SPECIAL LAWS AFFECTING LIABILITIES AND PENALTIES Upon joint motion of the prosecution and the defense, the
Upon joint motion of the prosecution and the defense, the cases were consolidated.
1. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (R.A. No. 9344; R.A. No. 10630)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENITO LABABO ALIAS "BEN," WENEFREDO
LABABO, JUNIOR LABABO (AL), AND FFF, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
For consideration is an ordinary appeal from the August 31, 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01992, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Benito Lababo alias "Ben", Wenefredo
Lababo, Junior Lababo (Al) and FFF".
The Facts
Accused-appellants Benito, Wenefredo, Junior, and FFF, all surnamed "Lababo," were charged in an
Information for the crime of Murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 of Catarman,
Northern Samar, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4460, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 27th day of October 2007, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon at (portion deleted)
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring with, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with an
unlicensed homemade shotgun locally known as "bardog" and with a long bolo, with deliberate intent to kill
thru treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot AAA2 with the use of said weapons which the accused
had provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said AAA a gunshot wound which directly
caused the death of said victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Additionally, accused-appellants Benito and Wenefredo were likewise indicted with the crime of Frustrated
Murder before Branch 20, RTC of Catarman, or Northern Samar. Docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4479,
the Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of October, 2007, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, in (portion deleted)
Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with a homemade shotgun, conspiring with (sic) confederating, and mutually
helping each other, with deliberate intent to kill thru treachery and evident premeditation did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot BBB4 with the use of said weapon which
the accused had provided themselves for the purpose, thus the accused having performed all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of murder but did not produce it by reason of some cause
independent of the will of the (sic) herein, accused, that is the timely and (sic) medical attendance to said
BBB which prevented his death.
That the commission of the crime was aggravated with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On January 26, 2009, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder in Criminal Case No.
C-4460. As for Criminal Case No. C-4479, Benito and Wenefredo pleaded not guilty to the charge of
frustrated murder on April 21, 2009. Junior, however, remained at large.6
Prosecution's version
According to the prosecution, the facts surrounding the incident are as follows:
On October 27, 2007, at around 3:00 in the afternoon, BBB, his wife CCC,7 and their son AAA, alighted
from a motorcycle in front of Benito's house, some fifty (50) meters away from their residence, and
proceeded directly to go to their house. A few minutes later, CCC heard a gunshot accompanied by a
child's scream emanating from near Benito's house. When she went outside to check, she saw her
husband and son lying on the ground, wounded. Within close proximity is Benito holding a 29-inch gun
locally known as "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all armed with bolos. Jesus Caparal
corroborated these accounts, saying that he was nearby when the incident occurred and that after hearing
gunshots, he proceeded to his house. On the way there, he saw Benito holding a "bardog", with the three
each holding a bolo, while AAA and BBB were lying on the ground. He reported the incident to the
Barangay Tanod.8
CCC ran towards Barangay Malobago to seek help from Vice Mayor Diodato Bantilo. The latter went to the
crime scene with CCC, at which point, CCC lost consciousness. Vice Mayor Bantilo brought the two (2)
victims to the hospital. AAA was declared dead on arrival. BBB survived the gunshot wounds on his left
wrist, right leg, and left buttock, but was confined at the hospital for one (1) month. DDD, CCC's adopted
daughter, reported the incident to the police authorities of Northern Samar.9
Dr. Candelaria Castillo, the attending physician of the victims, issued the Post Mortem Report on AAA
declaring that he sustained a single but fatal gunshot wound on his back, injuring his lungs, which resulted
in cardiopulmonary arrest, leading to his immediate death.10
As for her finding on BBB, in the Medico-Legal Certificate, it is stated that he sustained eight (8) non-fatal
gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body, signifying that he was moving at the time of the shooting.
The doctor stated that if BBB was not given timely medical attention, he would have died from his
wounds.11
CCC suggested that the possible cause for the shooting was the boundary dispute between BBB and his
brothers, Benito and Wenefredo.12
Version of the defense
For their part, the three denied the charges against them.
According to Wenefredo, he was fishing with a certain Rudy Castro at the time of the incident. He claims
that it was only around 6:00 pm of that day when he learned of the shooting when DDD came to his house
to borrow money for the hospital expenses.13
As for Benito, he claims that he was at home fixing his motorcycle with FFF's help when the incident
happened. According to him, their house is at least twelve (12) kilometers away from (information deleted).
He also posits that he only knew of the incident three (3) days later. As for the alleged boundary dispute,
Benito states that he was not involved therein.14
In his defense, FFF claimed that on the day of the incident, he was helping with the chores in their house.15
RTC Ruling
16
In its Decision  dated July 8, 2014, the RTC found accusedappellants guilty of murder. Benito and
Wenefredo were also found guilty for the crime of frustrated murder. According to the trial court, despite
the fact that there was no eyewitness to the actual commission of the crime, the combination of the
circumstantial evidence points out to accused-appellants as the perpetrators and
conspirators.17 The fallo of the Decision reads:
From all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused BENITO LABABO @ BEN, WENEFREDO LABABO
and FFF, in Crim. Case No. C-4460 are also (sic) found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the private complainant
each the amount of P50,000.00 civil indemnity, P50,000.00 moral damages, P25,000.00 exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
Accused BENITO LABABO @ BEN and WENEFREDO LABABO in Crim. Case No. C-4479 are also found
guilty of the (sic) frustrated murder beyond reasonable doubt, and are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor medium as minimum to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to pay the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P40,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.18
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings.
According to the CA, convictions may be anchored on circumstantial evidence as long as the series of
circumstances duly proved are consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance is
consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. Applying this, the CA found that the
circumstances proved by the prosecution lead to no other conclusion than that the accused-appellants
were the assailants and are, therefore, guilty of the crimes charged.19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed 8 July 2014 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Catarman, Northern Samar is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
In Criminal Case No. C-4460, accused-appellants Benito Lababo, Wenefredo Lababo and FFF are held
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accused-appellants Benito Lababo and
Wenefredo Lababo are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua while FFF, being a minor at
the time of the commission of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Said accused-appellants are also ordered to pay private complainant the amounts of
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and Php25,000.00 as temperate damages.
In Criminal Case No. C-4479, accused-appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo Lababo are held GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. They are also ordered to pay private
complainant the amounts of Php40,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate damages, and
Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.24
The Issue

The CA likewise found that the elements for the crime of murder are all present in the killing of AAA, noting Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that accused-appellants are guilty of the crimes
that it was done with treachery, the attack being sudden and unexpected, leaving AAA defenseless. As for charged.
the charge of frustrated murder, the CA agreed with the finding of the RTC that although the wounds
sustained by BBB were not fatal, the sheer number thereof made the totality of said injuries fatal. The CA
Our Ruling
noted the attending physician's testimony that one of the wounds, located at the posterior lumbar area, was
located in the area of a vital organ which could cause his death if it would not be treated.20
The instant appeal is without merit.
