CANON 1

I. UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW A. DUTY TO UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION AND OBEY THE LAW

CANON 1: A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02: A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

Rule 1.03: A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

Rule 1.04: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if
it will admit of a fair settlement.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land.

A. DUTY TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION AND OBEY THE LAW

CANON 1: “A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for law and legal processes

 A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. As
such, he should make himself more an exemplary for others to emulate
 While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation
imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the
basic requirements of good citizenship.
o Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so
far as respect for the law is concerned.

1. Lawyer’s Primary Duty is to Society or State; Attorney’s Oath (Form

28, Rules of Court)
“I, __________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not willingly nor
wittingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.”

2. Significance of Lawyer’s Oath

  Busiños v. Ricafort: by swearing the lawyer’s oath, an attorney
becomes a guardian of trust and the rule of law, an indispensable
instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice
 In re Abad: a successful bar candidate who was allowed to sign by the
SC Clerk to sign the Roll of Attorneys but was unable to take his oath
before the Supreme Court
 Ting-Dumali v. Torres: The Lawyer’s Oath is not mere ceremony or
formality, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep
inviolable

3. Oath Alone Will Not Make a Bar Passer A Full Fledged Member of The
Bar
a bar passer must not also take his oath as a member of the Bar, but he must
also sign the Roll of Attorneys

Agguire v. Rana
B.M. 1030 | June 10, 2003 | Carpio, J.

Facts:
 The respondent Edwin Rana was among those who passed the 2000
Bar Exams. A day before the mass oath aking, the complainant Donna
Aguirre filed against him a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar,
charging him with unauthorized practice of the law, grave misconduct,
violation of the law, and grave misrepresentation. Because of these,
Rana was disallowed from signing his name in the Roll of Attorneys
until the said charges are resolved.
 These charges stemmed from the fact that during the mayoralty
elections in May 2001, Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as
counsel for candidates before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate.
 Further, he even signed pleadings as “counsel for George Bunan”,
“Undersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan”, and even entered his “appearance as counsel for
mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao”. All these were executed
prior to his taking the lawyer”s oath. In denial of the charges, he claims
to have assisted the candidates not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. He also claims that the charges against him were only
brought as political vendetta by the daughter of the losing mayoralty
candidate.

Issue: WON Rana was guilty of unauthorized practice of the law

Held: YES. The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OBC found that Rana
did in fact appear as counsel for Bunan in the mayoralty elections even before
he took the lawyer”s oath on May 22, 2001, thus recommending that he be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

The SC agreed with the findings and conclusions of the OBC and denied him
admission to the Bar. The Court ruled that although he passed the
examinations and took the oath, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
makes one a full-fledged lawyer. Prior to this, he had no authority to practice
the law.

4. Delay No Man for Money or Malice

  Reyes v. Gaa: this duty to delay no man for money or malice is
imposed upon every lawyer

5. Lawyers Will Be Disciplined For Disobeying Legal Orders or Processes

of Clients

Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Racquel Kho

A.M. No. P-06-2177 | April 19, 2007 | Corona, J.
Facts:
 Dizon was a lawyer and was driving his car while drunk when a taxi
overtook him. Incensed that a taxi overtook him, he followed the taxi
and confronted the driver, Soriano. The confrontation led to Dizon
shooting Soriano.
 The RTC convicted Dizon for frustrated homicide. Later, Soriano filed
an administrative case for disbarment against Dizon on the ground
that the latter was convicted for a crime involving moral turpitude.

Issue: Whether or not conviction for frustrated homicide is a ground for

disbarment

Held: YES, Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment or suspension.
 By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold
the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character. Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.”
 When lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances – not the mere fact of their conviction – would
demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the
present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as
a member of the bar.
 Dizon was the aggressor, he employed treachery, and was extremely
arrogant and self-important having overreacted to a simple traffic
incident. He also possessed an unlicensed firearm and unjustly refused
to satisfy his civil liability despite a court order to that effect. Further,
he lied and fabricated a story in his testimony in court.
 Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the
exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral
character. Where their misconduct outside of their professional
dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and
unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license and
the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them
from that office.

Other cases:
 People v. Dalusag: a lawyer was admonished for failure to inform the
SC of his reaction or appointment by the SC as counsel for one of the
appellants
 Luzon Mahogany v. Castro: a lawyer was reprimanded for failure to file
the Comment required of him by the SC
  Casals v. Cusi, Jr.: suspension was meted out to a lawyer for failure to
file Comment despite several extensions he asked for and which were
granted by the Court
 Geeslin v. Navarro: for continuing to practice law in clear violation of
the original resolution of suspension from the practice of law, SC
ordered that the lawyer’s name be stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys
 Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr: the deference by lawyers to the Court is
underscored by the fact that willful disregard of court orders and
processes may subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt, but to disciplinary sanctions as well
 Marcelo v. CA: if the lawyer does not take the duty to respect the SC
seriously, he is unfit to engage in the practice of law

B. DUTY NOT TO ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL CONDUCT

Rule 1.01: He “shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct.”

 An unlawful conduct is an act or omission which is against the law.

 A dishonest act is an act of lying or cheating.
 An immoral or deceitful conduct is one that involves moral turpitude. It
includes anything done contrary to justice, modesty or good morals, or to any
vileness, baseness or depravity in the private and social duties that a man
owes to his fellowmen or society, contrary to accepted rule of right and duty
between man and man

1. Lawyer’s Requirement of Good Moral Character

Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and
the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong
 People v. Tuanda: the qualification of good moral character is not only
a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law
 In re Argosino: all aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar
 Cordon v. Balicanta: Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of
morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their
legal career, in order to maintain one’s good standing [in that
profession].

2. Purpose of Requirement for Good Moral Character

 Dantes v. Dantes: the requirement of good moral character has three
ostensible purposes, to:
a) Protect the public;
b) Protect the public image of lawyers; and
c) Protect prospective clients

3. Conviction For Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude

A number of lawyers have been suspended or disbarred for conviction of
crimes involving moral turpitude, such as: estafa, bribery, murder, seduction,
abduction, etc.
4. Gross Immorality
 Grossly immoral - must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree,
or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the community’s sense of decency.
 Immoral conduct – that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.
 Immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community.
 A member of the bar may be suspended or removed from his office as
a lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
o A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity.
o TEST: whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it
renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Garrido v. Garrido
A.C. No. 6593 | February 4, 2010 | Per Curiam
Facts:
 Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental
affidavit for disbarment against Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia
 According to Maelotisea, She and Atty. Garrido were married back in
1962. Subsequently, she found out that the two lawyers got married in
Hong Kong in 1978, while she and Garrido were still married. She also
found out that the two had a daughter. In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the
conjugal home and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence. Since he
left the conjugal home, he stopped giving Maelotisea and his family the
needed financial support.
 In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea”s charges and
imputations. He alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he
was already married to Constancia David when he married Maelotisea.
As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial
problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia.
 He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties.
Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties. He denied that he failed to give financial support to his
children with Maelotisea. Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his
marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar,
with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia. Also,
Atty Garrido argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under
the IBP rules. Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the
complaints she filed arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly
relations with Atty. Garrido.

Issue: Whether or not the disbarment case against Atty. Garrido and Atty.
Valencia would prosper

Held: YES, both Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia did not possess the good
moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.
 On Atty. Garrido:
 As a lawyer, heviolated his lawyer”s oath,Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of
the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy.
 He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he “shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”;
 Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that “[a] lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession”; Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that,
“[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.”

