Ibnal-Haytham Revision of The Euclidean Foundations of Mathematics

Research Collection
Journal Article
Ibn al-Haytham’s Revision of the Euclidean Foundations of

Mathematics
Author(s):
Ighbariah, Ahmad; Wagner, Roy
Publication Date:
2018-03
Permanent Link:
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000315867
Originally published in:

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8(1), http://
doi.org/10.1086/695957
Rights / License:
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
This page was generated automatically upon download from the ETH Zurich Research Collection. For more
information please consult the Terms of use.
ETH Library
Copyright The International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2017. Preprint (not copyedited or formatted).
Please use DOI when citing or quoting. DOI: 10.1086/695957
Abstract: This article studies Ibn al-Haytham’s treatment of the common notions from
Euclid’s Elements (usually referred to today as the axioms). We argue that Ibn al-Haytham
initiated a new approach with regard to these foundational statements, rejecting their
qualification as innate, self-evident or primary. We suggest that Ibn al-Haytham’s engagement
with experimental science, especially optics, led him to revise the framing of Euclidean common
notions in a way that would fit his experimental approach.
In his great work on optics, al-ManÁÛir (henceforth: Optics), Ibn al-Haytham does not
restrict himself to explaining the sensual processing of visual phenomena (involving light, the
eye of the viewer, the position of the observed object with respect to the eye, etc.). He also
studies the process of producing cognitive concepts and judgments at the intellectual level. In
this system, the common notions are not exceptional primary statements because they undergo
the same epistemological process of validation as other statements: they are a product of sensual
observations processed by intellectual faculties.
Ibn al-Haytham’s approach is echoed in his second commentary of Euclid’s Elements,
but contrasts with statements in his first, earlier commentary. In this article we will survey Ibn al-
Haytham’s philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of mind as expressed in the two
commentaries of the Elements and in the Optics. We will situate this philosophy in its scholarly
context, and analyze the motivation that led to its revision.
In broad terms, Ibn al-Haytham’s philosophy is in line with that of many of his important
contemporaries and predecessors: it is true to a basic form of Aristotelian “empiricism”, but
depends also on innate intellectual capacities that carry a Neo-Platonic flavor. However, his
approach is uniquely tailored for his own special philosophical project, which involves his
1

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
engagement with experimentation.1 Ibn al-Haytham’s cognitive architecture provides a detailed
description of how concepts and judgments are formed from sense impressions by means of the
faculties of imagination (takhayyul) and distinction (tamyÐz), connecting experiential,
experimental and mathematical and knowledge in ways that are crucial for the unity of
mathematized natural science. The impact of the Latin translation of his Optics on early modern
European science is still debated, but it definitely did not go unnoticed; Ibn al-Haytham’s
approach continued to resonate well beyond his life span and original cultural context (Omar
1979; Smith 2001, vol. 1, introduction, part 6; Elghonimi 2015; Lindberg 1976, 86).
Ibn al-Haytham, the Elements, and the two commentaries
Al-Íasan ibn al-Íasan ibn al-Haytham, known in the Latin west as Alhazen or Alhacen,
was born around 965 in the city of Basra in today’s southern Iraq. He then moved to Baghdad,
extended his education and became famous as a great scientist specializing in a variety of
sciences (Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa 1995, vol. 2, 90).2 He was later invited by the Fatimid caliph of
Egypt to assist in a project aiming to regulate the flow of the Nile (Sabra 1972, vol. 6, 189).3 He
died in Cairo after 1040.
Among his interests, we can specify his pioneering studies in optics, astronomy,
mathematics, philosophy, physics and other intellectual areas. Philosophically, he was an avid
reader of Aristotle, as he testifies in his own autobiography,4 and wrote some epitomes on
Aristotle’s works (Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa 1995, vol. 2, 94–5). Ibn al-Haytham is considered to be one
of the great mathematicians of Islam, both because of his contributions to the field, and because
of his copious writings that came to around twenty-five treatises covering different branches of
mathematics.5
2