Anent the theory that the accused-appellants conspired to kill the victims, the CA held that the pieces of
Conviction anchored on circumstantial evidence
circumstantial evidence establish a common criminal design-that is, to harm and kill the victims. The
appellate court added that although the victims only sustained gunshot wounds from Benito's bardog, and
Murder is defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the RPC, as amended, which provides:
not from the bolos held by the three, the fact that they stayed together while wielding said bladed weapons
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall
are enough to demonstrate their common evil intent to threaten, harm, and eventually assault the victims.21
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
With respect to the penalties and damages imposed, the CA affirmed the penalty meted upon Benito and
Wenefredo. But for FFF, the appellate court noted that he was 17 years old at the time of the commission
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
of the crime thus, being a minor, Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which states that the penalty
to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen, but
always in the proper period, shall apply to him. After following said provision and the Indeterminate
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
Sentence Law, the CA held, the range of penalty for FFF is prision mayor in any of its period, as minimum,
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.22 The CA thus modified the RTC's ruling by
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
imposing upon FFF for his commission of the crime of murder the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
great waste and ruin;
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
4. On occasion of any calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of
As to the damages awarded, the CA modified the amounts thereof to the following to conform to recent
a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity;
jurisprudence and imposed legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all damages
awarded, from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.23
5. With evident premeditation;
The fallo of the Decision reads:
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
The elements of murder are:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Thus, for the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1)
the offender killed the victim, (2) through treachery, or by any of the other five qualifying circumstances,
duly alleged in the Information.25
In the case at hand, the fact of AAA's death is undisputed. Similarly, there is no question that the killing is
neither parricide nor infanticide. It has also been sufficiently established that the killing is attended with
treachery. In People v. Camat, this Court expounded on the qualifying circumstance of treachery in this
wise:
There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. For alevosia to
qualify the crime to Murder, it must be shown that: (1) the malefactor employed such means, method or
manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and
(2) the said means, method and manner of execution were deliberately adopted. Moreover, for treachery to
be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.26 (Citations
omitted)
Here, the prosecution sufficiently proved that AAA, an unarmed minor, sustained a single, but fatal wound
on his back through from a firearm. This, to Us, is more than sufficient to prove that the killing is
treacherous since the attack was so sudden and unexpected that AAA was not given an opportunity to
defend himself.
As for BBB's case, We agree with the RTC and CA's factual finding that the eight gunshot wounds
sustained by BBB, as contained in the Medico-Legal Certificate, would have caused his death if he was not
given timely medical attention.27 Furthermore, it does not appear that BBB was armed or was in a position
to deflect the attack. As a matter of fact, based on CCC's narration of the events that transpired, the
suddenness of the attack upon AAA and BBB cannot be denied. Only that, unlike AAA, BBB survived.
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which could
produce the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will.28
Here, taking into consideration the fact that BBB was shot eight times with the use of a firearm and that
AAA, who was with him at that time, was killed, convinces Us that the malefactor intended to take EBB's
life as well. However, unlike in AAA's case, BBB survived. It was also established that he survived not
because the wounds were not fatal, but because timely medical attention was rendered to him. Definitely,
EBB's survival was independent of the perpetrator's will. As such, this Court is convinced that the attack
upon BBB qualifies as frustrated murder.
What is left to be determined, therefore, is whether indeed it was Benito who fired the shot that took AAA's
life and inflicted upon BBB eight wounds that could have killed him as well. In this respect, for one reason
or another, no eyewitness was presented. The evidence to support accused appellant's conviction are,
therefore, circumstantial evidence.
29
Convictions based entirely on circumstantial evidence are not new. In People v. Evangelio,  We detailed
the instances when a judgment of conviction can be sustained on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
Thus:
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, refers to proof of collateral facts
and circumstances whence the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and
common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the perpetrator.
Thus, for as long as the prosecution is able to meet the requirements for a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt anchored purely on circumstantial evidence, there is nothing to prevent a court from
handing out a judgment of conviction.
In the present case, We are sufficiently convinced that accused-appellant Benito is guilty of the crimes
charged. As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the prosecution were able to establish the following
facts:
1. On October 27, 2007, gunshots, accompanied by a child's scream, were heard emanating from
near Benito's house;
2. After such, the victims AAA and BBB were seen lying on the ground, wounded;
3. While the victims were sprawled on the ground, Benito was seen standing near them, holding a
29-inch "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all armed with bolos;
4. AAA died from a single gunshot wound to the back; and
5. BBB sustained eight (8) gunshot wounds.
Basic is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive
absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or reversal of the outcome
of the case.30 Since the aforementioned exceptions are not present, We are inclined to agree with the
findings of the RTC and the CA.
Furthermore, although none of the witnesses were able to testify on the actual shooting and BBB was not
presented as a witness, still, the prosecution's evidence formed a coherent narration of the events that
transpired that the only logical conclusion thereon is that it was Benito who shot the two victims. Aside from
Benito being seen standing near the sprawled bodies of the victims while holding a firearm and that the
wounds sustained by the victims emanated from a firearm, there is no evidence that there was another
person there who was wielding a firearm and who could have fired the shots at the victims.
With these, We find no error on the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that it was Benito who attacked AAA
and BBB.
On the alleged conspiracy
Having settled the issue on whether it was indeed Benito who fired at the victims, We shall now determine
whether, as held by the RTC and the CA, accused-appellants conspired to commit the crimes charged.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To prove conspiracy, the
prosecution must establish the following three requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement,
(2) the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided
upon. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one becomes the act of all.31
In Bahilidad v. People,32 the Court summarized the basic principles in determining whether conspiracy
exists or not. Thus:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime
itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to
show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a
conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the
cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution
to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present
at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the
mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active
participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.
Here, it was established that Wenefredo and FFF were present at the scene of the crime, both wielding a
bolo. However, it was also established that their alleged participation thereat did not go beyond being
present and holding said weapons. As a matter of fact, both the victims only sustained gunshot wounds.
The question now is this: Is Wenefredo and FFF's mere presence at the scene of the crime, while armed
with bolos, sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired with Benito to commit the
crimes imputed against them?
We rule in the affirmative.
While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, without actively
participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove that the accused conspired to commit the crime,
Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing near the victims and Benito, while wielding bolos, does not partake of
this nature.
To Our mind, their overt act of staying in close proximity while Benito executes the crime served no other
purpose than to lend moral support by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent the successful
perpetration thereof.33 We are sufficiently convinced that their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged
Benito and increased the odds against the victims, especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons.
Indeed, one who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral
support to the actual perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the actual
perpetrator, especially if they did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime.34 Under the
circumstances, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that they have nothing to do with the killing.
We are, therefore, convinced that indeed, the three conspired to commit the crimes charged.
On the penalties imposed
Finding that the RTC erred in the penalty imposed on FFF, the CA made the following modifications, noting
at FFF was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed 8 July 2014 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, of Catarman, Northern Samar is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
In Criminal Case No. C-4460, accused-appellants Benito Lababo, Wenefredo Lababo and FFF are held
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accused-appellants Benito Lababo and
Wenefredo Lababo are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua while FFF being a minor at
the time of the commission of the crime shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal  as
maximum. Said accused-appellants are also ordered to pay private complainant the amounts of
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php75,000.00 as moral damages, Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and Php25,000.00 as temperate damages.
In Criminal Case No. C-4479, accused-appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo Lababo are held GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. They are also ordered to pay private
complainant the amounts of Php40,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as temperate damages, and
Php20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.35 (underscoring ours)
We sustain the CA's modification of the penalty imposed on FFF.
The CA correctly took into account FFF's minority, he being 17 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime, in reducing the period of imprisonment to be served by him. Being of said age, FFF is entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of the RPC which provides that the
penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.36
Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.37 However, pursuant to RA No. 9346, proscribing the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua.
Applying Article 68 (2), the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e., from reclusion
perpetua, which is reclusion temporal. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
applicable. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be reduced
by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision mayor.
Furthermore, there being no modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should be imposed in its medium period38 which is 14 years, eight months, and one
day to 17 years and four months.39
The CA thus correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum to FFF.
As for the penalties imposed on Benito and Wenefredo anent their conviction for Murder and Frustrated
Murder, there is no reason to disturb the RTC and CA's ruling thereon.
Suspended sentence
We note, however, that FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, should benefit
from a suspended sentence pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006. Said provision reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however,
That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18)
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law. (emphasis ours)
It is well to recall that Section 38 of the law applies regardless of the imposable penalty, since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who
has been convicted of a lesser offense. We, therefore, should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous
crime.40
Furthermore, the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of judgment of
conviction is immaterial. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of
tender age. The promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who
has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she
was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in
accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community.41
FFF may thus be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides that "[a] child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD." The case shall thus be
remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training
facility, following the Court's pronouncement in People v. Sarcia.42
On the damages awarded
Lastly, We find the need to modify the damages awarded for both crimes, following People v.
