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CANON 8 efforts could be accurately called
RULE 8.01
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION
BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET
AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt
Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C.
Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito
M. Caling; and Morton F. Meads.
R E S O L U T I O N
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court
adverse to respondent MacArthur International
Minerals Co., the Solicitor General brought to
our attention statements of record purportedly
made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy,
Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto,
members of the Bar, with the suggestion that
disciplinary action be taken against them. On
November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-
cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor
General avers, are set forth in the memoranda
personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the
Executive Secretary) have made
these false, ridiculous and wild
statements in a desperate attempt
to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur International. Such
e. ... Never has any civilized,
"scattershot desperation"
(Memorandum for Respondents
dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14,
three lines from the bottom of
page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt
on its face and it lays bare the
immoral and arrogant attitude of
the petitioners. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum and
Reply to Petitioner's
Memorandum Brief, dated April
13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on
bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ...
opportunistically change their
claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case.
(Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth,
seventh and eighth lines from
bottom of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration
signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his
behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy,
Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B.
Sotto, the Solicitor General points out, contain
the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court]
has overlooked the applicable law
due to the misrepresentation and
obfuscation of the petitioners'
counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
democratic tribunal ruled that
such a gimmick (referring to the
"right to reject any and all bids")
can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse
losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud ... and
it is thus difficult, in the light of
our upbringing and schooling,
even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the
Honorable Supreme Court intends
to create a decision that in effect
does precisely that in a most
absolute manner. (Second
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10,
1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21,
1968 — after judgment herein was rendered —
and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself
and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and
Graciano Regala and Associates, asked Mr.
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves
from considering, judging and resolving the
case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive
to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat
the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
Castro is a vice-president of the favored party
who is the chief beneficiary of the false,
erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31,
1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in
effect prejudging and predetermining this case
even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son
of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment
in the Philippine Government by the President a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered in this case." The appointment

referred to was as secretary of the newly-
created Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics,
and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent
wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the
motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's
belief that "unjudicial prejudice" had been
caused it and that there was "unjudicial
favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their
appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the said decision." The
"incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of
the law, which law has not been
declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally
the applicable law in the above-
entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives
respondent of due process of law
and the right to adduce evidence
as is the procedure in all previous
cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the
unfounded certiorari in the first
place when the appeal from a
denial of a motion to dismiss was
and is neither new nor novel nor
capable of leading to a wholesome
development of the law but —
only served to delay respondent
for the benefit of the favored
party.
(e) the preliminary injunction
issued herein did not maintain
the status quo but destroyed it,
and the conclusion cannot be
avoided that it was destroyed for
a reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and
misrepresentations in the said
decision which the Honorable
Supreme Court has refused to
correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said
decision were decided otherwise
in previous decisions, and the
main issue "right to reject any or
all bids" is being treated on a
double standard basis by the
Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent
believes that the Honorable
Supreme Court knows better and
has greater understanding than
the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one
hundred and fifty to two hundred
million dollars by said decision —
without an effort by the
Honorable Supreme Court to
learn all the facts through
presentation through the trial
court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R.
Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates, in
writing pointed out to this Court that the
statements specified by the Solicitor General
were either quoted out of context, could be
defended, or were comments legitimate and
justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest
defense of the interests of his clients. It was
stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not
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plead such thoughts, his client would be
deprived of due process of law. However,
counsel sought to change the words "Chief
Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7,
paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty.
Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of
the said motion, which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it
seems that many of our judicial
authorities believe that they are
the chosen messengers of God in
all matters that come before
them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment
is truly ordained by the Almighty
unto eternity. Some seem to be
constitutionally incapable of
considering that any emanation
from their mind or pen could be
the product of unjudicial
prejudice or unjudicial sympathy
or favoritism for a party or an
issue. Witness the recent
absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring
to proceed to judge a motion to
hold himself in contempt of court
— seemingly totally oblivious or
uncomprehending of the violation
of moral principle involved — and
also of Judge Geraldez who
refuses to inhibit himself in
judging a criminal case against an
accused who is also his
correspondent in two other cases.
What is the explanation for such
mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence?
Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that
many of our government officials
are just amoral?

And, in addition, he attempted to explain further
subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7
thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente
L. Santiago filed his compliance with this
Court's resolution of November 21, 1968. He
there stated that the motion to inhibit and third
motion for reconsideration were of his exclusive
making and that he alone should be held
responsible therefor. He further elaborated on
his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his
explanations by saying that he already deleted
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore
quoted from his rough draft but that it was still
included through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as
counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended
motion to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer
that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Castro inhibit themselves, it left but
three paragraphs of the original motion to
inhibit, taking out the dissertation on judicial
ethics and most of the comments attacking the
decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must
be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he
insisted in withdrawing his appearance in this
case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His
ground was that he did not agree with the filing
of the motion to inhibit the two justices.
According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic) now
being taken is against counsel's upbringing and
judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November
29, 1968, he took pains to say that the
questioned statements he made were also taken
out of context and were necessary for the
defense of his client MacArthur. He made the
admission, though, that those statements lifted
out of context would indeed be sufficient basis
for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had
been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were
filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there
averred that the Supreme Court had no original
jurisdiction over the charge against him
because it is one of civil contempt against a
party and the charge is originally cognizable by
the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and
10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also
stressed that said charge was not signed by an
"offended party or witness", as required by law;
and that the Solicitor General and his assistants
could not stand in the stead of an "offended
Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his
explanation of December 2, 1968, as further
clarified by a supplemental motion of December
27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or
reference to his law firm in this case was
neither authorized nor consented to by him or
any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967, one
Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered
to retain his services, which was accepted; that
Meads inquired from him whether he could
appear in this case; that he advised Meads that
this case was outside his professional
competence and referred Meads to another
lawyer who later on likewise turned down the
offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and
he agreed to terminate their previous retainer
agreement; that he had not participated in any
manner in the preparation or authorship of any
pleading or any other document in connection
with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy
explained his side of the case. In brief, he
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denied participation in any of the court papers
subject of our November 21, 1968 order;
claimed that he was on six months' leave of
absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31,
1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but
that he gave his permission to have his name
included as counsel in all of MacArthur's
pleadings in this case (L-27072), even while he
was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on
March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on
July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through
new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who
entered a special appearance for the purpose,
lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration
without express leave of court. Said motion
reiterated previous grounds raised, and
contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal
because it was penned by the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was
outside the borders of the
Republic of the Philippines at the
time of the Oral Argument of the
above-entitled case — which
condition is prohibited by the
New Rules of Court — Section 1,
Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices;
who may take part. — ... . only
those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication ..."
This requirement is especially
significant in the present instance
because the member who penned
the decision was the very member
who was absent for approximately

