1.DOLE Philippines v Estava.
GR. No. 161115 HELD/RATIO:
November 30,2006
By: MJB
Topic: QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Petitioners: DOLE Philippines
Respondents: Madami kasi Labor Union eh
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J
DOCTRINE: The Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records of
the case and re-examine the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed with
ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it
finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case.
FACTS:
● Petitioner DOL PH is a domestic corporation with its pineapple plantation in Polomolok,
South Cotabato.
● Respondents are members of the Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CAMPCO), which
is duly registered with the CDA, and live in communities surrounding
petitioner’s plantation.
● On August 17, 1993, CAMPCO entered into a Service Contract with petitioner, which
stated that the number of CAMPCO members that report for work and the type
of service they performed would depend on the needs of petitioner at any given time.
● The Service Contract stated that it shall only be for a period of 6 months, (from 1 July to
31 December 1993) however, the parties had extended or renewed the same for the
succeeding years without executing another written contract.
● On May 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Polomolok passed Resolution No. 64 calling
the attention of the DOLE Secretary to the worsening working conditions of petitioner’s
workers and the organization of contractual workers into several cooperatives to
replace the individual labor-only contractors that used to supply workers to the
petitioner.
● The DOLE Regional Office thus organized a Task Force to investigate and found that 6
cooperatives were engaged in labor-only contracting, one of which was CAMPCO.
● The DOLE Regional Office held a conference where the 6 cooperatives were given the
opportunity to explain the nature of their activities in relation to petitioner, and
petitioner also submitted its position paper.
●  Nevertheless, DOLE Regional Office found the 6 cooperatives were engaged in different
activities with DOLEFIL with 3 cooperatives (including CAMPCO) engaged in labor-only
contracting activities; and issued an Order to all cooperatives to cease and desist from
engaging in labor-only contracting activities with DOLE PH.
● DOLE brought this case before the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, which both ruled in its
favor.
● CA ruled for respondents and held that DOLE illegally dismissed its employees and
ordered them reinstated with back wages
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the court of appeals was correct when it made its own factual findings
and disregarded the factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC.?
● W/N CAMPCO was a mere labor-only contractor
● The Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records of the case
and re-examine the questioned findings.
● As a corollary, this Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they
are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary
to arrive at a just decision of the case.
● The same principles are now necessarily adhered to and are applied by the Court of
Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction overlabor cases elevated through a petition for
certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it made a new a factual determination
of the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.
● The Court of Appeals, therefore, can grant the Petition for Certiorari if it finds that the
NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence which is material or
decisive of the controversy; and the Court of Appeals can not make this determination
without looking into the evidence presented by the parties. Necessarily, the appellate
court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged
to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation
to all other evidence on record.
On the second issue, CAMPCO was a mere labor-only contractor.
● This Court finds that CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor and, thus, petitioner is the
real employer of the respondents, with CAMPCO acting only as the agent or
intermediary of petitioner.
● Due to the nature of their work and length of their service, respondents should be
considered as regular employees of petitioner.
● Petitioner constructively dismissed a number of the respondents by placing them on
"stay home status" for over six months, and was therefore guilty of illegal dismissal.
● Petitioner must accord respondents the status of regular employees, and reinstate the
respondents who it constructively and illegally dismissed, to their previous positions,
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and pay these respondents’ back
wages from the date of filing of the Complaint with the NLRC on 19 December 1996 up
to actual reinstatement.

2.Ang Tibay v CIR
GR. No. L-46496
February 27,940
By: MJB
Topic: Requirements of Procedural Due Process
Petitioners: Ang Tibay
Respondents: Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union Inc
Ponente: Laurel J.
DOCTRINE: See BOLD FONT sa Ratio
FACTS:
● Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army.
● Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees.
● However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as
it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while  no members of
the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off.
● NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
● The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
● NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence.
● The Supreme Court agreed with NLU.
● The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial. - Yes
HELD/RATIO:
● The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them
at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
● Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory
accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).
● The SC also outlined that administrative body, like the CIR, although not strictly bound
by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of
due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
o The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
o The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
o The decision must have something to support itself;
o The evidence must be substantial;
o The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
o The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate;
o The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various
Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
3. SCENARIOS INC. v. VINLUAN
GR NO. 173283
September 17, 2008
By: RM
Topic: Quasi-judicial power; technical rules not applicable
Petitioners: SCENARIOS, INC. and/or RHOTZIV BAGO
Respondents: JELLY VINLUAN
Ponente: TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE: Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings;
only substantial compliance is required.
FACTS:
· Aug 8, 2000: Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, under payment and
nonpayment of benefits against petitioners Scenarios, Inc. and Rhotziv Bago and a
certain Jess Jimenez.
o Summons were issued and sent by registered mail to "Mr. Jess
Jimenez" with address at "Scenario, Inc./GMA Complex, EDSA,
corner Timog Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1104."
o However, the summons envelope bore the mark "RETURN TO
SENDER" and "UNCLAIMED".
· Petitioners failed to appear during the scheduled hearings.
o Labor Arbiter Salimathar Nambi ordered the reinstatement of
respondent to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and with full backwages from the time of dismissal up to the time of
actual reinstatement, or, if not feasible, the payment of separation
pay of 1 month salary per year of service.
· Claiming that it was the only time that they became aware of the proceedings
before the labor arbiter, petitioners led a Notice and Memorandum of Appeal with the
NLRC.
o NLRC issued an order remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
proper service of summons and appropriate proceedings.
 · Respondent then led a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA reinstated the
decision of the labor arbiter.
o ruled that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption that the
notices and summons had been regularly sent and received in the
ordinary course of events
· Petitioners posit that they were denied due process when the labor arbiter decided
the case even in the absence of sufficient proof that the summons and notices were
delivered to them.
o They allege that no proof that summons were received by persons
authorized to receive them, since Jess Jimenez, the person named in
the summons, is a complete stranger to Scenarios, Inc.