Jugueta.43 Thus,
I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes
involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity - P100,000.00
b. Moral damages - P100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages - P100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity - P75,000.00
ii. Moral damages - P75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages - P75,000.00.
It is well to mention that for FFF, Section 6 of RA 9344 expressly provides that the child in conflict with the
law is still civilly liable for the crime committed.44 Accordingly, FFF shall pay the same amount of damages
as shall be meted upon his co-accused-appellants.
Thus, applying Our pronouncement in People v. Jugueta,45 in Criminal Case No. C-4460 [Murder],
accused-appellants shall each pay civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
As for their conviction for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. C-4479, Benito and Wenefredo shall pay
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 31, 2016 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01992 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision, as modified, shall read:
In Criminal Case No. C-4460, accused-appellants Benito Lababo, Wenefredo Lababo and FFF are held
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Accused-appellants Benito Lababo and
Wenefredo Lababo are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, [while the case against
FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be remanded to the court of origin for
appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.]
Each of the accused-appellants are ordered to pay private complainant the amounts of [P100,000.00] as
civil indemnity, [P100,000.00] as moral damages, [P100,000.00] as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. C-4479, accused-appellants Benito Lababo and Wenefredo Lababo are held GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder and are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. They are also ordered to pay private
complainant the amounts of [P75,000.00] as civil damages, [P75,000.00] as moral damages, and
[P75,000.00] as exemplary damages.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK), * JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN
ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA
JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR HERSELF AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN
VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, v. QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
CITY OF MANILA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS CITY, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by
the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary
restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey
Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing
and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's
ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional
right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors
through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng
mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang
Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance);
(b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00
P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below
Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14,
2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled
"An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00A.M.,
Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014
(Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of
young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances
are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall
under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the
youth without substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance
contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that the law
enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only
on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities
exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with
evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate
activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of
the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict
scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to
their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes
Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the
penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the
parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the
youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the
same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-circuit
televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the
parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the
dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the
Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to
warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentalitv of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to
then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally
demandable and enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are
the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution."27 It was
explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions . This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution cited above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been
promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the
medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of
Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground that
these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of
minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by
imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an
act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions were
not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of
legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct
resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is
shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this
Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a
law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort
to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of
a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be anactual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case,
respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting — is the
presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."'36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction
under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something
has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case
given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair
the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the
provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce
impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication,
considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the
TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners]
must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the
enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "'[I]nterest' in the question involved must be
material — an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act — as distinguished from being
merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely:
(1) the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to
rear their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the
penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise
the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition
was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged,
she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of
apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim,
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted
in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are
not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a
consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the
parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s
and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is
represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew
Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor
child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an
action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to
allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors,
to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but
not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the
petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In
a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing,
especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its
sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners
to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under
judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the right of
parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of
the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including,
among others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their children,
this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient
enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their
provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of
petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical
appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City
Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they do
not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that
one may act accordingly.49The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due
process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate
warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a
definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine
with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that
explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in the
proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what
conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of
enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the
objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis;
rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an
ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct
is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process
because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or
forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on
individual impressions and personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the
Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be
stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected
curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law
enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when
implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determinedfrom the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended by RA 10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at
risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law
is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary
implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a
minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances
by simply presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of
such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect,
which - needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law
enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing
authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard, they
assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain
time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents
and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in
the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic
efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights, but
also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their
authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty
aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would
eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during
childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child
for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by
precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our
Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also
as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the
upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their
children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an
additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over children is
that "the child is not [a] mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning
the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to
promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental
health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate
state interests may override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these rights
and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental
supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting
minors, viz.:
role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed
that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental
involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children
from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews
may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the
streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local
context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental
rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to
rear their children.

[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as  parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting C. Right to Travel.
the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have
the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel.
recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of
prerogative of parens patriae  is inherent in the supreme power of every State , x x x."69 (Emphases the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the
and underscoring supplied) prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means
for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental
obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that
conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for
petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-
children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern
responsibility."71
Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of cases,"81viz.:
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further
compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order
crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors,
to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.72
litigants.

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are not -
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual
whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves
rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis,
only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow
those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates
minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours.73 In
the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates
their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors'
courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more active
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech
claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks
on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."'85
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can
only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated
how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the
basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there being
no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the
assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a
birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use
their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as
the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right
to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require
one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First
Amendment. Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights
cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has
eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of
travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to
worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of
assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the
streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is
inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made against
fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides
that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on
the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention
of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement
and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is
perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and
criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA
7610,98 as amended, RA 9775,99 RA 9262,100 RA 9851, 101 RA 9344,102 RA 10364,103 RA 9211,104 RA
8980,105 RA 9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government
units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours
for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall
devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have
done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to
travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,108but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always
subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of
their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the
right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to
obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a
foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate
that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and
overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose
limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117 the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the
minors' constitutional rights. These are:first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of
the parental role in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust
its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ...sympathy, and ...
paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on
the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and
from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors.
x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a
free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on
the streets to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers
within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of
child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities
subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's
claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in
such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or
in other things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel rights,
provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness
of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii)
burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve
suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based
on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the
first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that
minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over
minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of
San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of
minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that
rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may
differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. x x x. Thus, minors' rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential
analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not
establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile
curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling
state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults,
we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors'
fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of
minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their
well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict
scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates
to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the
burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and
(ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored
to accomplish the interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133This Court
has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as  parens
patriae  constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State .134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez,
the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on
minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling
interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances
is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if
not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and
influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City
Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance,
education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers,
street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private
roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming around,
loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city
ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children
during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on
the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the
face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not
provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City Council to
support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own
treatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected
bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make
dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first stated
interest—that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information
from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion,
news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports
from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that
keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer community. The
same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than during the day.
Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping
decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into
membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an early age may persist in
their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point.
Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to
reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences,the
City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila
presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving
juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their
police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on
public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means
to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens should
not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights
may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose
or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be
more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they
are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or
civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal
constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly
drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free
speech.145 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the
local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It
would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches.
Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor
relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council
meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal
the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly
drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to
pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in
a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary
association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon
City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors
accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c)
night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside
their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b)
those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific
barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under
the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (f) those
involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay
fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday,
and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are
inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair,
both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or
work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila
Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise
of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected
liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and
intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and
Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang
gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate
activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or
attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to
free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew
hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during
curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from
the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the
Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is
also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions,
which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to
ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the
same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of
any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently
safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other
extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are
required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home
early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper authorities
concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of
this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, communitv or other similar private activity sponsored by
the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going to
or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is
more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel,
to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these
items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations
are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of
religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious
masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-
participants to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these
numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the
locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful
errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian",
as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the
Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile
curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to
parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is
not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing
with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their
incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed
that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be
the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve
its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing
the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this
Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its
narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way
limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not
precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the
regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the
validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or guardian under Section 8
thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the
minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either
in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition
to the fine imposed therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the
minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND
for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental
authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty
shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a
warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent
violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of
one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED,
That the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office
of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions
- i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently,
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for
status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed
by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning
juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience,
anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or
safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and
trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said
violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay
hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided
for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict
with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance
in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors,
when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses).
Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" 157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or
fine";158 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent
act."159 Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of
property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in
violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based
programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program that
a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative
mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social
stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance
with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive
members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-
A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning
against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued
warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild
rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative
advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS)
and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be
considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not
penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of
the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment
imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict
the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal
censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he
belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public
pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the
erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public against repeating or
committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted
censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate
that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our
various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o
penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for
imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of
Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-
A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service
programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the
second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the
least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed
curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include
parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the
curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the
Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand
and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following
the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as
invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046,
issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014,
issued by the local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,VALID in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza,
Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion.
 G.R. No. 216671, October 03, 2016
JERWIN DORADO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 8, 2014
Decision1 and the January 29, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33581,
which affirmed the July 5, 2010 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Taguig City, Branch 163 (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 127784, finding accused Jerwin Dorado (Dorado) guilty of the crime of Frustrated
Murder.
The Antecedents
Dorado, Julius Ramos (Ramos), Jeffrey Confessor (Confessor) and Jayson Cabiaso (Cabiaso) were
charged with the crime of frustrated murder, defined under Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) committed against Ronald Bonion (Ronald) before the RTC. They were also charged
with violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed against Raniel Parino (Raniel). These
cases were docketed, as Criminal Case Nos. 127784-85. The respective Informations read as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 127784
xxxx
th
That on or about the 15  day of March 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one another
and with Jerwin Dorado y Felipe @ Ewing who is a 16 year old minor, and with two (2) unidentified
companions whose true identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, with intent to kill by means
of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, aggravated by the circumstances
of nighttime and with the use of an improvised shotgun (sumpak), a deadly weapon and unlicensed
firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said deadly
weapon, one Ronald Bonion y Bozar, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced
the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
said victim which prevented his death.
Contrary to law.4chanrobleslaw
Criminal Case No. 127785
xxxx
That on or about the 15th day of March 2004, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with one another
and with Jeffrey Confessor, Jayson Cabiaso, Jerwin Dorado y Felipe @ Ewing who is a 16 year old minor,
and with two (2) unidentified companions whose true identities and present whereabouts are still unknown,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of cruelty upon the person of
complainant Raniel Parino, a 15 year old minor by then and there hurling stones at the latter, which act is
prejudicial to the normal growth and development of said child.
Contrary to law.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On November 9, 2004, Dorado and his co-accused were arraigned and they all pleaded "not guilty" to the
charges. Thereafter, the trial ensued.
Evidence of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the victims, Ronald, Ronald's brother, Robert Bonion (Robert), Raniel Parino
(Raniel) and Dr. Ronaldo Artes (Dr. Artes), as its witnesses. Their combined testimonies tended to
establish the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn April 15, 2004, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronald was talking
to his friends Raniel, Delon Busar, Annan Luna, Jerome Amergo and a certain Erwin (Ronald's group)
along A. Reyes Street, Lower Bicutan, Taguig. At that very time, Dorado, carrying a sumpak, and his
friends, Confessor and Cabiaso (Dorado's group), arrived and threw stones and bottles at Ronald's group.
Ronald's group scampered for shelter toward the talipapa and hid inside to avoid being hit by the stones
and bottles. When Ronald thought that Dorado's group was no longer-in the vicinity, they came out of
hiding. Dorado's group, however, was out there waiting for them. When they finally surfaced, Dorado's
group resumed throwing stones at Ronald's group. During the commotion, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit
Ronald between the eyes. Ronald fell unconscious for about ten (10) minutes while Dorado's group ran
away. Thereafter, Ronald was brought to the Rizal Medical Center by Raniel and Delon Busan. He
sustained the following injuries:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Xxx Ruptured Globe, OU; S/P Excision of prolapsed Uvea + Repair of Corneal & Scleral laceration, OD;
S/P Enucleation & Evacuation of Foreign body's + Repair of Lower lid margin laceration, OS
xxx.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ronald was operated on his forehead and was confined for a month at the Rizal Medical Center. As a
result of the shooting incident, Ronald lost his left eye while his right eye could only see some light. Dr.
Artes, the operating surgeon, testified that without medical intervention, Ronald could have died.
Evidence of the Defense
The defense presented the accused Dorado and Ramos; Gloria Confessor and Jessie Confessor, the
mother and brother of accused Confessor; Mark Matuguina; Jeffrey Quijano; Aurin Reyes, and Ofelia
Ramos (Ofelia) as its witnesses, who collectively narrated the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn April 15, 2004, between 8:00 o'clock and 11:00 o'clock in the evening,
Dorado was at home watching television with his siblings and his mother. Suddenly, the
barangay tanods arrived and blamed him for the shooting of Ronald. Dorado denied any participation in the
incident and did not go with the tanods. No sumpak was taken from his house. He also denied that he was
a gang member and that he went into hiding.
The witnesses for Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso testified that they were not present in the crime scene
when Ronald was shot.
Ofelia, on the other hand, testified that on April 15, 2004, between 10:00 and 10:30 o'clock in the evening,
she was on her way to see her friend when she noticed five persons running in the opposite direction. Four
of them entered an alley, while one stayed and shot the face of another teenager. She added that she
would be able to recognize the assailant, but it was not Dorado.
The RTC Ruling
On July 5, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision. In Criminal Case No. 127784, the trial court found Dorado
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder; while in Criminal Case No. 127785,
accused Dorado, Ramos, Confessor and Cabiaso were all acquitted as the crime was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It noted that their participation in the crime was limited to the throwing of stones and
bottles and there was no indication that they Singled out Ronald as their target. The RTC also acquitted all
the accused for the charge of violation of R.A. No. 7610 because the prosecution failed to establish
Ronald's minority.
In finding Dorado guilty of frustrated murder, as defined under Article 248, in relation to Article 6, paragraph
2, of the RPC, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that it was Dorado
who shot Ronald with a sumpak. The trial court considered the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation because of the following: Dorado's group had an ongoing feud with Ronald's group; when
the assault began, Dorado was already holding a sumpak; after Ronald fled, Dorado waited intently for an
opportunity to shoot him; and when Ronald came out, Dorado shot him on the face. The RTC,
nevertheless, appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in Dorado's favor as he was
still a minor at the time of the incident. It, however, stated that Dorado was not entitled to a suspension of
sentence because he was above twenty-one (21) years old at the time of the pronouncement of guilt.
Thus, it disposed the case in this wise:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, taking all the foregoing into consideration, it is hereby adjudged that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. In Criminal Case No. 127784, CICL Jerwin Dorado y Felipe is hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated
Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248, in relation to Article 6,
2nd paragraph, 2nd phrase of the Revised Penal Code and, taking into
consideration the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, with all the effects thereof as provided" by law. He
is further ordered to pay the victim Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
Php50,000.00 by way of moral damages; and to pay the costs, at the
legal rate of interest from the time of the filing of the Information until
fully paid. Accused Julius Ramos y Labanero, Jeffrey Confessor and
Jayson  Cabiaso  are ACQUITTED  on  ground  of reasonable doubt.
2. In Criminal Case No. 127785, CICL Jerwin Dorado y Felipe, accused
Julius Ramos y Labanero, Jeffrey Confessor and Jayson Cabiaso are
ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aggrieved, Dorado elevated an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, dated August 8, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, finding that Dorado
committed the crime of frustrated murder because he had the intent to kill Ronald when he fired
his sumpak hitting the portion between the two eyes of the victim. It noted that Ronald would have died
were it not for the timely medical attention. The appellate court also agreed with the RTC that Dorado's act
of waiting for Ronald to come out of the talipapa, where the latter was hiding, indicated evident
premeditation.
The CA did not give credence to Dorado's defense of alibi because his house was merely one block away
from the talipapa. It opined that it was not physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time
in question.