One of the books that Ibn al-Haytham chose to engage was Euclid’s Elements, which
served as a canonical reference and an ideal of scientific presentation ever since its appearance.6
Ibn al-Haytham composed two commentaries on the Elements, where in line with his
contemporary scholarly tradition, he interpreted the text (as he and his predecessors understood
it), challenged it with criticism, and attempted to resolve these critical charges (Al-QifÔÐ 2005,
56; Ibn al-NadÐm 1996, 129). The first commentary, SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt kitÁb UqlÐdis, has a
modern Arabic edition, and was partly translated as Commentary on the Premises of Euclid’s
Elements.7 The second commentary is called Íall shukÙk kitÁb UqlÐdis fÐ al-ÞuÒÙl wa sharÎ
maÝÁnÐhi (On the Resolution of Doubts8 in Euclid’s Elements and Interpretation of its Special
Meanings), and is preserved as a manuscript with a modern facsimile edition.9
When browsing through both commentaries we find many statements indicating that the
second came to fill the gaps in the first, such as “this treatise shall become, together with our
Commentary on the Premises of Euclid’s Elements, a complete interpretation for the entire
treatise” (Ibn al-Haytham 1985, 4; see also Rashed 2002, 8). However, a comparison of Ibn al-
Haytham discussion of the premises (muqaddimÁt) in the two texts (definitions, postulates and –
most importantly for us – common notions, referred to as ÝulÙm Þuwal, lit. first knowledge),
reveals essential differences between the two commentaries.
Indeed, SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt is linked to the philosophical tradition which treated the
common notions as self-evident primary propositions that cannot be doubted (ÝulÙm Þuwal
yashhad bihÁ al-fahm, wa lÁ yaÝriÃu fÐhÁ al-shakk) (Ibn al-Haytham 2005, 140). However, in the
subsequent Íall shukÙk, we notice a new development in Ibn al-Haytham’s thinking, as he
undermines the foundational status of these common notions. Indeed, he claims that the
knowledge expressed by the common notions (or any such statements) is not innate, unprovable
3


or self-evident, but has acquired its foundational status as a result of the frequent use that people
made of it. This paper will attempt to analyze and explain this transition.
Our analysis will suggest that the new ideas of Íall shukÙk were developed after or in
proximity to the methods of the Optics. Note that the development of ideas does not necessarily
coincide with the writing of texts, but we should bring evidence at least against the possibility
that Íall shukÙk was completed before the Optics was embarked upon. This evidence can be
found in Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa’s list of Ibn al-Haytham’s works.10 Rosenfeld and Ihsanoºlu date
Íall shukÙk and the Optics to later than and earlier than 1038 respectively, because only the
latter appears in Ibn al-Haytham’s list of works up to that year (Rosenfeld and Ihsanoºlu 2003,
132). This claim is strengthened by the fact that while the Optics is cited in several of works of
Ibn al-Haytham’s other works, this is never the case for Íall shukÙk. However, Íall shukÙk may
include variations of earlier treatises, some of which are mentioned in Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa’s third
list (in places 40, 55 and 56 – the second concerning the first book of the Elements, and is
therefore specifically relevant for us). But Sabra showed, based on internal citations, that the
order in Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa’s third list is approximately chronological. In that list, the Optics
appears as number 3, and is cited by treatises in places 36, 38, 49 and later. This means that even
the possible drafts of Íall shukÙk are likely to postdate the Optics, and that the most likely
chronological sequence of redaction is SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt, the Optics, and Íall shukÙk.
We will start by providing some background concerning the premises of the Elements in
the Greek and Arabic traditions, and then turn briefly to Arabic theories of mind. Then we will
briefly review Ibn al-Haytham’s SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt, move on to a deeper analysis of the second
commentary, and draw our conclusions.
The Premises of the Elements in the Greek and Arabic traditions
4