On Atty. Valencia:
 Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of
and discredited the legal profession. Her actions were so corrupt as to
approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family.
 Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree;
as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of
his two previous marriages.

5. Unlawful Acts or Violation of Laws

Being a lawyer, the Rule dictates that he is supposed to be a model in the
community insofar as respect to the law is concerned

Re: Financial Audit of Atty. Racquel Kho

A.M. No. P-06-2177 | April 19, 2007 | Corona, J.
Facts:
 Atty. Raquel Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of
Eastern Samar, was held guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to
make a timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody
 Court now is deciding how to discipline him as a lawyer and officer of
the court
 In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely
remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He
maintained, however, that he kept the money in the court’s safety
vault and never once used it for his own benefit.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Kho committed an unlawful act that is contrary to
law

Held: YES
 Atty. Kho’s apparent good faith and his ready admission of the
infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that
his failure to remit P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was
contrary to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That
omission was a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities and of his duties under Canon
1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 o A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. It is no accident that these are the first edicts
laid down in the Code of Professional Responsibility or these are
a lawyer’s foremost duties.
o Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding
the Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed
on every citizen, a lawyer’s responsibilities under Canon 1 mean
more than just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants
of the law and officers of the court, lawyers are required to be
at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law.
 The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in
order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which
specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. The
least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from
engaging in unlawful conduct. By definition, any act or omission
contrary to law is unlawful. It does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although it is broad enough to include it.

Other cases:
 Bautista v. Gonzales: the law violated need not be a penal law
 In re Terrell: a lawyer was suspended for promoting an organization designed
to violate or evade the laws against crime with knowledge of its aims
 Platt v. Abordo: a lawyer who agreed to purchase opium – a prohibited drug –
although the sale was not consummated, was suspended
 In re Quiambao: a lawyer who engineered a scheme through his brother to
defraud another person was disbarred
 Stemmerik v. Mas: a lawyer who misled his foreign client into thinking he
could own land made a mockery out of the constitution and the legal
profession; he was disbarred. He was called a “swindler” in this case
 Re 2003 Bar Examinations: a lawyer was disbarred for transmitting and
distributing stolen Bar Examination questions to some members of his
fraternity to give them undue advantage over other examinees
 Batac, Jr. v. Cruz: a lawyer was suspended for committing dishonesty
concerning the excuses for his failure to attend hearings and lack of respect
for legal orders
 Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio: unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory
prohibition on a government employee to “engage in the private practice of
his profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions

C. DUTY NOT TO COUNSEL ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES

Rule 1.02: “A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance
of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal profession.”

1. Defiance of The Law Not To Be Abetted, Nor Acts Lessening

Confidence In The Legal System
Canon 32, CPE: A lawyer should not render any service or advice to any client
– no matter how powerful or important is the cause – which will involve
disloyalty to the laws of the country which he is bound to uphold and obey. If
he does so, he invites and merits stern and consternation.
 Donton v. Tansingco
A.C. No. 6057 | June 27, 2006 | Carpio, J.
Facts:
 Peter T. Donton filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of
a public document against Atty. Emmanuel Tansingco, a notary public
who notarized the Occupancy Agreement
 Tansingco allegedly helped Duane Stier, a US citizen, to circumvent the
laws against foreigners owning land through preparing and notarizing
an occupancy agreement
 Donton averred that Tansingoc’s act of preparing the Occupancy
Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is
disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
 Donton prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a
dishonest scheme.
 Tansingco defends that the complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case
against Stier
 He stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by
2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his
practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six
minor children.
 IBP recommended his suspension

Issue: Whether or not Tangsianco acted in defiance of the law

Held: YES. Tansingco is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the
Code
 A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client
which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and
obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary
action against the lawyer Tansingco advised and aided Stier in
circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership
of lands by preparing said documents.
 He had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath
and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Tansingco used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office
 Suspended for 6 months

2. What a Lawyer Should Do to Advance The Honor of His Profession

Canon 32, CPE: Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and
the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending
to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the
strictest principles of moral law.

He must also observe and advice his client to observe the statute law, though
until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent
adjudication he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and as to what
he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent.
 But above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for
fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic
and loyal citizen.

3. Duty To Be Performed Within The Law

Canon 15, CPE: In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
 But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the
law.
 The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of
him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery,
he must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

 Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers v. Lo Bu: Such conduct on the part of

counsel (attempts to frustrate the writ of execution) is far from
commendable. He was of course expected to defend his client's cause
with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the
clear purpose of labor statutes.
o He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the
court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that
he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his
client, ready and eager to do his every bidding.

4. Acts Which Corrode Confidence in the Legal System

 All acts, which are unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful, corrode
public confidence in the legal system. Hence, lawyers must always
conduct themselves in accord with the immutable tenets embodied in
the Lawyer’s Oath and the Rule of Legal Ethics
 In re 1989 IBP Elections: SC ruled that the candidates and many of the
participants in that election not only violated IBP By-Laws but also the
ethics of the legal profession imposed on all lawyers as a corollary to
obey and uphold the Constitution and the laws

D. DUTY NOT TO ENCOURAGE LAWSUITS

Rule 1.03: “A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding.”

1. Basis of The Rule

Section 20(g), Rule 138, ROC. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an
attorney: (g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance
of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt
motive or interest

2. Obligation Not To Encourage Suits

Lawyers owe it to the Court and to society not to stir up litigations; the reason
for the rule is to prevent barratry and ambulance chasing

3. Barratry and Ambulance-Chasing, Prohibited

 BARRATRY: frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, at law or
otherwise o It is the lawyer’s act of formenting suits among individuals and
offering his legal services to one of them for monetary motives or purpose

AMBULANCE CHASING: figuratively speaking, the lawyer’s act of chasing an

ambulance carrying the victim of an accident for the purpose of talking to the
said victim or relatives and offering his legal services for the filing of a case
against the person who caused the accident

AMBULANCE CHASER: a lawyer (or a person employed by him) who haunts

hospitals and visits the homes of the afflicted, officiously intruding their
presence and persistently offering his service on the basis of a contingent fee

Origin of The Term “Ambulance-Chaser”

In 1907, one Abraham Gatner persuaded a NY law firm to act as its agent in
soliciting retainer agreements from accident victims; he would hang around
police headquarters and with the cooperation of a clerk in the police
department, succeed in getting a daily list of accident victims

4. Evils Spawned by Ambulance-Chasing

 Formenting of litigation with resulting burdens on the courts and the
public;
 Subornation of perjury;
 Mulcting of innocent persons by judgments upon manufactured causes
of actions; and
 Defrauding of injured persons having causes of action but ignorant of
legal rights and court procedure through contracts with retain
exorbitant percentages of recovery and illegal charges for court
costs/expenses and by settlement made for quick returns of fees
against the just rights of injured persons

Linsangan v. Tolentino
A.C. No. 6672 | September 4, 2009 | Corona, J.
Facts:
 This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services.
 Complainant alleged that Tolentino, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial assistance, loans, and expeditious
collection on their claims.
 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and
sent them text messages.

Issue: Whether or not Tolentino’s actions of soliciting and stealing clients

away from other lawyers is a ground for disciplinary action

Held: YES, such solicitation and client grabbing is a ground for disciplinary
action.
 Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers.
 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. The
rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in
 order to gain employment). Through Labiano’s (Tolentino’s paralegal)
actions, Tolentino’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were
enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word
that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
 Settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client
nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.

