BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 14

Section 14. (1) “No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.”

(2) “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”

Rights under Prosecution

OLAGUER vs. MILITARY COMMISSION – “military tribunals / judicial power / due process” Olaguer and several
others were arrested and charged for subversion and several other crimes before a Military Tribunal created under
martial law. The military tribunal found them guilty only after a 25 minute recess and sentenced them to death. They
filed a case for habeas corpus and sought to enjoin the military tribunal from trying their case. The due process
clause of the Constitution contemplates trial by JUDICIAL process. The military tribunals are not part of the
judicial system but rather fall under the Executive Branch. Court Martial proceedings are intended primarily for
ensuring military discipline. Judicial power resides in the courts, not the Executive. Even during the existence of
martial law, military tribunals have no jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses properly cognizable by the civil
courts for as long as the same are functioning – otherwise the rights of the accuseds to due process are
violated.

The lifting of Martial Law effectively divested the Military Tribunals of any supposed authority. Further, the grave
national emergency that once justified their existence no longer exists. Thus, all cases pending under such tribunals
should be transferred to the civil courts.

TAN vs. BARRIOS – “acquitted by military tribunals / operative fact” Pursuant to the rulings in Olaguer as well as Cruz
vs. Enrile, declaring the military tribunals functus officio and the proceedings therein null and void, several persons
convicted by the military tribunals during martial law prayed for a re-trial of their case. The courts thus directed the
Secretary of Justice to file the necessary informations in the proper civil courts. However, pursuant thereto, Fiscal
Barrios re-filed informations against Tan and other persons who have been ACQUITTED by the military tribunals.
The lower courts then issued the warrants for their arrest. The ruling in Cruz vs. Enrile should not prejudice
persons who are not parties thereto; otherwise it could be used as an instrument for oppression. The military
tribunal hearings as to the following cases should stand:

1. Persons who had finished serving their sentences thereunder

2. Persons who have been granted amnesty
3. Persons who have been acquitted by the said tribunals

Thus, the rule laid down in Cruz vs. Enrile should be applied prospectively. Even assuming that proceedings
under military tribunals are void, operative fact applies. This bars the re-filing of informations against the herein
accuseds; to rule otherwise would violate their rights against double jeopardy and the enactment of ex post facto
laws or rulings.

US vs. LULING – “prima facie evidence of guilt / legislative power of the State” Luling was a wharf watchman who was
charged under Act. No. 335 for having solicited and received the sum of P 100 from Rufino Elord so that he may
secure the delivery and importation of certain rolls of paper containing opium. He assails the validity of Sec. 316 of
the said law for making the “mere receiving” of certain gifts from importers or exporters prima facie evidence of
violation, alleging that it violates his right to presumption of innocence by transferring the burden of proof to the
accused. Since the State has the right to declare what constitute criminal acts, it likewise has the right to
define what proof constitutes prima facie evidence of guilt and to pass the burden to the defendant to prove
that his acts were innocent. The constitutional provision on presumption of innocence is not violated by such
statutes.
PEOPLE vs. MINGOA – “malversation / overcome by contrary presumption / reasonable” Mingoa, a public officer
entrusted w/ funds, failed to account for the same alleging that the said monies were lost. He was charged for
malversation. Under the Revised Penal Code, mere failure to account for public funds or property amounts to prima
facie evidence that he has put the said funds or property to personal use. He assails Art. 217 of the RPC for violating
the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence. There is no constitutional objection to the passage of
a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption and what
evidence suffices to raise such presumption. Further, the law establishes a mere presumption; it affords the
accused the opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and founded upon experience
of human conduct.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC – “election disqualification / charged vs. convicted / not synonymous” BP No. 52 disqualifies
a candidate CHARGED either before the civil or military tribunals for acts of disloyalty, subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, and such other crimes. There is a distinction between a person who is charged and a person who is
convicted. The same cannot be equated. A person merely charged cannot be put in the same footing as a
person already convicted. The law violates the constitutional right to presumption of innocence. Further, evidence
regarding such acts of disloyalty should be presented before the courts, not the administrative bodies such as the
COMELEC. Legislative or administrative determination of guilt cannot substitute for judicial determination of
guilt. (This is the same case under Section 1)

MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC – “fugitive from justice / disqualification” Defeated candidate Bienvenido Marquez sought
the disqualification of Edgardo Rodriguez for the governorship of Quezon Province for being a “fugitive from justice”
based on Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code. Rodriguez was charged for 10 counts of insurance fraud and
grand theft in a Municipal Court of Los Angeles, but he fled from the US to evade prosecution. The term “fugitive
from justice” embraces not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who flee
to avoid prosecution. It is well supported in jurisprudence.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Davide

The said prohibition does not infringe upon the right to presumption of innocence because one is not being
disqualified for his guilt (or the lack of it), but rather for his act of fleeing from justice. As opposed to Dumlao
vs. COMELEC, the person was disqualified due to a presumption of guilt even when he was merely charged; the
same does not attend in this case.

PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO – “duties of the judge” Holgado was charged for slight illegal detention for kidnapping and
detaining Artemia Fabreag for 8 hours w/o justifiable reason. During arraignment, he was asked “Do you have an
attorney or are you going to plead guilty?” He did not have an attorney and pleaded guilty, saying that a certain Mr.
Ocampo had instructed him to do so. During arraignment, if the accused is unaccompanied by counsel, the
court has the following duties:

1. Inform the defendant of his right to counsel

2. Ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney
3. If he chooses to avail but is unable to employ an attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio to
defend him
4. If the defendant chooses to procure an attorney of his own, the court must grant him reasonable time to do
so

None of these duties have been complied with. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include
the right to be heard by counsel.

DD: If the victim is a woman, the offense should be serious illegal detention, not merely slight illegal detention.

US vs. ASH – “history of right to counsel / stages of proceedings” Under the old English Common Law Rule, the right
to counsel was limited to trial; however, this notion has been gradually disregarded. There was a growing
recognition of the fact that an unaided layman, even if educated or learned, may not be able to defend
himself intelligently given the intricate procedural system. Thus counsel was necessary as a guide through the
complex legal technicalities. The creation of the Office of the Prosecutor further necessitated the presence of
counsel. The prosecutor was dedicated primarily for the purpose of prosecuting defendants and is incomparably
more familiar w/ procedures, idiosyncrasies of juries, and the personnel of the court. There was thus the need to
minimize the imbalance.

The development of pre-trial proceedings further necessitated the assistance of counsel; otherwise trials could
become mere formalities. These involve critical stages where the accused may make mistakes or his reasoning
dimmed by emotional tension; thus he needs a spokesman or advisor in his lawyer. Counsel was further extended
to police line-ups under the Wade Case to prevent the prosecution from taking advantage of the accused during
 such stages. The more so that during trial the accused must be aided by counsel so as to be able to plead his case
intelligently w/o surrendering his right against self-incrimination.

PEOPLE vs. LIWANAG – “effective counsel / reasonableness” Liwanag was provided w/ counsel de oficio in Atty. Uy
who assisted him during arraignment and trial, and who cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. Liwanag
contends that Atty. Uy was not “intelligent counsel” for not being able to safeguard his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures for not having contested his warrantless arrest, and that Atty. Uy failed to secure a reversal of
his conviction. He contends that this in fact amounts to a violation of his right to counsel. The right to counsel under
the Constitution simply means “effective counsel.” The Supreme Court found that the services of Atty. Uy were
sufficiently effective. In the Philippine setting, counsel assisting the accused is presumed to be providing all
the necessary legal defenses w/c are reasonable under the circumstances in accordance w/ the said norms.
The Strickland Standards cannot be applied in our jurisdiction. The proper standard here is mainly reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms.

PEOPLE vs. LARRAÑAGA – “choice of counsel / counsel de oficio / prevent dilatory tactics” During trial, Larrañaga’s
counsel de parte unceremoniously withdrew. He asked for a continuance of 3 weeks to 1 month wanting to procure
counsel of his own choice. In order to prevent any dilatory maneuvers on the part of the defense counsel, the court
appointed counsel de oficio and refused to suspend the trial. Thus, Larrañaga contests that he was denied the right
to counsel. The preference of counsel pertains more aptly to persons under custodial investigation, but nevertheless,
such preferential discretion is not absolute so as to allow the accused to choose a particular counsel to the
exclusion of all others equally capable. Otherwise, it allows the accused to dictate the tempo of the
prosecution and delay the resolution of the case. Further, the period of extension requested was unreasonably
long. The right to counsel is, to some extent, subject to the supervision of the trial court, especially after the trial has
already commenced.

