Engineers Australia Design Guidelines: Develop a design usually covered by civil law »very important to resolve Batch processes
Batch processes flowsheets: Very important in pharmaceutical
solution to meet the project objectives
Reduce as far as reasonable: Waste production/Energy
consumption/Maintenance/Unreliability /Cost
Design requires you to: Make the process choices /Select and
size the equipment/Design the equipment items/Draw the
various flow sheets and plant layout/Undertake the
HAZOP/Undertake the economic analysis/Undertake the
environmental and sustainability analysis/Write the report
Teamwork: Most projects (even small ones) are too large for
one person/Design requires a wide range of skills (process,
mechanical, civil, electrical, architectural skills)/ Few engineers
have all the skills required to undertake even a small design
Working in teams: cannot choose team members, must work
with all team members, working together is critical for design,
disagreements need to be resolved quickly/plan the project as
a group/divide the work equally between team members/
Communicate well: Hold weekly meetings, don’t withhold
information, especially important when developing the mass
and energy balance.
Purpose of Meetings: Review progress/Identify difficulties/
Plan resolution of difficulties/Allocate priorities (tasks to be
completed prior to the next meeting)
Structure of Meetings: Choose chairperson to prepare the
agenda and manage the meeting/Choose a secretary to record
the minutes/ The chairperson and secretary roles must rotate
between all group members.
Minutes of Meetings: Members in attendance/Members
absent and the reason for the absence/Progress since last the
meeting and comparison with the project plan/Problems that
have been resolved/ New problems that have arisen and the
plans to resolve them /Work allocation for the coming week.
Specifications: Detail of the design and materials/ A set of
instructions governing the design, construction and
commissioning of a plant/ a very large document or series of
documents/Typically 2 groups: Overarching standards that
apply to all projects, Project specific standards/Specifications
can be a legal requirement of the government or based on
national or client requirements
Statutory specifications: Specifications that are legal
authority/must be complied with non-compliance is a criminal
offence/ replaced by legally endorsed National Standards
Overarching Standards
National & International Standards: Compliance is not
compulsory but failure to do so without good reason may be
considered legal negligence/ Some national standards are
legally endorsed and effectively become statutory
specifications
Industry Codes: Codes developed by industry funded
associations: Provide guidance for industry specific problems,
Principally construction or safety related
Company Standards: Company-wide standards and
specifications/Failure to comply with a company standard is
working practices/ Unexpected increase in cost of supplies
conflicting requirements early and officially in writing
What do Standards Cover? Fuels/Raw materials/Products/
Materials of construction (Cement, concrete, steel, plastics,
glass, electrical wiring, piping cabling, etc)/Electric motors/
Controls/Instruments/Painting, ect/Design: Documentation
(Reporting, drawings, mass and energy balance presentation,
etc. ), Foundation design, Structures, Pressure vessel design,
piping (inc. support), storage tanks and sheds, Instrumentation
systems & safety protective systems
Project Specification: Applies only to the current project/
Typically covers: Product quality specification, Raw materials
to be used and their availability and location, Production
capacity in tonne/year, Plant location with site and access
requirements, The overarching and company standards that
apply
Design Project Requirements
All design is undertaken to a specification divided into two
parts: An overall specification applying to all projects /A
process specification applying only to your specific project
Overarching specification specifies: Scope of design project
including: The objectives of the design of the project allotted
to each group/Timescale allowed/Format of report/Plant
layout and site development/Plant operability & safety
assessment/Environmental impact and sustainability
assessment /Capital and operating cost estimates/Work
schedule format/Conclusions and recommendations/Minutes
of group meetings
Project specific specification specifies: Scope of project,
project number and title: Project background/Product or
products to be manufactured/Annual capacity/Plant
availability and design life required/Feedstock
specification/Location may also be specified or left to the
group to choose
Process Flowsheets: Flowsheets are key documents in the
development of designs/Four basic types:
Block Flow Diagram: Diagrammatic description of the
process/Shows the major process operations in block or
symbolic form/Does not show: Control or ancillary items, Mass
flows, temperatures or pressures, Utility requirements/ Only
the major operations - essential for a basic understanding of
the process are incorporated
Process flowsheet or diagram (PFD) show: Tanks, vessels,
mixers, etc. Major pumps, fans, & compressors, Heat
exchangers, reactors, Separators, filters, etc, Major pipes and
ducts, Major valves/Only those necessary for process
understanding, As the design is developed, mass and energy
balance information is added
Process flowsheet Index MUST have and shows: All lines
identified by number (For simplicity line numbers should only
change when: Line enters a vessel (except for a cooling or
heating coil), Line exits vessel, A line divides or joins)/ Size of
line/Material flowing in line/Mass flow rate of material in
consistent units /Pressure and temperature of material
industry/Batch processes are time dependent, not steady
state/ Process flowsheet shows: Line diagram of equipment
Sequence of operation with: Step sequence number, time of
the step, Action undertaken and quantities involved.
Process and Instrument Diagram (P&ID):Shows all process
equipment identified by number/Equipment is roughly drawn
in proportion with location of nozzles shown/All pipes
identified by line number (Pipe size and material should be
identified, Flanges are shown )/All valves (both block &
control) with an identification number( Type & size should be
identified : Valve types are usually identified by use of a
symbol, Failure modes are also identified where relevant)/
Shows all ancillary fittings that are part of the piping system
(Sight glasses, filters, steam traps, etc, Identified by number)/
All instruments with Pressure gauges, temperature sensors,
flow meters, etc.( Identified by number, All control loops )/
Identifying the sensor and control action, Control loops are
also identified by number
Importance of P&ID: Diagrammatic record of the design/
Foundation for Hazard Analysis/Used to preparing: Equipment
List (a list & data sheet of all major items), Bill of Materials (all
other items not on equipment list, some Bills of Materials also
include items on the equipment list)/ Operating and
maintenance instructions
Industrial Context of Projects & Plant Sizing Methods
Intent: Produce useful products/Make a profit for its
owners/Be safe in operation/Minimise environmental damage
Risk: The process might fail owing to design errors/Cost over
runs may eliminate profit/There may be major safety &
environmental problems  minimise risk
Commercial risk Major object of any plant is to: Produce
useful products that are in demand (Sell those products for a
profit, maximise the return for shareholders)/ The investors
seek a rate of return on their investment while their money is
being used /Any investment involves a risk arising from factors
such as: Failure of the process, Change in market demand,
New, low cost competition, New, replacement product.
Financial risk: The higher the risk the greater the rate of return
required to justify that risk, Difficult to quantify risk to capital
Capital costs include: Design costs, Cost of land occupied,
Construction costs, Interest charges on expenditure to date,
Commissioning costs, Fees for licences, permits, etc..
Major risk: Delayed completion & extended
commissioningIncreased interest charges, increased capital
investment
Operating costs include: Interest payments on capital
invested, Insurance, Taxes, Depreciation, Operating costs (Raw
materials, Energy, Labour costs, Maintenance)
Risks to profitability: Over-capitalised plant (Interest charges
too high, Depreciation too high)/ Undercapitalised plant
(Poorly designed: High energy costs, Low yields /Poor
equipment: High maintenance costs)/Long construction
and/or commissioning times/High labour charges and/or poor
(Raw materials, Energy, Spare parts, unfavourable exchange
rate changes)/Increases in tax and insurance charges/New low
cost plant opens and competes in market
Plant sizing Optimum sizing crucial for success
Oversized plantspoor economic performance/Poor
technical efficiency (equipment operating at turndown rather
than optimum condition)/Overcapitalisation (high interest &
depreciation charges)
Undersized plantLoss of revenue because production
targets are not achieved/Poor technical efficiency (equipment
pushed to the limit, high maintenance costs)
Optimum sizing: to achieve least cost over entire life cycle
(Energy costs are unpredictableEasier to determine
optimum vessel size than optimum pumping costs)
Feasibility studies: undertaken to assess: Market for proposed
product/ Technical feasibility of proposed process/ Economic
feasibility/ Likely environmental impact // Demand for
products generally increases with time
Typical feasibility study consists of: Conceptual design with:
Block flow diagram/Preliminary mass & energy balances/
Preliminary cost estimates (cost of plant (typically + 30%), fixed
costs, direct production costs, administration, distribution
costs, etc..)/More detailed assessment of any proposed new
technology/Preliminary environmental impact assessment.
Typical Process Plant Items: Size changing plant (Size
reduction: Crushers/ Size increasing: sintering)/ Separation
plant (dryers, centrifuges, gravity settlers, filters, distillation
columns, thickeners, electrical and magnetic separators)/
Combining plant (Mixers - undertake physical mixing of more
than one feed stream)/ Reactors – undertake chemical
reactions: Separation, Synthesis, Many reactors undertake
more than one process.