Dorado moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by the CA in its assailed resolution, dated
January 29, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
SOLE ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER FOR
THE CRIME CHARGED.8
Dorado argues that his defenses of alibi and denial should be fully appreciated by the Court as there was
enough evidence to support them; that he was at his home at the time of the incident; that defense witness
Ofelia testified that he was not the one who shot Ronald; and that the barangay officials did not find
the sumpak in his possession.
In its Comment,9 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that Dorado had the intent to kill when
he fired the sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes; that the felony would have caused the death of the
victim, were it not for the timely medical intervention; and that Dorado's defenses of denial and alibi could
not overcome the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
In his Reply,10 Dorado reiterated that his defense was supported by Ofelia's testimony and that the CA
committed a misapprehension of facts when it did not consider his defenses.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Dorado was a minor at the
time of the commission of
the crime
A perusal of the records will readily show that Dorado was a sixteen (16) year old minor at the time of the
commission of the crime on March 15, 2004. The Informations filed against him consistently stated his
minority.11 For said reason, he must benefit from the provisions of R.A. No. 9344, or the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, as amended. Even though the said law was enacted on April 28, 2006, the same
must still be retroactively applied for the benefit of Dorado pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in
criminal law — favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect).12chanrobleslaw
Curiously, neither the RTC nor the CA paid much attention to Dorado's minority and how it affected his
criminal responsibility. Thus, the Court deems it proper to lay down the salient provisions of R.A. No. 9344
regarding the prosecution of a Child In Conflict with the Law (CICL).13chanrobleslaw

One of the significant features of R.A. No. 9344 is the increase of the minimum age of criminal
responsibility, to wjt:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected
to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.14
In sum, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the following minors shall be exempt from criminal
liability:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Those below fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime; and ,
2. Those above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age who
acted without discernment.
Thus, if a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she shall be released and shall be subjected to an
intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare and development officer, pursuant to
Section 20 of the said law.
Consequently, under R.A. No. 9344, only a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility.15 Nevertheless, the
said child does not immediately proceed to trial. Instead, he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers
to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of the CICL
without resorting to formal court proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds
provided by law16 are present, then the CICL shall undergo the appropriate preliminary investigation of his
or her criminal case, and trial before the courts may proceed.
Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not immediately execute its judgment;
rather, it shall place the CICL under suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or
her guilt. During the suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided
in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the disposition measures are
successful, then the court shall discharge the CICL. Conversely, if unsuccessful, then the court has the
following options: (1) to discharge the child, (2) to order execution of sentence, or (3) to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years.17chanrobleslaw
In other words, aside from increasing the minimum age of criminal responsibility, R.A. No. 9344 also
provides for alternative measures to address the criminal tendencies of a minor. The law endeavors that a
minor should be given several opportunities to mend his or her ways without resorting to detention and
incarceration. A judgment for conviction shall only be executed if all the alternative measures prove to be
ineffective. Indeed, the emphatic policies of R.A. No. 9344 emulate the right of every child alleged,
accused of, adjudged, or recognized, as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner
consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, taking into account the child's age
and desirability of promoting his or her reintegration.18chanrobleslaw
The Prosecution did not
determine the discernment
of Dorado at the time of
the commission of the crime
To recapitulate, R.A. No. 9344 provides that only those minors above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age who acted with discernment shall not be exempted from criminal responsibility. During
the deliberations for Senate Bill No. 1402, the following discussions transpired:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Senator Pangilinan: xxx there is no criminal responsibility below 18 and above 15, provided that it can be
shown that the individual did not act with discernment.
The President: Can we have it again?
Senator Pimentel: Yes, Mr. President.
The President: Beyond 15 up to below...
Senator Pangilinan: Up to below 18, yes, Mr. President.
The President: Is there an exemption from criminal liability?
Senator Pangilinan: Provided that the individual did not act with discernment, Mr. President.
The President: So we are actually raising the age to 18?
Senator Pangilinan: Yes, Mr. President. However, if he is above 15 and below 18 and he committed a
criminal offense and it is shown that he acted with discernment, then he is criminally liable.
The President: So that there is no presumption that if he committed a crime when he is 15 and above,
that he has acted with discernment.
Senator Pangilinan: There is no presumption, Mr. President. It has to be shown that discernment was in
fact]..
Senator Pimentel: Which means, Mr. President, in actual law practice, that the prosecutor is under
obligation to establish by competent evidence that this accused who is above 15 but below 18 acted with
discernment as a separate circumstance.
Senator Pangilinan: That is correct.
The President: All right.19 [Emphases supplied]
Based on the above-cited discussion, when a minor above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old is
charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he or she acted with discernment. During the trial, the
prosecution must specifically prove as a separate circumstance that the CICL committed the alleged crime
with discernment.

Notably, R.A. Np. 9344 was enacted while Dorado's trial was pending before the RTC. Consequently,
Resolution No. 03-2006, dated July 11, 2006, of the Juvenile Justice Welfare Council (JJWC)20 must apply
in the present case. It established the guidelines for the implementation of the transitory provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 and it stated that one of the duties of the prosecution during the trial regarding the CICL was as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4. For above 15 but below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense, with pending case but released on bail or on recognizance or under
detention
•  Trial may proceed for the prosecution to prove discernment.
JJWC Resolution No. 03-2006 is in accordance with Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 because only those minors
above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old who acted with discernment may be subjected to
criminal prosecution. Hence, in the present case, the Court must decide whether the prosecution made a
determination of discernment on the part of Dorado during the trial.
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor x x x who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances accorded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the
very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but
also after and even during the trial."21chanrobleslaw
"The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is
the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the
other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong."22 As earlier stated, the "prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment
by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of
the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the
crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness."23 In an earlier case, it was written:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor;
his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the
weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or
his hiding the corpus delicti.24
After a judicious study of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution did not make an effort to prove
that Dorado, then a sixteen (16)-year old minor, acted with discernment at the time of the commission of
the crime. The RTC decision simply stated that a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of
Dorado must be appreciated as it was proven that he was a minor at the time of the incident. Glaringly,
there was no discussion at all on whether Dorado acted with discernment when he committed the crime
imputed against him.
Discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with Ronald. Discernment is
different from intent. The distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.25cralawred Thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to
the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the petitioner that
"discernment" connotes "intent" (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People vs. Nieto, G.R. No.
11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill..." amply meets the
requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor between 9 and 15 years old.
Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused
acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless
and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the
information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception." (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a
quasi-offense under Article 265 of the,RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts. We
agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person
acts." (46 CJS Intent, p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in
Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this
wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong ..." (italics Ours) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While
both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desire of one's act while
the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence, a person may not
intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury
to the same person in .negligently handling an air rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner
does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen acted with discernment, then he
intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend, thus, did not intend to shoot him, and at
the same time recognize the undesirable result of his negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the
basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part
of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability.26" (Emphasis Ours)

Considering that there was no determination of discernment by the trial court, the Court cannot rule with
certainty that Dorado was criminally responsible. As earlier stated, there can be no presumption of
discernment on the part of the CICL. In the absence of such determination, it should be presumed that the
CICL acted without discernment. This is in accordance with Section 3 of R.A. No. 9344, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. — In case of doubt, the interpretation of any of the provisions of
this Act, including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed liberally in favor of the
child in conflict with the law.
Accordingly, Dorado is deemed exempted from criminal liability. Nevertheless, he is not excused from the
civil liability that arose from the act.27 Thus, the Court is tasked to determine the crime committed and the
civil liability that results from it.
Only Frustrated Homicide
was committed as Evident
Premeditation was not
duly proven
The crime of murder is committed when there is an unlawful killing of any person, which is not parricide or
infanticide, and any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the RPC exists. On the other hand,
a felony is in its frustrated stage when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the perpetrator.28chanrobleslaw
The prosecution witnesses positively identified Dorado as the person who shot Ronald between the eyes
with a sumpak. The crime was not consummated as Ronald survived because of the medical assistance
provided to him after he was immediately brought to the hospital by his friends. Dr. Artes testified that
without the timely medical intervention, the shooting of Ronald could have led to his death. Accordingly, the
CA and the RTC properly ruled that the crime committed was at its frustrated stage.
