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Social Media Impact on Malaysia's 13th General Election

James Gomez
Asia Pacific Media Educator 2014 24:
95 DOI: 10.1177/1326365X14539213
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Article

Social Media Impact Asia Pacific Media Educator

24(1) 95–105
on Malaysia’s © 2014 University
of Wollongong,
13th General Election Australia SAGE
Publications
Los Angeles,
London, New Delhi,
Singapore,
Washington DC
James Gomez DOI: 10.1177/1326365X14539213
http://ame.sagepub.com

Abstract
In the run up to Malaysia’s 13th general election, observers were curious
to know if social media would be able to impact the electoral outcome. In
the 2008 general election, it was widely accepted that alternative online
content disseminated by blogs, party websites and alternative news portals
determined the electoral outcome. The opposition then, for the first time,
denied the ruling coalition a two-thirds majority in Parliament. By 2013
the role of social media received widespread attention because of its
exponential growth in Malaysia since 2008, where there were 800,000
Facebook and 3,429 Twitter users to 2013 when the number increased to
13,220,000 for Facebook and 2,000,000 for Twitter users. This commentary
examines the role of social media in Malaysia’s 2013 general election and
assesses its impact on the electoral outcome.

Keywords
Electoral outcome, general election, Malaysia, political impact, social media

Introduction
Studies on social media influence in electoral campaigns and voter behaviour
show that the number of social media users or supporters online does not
necessarily translate into electoral success, such as the midterm election in
the US (Livne et al. 2011, p. 208) and the general election in Sweden in 2010
(Larsson & Moe 2010, p. 14). (Social media in the context of this commentary
is defined as the collection of online social interaction tools such as Facebook,
Twitter and YouTube.) In the Asia-Pacific, social media is likewise touted
as instrumental in garnering voter support by the incumbents and opposition—
for example, the use of Facebook in President Benigno ‘Ninoy’ Aquino III’s
election in the Philippines and the use of Twitter by the Red Shirts in
Thailand (see Behnke 2010). However, popularity on social networking sites
such as Facebook does not necessarily result in electoral success (Leng Ho
2012, p. 108). The predictive power of Twitter in forecasting election results has

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96 James Gomez
also been questioned, for instance in the case of the 2011 general election in
Singapore (Scoric et al. 2012, pp. 2589–2590), which is attributed to the digital
divide and unequal access to the mainstream media by opposition parties, such
as in Malaysia.
The electoral outcome in Malaysia’s 2008 general election where the ruling
Barisan Nasional (BN) lost its two-thirds majority control of parliament was
attributed by analysts to the online contents disseminated through blogs, opposi-
tion party websites and alternative news portals (Azhar 2013; Mohd Sani &
Zengeni 2010; Ndoma & Tumin 2011; Rajaratnam 2009; Suffian 2010; Weiss
2012). The former Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi admitted that his ‘biggest
mistake’ was to ignore cyber-campaigning over the Internet, and this was a
‘serious misjudgment’ that resulted in BN’s loss of crucial seats in the 2008
polls (AFP, 25 March 2008).
Social media usage in Malaysia had increased exponentially in the run up to
the 13th general election in May 2013.The total Internet penetration rose by
about 15 per cent from 2008 to 2012. It is expected to increase by about 40 per
cent to reach 25 million in 2015 (New Straits Times 25 October 2013). Social
media saw a similar exponential growth. In 2008, there were 800,000 Facebook
pages and 3,429 Twitter users in Malaysia. By 2013 these numbers had
increased to 13,220,000 for Facebook and 2,000,000 for Twitter users (Forest-
interactive.com 2013). This commentary, thus, poses: to what extent did the
exponential growth in social media erode the dominance of the mainstream
media and influence voter behaviour in the 13th general election?