5. Volunteer Legal Advice to Bring a Lawsuit:

Unethical Generally; Exception – Canon 28, CPE
 GR: It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit
 XPT: in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his
duty to do so

6. Lawyer Should Not Be An Instigator of Controversy, But A Mediator

For Concord And Conciliator For Compromise
 It is the duty of a lawyer in his exalted position as an officer of the
court not to be an instigator of any controversy

7. Delaying Any Man’s Cause for Corrupt Motive, Condemned

 Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos: in his Lawyer’s Oath, he had sworn not to
delay any man’s cause for money or malice
 Jesalva v. Bautista: a lawyer cannot delay the approval of a
compromise agreement entered into between the parties, just because
his attorney’s fees were not provided for in the agreement

8. Appealing A Case For Purposes of Delay is Considered Obstruction of

Justice
 Vda. De Bacaling v. Laguna: The summary proceeding was originally
filed on September 13, 1960; it reached the appellate courts five
times, twice before the Court of Appeals, Once before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, and twice before this Court. The present petition
smacks of a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by
petitioner to frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case
and to prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of
petitioner and her counsel

Other unprofessional acts which come within the prohibition includes:

 To stir up litigation is a crime known as maintenance at common law.
 Among the unprofessional acts which come within the prohibition includes:
 Volunteering advice to bring lawsuit, except in cases where ties of blood,
relationship or trust make it his duty to do so
 Hunting defects in titles and informing its owners thereof for employment
 Employing agents or runners for like purposes
 Paying reward to those who bring such cases to his office
 Remunerating policemen, or other officials, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice
 Searching for unknown heirs and soliciting their employment of him
 Initiating a meeting of the members of the club and inducing them
 To organize and contest legislation under his guidance
 Purchasing notes to collect them by litigation at a profit
 Furnishing credit reports in expectation of possible employment
  Agreeing with a purchaser of fit ire interest to invest therein in consideration
of his service

E. DUTY TO ENCOURAGE AMICABLE SETTLEMENT

Rule 1.04: “A lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.”

A lawyer should be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise rather
than an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict, a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation

1. Nature of Compromise
 A “compromise is as often the better part of justice as prudence is the
better part of valor” and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no
less the client’s champion in settlement out of court than he is the
client’s “champion in the battle in court.”
 A litigation involves time, expense and ill feelings, which may well be
avoided by the settlement of the action. And in those clearly
unmeritorious cases, a compromise or even a confession of judgment
will accord respect to the just claim of the other party, save the client
additional expenses and help prevent clogging of the docket.
 Jesalva v. Bautista: the nature of a compromise agreement is such that
a party must give up some of the rights that he has, in consideration of
the same act on the part of the other side

2. Authority of a Lawyer to Bind Clients

Rule 138, Sec. 23 of ROC: Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking
appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. They cannot,
without special authority, compromise their client’s litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash

3. Settlement of Cases Authorized and Encouraged by Law

 Republic v. Villarosa: the settlement of cases in court is authorized and
even encouraged by express provision of law
 Jesalva v. Bautista: the law does not limit compromise to cases about
to be filed or cases already pending in courts; that compromise which
may be effected even after final judgment is impliedly allowed by Art.
2040, NCC

4. Lawyer Must Encourage Fair Settlement

A compromise is often the better part of justice as prudence is the part of
valor and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the client’s
champion in settlement out of court than he is the client’s champion in the
battle of court

Castaneda v. Ago
G.R. No. L-28546 | July 30, 1975| Castro, J.
Facts:
 In 1955, petitioners Castaneda and Henson filed a repleving suit
against Pastor Ago to recover certain machineries.
  In 1964, the Sheriff executed a final deed of sale in favor of Castaneda
and Henson since Ago failed to redeem the machineries
 Upon their petition, the CFI of Manila issued a writ of possession to the
properties which Ago objected and did a lot to resist in complying with
the judgment
 Ago, with asistance of his counsel Atty. Jose Luison, filed the following
“remedies”: Motion to stop auction sale, annulment of auction
sale with another court (which issued and lifted restraining
order 3 times). Certiorari with SC, then MR. Certiorari with CA,
then appeal to SC. Certiorari with CA and the case is still pending
until1975.

Issue: Whether or not Ago, assisted by their lawyer Atty. Jose Luison, misused
the legal remedies in this case

Held: YES, Atty. Luison “has allowed himself to become an instigator of

controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primary of truth and moral justice”
 it is even the lawyer’s duty to resist the whims and caprices of his
client and to temper his client’s propensity to litigate
 New causes of action alleged by Ago are baseless. Alleges that house
cannot be levied upon because conjugal property, but this issue was
decided by SC long ago (laches).
 Misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of
the petitioners.
 A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candorand honesty his
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended, what
we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite
the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
 It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack
of merit of his case.
 If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden
duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible.
 A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to
his client.

5. Attorney’s Fees Not Ground For Disapproval of Compromise

 Jesalva v. Bautista: The rights of lawyers to the fees due them for
services in a litigation cannot have a higher standing than the rights of
the clients or the parties themselves. Lawyers' rights may not be
invoked by some of the parties as a ground for disapproving the
compromise. The lawyer affected can enforce his rights in a proper
proceeding in accordance with the Rules, but said rights may not be
used to prevent the approval of the compromise

6. A Lawyer Cannot Compromise Case Without Client’s Consent;

Exception
 A lawyer cannot receive property subject of a pending litigation where
he is appearing by way of compromise
 A compromise entered into without authority is merely unenforceable;
 the client, if he so desires, may ratify the compromise
o However, a lawyer has the exclusive management of the
procedural aspect of the litigation including the enforcement of
rights and remedies of the client
 Melendrez v. Decena: a lawyer cannot, without special authority,
compromise his client’s litigation or receive anything in discharge of
the client’s claim but the full amount in case
 Philippine Aluminum Wheels Inc v. FASGI Enterprises: a lawyer cannot
compromise the case of his client without the latter’s consent even if
he believes that the compromise is for the better interest of the client
o If the client is not agreeable to the compromise, he must
immediately repudiate the same; otherwise, he cannot be heard
to complain late

CANON 2

CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN

EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.

 In essence, it mandates that a Lawyer’s attitude towards the practice should

be characterized with efficiency such that whenever he decides to handle a
case or to extend his legal services for a fee or even for free, he must always
see to it that he must do so with efficiency and convenience with the end on
view of maintaining independence, integrity and effectiveness of the legal
profession at all times.

Under Canon 2, there are four rules, stated as follows:

o Rule 2.01 – A Lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed.

o Rule 2.02 – In such a case, even if a lawyer does not accept a case, he
shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only
to the extent necessary to safeguard latter’s right.

o Rule 2.03 – A Lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act

designed primarily to solicit legal business.

o Rule 2.04 – A Lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those
customarily prescribed unless the circumstance so warrant.

 Rule 2.01. It highlights the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed

vis-à-vis the legal profession.
 o As general rule, people who are not in a position to defend
themselves due to poverty, weakness, ignorance, or other similar
reasons and those who are victims of cruelty, unlawful exaction,
domination, or excessive use of authority should not be rejected by a
Lawyer whose services are being engaged.
 It is the Lawyer’s prime duty to see to it that justice be
accorded to all without discrimination. In effect, Canon 2
serves as the backbone of conducting legal aid, not as a matter
of charity, but a public responsibility and public service.
o However, exceptions to this general rule may be found under Rule
14.03 and jurisprudence.
 Under Rule 14.03, “A Lawyer may not refuse to accept
representations of an indigent client unless (1) he is not in a
position to carry out the work effectively or competently; and
(2) he labors under conflict of interest between him and the
prospective client or between a present client and the
prospective client.
 Furthermore, in the case of Canoy v. Ortiz, the Supreme Court
laid down another valid reason for a Lawyer to reject the cause
of the defenseless or oppressed when the Court stated that a
Lawyer should not accept more cases than he can handle
thereby implying that the caseload of a Lawyer may be a
ground for an exception under Rule 2.01.