The Court is of the view, however, that the prosecution was unable to establish the element of evident
premeditation to qualify the crime to frustrated murder. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the
following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of
his act.29 For this aggravating circumstance to be considered, it is indispensable to show how and when the
plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.30chanrobleslaw
In this case, evident premeditation was not established because, first, the prosecution evidence only
referred to the matters that happened during the incident, and not to the preparations undertaken by
Dorado beforehand to kill Ronald. There was no evidence on record which would indicate how and when
Dorado hatched his plan to kill Ronald. The mere fact that Dorado was seen with a sumpak at the
beginning of the . altercation does not unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to
murder Ronald. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely
be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation."31chanrobleslaw
Second, the prosecution failed to show a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow Dorado to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. Raniel simply testified that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Jerwin Dorado only? Did he had (sic) companions?
A: Also Jeffrey Confessor, Jayson Cabiaso, and I don't know the other who came, ma'am.
Q: Can you estimate how many they were?
A: About seven (7) up, ma'am.
Q: When they came, what did you do?
A: We ran because they were armed with sumpak ma'am.
Q: Who was armed with a sumpak?
A: Jerwin Dorado, (witness pointing to accused Jerwin Dorado)
Q: You said you ran, what did you do after you ran?
A: We hid, ma'am.
Q: Where did you hide?
A: We hide (sic) at the back of the talipapa, ma'am.
Q: After you hid, what happened?
A: When we came out, stones were hurled to us and they fired the sumpak to Ronald. 32 [Emphasis
supplied]
As can be gleaned above, the prosecution witness did not testify on how long they hid at the back of
the talipapa or how long Dorado's group waited for them to come out. As the lapse of time between the
determination until the execution of the unlawful deed was unclear, it cannot be established that Dorado
had sufficient time to reflect on his actions.
Lastly, Dorado did not have a cool thought and reflection when he shot Ronald. The RTC observed that
there was an ongoing feud between Dorado's group and Ronald's group.33 Certainly, Dorado would not
have a calm and reflective mind - from the time Ronald's group hid inside the talipapa market until they
moved out of hiding - as he was obscured by the heat or anger of the moment. The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.34chanrobleslaw
The OSG itself, in its Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee (With recommendation for reduction of penalty)35 filed
before the CA, submitted that "the shooting of Ronald was not attended by evident premeditation.36 For
said reason, the crime committed was only frustrated homicide.
Civil Liabilities
Pursuant to the recent case of People v. Jugueta,37 the crime of frustrated homicide entails the following
awards of damages: P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages. In addition, the
damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of the
judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The judgment of conviction of Jerwin Dorado is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE by reason of the exempting circumstance of minority. He is hereby
referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention
program.
He is also ordered to pay the private complainant, Ronald B onion, civil indemnity in the amount of
P30,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.,
The amounts of damages awarded shall have an interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the two houses of Congress for their information and guidance in
future legislation regarding children in conflict with the laws.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Del Castillo, (Acting Chairperson), and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Carpio, on Official Leave.
Brion, J., on Leave.
G.R. No. 200157, August 31, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE
DELIOLA," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the 29 June 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435,
affirming the 22 December 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros
Occidental, in Criminal Case Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, which found accused-appellant Joery Deliola y
Barrido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape, and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in both cases.
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape. The accusatory portions of the
Informations narrate:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 5214-69
That sometime in the month of June, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15 years old,
with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of herein victim who
was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one [MMM],3 a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to the damage and
prejudice.4chanrobleslaw
Criminal Case No. 5215-69
st
That on or about the 1  day of July, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15 years old,
with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of herein victim who
was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one [MMM], a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to the damage and
prejudice.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.6 At the joint pre-trial7 of the cases, the
following stipulation of facts were admitted: (1) that the court has jurisdiction over the case (2) the identity
of accused-appellant as the accused in the two criminal cases; (3) that accused-appellant is the uncle of
MMM; (4) that MMM, was 11 years old when the incidents giving rise to the present criminal actions were
allegedly committed; (5) that at the time of the incidents on June and 1 July 2002, accused-appellant and
MMM were neighbors; (6) that MMM was then a grade school pupil; and (7) that accused-appellant was
not attending school at the time of the submitted incidents giving rise to these criminal actions. Trial on the
merits ensued afterwards.
The Facts
The facts culled from the records and as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWhen the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years old,8 while the accused-
appellant, MMM's uncle,9 was 15 years old.10 The prosecution submits that sometime in the first week of
June 2002, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, MMM went to the nipa plantation to defecate but before
she was able to do so, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, suddenly appeared. He approached MMM,
poked a knife at her neck, ordered h bend over, and took off her shorts and underwear. Fearing for her life,
MMM obeyed the orders of accused-appellant. MMM tried to resist but accused-appellant was still able to
force his penis inside MMM's vaginal MMM felt pain and cried. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant
put on his briefs and shorts then left. When she got home, MMM immediately took a bath and noticed
bloodstain on her underwear. Afraid of accused-appellant's threats of killing her, MMM kept mum and did
not disclose to anyone the tragedy that happened to her that day.11chanrobleslaw
On or about the 1st day of July 2002, MMM was at the nipa plantation again when accused-appellant
suddenly arrived. He poked MMM's back with a knife and threatened to stab her unless she followed
accused appellant's orders. MMM was fearful and was left with no choice but to submit to accused-
appellant's commands. She was directed to bend over and to lower down her shorts and underwear. While
MMM was bending over and half naked, accused-appellant held the victim's waist and inserted his penis
into MMM's private part. MMM could not do anything but cry. Before leaving, he again threatened to kill
MMM if she would reveal happened between them.12chanrobleslaw
MMM still remained silent about her ordeal. However, about two weeks after the second rape, MMM's
grandmother noticed that there was something unusual in the way MMM was walking. This prompted her
to confront MMM.13 Upon learning of what happened to MMM, the vie aunt, brought the former to the
Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros Occidental for examination,14 and thereafter to the police
authorities, before whom the victim executed her sworn statement.15chanrobleslaw
Dr. Edbert Jayme (Dr. Jayme), the Municipal Health Officer who conducted a physical and internal
examination upon MMM, testified as an expert witness for the prosecution. Dr. Jayme's internal findings
showed that the victim had positive hyperemia of the vulva or congestion, redness, and swelling around
the area, which may have been caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the human being or an erect
penis. The victim was also found to have a positive incomplete hymenal laceration at 3:00 and 7:00
positions, which was similarly caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the human being or an erect
penis.16 According to Dr. Jayme, the lacerations may have been inflicted within two weeks prior to the
examination since the lacerations were fresh.17 Dr. Jayme also found that the victim's vagina could admit
two (2) fingers with ease, which is unusual for an 11-year old.18 A Medical Certificate19 dated 12 July 2002
was issued by the Municipal Health Center of Manapla.
As lone witness for the defense, accused-appellant denied raping the victim and claimed that he was
fishing with his grandfather during the times MMM was raped.20 He testified that he is MMM's uncle and
that he was only fifteen years old when the alleged crime occurred.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 22 December 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of
Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Cases Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, this Court finds
accused, JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Guilty of the crimes of Rape, as defined
in Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 8353, as his
guilts had been established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.
Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority, this Court, in Criminal Case No.
5214-69, sentences accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal,
Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, further, ordered by this Court to pay
minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, this Court likewise sentences accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake
Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake
Deliola, is, likewise, ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in
Philippine Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is remanded to the custody of the Jail Warden of the
Provincial Jail of Negros Occidental, until he is finally committed to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa
City, Rizal.