Malaysia’s Changing Media Landscape

Since the last general election in 2008, two mainstream Malay-language
newspapers, Berita Harian (weekend edition Berita Minggu) and Utusan
Malaysia and (weekend edition Mingguan Malaysia) saw a decline of 22.4 per
cent in its combined circulation (890,446) from 2008 to 2012. Similarly, The
New Straits Times, The Star and The Edge saw their combined circulation drop
by 13.1 per cent to 813,994 in the same period. The dwindling circulation is also
marked by a drop in press freedom ranking by Reporter Without Borders and
Freedom House (see Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1a. Index of Press Freedom in Malaysia (Reporter Without Borders)

Index 2004 2008–2009 2012–2013

Press Freedom Not Free Not Free Not Free
World Ranking 122nd 132nd 145th
World Score 39.83 39.50 42.73
Source: www.rsf.org

Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24, 1 (2014): 95–105

Social Media Impact on Malaysia’s 13th General Election 97

Table 1b. Index of Press Freedom in Malaysia (Freedom House)

Index 2004 2008–2009 2012–2013

Press Freedom Not Free Not Free Not
Free World Ranking 154th 141st 146th
World Rating 69 65 64
Source: www.freedomhouse.org
Note: Status: Free (0–30), Partly Free (31–60), Not Free (61–100).

Table 2. Malaysian Internet Penetration by Online Media on February 2012

News Online Media Number of Penetration

thestar.com.my 2,221,763
utusan.com.my 1,171,578
bharian.com.my 769,772
malaysiakini.com 1,858,649
themalaysianinsider.com 1,117,124
Source: Malaysian Digital Association’s (MDA).

In Malaysia, the pole position of public broadcast media has been replaced by
a fragmented viewership base. Viewers switch easily between public and private
broadcasters consuming a mixture of free-to-air, subscription TV and videos on-
demand for their entertainment needs, leaving those interested in political news
to turn to alternative news portals, which reportage are deemed to be more
‘independent’ and critical of public interest issues.
This drop in circulation of print media, low press freedom ranking and a
fragmented broadcast base coupled with political ownership of selected media
companies underscore the declining credibility of the mainstream media. An
election media monitoring by the University of Nottingham and Centre for
Independent Journalism in Malaysia noted that the alternative online media
were most ‘even-handed’ in their election reportage than mainstream media
(Malaysiakini 2013b). Online news sites, such as Malaysiakini and the
Malaysian Insider, which are not covered by the country’s restrictive Printing
Presses and Publications Act, were deemed to be the medium of choice for the
middle-class Malaysians and those in living in urban areas (Asohan 2013; see
Table 2).

New Media in GE12 (2008)

In 2008 the country’s opposition coalition were credited for using new media—
blogs, party websites, Twitter, Facebook, alternative news portals and YouTube
— to counter a hostile pro-government mainstream media to break the BN’s
two-thirds majority control of parliament. Then, the only parties that had estab-
lished a YouTube Channel were BN and the Democratic Action Party (DAP),

Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24, 1 (2014): 95–105

98 James Gomez
Table 3. Index of Internet Freedom in Malaysia

Index 2004 2009 2011 2012 2013

Internet Freedom Status N/A Partly Free Partly Free Partly Free Partly
Free Total Score N/A 41 41 43 44
Source: freedomhouse.org
Note: Status: Free (0–30), Partly Free (31–60), Not Free (61–100).

a Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition member. Later, another PR coalition member,

the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) created its channel in 2009.
The BN and PR coalition did not have a Facebook account in 2008, although
Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) established a Facebook page after the 2008 general
election. With regards to Twitter, DAP was the only party that started a Twitter
account one month after the 2008 general election results. The opposition leader,
Anwar Ibrahim, was the only politician who had a Twitter account before the
2008 general elections.
Although the Internet in Malaysia has been deemed to be free under the
Multimedia Bill of Guarantees, since 2008 Freedom House and Reporters
Without Borders have lowered their rankings of Malaysia’s Internet freedom
(see Table 3).
The Freedom House reports attribute its low rankings to the periodic
harassment by government authorities and politicians who resort to civil and
criminal legislation to take action against bloggers and alternative media for
posting anti- government information on their websites.
It was against this backdrop that social media emerged as a popular platform
in the run up to the 2013 general elections. It was expected that most of the news
associated with the general election would be pushed through social media
platforms. It was thus not surprising that on March 2013, just a month before the
election dates were announced, the Malaysian Communications Multimedia
Commission (MCMC) declared that it was going to monitor the social media for
any abuses and seditious postings during the election (Bernama 2013).