Typical Reactors: Gas-solid (Fixed bed: Used where the solid is
not consumed, Moving bed: Used where the solid is consumed,
Fluidised bed: used where the bed is catalyst or where the bed
is consumed, Rolling bed: Used for solid-solid & gas-solid
reactions)/Gas liquid (Bubble column: Co-current, counter-
current, fixed, plug-flow, Used for solid-solid & gas-solid
reactions)/Three phase (Suspension, slurry, fluidised bed,
Bubble column, Flash smelter)
Plant Sizing Methods
Capacity terminology
Annual production capacity (tonne/annum)
Mean daily design rate (MDDR) (tonne/day): The basis of
most equipment sizing /Takes into account: Normal variation
in production between different days caused by various
factors; Equipment downtime required for: Scheduled
maintenance, Catalyst regeneration, Breakdown; Usually
quoted in tonnes/day
Calculation of mean daily design rate:
 Pannual x IF
MDDR =
(365−S)
MDDR = mean daily design rate /Pannual = Annual production
requirement/ S = scheduled shutdown days/ IF= Integration
factor
The greater the plant integration the higher the MDDR needs
to be for the same annual production
Optimum equipment sizing
MDDR: the production that the overall plant must be capable
of sustaining over a 24 hour periodIdeally all equipment
should be sized to achieve the same production over the 24
hour periodselecting installed capacities for individual items
of equipment based on a shorter timescale Usually known as
Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR)
Maximum Continuous Rating (MCR) maximum rate that a
plant item can operate over a continuous period of many 24
hour days without overload or severe wear & tear/Applies to
the equipment when in normal well maintained condition/
Production rate usually falls off as wear sets in and
maintenance becomes due. Real plant does not operate in
steady-state, normally there are continuous variations around
MCR (MCRconst>MDDR)
Process excursions Around and above MCR, can occur for
short periods without harm, large or fast excursions may result
in process instability & damage, Specification of the overload
capacity can be important for some critical plant items/
Cannot be prevented (Tolerated excursion limits time and rate
interdependent)/Control systems are used to minimize
excessive load excursions
Turndown ratio: a minimum throughput below which plant
cannot operate effectively/Typical limits on minimum
throughput: Difficulties in maintaining stable flows, Excessive
heat loss relative to heat utilized, Poor product caused by poor
reactant mixing, Poor product separation, etc.
Minimum throughput
– Turndown ratio =
Maximumthroughput
Plant equipment items must be sized to achieve MCR
Difficult to size: Reactors, furnaces, burners (kinetic data is not
available, May need to scale from lab tests or existing plant,
Can be complex to size correctly)
Easy to size: Pumps, pipes, valves, flow-meters, Heat
exchangers, surge vessels, tanks, Fans, dampers (Use standard
text book techniques)
Plant usually has to be scaled from one or more of the
systems: Scale up from lab tests/ Scale up from small scale
industrial tests/ Scale up from pilot plant/ Scale up existing
plant to larger capacities
Scaling is very difficult because not all the pertinent features
scale similarly/Relevant scaling parameters have to be chosen
very carefully
Rotary kiln producing cement
Traditional sizing method used constant volume/tonne
production, Failed badly when scale up because increase in
secondary air velocity above upper limit with existing burner
designs resulted in severe deterioration in fuel/air mixing
scaled up on constant velocitynot feasible (Mechanical
limits on shell diameter, maximum tyre size achievable)
Basic scaling techniques: Constant Velocity Scaling (Maintains
similar inlet velocities for the small scale and large scale
systems, Sometimes maintains the velocity ratios similar,
rather than the absolute velocities), Constant Residence Time
Scaling (Maintains the gas or particle residence times in the
reactor similar), Constant Reaction Intensity Scaling
(Maintains the specific concentration of species of the small
scale and large scale systems similar)
Each method has its advantages and disadvantagesMust
choose the appropriate technique for the system being scale
(requires a fundamental understanding of the limiting factors)
Need to assess all the factors and decide the limiting factors
(there may be more than one) prior to choosing a scale up
techniqueWe can’t scale nature!
Rules of “thumb”: Procedure based on experience and
practice rather than theory (Often enshrined in National
Standards & company design procedures)/ Shortcuts
compared with rigorous calculation/ Usually based on:
Empirical observations, Economic practice, “Common sense”
Widely used in all branches of engineering
Can give good results especially where the new system is very
similar to an existing one (Less reliable where there are
significant differences between the systems)/ Limits: Can
provide false confidence especially where big changes are
made (Poor plant performance is then a common problem)
Why use “Rules of Thumb”? Design is results based (Need to
produce a functioning process)/Many conflicts exist in the
design process (Design vs. analysis, System vs. component,
Inter-relationships vs. rules of thumb: are regarded as
academically inferior , still indispensable, Some become so
entrenched that they are regarded as laws of nature, Practical
vs. theoretical, Computer literacy vs. numeracy, Cost vs.
elegance)
Rules of thumb – Cautionary note: Must be used with care
(Do not use indiscriminately, Do a “sanity check”, Do not use
where better methods are available), National standards, ISO
standards, should be used where applicable.
Standard Design Methods used for repetitive equipment items
/based on a combination of theory, rules of thumb and
experience /Ensures consistency of decision making /
Predicable performance /Predicable cost /Reduces risk
Other scaling methods Process Modelling: Increasingly used
design and scaling technique (Based on representing the
pertinent features of the full size system in the model, When
used by suitably qualified and experienced engineers gives
reliable prediction of the operation of a full sized plant) /Most
reliable technique for the when fundamental data is
unavailable but a usable mathematical or physical model exists
Note on use of Computers for Design: Computers are a useful,
but not essential, design tool/ Process modelling allows more
detailed calculations computer packages are only available for
the more popular processes /other processes calculations
have to be done by hand or with Excel
Optimum Equipment Sizing
Oversized equipment is expensive: Leads to over
capitalization/ Results in poor performance owing to:
Operation at non-optimal rate, Poor utilisation of available
turndown ratio
Undersized equipment results in: Failure to reach production
targets/ Poor efficiency with equipment “pushed to the limit”/
High maintenance costs
Design margins (safety factors): the allowance above and
beyond the design MCR that is used to allow for factors of
ignorance in the design process It ensures that MCR can be
achieved despite this design sizing in-exactitude/ Design
margins should be minimized to avoid risk of equipment over-
sizing
Process and economic risks: Too small a design marginPlant
does not achieve required output, Energy consumption is
excessive, Poor product quality/ Too large a design
marginPlant achieves required output but usually with:
Excessive energy consumption, Possible poor product quality,
Unstable operation, Poor turndown performance, Excessive
capital cost/Accumulation of design marginsover-sizing of
sub items of equipment, Is a very bad feature, Inconsistent
plant capacities lead to many problems with process operation
Pressure Vessel Design
Pressure Vessel: vessel intended to contain liquids or gases at
elevated pressure, Usually any pressure greater than 200 kPa
(absolute).
Pressure vessels are potentially hazardous, There were many
failures of early boilers, Often with catastrophic results.
Development of Standards
ASME VIII: "Standards for Specifications and Construction of
Boilers and Other Containing Vessels in Which High Pressure is
Contained”, in Imperial units, Provided guidance on the design
and construction of boilers, used extensively throughout the
world especially in the petroleum and gas industries.
Divided in to 3 divisions: Division 1: Rules for Construction of
Pressure Vessels/Division 2: Requirements on materials,
design, and nondestructive examination/Division 3
Requirements applicable to pressure vessels operating at
either internal or external pressures generally above 10,000
psi. (68 MPa)
Australia’s Standard: Covers: Fired (boilers & pressurised
furnaces) and unfired vessels/Construction using: Ferrous &
non-ferrous metals, Non-metallic vessels & metallic vessels
with non-metallic linings
Pressure Vessel Design
Determining shell thickness: Based on the allowable stress in
vessel wall for a thin walled (diameter is more than 5 x wall
thickness) cylindrical vessel the hoop stress is given by: σh =
pd/2t (σh = hoop stress (MPa),p = internal pressure (MPa), d =
internal diameter of tube or cylinder (mm), t = thickness of wall
(mm))
Determining shell thickness: The longitudinal stress is given
by: σL = pd/4t (σL = longitudinal stress (MPa), p = internal
pressure (MPa),d = internal diameter of tube or cylinder (mm),
t = thickness of wall (mm))
The thicker the wall the lower the stress But increases the
weight and cost of the vessel
• Allowable working stresses are typically 25% of the yield
stress of the material– Stresses caused by other factors must
also be allowed.