In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this Court, accused named shall be given full credit for
the entire period of his detention pending trial.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 2011, affirmed the judgment of conviction of
the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision insofar as the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-
appellant Joery B. Deliola of the two crimes of rape in Criminal Cases No. 5214-69 and 5215-69 is
AFFIRMED. However, as accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido is a child in conflict with the law, the
pronouncement of his sentence is hereby SUSPENDED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros Occidental, for appropriate disposition in
accordance with Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Accused-appellant is CONDEMNED to pay the
victim MMM: 1) In Criminal Case No. 5214-69, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
for moral damages, and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages; and 2) In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000 for moral damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary
damages.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused-appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution23 dated 27 February 2012, we required
the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. However, both parties manifested24 that they
dispensing with the filing of supplemental briefs and, instead, adopting respective briefs as supplemental
briefs in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. His defenses of denial and alibi are bereft of merit.
Statutory Rape
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8353,25cralawred define and punish Statutory Rape as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.- Rape is committed-
1) by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman x x x:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
Art. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree,
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves that: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of
age and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat
or intimidation; whether the offended party was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was
done through fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is
proven: and that there was sexual intercourse.26chanrobleslaw
The two elements were proven in the present case. The age of MMM was uncontested. In her Birth
Certificate,27 presented and admitted in open court,28 it was indicated that she was born on 5 March 1991
and, thus, only eleven years old when the crime was committed. The only controversy left before us is
whether or not accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim.
Credibility of Witness
Accused-appellant tried to dispute MMM's credibility by pointing out several inconsistencies in her
testimony. He argued that the victim testified that on the alleged second incident of rape, on 1 July 2002,
she felt no and her vagina did not bleed. Accused-appellant maintains that such statement is inconsistent
with MMM's grandmother's claim that MMM was walking with great difficulty and pain. Accused-appellant
likewise argues that given the tender age of the victim, she could have felt pain, if not suffered bleeding,
even on the second incident of rape.
We disagree. It is carnal knowledge, not pain nor bleeding, which is essential to consummate rape.29 It is
also possible for physiological manifestations of rape, such as pain, to appear only after the incident, more
importantly, the testimony of MMM's grandmother was just an observation on the victim's manner of
walking. It is baseless and unreasonable to put the victim's and the grandmother's testimonies side by side
and claim them to be inconsistent. Moreover, as consistently held by this Court, discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details and not in actuality touching upon
the central fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the witness is not
coached or rehearsed.30chanrobleslaw
Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Jayme's findings are not conclusive and that the non-intact
hymen of the victim could be congenital.
This argument is bereft of merit. The prime consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victim's
testimony, not necessarily the medical findings. Assuming arguendo that the non-intact hymen of the victim
is congenital, this Court has consistently held that the absence of laceration in the hymen does not negate
rape.31 Apart from the findings of Dr. Jayme, MMM was steadfast in testifying that accused-appellant raped
her twice. When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward and consistent despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence.32 The victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to
convict.33chanrobleslaw
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the victim's claim that she was penetrated from behind is contrary
to human experience. We are not persuaded. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, the animal in man
may come out when he commits rape such that it is not unlikely that in the process of his immersion and
transformation into another character, he would prefer to mate in the way lower creatures
do.34chanrobleslaw
Accused-appellant further questions the fact that the victim did not attempt to escape from her captor or
even shout or call for help, and that she did not report the alleged rape to anyone after its occurrence.
However, as held in the case of People v. Rosales:35
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or victim of a crime can be expected to
act reasonably and conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. People may react differently to the
same situation. One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even instinctive, response to a horrible and
repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another's may be cold indifference. Yet, it can never be
successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than the former.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Given the nature of the crime of rape, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim alone
may be sufficient to convict the accused, more so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal
findings of the examining physician.37chanrobleslaw
MMM's testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant as the person who raped her is believable. We
uphold the ruling of the trial court on the credibility of MMM and the truthfulness of her testimonies, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[MMM], though a minor, thirteen (13) years old at the time she took the stand, demonstrated to this Court
her capacity of observation, recollection, and communication. She showed that she can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known her perception to this Court as she clearly and capably related the details of
her sad and horrible experiences at the hands of the accused. She withstood a thorough and exhaustive
examination. There is no doubt that she is a competent witness. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA
451, G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001; People vs. Rama, 350 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 136304, January 25,
2001). [MMM] gave a clear, straightforward, spontaneous, frank and consistent narrative. It was a positive
and credible account she presented before this Court. There was not a motive ascribed or, in the very
least, suggested by the defense that might have raised doubt on her credibility and on the credibility of the
statements she made before this Court.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of MMM's testimony. Deeply entrenched in our
jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial
court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness
stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts; and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.39chanrobleslaw
Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.40 No young woman would
admit that she was raped, make public the offense and allow the examination of her private parts, undergo
the troubles and humiliation of a public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all the gory details, if she
had not in fact been raped.41chanrobleslaw
Denial and Alibi as Inherently Weak Defenses
In contrast to MMM's direct, positive and categorical testimony identification of her assailant, accused-
appellant's bare denial and alibi could not prevail. This Court has consistently held that: "denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi to
prosper, it is imperative that the accused establishes two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the
time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time
of its commission.42" Accused-appellant failed to establish these elements. His claim that at the time of the
alleged crime, he was at sea fishing with his grandfather was uncorroborated. For some reason, he did not
even present his grandfather Clemente Gabayeron to testify in court. As. opposed to MMM's convincing
recital of facts, accused-appellant's denial and alibi will not stand.
Time of commission not an essential element to establish rape
Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the Information43 stating that the first crime of rape was committed
"sometime in the month of June 2002" is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform him of the date on
which the criminal act was alleged to have been committed.
Accused-appellant is mistaken. This Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon the victim to
establish the date when she was raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator.44 The date of
commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape; what is material is its occurrence. Thus, there
is no need to prove the exact date of commission; an approximation thereof will suffice.45chanrobleslaw
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused-appellant's belated objection to the
Information cannot prosper, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial by cross-examining the prosecution
witnesses on the particular dates and circumstances of the two offenses of rape as alleged in the
informations without prior objection to the validity or propriety of the informations. It is now too late in the
day for the accused-appellant to claim that any of the Informations was defective. Objections relating to the
form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the appellant had found
the Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him
to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on the
ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Penalty and Damages
To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the pertinent law on the matter. According to R.A. No.
9344,47 as amended:48
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — x x x
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of
his/her birth date. In A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC49 dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise defined
the: age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and; one, (1) day old or above
but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with discernment.
Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April 1987,50 making him 15 years and 2 months old
when the crime was committed. We are now left with the question of whether or not accused-appellant
acted with discernment. In People v. Jacinto,51 we explained that discernment is the mental capacity of a
minor to fully grasp the consequences of his act, known and determined by taking into account all the facts
and circumstances presented by the records in each case.
That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the victim is demonstrated by the
following surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured
the consummation of the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by penetrating the victim from
behind; and (4) he threatened the victim not to report what happened. Taking all these facts into
consideration, accused-appellant clearly knew that what he did was wrong.
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven during
trial,52 accused-appellant shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape. However, given
that accused-appellant was only 15 years old and 2 months when the crime was committed, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed.53 In accordance with the controlling jurisprudence on the matter,54 for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the lower courts
and impose upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant was qualified for suspension of sentence when he
committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A. 934455 provides that the same extends only until the child in
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years old. Nevertheless, in extending
the application of RA No. 9344 to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law, we ruled in People
v. Jacinto,56 as cited in People v. Ancajas,57 that the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the
law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age lirr it of twenty-one (21) years, so long as
he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the chance to live a normal
life and become a productive member of the community.58 Thus, accused-appellant is ordered to serve his
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities, in accordance with Section 5159 of R.A. 9344.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,60 we modify the award of damages of the lower courts. Accused-
appellant is hereby ordered to indemnify MMM, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
count of rape, P75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of rape. The damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.61chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the 29 June 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA," is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Statutory Rape and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. Appellant is ORDERED to indemnify MMM
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape, P75,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each count of rape. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Branch 69 for its appropriate action
in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes, and Caguioa,*JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 169641. September 10, 2009.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RICHARD O.