four months or more. This
provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio
Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent
MacArthur International Minerals
Company abandons its quest for
justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will
inevitably either raise the graft
and corruption of Philippine
Government officials in the
bidding of May 12, 1965, required
by the Nickel Law to determine
the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on
grounds of deprivation of justice
and confiscation of property
and /or to the United States
Government, either its executive
or judicial branches or both, on
the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested
rights by the Philippine
Government without either
compensation or due process of
law — and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid
and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar
price premium, amounting to
more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court
on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M.
Caling "to show cause within five (5) days from
receipt of notice hereof why he should not be
dealt with for contempt of court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed
his return. He there alleged that the said fourth
motion for reconsideration was already finalized
when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his
office and requested him to accommodate
MacArthur by signing the motion; that he
turned down said request twice on the ground
that he did not know anything about the case,
much less the truth of the allegations stated in
the motion; that "the allegations in said motion
were subsequently explained to the undersigned
counsel together with the background of the
case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and
by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon assurance
that there was nothing wrong with the motion
he was persuaded in good faith to sign the
same; that he was misled in so signing and the
true facts of the allegations were not revealed
to him especially the oral argument allegedly
made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty.
Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved
"to require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and
Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to
the said return [of Atty. Caling] and at the same
time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Morton Meads, should not be
dealt with for contempt of court, on or before
August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three,
Atty. Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear
Before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969,
at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt
proceedings against all of them will be heard by
this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of
Atty. Caling's statement that he (Santiago)
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convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth,
according to Santiago, is that one day Morton
Meads went to his office and asked him if he
knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him file
another motion for reconsideration, and he
(Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there
upon accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling
of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling.
Santiago insists that he never prepared the
motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered.
Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969,
he went to Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth
motion for reconsideration which he himself
prepared. Santiago started to read the motion
and in fact began to make some changes in
Pencil in the first or second paragraph when
Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new
lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same. Meads
asked Santiago if he could recommend one.
They then went to Caling whose office was on
the same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to
Caling at the same time handing the fourth
motion to Caling. While Caling was reading the
document, Santiago left. After reading the
motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He signed the
same after his name was typed therein. The
motion was then filed. According to Meads,
from the time he entered the office of Santiago
to the time the motion was filed, the period that
elapsed was approximately one hour and a half.
Santiago was with Caling for about three
minutes and Meads was with Caling for about
fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge,
Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules
of Court set forth in the fourth motion for
reconsideration has not been taken out of
context because said quotation is precisely
accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a
complete quotation and that it is a common
practice in court pleadings to submit partial

quotations. Meads further contends that the
announced plan to bring the case to the World
Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also
included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys.
Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and
Morton Meads in oral argument with respect to
the second contempt incident. We shall now
discuss the first and second contempt incidents
seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that
is not to be expected of an officer of the courts.
He pictures petitioners as "vulturous
executives". He speaks of this Court as a
"civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph
categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as
"false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous
manner. He there charges that the ex
parte preliminary injunction we issued in this
case prejudiced and predetermined the case
even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this
Court for being interested in the decision of this
case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
because his brother is the vice president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, "a
significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to
state that "it would seem that the principles
thus established [the moral and ethical
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority
by the Honorable Supreme Court should first
apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that
lesser and further removed conditions have
been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that
the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief
Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely
to engender favoritism or prejudice for or
against a particular cause or party." Implicit in
this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could
make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain
in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro not only were not free from the
appearance of impropriety but did arouse
suspicion that their relationship did affect their
judgment. He points out that courts must be
above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or
a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, "although the process
has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted
paragraph 6 which contained language that is
as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact
that it has been made. He explained that, he
deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which
paragraph was included in the motion filed in
this Court only because of mere inadvertence.
This explanation does not make much of a
distinguishing difference; it erects no shield.
Not only because it was belatedly made but also
because his signature appeared on the motion
to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this
paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of
our judicial authorities" who "believe that they
are the chosen messengers of God in all matters
that come before them, and that no matter what
the circumstances are, their judgment is truly
ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It
depicts them as seemingly "incapable of
considering that any emanation from their mind
or pen could be the product of unjudicial
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prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism
for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two
judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What
is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence?
Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or
is it that many of our government officials are
just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit
repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice"
against respondent MacArthur and spoke of
"unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their
appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8
is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a
warning to this Court about loss of confidence,
and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement
that "any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any
of the petitioners or members of any board-
petitioner, or their agents or principals,
including the President", should also inhibit
themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's
accusations have no basis in fact and in law.
The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts
aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is
also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices
who have received favors or benefits directly or
indirectly from any of the petitioners or any
members of any board-petitioner or their agents
or principals, including the president." The
absurdity of this posture is at once apparent.
For one thing, the justices of this Court are
appointed by the President and in that sense
may be considered to have each received a
favor from the President. Should these justices
inhibit themselves every time a case involving
the Administration crops up? Such a thought
may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the

machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of
government operating in this country. Counsel
is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not-too-well
concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the
foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern.
Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity
of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are
intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat
what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines
vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows:
"By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have
become common place. Really, there could
hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells
out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal
ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance.'
That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.'
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be 'with all good
fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is
that the duty of an attorney to the courts can
only be maintained by rendering no service
involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like
the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice." 1 His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to
the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people." 3 Thus
has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer
of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of
justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language
with the statement that it was necessary for the
defense of his client. A client's cause does not
permit an attorney to cross the line between
liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep
in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers
are administrators of justice, oath-bound
servants of society, their first duty is not to their
clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients'
success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct
ought to and must be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr.
Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a
judge from the very nature of his position, lacks
the power to defend himself and it is the
attorney, and no other, who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this,
Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of
course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under
certain conditions to maintain respectful
obedience to the court. It may happen that
counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law
than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that
since no court claims infallibility, judges may
grossly err in their decisions.
Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on
the part of the bar even under adverse
6
conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just
recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet,
this Court finds in the language of Atty.
Santiago a style that undermines and degrades
the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against
improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice 8 — is thus
transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of
contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to
us by the Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted.
Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts against
MacArthur." He brands such efforts as
"scattershot desperation". He describes a
proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its
face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners." He charges
petitioners with opportunistically changing their
claims and stories not only from case to case
but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
Such language is not arguably protected; it is
the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a
litigant; it offends the court before which it is
made. It is no excuse to say that these
statements were taken out of context. We have
analyzed the lines surrounding said statements.
They do not in any manner justify the inclusion
of offensive language in the pleadings. It has
been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of
the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with