 Rule 2.02. It mandates that in case of non-acceptance of the case of the

defenseless or oppressed due to valid reasons, the Lawyer shall still
render legal advice in order to safeguard their rights.

o For example, if a Lawyer, for reasons of health, could not handle the
case of a detainee or detainees incarcerated in a military camp, he
could advise the latter’s relatives to make representations with the
proper authorities or to file a petition for habeas corpus with the
proper court and even to recommend a competent lawyer who could
render prompt assistance under the circumstances.

 Rule 2.03. It emphasizes that the practice of law is a profession and not a
money-making trade.
o The Supreme Court has distinguished the primary characteristics of
the legal profession from a business, such as the following:
 A duty of public service of which the emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
 A relation as an officer of court to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability;
 A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
  A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods od advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.
o Solicitation of legal business, when permissible.
 For the solicitation of legal business to be permissible, it must
be compatible with the dignity of legal profession such that it
must be made in a modest and decorous manner and it must
not bring injury to the lawyer or the bar.
 The use of simple signs stating the name or names of the
lawyers, professional cards bearing the name of the lawyer or
lawyers, office and residence address, and special lines in law,
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data,
as well as the use of calling cards with a formal picture of the
lawyer are now acceptable.
 Publication in reputable law list, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is allowable
o Advertisements in newspaper, when permissible.
 Modest announcements in newspapers, periodicals, or
magazines about the opening of a law office or law firm stating
the names of the lawyers and the address of the office or firm is
permissible.
 It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by
circulars, advertisements, through letters or by personal
communications or interviews not warranted by personal
relations.
 Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with the causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the importance of the lawyer’s
position, and all other like self-laudation offend the traditions
and lower the tone of the profession and are reprehensible, but
the use of simple professional cards is not improper
 An advertisement bearing the name of the lawyer, his address
and the remarks “advice free” is an improper solicitation. In
the same breadth, a radio program of a lawyer advertising his
legal skill and receiving phone questions about law and which
he answers in the form of legal advice is likewise improper and
reprehensible. However, a legal aid program as a public service
is allowable
o Best advertisement for a lawyer
 The best advertisement for a lawyer is a well deserved
reputation for competence, honesty, and fidelity to private
 trust and public duty. Of these, honesty reigns paramount. A
lawyer, must not only be honest but must appear to be honest.
By honesty, he gains public confidence and this public
confidence is his greatest advertisement.

o Cases
 DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS V. BAYOT
 Facts:
o The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is
charged with malpractice for having published
an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June
13, 1943, which assured the prompt issuance of
a marriage license and a marriage arranged to
the wishes of the parties through their
assistance. Respondent first denied having
published the said advertisement but
subsequently admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and
mercy" of the Court.
 Issue:
o WON respondent Bayot acted in violation of the
Code of Ethics which prohibits the solicitation of
legal business
 Ruling: Yes.
o It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from the
public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by
advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worth and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
 reputation for professional capacity and fidelity
to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.) The Court decided that the
respondent should be reprimanded.

 IN RE: TAGORDA

 Facts:
o The respondent Atty. Luis Tagorda, a member of
the provincial board of Isabela, admits that in the
last general elections he made use of a card
written in Spanish and Ilocanom which in effect
advertising his services as a lawyer to the public.
o The respondent further admits that he is the
author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of
barrio in his home municipality written in
Ilocano in which he stated his continued exercise
of his profession as a lawyer and a notary public,
beside being a member of the board of the
municipality of Ilagan, Isabela. He also stated
that he would be willing to render his legal
services to the people who have not contracted
any other lawyer’s services
 Issue:
o WON Tagorda is in violation of Code of Ethics
 Held: Yes.
o Application is give to sec. 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act NO. 2828,
providing “The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokets, constitutes
malpractice,“ and to Canon 27 and 28 of the Code
of Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and by the Philippines Bar
Association in 1917, to the case of the
respondent lawyer.
o The law is a profession and not a business. The
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by
himself or through others for to do so would be
unprofessional. It becomes our duty to condemn
in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of
solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive
of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the
standards of that profession. It works against the
 confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar. It results in needless
litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise
peacefully inclined citizens. The solicitation of
employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension.

 ULEP v THE LEGAL CLINIC

 Facts:
o Petitioner Ulep, petitioner, prays for the Court
"to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law.”
o Petitioner avers that the advertisements
reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive
of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed
and offended by the said advertisements.
Respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it
is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers
and electronic machines.
o Respondent further argues that assuming that
the services advertised are legal services, the act
of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona

 Issue:
o WON the services offered by respondent
constitutes practice of law and, thus in violation
on the rule of advertisements of legal services

 Held: Yes. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of

law and such practice is not allowed. Respondent is
composed mainly of paralegals; the services it offers
 include various legal problems wherein a client may
avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine
jurisdiction however, the services being offered by
Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

 Rule 2.04. A lawyer must refrain from charging lower rates than the
customary rates unless with valid justification such as, relatives, co-lawyers,
or belongs to the marginalized sector.

o Rates to be charged
 Some IBP Chapters in the country have approved schedules of
Attorney’s fees providing specific guidelines in the fixing of
attorney’s fees for legal services, including but not limited to
consultation, documentation, notarization, pleading, research,
trial work, appearance fees, acceptance fees, retainers and
similar others.
 Other chapters, while they do not have such schedules have
followed and are still following a long standing local custom or
tradition on the amounts of attorney’s fees for their legal
services.
 To avoid any demeaning and degrading competition, lawyers
as much as possible should be in unison in respecting such
custom or tradition. They must refrain from charging rates
lower than the customary rates unless there are valid
justifications – such as when a client is a relative or a brother
lawyer, or is too poor that it would be inhumane to charge him
even the customary rates of attorneys’ fees. In the latter
situation, when a client is indigent, the lawyer may charge a
reduced fee or no fee at all.
 If the attorney’s fees customarily charged in an area are too
low and petty in which affect the respectability of the legal
profession, the lawyers may agree to modify and calculate the
rates chargeable within the paying capacity of the ordinary
clients.

CANON 3
 CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE
ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall
be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible
provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm
and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to
practice law currently.

Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE

ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed

name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner
is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications
that said partner is deceased.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from
the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law
allows him to practice law currently

Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to

representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business

CANON 4

CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM
AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID1 TO EXEMPT
LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING, DOCKET AND OTHER FEES.

The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008 which requested the IBP’s
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the
payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid office of
various IBP chapters. 

The Supreme Court granted the request of Misamis Oriental

Chapter of the IBP. 

Access to Justice: Making an Ideal a Reality

Access to justice by all which is essential in a democracy and in the

rule of law is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. 

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of
poverty. 

The IBP, pursuant to its general objectives to "improve the

administration of justice and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively," assists the Court in providing the poor access
to justice. In particular, it renders free legal aid under the supervision of the
NCLA.

A New Rule, a New Tool for Access to Justice 

Under the IBP Guidelines on Legal Aid, the combined “means and merit
test” shall be used to determine the eligibility of an applicant for legal aid. 