ISSUE: W/N summons and notices were delivered to petitioners.
RULING: YES.
· Service of notices and resolutions, including summons, in cases led before the labor
arbiters is governed by Sections 5 and 6 of Rule III of the New NLRC Rules of Procedure.
Section 5. Service of Notices and Resolutions. — (a) Notices or summons and copies of
orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by
registered mail;
Section 6. Proof and completeness of service. — The return is prima facie proof of the facts
indicated therein. Service by registered mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his
agent; but if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from
the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect after such time.
· The envelope containing the summons addressed to Jess Jimenez, Scenarios,
Inc./GMA Complex, EDSA, corner Timog Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City 1104, is marked
"RETURN TO SENDER" and "UNCLAIMED" and has the notations "SECOND NOTICE DATE
8/14" and "LAST NOTICE DATE 9/6." There is also an unsigned Registry Return Receipt
attached to the said envelope
o It appears that Jess Jimenez has been notified at least twice. At the
very least, petitioners had five (5) days from the 14 August 2000
notice within which to claim the summons. As petitioners failed to
do so, the service was deemed complete at the end of the said five-
day period.
o Allegation of petitioners that Jimenez is a complete stranger to
Scenarios, Inc. is a factual matter which the Court is not in a position
to resolve. Besides, the name of respondent Scenarios, Inc. itself is
mentioned on the face of the letter envelope. In any case, when the
summons was sent, the labor arbiter could only rely on the name
and address indicated by respondent in the complaint. There was no
way to determine, at that point, whether Jess Jimenez is an
employee or an officer of Scenarios, Inc.
· The records furthermore indicate that petitioners had been furnished a copy of the
decision of the labor arbiter.
o As indicated in the certification issued by the Quezon City Central Post
Office, a notice of judgment/decision was served by registered mail
on petitioners, delivered on 5 June 2001 and received by a certain
S/G Cuevas.
· There is enough evidence showing that petitioners had been duly notified of the
hearings and of the decision. The postal office certifications are prima facie proof that
the said processes had been delivered to and received by petitioners. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands. It is incumbent
upon petitioners to prove otherwise, a task which they failed to do.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 25 October 2005
and 21 June 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 85387 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
4. PISON-ARCEO v. NLRC
GR. No. 117890
DATE: Sept. 18, 1997
By: EAY3
Topic: QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
Petitioners: PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
SUGAR WORKERS-FOOD and GENERAL TRADE (NFSW-FGT)/ JESUS PASCO, MARTIN
BONARES, EVANGELINE PASCO, TERESITA NAVA, FELIXBERTO NAVA, JOHNNY GARRIDO,
EDUARDO NUÑEZ and DELMA NUÑEZ
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: We must stress that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing
service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient.
FACTS:
● Private respondents all represented by Private Respondent National Federation of
Sugar Workers- Food and General Trade (NSFW-FGT) filed on June 13, 1988 a
complaint for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, payment of backwages and
attorney's fees against "Hacienda Lanutan/Jose Edmundo Pison."
● They alleged that they were previously employed as regular sugar farm workers of
Hacienda Lanutan in Talisay, Negros Occidental.
● On the other hand, Jose Edmundo Pison claimed that he was merely the
administrator of Hacienda Lanutan which was owned by Pison-Arceo Agricultural
and Development Corporation.
● Labor arbiter - rendered decision in favor of the complainants and ordering
respondent Jose Edmundo Pison/Hda. Lanutan to pay backwaters and separation
pays.
 ● Upon appeal to the NLRC, it affirmed the decision of the executive labor arbiter and
ordered Jose Edmundo Pison and Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development
Corporation to pay jointly and severally the claims for backwages and separation
pay.
● Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, the owner of Hacienda
Lanutan appeal to the SC he contends that:
o NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it included motu proprio petitioner corporation as a
party respondent and ordered said corporation liable to pay jointly and
severally, with Jose Edmundo Pison the claims of private respondents.
o It alleges deprivation of due process.
o Petitioner contends that it was never served any summons; hence, public
respondent did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
ISSUE:
W/N there was a deprivation of due process - NO
W/N jurisdiction over the petitioner is acquired – YES
HELD/RATIO:
DUE PROCESS
● At the outset, we must stress that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules
governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance
thereof is sufficient
● Also, in labor cases, punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be
relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the complete and
equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the parties. This Court is ever
mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the
facts of each case speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law
and procedure, all in the interest of due process.
● In this case, there are legal and factual reasons to hold petitioner jointly and
severally liable with Jose Edmundo Pison.
JURISDICTION
● Consistent with the foregoing principles applicable to labor cases, we find that
jurisdiction was acquired over the petitioner. There is no dispute that Hacienda
Lanutan, which was owned SOLELY by petitioner, was impleaded and was heard. If
at all, the non- inclusion of the corporate name of petitioner in the case before the
executive labor arbiter was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.
● Petitioner was adequately represented in the proceedings conducted at the
regional arbitration branch by no less than Hacienda Lanutan's administrator, Jose
Edmundo Pison, who verified and signed his/Hacienda Lanutan's position paper
and other pleadings submitted before the labor arbiter. It can thus be said that
petitioner, acting through its corporate officer Jose Edmundo Pison, traversed
private respondents' complaint and controverted their claims.
● it is undisputed that summons and all notices of hearing were duly served upon
Jose Edmundo Pison. Since Pison is the administrator and representative of
petitioner in its property (Hacienda Lanutan) and recognized as such by the
workers therein, we deem the service of summons upon him as sufficient and
substantial compliance with the requirements for service of summons and other
notices in respect of petitioner corporation.
● it is fair to state that petitioner, through its administrator and manager, Jose
Edmundo Pison, was duly notified of the labor case against it and was actually
afforded an opportunity to be heard. That it refused to take advantage of such
opportunity and opted to hide behind its corporate veil will not shield it from the
encompassing application of labor laws.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for its failure to show
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on January 19, 1995 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against
petitioner.
5. Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners
G.R. No. L-25018
May 26, 1969
By: Sarah Zurita
Topic: Quasi-judicial power -- RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
Petitioners: ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR
Respondents: BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
(SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants)
Ponente: FERNANDO, J.
DOCTRINE:
In an administrative hearing complainant cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
FACTS:
● Pascual (petitioner) filed an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
against the Board of Medical Examiners (respondent).
● An administrative case was filed against Pascual for alleged immorality. Board of Medical
Examiners’ counsel announced that he would present as his first witness Pascual, who was
the respondent in the case.
● Pascual objected relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself.
● Board of Examiners, took note and stated that at the next scheduled hearing, Pascual would
be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.
● Pascual alleged that the Board of Examiners was guilty of grave abuse of discretion for failure
to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding
against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in
character.
● Lower court issued writ a of preliminary injunction against the respondent Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding
● BOARD’S ARGUMENT:
o The right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness.
o Pascual’s remedy is to object once he is in the witness stand, for respondent "a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," precluding the issuance
of the relief sought.
● Salvador and Enriqueta Gatbonton (intervenors), the complainants in the administrative
case, argue that the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to compelling
the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to
compel a witness to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
● LOWER COURT: in favor of petitioner and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the
petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without
his consent and against himself."
ISSUE #1: W/N a respondent in an administrative proceeding can be required to take the
witness stand at the instance of the complainant?
RULING: NO
● In the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan, it was held that a respondent in an
administrative proceeding under the Anti-Graft Law cannot be required to take the
witness stand at the instance of the complainant.
○ In the said case, the proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus
possesses a criminal or penal aspect.
○ IN THE PRESENT CASE, it is not dissimilar; PASCUAL would be similarly
disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of
his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
● In the language of Justice Douglas: "We conclude ... that the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its
protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered
down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a
price for asserting it."
○ such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in
the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
ISSUE #2: W/N the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination should be limited to
allowing a witness to object to questions the answers to which could lead to a penal
liability being subsequently incurred?
RULING: NO
● It is true that one aspect of such a right is the protection against "any disclosures which
the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that were all there is then it
becomes diluted.
● The constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a
belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed,
such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality.
● To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens."
● Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 2, 1965 is
affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
6. United Pepsi-Cola v. Laguesma
GR NO. 122226
Mar. 25, 1998
By: BDC
Topic:Right against Self-Incrimination
Petitioners:United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU)
Respondents: Bienvenido Laguesma and Pepsi-Cola Products
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res judicata applies to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and
not to the exercise of administrative powers.
FACTS
·On Mar. 20, 1995, the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route
managers at Pepsi-Cola Products PH Inc.
·The petition was denied by both the med-arbiter and the Sec. of Labor and Employment
on the ground that route managers are managerial employees and are prohibited from
joining a union as provided under Art. 245 of the Labor Code.
 ·Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order by the Secretary.
·Petition was denied, but petitioner filed a MR
o contending that the same article is in contravention of Art. 3 Sec. 8 of the
Constitution
§ “The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for the purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.”
o He also cited the ruling in Nasipit Lumber v. NLRCarguing that previous
administrative determinations of the NLRC do not have the effect of res
judicata because labor relations proceedings are non-litigious and summary
in nature without regard to technicalities
ISSUE
WON res judicata applies to administrative proceedings
HELD/RATIO
The doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings.
As early as 1956, in Brillantes v. Castro,we sustained the dismissal of an action by a trial court
on the basis of a prior administrative determination of the same case by the Wage
Administration Service, applying the principle of res judicata. Recently, in Abad v. NLRCwe
applied the related doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, in Nasipit Lumber Co., this Court
clarified toward the end of its opinion that "the doctrine of res judicata applies . . . to
judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers ."
Now proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature and, therefore,
decisions rendered in such proceedings can attain finality.
Thus, we have in this case an expert's view that the employees concerned are managerial
employees within the purview of Art. 212 which provides:
(m) "managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down
and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employeesare those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is
not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels respect for
the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial employees as
defined by law in the absence of anything to show that such determination is without
substantial evidence to support it. Nonetheless, the Court, concerned that employees who
are otherwise supervisors may wittingly or unwittingly be classified as managerial personnel
and thus denied the right of self- organization, has decided to review the record of this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
7. DELFIN VS. INCIONG
GR NO. 50661
DEC 10, 1990
By: DEINLA
Topic: Res judicata
Petitioners: RUBEN DELFIN et. al
Respondents: THE HON. AMADO G. INCIONG in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Labor;
NLRC Commissioners DIEGO ATIENZA, CLETO VILLATUYA and GERONIMO QUADRA; ATLANTIC
CONTAINER CORPORATION; INLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., LAZARO ARRIOLA, BIENVENIDO
KATALBAS, AURORA JEREZA, GOSHI DE YULO AND PAZ YULO AND ROBERTO JACINTO
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
concur:
(a) it must be a final judgment or order;
(b) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, and
(d) there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action.
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for
such a trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties
and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated.
FACTS:
● The 136 petitioners are former employees of Atlantic. Petitioners organized themselves into
the Atlantic Container Employees Organization and affiliated with the Federation of
Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU)
● Atlantic and FEDLU had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Claiming that Atlantic and
its General Manager refused to implement the CBA and its amendment, petitioners and
FEDLU held a strike. Thereafter, the Atlantic Container Employees Organization and FEDLU
filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) against Atlantic, Roberto
Jacinto and one Hedy F. Jacinto (Case No. 5195-ULP).