which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs.
Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the
accused convicted of murder made use of the
following raw language in his brief : "The
accused since birth was a poor man and a son of
a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has
never owned a thousand pesos in his own name.
Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty
thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A
simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work
and that would transform him into a new man.
Once in a small nipa shack, now in a palatial
mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the
promise of wealth, protection and stability was
given to do the forbidden deed." We there held
that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace to the bar and
an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the
Solicitor General or his assistants may not be
considered offended parties in this case. This
Court may motu proprio start proceedings of
this nature. There should be no doubt about the
power of this Court to punish him for contempt
under the circumstances. For, inherent in
courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance
of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every
manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the
court in the performance of his official duties;
and that he too has committed, under Section 3
(d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending
to degrade the administration of justice. He is,
therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty.
Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty.
Santiago to have included the name of the firm
of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge
and consent. Correctly did Regala insist — and
this is confirmed by the other lawyers of
respondents — that he had not participated in
any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled
case. Regala did not even know that his name
was included as co-counsel in this case. He is
exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first
contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R.
Uy. Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty.
Uy was not also involved in the preparation of
any of the pleadings subject of the contempt
citation. He should be held exempt from
contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second
contempt incident. The fourth motion for
reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court.
No explanation has been made why this has
been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of
Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted
as follows: "Justices; who may take part. — ...
only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication ..." However, the
provision in its entire thought should be read
thus —
SECTION 1. Justices; who may
take part. — All matters
submitted to the court for its
consideration and adjudication
will be deemed to be submitted
for consideration and adjudication
7
by any and all of the Justices who
are members of the division of the
court at the time when such
matters are taken up for
consideration and adjudication,
whether such Justices were or
were not present at the date of
submission; however, only those
members present when any
matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its
consideration and adjudication, if
the parties or either of them,
express a desire to that effect in
writing filed with the clerk at the
date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in
1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out
why such a distorted quotation came about —
the portion left out was anyway marked by "XS"
which is a common practice among lawyers.
Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds
the lawyer to characterize his conduct with
candor and fairness, and specifically states that
"it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer
knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is
admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is
being foisted upon this Court. There was a
qualification to the rule quoted and that
qualification was intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat
to take the case to the World Court and/or the
United States government. It must be
remembered that respondent MacArthur at that
time was still trying to overturn the decision of
this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were injected. More

specifically, the motion announced that
MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of [the] Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the
World Court" and would invoke "the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting
off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price
premium, amounting to more than fifty million
dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the
mind of this Court to decide the case in its
favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has
even been embodied in Meads' return. There is
a gross inconsistency between the appeal and
the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal
from a decision presupposes that a party has
already abandoned any move to reconsider that
decision. And yet, it would appear that the
appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a
threat to effect a change of the decision of this
Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction
of this Court that he should be exempted from
the contempt charge against him. He knows
that he is an officer of this Court. He admits
that he has read the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed it. While he
has been dragged in only at the last minute, still
it was plainly his duty to have taken care that
his name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted
having prepared the fourth motion for
reconsideration. He cannot beg off from the
contempt charge against him even though he is
not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His
insistence that he had nothing to do with the
fourth motion for reconsideration and that he
had not even read the same is too transparent
to survive fair appraisal. It goes against the
grain of circumstances. Caling represents
before us that it was Santiago who convinced
him to sign the motion, who with Meads
explained to him the allegations thereof and the
background of the case. Caling says that if not
for his friendship with Santiago, he would not
have signed the motion. On the other hand,
Meads states that Santiago began to read the
fourth motion for reconsideration and even
started to make changes thereon in pencil. We
must not forget, too, that according to Meads
himself, he spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some
time with Santiago before they proceeded to
Caling. It is highly improbable that Santiago did
not read the fourth motion for reconsideration
during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for
respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not
resigned from his position as such lawyer. He
has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps
his client takes should be within his knowledge
and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded
him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts
to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
those things which the lawyer himself ought not
to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors,
witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their
relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches,
can never be protected where infraction of
ethics meets with complacency rather than
punishment. The people should not be given
cause to break faith with the belief that a judge
is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not
yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of
8
honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a
cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say
again that, if only for one reason, this Court had
really no alternative but to decide the main case
against respondent MacArthur. As we held in
our decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not
even adhere to the terms and conditions of the
invitation to bid. For, this invitation to bid
explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by
bid bonds will be rejected. And We repeat,
"[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company
[MacArthur] had been submitted without the
requisite bond." 13 It would not require the
adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid
unaccompanied by a bond., contrary to the
instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any
consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the
decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even
if the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro had not taken part in the decision on the
merits of this case, the result would have been
the same: MacArthur's cause would just the
same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of
contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in
the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and
holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates
and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of
court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente
L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita
M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000,

Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M.
Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for
whatever action he may deem proper to take in
the premises against Morton F. Meads who is
an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded
to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such
action as he may deem proper in relation to the
disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L.
Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M.
Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to
append a copy of this decision to the personal
records of Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654,
ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
R E S O L U T I O N\
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest
against what he therein asserts is "a great
injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his
own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes
to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf
and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustice's
committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends
his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court
to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with
reservation that at any time in the future and in
the event we regain our faith and confidence,
we may retrieve our title to assume the practice
of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the
contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus,
on September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times  published statements attributed to him,
as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented
petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
9
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut
justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing
why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice,
Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reason their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself
of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court "will
become responsive to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit" or "denied resolutions.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men
who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice,
who ignore their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis
in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith,
Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious
that the Court must clear itself," and that "his
charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a
civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was
counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received
a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on
July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration.
He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the
motion, but did not notify the latter of the time
and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved
for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof
of service," the trial court denied both motions.
To prove that he did serve on the adverse party
a copy of his first motion for reconsideration,
Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second
motion for reconsideration to which he attached
the required registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August
30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22,
1966, had already perfected the appeal.
Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to
the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of
this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636,
June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March
27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that
the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition
thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the
motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not
contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636,
June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this
resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a
pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-
20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966,
as the applicable case. Again, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration,
thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion
dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto
of the same date filed by defendant- appellant,
praying for reconsideration of the resolution of
May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some
important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636,
June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further
states that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by
the Supreme Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is
contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this
case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the
resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised
10
herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which
was much earlier than the date of promulgation
of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which
was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in
the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to
appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In
the main decision in said case (Rep. vs.
Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the
issue sub silencio presumably because of its
prior decisions contrary to the resolution of
November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no
authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by
certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied
shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave
to file a second motion for reconsideration and
for extension of time. Entry of judgment was
made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the
Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave
vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
already adverted to — a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the
insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory remarks hereinbefore
reproduced, against this Court as well as its
individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated
September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered
his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him.