The "means and merit tests" appear to be reasonable determinants of

eligibility for coverage under the legal aid program of the IBP. Nonetheless,
they may be improved to ensure that any exemption from the payment of
legal fees that may be granted to clients of the NCLA and the legal aid offices
of the various IBP chapters will really further the right of access to justice by
the poor. This will guarantee that the exemption will neither be abused nor
trivialized.

A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, the Implementing Rules and Regulations

promulgated by the Supreme Court to implement Resolution No. 24, provides
for the means test and the merits test. "Means test" refers to the set of
criteria used to determine whether the applicant is one who has no money or
property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family. "Merit test" refers to the ascertainment of whether the
applicant's cause of action or his defense is valid and whether the chances of
establishing the same appear reasonable and

The means test shall be based on the following criteria: (i) the
applicant and that of his immediate family must have a gross monthly income
that does not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage of an
employee in the place where the applicant resides and (ii) he does not own
real property with a fair market value as stated in the current tax declaration
of more than Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos.

In this connection, the applicant shall execute an affidavit of indigency

(printed at the back of the application form) stating that he and his immediate
family do not earn a gross income above mentioned, nor own any real
property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a
disinterested person attesting to the truth of the applicant's affidavit. The
latest income tax return and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be
attached to the applicant's affidavit. 

The means test shall not be applicable to applicants who fall under the
developmental legal aid program such as overseas workers, fisherfolk,
farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women, children and
other disadvantaged groups.

This test now appears in the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 19 of Rule 141.

Under the merit test, a case shall be considered meritorious if an

assessment of the law and evidence at hand discloses that the legal service
will be in aid of justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking into consideration
the interests of the party and those of society. A case fails this test if, after
consideration of the law and evidence presented by the applicant, it appears
that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work
oppression or wrong.

In promulgating Resolution No. 24, the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the

IBP has effectively performed its duty to "participate in the development of
the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
administration of justice."

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty on Allegations of Plagiarism and

Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, [March
8, 2011], 660 PHIL 1-130

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled

"Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in
Newsbreak's website and on Atty. Roque's blog. A report regarding the
statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News
TV and the Sun Star sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise
posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law's bulletin board
allegedly on August 10, 2010 and at said college's website.

The Supreme Court issued a Resolution and went on to state: “While

most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy
criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross
the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the
disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference
obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice."
 The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the
faculty's less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010
Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court's honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on
the comfort women's claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty
would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would
not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they
have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.”

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal

processes and the courts and of tending to influence, or giving the
appearance of influencing the Court in the issuance of their Statement,
respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather
to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in
the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the
portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action."  Respondents'
call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to
the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining
lawyers to 'participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or
supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration
of justice'" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to
"promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.).
Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest and duty
to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these
unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in
our law schools."

The Court has this to say: Even if the Court was willing to accept
respondents' proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of the
Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of
the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the
improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same
duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect
to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence
the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to
abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors are
not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just
their preferred portions thereof.

Thus, Canon 4 of the CPR cannot justify the statement of the UP Law
Professors when such statements run counter to other provisions of the CPR
such as Canon 1, 11, and 13 on giving due respect to legal processes and the
courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts.

CANON 5
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS,
PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN
THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN
DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

CANON 5

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT

SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
public duties.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.

Ethical Conduct of Government Lawyers.

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the

continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by government
lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of
conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713,  otherwise known as “Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” for
government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to
observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct
demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the
standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service
are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability.

As stated by the IBP Committee that drafted the Code, "a lawyer does
not shed his professional obligations upon assuming public office. In fact, his
public office should make him more sensitive to his professional obligations
because a lawyer's disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in the
public's eye." Want of moral integrity is to be severely condemned in a
lawyer who holds a responsible public office. Thus, lawyers in the government
service are under an even greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of
the legal profession because public office is a public trust. For a lawyer in
public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government,
she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer
in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official duties." A government lawyer is thus
bound by the prohibition "not to represent conflicting interests." However,
this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent
conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a
written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or
when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.

Discipline of lawyers in government service.

The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the
administrative disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute any act or
omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman is the
government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil, and
criminal liability of government officials "in every case where the evidence
warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the
people." In Samson v. Restrivera, the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance committed by any public officer or employee during his or her
tenure. Consequently, acts or omissions of public officials relating to the
performance of their functions as government officials are within the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, the Court held that the IBP has
no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged with administrative
offenses involving their official duties.

In a number of cases, the Court has defined the line between the
accountability of government lawyers as members of the bar and as public
officials. In Trovela v. Robles, the Court has held that the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate government lawyers charged with administrative
offense in the exercise of their official duties and functions. The Court further
expounded that the authority to discipline government lawyers is with the
Secretary of Justice as their superior. Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman
is clothed with disciplinary jurisdiction over government lawyers as public
officials, pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989). Thus, the filing of the administrative complaint for
disbarment should be filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.

It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government
official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar
on such grounds. In the following cases, a public prosecutor, chairman and
vice chairman of the Board of Canvassers, a judge, and a Register of Deeds
were held liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility, applying
Canon 6.

Penticostes v. Ibañez, A.C. CBD No. 167 (Resolution), [March 9,

1999], 363 PHIL 624-629

Sometime in 1989, respondent Prosecutor Diosdado S. Ibañez was

assigned to conduct a preliminary investigation of the complaint for non-
remittance of SSS payments filed against Encarnacion Pascual, the sister-in-
law of the complainant. In the course of the investigation, Encarnacion
Pascual gave P1,804.00 to respondent as payment of her Social Security
System (SSS) contributions in arrears. Respondent, however, did not remit
the amount to the SSS. Hence, on November 16, 1990, Atty. Prudencio S.
Penticostes, the brother-in-law of Pascual, filed a complaint for professional
misconduct against Ibañez alleging that the respondent's misappropriation of
Encarnacion Pascual's SSS contributions amounted to the violation of his oath
as a lawyer. In his defense, respondent, claimed that the action was moot
and academic, since the amount of P1,804.00 had already been paid by him
to the SSS and that the acts complained of were not done by him in his
capacity as a practicing lawyer but on account of his office as a prosecutor.

Respondent's claim that he may not be held liable because he

committed such acts, not in his capacity as a private lawyer, but as a
prosecutor is unavailing. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: "These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks." ACCORDINGLY, the Court REPRIMANDED the
respondent.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Fabros, A.C. No. 4517 (Resolution), [September 11,

2006], 533 PHIL 1-8

As chairman and vice-chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers

of Isabela, respectively, respondents were mandated to receive the
municipal/city certificates of canvass, and to canvass them for the votes of
the members of the Senate, among others. They were also required to
determine the provisional total votes of each candidate as of each
adjournment. On final adjournment, they were tasked to prepare a statement
of votes with a certification of the same as official. In addition, they prepared
the provincial certificate of canvass (in which the padded figures were
discovered) with the certification under oath as public officers that the entries
were true and correct. The records reflect, and respondents admit, the
discrepancy between the questioned certificate of canvass and the statement
of votes of the Province of Isabela in the 1995 elections. While there was no
question that the municipal/city certificates of canvass were not tampered
with, the tabulation of the figures on the statement of votes was anomalous.
For this, respondents were responsible.

As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of

excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them. As
lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful conduct. They also violated their oath as officers of the court to
foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is
demanded of them as lawyers in the government service:

CANON 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service

in the discharge of their official tasks.

