the Council action not
only in political but also in legal terms.
- In conclusion, while the annual reports were in the past barely used by the
General Assembly as an accountability tool, that use has always been a topic of
debate and has been continuously intensified.
- Under Art. 24 (2), the Security Council must act in ‘accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations’. These are first of all enshrined in Arts 1 (purposes)
and 2 (principles).
- Article 24 (2) sentence 2 reads: ‘The specific powers granted to the Security
Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII,
and XII.’
- Namibia Advisory Opinion’s concern for an effective fulfilment of functions by
relying on the principle of implied powers which governs international
organizations. According to that principle, the United Nations ‘must be deemed to
have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance
of its duties’
It now seems settled that the Council may in principle ‘legislate’ but only under
specific conditions which can be drawn from the Charter framework and from
practice.
a. Practice
b. Admissibility in Principle
- The Council is entitled to adopt legislative resolutions. Decisions of that kind are
not inadmissible or even illegal on the ground that they are of a wrong type.
- As a matter of practice, by far the majority of members has supported the
legislative resolutions. Those few members who objected could not block the
development towards an overall acceptance
- Article 41 constitutes a sufficient legal basis for legislative acts. That provision
authorizes the Council to take ‘measures’ not involving the use of force.
‘Measures’ is a broad term which does not limit the Council to concrete and
particular decisions, but which encompasses legislative measures.
- 2 objections against legislative decisions
o First: It is the General Assembly which is entrusted with the ‘progressive
development of international law’
§ However, law-making by the Council does not—as a matter of
form—interfere with the Assembly’s competences.
o Second: Imposition of binding, general, and in temporal terms unlimited
obligations on States which are for the most part not members of the
Council overturns the cornerstone of the international legal system,
namely the principle that States can be bound only on the basis of their
consent which ultimately flows from sovereignty.
§ However, by not delineating the Council’s powers more strictly,
the members have not forgone their right to protest against
novel types of decision-making. They have not given a blank
cheque to the Council.
AKEHURST
Air space
- First bilateral agreement = 1913 exchange of notes between France and Germany
stipulated that aircraft belonging to military service of one party could not fly over
the territory of another party except upon the latter’s invitation
o However, civilian aircraft could fly over and on the territory of another State,
subject to compliance with some national regulations as to exclusion zones.
- First multilateral treaty = 1919 Paris Convention (Pertinent articles = Articles 1,
15, 30) *ilagay sa footnotes
- Customary rule = aircraft from one State have a right to fly over the high seas but
not over the territory or territorial sea of another State.
o Affirmed by the 1944 Chicaco Convention on International Civil Aviation
which states that ‘every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory’
- It is a SERIOUS BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW for a State to order its
aircraft to violate the air space of another State.
- Assembly of the ICAO amended the 1944 Chicago Convention.
o ‘every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, is entitled to require the
landing at some designated airport of a civil aircraft flying above its territory
without its authority’
o ‘the Contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from
resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that in case
of interception, the lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must
not be endangered’
2. Regulation of flights
- 1944 Chicago Convention and the rules adopted by the ICAO = international
standards.
- Multilateral rights = failed. Current system is mostly governed by BILATERAL
TREATIES.
o ICAO Convention
§ Non scheduled flights – enjoy the right of flight into and transit over
the territory of a State party (Article 5)
§ Scheduled flights – require permission from the territorial State
(Article 6)
Outer Space
1. Basic rules and instruments
- The basic substantive framework of the present law on outer space is contained in
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. (Pertinent articles = Articles 1 - 12)
o Article 4 provides that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
[…] exclusively for PEACEFUL purposes
§ However, as regards spacecraft orbiting the Earth, Article 4 merely
provides that NUCLEAR WEAPONS and OTHER WEAPONS of
mass destruction must NOT be placed in orbit around the Earth.
- Since Sputnik 1, artificial satellites have passed over the territory of other States
on innumerable occasions and no State has ever protested.
- The conduct of States launching satellites, coupled with the acquiescence of other
States, may have given rise to a new permissive rule of customary international
law.
o States are ENTITLED to put satellites in orbit over the territory of other
States, but not necessarily to pass through their air space to get into orbit
in outer space.
- The precise location of the point where air space ends and outer space begins is
not important because the minimum height at which satellites can remain in orbit
is at least twice the maximum height at which aircraft can fly.
- There is no customary law allowing the passage of space objects through the
national air space of another State.
- Integrated in Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty, stating that the exploration and
use of outer space shall be the common province of all mankind.
- Article 4 likewise provides that the exploration and use of the moon ‘shall be the
province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development’