So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to
surrender, so that this Court could act on his
petition. To said reminder he manifested "that
he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,
said case is now final and executory;" that this
Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not
require him to do either a positive or negative
act; and that since his offer was not accepted,
he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to
discipline a member of the bar for contumely
and gross misconduct, this Court on November
17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to
show cause "why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him." Denying the charges
contained in the November 17 resolution, he
asked for permission "to give reasons and cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him ... in an open and public hearing."
This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from
notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed
waived and incident submitted for decision." To
this resolution he manifested that since this
Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his
sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to
file a written explanation "in the event this
Court has no time to hear him in person." To
give him the ampliest latitude for his defense,
he was allowed to file a written explanation and
thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical
as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far
from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly
repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the
Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For
with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it
shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see
the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not
consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the
speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast
out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou
wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you,
even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing
the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated,
compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual
members of the Court; that they tend to bring
the entire Court, without justification, into
disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming
of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his
statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
11
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with
the highest interest of justice that in the
particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for
JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of
humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all
in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did
we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was
the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas
and prayers, in simple word, it is plain
callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell
the members of the Court that notwithstanding
the violation of the Constitution, you remained
unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said
in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings
and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors
attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you,
he reiterates the same statement with
emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life
in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current, though
nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is
not what it is used to be before the war. There
are those who have told me frankly and brutally

that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We
detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We
were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until this
Court has performed its duties. We never
interfered nor obstruct in the performance of
their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your
judgment against our client and sensing that
you have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence and
wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his
Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to
this Court and the further violations we sought
to be prevented is impliedly shared by our
President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the
very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the
French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O
JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in
thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE,
what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from
commission of any abuses, but who would
correct such abuses considering that yours is a
court of last resort. A strong public opinion
must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in
paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two
more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court
has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our
beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give
us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED,
not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal
state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and
confidence in the members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to surrender our
lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-
imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as
to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to
have faith and confidence in the members of the
Court but disregard our Constitution and to
uphold the Constitution and be condemned by
the members of this Court, there is no choice,
we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative
chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine
the grain of his grievances.
12
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his
petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's
practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away
with it, to state the facts and the law, and to
spell out the reasons for denial. We have given
this suggestion very careful thought. For we
know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary
hours meticulously marshalls his arguments,
only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
frivolous and ought never to have been lodged
at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression
cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny.
By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case
or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out
effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only
those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties
involved." Pertinent here is the observation of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs.
Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of
the writ, and as to the same petition different
reasons may read different justices to the same
result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the
uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested
from time to time that the Court indicate its
reasons for denial. Practical considerations

preclude. In order that the Court may be
enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the Court's
business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
During the last three terms the Court disposed
of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the
Court is to do its work it would not be feasible
to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to
take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that
as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the
Court in concluding that a particular case at a
particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al.,  vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice
Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel
urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions,
the same question has been raised before; and
we held that these "resolutions" are not
"decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained in view of
the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court;
and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to
fully explain the court's denial. For one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in
the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as
intended — helped the Court in alleviating its
heavy docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this
Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court
of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate
review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons
to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be
moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic
that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon
this Court over the Court of Appeals is not
intended to give every losing party another
hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision
discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has
decided it in a way probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review,
we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of
the pleadings. and records, that the Court of
13
Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law
and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory
power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the
Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew —
or ought to have known — that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the
period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse
party (which he did), but also notify the adverse
party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety &
Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is
prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time,
and place of hearing and shall be served upon
all the Parties concerned at least three days in
advance. And according to Section 6 of the
same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has
been held that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality
of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands
vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious:
Unless the movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or
objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection, since the Rules themselves

do not fix any period within which he may file
his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate
court to review the lower court's judgment, he
has only himself to blame. His own negligence
caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal,
which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To
shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy."
But he made sure that he assumed the posture
of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
professional certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It
would thus appear that there is no justification
for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of
Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a
lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time
he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given
'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their
disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but,
also the manner in which they are handed
down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to
comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by
the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a
lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations
are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our
decisions and all our official actions," said the
Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public
property, and the press and the people have the
undoubted right to comment on them, criticize
and censure them as they see fit. Judicial
officers, like other public servants, must answer
for their official actions before the chancery of
public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of
human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent
danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such
a case as this where those who Sit as members
of an entire Court are themselves collectively
the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint
a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless
advocates are the strands that weave durability
into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen
and officer of the court, every lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They
should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a
lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the
important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to
criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the
14
bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp.
487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an
important part of the traditional work of the
bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out
the errors of lower courts. In written for law
journals he dissects with detachment the
doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and
inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman,
126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am.
Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed
freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or
integrity of judges than members of the bar.
They have the best opportunities for observing
and forming a correct judgment. They are in
constant attendance on the courts. ... To say
that an attorney can only act or speak on this
subject under liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his profession and
livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of
such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor
is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny
into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as
a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657,
665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have
the beat Opportunity to become conversant with
the character and efficiency of our judges. No

class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no
other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench.
(State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116
N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of
the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the
lips of those in the best position to give advice
and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there
must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit
Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is Such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a
person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the
legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct
himself "with all good fidelity ... to the
courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly
remind him "to observe and maintain the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly
assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted
to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v.
Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful
subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
— assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers —
even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an
abler or more learned lawyer than the judge,
and it may tax his patience and temper to
submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect,
but discipline and self-respect are as necessary
to the orderly administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because
he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the
bar should at all times be the foremost in
rendering respectful submission. (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of
his intellectual endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is
others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be
allowed to harden into a belief that he may
attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts
15
are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979.
June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the
course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an
examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme
Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d
604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of
appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory
to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona
fide comments and criticisms which do not
exceed the bounds of decency and truth or
which are not aimed at. the destruction of
public confidence in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of
false and scandalous accusations then the rule
is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney
was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA,"
which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced
as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and

of being subject to the control of a group of city
officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took
Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also
DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the
accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the
part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the
court and to bring it into disrepute with the
general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the
Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-
year suspension of an attorney who published a
circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement that the judge
"used his judicial office to enable -said bank to
keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities
which place no limit to the criticism members of
the bar may make regarding the capacity,
impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even
though it extends to the deliberate publication
by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence
and integrity of the highest courts. See State
Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.)
585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the
first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a
libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of
such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in
that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our view,
the better rule is that which requires of those
who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of
practicing law the strictest observance at all
times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the
courts, to the end that the public confidence in
the due administration of justice be upheld, and
the dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v.
Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a
divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the
decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story
of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in  In re Petersen v.
Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the
law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I
do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in
dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the
attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism,
and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right
and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to
the proper authorities, but the public interest
and the administration of the law demand that
the courts should have the confidence and
16
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting
language, and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally by attorneys, who are officers
of the court, which tend to bring the courts and
the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge was
plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence
him in the discharge of judicial functions, and
the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together
with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer
accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that
the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered.
It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the
Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court
said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would
tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its
judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's
right, and interfere with the administration of
justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court
will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that
freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of
this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and
honest comment and criticism. It is only when
an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate
criticism that he will be held responsible for an
abuse of his liberty of speech. We well