Social Media in GE13 (2013)

The Prime Minister, Najib Abdul Razak’s online presence—Facebook, Twitter
and blogs—after the 2008 election elevated BN’s engagement with the
electorate leading up to the 13th general election. By April 2013, BN’s
Facebook boasted 55,000 likes while supporters of the PR had 92,000. Other fan
and supporter pages reflected smaller numbers (see Table 4).
On the Twitter front, Najib had 1,460,000 followers; Anwar Ibrahim had
267,000, Nik Aziz 94,000 and Lim Kit Siang 89,000 (see Table 5). Put together,
Pakatan leaders combined could only muster a third of Najib’s followers. 1 When
the numbers of BN and Najib were combined with that of PR and its leaders,

Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24, 1 (2014): 95–105

Social Media Impact on Malaysia’s 13th General Election 99

Table 4. Fans Page on Facebook of Political and Leader Parties in Malaysia on April
2013

Political Party ‘Like’ Fans Party Leader ‘Like’ Fans Page

Page
Barisan Nasional (BN) 55,000 Najib (BN) 1,58,000
Pakatan Rakyat 92,000 PR Leaders 80,000
Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) 29,177 Anwar Ibrahim 480,000
(PKR)
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party 138,317 Nik Aziz (PAS) 889,000
(PAS)
Democratic Action Party 510,230 Lim Kit Siang 120,000
(DAP) (DAP)
Source: www.facebook.com (17 April 2013).

wTaitbteler F5o. lTlowers of Political and Leader Parties in Malaysia in April 2013

Political Party Followers Party Leader Followers

Barisan Nasional (BN) 24,000 Najib (BN) 1,460,000
Pakatan Rakyat (PR) 1,900 PR Leader
Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) 27,000 Anwar Ibrahim (PKR) 267,000
Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) 1,200 Nik Aziz (PAS) 94,000
Democratic Action Party (DAP) 27,000 Lim Kit Siang (DAP) 89,000
Source: www.twitter.com (17 April 2013).

it placed the ruling coalition well ahead in social media numbers on the eve
of elections. In February 2013, two-and-a-half months before Malaysia’s 13th
general election (GE13), this prompted the Prime Minister to declare that the
country would experience its first ‘social media election (Zahiid 2013).
Apart from the use of Facebook and Twitter, one key social media
observation in Malaysia’s 13th general election was the extensive use of online
videos to spread the message. In the run up to the elections there was already a
consolida- tion of online video-based platforms in Malaysia’s alternative media
landscape. These included the re-branded KiniTV (formerly Malaysiakinitv),
MobTV.my and the staronline.tv. Others like Free Malaysia Today had videos
embedded in the homepage. Political parties and candidates were also uploading
their own election video messages, but the bulk of the video postings came from
individual citizen journalists. These comprised videos of political spoofs, scenes
outside nomination centres on nomination day, clips of parties and candidates on
the election campaign trail, attendance at political rallies, incidents at polling
stations and news reports.
Noteworthy were videos and pictures of those caught on camera for elec-
tion vandalism, mischief and thuggish behaviour—captioned as the ‘samseng’
videos—which quite often went viral. One video captured aggressive election
flag installers planting BN flags in between Pakatan flags (YouTube 2012a).
When confronted by supporters from the other camp, the installers damaged sev-
eral Pakatan flags and hurled abuses before taking off. In another video, several
youths in BN T-shirts on motorbikes and carrying BN flags were captured shout-
ing abuses across to the opposition camp on the shoulder of the road. The video
Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24, 1 (2014): 95–105
100 James Gomez
later showed BN supporters physically attacking PR supporters. The video clip
at the end urged viewers to reject election violence (YouTube 2014). Other
incidents captured on video and posted on YouTube include car vandalism or
disruption of campaign activities and election rallies by rival factions. One
video shows UMNO supporters trying to disrupt a public rally where Anwar
Ibrahim was scheduled to speak (YouTube 2012b). It is unclear, however, if the
videos had an impact on party supporters, especially the youth, in translating
negative feelings into violence.