Determining shell thickness
For material except plate: to = t + c + TA + MA + X (mm)
For plate material where design thickness is 5mm or less: t o =
0.94(t + c) + TA + MA + X (mm)
For plate material where design thickness is greater than
5mm: to = t + c - 0.3 + TA + MA + X (mm)
c = corrosion allowance /MA = manufacturing allowance
(forming & machining) /TA = under-tolerance allowance (from
material specification) /t = minimum calculated thickness for
pressure and applied loads /X = any extra thickness to round
up to commercially available material
Design conditions allow for process excursions – Pressure:
Typically10% or 0.69 to 1.7 bar (10 to 25 psi) above the
maximum operating pressure, whichever is greater/
Temperature: For operating conditions 30oC to 345oC, typically
25oC above the maximum operating temperature; For
operating conditions 0oC to -30oC, typically 25oC below the
minimum operating temperature; Margins increase below
-30oC and above 345oC/ Vacuum: Typically 100 kPa to full
vacuum/ Structural integrity requirements Minimum shell
thicknesses for structural integrity •6.4 mm (1/4 in) for up to
1.07 m (42 in) diameter•8.1 mm (5/16 in) for 1.07–1.52 m to
(42-60 in) diameter•9.7 mm (3/8 in) over 1.52 m (60 in)
diameter
Other aspects of pressure vessel design: Location of welded
joints, Vertical vessel support, Horizontal vessel support,
Flanges, Nozzle connections, Jacket vessels
AS1210 – 2010 is very comprehensive•Specifies acceptable
materials of construction•Gives calculation methods for
almost all stressed areas•Specifies: Tubeplate design,
thicknesses, hole diameter & pitch, fixing to shell, etc,
Acceptable gasket materials, bolts, nuts, etc., Inspection
opening requirements & design
Design Constraints & Sustainability
Design objectives: Production of final specifications for a
system capable of being: •Safely operated and maintained
(Including the avoidance of environmental damage)•Efficiently
managed •Efficiently operated from the point of economic
performance
Design failures: Often associated with:• Failure to choose the
best technical concept in the early stages• Poor design
information• Construction in the wrong geographical location•
Poor attention to the right kind of detail during the final stages
of design and construction, chosen on price rather than
performance• Failure to anticipate and address potential
hazards/ Includes very prolonged commissioning times /
Economic failure can result from poor timing/ Failure always
reduces the owners net worth
Avoidance of failure requires: Qualified and trained
engineering staff with recent relevant experience for their role
and responsibilities/A system approach to design/An adequate
budget to fulfill the engineering requirements/Excellent
project management
Safety: Safety is critically important nowadays: increased
awareness of the real costs and trauma of accidentsSociety’s
general condemnation of industrial accidents, Widespread
legislation to regulate industry and prevent accidents and hold
management accountable
What is an accident? Any unwanted event that causes death,
injury or damage
Accidents, incidents and dangerous occurrences• For every
catastrophic and critical accident there are hundreds of minor
incidents•Safety is improved by: Analysing & reducing the
marginal & negligible incidents, Identifying hazard (condition
that could lead to an accident), Analysing dangerous
occurrences (an incident that could have been an accident)
Continuous process: Operates 24 h/day for 7 days/week
throughout the year• Only downtime is for maintenance and
maybe catalyst regeneration• Generally the choice were:
Large scale production required, Continuous operation is
technically feasible• Plant availability is a very important
factor: Must be high for a successful project, Plant availability
(%) = hours producing x 100/8760
Continuous process are normally chosen where: Single
product• No severe fouling or controllable fouling• Good
catalyst life• Proven process design• Established market•  requires: Minimizing the input of raw materials, Minimizing
Production rate is above 50 to 100 t/h
Batch process: Operates intermittently• Generally the choice
were: – Small scale production required – A range of products
or product specifications are required– Severe fouling
occurs– Short catalyst life– New product– Uncertain
design– Continuous operation is not technically feasible
All designs are subject to constraints– External: Imposed by:
Reality, Society – Internal: Imposed by: Client, Project team
The design process: A series of stages with feedback loops,
Ideally plant construction commences on completion of
design, Increasingly plant construction starts before design is
complete especially civil works.
Stages in Design & Construction of a Plant: Conceptual or
Preliminary Design– Basic Engineering– Detailed
Engineering– Project Management– Construction
Management– Plant Completion
Fast Track Engineering & Construction: Several stages run
concurrently - risky strategy
Conceptual or Preliminary Design: Work performed in the first
stage of engineering activities: Develop the basic process,
Study any (confidential) technology transfer information,
Preliminary capital & running cost estimates, Consideration of
Local Conditions, Consideration of Environmental
Requirements, Describe in a preliminary form on paper (or
electronic format), Develop a Block Flow Diagram (BFD), also
consider: Design Capacity, mass and energy balances, Yields,
Preliminary evaluation of the economics and market, Produce
case to management to proceed
Basic Engineering: Description of plant & process with basic
layout»  Raw material & product specifications» Process
flowsheets (PFD) with M & E balances » Performance data
sheets» Utility consumption & power requirements» Basic
equipment list, motor list & data sheets» Basic control &
instrumentation scheme» Basic engineering flow sheets (P&ID)
and specifications
Detailed Engineering: Develop detail drawings and
specifications for procurement, construction and erection from
the Basic Engineering Package. Multi-disciplinary task
involving: » Mechanical engineering» Materials handling
engineering» Tankage and piping engineering» Civil, structural
& architectural engineering» Electrical
engineering» Instrumentation and control systems engineering
Project Management:•Principle engineering activities:
Definition of Scope of Project, Definition of Project
Organization, Project Procedure Manual, Co-ordination and
Control of Project implementation, Progress reporting,
Problem resolution, Close out Reports, Evaluation of Project
and feed back to Management• Project Management is a
critical task to ensure a successful project• Organization of
tasks: Project manager is critical to the whole process
Societal pressure to improve: Environmental performance and
Sustainable performance• Related but not necessarily
convergent• What does sustainable mean? Means to
maintain effort for a long period• Plant sustainability
energy consumption, Maximizing product output.
Difference between sustainability and environmental impact
(time and location related)• Environmental impact
considerations tend to short term and local • Sustainability
tends to be longer term and more global •Significant
ambiguity: Much environmental degradation reduces long-
term sustainability
Current production is very wasteful: Emphasis is on: •
Maximising output (At the expense of energy efficiency,
Regardless of raw material use)significant proportion may
be unconverted in the process and wasted• Minimising capital
and labour costs/ Energy & material costs have been
lowlargely ignored in the quest for higher outputs and lower
overall costs
Waste minimization: In all parts of the supply and consumer
cycle Strategies By designing: Maximum yield rather than
maximum throughput• Maximum selectivity in multiple
reaction processes• Recycling discharge streams to extract
additional product Operational strategies Minimizing reject
product (Optimizing process stability, Quality assurance
procedures for early detection of off-specification product)
Minimising packaging (A major source of preventable waste
but not so much that product deteriorates in transport and
storage)
Energy conservation: (Benefits: Fuel resource conservation,
slows the increase in global warming) Strategies By designing:
More inherently efficient processes (Avoid repeated heating
and cooling, Process at lower temperatures (where practical),
Avoid unnecessary size reduction, Lower pressure drops in
pipework and equipment), Replace energy intensive thermal
processes with alternative non-thermal, Process integration
(Combined heat and power, Use the waste energy from one
process to provide all or some of the energy for another
process), Heat recovery (Recover waste heat from flue gases
and/or product and waste streams), Operational strategies:
Maximize stable operation of plant (Plant running at constant
rate minimizes energy use, Minimize steam use and hot water
washing, Minimize compressed air use), Minimize waste (it
contains process energy), Maintain plant in good condition
(Minimize steam leaks from valve glands, Maintain lagging and
insulation in good condition)
Raw material conservation: Minimize use of high value raw
materials by Reuse and recycle Strategies Waste minimization
in production, Recycling of high value used materials (high
value means: Those whose known deposits are small, Those
with high embedded energy, Those that would be toxic in the
environment) (There is no value in recycling some items, the
cost (financial & environmental) is greater than their value)
Reuse of used materials (Use combustible waste materials as
substitute fuelReduces fossil fuel use, reduce greenhouse
gas emissions)
Effectiveness of recycling: --Metals industry is already a very
effective recycler especially, aluminium, steel, lead and
copper. However the recycling rate (as % of raw materials
used) is falling not rising, the increasing complexity of products
makes them more difficult to recycle--Quality of most metals
industry is degraded during recycling, Especially steel, Lead
and copper are not degraded– Quality of plastics is also
degraded, Cross linked thermo-set plastics cannot be recycled
Measuring Sustainability
Environmental & Sustainability Reporting
Inputs: • Raw materials (excluding water): Total consumption
of each raw material (tonnes/year), Specific consumption of
each raw material (kg/kg product) •  Recycled materials
utilised (if any): Total consumption of each recycled material
(tonnes/year), Specific consumption of each recycled material
(kg/kg product) •  Energy: Total consumption of each fossil fuel
(GJ/year), Specific consumption of all fossil fuel (kJ/kg
product), Total consumption of bought in electricity
(MWh/year), Specific consumption of bought in electricity
(kWh/kg product) •  Water: Main’s (town’s) water consumed
(GL/year), Specific consumption of main’s (town’s) water
(L/kgproduct), Rain water collected and used (GL/year),
Specific rain water consumption (L/kgproduct), Waste water
recycled (GL/year), Waste water recycled (L/kgproduct)
Discharges:•To Air: Atmospheric acidification burden (tonne/y
of SO2 equiv.), Global warming burden emissions (tonne/y of
CO2 equiv.), Human health burden (tonne/y of benzene
equiv.), Ozone depletion (tonne/y of CFC-11 equiv.),
Photochemical ozone burden (tonne/y of ethylene equiv.)• To
Water: Aquatic acidification added (tonne/y of H+ ions equiv.),
Aquatic oxygen demand added (tonne/y of O2 equiv.), Eco-
toxicity to aquatic life for metals (tonne/y of Cu equiv.), Other
eco-toxicity to aquatic life for metals (tonne/y of formaldehyde
equiv.), Eutrophication added to aquatic systems (tonne/y of
phosphate equiv.)• To Land: Total non-hazardous solid waste
to land (t/y), Total hazardous solid waste to land (t/y).