● The CIR dismissed the case with respect to Hedy F. Jacinto, but finding Atlantic and Roberto
Jacinto guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them to cease and desist from further
committing the same; to reinstate complainants striking members Benito Dolosa, Anastacio
Gordola, Antonio Moreno, Jose Orzal, Cornelio Aguilar, Ernesto Hausan and Mauro Wagan,
with back wages without loss of seniority and to make good the benefits herein found to
have been denied them.
● Because Atlantic allegedly stopped operating prior to the rendition of the Decision in Case
No. 5195-ULP, which petitioners claim they actually learned in 1973, the 136 petitioners
herein filed Charge No. 5701-ULP with the CIR on February 12, 1974:
 o To defeat the law, (the judgment and herein complainants) Inland Industries Inc. was
concocted and subsequently registered as a corporate entity, alter ego and conduit of
Atlantic Container, to engage, as it indeed engaged in the identical business as Atlantic
Container absorbing, as it did all the assets including but not limited to the facilities and
machineries of the latter.
● Named respondents in the above case were Atlantic, Roberto Jacinto, Inland Industries, Inc.,
Lazaro Arriola, Bienvenido Katalbas, Aurora Jereza, Goshi de Yulo, and Paz Yulo, as
incorporators thereof.
● When the CIR was abolished, Charge No. 5701-ULP was transferred to the NLRC where the
case was docketed as Case No. LR-4320. NLRC Arbiter Jose T. Collado rendered a Decision:
o 'IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, respondents Roberto Jacinto,
Atlantic Container Corporation, Inland Industries, Inc., Lazaro Arriola, Bienvenido
Katalbas, Paz Yulo, Goshi de Yulo and Aurora Jereza are hereby ordered, in their joint and
several capacities, to reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of
seniority and other personnel privileges and to pay back wages of three (3) years without
any deduction from earnings elsewhere.
o Considering, however, that not all complainants evinced their desire to prosecute the
case, the award is extended only to those who testified and/or presented their respective
manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action . . .'
● Respondents in Case No. LR-4320 (Charge No. 5701-UL P) appealed to the NLRC which set
aside the Decision of Arbiter Collado and dismissed petitioners' complaint for unfair labor
practice.
o (a) res judicata, in that Case No. LR-4320 (Charge No. 5701-ULP) was barred by the prior
judgment in Case No. 5195;
o (b) that petitioners' cause of action had prescribed; and
o (c) that Atlantic and Inland Industries, Inc., were distinct and separate entities.
ISSUE: Whether the case should be dismissed based on res judicata- barred by prior
judgment. YES.
RULING:
● The first three (3) requisites are present in this case.
● First, the decision in the first complaint had already become final and executory. The motion
for reconsideration filed by the union in that case was denied by the CIR and no petition
questioning the denial was brought to this court. The fact of its finality was admitted by the
petitioners in their second complaint
● Second, the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) which rendered the decision had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties.
● Third, the judgment rendered therein was a judgment on the merits of the case after the
parties presented their evidence, oral and documentary.
● Going now to the fourth requisite, private respondents NLRC and then Deputy Minister
Inciong did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when they ruled that there is, between the first and the second complaints, identity of
causes of action, subject matter and parties.
● The Solicitor General, contends that there are two (2) causes of action in the charge subject
of this petition:
o (1) the unfair labor practices committed by Atlantic; and
o 2) the alleged fraudulent closure of Atlantic and the birth of Inland which were actually
one and the same corporation, with the purpose of evading its obligations to Atlantic's
employees.
● We do not agree. There is an identity of cause of action in the two cases, that is, the unfair
labor practices committed by Atlantic against its employees during its existence. The
obligations of Atlantic arising from the acts of unfair labor practices committed against its
employees during the former's existence were already settled in the first case.
● Whatever cause of action individual petitioners had against Atlantic for violations of the CBA
constituting an unfair labor practice act had already been heard in the first case. The
allegation regarding the fraudulent closure of Atlantic and the establishment of Inland for
evading its obligations to the former's employees for unfair labor practice comes to play
only in the execution or enforcement of the final and executory decision in the first case. It
cannot, when joined with the unfair labor charges already settled in the first case, make
out a different cause of action.
● While it is true that the complainants in the first charge was the union, it had no material
interest in the outcome of the case. The real party who stands to be benefited or defeated
by a case brought in the name of the union are the union members themselves.
● The bringing of the same action in the name of the individual members of the union will not
take out the case from the ambit of the principle of res judicata. Neither will the bringing in
of new respondents in the name of the new corporation Inland, its incorporators and
private respondent Roberto Jacinto, who is also its General Manager, help petitioners'
cause.
● It should be noted that in the decision of the first complaint, only seven (7) of the members
of the union were ordered reinstated "inasmuch as complainants and/or their witnesses
failed to present any evidence, oral or documentary, as to who were those other union
members who joined the strike." In the second complaint, Labor Arbiter Jose T. Collado
ordered the reinstatement of only eighty-six (86) of the 136 petitioners-members of the
union "considering, . . ., that not all complainants evinced their desire to prosecute the
case," and "the award was extended only to those who testified and/or presented their
respective manifestation of prosecuting their causes of action . . ."
● If We were to allow the second complaint to prosper for the eighty-six (86) (out of 136)
petitioners-members union after only seven (7) were ordered reinstated in the first
complaint, nothing would deter the other members of the union who were not yet ordered
to be reinstated from bringing a third complaint and there would be no end to the litigation
until all of the members of the union are ordered reinstated.
● We have already held that when a labor union accuses an employer of acts of unfair labor
practice allegedly committed during a given period of time, the charges should include all
acts of unfair labor practice committed against any and all members of the union during
that period.
● The union should not, upon dismissal of the charges first preferred, be allowed to split its
cause of action and harass the employer with subsequent charges based upon acts
committed during the same period of time.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered: a) AFFIRMING the
dismissal of the complaint in NLRC Case No. LR-4320; and b) REVERSING the findings of public
respondents with regard to the distinctness of personality of Atlantic and Inland for purposes
of compliance with their obligations to the former's employees as adjudged in Case No. 5195-
ULP.
