Risto Saarinen, Weakness of the Will in Medicoal Thought from Augustine to Buridan. EJ. Brill, Leiden 1994, v + 207 p. ISBN 90 04 09994 8 (Studien und Texte zur Geistergeschichle des Mittelalers, XLIV). Although there has been extensive discussion of alrasia, or “weakness of the will,” in both ancient and modern thought, there has been almost no discussion of the problem in the context of medieval philosophy. The reason for this, according to Saarinen, is that scholars have maintained the view that because the Judeo-Christian concept of human nature dominated in the Middle Ages, the existence of akrasia was taken for granted. Since the will is held to be able to act against reason, therefore “a concept of alvasia holds no special interest.” (p. 2) Saarinen maintains to the contrary that there was indeed a very sophisticated philosophical discussion of akrasia, rendered into Latin as incontinentia, from © EJ. Brill, Leiden, 1996 Vivarium 34,2276 REVIEWS the thirteenth century onwards. His work is an outline and analysis of the medieval discussion from Augustine to Buridan. His study is ambitious and enlightening. ‘The book consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, the author introduces his topic and establishes the parameters of his discussion. He briefly discusses modern historiogra- phy on the issue. He notes that modern discussion of the issue stems from the rediscov- ery of Aristotle’s theory of action. The author proceeds to outline Aristotle’s concept of akvasia, which Aristotle discussed in terms of the practical syllogism. Saarinen notes that “Within the framework of the practical syllogism alrasia cannot be explained as the will’s intentional rebellion against the better judgment of the reason.” (p. 11) Thus, “Because incontinent people seem to act against their better judgment, there must be something wrong with the judgement itself; in other words, something goes wrong within the practi- cal inference formed in the soul of the akratic person.” (p. 11) There are, however, various views as to exactly which premise is not completely understood by the akratic person. According to one view, the incontinent person does not possess a complete knowledge of the situation in question because passion inhibits the alyatés from comprehending the minor premise clearly, or from making the proper connection between the major and minor premises (p. 12-3). A second position maintains that the incontinent person reaches the conclusion of the practical syllogism clearly, but intentionally violates it in acting upon it (p. 13). In any case, “it is generally maintained that Aristotle never found a satisfactory solution” to the problem of how one can act akratically (p. 17) Chapter One ends with Saarinen establishing three heuristic models for understanding the medieval positions (p. 17-9). The first is the “Socratic-Aristotelian” position that since man does not act against right reason, the akratic person thus lacks complete knowledge of the good conclusion and action, knowledge of which is obscured through some passion. The second model is termed the “Non-Socratic Aristotelian” position, in which the per- son has complete knowledge of the good conclusion and good choice, but they are not realized as the akratic person intentionally violates the knowledge. The third model, the “Non-Aristotelian” model, is that of the Judeo-Christian model in which the will is con- sidered an autonomous or self-determining principle in human action. Within these three models Saarinen makes further distinctions, and they will form the basis on which he judges Medieval thinkers. In Chapter Two Saarinen discusses “Reluctant Actions in the Augustinian Tradition.” In this chapter the author discusses the Augustinian contribution at length, since Augustine provided the basis for much of the philosophical and theological discussion of the Middle Ages, especially that prior to the rediscovery of Aristotle in the West. Although Augustine made many contributions to these discussions, Saarinen notes especially with regard to in- continent behavior the concepts of freedom of the will and that of invitus face or “to do something unwillingly” or reluctantly. Saarinen moves on to discuss Anselm of Canterbury, who concentrates on the expression invitus velle. Saarinen maintains that for Anselm, no one can will anything inoitus, or reluctantly, because everyone who wills, wills willingly. His next subject, Peter Abelard takes the opposite view, ive. that one can consent to something without actually willing it, and thus can do something invitus. Peter of Poitiers maintains further, that one can will one thing without necessarily willing the inevitable consequences. Peter of Poitiers and others also discuss the Augustinian notion of a latent wish, the idea that a man may achieve a state in which he does good only reluctantly, or in which he commits a sin while knowing better, and perhaps even latently wishing not to commit it. According to Saarinen, this is a moral state resembling Aristotle’s akra- sia, On the other hand, he notes, in opposition to the Aristotelian idea of alvasia, the ‘Augustinian tradition maintains that those existing in such a moral state nevertheless per- form their actions out of choice (consensia, liberum arbirium). Chapter