The contemporary canonical versions of the Elements contain five common notions, also
known as axioms (Heath 1968, vol. 1, 155):
1. Things which are equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.
2. If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal.
3. If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal.
4. Things which coincide with one another are equal to one another.
5. The whole is greater than the part.
However, this list has been subject to substantial controversy.11 Proclus (d. 485), in his
commentary (1970), argued against both reducing the list to the first three items (as had been
done by Heron, d. 70) and enriching it by further common notions (that he attributes to Pappus,
d. 350). These debates were known to Arab commentators, and are attested, for example, in al-
Nayrīzī’s commentary (Besthorn and Heiberg 1893, 30). In general, Arab commentators,
including Ibn al-Haytham, often considered extended collections of the common notions,
sometimes referring to several alternative formulations.12 The status of common notions was
therefore not entirely canonical.
In Ibn al-Haytham’s commentaries, the common notions are ordered as follows. After the
Euclidean common notions numbered 1–3 above, it is stated that adding or subtracting equals
from non-equals produce non equals and that two halves of the same thing are equal to each
other. The last two Euclidean common notions (4–5 above) follow, supplemented by the
statement that two straight lines cannot surround an area. Ibn al-Haytham, however, preferred to
treat this last common notion as a postulate.13
This raises the question of the difference between common notions and postulates. The
classical tradition includes several options (Heath 1968, vol. 1, 117–24). The most relevant for
5


our context depends on one of Proclus’ suggested interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior
Analytics I.10: axioms are evident to all (literally, common opinions – hence common notions),
whereas postulates must be accepted by students even if they are not evident to them. This
interpretation is echoed by al-Nayrīzī, who refers to the authority of Simplicius (Besthorn and
Heiberg 1893, 14–26).
Given this and other classical views, it is not clear what kind of justification postulates
and common notions require, if they are to be accepted into a demonstrative science, on top of
common agreement (even by the uninitiated) in the case of common notions (e.g. McKirahan
2008, 43–4). This led to attempts to provide postulates with justifications, often in the form of
Euclidean proofs (most notably, but not exclusively, in the case of the parallels postulate).
Challenges to the status of the common notions as innate or a-priori do occur in Islamic
intellectual history. Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ (d. 1209), who lived after Ibn al-Haytham, claims that
some scholars reject this innate or primary status of common notions, and argue that they are
derived from sense data (1991, 93–4). He does not provide references, so we can only speculate
about his sources here. One of his sources may be Ibn SÐnÁ, Ibn al-Haytham’s contemporary,
who claimed that common notions were not a-priori, but were discovered naturally (without
syllogistic derivation), after the relevant abstract concepts were derived from sense data (Hasse
1999, 31–6; McGinnis 2008, 140–1; Gutas 2012, 404–18).
A notable but rare attempt at proving the common notions is attributed by Proclus to
Apollonius. Here is Proclus’ version of Apollonius’ proof of the first common notion: “Let A be
equal to B … and the latter to C. I say that A is also equal to C. Since A, being equal to B,
occupies the same space as it, and since B, being equal to C, occupies the same space as it, A
also occupies the same space as C. Therefore they are equal” (Proclus 1970, 153). We bring this
6


attempted proof (which seems to justify Aristotle’s insistence on the need for basic
indemonstrable statements more than actually prove the common notion) because of its similarity
to Ibn al-Haytham’s argument to be considered below. But, as we will see, Ibn al-Haytham’s
version, which does not invoke Apollonius’ name, relies on an epistemological background that
grants it much more weight.
Theories of cognition in Arabic science
The purpose of the following section is to place Ibn al-Haytham’s theory of mind in its
relevant intellectual context. This will allow us to understand the background for the original
features of Ibn al-Haytham’s understanding of mathematical foundations and its relation to the
experimental investigations in the Optics. Specifically, it will explain the background of terms
such as “imagination” (takhayyul) and “distinction” (tamyÐz), which Ibn al-Haytham uses
frequently. This will help us interpret (in the section “distinction and imagination in context”)
Ibn al-Haytham’s motivation for theorizing cognition in the way that he does.
The classical tradition manifests several approaches to Aristotle’s epistemology of
mathematics. According to Ian Mueller (1990), the most popular is the one that describes
mathematics as abstraction of physical objects from their material substance. But another
tradition links this process to a Platonic projection of pre-existing forms onto sense perceptions.
A notable reference in this context is Porphyry (Mueller 1990, 479), who assigns the imagination
the role of introducing conceptual exactness to abstracted sense perceptions, but Porphyry does
not refer explicitly to mathematics.
The general framework for this discussion in the Arabic context is the Aristotelian
internal senses (opposed to the five external senses). The Arabic literature includes many
variations of the division of internal senses, all stemming from the Aristotelian-Galenic tradition,
7


