SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132197. August 16, 2005.]

ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC. ,
petitioners, vs . SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG ,
respondents.

Ernesto L. Abijay and Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioners.
Edgar F. Gica for respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEALS; DISMISSAL OF APPEAL; FILING OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DEEMED AN EFFECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DEFECTIVE NOTICE
OF APPEAL. — Since the unlawful detainer case was led with the MTC and a rmed by the
RTC, petitioners should have led a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the
timely ling of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before
the ling of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the ling of the Motion for
Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of
Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and
started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise led with the Court of
Appeals. Counting fteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that
respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS;
PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. —
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz that once a notice of appeal is filed, it
cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual
circumstances in the two cases are different. De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by
criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that the proper
mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed
perfected upon ling of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the
filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; UNLAWFUL DETAINER; AN ALLEGATION THAT
THE DEFENDANT IS UNLAWFULLY WITHHOLDING POSSESSION FROM THE PLAINTIFF IS
DEEMED SUFFICIENT WITHOUT NECESSARILY EMPLOYING THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE
LAW. — Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought. Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that
petitioners' possession was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration
of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied contract. The emphasis placed
by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify the case as
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 one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter. In
Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there
was unlawful withholding of possession is su cient to make out a case for unlawful
detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed su cient,
without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase "unlawful
withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal
in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later
expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of
Appeals, we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from plaintiff is su cient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the
Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still
refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from
plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; is already su cient to constitute
an unlawful detainer case.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY IN NATURE; TECHNICALITIES OR DETAILS OF
PROCEDURE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY AVOIDED. — In the subject complaint, petitioners
alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467
and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the former owners
of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to
respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby
depriving petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic
elements of an unlawful detainer case, certainly su cient for the purpose of vesting
jurisdiction over it in the MTC. Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as
cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis. But the citation is a mere reiteration of
Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The case does not provide for rigid standards in the
drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz justi es a more liberal
approach, thus: . . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy.
Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of
social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly,
technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF POSSESSION IS PRIMORDIAL WHILE THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP IS GENERALLY UNESSENTIAL. — The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria
is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs from accion publiciana where the
issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where
the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer,
the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally
unessential.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY ONLY SEEKS TO RECOVER PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY; CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WILL NOT
DEPRIVE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION. — Neither the allegation in
petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents
su ciently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of
the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of
claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings
of the fact of prior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of
respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary
elements for a case of unlawful detainer, speci cally the unlawful withholding of
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 possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover physical possession
of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land
as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PENDING ACTIONS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
DEED OF SALE AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND QUIETING OF TITLE ON THE
SAME PROPERTY WILL NOT ABATE THE EJECTMENT CASE; RATIONALE. — Even if
respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion
would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case
will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court in
Ganadin v. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession,
it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions
for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certi cates of Title and quieting of
title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case. In Drilon v. Gaurana, this
Court ruled that the ling of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or
for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction
to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while
there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit
for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are
not the same.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LOWER COURT'S ADJUDICATION OF OWNERSHIP IS
MERELY PROVISIONAL. — In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the fact that
respondents had previously led a separate action for the reformation of a deed of
absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of
First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded
by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding
regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez when it ruled: We must stress,
however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute,
for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the
ejectment case is merely provisional, and our a rmance of the trial courts' decisions as
well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum. The long
settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. In
Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this: . . . Under Section
48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certi cate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modi ed or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that
purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can
only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the
petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.

DECISION

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 TINGA , J : p

In a Decision 1 dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of
Appeals overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of
the aforesaid Court of Appeals' Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for ejectment led by petitioners against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I.
In the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certi cates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners
likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong's ownership of the lots previous to
theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate
Realty, wrote respondents informing them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to
vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But respondents refused to vacate,
thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged.
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had
acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March
1995. In turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties
from the respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this
latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were subsequently
sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint led on 13 February 1995 before the
Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. 2 Per record, this case is still pending
resolution.
Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision
ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over
possession thereof to petitioners.
On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment a rming the MTC's
decision in its entirety.
On 8 May 1997, respondents led a notice of appeal. However, on the following day,
they filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to
respondents' notice of appeal led on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration
dated 9 May 1997, 3 and granted petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending
appeal.
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction led with the Court of Appeals and treated
as a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
said case as there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would
qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and
RTC were set aside.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has
already become nal and executory at the time the petition for review was led; (ii)
whether the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly
cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to
the possession of the subject premises.
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 We resolve the first argument to be without merit.
The following sequence of events is undisputed:
(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision
affirming the judgment of the MTC.
(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the
aforementioned decision.
(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
SAcaDE

(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying
respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.
(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned
23 June 1997 Order.
(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their
motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file
their Petition for Review.
(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their
Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was led beyond the fteen (15)-day
period for appeal. They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date
of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this
reglementary period could not have been interrupted by the ling on 9 May 1997 of the
Motion for Reconsideration because of the ling one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal.
This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode of appeal, expressly
manifested their intention to le a petition for review to either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court. 4
Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having led the Notice of Appeal
which was given due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as ling a
Motion for Reconsideration. Such ling, therefore, did not toll the fteen (15)-day period
which started running from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and
ended on 13 May 1997.
Respondents, in their Comment, 5 submit that the ling of the Notice of Appeal
dated 8 May 1997 was improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore,
the ling of the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this
defect. The RTC refused to subscribe respondents' position. It justi ed the denial of the
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already led a Notice
of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari led by Defendants on May 8,
1997.