PEOPLE vs. REGALA – “assault / knowledge not alleged in information / cannot convict” Regala and Flores were
charged for murder w/ assault upon an agent of a person in authority for having stabbed and killed Sgt. Desilos.
However, the information failed to allege the crucial element of knowledge – that the accuseds had knowledge of the
fact that the victim was indeed an agent of a person in authority. Thus, the accuseds cannot be convicted of the said
crimes. The fact that the victim was engaged then in the exercise of his duties does not suffice. Knowledge
must be alleged in the information. There are no other allegations in the information that would clearly point to the
fact that the accuseds had knowledge. The fact that the accuseds did not object thereto likewise does not cure the
defect. To rule otherwise would be to convict the accuseds of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the
information. This would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
him.

DD: The facts must be alleged in the information so as to allow the defense to prepare evidence or arguments to
contradict the same. The defense should not be surprised by the introduction of new averments during trial that they
were not given the chance to prepare for.

ENRILE vs. SALAZAR – “alleged: simple rebellion” Sen. Enrile was arrested and charged w/ the complex crime of
rebellion w/ murder and multiple murder committed during the failed coup attempt. He alleges that he is being
charged for an offense that does not exist in the statute books. The Supreme Court held in the case of People vs.
Hernandez that rebellion cannot be complexed w/ murder or homicide. However, the information does charge a
crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

DD: Simply put, the facts averred in the information suffice to form the elements of simple rebellion. The information
should contain statements of fact, not conclusions of law – w/c are for the courts to decide.

PEOPLE vs. LEGASPI – “2 separate informations / separate crimes complexed w/ each other” Pamela was charged
under 2 separate informations, one for double murder, the other for violation of RA No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act).
She was convicted of the complex crime of robbery w/ double homicide, combining and complexing the two crimes
alleged in separate informations. While the court can hold a joint trial of two or more cases and can render a
consolidated decision, the court cannot combine 2 crimes charged in 2 separate informations to form a
complex crime – and convict the accused therefor. It violates the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him.

PEOPLE vs. DE LA CRUZ – “conclusions of law” De La Cruz was charged for “committing sexual abuse on his daughter,
either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her.” The validity of the information was questioned. The
information contained conclusions of law, not averments of facts. It does not cite w/c provisions of RA No.
7610 were violated by De la Cruz. It did not state the acts and/or omissions constituting the offense of the
attending circumstances.

DD: The information went ahead to conclude that he committed the felony of acts of lasciviousness w/o mentioning
what particular acts he committed constituting the same as well as the applicable provisions of law violated.
Conclusions of law are for the judge to make.
PEOPLE vs. ESPERANZA – “qualifying circumstances must be alleged” Nelson was charged for the rape of his 13
year old niece. Supposedly, minority (under 12 years of age) and relationship (w/in 3rd civil degree of consanguinity)
are qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape. However, the information does not allege that he is related to her
w/in the 3rd civil degree of consanguinity, and he was charged under paragraph 1 of Art. 335 of the RPC
(intimidation), not under paragraph 2 or 3 (minority / deprivation of reason). While the victim turned out to be 11 years
old as proved during trial, the crime cannot be qualified by minority (under 12 years of age) because the information
alleged that she was then 13 years old. To appreciate these qualifying circumstances against Nelson w/o
having properly alleged the same in the information would violate his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusations against him.

DD: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information and proved during trial.

PEOPLE vs. PURAZO – “time not an essential element of rape / need not be alleged accurately” Purazo was charged
and convicted of rape (incestuous). He alleged that the information failed to state w/ particularity the time when the
rape was committed, thus violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. It
provided merely “sometime in the Month of March 1997.” Date is not an essential element in the crime of rape;
thus it need not be accurately stated. It satisfies the 2 requirements that: (1) it is as near to the actual date of
commission as permissible, and (2) the time ultimately proved should be alleged in the complaint.

GARCIA vs. PEOPLE – “basis is nature of the crime, not the designation” Garcia was charged for estafa under Art.
315, Section 2 (a), w/c penalizes false manifestations or fraudulent machinations, but was convicted based on Art.
315 Section 2 (d) for having issued post-dated checks that were not funded or insufficiently funded. The real nature
of the crime is determined by the facts alleged in the information and not by the title or the designation of the
offense contained therein.

CONDE vs. RIVERA – “unreasonable delays / mandamus to dismiss the case” Aurelia Conde had to respond to 5
separate informations and had to make court appearances for over a year already. Even so, there has still yet to be
any resolution of the case. Thus she came before the SC to seek redress. When the prosecuting officer secures
postponements of trials beyond reasonable time, the accused may file a case for mandamus to compel the
dismissal of the case. It is also a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; it is practically an acquittal. She
may likewise petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to obtain freedom is her liberty s retrained. Every
person has the right to have a speedy trial.