L6. Poorly designed plant • Difficult to operate •
Inefficient • Difficult to maintain • Downright dangerous
Good plant layout can minimize the effects of • Fires &
explosions •Toxic leaks
Human error and design: Many chemical process systems
are extremely complex • Great scope for human error– In
the design stage – While the plant is being constructed » i.e.
not built to specification (relatively common) – During
process operation – During maintenance operations » major
cause of serious accidents  Faulty decisions made in the
design & construction stage may remain hidden as latent
errors for many years before causing a problem
Causes leading to unsafe conditions – Faults in the design
process • Can be minimized by the application of HAZOP
studies during the design process – Usually undertaken at
least twice» preliminary process flow diagram » final
engineering flowsheet (P&ID) – Faults in the construction
process • Can be minimized by proper supervision of
contractors – Faults in the operation of the plant• Should
try and anticipate potential operating errors – Need to
specify suitable protective systems
» relief valves, safety interlock systems,…• Faults in
maintenance of the plant– Ensure that the plant is readily
maintainable – Provision of suitable manuals for plant
management • Faults in the design process – Incorrect valve
sizing• Faults in the construction – Pipe failure • Duty
•Correct material specified – Incorrect material used »
creep failure • Faults in the operation – Operational error –
Flare stack • Used to burn flammable gases in an emergency
or process upset • Purge gas (N 2) flow reduced – To below
the safe level – “Flash back” occurred » initiated explosion –
Maintenance • Temporary modification • Human
contributions to breakdown of complex systems • Unsafe
Acts • Management pressures – Resource allocation •
Analyzing failures Failure types - deficiencies in
management/organization Failure tokens - individual
conditions & unsafe acts
Plant layout • General principles– Goals of the layout design
process • Determination of the relative location of the
individual plant items • Specifications of the distance
between plant items • Assess alternative acceptable layouts
to obtain the optimum for: – Efficient safe and reliable
operation – Minimum hazard and nuisance » to the public »
to the environment – Minimum life cycle cost • General
principles - Context of plant layout • General principles -
Constraints – Topography, geology and climatic •
Surrounding hills, valleys, rivers, coastal, etc.. –
Environmental • Emissions and effect on neighbours, … –
Access & service• Roads, pipelines, rail, sea, canal, airstrip,
… • Power and water supply • Storm water, sewage and
effluent handling – Legal requirements • Development
approval, process licensing, … • General principles - Site
standards – Road width – Service corridors – Safety
requirements – Clearances • Pipe bridge heights • Vehicle
turning circles & lengths • Crane access – Amenities
– Building lines (car parking) – Architectural finishes, etc.
• Site layout • Site location plan - Location is
superimposed on a map of the area • Typical plant unit plot
plan • Plant elevation • Criteria for layout development–
Objective is best performance for life cycle • Effective and
economical use of space – Land is expensive – Future
developments may be allowed for • Access for safe and
convenient maintenance – Insitu or removal to workshop •
Efficient, reliable and safe operation – Economical material
flows • Access for emergencies – Isolation of dangerous
items, leak control, etc. – Fire fighting, evacuation of
casualties • Criteria for layout development – Remember
the need for construction access! – Equipment should be
grouped and numbered logically • Allow adequate
maintenance access – e.g. end access to heat exchangers
allow tube bundle removal • Provide logical identification –
Labels become difficult to read as plant gets older »
corrosion » dirt» painting
• Stages in plant layout development – Stage 1 Layout -
concept of plant defined • Preliminary design showing
relative positions of units and buildings – Economic factors
– Safety, environmental and nuisance factors • Stage 2
Layout – Further development of design » comprehensive
environmental and social assessments » development
planning approval» capital expenditure approval • Stage 3
Layout – Final details and specifications for construction •
Stage 1 Layout and integration with general design
• Stage 1 Layout - Main themes – Safety - Isolation of
hazardous plant – Environmental and planning regulations
• Effluents - including odours and noise emissions – Utilities
• Electricity, fuel gas, water supplies – General access and
plant arrangement • Relative positions of units and
buildings including – Control rooms, workshops and
amenities– Access for emergencies & fire fighting– Product
and raw material storage • Stage 1 & 2 Safety
considerations – Identification of the hazard/nuisance
properties of each individual substance • Occurring
normally in the process • That could occur under upset or
failure conditions – The use of this information in a critical
examination of the layout • Minimizing risk by:
– Location of hazardous plant with due consideration of: »
adjacent population » location of control, first aid and
amenity buildings • Critical analysis of layout proposal –
Procedure for stage 1 & 2 analysis
– Check plant layout related to surroundings – Refer to
location plan – Examine layout of plant units – Examine
block plan of unit to make product – Substance analysis
table • Start with a block– Select substance in the block »
consider in sequence all hazards associated with each
substance and the consequences for layout determination -
make notes in record sheet »  modify proposed layout if
appropriate • Select next block – Repeat as above – Then
consider the effect of individual block hazards on each other
block considered so far »  determine consequences for
layout of hazardous block interactions - make notes in
record sheet »  modify proposed layout if appropriate –
Factors to be considered when analyzing block interactions
• Release of material – Frequency –Quantity – Likely
consequences » fire / explosion » toxic / asphyxiate » other,
e.g. flooding – Fire Zone - Typical Fire zone around leak is
5000 ft2 – Factors to be considered when analyzing block
interactions • Effects of explosion – Damage to human
body / equipment » blast pressure » thrown against solid
barrier (e.g. ground or structure) » hit / buried by falling
debris » struck by missile (e.g. glass or metal fragment) »
asphyxiated by combustion products – Types of fire and
explosion • Liquid pool fire • Jet fire at point of release •
Ignition of large cloud of dispersed vapour /droplets –
Fireball - produces high thermal radiation hazard •
BLEVE - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion –
Usually a very destructive fireball & deflagration occurs •
UCVE - UnConfined Vapour-cloud Explosion – Causes
deflagration (pressure wave sub-sonic) • Aerial detonation -
extreme case of UCVE – Pressure wave supersonic – Fire
prevention • Consider the frequency and potential size of
flammable releases – Estimate the volume where a
flammable mixture may occur – Classify the zone (0, 1 or 2)
– Use AS/NZS 2430.3.1:2004 Classification of hazardous
areas for guidance – Eliminate / minimize ignition sources
within this area – No burners and fired heaters (easier said
than done) –Select appropriate electrical equipment for the
zone
• Area Classification – Zone 0 • Flammable/explosive gas
air mixture continuously present or present for long
periods – Zone 1• Flammable/explosive gas air mixture is
likely to occur in normal operation but only for short
periods – Zone 2 • Flammable/explosive gas air mixture is
not likely to occur in normal operation - if it occurs it will
only last for a short time • These classifications can also be
used for toxic/asphyxiant and odour release occurrences •
Protection of Pressure Vessels – e.g. LPG storage sphere -
Critically important Vessel failure is usually catastrophic
and results in great damage and many casualties. Note:
These requirements do not apply to vessels storing liquids at
atmospheric pressure
• Flammable and explosible dusts – Many carbonaceous and
metallic dusts are flammable and explosible e.g. •
Aluminium, magnesium and iron powder • Cornflour, wheat
dust, sugar and starch • Coal dust – Dust clouds are often
created in the processing and handling of these substances
• Special precautions need to be taken to prevent: – Ignition
of dust clouds – Spontaneous ignition of dust piles •
Pipework and Services – Pipework enables material flows
within a unit and between blocks • Piping failures are a
significant contribution to loss of containment occurrences
– Piping must be suitably supported and protected •
Especially from vehicle impact – Piping may be located •
Below ground in trenches • At ground level (grade) • On
overhead racks – Grade level piping • Cheapest
arrangement but limits access to plant areas –  Pipe
normally supported slightly above grade - typically 300 mm
» to allow access for cleaning and painting » to provide
clearance for trapping and draining – Must dip down into
roofed trench to cross under roadways – Elevated
walkways required for pedestrian access to plant areas –
Overhead piping • Commonly used method to support
pipework – Design is a complex 3-D process »  pipes can
impose significant loads on the supporting structure and
must be adequately supported »  pipes carrying hot fluids
and solvent should be kept away from electric cables »
utility pipes (i.e. steam & compressed air) should run above
process pipes »  large bore pipes are heavy and should be
located close to the vertical supports »  pipes requiring
continuous falls should be mounted externally on separate
supports
L7. Capital Cost Estimating • Estimating the cost of a plant
– Difficult exercise • Can be very time consuming and hence
expensive • Price and cost information can be difficult to
obtain – Little reliable information in the public domain –
Types of estimate • Proposal • Capital • Operating • Trend •
Proposal estimating– Type of estimate prepared when
bidding for a job • Need to get it right – Price too high - bid
is over priced compared with the competition » job is lost
and bidding effort wasted – Price too low – job is under-
priced » job will be won but a loss will be made on the
resulting contract • Proposal estimating requires sufficient
detail to get it right – Proposal estimating is detailed and
expensive • Often done against a tight Tender Schedule –
Key parameters to be costed• People and general expenses
• Equipment, installation and commissioning – People
hours • Project management• Engineering • Construction
management – Expenses • General – printing, computing,
communications, etc • Travel • Accommodation & living
expenses (daily basis) – Equipment • Cost of fabrication and
ex-works price • Shipping and insurance – Installation •
Cost of site labour, crane & equipment hire, workers
accommodation, etc. •  Cost of sundry installation materials
•  Cost of engineering supervision – Commissioning • Cost
of supervision, additional site labour, workers
accommodation, etc. – Overheads – Expenses– Profit –
Contingency • Quality Assurance Procedure – Estimates
should be checked and approved by senior experienced
engineers prior to submission
• Capital cost estimates – Three types • Order of magnitude
+ 30% accuracy– Owing to lack of readily available data and
rapidly changing costs these tolerances are difficult to
achieve • Pre-feasibility study + 20 to 25% accuracy –
Requires budget quotations for this accuracy • Bankable
feasibility for funding + 10 to 15% accuracy – Requires
more detailed quotations – Based on:• Historical data •
Factored for inflation & foreign exchange movements –
Method •  Prepare flowsheet & plant layout •  Size and cost
equipment •  Installation work hours •  Percentage factors
for other disciplines including engineering – Owing to lack
of readily available data and rapidly changing costs difficult
to achieve + 30% accuracy • Pre-feasibility study – Detailed
and factor estimate • Defining options – to select “go
forward” option – Method• Flowsheet/Preliminary P&IDs •
Plant layout with some cross-sections • Equipment sizing
and costing • Some quantities which significantly effect the
cost – i.e. piping • Installation work hours for equipment•
Other disciplines, including engineering, factored •
Bankable feasibility study for funding – Detailed estimate
undertaken – Method • Agreed scope of work for the
facilities to be constructed • Flow sheets & P&IDs • Layout
and cross sections of plant • Electrical single line diagrams •
Instrument list• Equipment sizing •  Quantity take off for all
other construction disciplines •  Installation work hours for
equipment and bulk materials •  Engineering procurement
and contract management cost •  Estimating Factors –
Design development, contingency and risk •  Estimate
Check and Approval • Bankable feasibility - Estimating
Elements – Total Installed Cost (TIC) • Direct cost – Labour