understand that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant defender
of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney
was suspended for six months for submitting to
an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon
the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said,
constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that
he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is
a growing habit in the profession of criticising
the motives and integrity of judicial officers in
the discharge of their duties, and thereby
reflecting on the administration of justice and
creating the impression that judicial action is
influenced by corrupt or improper motives.
Every attorney of this court, as well as every
other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to
submit charges to the authorities in whom is
vested the power to remove judicial officers for
any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends
to show a violation of his duties, or would justify
an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved
upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if
based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent
right of an attorney in a case decided against
him, or the right of the Public generally, to
criticise the decisions of the courts, or the
reasons announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official duties, when the
proceeding is not against the officers whose
acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert
the confidence of the community in the courts of
justice and in the administration of justice; and
when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect
the administration of justice, the attorney
making such charges is guilty of professional
misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer
published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however,
with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and
finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too
much to look for a decision in their favor against
a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only
transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted
attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo,
upon the motives and integrity of this court, and
make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a
license from this court and who is under oath to
demean himself with all good fidelity to the
court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the
attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258
Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned the motives of
the court and its members to try a case,
charging the court of having arbitrarily and for
a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:
17
The privileges which the law gives to members
of the bar is one most subversive of the public
good, if the conduct of such members does not
measure up to the requirements of the law
itself, as well as to the ethics of the
profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as
to judicial determination is of prime importance
under our system and ideals of government. No
right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well
as to public officials, whether he labors in a
judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served
by denying this right of free speech to any
individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are
sworn to act honestly and honorably both with
their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever
properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly
asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose
by members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is none
the less impaired by a polluted water supply
than is the health of the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through its duly
established courts, has reposed in them to deal
with the affairs of the private individual, the
protection of whose rights he lends his strength
and money to maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the members of the bar
the law itself demands retribution — not the
court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook,
170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to
the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident

insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated
brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring
lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116
N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of
criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal
letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence
and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and
his associates in the decisions of certain appeals
in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this
paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one
who has no better right to it than the burglar to
his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to
reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence,
or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow
got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper
motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence,
or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to
duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty
of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active
students, or if any member of the court, or any
other person, can formulate a statement of a
correct motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and
quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every
right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering
the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was
guilty of professional misconduct in sending to
the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him.
This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices
of this court; and the insult was so directed to
the Chief Justice personally because of acts
done by him and his associates in their official
capacity. Such a communication, so made, could
never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect
in any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so
assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by
the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer,
with due regard to his position, can resent such
an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned
by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed
secretly to the judge alone, he can have no
redress in any action triable by a jury. "The
sending of a libelous communication or libelous
matter to the person defamed does not
constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this
letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different
from his other acts charged in the accusation,
and, as we have said, wholly different principles
are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way
discreditable; but so far as he exercised the
rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations
of public policy, to which reference has been
18
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the
penalty here sought to be enforced. To that
extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to
the obligation which he had assumed as an
officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice
personally, he exercised no right which the
court can recognize, but, on the contrary,
willfully violated his obligation to maintain the
respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in
open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally for their
official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.)
355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no
distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an
attorney upon a judge, induced by his official
act, and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the judge
in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere.
Either act constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction
made is, we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in that
case, as has been shown, fully sustained the
right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court
in actions which are ended, it held that one
might be summarily punished for assaulting a
judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of
the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of any person,"
said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the
judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge
leaves the building, to compel the judge to
forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard
of the people by tame submission to the
indignity, or else set in his own person the evil
example of punishing the insult by taking the

law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly
man would hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed
to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional
punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated
in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial
justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is
guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by
the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re
Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that
the accused attorney had addressed a sealed
letter to a justice of the City Court of New York,
in which it was stated, in reference to his
decision: "It is not law; neither is it common
sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80."
And it was decided that, while such conduct was
not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline
the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them
with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or accessories, it
will not be long before the general public may
feel that they may redress their fancied
grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a
judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad
repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44
South. 671, was in this respect much the same
as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at
law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received by due course
of mail, at his home, while not holding court,
and which referred in insulting terms to the
conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the
accused had been one of the attorneys. For this
it was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain
respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial
officer, and thereby breached his oath as an
attorney." As recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application to the facts of
this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed.
214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas.
408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac.
65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179
Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa.
270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the
accused have been so far sustained as to make
it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be
sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning
to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the
court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in
which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed
him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court
held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge
constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only
the judge, but his decisions in general claiming
that the judge was dishonest in reaching his
decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney
published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate
19
language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed
disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an
attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks
on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of
the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even
though he expressed an intention to resign from
the bar.
The teaching derived from the above
disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation
utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or
not, which transcend the permissible bounds of
fair comment and legitimate criticism and
thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to
subvert public confidence in their integrity and
in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which
may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of
the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our
disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in
the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been
disposed of under the power of courts to punish
for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that

universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these
instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724,
where counsel branded the denial of his motion
for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous
and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in
defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will
be so for him to exercise said right by resorting
to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the
courts requires. The reason for this is that
respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
their institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as,
in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of
the court and an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is thereby charged
with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties,
and 'of the untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator
and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of
one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item
carried in his paper, caused to be published in i
local newspaper a statement expressing his
regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so
many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, ... the only
remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to
change the members of the Supreme Court,"
which tribunal he denounced as "a constant
peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of justice of
those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of
the Philippine Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding
him in contempt, despite his avowals of good
faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement
which he caused to be published in the press,
the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition of
Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate
the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one
of the members, reorganizing the Supreme
Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this
Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent and
narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of
20
justice. But the respondent also attacks the
honesty and integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has
been for the last years committing deliberately
so many blunders and injustices, that is to say,
that it has been deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part
of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many
cases decided during the last years, would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the
people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to
lower ,or degrade the administration of justice
by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair
to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result.
As a member of the bar and an officer of the
courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in
duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to
emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under
special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
and communication to the courts; he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of
attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct
(17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re
Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et
al., supra, where counsel charged this Court
with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall
of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations,
our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the
Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore
quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one
pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into question. That
pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its
own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that
the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to
earlier rulings without as much as making any
reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The plain import of all these is
that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and continuously
repeated that error to the point of perpetuation.
It pictures this Court as one which refuses to
hew to the line drawn by the law on
jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court
are not entitled to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of and respect
due this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members — and some former
members of this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called"
the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been
expressed in other cases 18 which, in the
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in
detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the
aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings
filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of
contempt may ordinarily be invoked only
against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to
sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his
studied emphasis that the remarks for which he
is now called upon to account were made only
after this Court had written finis to his
appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial
proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing
view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when,
in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of
the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted
to. A complete disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for
publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a
farcical manner after the question of the validity
21
of the said examinations had been resolved and
the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption
of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in
his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them
may still be contempt by publication even after
a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct,
embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts
and to destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal
contempt, and is equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to
be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the
courts to administer justice in the decision of a
pending case. In the second kind of contempt,
the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first
there is no contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which might in
any way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its
dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty.
Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the
judgment in his client's appeal had attained
finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of
whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and
actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of
our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely
in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer
and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the
exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard
and ethics of the legal profession and to
preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the
noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency
or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether
of no consequence. The sole objective of this
proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a
member whose misconduct has proved himself
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to
do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the
rules for admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and
exclude from the practice of law those who have
proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are
officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. To deny its existence is
equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not
subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state
that power is vested in this court-has the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the
practice of law is a representation to all that he
is worthy of their confidence and respect. So
much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court
that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust
and confidence of the public and of the courts, it
becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the
court which made him one of its officers, and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its
bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is
almost universally held that both the admission
and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts,
and that one is admitted to the bar and
exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a
matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned
on his own behavior and the exercise of a just
and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to
remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being
unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances
and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary
sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's
certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may
seem, no statute, no law stands in its way.
Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
22
went farther. In haughty and coarse language,
he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle
for his vicious tirade against this Court. The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with
vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial
victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice
administered by this Court to be not only blind
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the
Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time
branding its members as "calloused to pleas of
justice." And, true to his announced threat to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," he caused the publication in the papers
of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court.
Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks
and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred
and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty.
Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes
they carried far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never
serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an
irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and
destroy public confidence in them to the
detriment of the orderly administration of

justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely
negates any pretense of passionate commitment
to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic
example of gross misconduct, gross violation of
the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be
allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the
exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid
clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit
disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy,
the Court is not, and should not be, above
criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high
function as the court of last resort. And more
than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires
detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must,
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to
the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the
members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of
the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that
disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
this proceeding is not — and does not involve —
a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a
certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and
inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with
the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals
but. only as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of
their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if
there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of
justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar
of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.
23
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the
practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon
it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that
power because public policy demands that
they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in
all cases which call for disciplinary action. The
present is such a case. In the end, the imagined
anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and
judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and
extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon
Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked
out by the Rules of Court, these may range from
mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under
the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of
course, primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court which, being neither
arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the
purity and independence of the Bar be
scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and
respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty.
Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern
injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that
it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen

will realize that abrasive language never fails to
do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for
the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances.
His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct
by neither manifesting repentance nor offering
apology therefor leave us no way of determining
how long that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the
same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the
matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious
that if we have authority to completely exclude
a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is
lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as
falling outside of the compass of that authority.
The merit of this choice is best shown by the
fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to
determine for himself how long or how short
that suspension shall last. For, at any time after
the suspension becomes effective he may prove
to this Court that he is once again fit to resume
the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court
that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until
further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and
the Court of Appeals for their information and
guidance.
[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]
JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. —
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. The Canons of
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
avoid all personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE
LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT
BAR; PENALTY. — Whether directed at the
person of complainant or his manner of offering
evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo"
was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had
no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing
the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of
respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to
the court. By the use of intemperate language,
respondent failed to measure up to the norm of
conduct required of a member of the legal
profession, which all the more deserves
reproach because this is not the first time that
respondent has employed offensive language in
the course of judicial proceedings. He has
previously been admonished to refrain from
engaging in offensive personalities and warned
to be more circumspect in the preparation of his
pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded
24
for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe
proper decorum and restraint and warned that a
repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the
suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for the use of insulting language in the
course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
As the material facts are not in dispute, we have
deemed the case submitted for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants
(and at the same time, one of the defendants) in
Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan.
Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the
hearing of the case on November 19, 1981,
while complainant was formally offering his
evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo."
When complainant turned toward respondent,
he saw the latter looking at him (complainant)
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the
presence of many people, complainant was
unable to proceed with his offer of evidence.
The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent
denied having directed the same at the
complainant, claiming that what he said was
"Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner
complainant was trying to inject wholly
irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the

record" while in the process of making an offer
of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo
referred to by respondent
was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was
included in the present complaint for ejectment
was because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of
this representation called up this representation
at his house and crying over the phone,
claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing
her and immediately, this representation like
any good husband would do in the defense of
his wife immediately went to the school and
confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk
and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed
the wife of this representation and if yes, right
then and there l would sock his face."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to
observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court,
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of
Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to
avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon
17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant
or his manner of offering evidence, the remark
"bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and
uncalled for. Respondent had no right to
interrupt complainant which such cutting
remark while the latter was addressing the
court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect
not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court.
By the use of intemperate language, respondent
failed to measure up to the norm of conduct
required of a member of the legal profession,
which all the more deserves reproach because
this is not the first time that respondent has
employed offensive language in the course of
judicial proceedings. He has previously been
admonished to refrain from engaging in
offensive personalities and warned to be more
circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings.
(CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil
Case No. C-7790 CFI of Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at
bar, respondent’s actuation was triggered by
complainant’s own manifest hostility and
provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore
not entirely free from blame when respondent
unleashed his irritation through the use of
improper words.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby
reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed
to observe proper decorum and restraint and
warned that a repetition of the offense will be
dealt with more severely.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-
2141], August 23, 2017
LITO V. BUENVIAJE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO, Respondent.
DECISION
25
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is an Administrative Complaint dated
December 28, 2007 filed by Lito Buenviaje1
(Buenviaje) against respondent Atty. Melchor G.
Magdamo (Atty. Magdamo), docketed as A.C.
No. 11616 for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In the instant Complaint dated December 28,
2007, Buenviaje alleged that he was married to
the late Fe Gonzalo-Buenviaje as evidenced by
NSO issued Marriage Contract Register No. 87-
13503-A.2 Fe died on September 17, 2007.
Meanwhile, Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of
Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who
filed a criminal case for bigamy against
Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was
married to a certain Amalia Ventura in 1978,
thus, making him guilty of bigamy.
In an attempt to protect the rights and interests
of his clients in securing the monies of their
sibling, deceased Fe Gonzalo, Atty. Magdamo
sent a Notice of Death of Depositor3 dated
October 11, 2007 to the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI)-Dagupan Branch where Buenviaje
and Fe appeared to have a joint account. The
pertinent portion of said Notice reads as
follows:
"x x x x
FE SOLIS GONZALO was formerly an Overseas
Filipina Worker (OFW) Nurse in Switzerland
whose lifetime savings is now in an account in
BPI-Dagupan. She came back to the Philippines
to spend the last days of her life with her family
in San Fabian, Pangasinan. Unfortunately, while
she was terminally ill and while residing in
Manila so as to be near Saint Luke's Hospital, a

