Administrative Reforms Commission - 1966 .

The Administrative Reforms Commission was set up to explore the arenas for establishing
Administrative Tribunals for different subject matters. It recommended establishment of Civil Services
Tribunals as adjudicatory entities for disciplinary punishments awarded to civil servants.

II. Wanchoo Committee - 1970 33. The Wanchoo Committee recommended reforms to the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal to effectuate replacement of Civil Courts for expeditious redressal of tax disputes. It
also recommended formation of a Direct Taxes Settlement Tribunal to ensure speedy remedies and
decisions of disputes.

III. High Court’s Arrears Committee Report - 1972 34. A committee headed by Justice JC Shah highlighted
an urgent need for individual-specialised Tribunals for exclusively dealing with service matters and to
unburden High Courts by restricting the barrage of writ petitions being filed by government employees.

IV. Swaran Singh Committee - 1976 35. The Swaran Singh Committee took a radical view by advocating
amendments to the Constitution for regulation of Tribunals and to curtail the writ jurisdiction of High
Court and the Supreme Court. This report attracted a lot of critique from the legal fraternity and was
later rejected in Sakinala Hari Nath vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh.

V. Raghavan Committee - 2002 36. In accordance with contemporaneous evolutions in the commercial
sphere, the Raghavan Committee was set up to suggest methods to regulate anticompetitive practices.
This Committee recommended establishment of the Competition Commission of India (CCI), which was
envisioned to maintain adequate competition in the market and protect consumer welfare. Further, the
Competition Act, 2002 was later enacted which provided certain powers of Civil Courts to the CCI for
effective enquiry and adjudication

R.K. Jain vs. Union of India(1993) 4 SCC 119, a three-judge Bench of this Court emphasised the need for a
safe and sound justice delivery system adept at satisfying the confidence of litigants. It was further
noted that since members of Tribunals discharge quasi-judicial functions, it is imperative that they
possess requisite legal expertise, some judicial experience and an iota of legal training.

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India(1997) 3 SCC 261 , a Constitution Bench of seven judges of this Court
examined reports of expert committees and commissions analysing the problem of arrears. The
Malimath Committee Report (1989-1990) was also referred to, wherein it was found that many
Tribunals failed the test of public confidence due to purported lack of competence, objectivity and
judicial approach. This Court thus called for drastic measures to elevate the standards of Tribunals in the
country.

Union of India vs. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association (2010) 11 SCC 1 , a Constitution Bench of
five judges of this Court reviewed the Constitutional validity of Parts I-B and I-C of The Companies Act,
1956 inserted by the Companies (2nd Amendment) Act, 2002. The bench observed that if Tribunals are
established in substitution of Courts, they must also possess independence, security and capacity.
Additionally, with transfer of jurisdiction from a traditional Court to a Tribunal, it would be imperative to
include members of the judiciary as presiding officers/members of the Tribunal.
Madras Bar Association vs. Union of India (2015) 8 SCC 583. vires of the Companies Act, 2013 which
contemplated establishment of National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) were challenged. Interestingly, while examining Chapter XXVII of Companies
Act, 2013 i.e. Sections 407 to 434, this Court held that although the establishment of NCLT and NCLAT
was not unconstitutional but there was a need for curing defects in accordance with the dictum of R.
Gandhi.

Sec 28 and HC

In the case of Ishvarbhai Jaganji Naik Vs. The Returning Officer and Another 1991 (1) SLJ 36 , it was held
by the Bombay High Court that in the light of the provisions of section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals
Act, 1985, the courts are not entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to
service matters even where a question arises incidentally in a proceeding which is not between
employer and the employee.

M.B. Shukla v. Union of IndiaAIR 1986 All 2. had taken the view that as the jurisdiction of the Iiigh court
under article 226 was an extraordinary jurisdiction, to issue prerogative writs, the writ proceedings do
not fall within the meaning of the word 'proceedings' used in sections 28 and 29 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act and, therefore, the high court can continue to entertain or retain petitions under article
226 of the Constitution for the issue of prerogative writs even in respect of service matters.

S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India and others (J.T.I 986 SC 996) the Constitution Bench has held that
the Act is a law made by Parliament under cl (1) of art. 323 A to exclude the jurisdiction of the high court
under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Section 28 of the Act which bars the jurisdiction of all courts
except the Supreme Court is relatable to cf. 2(d) of art. 323A for adjudication of service matters
including questions involving the validity or otherwise of such laws on the ground that they abridge the
fundamental rights under arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution, and that the Administrative Tribunal set
up under section 4 of the Act is a substitute for and not supplemental to the high court, providing an
equally efficacious alternative remedy for adjudication of such disputes.

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India(1997) 3 SCC 261

where the court, while holding that "though the subordinate judiciary or tribunal created under the
ordinary legislation cannot exercise the power of judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of
the high courts and thesupreme court, there is no constitutional prohibition against their performing a
supplemental - as opposed to a substitutional - role in this respect".

Finally, a 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India29 (“L. Chandra
Kumar”) conclusively held that the power of the High Courts under Article 226 and 227 to exercise
judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals, is a part of the basic structure of
the Constitution.30 It also stated that “all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article
323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial
jurisdiction the particular tribunal falls. In the opinion of the court, it would serve two purposes: First,
frivolous claims will be filtered by tribunals before they reach the High Court; and second, the High
Court will have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will assist in finally deciding the
matter.32

S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of IndiaAIR 1987 SC386.ATR 1987 SC 34.

The validity of Article 323-A and the Act have been upheld by the Supreme Court.

In Sampath Kumar, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court had to determine the constitutionality of
Section 28 of the Act, which ousted the power of judicial review of the Supreme Court and High

The bench concluded that the creation of ‘alternative institutional mechanisms’, which were as
competent as High Courts, would not violate the basic structure of the Constitution.22 It also passed
directions with respect to qualifications of tribunal members, manner of appointment, etc.23 With
regard to the appointment process, the court stated that the recommendations of a High Powered
Selection Committee (chaired by the Chief Justice of India or his/her designate) must be ordinarily
followed, unless reasons for not following them are furnished