» Standard work hours » Productivity» Labour costs EBA*
and contractor indirect costs – Subcontract – Equipment
and bulk materials pricing – Freight – Estimating Factors–
Design Development *Enterprise Bargaining Agreement –
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) – Organisational
Breakdown Structure (OBS) – Spares • Commissioning •
Capital • Operating – Escalation – Contingency – Risk
allowances • Commercial risks • Extraordinary risks –
Accuracy – Cash Flow – Tax Categories • Operating – labour
– Power costs – Fuel costs – Expendable supplies –
Reagents, etc. – Spares • Trend
– Forecasting the project changes • Potential Trend - Order
of Magnitude – Sign-off by Client to proceed » Produce a
scope change (Trend) – Trend - Detail Estimate • Budget
change • Design change  Concluding Remarks •
Estimating is a labour intensive process •  Increased
accuracy dramatically increases the hours required •
Proposal estimates need to be as accurate as possible under
the circumstances – Too high a cost – job is lost– Too low a
cost job is won but becomes loss making – No prizes for
second place! •  Capital cost estimates are of three types –
Order of magnitude + 30% accuracy – Pre-feasibility study
+ 20 to 25% accuracy – Bankable feasibility for funding + 10
to 15% accuracy • Trend estimate– Predicting the tends a
project will take during execution
L8. Quality Assurance in the Design Process – What is
Quality Assurance (QA)? • System of working that ensures
that the design, product, service, … meets the standard
required by the customer/user • It is not the detection of
errors by inspection but a system to prevent errors occurring
in the first place – Why do we need Quality Assurance (QA)?
• Designing and building process plant is a complex process
– Design errors introduce safety risks • Two types of fault
can be introduced by design errors – Revealed faults –
Latent faults • Revealed faults – Cause an observable event
with or without associated loss – Remedial action can be
taken to rectify these errors – Generally remedial action has
a very high financial cost » cost of plant shutdown » cost of
remedial work – Failure to rectify errors that subsequently
lead to an accident has the highest cost of all – Latent faults
» un-revealed, therefore very difficult to detect » a certain
combination of events may result in an accident • All efforts
should therefore be directed to minimizing errors and the
subsequent need for changes – HAZOP & HAZAN »
techniques used to reveal errors and defects in design at the
preliminary design stage • Designing and building process
plant is expensive – Doing it 2 or 3 times is even more
expensive! – Every change in the design costs time and
money » the bigger the change the more it costs » the later
the change the more it costs – All efforts should therefore
be directed to minimizing errors and the subsequent need
for changes • Late design changes are one of the major
causes of cost “blow outs” on projects • Cost of
manufacturing and construction errors • Cost of
replacement – Engineer on site for 3 weeks sorting good
bricks from bad » $25,000 – Air freighting replacements
cost $200,000 • Purpose of QA in design – Minimize the risk
of human error • Three broad mechanisms – Planning
errors » caused by intended but inadequate action plans –
Slips » attention failures, calculation errors, omissions, etc. –
Lapses » memory failures such as forgetting the intention,
losing one’s place, etc.. • These errors can be present at any
stage of design, construction, operation and dismantling •
QA Systems – Quality Assurance systems • Are specified in
national and international standards: – AS/NZS ISO
9001:2000 Quality management systems - requirements •
Organizations wishing to register their QA systems must: –
Have their system audited before they can be registered–
Subject their systems to regular internal and external audits
• QA in design – Four major aspects of QA in the design
process • Design control • Document control • Process
control • Training – We will look at each of these in turn
• Design control – Method of ensuring that: – Reliable
information – Appropriate decisions • Are an integral part
of the design process – Reliable information sources •
National and industry standards •  Standard text and
reference books (up to a point) •  Company standards that
have been approved and checked •  A carefully planned and
controlled test – Unreliable information sources • Old
drawings, out of date standards and textbooks • Hearsay,
poor computer software, poor testing – Appropriate
decisions • Decision making process should be controlled so
that: – Decisions should only made by engineers with the
appropriate level of knowledge and competence – The
greater the consequences of an incorrect decision the
greater the competence required • Most design
organisations adopt cascaded decision making – Not the
case in the former Soviet Union » very centralised decision
making – Basic principles •  Need clearly documented
design procedures that comply with an approved QA
Standard •  Procedures must include the initial conceptual
stage •  All design decisions should be made by
appropriately qualified and experienced engineers •  A
system of checks and approvals is required to ensure that
the procedures are followed •  Designs must be traceable to
national, industry or company standards, pilot scale tests,
etc.. – Design procedures should cover: • Interpreting the
client’s requirements •  Standards and specifications •
Calculations – Hand and computer based •  Process
simulation and modeling – Physical modelling and
computer simulations •  Preparation of engineering
drawings •  Preparation of equipment specifications and
data sheets – Interpreting the client’s requirements • Can be
an internal or external client • Requirements may be
comprehensively specified or quite vague e.g. – Detailed
specifications such as: » process, mechanical, electrical,
control and safety specs – Or a simply stated need for, say: »
15% increased plant output» 12% reduced energy
consumption » a different product mix, etc. No matter how
the client specifies the requirements, it is essential they
are fully understood by the design team –
Standards and specifications • The starting point for all
designs should be: – Relevant legislation » Environmental
and safety requirements – National Standards e.g.: »
Standards Australia (AS), British Standards (BSI), German
Standards (DIN, VDI), American (ANSI) – Industry
standards» API, NFPA, AGA, etc.. – Client standards and
specifications– Company standards and specifications It is
essential that the latest edition/issue is available & used
– Calculations • Hand calculations – Should be checked for
accuracy by someone other than the person who did them –
Approved by a senior engineer who is: » familiar with the
methodology» familiar with the client’s requirements •
Computer based calculations:– Spread sheet based– Process
simulations, in-house computer programs, etc. –
Computational Fluid dynamic modelling (CFD) •  All
computer calculations and simulations must be validated to
minimize the risk of: – Programming errors– Latent
software faults corrupting the result •  Input data and
answers should be checked and approved as for hand
calculations – Standards design methods •  Wherever
possible standard design methods should be adopted •
These would include: – Description of the function of the
process or unit operation – Design description – A general
drawing – Sizing and calculation methodology – A worked
example – References to source information •  Standard
methods must be validated by checking and approval –
Preparation of engineering drawings • Process flow sheets
(PFDs) • Process and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) •
Engineering flow sheets – These are the most important
drawings produced for a process plant • Must be prepared
by competent engineers– P&IDs must be subjected to
HAZOP and HAZAN studies to minimize the risk of latent
defects
– Preparation of Plant Layouts • Another critically
important drawing for a process plant – Has major
influence on safety » effects the ease or difficulty of
containing an incident – Poor plant layout can result in a
minor incident becoming a major disaster » Flixborough -
location of control room • Plant layouts must be prepared
by competent engineers – Subject to independent checking
and approval – Preparation of engineering drawings •
Equipment drawings –  Usually prepared electronically -
CAD –  Temptation to amend/update the last version » high
risk owing to the risk of “creeping design” –  New design
should be based on a standard design drawing or
specification (if one exists) –  All drawings and all
amendments should be checked for accuracy by someone
other than the person who did them –  Approved by a
senior engineer who is: » familiar with the equipment and
understands the client’s requirements
• Document control – Standards, codes and specifications •
It is a requirement of all QA Design Standards that: –  Copies
of all relevant standards, codes and specifications are
available in the design office –  All copes must be the latest
editions/issue –  Out of date standards must be destroyed •
This is most easily achieved by: –  Maintaining a central
register of all standards, codes and specifications –
Subscribing to on-line or automatic updating services so
that the latest version is always available – Client supplied
information and specifications •  A register of all client
supplied information and specifications should be
maintained •  Each document should be clearly identified
including: – Date of receipt – Date of issue and document
number if appropriate – Title or description of document •
These documents form the basis of the client’s
requirements and may be critical in the event of a dispute •
Must be recorded and effectively managed – Project
drawings and specifications • Every drawing should have a
unique number – Design is an iterative process so drawings
are regularly amended – Each amendment should be
identified on the drawing »  by number and description in
the amendment box »  by number in a triangle adjacent to
the amended item – Project drawings and specifications • A
project register of all drawings and specifications should be
maintained – Should include the following information »
title » number » current issue » date of latest issue »
distribution – Control of the design and construction
processes • Seeks to determine common causes of quality
variation – Not control of the chemical process • Uses
techniques such as – Physical inspections, documentation
checks, – Statistical methods (for mass production) • Non-
compliance with design or specification is investigated–
Results fed back to improve quality system • Cost of and
potential cost of non-compliance is an important factor •
Training for competency – It is a requirement of most
safety legislation that work be undertaken by “competent
persons” • Competence is normally established by
appropriate training – An engineering degree is just the
start • Design engineers need further training in topics such
as: – Company design procedures – QA systems» document
control » interpreting codes and standards » software usage
– The design process includes • Preparation of operating
manuals • Determining the training requirements for: –
Process engineers– Operators & supervisors – Maintenance
staff • Recognition of competency – Chartered Engineer &
Chartered Professional Engineer • Recognition of
competency in your field – Chartered Engineer (CEng) »
Institution of Chemical Engineers (Engineering Council UK
accredited and recognised throughout Europe, North
America and Asia) – Chartered Professional Engineer
(CPEng) » Engineers Australia (limited recognition
overseas) – CEng or CPEng is a now legal requirement in
QLD to approve drawings and calculations – Must stay up to
date with developments • Requirement of:
– Institution of Chemical Engineers – Engineers Australia
and similar organisations • Process known as Continuing
Professional Development (CPD) – Must plan an on-going
technical and managerial knowledge advancement program
by: » Attending courses in a range of related topics »
Participate in conferences and technical meetings » Focused
private study » Maintaining records showing activities and
benefits
• QA System Auditing – Effectiveness of the QA systems
are regularly checked by auditing • Internal audits –
Undertaken monthly by the QA manager » usually
concentrating on a different specific area for each audit »
non-compliances are investigated » findings are fed back to
improve the system • External audits – Undertaken twice
yearly by the Registering Body » Standards Australia,
Lloyds of London, etc.. – Serious non-compliance can result
in de-registration
 Concluding Remarks • QA systems are a formal way of
minimizing the risk of mistakes The QA system specifies the
process for: • Design control• Document control• Process
control• Training Requires that decisions and calculations
are checked by competent engineers. The system is subject
to regular internal and external audits to ensure
compliance.