clever swindler by the name of LITO
BUENVIAJE made it appear on spurious
documents that he is the husband of Fe Gonzalo
when in truth and in fact LITO BUENVIAJE is
married to AMALIA VALERA.
xxxx
Moreover, ever since 24 August 2007, LITO V.
BUENVIAJE has been a fugitive from justice as
he has been hiding from the criminal charge in
People of the Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y
Visayana, case number 7H-103365, pending in
the City of Manila.
xxxx
Fe never had a husband or child in her entire
life. x x x" (Emphasis ours)
Aggrieved, Buenviaje filed the instant
administrative complaint against Atty.
Magdamo for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 ,
Rule 7.03 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Buenviaje averred
that in Atty. Magdamo's Notice of Death of
Depositor dated October 11, 2007 sent to the
BPI-Dagupan Branch, he untruthfully and
maliciously quoted the following statements: (1)
"a clever swindler by the name of Lito Buenviaje
made it appear on spurious document that he is
the husband of Fe Gonzalo when in truth and in
fact Lito Buenviaje is married to Amalia Valero",
(2) "since August 24, 2007, Lito V. Buenviaje
has been a fugitive from justice as he has been
hiding from the criminal charge in People of the
Philippines versus Lito Buenviaje y Visayana,
case number 7H-103365 pending in the City of
Manila", and (3) "Fe never had a husband or
child in her entire life" to his prejudice.
Buenviaje alleged that he discovered the
Notice's existence sometime in December 2007
when he inquired about the remaining balance
of his joint account with Fe. He lamented that
he was shocked upon reading the letter and felt
humiliated at the words written against him as
the bank manager and the other bank personnel
might have really thought that he was a
swindler and a fugitive from justice.4
Buenviaje denied Atty. Magdamo's allegation
that Fe was never married as they were in fact
married in a public civil rites in the presence of
many relatives of Fe. As to his alleged marriage
with a certain Amalia Valera, Buenviaje
admitted that he had extramarital relationship
with her and that they had two (2) sons. When
they separated and he subsequently worked
overseas, it did not stop him from fulfilling his
responsibilities as a father to his sons. He was
then advised to remit money to Amalia but he
was told that he needed a marriage contract to
be able to do so, thus, he asked someone to
make a marriage contract for remittance
purposes and that he was told that there would
be no record of it. Buenviaje claimed that at
that time, he really believed that no valid
marriage took place between him and Amalia
and that he was single up to the time he
married Fe.
Buenviaje lamented that Atty. Magdamo
employed dirty and dishonest means and tactics
to ensure that BPI will prevent him from
withdrawing money from the joint account that
he has with his late wife. He averred that in
referring to him as a "swindler", Atty. Magdamo
succeeded in intimidating BPI-Dagupan into
extrajudicially "freezing" the joint account and
in not transacting with him.
Buenviaje also pointed out that Atty. Magdamo,
in referring to him as a fugitive from justice, in
effect, made BPI-Dagupan believe that a
criminal complaint was already pending against
him when in truth and in fact, the August 24,
26
2007 complaint for bigamy filed by Lydia and
Florenia was still pending before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila at the time that
they wrote and served the Notice to BPI-
Dagupan.
Buenviaje further added that Atty. Magdamo
even made threats to him as evidenced by his
text messages to him, to wit: "Sometime in the
morning of 1 October 2007, I sent text
messages to Lito's last known Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM) number
(+639062097612) requesting him to stop his
merciless plunder and to voluntarily surrender
to the rule of law."
Finally, Buenviaje questioned Atty. Magdamo's
fitness to continue in the practice of law as he
has displayed lack of ability to distinguish a
fugitive from justice and a respondent in a
criminal investigation; employed of dirty and
unprofessional tactics of calling him a
"swindler"; and by referring to his marriage
contract with his wife as "spurious document".
He, thus, prayed that considering Atty.
Magdamo's actuations, he should be disbarred
or suspended from the practice of law.
On January 9, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed Atty. Magdamo to
submit his answer on the complaint against
him.5
In its Report and Recommendation6 dated
October 23, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended
that Atty. Magdamo be reprimanded for his
unethical actuations.
However, the IBP-Board of Governors, in a
Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-717 dated
October 10, 2014, resolved to adopt and
approve with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead

suspend Atty. Magdamo from the practice of
law for three (3) months.7
Aggrieved, Atty. Magdamo moved for
reconsideration. However, in Resolution No.
XXII-2016-3268 dated May 28, 2016, the IBP-
Board of Governors resolved to deny Atty.
Magdamo's motion for reconsideration and
affirm the latter's suspension.
We concur with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-Board of Governors.
The practice of law is a privilege given to
lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against the opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
In the instant case, Atty. Magdamo's actuations
do not measure up to this Canon. The records
show that he referred to Buenviaje as a
"swindler". He made this imputation with pure
malice for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is
committing swindling activities. Even if he was
suspicious of Buenviaje, he should have
refrained from making such malicious reference
or name-calling for he should know as a lawyer
that the mere filing of a complaint against a
person does not guarantee a finding of guilt,
and that an accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty. Here, other than the criminal
complaint for bigamy which Fe's siblings filed
before the prosecutor's office, there were no
other cases decided against Buenviaje.
Atty. Magdamo's malicious imputation against
Buenviaje is further aggravated by the fact that
said imputation was made in a forum which is
not a party to the legal dispute between Fe's
siblings and Buenviaje. He could have just
informed BPI-Dagupan of the death of its client
and that there is a pending litigation regarding
their client's estate, and he did not have to
resort to name-calling and make unnecessary
commentaries in order to support his cause.
Undoubtedly, his malicious imputation against
Buenviaje is unfair as the latter was
unnecessarily exposed to humiliation and shame
even as there was no actual case yet to be filed
in the courts.
Moreover, Atty. Magdamo is likewise out of line
when he made inference to the marriage
documents of Buenviaje and Fe as "spurious" as
well as his conclusion that "Fe never had a
husband or child in her entire life". He should
know better that without the courts'
pronouncement to this effect, he is in no
position to draw conclusions and pass judgment
as to the existence, and validity or nullity of the
marriage of Buenviaje and Fe. That is not his
job to do. While his statements in the Notice
given to BPI-Dagupan might be prompted by a
good cause, it were nevertheless careless,
premature and without basis. At the very least,
Atty. Magdamo's actuations are blatant violation
of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has
not been proved. (Emphasis ours)
27
Equally incredulous is Atty. Magdamo's
statement in the Notice that "Lito V. Buenviaje
has been a fugitive from justice as he has been
hiding from the criminal charge in People vs.
Lito Buenviaje y Visayana, case number 7H-
103365, pending in the City of Manila". Upon
review, it appears that case number 7H-103365
is the same bigamy case which Fe's siblings
filed against Buenviaje before the Prosecutor's
Office of Manila. At the time Atty. Magdamo
made the subjects statement in the Notice to
BPI-Dagupan, he knew that there was no final
resolution yet from the prosecutor's office, no
case has yet to be filed in the courts, there was
no warrant of arrest against Buenviaje, and
more importantly, there was no evidence that
Buenviaje had any intent to flee prosecution as
he even filed the instant case and participated
in the proceedings hereto. A mere charge or
allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. There
must always be sufficient evidence to support
the charge.9 As to why Atty. Magdamo made
such malicious statements is beyond this
Court's comprehension.
We had an occasion to say that the use of
disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless,
and malicious statements by an attorney in his
pleadings or motions is a violation of the
lawyer's oath and a transgression of the canons
of professional ethics.10 The Court has
constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified
language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.11
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Magdamo ought
to have realized that this sort of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the