8. SUYAT JR. V TORRES
 GR NO. 133530 the NBI in relation to the entrapment activity, Suyat still opted to remain
OCTOBER 25, 2004 silent.
By: CLAIRE RENDOR ● Rosalina Espina, in her capacity as Supervising Agent of the NBI, filed w/ DOJ an
Topic: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW unnumbered admin complaint accusing Suyat of the Office of the Prosecutor of
Petitioners: DONATO S. SUYAT JR grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift, or other valuable
Respondents: HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary thing in the course of official duties in violation of Anti-Graft laws and Sec. 46, par
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR., J. b(4) and b(9) of EO 292 of the Administrative Code of 1987. She prayed for the
dismissal of Suyat from government service after due hearing of the case.
FACTS:
● Finding that there was a prima facie case, Sec. Franklin Drilon of the DOJ issued a
● A robbery took place at the residential house of Atty. Reynaldo Bautista at Cainta,
formal charge against Suyat for the said admin charge as well as memorandum
Rizal and allegedly committed by Randy Torres, Nelson Torres, Marlon Bonson, and
placing him under preventive suspension. From several hearings of the case, Sec.
Bernardo Bautista.
Drilon recommended to the then Exec. Sec. Teofisto Guingona the immediate
● After the arrest of the suspects, Cainta Police filed before Inquest Prosecutor
dismissal of Suyat from gov’t service w/ forfeiture of all benefits.
Gapusan a criminal complaint for robbery w/ force upon things against the
● In response, Guingona issued a memorandum stating his concurrence w/ the
suspects.
recommendation of Drilon and recommended to Pres. Ramos the approval of the
o At the inquest proper, Bernardo admitted the sole responsibility of the
proposed admin order dismissal of Suyat w/ forfeiture of benefits.
commission of the crime and exonerated his co-suspects. But despite
o Pres. Ramos issued the first questioned order dismissing Suyat w/
admission, preliminary investigation was still conducted upon
forfeiture of benefits
recommendation of Gapusan, and considering the waiver of detention
● Suyat filed a motion for reconsideration w/c was denied by the new Exec. Sec.
signed by suspects, they were detained in the provincial jail.
Ruben Torres in his second questioned order. Suyat still filed his 2 nd motion for
● Not satisfied w/ the above detention, Imelda Torres (mother of Torres suspects),
reconsideration but the same was denied by Torres in his 3 rd questioned order.
and aunt of Bonson, followed up the case w/ the Prosecutor’s Office of Rizal.
Hence the petition of Suyat alleging that Torres committed grave abuse of
o In the process, Imelda was able to know that Prosecutor Donato Suyat Jr.
discretion in issuing assailed orders because a) the first order is not supported by
was the reviewing prosecutor of the inquest cases, so she talked to Suyat
the evidence on record and is tainted w/ gross error of law and irregularities
who initially demanded 20k from Imelda for the dismissal of the case
prejudicial to the interest of Suyat and b) the 2 nd and 3rd questioned orders violated
against his 2 sons and nephew.
the prevailing doctrine concerning pro forma motions for reconsideration.
o Realizing, however, that 20k was much lower than what was required of
Imelda in the payment of cash bond for every suspect so she decided to
ISSUE: WON the courts may validly take cognizance of a petition for certiorari of a decision
bargain the amount until Suyat agreed to 15k.
by the Office of the President that has become final and executory - NO
● Upon consultation w her lawyer Atty. Mariano Santiago, Imelda was referred to the
Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI for immediate assistance. This the said
RULING:
division thru its Chief, Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, ordered Special Agent Mar
● In his petition at bar, the petitioner did not assail the ruling of the CA that his
Panganiban to form a team for entrapping Suyat.
petition for certiorari in the said court was an inappropriate remedy. The petitioner
● Then Imelda went to Suyat w/ her daughter Mildred. Since the dismissal papers
is, thus, bound by the ruling of the CA.
were still being typed, they waited until 5pm on w/c occasion Suyat handed over
● The records show that the petitioner received a copy of AO No. 95 dismissing him
the resolution dismissing the robbery case in favor of her 2 sons and nephew.
from the government service on December 14, 1993. He had 15 days from the said
● When Mildred suggested that the 15k be given the next day, Suyat refused and said
date within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the order. The petitioner
that he badly needed the money so he had already prepared the dismissal papers.
filed a timely motion for reconsideration of the order which the President denied in
So they gave him the 15k and left the office.
an Order dated February 16, 1996. The petitioner received a copy of the same on
● The NBI Agent Panganiban immediately entered Suyat’s office who, at that time,
February 28, 1996. Instead of filing a petition for review of the said orders with the
was w/ a male companion who turned out to be his son Junior. From the intro of
CA, the petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration which the President
the NBI, Suyat put down the envelope and kept his hand on his pocket. When he
denied in an Order dated November 7, 1996. Cited therein was Section 7 of AO No.
was asked to count the money, he refused until the time he was forced to count
18, Series of 1987, which prohibits the filing of a second motion for reconsideration
the money. Since there was only 9k in the envelope, the NBI search Junior and they
of the final order or decision of the Office of the President of the Philippines. Thus,
found the 6k folded from his pocket.
the filing by the petitioner of a second motion for reconsideration of AO No. 95,
o Suyat told the NBI to relieve his son from any liability. Accordingly, Suyat
being a prohibited pleading, did not suspend the period to appeal the February 28,
was brought to the NBI for forensic chemistry examination under which
1996 Order to the CA via petition for review. Indubitably then, when the petitioner
he was found positive, and despite the additional evidence produced by
filed his petition for certiorari with the CA after the President denied his second
motion for reconsideration, AO No. 95 of the President had become final and
 executory, beyond the jurisdiction of the CA to alter, modify, or reverse.