Hazard & Risk Analysis in the Process Industries
Why do we need to study safety? – Many plants process
hazardous materials: Petrochemicals & other flammable
materials• Toxic substances such as chlorine• Explosives and
explosible substances– Often in very large
quantities– Potential for disaster is high: High casualties,
including multiple fatalities• High cost of damage to plant,
buildings and environment• Substantial consequential losses
– A good understanding of the risks and how to manage them
is essential
Plant can’t be made perfectly safe because: Toxic and
flammable substances are very useful and needed for modern
lifeRisk is therefore inherent
Plant is subject to failure for many reasons: Design errors»
Maintenance errors» Equipment and materials failures
•Human operators make mistakes: Careless or
inattentive» Interpret information incorrectly» Take
inappropriate “short cuts”» Fall asleep» Occasionally wilfully
disregard correct procedures including by senior management
Process Safety accidents are of low frequency but often have
very severe effects
Company directors have a duty to consider the full effects of a
potential process safety accident Can be catastrophic for
both company and community
Types of incident: Fire, Flash fire, Vapour cloud explosion,
Explosions - chemical reaction runaway, Implosions, Toxic gas
escape, Toxic fumes from fires, BLEVE or Fireball, Dust
explosions
Most accidents arise from longstanding problemsneed to:
IDENTIFY the problems (hazards) and MANAGE the risks
Need a SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: Planning, Leading,
Organizing, ControllingThe correct procedures applied by the
right people effectively
Root cause is always the failure to construct and/or maintain
a safe system
Some company names occured more than once: clear inability
to learn from other’s mistakes.
In the ICI Training Video analysing the Pipa-Alpha accident,
what did Brian Atherton say was the “Bottom Line of Safety” in
his closing remarks?
The sum and quality of our individual contributions to the
management of safety determines whether the colleagues we
work with live or die.
Pressure Relief and Protective Systems
We need systems to protect against plant failure that can
create hazards: Tank or vessel overfilled, Vessel over
pressurized, Thermal runaway of a chemical reaction, Ignition
of an explosible mixture, Flame–out in a boiler or furnace, Leak
of process fluid need “Protective Systems”
Protective Systems: Engineered systems to protect plant and
people from the consequences of process failures
– Two basic types: Pressure relief systems: Designed to vent
over-pressure to a safe place • Safety interlock systems:
Designed to prevent dangerous and/or conflicting actions (Will
override operators and control system and to drive the process
into “safe mode”, Safe mode is normally (but not always) an
emergency shut-down)/ Originally developed in the 1840s to
assist railway signal operators (Mechanical interlocking
prevented the setting up of conflicting train movements,
Ensured signals showed the true positions of switches and
turnouts)
Two types of vessels subject to overpressure and prevent
catastrophic failure: Those designed to operate normally at
elevated pressures (Specific legal requirement to protect these
vessels in most cases – pressure vessel codes, etc) / Those that
operate close to ambient pressure (Most likely require
protection as a consequence of general OH&S legislation - less
specific requirements)
Typical causes of overpressure: Utility failure (single item or
plant wide)• Equipment failure (fans, pumps,
compressors)• Blocked exit (operator error, control system
failure)• Open inlet (gas blow though)• Runaway reaction•
Exchanger tube rupture• Plant fire• Thermal expansion – If
unchecked vessel will fail
Consequences of vessel failure: Pressure wave causing further
damage and /or injuries• Release of potentially flammable
materials (May cause fires and secondary explosions escalating
the damage and injuries)• Release of potentially toxic
materials (May cause deaths, illness and environmental
damage) Pressure vessels must therefore be equipped
with pressure relief systems
Consequences of Failure
Distillation tower flooded with hydrocarbons: Control system
failure over-pressurized vessel and caused a geyser-like
hydrocarbon leak, Was not released to a safe place DESIGN
FAULT + inadequate protective system
Hydrocarbons plants have high potential for major
incidents, Processing plants are often integrated, making
design complex , Significant incidents have resulted in
increasing obligations on plant operators and designers
Pressure Relief Devices
Pressure relief location: Generally located on top of vessel–
Must be stand alone connection– Relief pipework: No isolating
valves • Use long radius bends• Discharge line pipe pressure
drop must be suitable for relief device type
•  Safety Pressure relief valves: where: Self closing action
required and relatively slow pressure relief acceptable
– Two basic types: Direct spring acting for low to medium
capacities • Pilot acting for high capacities
Direct spring acting: Slow opening• Low capacity• Impose
significant pressure loss across valve• Normally be used in
pairs: Parallel arrangement or Second valve set at slightly
higher pressure than first
Pilot acting: For high capacities• Rapid opening• Impose lower
pressure loss across valve• Used in pairs: Parallel arrangement
or Second valve set at slightly higher pressure than first valve
Bursting discs used where: Very rapid pressure relief
required•  Self closing action not necessary Two basic types
• Forward acting: Utilises a scored discSuited to steady
pressures • Reverse acting: Utilises a non-scored disc bowed
against pressureLonger life with fluctuating pressures
Explosion vents: Rip panels: Always remain open after venting
• Used where: Low opening pressure needed, Leak proof
sealing required, Rapid opening essential. Explosion doors:
Can be made self closing, Must be light weight to minimize
inertia and allow rapid opening
Sizing Pressure Relief Devices: Vessels are subjected to over-
pressure, 2-phase flow considerably increases the pressure
compared with vapour only, Although we are relieving
pressure, the magnitude of the flow affects the size and type
of relief valve
Potential pressure rise: Must be calculated using empirical
rules, or •  Determined from tests: Assistance is provided in
applicable standards
Process Information Required for Pressure Relieving System
Design: Process flow diagram mass balance• Piping and
instrument diagrams• Plant layout and equipment elevations•
Vessel dimensions and design conditions: Temperature and
pressure• Site paving and drainage layout• Pump and
compressor performance curves• Control valve sizing• Pipe
specifications
Causes of Equipment over Pressure: Utility failure(Heating/
cooling medium, inst. air, power) Single item or Plant wide
• Equipment failure (Fans, pumps, compressors, etc.)• Blocked
exit (Operator error, control system failure) • Open inlet (gas
blow though)• Heat exchanger tube rupture• Plant
fire• Thermal expansion
Understanding potential scenarios: – Two unrelated abnormal
conditions are not normally considered– Consequential failure
must be considered– Control valves (Those not under
consideration as causing overpressure shall be assumed to
relieve pressure based on the valves in their normal operating
positions)– Block valves, electric switches or other equipment–
Operator intervention
Quantification of Cause of Overpressure: Use process
simulation for physical property data at relieving conditions–
Assess effect of loss of heating/cooling – Blocked exit (Use flow
rates at design, Allow credit for reduced flow at relieving
conditions, Allow credit for outflow from ‘other’ control
valves)– Open inlet (gas blow through): Assume upstream
vessel at normal operating pressure, Allow normal liquid flows
continue, Allow for additional flow due to bypass– Vessels
containing liquids: Allow reduction of relieving rate for good
drainage, Use ‘wetted’ vessel surface area to assess pressure
rise– Gas filled vessels: Relieving temperature limitations
Liquid and Gas Disposal
Relief disposal pipe work system required: All relief valve
discharges are connected to flare header• System must be
able to cope with maximum flows from all credible
scenarios• Limited backpressure allowed • Free drainage away
from valve• Velocity limitation in pipe work• Liquids must not
be sent to the flare
Modern relief discharge pipe work system: Attempts to
recover liquids and gases for re-useReduce costs and add
value
Allowable back pressure in discharge pipe work system:
Back pressure limitations for spring loaded pressure relief
devices: Conventional spring loaded (Maximum back pressure
10% of set pressure), Balanced relief valve (not shown)
(Maximum back pressure 50 – 60% of set pressure, Pilot
operated relief valve (Back pressure up to 80% of set pressure)
– Bursting discs: Back pressure limitations not applicable–
Pressure safety valve inlet (PSV) piping (Pressure drop limited
to less than 3% set pressure)– Pressure safety valve outlet
piping (Complex with multiple inputs and multiple
subheaders.)