NEPOMUCENO vs. SEC. OF DEFENSE – “own fault / delay must be unreasonable” Nepomuceno along w/ several
others have yet to be arraigned for their respective offenses before the Military Tribunal. This is due to the fact that
they filed a Motion to Quash, and then a Supplemental Motion questioning the constitutionality of the Military
Commissions, and even asked for preliminary injunction to suspend the trials. Then they assert that their right to a
speedy trial is violated and seek the dismissal of the case. Any delay in the disposition of Nepomuceno’s case is
attributable to his own actions. Further any delay in filing the charges was brought about by the exigencies of
martial law and by the circumstances of the case. What the constitution prohibits are unreasonable and
capricious delays. The delays in this case are neither unreasonable nor capricious and were brought about by the
accused’s own actions. Further, the right may be waived.

MATEO vs. VILLALUZ – “notarized by judge / under intimidation / to be decided by him” Mateo, among others, was
tried before Judge Villaluz for robbery in a band w/ homicide. Later on, a certain Rolando Reyes executed an extra-
judicial statement implicating Mateo; the statement was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Villaluz.
However, Reyes later repudiated the said statement claiming that he made the statement under intimidation from a
“government agent.” In short, it is possible that Judge Villaluz had something to do about it. Mateo thus prayed that
Judge Villaluz disqualify himself from the case to w/c the latter refused. Due process requires that every litigant be
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Through the exercise of sound
discretion, a judge may disqualify himself from a case.

While discretion lies w/ the judge, the Supreme Court exercises corrective authority. In this case, clearly the
refusal of the judge to inhibit himself amounts to grave abuse of discretion. He is being called upon to decide a matter
w/ w/c he is involved; this casts serious doubts upon his impartiality.

IN RE: OLIVER – “public trials” Secret trials are a menace to liberty. They are instruments for the repression of religious
and political heresies and allow the government to act arbitrarily. An effective restraint on possible abuse of
judicial power is the knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum
of public opinion. Besides the accused should at least be entitled to have his friends, relatives, or counsel present
no matter what offense is charged.

GARCIA vs. DOMINGO – “trial in the chambers of the judge / public trial / public not precluded” The trials in this
case, on 14 separate instances, were held in the air-conditioned chambers of the trial court judge, for the purpose of
convenience. The defendants offered no objection. Later on, they assert that their right to a public trial has been
 violated. Generally, trials should be held in public in order to offset any danger of conducting them in an
illegal or unjust manner. This only means that any person interested in observing the proceedings may do
so, even if not a party to the case or a relative of any party thereto. In this case, there is nothing to show that
other persons are prohibited from observing the proceedings; hence there is no violation of such right. It even
suffices that the relatives, friends, or counsel of the accused are allowed to be present.

FAJARDO vs. GARCIA – “written interrogatories / not embraced by compulsory process” Fajardo, along with other
accuseds, were charged for murder. Evidence of the prosecution disclosed that during the night of the murder, the
accuseds were wounded. They presented medical certificates issued by Dr. Academia. However, when the judge
asked where the doctor was, it turned out that he left for the United States. Counsel for the accuseds asked the judge
to allow them to send interrogatories to Dr. Academia in the United States, invoking the expanded guarantee of
compulsory process to produce evidence. The judge refused, and thus they appeal alleging grave abuse of
discretion.

The service of written interrogatories is worlds apart from the compulsory process guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. Such is not embraced therein. Evidence of their stay in the hospital, besides, could be easily obtained from
the testimony of nurses or the records of the hospital w/o having to resort to sending the interrogatories all the way to
the United States to Dr. Academia.

CARREDO vs. PEOPLE – “waiver of right / duty to appear” Carredo was charged for malicious mischief. After
arraignment, he posted bail and waived his right to appear during trial. During trial, the prosecution witnesses were
presented but hearing was postponed because they could not identify the accused; thus the trial judge summoned
Carredo. After his failure to appear during trial, the judge ordered his arrest and the forfeiture of his cash bond. In the
bail system under our constitution, the accused is granted provisional liberty subject to the condition that he appears
during trial; his failure to do so would make the previous warrant of arrest sufficient for his re-confinement.

The accused may waive his right to meet the witnesses face to face, but he cannot waive his duty to appear
in court for the purpose of being identified by the prosecution witnesses. It is possible that the witnesses do not
know him by name but only by appearance. Further, if he is to be allowed to be absent during all hearings, he may, in
his defense, say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and thus entitled to acquittal.
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