BILL OF RIGHTS

SECTION 17

Section 17. “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.”

Right against Self-Incrimination

US vs. NAVARRO – “guilt due to mere silence / presumption of innocence” Subject to review in this case were 2
provisions of the Penal Code. Art. 481 punishes unlawful deprivation of liberty, while Art. 483 provides that a
person who detained another, who fails to give info as to his whereabouts or does not prove that the same has
been set free shall be punished by a higher penalty. Therefore, in order for the accused to lessen the penalty
he stands to incur, he is forced to divulge the whereabouts of the detainee or declare that the same has been set
free – this is practically an admission that he in fact detained another. If he opts not to speak, he incurs a more
severe criminal liability. Simply put, the evidence required to absolve him under Art. 483 has the effect of
convicting him under Art. 481.

This violates the right against self-incrimination. Under Art. 483, the fact of guilt follows the mere silence of
the accused; this cannot be permitted. Refusal to testify should not create a presumption against the
accused – otherwise it amounts to a law adjudging w/o evidence. The accused has the right to rely on
the presumption of innocence until the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

US vs. TAN TENG – “physical test for gonorrhea / only testimonial evidence” Prosecuted for rape, Tan was
physically examined after his arrest and a substance was taken from his body for the purpose of testing him for
gonorrhea. He tested positive. He assails the admissibility of the evidence claiming that it was obtained in
violation of his right against self incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is a prohibition against
extracting from the defendant’s own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. It does not cover all
forms of compulsion but only testimonial compulsion. The examination does not call upon the accused to
be a witness, nor does it compel him to render testimony or answer questions; the evidence obtained from him is
not testimonial in nature and is not covered by the right.

By analogy, a physical examination for evidence is similar to introducing stolen property taken from the person of
the thief. Also, Tan never objected to the extraction from his body of said substances.

VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS – “examination of woman’s privates / dura lex sed lex” Emetria Villaflor and Florentino
Souingco were charged for adultery. The trial court ordered Villaflor to be examined by physicians to determine if
she was pregnant; the latter refused, thus she will be cited for contempt. She invokes her right against self-
incrimination. While to compel a woman to submit to the examination of her private parts indeed amounts
to great embarrassment and shame, nevertheless, the court must apply the constitutional provision in
accord w/ the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by sentimental influences. The prohibition against
self-incrimination is, and remains to be, limited to compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. Physical
examinations are not covered by the right. However, due care must be exerted at least not to embarrass the
accused any more than necessary in carrying out the test.

US vs. ONG SIU HONG – “morphine in the mouth / not testimonial compulsion” Ong was forced to discharge a
certain amount of morphine from his mouth. The substance was appreciated as evidence against him. He thus
assails the admissibility of such evidence, invoking his right against self-incrimination. The purpose of the
constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral
examination, in order to extort unwilling confessions implicating the accused. The case of Ong was no
different from the Tan Case where the accused was subjected to a test to obtain substances from his body as
evidence to prove his guilt. The evidence is obviously admissible.

BELTRAN vs. SAMSON – “handwriting specimen / testimonial act” Beltran was ordered by the respondent judge to
appear before the fiscal for the purpose of taking a sample of his handwriting to determine if he was the one who
wrote certain falsified documents. There was yet no information filed against him; it was merely an investigation,
not a prosecution. Nevertheless, he invokes his right against self-incrimination. The prohibition is not limited
to declaration, but rather “to be a witness” against oneself – or to give or furnish evidence. Any pressure
towards relaxing the said prohibition must be appreciated w/ suspicion.