Likewise led by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for

Reconsideration.
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 Considering the Notice of Appeal led earlier which the court hereby
approves, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is
GRANTED. 6 (Emphasis in the original.)

Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it
took cognizance of respondents' position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily
mean that the RTC was correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was
barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1 . How appeal taken; time for ling . — A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction may le a veri ed petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying
at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the
Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be led and served within fteen (15) days from notice of the decision
sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration led in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit
for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fteen (15) days only within which to le the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Since the unlawful detainer case was led with the MTC and a rmed by the RTC,
petitioners should have led a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the
timely ling of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before
the ling of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the ling of the Motion for
Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of
Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and
started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise led with the Court of
Appeals. Counting fteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that
respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz 7 that once a notice of appeal
is led, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The
factual circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a
notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper
mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the ling of the notice of appeal is
erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
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 Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the
Complaint satis es the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly
cognizable by the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and
disposed of the same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was a rmed by the RTC. The
Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for
unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds, namely: that the allegations fail to show that
petitioners were deprived of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the
case as one of unlawful detainer.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals.

The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by
T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is
covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot
No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer
Certi cate of Titles are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively
and made an integral part hereof;
4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of
said lots;
5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant
Elizabeth Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in
the house constructed on said lots;
6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel,
wrote defendants a letter informing them or their intent to use said lots and
demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30 days from receipt of said letter.
Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an integral part
thereof;
7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and
still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said
lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;
8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the
plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the
amount of P10,000.00 a month
xxx xxx xxx 8

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought. 9
Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners' possession
was originally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess
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 by virtue of any express or implied contract. IASEca

The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a

requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various
jurisprudence dealing on the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals , 1 0 it was held that the allegation in the complaint
that there was unlawful withholding of possession is su cient to make out a case for
unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 1 1
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the
part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
1 2 I n Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals , 1 3 we held that a simple allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still
refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots
from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; 1 4

is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.

In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of
the lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they
have allowed respondents, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein.
Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to respondents asking that the latter vacate the
said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving petitioners of possession of the lots.
Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer case,
certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of
Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis . 1 5 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 1 6 of
the Rules of Court. The case does not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the
ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz 1 7 justi es a more liberal approach,
thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases rests upon considerations of public
policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they
involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as
possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be
carefully avoided. 1 8

Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case
involving the annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know
better than to question this in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of
the action in this case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it
being an accion reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were
constantly claiming ownership over the lands in the guise of ling an action for ejectment.
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 In their Comment, 1 9 respondents maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal
owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking recovery of possession under a claim
of ownership which is tantamount to recovery of possession based on alleged title to the
lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents conclude.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real
property. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of
possession or possession de jure, and accion interdictal where the issue is material
possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of
possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. 2 0
Neither the allegation in petitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses
thereto raised by respondents su ciently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria
which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the
complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties.
The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by respondents
does not constitute a recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to
establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, speci cally the
unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to
recover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim
ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the
ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment,
the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an
ejectment case will not therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. 2 1
This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos 2 2 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery
of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the
pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certi cates of Title
and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case.
In Drilon v. Gaurana , 2 3 this Court ruled that the ling of an action for reconveyance
of title over the same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not
divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before
it, the rationale being that, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the
forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights
asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same. 2 4
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals , 2 5 this Court held that the fact that respondents had
previously led a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of
pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid
reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.
Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the issue of
ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing
doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the
real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez 2 6 when it ruled:

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 We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of
ownership over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of
possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As
such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely
provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar
or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if
and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum. IECcaA

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral
attack.

In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 2 7 this Court had the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certi cate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modi ed or
cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law.
The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be assailed in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have
the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a
quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer. 2 8
With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to
discuss the third assignment of error which is related to the second issue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6
January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24 April 1996 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 24-32; Penned by Acting Presiding Justice Fidel P. Purisima, (later named
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo P.
Galvez and B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz.
2. Docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2356 for Declaration of Deed of Sale and Transfer
Certificates of Titles as Null and Void ab initio and Quieting of Title, Damages and
Attorney's Fees.
3. A motion for execution pending appeal was also granted in the same Order. Rollo, p. 13.
4. Id. at 12.
5. Id. at 61-84.
6. Id. at 12-13.
7. 312 Phil. 158 (1995).
8. Id. at 86-88.
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 9. Caniza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997); Ten Forty Realty and Development
Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, 410 SCRA 484, 10 September 2003.
10. 333 Phil. 331 (1996).

11. Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, 10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 372;
Pangilinan v. Aguilar, 150 Phil. 166 (1972); Virgilio v. Jimenez, 394 Phil. 877 (2000).
12. Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 339.
13. 426 Phil. 598 (2002).
14. Rollo, p. 87.
15. 315 Phil. 238 (1995).

16. SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of
the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession,
or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.

17. 75 Phil. 672 (1946).

18. Id. at 686.

19. Rollo, p. 73.
20. Fige v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107951, 30 June 1994, 233 SCRA 586.
21. Ching v. Malaya, G.R. No. L-56449, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 412.
22. L-23547, 11 September 1980, 99 SCRA 613.

23. G.R. No. L-35482 30 April 1987, 149 SCRA 342.

24. Feliciano v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 499 (1998).
25. 331 Phil. 616 (1998).
26. G.R. No. 152978, 4 March 2005, citing Balanon-Anicete v. Balanon, G.R. Nos. 150820-
21, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 514; Co v. Militar, G.R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421
SCRA 455.

27. G.R. No. 125375, 17 June 2004, 432 SCRA 351.

28. Id. at 359.

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