but evolving in their own context (Wolfson 1935). The division may be as simple as
imagination-cogitation-memory. But it can also be as complicated as Ibn SÐnÁ’s 5-fold (or even
7-fold) division of the internal senses.14
Ibn al-Haytham does not propose a complete and detailed division, or explicitly adopt an
existing system. However, the terms distinction (tamyÐz, a subdivision or function of cogitation
in some Arabic systems) and imagination (takhayyul) feature prominently in his discussion, and
require a more detailed contextualization.
Distinction (tamyÐz) is a term frequently used in Islamic logic and philosophy, but its
treatment is far from uniform. Already in the translations of Aristotle, it is used inconsistently as
a possible translation of nous kritikos and dianoia (Sabra 1989, vol. 2, 65). In this vein, al-KindÐ
(b. ca. 870) related distinction to the capacity to create abstract forms.15 But elsewhere he defines
tamyÐz as “gathering judgments together and drawing a conclusion” (Adamson and Pormann
2012, 309).
Al-FÁrÁbÐ (d. 950), on the other hand, emphasizes the moral function of the faculty of
distinction. Distinction for him is one of the three aspects of human activity that are subject to
ethical judgment. The three include physical actions (such as standing or sitting), accidents of the
soul (such as joy or anger), and distinction by the mind (al-tamyÐz bi al-dhihn) (Al-FÁrÁbÐ 1985,
50). This interpretation is in line with the use of “distinction” in the legal literature, where it
relates to the age from which one can tell good from bad.16 But elsewhere al-FÁrÁbÐ goes beyond
the moral aspect of distinction, and relates it more generally to the distinction of true and false.17
He explains that when distinction is good the intellect is strong, and vice versa (1985, 53–4).18
If we look beyond Ibn al-Haytham’s life span, we find that distinction shifts from being
an ambiguous moral-intellectual power to playing a distinct role in the intellect.19 Ibn Rushd (d.
8


1198) gave the faculty of distinction a particularly clear cognitive role within the intellect: it was
the power of associating a recalled image with its non-figural meaning, thus placed between
sense and retention (Sabra 1989, vol. 2, 65–6).
Imagination too had a range of meaning that was not perfectly stable, but it tended to
revolve around abstraction and manipulation of sensual stimuli. Aristotle defined imagination as
that “in virtue of which an image occurs in us” (De Anima III, 3, 428a1–2), but did not provide a
detailed analysis of its role. Al-KindÐ gave the imagination a more precise abstractive role in the
Arabic tradition, specifying that “phantasía”, which is the imagination, is the presenting of the
form of sensible things in the absence of their matter (Adamson and Pormann 2012, 301). Al-
FÁrÁbÐ followed suit by defining imagination as the faculty “that apprehends the non-sensible
from the sense-data”, but qualified that it provided only a relative, and not a true understanding
(Alon and Abed 2007, vol. 1, 120–2).20
The imagination, then, is in charge of a level of abstraction, which has to do more with
sense than conceptualization (we leave aside the role of the imagination in creating
counterfactual images, because it is less relevant to our discussion). But beyond this general
characterization, its definition in the Arabic tradition is not very precise, and fluctuates between
authors.
Ibn al-Haytham’s first commentary, SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt
SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt kitÁb UqlÐdis is Ibn al-Haytham’s first commentary on Euclid’s
Elements. He uses the term muÒÁdarÁt to refer specifically to the postulates, but also more
generally to definitions and common notions as well. This commentary does not discuss Euclid’s
propositions and problems, focusing instead only on the premises of Euclid’s books.
9