Three, “Alrasia in Scholasticism” covers the period from Grosseteste (c. 1246) to John Buridan (d. 1358)—the period of what he terms “Aristotelian scholasticism.” InREVIEWS 277 this chapter he discusses the views of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Walter Burley, Gerald Odonis and John Buridan, with brief excurses on Duns Scotus and William of Ockham (both of whom he might have covered in more detail). Albert’s views correspond roughly to the first heuristic model outline above. He does add something original to the discussion by arguing that one’s judgments do not always possess absolute certainty, and thus alrasia becomes connected to uncertain judgment based on cognition. Aquinas’ views are more problematic because in his Commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics he basically follows Albert and the Aristotelian view, whereas in the Summa Theologiae and the De Malo he adopts a more non-Aristotelian view of afrasia as a transitory vice, which means that before and after the action he knows and wills the good, but has te1 porarily lapsed from it and consented to evil. Walter Burley takes a non-Aristotelian po: tion as well, but is more original in his solution to the problem of how akratic actions are possible. He introduces the doctrine that willing the antecedens does not necessarily imply willing the consequens. Thus an akratic person can know and will the premises of a prac- tical syllogism in a complete, perfect way, but he need not will their consequens, i.e., the action which emerges as the conclusion of the practical syllogism. Moreover, he also main- tains the akratic actions resemble the movement of paralyzed limbs—a person may will to move them to the left, but they nevertheless move to the right. So, a person might possess the good choice but be prevented from executing it, Odonis tries to create a medium between the Aristotelian and Augustinian views, which leads to inconsistencies in his argument. He does maintain that the akratic person possesses a good choice, but he also wants to maintain that a conscious bad consent precedes akratic actions. Buridan’s views are interesting because he seems to take both an Aristotelian and a Scotistic-Augustinian view of the matter. On the one hand he maintains that the rational free will never acts contrary to reason except through ignorance. The psychology behind it however is Augustinian in that the will is free and self-determining, not merely a ratio- nal desire, and it consents by its own free act of acceptance to all actions for which the person is morally responsible. Buridan solves the obvious problem with regard to alvasia by saying that the will simply ignores what is supposed to be known and thus a degree of ignorance is presupposed for both his Aristotelian and Scotistic-Augustinian explana- tions of akratic behavior. Buridan also applies Albert’s idea of uncertain judgments to his ‘own ends—ice. insofar as judgment remains uncertain the will retains its self-control and the possibility of self-determination. ‘Thus it appears that Albert the Great and Walter Burley seem to adopt positions expressed in the Aristotelian models (1-2), but Thomas Aquinas, Gerald Odonis and John Buridan tend toward defending the idea of a self-determining free will in the Augustinian and later Scotistic sense (model 3a). As a result, Saarinen correctly sees a tendency in medieval thought toward a non-Aristotelian theory of will. The author closes his study by affirming what he set out to prove—that the topic of alvasia was indeed discussed in the middle Ages and that the discussion was quite sophisticated, especially from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries. Saarinen accomplished his task admirably well in so brief a space. The third chapter, however, would be better divided into two smaller chapters, one covering the period from the recovery of Aristotle’s Ethics to the end of the thirteenth century (for example), and then treat the fourteenth century writers together. I regret that he did not cover Scotus and Ockham in more detail in their own right. Their importance to fourteenth century thought cannot be disputed. On a more mechanical note, it would be helpful if on first citation of sources (espe- cially secondary works) a full citation were given (rather than simply last name and year of publication), and on subsequent citations, a shortened title. It can be rather trouble- some for the reader to have to page back and forth from the text to the bibliography if fone is interested in a particular source. In connection with this point, his citations of278 REVIEWS Ockham’s works were rather haphazard, in that he refers to Ockham’s conclusions in cer- tain “quaestions” but cites neither the particular question, nor does he give the Latin. In spite of his justification for this (p. 164, n. 22) it would allow the reader to better judge the author’s reading if one had more than the citation of merely the volume of the Opera Omnia and the page number (e.g., p. 165-6), Despite its few shortcomings, Saarinen’s work is a very valuable resource for the study of ethics in medieval philosophy, and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the theory of will and action in medieval thought. Steubenville Kierty Gzorcepes