As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an

even greater obligation to observe the basic tenets of the legal profession
because public office is a public trust.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is

not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or
the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the
accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action

People v. Gacott, Jr., G.R. No. 116049, [March 20, 1995], 312 PHIL
603-613

Obviously, respondent judge did not even bother to read the text of
the cited Letter Of Instruction; otherwise, he would have readily
acknowledged the validity of the argument advanced by the prosecution. But
even more glaring than respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to
check the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the duty to
inform the court on the applicable law to a particular case devolves solely
upon the prosecution or whoever may be the advocate before the court.

Courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws of the land
(Sec. 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court). Being the trier of facts, judges are
presumed to be well-informed of the existing laws, recent enactments and
jurisprudence, in keeping with their sworn duty as members of the bar (and
bench) to keep abreast of legal developments. As provided in the Code of
Professional Responsibility: "CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal
developments, participate in continuing legal education programs. . . .
CANON 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks." In the present case, the error could have
been entirely avoided were it not for public respondent's irresponsibility in
the performance of his duties. It is but proper that respondent judge be
reprimanded and his order of dismissal set aside for grave ignorance of the
law. Respondent judge's error is not a simple error in judgment but one
amounting to gross ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the
public's perception of the court's competence.
 Coloma v. Ulep, A.C. No. 5961 (Notice), [February 13, 2019]

Commissioner Villadolid found Atty. Coloma liable for committing

perjury while on the witness stand; that during cross-examination, Atty.
Coloma had disavowed any knowledge regarding the official stand of the LRA
on the Maysilo Estate and claimed that he was unable to read the March 27,
2000 letter to Atty. Faylona; that such statement directly contradicted his
letter dated October 22, 2001 containing the LRA's stand on the Maysilo
Estate; that Atty. Coloma would not have attached a copy of the March 27,
2000 letter as supporting evidence to his letter had he not read and known of
the contents of said letter.

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that the

Code extends to government lawyers including complainant herein Atty.
Coloma as Register of Deeds. As such, the canons require him to:

Canon 1 — A Lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law of and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A Lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral

or deceitful conduct.

Canon 10 — A Lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the

court.

Rule 10.01 — A Lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead
by any artifice.

We find herein that Atty. Coloma had transgressed Canon 1, Rule 1.01,
Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 when he falsely testified in court on January 6,
2009. As an officer of the court, Atty. Coloma is expected to be truthful with
his testimony and to avoid committing any form of falsehood.

Lim-Santiago v. Sagucio, A.C. No. 6705, [March 31, 2006], 520 PHIL
538-553

Respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to the

complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he
signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer's fee." Thus, as
correctly pointed out by the complainant, respondent clearly violated the
prohibition in RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees).

Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official duties." A government lawyer is thus
bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." However,
this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent
conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a
written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or
when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to

engage in "unlawful conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the
statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private
practice of his profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official
functions."

RULE 6.01 The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public

prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible
and is cause for disciplinary action.

Duty of Prosecutors.

The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors
represent a sovereign whose obligation to govern impartially is compelling as
its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time
to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, Lawyers
Review, July 31, 1994).

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

prosecutors who represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are
not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice is
done.

The authority and the duty to dismiss a worthless complaint fully

accorded with the primary responsibility of an officer engaged in public
prosecution of offenses not to convict the offender but to see that justice is
done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is a
cause for disciplinary action. Conformably with this tenet, the respondent
public officials had the authority and the duty to dismiss the petitioner's
complaint once they determined it to be devoid of merit; thus, no abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse, could be attributed to them.

Cuenca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109870 (Resolution), [December

1, 1995], 321 PHIL 64-70

Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial. However,
the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own
interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts
doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner.
Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the
Court.

The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness

and due execution of his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair
play.

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

prosecutors who represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are
not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice is
done.

Untalan v. Soriano, A.C. No. 8618 (Notice), [January 19, 2018]

On November 3, 2009, respondent issued a Resolution recommending

the filing of an Information for libel against Domingo Pastrana and the bail be
set at P10,000. On November 4, 2009, however, respondent issued an
Amended Resolution, recommending that no case be filed due to non-
payment of legal fees despite notice and directing the arresting officer to
release Domingo Pastrana unless detained for a lawful cause.

Complainant argued that reversing the previous resolution merely due

to the non-payment of filing fees is a flimsy reason, especially when the
private complainant in the criminal case was not notified of such requirement
in violation of Article II, Section 2B (2), Paragraph (f) of the Guidelines in the
Assessment and Collection of Legal Fees by the National Prosecution Service
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9279 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The case, according to the complainant, should have been
decided on the merits and not on such technicality. Considering the
foregoing, complainant argued that respondent violated his duty as a
member of the Bar under Rule 10.03, CANON 6, and Rule 6.01 of the CPR, to
wit:

“Rule 10.03 — A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

CANON 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government

services in the discharge of their official tasks.

Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public

prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression
of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action.”

The IBP-CBD found no reason to suspend, much more disbar the

respondent based on the allegations in the complaint and records available.
 It found that respondent's conduct of the inquest was in accordance
with the Guidelines in the Assessment and Collection of Legal Fees by the
National Prosecution Service Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9279 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations. The said Rules expressly provide that
complaints filed for inquests, preliminary investigation and for
appeals/petitions for review shall not be accepted unless the legal fees have
been paid.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties.

Prohibition on Private Interests.

Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits

a lawyer in government from using his/her public position or influence to
promote or advance his/her private interests. Since public office is a public
trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service
is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in
the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms
of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put
aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private
activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions. 

Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the CPR is particularly directed to lawyers in

government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1)
promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private
interests to interfere with public duties.

Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of

monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or
which may be affected by the functions of his office. A lawyer in public office
is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig, we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer

who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, Commission on Higher
Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,
we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor Relations
Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the
act of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.
 Buere v. Ramon, A.C. No. 10250 (Notice), [July 3, 2017]

Respondent Atty. Ramon violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 which states

that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 which states that a lawyer in the
government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent fell short of the standard for lawyers when she converted
fees entrusted to her that were supposed to be turned over to NHMFC and
used to defray expenses for the foreclosure proceedings.

Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984 (Resolution), [April 1, 2003], 448

PHIL 199-210

The complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal
Affairs Service of CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment
under Sec. 27 Rule 138 when she demanded money from students and
teachers for the fixing of their transactions with the Legal Affairs Service. She
also violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing 11 baseless, groundless and
unfounded suits which were subsequently dismissed. 

The IBP concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a

government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act
favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used
her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the
dignity and reputation of the CHED.  It was recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of
three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be
a ground for disbarment of respondent.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be

disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a government
official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be
disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various

occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to
extort from persons sums of money as consideration for her favorable action
on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence
remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure, despite the opportunities
afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to
comment on the charges. We find that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer
of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member
of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently
unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for
the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the CPR was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the
performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is
subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications

or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the CPR
which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach
of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes
soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.
Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of
the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. Thus, she is disbarred. 