This approach is in line with Ibn al-Haytham’s On Analysis and Synthesis (FÐ al-taÎlÐl wa
al-tarkÐb), where he describes mathematics as a deductive science that advances from known
statements to new, unknown statements (istikhrÁj al-majhÙlÁt). The validity of mathematics
thereby relies on the validity of its premises (Rashed 2002, 231), and the validation of these
premises is the main purpose of SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt.
Mathematics, according to Ibn al-Haytham (2005, 83), is the research of mathematical
magnitudes (al-maqÁdÐr al-taÝlÐmiyya), which are the point, line and surface. These magnitudes
are abstracted from sensible bodies (ÞajsÁm maÎsÙsa) by the imagination (takhayyul). Geometry
is thus concerned with two ontological levels: the study of imagined geometrical magnitudes and
their properties or conceptualizations (maÝÁnÐ), where the latter, conceptual level, depends on the
imagined abstraction: “it is possible to imagine the dimensions of the body free of matter, for
there is no way to investigate any concept (maÝnÁ) and its properties (khawÁÒÒ) except after that
concept has been mentally imaginedmutakhayyal ( maÝqÙl)” (Sude 1974, 22; Ibn al-Haytham
2005, 84).
The transition from the level of the imagined form, abstracted from matter, to the
conceptual level, dealing with quiddity (mÁhiyya) and properties (khawÁÒÒ), depends on the
power of distinction (tamyÐz). This power thus achieves both classical aspects of a logical
definition (Îadd): capturing the quiddity of an object and setting it apart from other objects (e.g.
Al-FÁrÁbÐ 1986, 100–1).
The two levels (imagination and conceptualization) are manifest in the discussion of the
three geometrical dimensions: “these three dimensions of the mathematical body do not differ
from one another in quiddity (fÐ mÁÞiyyatihi), but their positions differ with respect to the
imaginer” (Sude 1974, 22; Ibn al-Haytham 2005, 84–5).21 At the conceptual level, the three
10


dimensions are essentially equivalent and interchangeable, but in the imagination, they are
distinct, as they depend on the position of the observer with respect to the imagined form (Ibn
al-Haytham 2005, 85, 88–9). Geometric relations belong to an imagined place, which Ibn al-
Haytham articulated in his On Place,22 whereas the quiddity of these forms are extracted by the
power of distinction. The fixed and unchanging conceptions of geometric forms are called
“things known” (maÝlÙmÁt), and the methodology of their treatment was the subject of a separate
treatise bearing that title (FÐ al-maÝlÙmÁt) (Rashed 2002, 249).23
The geometric forms are derived by separating one element from another in the
imagination (the surface is the end of the body, the line the end of the surface and the point the
end of the line). But when one magnitude is distinguished from another, it becomes
independently intellectual and distinguished (maÝqÙla Ýinda al-tamyÐz) (Ibn al-Haytham 2005,
89–95). Again we see here the transition from imagination to conceptualization: Ibn al-Haytham
constructs the geometrical magnitudes in the imagination, and then analyzes them conceptually
by means of the power of distinction.24
It is interesting to compare Ibn al-Haytham’s epistemology with that of al-FÁrÁbÐ, as
expressed in his comments on Euclid’s basic definitions (following Gad Freudenthal’s (1988)
elaborate interpretation).25 According to this interpretation, Aristotelian abstraction of bodies
from matter does not suffice to construct the geometric elementary entities (surface, line, point),
as these entities are always conjoined in experience (this may echo Porphyry’s approach noted
above). In al-FÁrÁbÐ’s system, it is the active intellect26 which manages to set these elements
apart and establish the common notions. However, the active intellect requires the input of the
senses to act: “The position of al-FÁrÁbÐ implies that … the formation of geometric ideas is made
11