Writing is something more than a mechanical act; it requires application of intelligence and attention.
Compelling a person to produce a specimen of his handwriting is treated more seriously that compulsion to
produce mere documents and chattels – which themselves are covered by the privilege. Here the person is
compelled to produce evidence that previously did not even exist – evidence that causes him to be
identified as a falsifier. He is being compelled to perform a positive and testimonial act. The respondent
judge and fiscal are thus ordered to cease and desist therefrom.
BERMUDEZ vs. CASTILLO – “expanded right” The right against self incrimination has been expanded to cover other
forms of proceedings or compulsion, such as:

 It now extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law

 It now extends to both accused as well as mere witnesses in a prosecution
 It protects equally in civil cases when incriminating questions are asked
 It covers litigious or non-litigious proceedings
 It covers proceedings ex parte or otherwise
 It covers all forms of interrogation before the courts
 It now extends to investigations conducted by legislative bodies
 It now prohibits rendering incriminatory handwriting specimens (Beltran vs. Samson)

CHAVEZ vs. CA – “accused cannot be compelled to take the witness stand” Chavez, along w/ several others, was
charged for qualified theft of a motor vehicle. During trial, the fiscal called upon Chavez to testify as an ordinary
witness (not a state witness), to w/c the trial judge acceded amid strong objection by the defense counsel and
the refusal of Chavez. The judge said that the act of testifying, by itself, does not necessarily incriminate him,
and it is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness – including the accused. Thus the accused
was compelled to take the witness stand. The accused occupies a greater degree of protection than an
ordinary witness. He may altogether refuse to take the witness stand or answer any questions. After all,
the purpose of the prosecution for calling a witness to the stand is to secure a conviction. This rule applies even
to a co-accused in a joint trial. The damaging facts forged in the decision of the lower court were drawn directly
from the lips of Chavez and are inadmissible.

Forcing the accused to testify likewise violates his right to remain silent. Actual violence need not be
employed to amount to compulsion; moral coercion, as in this case, is sufficient. Chavez did not waive his rights
to remain silent and against self-incrimination. His objection in the beginning is a continuing one; waiver must
be unequivocal and certain, and should be made willingly and intelligently. The courts indulge every
presumption against waiver of constitutional rights.

DD: A witness can also invoke his right against self-incrimination, but only when an incriminating question is
already asked. As stated above, the accused, on the other hand, can refuse to take the witness stand altogether.

CABAL vs. KAPUNAN – “forfeiture proceedings / criminal in nature / rights accrue” Col. Jose Maristela of the
Army filed a letter-complaint to the Sec. of National Defense, charging Chief of Staff Manuel Cabal for graft and
corruption, unexplained wealth, and other reprehensible acts. Maristela did not seek the removal of Cabal but
rather the forfeiture of Cabal’s unexplained wealth. The President ordered the formation of a Committee to
investigate the matter. The Committee then ordered Cabal to take the witness stand, but the latter refused to be
sworn and invoked his right against self-incrimination. Forfeiture is imposed by way of punishment. It is a
penalty. While technically civil in nature, such proceedings are actually criminal in nature – thus the
rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination accrue. In criminal proceedings, the accused may
refuse to take the witness stand altogether.

Generally, forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature; but when the forfeitures are imposed as a vindication of the
public justice – as in this case – the proceedings acquire a criminal nature. The properties may be forfeited only
by proving a breach of the laws. The same rule applies to administrative cases where the person charged is
sought to be dismissed.

PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS – “medical malpractice proceedings” Pascual was being tried
administratively before the Board for alleged immorality and malpractice. The result could be the cancellation of
his license to practice his medical profession. He was then ordered by the Board to take the witness stand; he
refused and invoked his right against self-incrimination. The ruling in Cabal vs. Kapunan is applicable in this
case. The Board, in an administrative proceeding that could result to the loss of the privilege to practice
the medical profession, cannot compel the respondent therein to take the witness stand w/o his consent.
The cancellation of license to practice medicine, as a consequence, acquires the nature of a penalty; thus the
right against self-incrimination and the right to refuse to take the witness stand accrue.

The provision on self-incrimination should be liberally construed in favor of the person invoking the same. The
guarantee also protects the right to remain silent. Silence should not be used to raise a presumption of
guilt.