SARCIA, respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
On automatic review is the decision 1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein
accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape 3 committed against AAA, 4 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of
the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty,
increasing the award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5)
year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA's father filed a complaint 5 for acts of lasciviousness
against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape. 6 The Information 7 dated
September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design,
and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then
6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her
father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense
presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to
him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan,
Albay. ASCTac
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 9 finding the accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed
by the accused-appellant. 10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant's Brief 11 on July 15, 2004, while the People,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee's Brief 12 on December 15, 2004.
 Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 13 modifying the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals
from the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death,  reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court", the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial
court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The
accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme
Court for review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which
took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review. 14
In our Resolution 15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief 16 on
April 7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to
have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her father]. EAHcCT
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as
follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her
[cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo
near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to
the backyard of Saling Crisologo's house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant,
[AAA's cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA's] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered
[AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his
penis into [AAA's] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down
movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private
part and said "aray". She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA's cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters
away from them, witnessed appellant's dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA's cousin]
instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA's] mother, her aunt Emily, and told
the latter what she had seen. [AAA's] mother answered that they (referring to
{AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and
ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA's cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of
Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was
gone. [AAA's cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had
done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any
further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to
her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her
mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private part.
Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA's cousin] came to their house
and told [AAA's] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-
down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA's mother], however did not say
anything. At that time, [AAA's] father was working in Manila. ICESTA
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan,
Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who
signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result of [AAA]'s examination;
(3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health officer of
Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in
said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]'s medical findings are
as follows: "negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated
hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with
resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars"
means, in layman's language, that there was no showing of any scar or
wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the hymen which means
that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as
strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or
penis". 17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of
Doña Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows
[AAA's] parents, because sometimes they go to their house looking for his
father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father retired as
a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in
the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the
Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and attend
seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when
sometime in 1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father
 is from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doña
Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his
mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare
coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15)
years old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and
1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at
Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually play
basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doña Tomasa about 1
kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999
he and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied
molesting other girls . . . and was most surprised when he was accused of
raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latter's place which is more
than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier,
grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was
imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No.
4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAA's] parents who
are related to Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAA's] rape charge
against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger and life for him
miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and
two (2) months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly
committed in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a
Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in
jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did
not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and
have the child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his
sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA's] mother, is also
related to his father, [AAA mother's] father, being a second cousin of his
father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his father to the
AAA's family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case against him but
the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078
filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation
to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape case but the
accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits relative
to said case. 18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution
was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies
of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date
and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case,
and the only reason why they filed the said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of
this same accused in a murder case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her
granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000". Accused-appellant stressed that the same
Salvacion Bobier helped AAA's father in filing the said case for rape. Accused-appellant also claimed
that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his end.
Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso
and interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which
means that there was no showing of any scar or wound". TAIDHa
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAA's
and her cousin's testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time
of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-appellant invited her to
the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-
appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice
contrary to AAA's testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-
down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the latter's mother
what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after
putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that other
children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them
who were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused.
Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that
their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual,
for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. 19 The alleged inconsistencies in this case are
too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution
witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their
positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-
appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only
five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,
respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and
that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent
statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the
atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for
inaccuracy. 20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA's inability to recall the exact date when the incident
in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of
false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and
immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness. 21 In People v.
Purazo, 22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape
cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that
where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element
of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of
the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise
time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific
crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the
complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a
place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima, 23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred
does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is
obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an
element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was
 committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that
allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994",
"sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter", "sometime in November
1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about
and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section
11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. TcSaHC
In this case, AAA's declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996
was explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the
date December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was subjected
but the Court believes it could have been in any month and date in the year
1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA's] sworn statement mention
the month and date but only the year. 24
Likewise, witnesses' credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against
accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellant's claim that the only reason
why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same
accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter
Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000".
The rape victim's delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of
the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of
her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused.
In People v. Coloma 25 we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by
the victim's father as understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-
old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere
concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to
defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA's parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently
justified by the complainant's father in the latter's testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when
your wife told you that something happened to Hazel way back in
1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file
this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that
during that time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we
waited. When we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the
case. 26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no
proof that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the
girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge"
took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element
of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim
is below the age of twelve. 27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as
follows: "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that
there was no showing of any scar or wound". The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of
lacerations in the victim's sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence
does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape. 28 What is important is that AAA's testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient
to convict the accused. CAaSHI
Accused-appellant's defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we
have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of
appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive
identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
prevails over the appellants' defense of denial and alibi. 29 The shallow hypothesis put forward by
accused-appellant that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier
hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
. . . True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA's family file the
instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA's] parents
finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize
after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously [AAA and
her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is
after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that
the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for
a girl of complainant's age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her family had she not
been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender years,
innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any
man if it were not true. 30 Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at
that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by
an honest desire to have their daughter's transgressor punished accordingly. 31 Hence, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we
discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 32 was
the governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said
law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of
age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed,
was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate,
which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We
cannot agree with the CA's conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the
time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68 (2) 33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified
on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18
years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and
date in the year 1996". Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the
rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18
years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in
several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the
accused regarding his age. 34 CAcEaS
 Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18
years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. 35 Thus, the
proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil
Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in
crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances". The issue now is whether the award of damages should be
reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is
in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification", which is included
in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. — Indemnification for
consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured party,
but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the
crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor 36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of
P50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of moral damages.
We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza that the
indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the
offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and
aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral
damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and
assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for
rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of
higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction.
Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim
shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only
a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the
financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of
the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis
Supplied) ASTDCH
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 37 we held:
. . . Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are
in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis
Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American
jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and
suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S.
815). 38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family,
and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the
time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the
victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the
accused-appellant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was
accorded the benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof
regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his
minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable
ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape,
considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was
the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario, 39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which
did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused
was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome 40 and People v. Quiachon 41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the
offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis
for increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the
Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Sambrano which states: SHTaID
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated
with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that require the
imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall
P75,000.00 . . . Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the
need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial
court's award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to
P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous.
Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court,
following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts;
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty;
P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have
 suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages
even without proof thereof, . . .
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant
because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v.
Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the
financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the
displeasure or the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity".
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous
character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The
requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example
in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been
established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon
the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;  (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
manner. 42 Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are
increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 43 aCcSDT
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages
should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be
likewise increased to the amount of P30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of
damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However
the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 44 and that of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00. 45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the
outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence
of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25
years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The
Child and Youth Welfare Code 46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law. 47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was
previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen
(18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. . . .
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were
below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act
should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is
necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was
below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found
guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child
who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. ETDHaC
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition
measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the
Law.
The above-quoted provision makes to distinction as to the nature of the offense
committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. 48 The
said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. 49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor
who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense,
the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a
child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations 50 on
Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion
of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is
charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may
have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local
Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial
or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be
the child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. . . . (Italics supplied)
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can
still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension
of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
 Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.  — If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment. SHaIDE

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine
whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution
of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (emphasis ours)

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had
been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and
40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. 51 However, accused-appellant shall
be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural

Camps and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the
appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law. 52

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed
on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; 53 and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary
damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained.
However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance
with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Chico-

Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Catillo and Abad, JJ., concur.

||| (People v. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, [September 10, 2009], 615 PHIL 97-131)