Yagong v. Magno, A.C. No. 10803 (Notice), [April 17, 2017]

Imelda Yagong filed an administrative complaint against City

Prosecutor Apao which stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti Fencing Law. Marchelle Yagong, one of the respondents in the Anti-
Fencing case, is the complainant's son. Yagong claimed that during the
clarificatory conference, she tried to take notes on matters discussed during
such but Apao, in an insulting manner, told the complainant that the latter
and her company will be charged should they violate the order. The
Complaint maintained that Apao's actuation was highly improper and
irregular. Complainant cited signs of partiality, discrimination, and evil motive
of personal vengeance and reprisal committed by respondents, such as:

1. The entire City Prosecution Office of IGACOS inhibited themselves

from resolving the criminal complaint filed by complainant against Mr. Wilmer
Villabrille simply because complainant happened to be a witness against the
respondents in two administrative cases filed before this Court;
 2. Apao found 2 probable cause for the filing of an Information for
Murder against Edwin San Juan (San Juan), just because complainant was the
witness of San Juan;
3. The bias and discriminatory actuations of respondents were so
apparent when a certain Prosecutor Garcia and Administrative Clerk Patricio
Colinares refused to accept the counter-charges interposed by San Juan; and

4. As expected, Apao resolved to indict complainant's son together

with Frederick Lendon Monteclar (Monteclar) and Jesus A. Gonzales
(Gonzales) for violation of PD 1612 by simply declaring that Maghinay owned
the fighting cocks on the basis of an "insignificant and absurd justification"
not even alleged in Maghinay's complaint.

The Complaint claimed that respondents’ reprehensible acts are in

violation of Rule 6.02 of the CPR. Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the CPR is particularly
directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from using one's
public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private
interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties. It is well
to note that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the
Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer

The allegation of the complainant to the effect that Apao is biased and
partial against the complainant has no merit. Additionally, complainant's
allegation that Apao issued resolutions adverse to a party whenever
complainant acts as a witness of such person is speculative and is
unsupported by the evidence presented. It is well-established that a public
prosecutor is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as
defined by law and should be held for trial.

In the present case, the complainant failed to present any evidence

that Apao was motivated by malice, bad faith, vengeance and hate in issuing
the resolutions. While Magno is also charged in the present administrative
complaint, the complainant, however, failed to specifically mention any act or
present any evidence that shows that Magno committed misconduct,
dishonesty, falsehood or had misused the rules of procedure.

Bautista v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 9057, [July 3, 2019]

Complainant Bautista alleged that she had recently accused Ferrer,

Assistant Regional State Prosecutor with grave coercion, grave threats, grave
oral defamation, unlawful arrest, violation of R.A. No.7438, theft and
attempted homicide. Bautista suggests that she once owed Ferrer
P200,000.00, but the latter is now claiming that the amount is already
P440,000.00.
 Bautista narrated that Ferrer, who was very furious, came to her house
she was renting from the latter and uttered derogatory remarks such as
"punyeta ka! Ang kapal ng mukha mo!" and threatened her with the words,
"kung hindi lang ako naawa sa anak mo, tuluyan kita!" Ferrer then brought
out a handgun from a bag being held by her driver, forced her to leave the
house she was renting, illegally searched her bag, and forcibly took her Nokia
cellular phone. When her live-in partner and the latter's sister arrived on a
tricycle, she also harassed them and took the key thereto from him.
Thereafter, Ferrer forcibly brought her to the City Hall of San Fernando
supposedly to identify those people who she lent Ferrer's money to. Upon
arriving thereat, however, Ferrer not only identified her debtors, but also
placed Bautista in public ridicule in exclaiming that she was a member of the
"Budol-budol" gang. Unsatisfied with said deed, Ferrer next detained and
delivered her to the custody of the PNP without any legal grounds where she
was subjected to an investigation. When she finally disclosed the names,
Ferrer kicked, punched, and repeatedly slapped her head. Then, Ferrer
bragged that the police was under her control and ordered a police officer to
search her bag who consequently searched her wallet and got the list of
debtors therein. Finally, at the end of the day, Bautista recalled that Ferrer
evicted her and her family from the house they were renting from Ferrer and
prevented them from taking their personal belongings therein. These
personal belongings, which includes a television set and a refrigerator, were
taken out of the rented house and brought to one of the rooms in Ferrer's
house, which Ferrer refused to return until Bautista paid the alleged sum of
money. Bautista further narrates she went to Ferrer's office with Jose Mari
Almeida, a Supervisor from DepEd, to beg for the release of her personal
belongings as well as a computer belonging to Almeida. But Ferrer got angry
and told her "Putang ina mo Arlene ayusin mo ako bago mo muna makuha
mga gamit mo!" She then picked a pair of scissors on top of her table and
thrust it towards Bautista but was subdued by Almeida. In the end, Bautista
maintains that as a result of her family's displacement, she had no choice but
to allow her former husband to bring their 13-year-old daughter with him to
Isabela where he succeeded in raping the latter. Thus, she blames Ferrer for
her daughter's misfortune.

The Court finds that Ferrer must be suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year. Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the CPR prohibits a lawyer in government
from using his/her public position or influence to promote or advance his/her
private interests. On this score, let Us not forget that Ferrer was the Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union, at the time of the
incident and that Bautista was well aware of such fact. Let Us also not forget
that Bautista was questioned at the police station from 2:30 p.m. to 7:00
p.m., or almost 5 hours. But despite this, Ferrer did not file any complaint
against Bautista, insisting that she merely wanted to talk to Bautista in front
of the police authorities. These police authorities searched Bautista's
belongings looking for any clue as to the whereabouts of Ferrer's money as
well as the debtors who borrowed the same. Thus, even assuming that Ferrer
did not really kick, punch, or repeatedly slap Bautista's head, the fact that
Bautista surrendered her cellphone and allowed herself to be brought by
Ferrer from one place to another, from early morning until the evening,
shows how Ferrer succeeded in using her high and powerful position in the
government to intimidate Bautista, a mere manicurist and lessee of her
property.

Facturan v. Barcelona, Jr., A.C. No. 11069, [June 8, 2016]

Complainant Facturan alleged that he filed a complaint for qualified

theft against Mendoza et. al. and was assigned for preliminary investigation
to Prosecutor Amerkhan. Thereafter, Prosecutor Amerkhan forwarded the
records of the case, together with his Resolution recommending the
prosecution of Mendoza et. al. and the corresponding Information to
respondent Barcelona Jr. for his approval and signature. However, respondent
neither approved nor signed the resolution. Instead, he removed the case
records from the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and brought them to his
residence, where they were kept in his custody. It appears that the
respondents in the case were personally known to respondent Barcelona, as
Elezar is his cousin, while Mendoza and others are his close friends.
Aggrieved, complainant sought the intervention of DOJ but to no avail.
Complainant learned that the case had been turned over to the Provincial
Prosecution Office but without the Resolution and Information. Neither did
respondent approve nor act upon the same, prompting complainant to file
the present complaint for disbarment against him. 

In his defense, respondent claimed that the alleged malicious delaying

or perceived concealment of the case records was neither intentional nor due
to favoritism, as he inhibited himself from the case which was the reason it
was assigned to Prosecutor Amerkhan. 

The IBP found respondent to have failed to perform his duty of

approving or disapproving Prosecutor Amerkhan’s recommendation. As such,
he is guilty of violating Canons 18 and 18.03. He was also found guilty of
violating Canon 6.01 of the CPR for his failure to resolve the case and
delaying its resolution by keeping the case records in his possession. He was
suspended from the practice of law for 1 year. 

The Supreme Court concurs with the IBP’s factual findings and
recommendations to hold respondent administratively liable but not for
violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR but instead, of Rule 6.02 which
provides: 

“Rule 6.02 — A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
latter to interfere with his public duties.”

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be

disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer. Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in the
government service, enjoining them from using one's public position to: (1)
promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private
interests to interfere with public duties.