Flare sizing and siting: Two types of flare
• Ground flare: Limited capacity, Smokeless design
• Elevated flare: Can be designed with very high capacities,
Generally smoky at full load, Generates significant radiant heat
fluxMust be high enough to eliminate burns and heat
damage
Basic sizing of elevated flare: Exit velocity based on Pressure
loss (Flame extinction and Nozzle exit velocity must not exceed
20% of sonic velocity of mixture at max duty)• Flare height
Based on safe levels of radiant heat flux
Flare height and siting: Rule of thumb
Where: All dimensions are in ft: Qm= vapour flow rate (lb/h)-qf
= radiation (Btu/h/ft2) at distance Xf-M = ave. molecular
weight of vapour -Assumptions: Flame length = 120 df,
Emissivity = 0.048M0.5
Flare systems: Blow down drum to collect liquid• Knock out
drum to remove entrained drops• Water seal: Non return
valve, Pressure control system• Flare tip with: Igniter/pilot
system, Steam jets, Windshield
Safety Interlock Systems
Not all hazards are caused by pressure rise: Overfilling a tank,
Fire risk if flammable• Pump running “dry”: Pump damage or
possible explosion from overheating• Flame out in a furnace If
fuel continues to flow inSEVERE EXPLOSION RISK ARISES•  other fittings for boilers and unfired pressure vessels• Bursting
Cooling water failure on an exothermic reactorRunaway
reactionSEVERE EXPLOSION RISK ARISES• Flow failure to a
petrochemical fired heater Leads to loss of heat sink, tube
failure and ignition of HydrocarbonLARGE FIRE RESULTS
To protect us from other hazards we use control based
Protective Systems
Safety Interlock Systems: Designed to prevent dangerous
and/or conflicting actions
Mechanical systems: Used in the process industries to prevent
conflicting operation of hand operated devices: e.g. valves:
Uses unique keys to limit valve positions, Designed to ensure
only the correct combination(s) of valve positions is possible
Electrical systems: override control room operators and
control system and to drive the process into “safe mode” -
Designed to protect against equipment failure, e.g. Control
sensor failure, Valve failure, Process control computer failure,
Flow failure, Over temperature, Distraction, mistake,
incapacityMust be completely separate from the control
systemMust be “fail-safe” or designed for a very low risk of
failure
Safety shutdown systems: Almost always electrically based
(Also known as: Trip systems, Safety Shutdown Systems,
Burner Management Systems)• Requirements may be
specified in: Codes of practice, National standards, Law Must
be “fail-safe” or designed for a very low risk of failure,
Generally requires that they are completely separate from the
control system
Achieving an acceptable risk of failure
Option 1: Fail safe relay logic Based on ensuring any failure of
sensor, switch, relay, valve, power supply, etc leads to plant
shutdown• Plant cannot re-start without operator
intervention• Used since the 1920s: Require little duplication
provided danger was indicated by loss of electrical signal
(inherent safe design), Very good safety record, Very few
danger side failures An equivalent level of safety is still not
achievable by computer based systems!
Option 2: Computer based systems: Computers cannot be
made “fail-safe” so system Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is
defined• Any electronic semi-conductor failure can be two
ways: Open circuit to safe condition–Closed circuit to
dangerous conditions• Introduction of PLC based for safety
trip systems has increased the number of danger side failures
100 fold• This includes sensors with electronic signal
processing• To achieve the required level of safety: All safety
instrument circuits must be duplicated or triplicated, Special
safety PLCs dedicated solely to this task must be used,
Extensive failure analysis must be undertaken and recorded,
Separate relay circuits must be used for safety critical circuits•
A target must be set depending on the danger arising from
failure to act when requiredThe greater the danger, the
higher the SIL required
Applicable Codes and Standards: Pressure Vessels: AS1210
Australian Standard for unfired pressure vessels, ASME VIII US
standard for unfired pressure vessel• Relief Valves: AS 1271-
2003 - Safety valves, other valves, liquid level gauges, and
discs: AS 1358-2004 Bursting discs and bursting disc devices -
Application, selection and installation• Piping: ASME B31.3 (ref
5)• Petrochemical specific standards: Offshore Production
Platforms API RP14C, Refineries API RP520, Gen. Hydrocarbon
Processing API RP521• Explosible Dusts: VDI 3673 Pressure
release of dust explosions, NFPA 654: Standard for the
Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the
Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible
Particulate Solids, 2000 Ed
Hazard and Operability Studies
Nothing is “Perfectly Safe”, All activities involve “risk”,Nothing
is achieved without involving riskBasic rule is that the
benefits should be achieved at an acceptable risk
In the real world it is often perceived risk rather than the
real risk that governs the decision making process
Hazard & Risk Analysis
Hazards should be eliminated wherever possible, if the hazard
cannot be eliminated The risk must be managed in an
acceptable wayThe risk requires quantifying
•  Hazard analysis is a method of quantifying risk associated
with identified hazards, Hazards include risks to: people,
property, environment
Hazard and risk analysis must be part of the Safety
Management System: Must be approached in a methodical
way: Identify the hazards before quantifying the associated
risks – Hazard identification: Hazard & operability studies
(HAZOP) – Risk quantifying: Hazard analysis (HAZAN) Always
do a HAZOP before doing a HAZAN
Murphy’s law - Observations attributable to the mythical
Irishman: Sooner or later whatever can go wrong will go wrong
Things which can’t go wrong will still go wrong
HAZOP
Purpose: Identify all foreseeable risk situations associated with
a process, Ensure all reasonably practical steps have been
taken to, eliminate or minimise the risk
Legal terms frequently encountered in the British and
Australian legislation
So far as is practicable: Must be complied with Regardless of
cost and Within the light of current knowledge (all sources of
knowledge not just yours or the company’s - if it is published
somewhere, no matter how obscure, then it is “ current
knowledge”)
So far as is reasonably practicable: Must be complied with
until the cost of additional control measures become
disproportionate to the reduction in risksThis measure of
cost seems to vary according to who is paying
HAZOP: Systematic method of identification and assessment
Undertaken by a small team: The plant is examined process
line by process line
Using a series of guide words: NONE, PART OF, MORE OF,
MORE THAN (or AS WELL AS), LESS OF, OTHER THAN
NONE Related to flow this could mean; no flow, no forward
flow or possibly reverse flow
MORE OF (any relevant physical property than there should
be) Could be: More flow (flowrate or more total quantity),
More pressure, More temperature, More viscosity, etc.
LESS OF (any relevant physical property than there should be)
Could be: Less flow (flowrate or less total quantity), Lower
pressure, Lower temperature, Lower viscosity, etc.
PART OF (composition different from what it should be) Could
be: Change in ratio of components (in mixtures), Component
missing, etc.
MORE THAN (more components present than there should be)
Could be: Extra phase present e.g. liquid water in steam,
vapour in cooling water, Impurities present e.g. water, acid,
dirt, corrosion products, etc.