The Petition for Certiorari Filed in the Court of Appeals Not A Substitute for the Lost Remedy
of Appeal
We are convinced that the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court instead of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the said Rules because he
realized that the period within which to file the said petition for review had lapsed, and that
AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory. By filing a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner sought to nullify the said order via an
independent action, in lieu of his lost right of appeal. But case law is that the existence and
the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action
of certiorari. These two remedies are mutually exclusive.
The Issues Raised in the Petition At Bar Are Factual
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari, the reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts. It is
not the function of the Court to calibrate the evidence of the parties. For a question to be
one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. 13 Moreover, findings of facts of questions of law,
in addition to questions of facts of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies of the government, if
based on substantial evidence and particularly when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on
the Court unless grave abuse is shown amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 14 The
petitioner failed to preponderantly establish such abuse on the part of the CA. The records
show that the Secretary of Justice calibrated the evidence on record and ruled against the
petitioner. The President of the Philippines reviewed the records and the evidence anew, and
affirmed the findings and rulings of the Secretary of Justice. The CA again reviewed the
records and the evidence, and affirmed the rulings of the Secretary of Justice and the
President of the Philippines. Even if the Secretary of Justice, the Office of the President of the
Philippines, and the CA erred in appreciating against the petitioner the results of the Forensic
Chemistry examination conducted by the NBI, there is more than ample evidence on record
to support the finding that the petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct.
The Errors Ascribed to the Office of the President Are Errors of Judgment and Not Errors of
Jurisdiction
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is
limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions
or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial
court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition
for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue
only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An
error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court or quasi-judicial body in its appreciation of the evidence of the
parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law. As long
as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, the petitioner alleged in his petition for certiorari that AO No. 95 of the President
was not supported by the evidence on record; that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted its operations with undue interest and enthusiasm; and that the Office of the
President failed to appreciate the defenses he invoked, such as the violation by the NBI of his
right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimination. The petitioner complained that
the President even used his invocation of his constitutional rights as evidence against him.
However, these errors ascribed by the petitioner to the CA and the President of the
Philippines are mere errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
The Issues Raised in the Petition At Bar Are Factual
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari, the reason being that the Court is not a trier of facts. It is not
the function of the Court to calibrate the evidence of the parties. For a question to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. Moreover, findings of facts of questions of law, in
addition to questions of facts of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies of the government, if based
on substantial evidence and particularly when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the
Court unless grave abuse is shown amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petitioner
failed to preponderantly establish such abuse on the part of the CA. The records show that
the Secretary of Justice calibrated the evidence on record and ruled against the petitioner.
The President of the Philippines reviewed the records and the evidence anew, and affirmed
the findings and rulings of the Secretary of Justice. The CA again reviewed the records and
the evidence, and affirmed the rulings of the Secretary of Justice and the President of the
Philippines. Even if the Secretary of Justice, the Office of the President of the Philippines, and
the CA erred in appreciating against the petitioner the results of the Forensic Chemistry
examination conducted by the NBI, there is more than ample evidence on record to support
the finding that the petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
9. TAN v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
GR NO. L-24548
OCTOBER 27, 1983
Topic: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW; APPEAL TO THE PRESIDENT
Petitioners: WENCESLAO VINZONS TAN
Respondent: THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO
Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.
DOCTRINE: When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive
department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the
judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the final
judgment or decisions
FACTS:
● Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain
 tract of public forest land in Olongapo, Zambales
o consisting of 6,420 hectares located within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation
● Tan submitted his application
● President Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry, which
read as follows:
o establishing the said area as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo,
Zambales
o bids received for the issuance of the timber license be rejected
● Secretary Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and
recommendations of the Director of Forestry
o "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available
for exploitation…”
● the area was awarded to Tan
o bidders Ravago Company and Jorge Happick filed motions for
reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry
● Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Gozon issued General
Memorandum Order No. 46 which states:
o The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary
timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000
hectares each
● On December 19, 1963, Feliciano, appointed as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, promulgated General Memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the
authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum Order
No. 46
o “Until further notice, the issuance of new licenses…shall be signed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.”
● On the same date, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 in the name of Tan was
signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Bernal without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
● Ravago Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources praying that O.T.L. No. 20-'64 in the name of Tan be cancelled or
revoked
o on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and
contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and regulations
● the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources declared Ordinary Timber
License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Tan as void ab initio.
o having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority
● Tan moved for a reconsideration, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources denied the motion
● Tan filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory injunction before the Court of First Instance
o claims that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion by
revoking a valid and existing timber license
● Director of Forestry, in his motion to dismiss, alleges that the petition does not
state a cause of action among other grounds.
o The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined the motion to
dismiss.
● The CFI declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action, and
dismissed the same accordingly.
● His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Tan appealed directly to this
Court.
o alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Tan has exhausted all his administrative remedies – NO.
2. Whether or not the Tan’s timber license is valid – NO.
RULING:
1. NO. Tan did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary to the President, who issued
Executive Proclamation No. 238. Considering that the President has the power to review on
appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the Tan’s failure to take that appeal
is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.
● in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps: "When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is
afforded by and within the executive department of the government the courts will
not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted.”
o In the case at bar, Tan’s speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the
President of the Philippinesd
o Certiorari is not a substitute for appeal
2. NO. WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that Tan's timber license was signed
and released without authority by then Acting Director Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore
void ab initio.
● in general memorandum order No. 46, the Director of Forestry was authorized to
grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not
more than 3,000 hectares
o the tract of public forest awarded to Tan contained 6,420 hectares
● In the second place, at the time it was released to Tan, the Acting Director of
Forestry had no more authority to grant any license.
o license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19,
1963, and released to Tan on January 6, 1964
o The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry was revoked by
general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on
December 19, 1963
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
10. CALO v. FUERTES
GR NO. L-16537
June 29 1962
By: RM
Topic: Administrative appeal and review; withdrawal of appeal
Petitioners: FRANCISCO C. CALO
Respondents: DELFIN G. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
DOCTRINE: In an administrative case, appeal to the President of the Philippines is the last
step that the aggrieved party should take. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the
President is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal.