Social Media Election Advertising in GE13

In the 2013 elections, Najib Razak was the most popular political leader based
on the number of Twitter followers and Facebook fans. In terms of images and
mes- sages over social media, the content shows that BN projected a singular
branding with a single image of Najib as the iconic leader. Part of BN’s and
Najib’s strong presence online can be attributed to monies spent on election
advertising. Unlike previous elections, part of the budget for election advertising
was diverted to online advertising. For instance, the MalayMailOnline reported
on 15 August 2013 that according to international media-buying agency Vizeum
Media, the BN government spent an all-time high of RM531 million (USD 162
million) with the Prime Minister’s Department taking up a huge share of
Putrajaya’s advertising expenditure by spending RM264 million (USD 81
million) for the first six months of the year, five times more than it did in 2012
(MalayMailOnline 15 April 2013). The Malaysian Insider reported that BN
went on the offensive in purchasing online advertising space early for the
election.
Consumer analyst Nielsen Media Research reported that the Prime Minister’s
Office spent RM67.8 million (USD 21 million) on advertising in March 2013
and in February 2013 spent RM36.1 million (USD 11 million) for the purpose
of disseminating propaganda through the media (Zurairi 2013). The Malaysia
Insider reported that the @barisanasional Twitter account had been in opera-
tion from May 2012 as a Twitter ‘Promoted Account’, which is advertised by
Twitter. The account can cost at least RM45,900 (USD 15,000) for a three-
month campaign using its BN initials to maintain a website, Better Nation with
linked advertisements to other sites (Zurairi 2013).
On the other hand, PR was unable to effectively portray a singular coalition
branding or a convincing single coalition leadership icon. For instance, in all its
posters online and offline, the opposition coalition featured all three of its
leaders and maintained separate social media platforms at the party level. Hence
as a coalition, PR’s identity and messages over social media was visually
disparate as three distinct components. PR also had to manage BN’s paid
negative advertising in the mainstream media and respond to BN’s online
strategy to circulate lapses by the opposition coalition through Twitter, YouTube
and Facebook. Negative campaigning and counter campaigning on social media
defined the 13th general

Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24, 1 (2014): 95–105

Social Media Impact on Malaysia’s 13th General Election 101
election. Yet during the cause of the elections MCMC, which earlier warned
that it will take action against those who spread misinformation and falsehoods
circulated via the internet, did not take any significant action.
Nevertheless, the bulk of alternative materials shared over social media por-
trayed Pakatan party members as the victims of BN’s negative campaigning.
Social media postings during the election period showed that it had become the
‘consolidated’ platform for negative campaigning. In spite of the financial and
image disadvantage, social media did act as an election advertising leveller for
the opposition in relation to the establishments’ mainstream media and direct-
marketing advantage. Social media acted as a counter-frame to the negative
reporting of, and election advertising against opposition parties and their candi-
dates, by the pro-government mainstream media. This perhaps explains why BN
could not improve significantly its electoral showing.

Social Media’s Role and Impact on GE13’s

Electoral Outcome

In terms of social media’s foremost role in GE13, it may lie in its ability to
mobilize high voter turnout. From the context of voter mobilization, for
instance, compared to the 2008 elections when turnout was only 76 per cent, in
2013 the voter turnout was highest in Malaysian electoral history with 84.8 per
cent of eligible voters who cast their ballots. This underscores the point that the
dominant role of social media in elections lies in its capacity to mobilize and
politicize the citizenry. Here the term ‘social media election’, a term first used to
describe the 2008 presidential election campaign by Barack Obama, who used
new media technology to motivate young American voters to cast their vote is
relevant.
Chang and Bae noted that social media such as Twitter can turn elections
into ‘social elections’. The significance of the term lies in the way social media
can influence those who traditionally do not vote to turn out during an election
(Chang & Bae 2012, p. 36). While social media do influence more voters to turn
out during elections, the influence of social media in the Malaysian general elec-
tion needs to be assessed in the context of the people’s angst with key election
issues—corruption, racial-based policies, cronyism and religious extremism—
and unequal access to the mainstream media by the opposition parties.
Malaysia’s 13th general election was arguably not a ‘social media election’ at
least not for the ruling BN when we consider the electoral results.
In terms of social media’s impact on electoral results, despite BN’s financial
resources and political advertising in the mainstream media and its online pres-
ence, it only managed to secure 133 seats compared to 89 by the opposition PR.
It was the BN coalition’s worst electoral performance since 1969, dropping
further from its 140 seats in the 2008 general election. Despite the time and
resources dedicated by both the BN and Najib to improve their online presence
in the lead

Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24, 1 (2014): 95–105

102 James
Gomez
Table 6. Malaysian Voters, 2008 and
2013
Matter 2008 2013
Total Votes 10,740,227 13,268,002
Spoiled Votes 177,256 173,661
Total Votes Received 7,942,803 11,256,545
Source: spr.gov.my (16 August 2013).