As the IBO had found, respondent should have timely disapproved the
recommendation to enable complainant to take the appropriate remedy to
challenge the disapproval. Worse, he removed the case records from the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and, when directed to turn them over,
failed to do so. As a result, no further action had been taken in the case. In
fact, respondent still had not complied with the State Prosecutor’s directive to
return the case records without any plausible reason. Respondent ought to
have known that without such, no further action could be taken on the case. 

Absent any intelligent explanation, it can only be inferred that

respondent not merely failed, but obstinately and deliberately refused to
perform his duties as a prosecutor. Such refusal, evidently worked to the
advantage of the respondents, which included his cousin, as the absence of
the records delayed the filing of the criminal information in court. Hence, it is
apparent that respondent used his public position as a prosecutor to advance
and protect the private interest of his relative, which is clearly proscribed in
the CPR. 

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.

Meaning of “Matter” and “Intervene.”

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of
"matter" referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the
"intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The
American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any
discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving
a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.

To intervene means — 1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or

extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or come between points
of time or events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie between two things.

Further, "intervention" is defined as — 1: the act or fact of intervening:

INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others.

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word

"intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene" includes participation
in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little
influence. Under the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act
of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. We hold
that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word
"intervention" under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist
where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as
innocuous such as ". . . drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law."

Judges, Justices, and Lawyers in the Judiciary.

Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor,
probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always
be fair and impartial. They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all
appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be consciously
and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For theirs
is the assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity
of the Judiciary.

To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, the respondent must be shown to have accepted the
engagement or employment in relation to a matter that, by virtue of his
judicial office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings. It is also plain and unquestionable that Canon 36, supra,
from which the canon was derived, prohibited him as a former member of the
Bench from handling any case upon which he had previously acted in a
judicial capacity. In this context, he not only exercised the power to influence
the outcome of the proceedings but also had a direct hand in bringing about
the result of the case by virtue of his having the power to rule on it.

With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the Office of the Chief Attorney
(OCAT) pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel — the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent
judicial employee and which limits such outside employment to one that
"does not require the practice of law". The prohibition to practice law with
respect to any matter where they have intervened while in the government
service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government
service.

Rule 6.03 in relation to R.A. No. 6713.

In re: Silverio-Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, [August 19, 2009], 613

PHIL 1-25

The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of

Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she
resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and within
the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision),
she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in
several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon. 

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives
preferential treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in
the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict
or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or
employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government
service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter
before the office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from
the date of her separation from government employment.

The general rule under Section 7 (b) (2) is to bar public officials and
employees from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this
general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of
exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law
allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current
duties and the practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above, no
chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their
profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5,
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so.
Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe's basic
premise is misplaced. The prohibition to practice law with respect to any
matter where they have intervened while in the government service is
reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service.

As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the

practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and without
any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A.
No. 6713. The clerk of court's limitation is that she cannot practice her
profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work
with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or
employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the
other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with
respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one
year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically
allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of
interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises.

Philippine National Bank v. Cedo, A.C. No. 3701 (Resolution), [March

28, 1995], 312 PHIL 904-910

In a verified letter-complaint, complainant PNB charged respondent

Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management
Group of complainant bank, with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, thus:
 "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service."

By appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions with

complainant bank in which respondent during his employment with PNB, had
intervened.

PNB averred that while Atty. Cedo was still in its employ, he
participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets in favor of Milagros Siy for
P200,000. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong
Siy and complainant bank, respondent who had since left the employ of
complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy. Similarly,
when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case
filed by complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan,
for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for
Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil Service Commission. Moreover,
while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of the complainant's Asset
Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of the
spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda PNB by writing demand letters to the
couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the
Almeda spouses as a result of this loan account, the latter were represented
by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates" of which respondent is
one of the Senior Partners.

The IBP found that the charges against Atty. Cedo were fully
substantiated. IBP found a deliberate intent on the part of respondent to
devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of the
complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal
weaknesses of his former employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to
seek his professional services. In sum, the IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by
the respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he expected to
earn.

The Court emphasizes the paramount importance of avoiding the

representation of conflicting interest. Communications between attorney and
client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between attorney and
client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainants’ cause. There necessity of setting down the existence of the
bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent
the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the
honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is
founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. As has been said in
another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standards.
 The foregoing disquisition on conflicting interest applies with equal
force and effect to respondent in the case at bar. Having been an executive
of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the
opposite side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction
which he formerly handled while still an employee of complainant, in violation
of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on adverse influence and
conflicting interests, to wit:

"It is unprofessional to represent interests, except by express

conflicting consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to
another client requires him to oppose."

Hence, Atty. Cedo is suspended from the practice of law for 3 years. 

Pasok v. Zapatos, A.C. No. 7388, [October 19, 2016]

Complainant alleged that respondent was the former Presiding Judge of

RTC Branch 35 of Ozamis City and retired as such. Previously, he was
Presiding Judge of MTCC in Tangub City where he presided over a Forcible
Entry case. Complainant was the counsel of the petitioner's and the decision
was rendered against him by respondent. Another case was filed by the
clients of complainant but they were surprised that the defendants filed a
Memorandum where they were now represented by respondent, the former
judge who once presided over the said case. Complainant filed a Motion to
Expunge from the Court Records the Memorandum through their counsel Ex-
MTC and RTC Judge Zapatos, on the ground that as the former presiding
judge of the MTCC, he is disqualified to appear as counsel for the
defendants. 

IBP-CBD found and held that respondent is guilty of violating Rule 6.03
of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
and as a member of the Bar for 1 month. It observed that under Rule 6.03, "a
lawyer shall not, after leaving the government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in said service;" and that the words or phrases any matter and he had
intervened qualifying the prohibition were very broad terms, and included
any conceivable subject in which the respondent acted on in his official
capacity. 

The Court adopted and affirmed the findings of the IBP. Rule 6.03 of
the CPR states that A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in said service. This rule pursuant to PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan, traces its lineage to Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics which states A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate
in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial
capacity. A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ.

To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the CPR the respondent must
be shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in relation to a
matter that, by virtue of his judicial office, he had previously exercised power
to influence the outcome of the proceedings. That showing was sufficiently
made herein. The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC of
Tangub City, presided over the case before eventually inhibiting himself from
further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted intervention
within the meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the
degree or length of the intervention in the particular case or
matter. 

The restriction extended to engagement or employment. The

respondent could not accept work or employment from anyone that would
involve or relate to any matter in which he had intervened as a judge except
on behalf of the body or authority that he served during his public
employment. The restriction as applied to him lasted beyond his tenure in
relation to the matters in which he had intervened as judge. Accordingly, the
fact that he was already retired from the Bench, or that he was already in the
private practice of law when he was engaged for the case was
inconsequential. 

The respondent has pleaded for the sympathy of the Court towards his
plight of "poverty." Although we can understand his current situation and
sympathize with him, his actuations cannot be overlooked because they
contravened the express letter and spirit of Rule 6.03 of the CPR. In any case,
his representing the defendants in the civil cases was not the only way by
which he could improve his dire financial situation. It would not be difficult for
him, being a lawyer and a former member of the Bench, to accept clients
whom he could ethically represent in a professional capacity. If the
alternatives open to him were not adequate to his liking, he had other
recourses, like serving as a notary public under a valid commission. His
taking on of the defendants' civil cases despite his previous direct
intervention thereon while still a member of the Bench was impermissible. He
should have maintained his ethical integrity by avoiding the engagement by
the defendants. Atty. Zapatos is suspended from the practice of law for 1
month.