FACTS:
· Delfin Fuertes, Director of Lands, rendered an opinion denying and dismissing
Fancisco Calo’s claim and contest against the Homestead Application of Fuertes,
ordering him to vacate the premises.
o Request for reconsideration denied.
· Calo brought the case to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which
modified the opinion:
“Fuertes should reimburse Calo of the difference between the value of the
improvements the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the
consequential benefits derived by him therefrom “
· Still dissatisfied, Calo asked the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
reconsider but was denied.
· Calo appealed to President of the Philippines but withdrew it before the President
could act thereon.
· Calo filed in the CFI of Agusan petition for writ of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
o The court dismissed the petition for failure to state cause of action,
for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all administrative
remedies available to petitioner in the ordinary course of law.
· Petitioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner followed proper procedures.
RULING: YES/NO.
· This appeal has not been perfected within the reglementary period, as provided for
in section 17, Rule 41, for although the notice of appeal was filed on 31 August 1959
(13th day from the receipt of notice of judgment), the appeal bond was led on 18
September (31st day after notice of judgment).
o This is enough to dispose of the case.
· At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also
those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the
latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands
he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.
· The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is
tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal
to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.
· Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
o In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines
is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.
The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal
is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.
11. FORTICH v. CORONA
GR NO. 131457
APRIL 24, 1998
TS
Topic: DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Petitioners: HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B.
BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Respondents: HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Ponente: MARTINEZ, J.
DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a
court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations; A resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality,
is utterly void.
FACTS:
· This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the
Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one
of the petitioners. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI) for 10 years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement
duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April 1994.
· During the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at
P2.38 million.
· When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon
found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title and had it transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines in the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
· Thereafter, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and
had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries.
 · NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the RTC for annulment and cancellation of title,
damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a TRO and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering,
occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
· Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying
DAR’s MR for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days. The said
order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and
executory.
· A Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through
counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified
by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property.
· In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the
Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-
managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in
pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this
purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision
of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June
1997.
o Petitioners further allege that then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of
7 November 1997.
ISSUE: W/N the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially
modified by the “Win-Win” Resolution.
RULING: NO.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines
are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
● “SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.“Only one motion for
reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases.”
● It is further provided for in Section 9 that “The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable.”
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision
of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision.
● Having lost its jurisdiction, the OP has no more authority to entertain the second
MR filed by the DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only 1 MR is allowed
to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996.
● And even if a 2nd MR was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious
cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said
motion should not have been entertained considering that the 1 st MR was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into
finality. Thus, the act of the OP in re-opening the case and substantially modifying
its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in
gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or
quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in
our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and
adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of
adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The
challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP
Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene
filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
12. SSS Employees Association v. Bathan-Velasco
GR NO. 108765
August 27, 1999
SPV
Topic: Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action
Petitioners: SSS Employees Association
Respondents: PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations,
ALERT AND CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER SSS (ACCESS), SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
Ponente: Pardo
FACTS
- ACCESS filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election
to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of SSS.
- The Bureau of Labor Relations ordered a certification election to be conducted
among the rank and file employees of the Social Security System in its main office
and regional branches.
o SSS Employees Association and ACCESS were the contending parties in
the certification elections.
- The certification elections were held, with ACCESS garnering 1,378 votes, SSSEA
obtaining 1,116 votes, and No Union collecting 40 votes
- SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest and/or motion
to annul the certification Election but it was denied.
- SSSEA filed an Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in
the SSS Regional Office
o Velasco denied the Election Protest and declared ACCESS the winner in
the certification election, and certified ACCESS as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of SSS for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement with the latter.
Hence, this petition:
- SSS Employees Association argues that the certification election should not have
proceeded because of the pendency of a formal charge of a company-initiated,
dominated, or supported union with the bureau of Labor Relations.
o It further contends that no certification election was held in the regional
offices of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in incomplete
certification election, thereby rendering null and void the proclamation of
ACCESS as the winner of the election.

ISSUE: W/N SSS Employees Association exhausted all administrative remedies before going
to the Supreme Court - NO

HELD:
- The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies
before resorting to the courts.
o The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s
cause of action.
o This rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the
unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
- SSS Employees Association failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director,
Bureau of Labor Relations to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the
Labor Code.
- Absent a showing that it had availed itself of an exhausted the appropriate 13. Macailang v Andrada
administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the L-21607
dismissal of the petition. January 30, 1970
- The issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings of public By: Rich Velarde
respondent. Topic: Judicial Review
o Unfortunately for petitioner, factual issues are not proper subjects of an Petitioners: RAFAEL MACAILING, SILVESTRE MACAILING, DOMINICO NECESITO and RAFAEL
original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to NECESITO
review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion Respondents: TOMAS ANDRADA, MARIA ANDRADA, FEDERICO ANDRADA, FLORENCIA VDA.
of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials. DE ANDRADA, JESUS ANDRADA, ANDREA R. GAURANA (HEIRS OF SALVADOR ANDRADA) and
- Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ENRIQUE C. QUEMA (in behalf of the President),
upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination. Ponente:

DISPOSITIVE DOCTRINE: In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not
remedies. No pronouncement as to costs. necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Where the law stands mute, the
accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available

FACTS:
● The Macailang and Andrada had a dispute over four parcels of land
● The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor, excluded the four
parcels of land claimed by plaintiffs.
● The Director of Lands, however, reversed
 ● Appeal having been taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
the latter, on October 27, 1956, in turn reversed the Director of Lands by awarding
to plaintiffs the lands they claimed.