OTHER THAN (what else can happen apart from normal
operation)• Usually applied to the vessels after the lines have
been studied• Could be: Start-up and shutdown, Low rate
operation, Power failure, Catalyst change, Failure of plant
services, Maintenance operations, etc
Additional guide words to the operating instructions: DON’T
CHARGE “A”/ CHARGE MORE “A”/CHARGE LESS “A”/CHARGE
“B” AS WELL AS “A”/CHARGE PART OF “A” (if “A” is a mixture)/
REVERSE CHARGE “A” (i.e. reactants flow back to tank)/
CHARGE OTHER THAN “A”/“A” is ADDED TOO EARLY/“A” is
ADDED LATE /“A” is ADDED TOO QUICKLY /“A” is ADDED TOO
SLOWLY
HAZOP Studies - Computer controlled plant: Computers are
fallible, Instructions (program) should also be studied
(Determine the consequences of the computer failing to take
action and Provide hard wired fail-safe safety interlocks where
appropriate), Computer systems can never be totally fail-safe
No matter what the safe guards that are added in
HAZOP Hints: Don’t get carried away and install expensive
equipment to guard against possible but unlikely hazards –  likely to result in any serious injuries it is worth spending
Cannot spend our way out of every problem– Actions should
be changes in equipment or proceduresMain effort should
be on prevention
Modifications: HAZOP should always be undertaken on
proposed modifications, Many accidents have occurred as a
consequence of the unforeseen effects of modifications•  If a
HAZOP is not study undertaken then the attached check list
should be used
All modifications should be examined: Temporary as well as
permanent ones• Commissioning as well as those on
established plant• Cheap as well as expensive modifications
• Modifications to procedures
HAZOP Teams
New plant: Project or design engineer (Usually a mechanical
engineer) –  Process engineer (Usually a chemical engineer)–  relief valves and trips, Decide how much redundancy should be
Commissioning manager–  Instrument design engineer (HAZOP
usually adds instruments and trips) – Independent Chairperson
(Ensures team follows procedure - should be familiar with
HAZOP not an expert in the process being studied)
Existing plant: Plant Manger (Responsible for plant
operation)– Process foreman (Knows what actually happens
rather than what should happen)– Plant engineer (Responsible
for maintenance) – Instrument manger (Responsible for
instrument maintenance; including testing of alarms and
interlocks) – Independent Chairperson
Hazard Analysis
Hazard Analysis: Undertaken when the hazard cannot be
eliminated
Objectives of hazard analysis: To determine how often a
particular incident is likely to occur, To determine the likely
consequences of the incident, To determine what should be
done about the risk
A rough rule of thumb is: HOW CAFEFUL? > HOW BIG? x HOW
OFTEN?  We have a duty of care to prevent injuries to
people and damage to the environment
Reasonably practicable: Must spend sufficient to make risks
acceptable But not so much that the business is threatened
Stages of hazard analysis: Estimating how often the incident
will occur/ Estimating the consequences to: Employees, The
public, The Environment, Plant and profits
Best hazard analysis: Quantitative risk analysis• Uses statistical
data: Based on plant and equipment failures, Based on actual
injuries and fatalities in typical events• Combined with fault
tree analysis • To determine how often an event will occur
Targets or Criteria: The simple risk analysis shows us where to
target our efforts but does not tell us anything quantitative 
Makes it difficult to know when we comply with the So far as is
reasonably practicable criteria We need measurable criteria:
Relatively easy for economic loss but very difficult where injury
or potential death is concerned
Economic loss: hazard that is likely to result in an accident
once in 1000 years, Cause plant damage of $1 million, Not
$1000/year to prevent this accident but no more/If lost
production is important then the value increases (if the
additional production loss is $100 million then it is worth
spending $101,000)
Injuries and fatalities: The target is often set intuitively e.g.
handrails, No formal hazard analysis, The height of handrails is
largely accepted as adequate by the general populationWe
find the small risk of falling acceptable despite the fact that a
fall is likely to be fatal• Tolerable risk is preferred over
acceptable risk • UK Approach: An upper level of fatalities that
must never be exceeded no matter what the cost, A lower,
negligible level, that there is no need to get below• In
between these limits (ALARP region): Accidents should be
reduced if reasonably practical Use cost/benefit analysis to
determine whether further reduction is reasonably practicable
We can use ALARP to: Resolve design choices e.g between
built in to a protective system
Not always necessary to consider numerical targets: New
design should NEVER be less safe than the old design
Fatal accident rate (FAR): Risks to employees: Number of fatal
accidents per 1000 workers in a working lifetime (108 hours)
Chemical Industry FAR 4.25 made up from: Ordinary risks (2)
and Chemical risks (2.25)priority should target to areas of
chemical industry where the FAR is >2
FAR should be used to compare the person or group at
greatest risk not the average for all employees on the plant,
for UK chemical industry the target for the person at greatest
risk is FAR of 0.4
What we really need is a Hazard rate: Given a target FAR of
0.4 then if the person at greatest risk is killed in every
dangerous incident (not typical), Then maximum rate of
occurrences for a shift worker is: 0.4 incidents in 108 working
hours or once in 2.5 x 108 hours, i.e. once every 30,000
years This translates to 3 x10-5 incidents/year, If the person
at greatest risk escapes in 9 out of 10 incidents then the
tolerable incident rate can increase to 3 x10-4 incidents/year
Risks to employees - Multiple Casualties
•  Which is worse?
(a) 1 person killed every year for 100 years
(b) 100 people killed in 1 incident every 100 years
A difficult dilemma because
–  (b) will cause more trauma and disruption to the community
but may never happen
–  (a) will almost certainly happen and cause many deaths
•  If the plant lasts 25 years:
–  The chance is that (b) will happen is 1 in 4 but (a) will almost
certainly result in 25 deaths
•  If we give priority to (b) then we take resources away
from (a)
–  In the meantime (a) will certainly result in many deaths yet
we
have applied the resources to something that may never
happen
•  There have been many attempts to quantify the
tolerable hazard rate for (b) but these have been
somewhat arbitrary
•  Probably the only equitable way is to give equal
priority to (a) & (b) - we’re just as dead in either case
Risks to the public: We accept greater voluntary risks than
imposed risks, for risk to the public, 1 x 10-7 is commonly
considered tolerable •  Difficult to explain: Easy to understand
the high number of casualties but Difficult to understand the
very low frequency of such events
Quantitative Hazard & Risk Analysis
HAZARD (OR INCIDENT) RATE (H): The rate (occasion/year) at
which hazards occur
PROTECTIVE SYSTEM: Device installed to prevent a hazard
occurring
TEST INTERVAL (T): Protective systems require regular testing
to ensure that they are still functional, The time between tests
is the test interval T
DEMAND RATE (D): The rate (occasion/year) at which a
protective system is called upon to act
FAILURE RATE (f): The rate (occasion/year) at which a
protective system develops faults
FRACTIONAL DEAD TIME (fdt): The time for which a protective
system is inactive i.e. the non-availability fdt = 1 - availability
•  If a protective system always operates when demanded
then the hazard rate: H = 0
•  If a protective system never operates when demanded then
the hazard rate: H = D
 H= D x fdt = D.fT/2 (based on failure 1/2 way through
the test period T)
Testing and fractional dead times: Failure not obvious until
demand occursMust be tested regularly and put back into
service, On average failure occurs midway between tests fdt
= fT/2
Need failure data to choose appropriate test intervals
The less reliable the component the more often it needs testing
Limitations of hazard and risk analysis: Most major accidents
are caused by management systems failure not isolated
equipment failures, Risk analysis only considers “How often?”
This is a major limitation for low frequency, high impact
events, Boards of directors have a legal responsibility to
consider and act on all ways of either eliminating the risk or
minimizing the impact.

Fractional dead times - relief valves
Failure to operate within 20% of set pressure occurs
once in 100 yearsfailure frequency is 1/100 = 0.01
Test once/year i.e. T = 1, Typically failure occurs midway
between teststhe valve is dead for 6 months or 1/2 T
Therefore fdt = 0.5 x 1 x 0.01 = 0.005 of a year
Hazard frequencies: Take a plant with a demand of 1 per year
A hazard occurs when a demand arises during a dead time
H = D x fdt
Legal responsibilities: Defined under “Common Law” (law of
judicial precedent, does not recognize the concept of low risk
if the consequences are severe and that risk is avoidable),
Criticality: Establish critical hazards, Preventability: Identify
and enact all practical precautions for each critical hazards,
Reasonableness: Determine which of the practical precautions
are reasonable, Implementation Of reasonably practical
solutions, On-going monitoring and review

Multiple Protective systems

– Two systems in parallel: fdt = 4/3*FA*FBhazard rate: H =
4/3*D*FA*FB
–Two systems in series: fdt=FA+FB hazard rate: H=D (FA+FB)

Fault trees: Widely used in hazard analysis to determine the

series of events that will lead to creation of a hazard: For AND
Gates we multiply the probabilities, For OR Gates we add the
probabilities
The hazard frequency (vessel over pressurized) once a year is
unacceptable so we use a protective system Dramatically
reduces the frequency of the hazardous occurrence

Pitfalls in hazard analysis: Data may be inapplicable, Designs

change, Using impossibly low fractional dead times, Common
mode failures in parallel systems

Hazard analysis - Methodology

– Common mode failures: Should be minimized by good
design
– Example: pressure in a fire main is maintained by a pump
that switches on whenever the pressure drops below 600kPa
–  A pressure switch is used to do thisdemand rate is
10/yearpressure switch has a failure rate of
0.8/yeartested 10 times a yearThe hazard is the pump
failing to start: H = D x 0.5fT=10 x 0.5 x 0.8 x 0.1 = 0.4/y or once
in 2.5 yearstoo high, therefore install a second pressure
switchFailure rate only fell to once in 4 yearstoo
highinstall a third pressure switch Or remove the common
mode failureFailure rate fell to once in 77 years
–  Greater fall than predicted by: H = D x 0.5fT

– Eliminating common mode failures

Don’t rely on just one technique: Always use HAZOP to look

for potential hazards, Consider all reasonable means of risk
elimination and reduction - not just protective systems • Do
not rely on “Nothing has gone wrong in the past - it must be
safe” syndrome.• Don’t assume that because a proposal
completely satisfies current rules that it must be safe,
Especially with new technology• Remember that fault tree
analysis may provided part of the answer but it will never
provide all the answer• Think about inherently safe design