Table 7. Popular Votes for Political

Parties
Political Party 2008 2013
Barisan Nasional 50.2% 45.5%
Pakatan Rakyat 46.75% 53.5%
Source: spr.gov.my (16 August 2013).

up to the 2013 general election, they could not arrest the erosion of support
for the government from Malaysian voters, who were keen to hear of signi-
ficant fundamental reforms and governmental actions in rising costs of living,
public corruption and equal opportunities for all Malaysians. As Leng Ho (2012,
p. 108) notes, popularity on social media platforms need not necessarily
translate into votes.
On the other hand, PR won five more seats from its 2008 results. For two
elections running, the opposition was able to deny the ruling BN a two-thirds
majority in Parliament. Issues such as standing up to corruption, democracy and
human rights, equality for all races and multiculturalism found resonance among
voters (see Tables 6 and 7 for a profile of the popular votes).

Conclusion: Social Media Predictive

Power Remains Elusive
Social media in Malaysia has been influential in keeping important political
issues in the forefront in the last five years prior to the 2013 elections. During
this time, both sides were pushing content through the various Facebook pages,
Twitter accounts and video portals. For the BN it did not significantly alter the
results in its favour. The opposition social media campaign was eclipsed by
BN’s main- stream media presence and paid advertising, yet it was able to
manage some improved showing at the polls. The influence of social media on
the outcomes of the 13th Malaysian general election is accumulative and
culminated during the period from nomination to polling day.
In Malaysia’s 13th general election, the difference between the role of social
media in facilitating voter mobilization and its ability to impact electoral result
holds explanatory potential to understand the influence of social media on voter

Asia Pacific Media Educator, 24, 1 (2014): 95–105

Social Media Impact on Malaysia’s 13th General Election 103
behaviour during any election. But the predictive power of social media remains
elusive in the Malaysian political context. The power structure, the ruling coali-
tion’s incumbent advantage and access to government resources, and the
politici- zation of ethnicity and Islam by both the ruling coalition and opposition
parties are played out in various shades on the Internet. This explains why the
Malaysian polls ended in dispute over alleged election irregularities.
The opposition led a series of post-election rallies to express dissatisfaction
with the results claiming that irregularities in the electoral system robbed them
of victory. The Election Integrity Project based in the University of Sydney and
Harvard University, which studies the quality of electoral systems against
international standards, scored Malaysia at 48.4 out of 100 points (The Election
Integrity Project 2014). The report identified imbalanced campaign coverage by
the mainstream media as one of the weakest links in the election cycle.
Hence, analysts need to be aware that social media only forms one part of the
media narrative in the Malaysian 13th general election. There are other
narratives formed by the mainstream print media, the broadcast media, paid
advertising and direct marketing. Nevertheless, social media will continue to be
an important tool for the ruling and opposition coalitions in the interim years
leading up to the next elections. However, the political issues that have been
simmering for decades will prove to be more critical in determining the results
of the next election in 2018 than the assumed inherent power of social media.

Note
1th.esWe hniulembers are impressive, it is important to note that there are accounts
that can be set up to artificially amplify messages or shore up a party or leader’s popu-
larity. Digital News Asia, which reported on the use of an online tool to investigate
the veracity of social media networks argued that only 20 or 40 per cent of a leader’s
Facebook followers in Malaysia are genuine (Asohan, 16 April 2013).

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James Gomez, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow at the Estonian Institute of

Humanities, Tallinn University, Estonia. He is a policy and communications
specialist with more than two decades’ experience in academia, think-tanks,
inter- governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations. He has
worked full-time in Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand
and the United Kingdom in organizational leadership roles. For his use of the
Internet for political communication, Gomez was identified as one of ‘Asia’s 50
most power- ful communicators’ by Asiaweek (2001), ‘An Asian Trailblazer’ by
Newsweek and an ‘Asian Making a Difference’ by the Far Eastern Economic
Review.
E-mail: jamesgomez@hotmail.com
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105