● defendants appealed to the Office of the President.
● in a letter-decision, Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, "[b]y authority
of the President", reversed the decision of the Secretary and declared that the
lands involved "should be restored to the heirs of Andrada to be included in their
individual applications."
● Plaintiffs, on December 23, 1959, started the present suit in the Cotabato court.
They raised the issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary. The Court of First
Instance
● The CFI affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
● Thus, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUES:
● (Issue in the syllabus) W/N certiorari is the proper remedy - YES
● W/N the Court has the power to nullify the decisions of administrative agencies -
YES
HELD/RATIO:
● YES
○ In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes
especially provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence,
however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable
○ Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary
remedies in the Rules of Court are still available
○ Deducible from the foregoing is that where administrative agencies have
original jurisdiction in the premises, the court's interference with
administrative action is necessarily limited
○ The remedies that can be availed of where the statute is silent, as in the
present case, are the special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and/or
mandamus specified in the Rules of Court. In this case, therefore, we
have no alternative but to hold that the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy is
certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
○ Certiorari appears to be the real course of action here taken by plaintiffs.
While the petition by itself does not conform to the formal requirements,
the allegations thereof show that plaintiffs charge defendant Assistant
Executive Secretary with grave abuse of discretion in upholding
defendants' appeal "in desecration of a solemn decision" of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources "that had already become `final and
executory
○ No necessity there was for plaintiffs to aver that there was no plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This can be
clearly read from the factual narration in the complaint. After all, the case
has already reached the administrative peak — the Office of the
President has already acted thereon. The fact that the petition was not
verified may be excused. The case presented was one which shaped out a
question of law. There were no facts that really needed confirmation
under oath. In fact, no trial was conducted by the court below. Absence
of verification here is not fatally defective
○ This is a special civil action for certiorari.
● YES
○ The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction are
inapplicable, in that those cases involved petitions for writs of injunction
seeking to control the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the respondent courts involved
○ the ruling in Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary, L-21066, April 30, 1965, has
not varied the rule, at least in so far as prohibitory writs are concerned.
The Gayacao case conceded the power of the provincial Court of First
Instance to take cognizance of cases involving judicial review of
administrative decisions, where the sole issue before the Court, is
`whether the decision of respondent public officials was legally correct or
not'; but it clearly reaffirmed the non-jurisdiction rulings previously cited
where writs of injunction are issued or sought in order to control acts of
non-resident officials
○ Indeed, numerous are the cases where courts of First instance of
provinces have rightly assumed jurisdiction over petitions solely to
review acts of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, both of whom may be found in Manila. For instance,
in the 1949 case of Alejo vs. Garchitorena, 83 Phil. 924, 928, this Court
impliedly upheld the power of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
to review land decisions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources
○ We hold that the Cotabato court has jurisdiction
We, accordingly, hold that the August 20, 1959 letter-decision of the Assistant Executive
Secretary "by authority of the President" reversing the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in this case is null and void and of no force and effect.
For the reasons given, the lower court's decision (labeled Order) of January 31,
1963 appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
14. OCA v LOPEZ
A.M. No. P102788
January 18, 2011
By: Raymond Villafuerte
Topic: ADMIN LAW
Petitioners: Office of the Court Administrator
Respondents: Claudio M. Lopez
Ponente:
FACTS:
Claudio Lopez (Process Server for the MTC, Supiden, La Union) was charged with a violation
of SEC 11 of RA 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act), after a search of his house yielded the seizure of
790.6 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops.
Consonant with the En Banc Resolution dated 12 March 1981 authorizing the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) to initiate motu proprio the filing of administrative complaint
against judges and/or employees of the inferior courts who have been convicted and/or
charged before the Sandiganbayan or the courts, the OCA recommended the filing of an
administrative complaint against Lopez for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a
Government Employee. The Court approved the OCAs recommendation and required Lopez Administrative Cases, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for
to comment on the complaint. Lopez submitted a onepage answer/comment alleging that a the first offense.
criminal case was pending before the RTC La Union and that from the evidence presented, it ● Once again, we stress that court employees, from the presiding judge to the
was clear that the prosecution failed to prove its case and that the case might be dismissed. lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, should always
Lopez therefore prayed that this instant complaint be dismissed. act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility.
○ Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum,
ISSUE: W/N Lopez should be administratively liable. but must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations.
○ No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from
RULING: YES. its holder than an office in the judiciary.
● As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Judge, to sustain a finding of ○ Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty
administrative culpability, only substantial evidence is required. [DOCTRINE] to maintain the peoples respect and faith in the judiciary.
○ The present case is an administrative case, not a criminal case, against ○ They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust
respondent. and confidence in the courts.
○ Therefore, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, or ○ Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept responsibility.
as adequate to support a conclusion.
○ Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an WHEREFORE, we DISMISS respondent Claudio M. Lopez, Process Server of the Municipal Trial
administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative Court of Sudipen, La Union, from the service with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued
case. leave benefits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
○ We emphasize the well settled rule that a criminal case is different from government including government owned or controlled corporations. This decision is
an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the immediately executory.
facts and the law applicable to each case.
● The evidence showed that Lopez is the occupant of the place where the 790.6
grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops were recovered. He did not have the
necessary permit or authority from the appropriate government agency to possess
the same.
○ This is a flagrant violation of the law and is considered a grave
misconduct.
● The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer.
○ The misconduct is grave IF it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
○ As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule,
must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
○ Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an
official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station
or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.
○ An act need not be tantamount to a crime for it to be considered as grave
misconduct as in fact, crimes involving moral turpitude are treated as a
separate ground for dismissal under the Administrative Code.
○ We agree with the findings and recommendation of both the
Investigating Judge and the OCA that Lopez committed grave misconduct
which, under Section 52 (A)(3), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on