public estimation and erode public respect for
it.12
In this case, Atty. Magdamo's statements
against Buenviaje were not only improper but it
also undoubtedly tended to mislead BPI-
Dagupan into thinking that the latter is a
swindler and a fugitive as it was made without
hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any
evidentiary support. The Court cannot condone
this irresponsible and unprofessional behavior.
As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court
Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos.
145817 & 145822:13
The Court cannot countenance the ease with
which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening
their cause in a motion for inhibition, make
grave and unfounded accusations of unethical
conduct or even wrongdoing against other
members of the legal profession. It is the duty of
members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justness of the cause
with which they are charged. (emphasis ours)
Finally, it must be emphasized anew that, in
support of the cause of their clients, lawyers
have the duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law.
However, a client's cause does not permit an
attorney to cross the line between liberty and
license.14 The lawyer's duty to its clients must
never be at the expense of truth and justice. As
explained in Choa v. Chiongson:15
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the
cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law. He must give
a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his client's case with the end
in view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes, and counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as it appears to him
to be just, and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law. He
must always remind himself of the oath he took
upon admission to the Bar that he will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; and that he will
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the
best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice, and it
must be done within the bounds of reason and
common sense. A lawyers responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client
does not warrant a course of action propelled by
ill motives and malicious intentions against the
other party.
Based on the foregoing, We cannot countenance
Atty. Magdamo's use of offensive and
disrespectful language in his Notice addressed
to BPI-Dagupan. He clearly violated Canons 8
and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for his actions erode the public's
perception of the legal profession. We, thus,
sustain the findings and recommendation of the
IBP-Board of Governors.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the
October 10, 2014 and May 28, 2016 Resolutions
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors in CBD Case No. 08-2141 and
ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Melchor G.
Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3)
months effective upon his receipt of this
Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty.
Magdamo's personal record as an attorney with
the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the
28
same be served to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in
the land.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 8.02
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN L-24114,
People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation and University of the
Philippines,
vs.
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO
TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance"
filed with this Court on October 10, 1969,
Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the
Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered
his appearance in the present case (L-24114,
PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as
"chief counsel of record" for the respondents
Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would
have been innocuous were it not for the fact
that it was done one year and eight months
after the decision in this case became final.
Wittingly or unwittingly, therefore, Atty.
Soriano was in effect asking this Court to
exhume this case from the archives. We thus

considered it needful that he explain in full and
in writing his unprecedented, if not altogether
bizzare behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however,
serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him
to show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him for entering an
appearance at such a late date. He forthwith
came with a recital of the circumstances under
which he had agreed to have his services
retained by the respondents Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week
of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino
Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-
fact of the other respondents, went to him to
engage his professional services in two cases, to
wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the
case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon. Herminio C.
Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their
conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly
informed Atty. Soriano of the precise status of
each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity
Hills case was set for hearing by this Court on
October 27, 1969, while the present case was
still pending and the date of hearing thereof
was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino
Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano
allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual
acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan — that
indeed these two cases were pending in this
Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-
contract dated October 8, 1969, by virtue of
which he agreed to render professional services
in the two cases in consideration of a contingent
fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430
hectares (more or less) involved in the two
cases. It was on the same date, October 8, 1969,
that he then caused the preparation of his
written appearance in the present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the
contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would
find no justification if Atty. Soriano were to
render his professional services solely in
the Varsity Hills case, for in this latter case, the
records of which we are in a position to take
judicial notice, an area of only about 19
hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property
claimed by the respondents having been
litigated in the present case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case
which has long been sealed and terminated by a
final judgment, besides being an unmitigated
absurdity in itself and an unwarranted
annoyance to the court which pronounced the
judgment, is a sore deviation from normal
judicial processes. It detracts heavily from the
faith which should be accorded final judgments
of courts of justice, generating as it does in the
minds of the litigants, as well as of the public,
an illusory belief that something more can be
done toward overturning a final judicial
mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano
grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in
putting an officious finger into the vortex of the
case. He was wanting in the reasonable care
which every member of the Bar must needs
exercise before rushing into the midst of a case
already litigated or under litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in
the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the
conformity of the counsel whom he would
substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he
should, at the very least, give notice to such
lawyer of the contemplated substitution. 2 Atty.
Soriano's entry of appearance in the present
case as "chief counsel of record" for the
respondents in effect sought to preempt the
former counsel, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, of the
29
premier control over the case. Although at the
hearing of the present incident he averred that
he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty.
Diaz to no avail, we are far from being
convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his
written manifestations to this Court did he make
mention of such efforts on his part. His
subsequent assertions to the contrary are
plainly mere after thoughts.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has
joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel
for the respondents in the Varsity Hills case
now pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who
was counsel of record in that case even prior to
October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of
the present case since the scope of our decision
in the latter is a prime issue raised in
the Varsity Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when
Atty. Soriano accepted the two cases for the
respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case,
he had not bothered at all to communicate with
Atty. Doria, as is the befitting thing to do when
a lawyer associates with another in a pending
cause.3 He did not bother either to comprehend
the substance of the Varsity Hills case before
accepting the said case, something which is
elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he been
less precipitate in his actions, he would have
surely detected the existence of a final
judgment in the present case. Further still, if it
were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the
hearing of this incident, that his clients
complained to him about having been left out in
the cold by their former lawyer, then that
circumstance of itself should have indicated to
him the imperative need for verification of the
true status of the present case. Atty. Soriano
cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty.
Dalangpan that the case was still pending with
his Court — which assurance Atty. Dalangpan,
at the hearing of this incident, categorically
denied having given. What Atty. Soriano should
have done, in keeping with the reasonable
 30

vigilance exacted of members of the legal

profession, was to pay a verification visit to the
records section of this Court, which is easily and
quickly accessible by car or public conveyance
from his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue,
Manila). If this office were situated in the
province and he did not have the time to come
to the Supreme Court building in Manila, he
could have posed the proper query to the Clerk
of Court by registered mail or by telegram.

We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of

gross negligence in the performance of his
duties as a lawyer and as an officer of this
Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit
no less than his suspension from the practice of
the law profession, were it not for his candor, at
the hearing of this incident, in owning his
mistake and the apology he made to this Court.
It is the sense of this Court, however, that he
must be as he is hereby severely censured. Atty.
Soriano is further likewise warned that any
future similar act will be met with heavier
disciplinary sanction.

Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present

case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that
he has entered as chief counsel of record for the
respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the

personal record of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on
file in the Bar Division of this Court.