neither on the sole basis of sensible givens to the exclusion of the intellect, nor by the intellect
without bringing in sensible givens” (Davidson 1992, 167).
So al-FÁrÁbÐ indeed provides a synthesis similar to that of Ibn al-Haytham (2005, 92–5)
in the same context. But al-FÁrÁbÐ is more concerned with an analysis of the intellect, and much
less with the division of labor between imagination and intellect which is somewhat neglected.
Ibn al-Haytham’s distinction plays, to a certain extent, the role of al-FÁrÁbÐ’s active intellect, but
does not have the theological and universalizing aspect of the latter. Where al-FÁrÁbÐ sought to
bridge the gap between sense data with divine order, Ibn al-Haytham only sought to construct a
working model of the mind.
Moreover, whereas al-FÁrÁbÐ restricts his analysis to definitions of geometrical entities
(points, lines, surfaces…), without engaging the postulates or common notions (he does claim
elsewhere that they are formed by the active intellect) (Walzer 1985, 202), Ibn al-Haytham’s
(2005, 119) analysis probes deep into the latter.
It is important to note that Ibn al-Haytham (2005, 139) sets out to prove the postulates, in
order to establish the claim that we should accept them without challenge (tusallam lanÁ min
ghayr mushÁÎana). This is not an entirely novel endeavor, as it is hinted already in Aristotle, who
describes the postulates as “something assumed without proof though it is ‘matter of
demonstration’” (Heath 1968, vol. 1, 124). Indeed, Proclus and others also attempted to endow
some postulates (or some reformulations of the postulates) with proofs. According to Ibn al-
Haytham (2005, 139–40), Euclid’s choice not to prove the postulates was pedagogical – such
proofs would confuse the novice.
Ibn al-Haytham’s (2005, 141, 186) proofs of the postulates are imaginary constructions
that assume the common notions (similar constructions are offered for definitions as well). The
12


proofs or constructions are based on manipulations of motion, intersections and rotations (the
best known is the proof of the parallel postulate, but we will not go into detail here, as this is
aptly covered in Sude’s notes to her translation of SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt and in Rosenfeld (1988). The
objects of these proofs are concepts derived or abstracted from sensory observation, as discussed
above, such as straightness (Ibn al-Haytham 2005, 147–52).
On the other hand, Ibn al-Haytham clearly distinguishes the status of the postulates from
that of the common notions. The common notions, according to SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt are self-evident
and require no proof. They “are immediately understood and, therefore, in which no doubt arises.
… [They] are primary notions [axioms] and prior” (Sude 1974, 76; see also Ibn al-Haytham
2005, 140). The term used for axioms or common notions here and elsewhere in the Islamic
tradition is ÝulÙm Þuwal, namely “first knowns” (e.g. Mahdi 1962, 13; al-BaghdÁdÐ 1357 hijra,
vol.1, 46, 79). As such, they cannot be the product of a syllogism – a view that Ibn al-Haytham
will revise in Íall shukÙk and the Optics. This stance leads Ibn al-Haytham to regard the last
common notion (absent from today’s canonical versions of the Elements), which states that two
straight lines do not enclose an area, as a postulate that requires proof, rather than as a common
notion.
So far, SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt fits well with standard approaches of the classical and Arabic
tradition. But as we are about to see, Ibn al-Haytham changed his position concerning the
common notions in his second commentary, and this will be the focus of the next section.
Developments in Ibn al-Haytham’s philosophy of mind in Íall shukÙk and the Optics
Ibn al-Haytham’s Íall shukÙk concerns two kinds of doubts: those raised by previous
scholars, which Ibn al-Haytham tends to resolve, and some new doubts, which reconsider some
of Euclid’s stances (such as the status of the common notions).27 However, unlike in his Doubts
13


on Ptolemy (Al-ShukÙk ÝalÁ BaÔlamiyÙs), the general purpose is to justify Euclidean claims,
rather than suggest substantial revisions. In this section, we will show that Íall shukÙk was
composed not only to complete what was missing in Ibn al-Haytham’s SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt (such as
dealing with the theorems and problems), but also to reconsider the treatment of certain issues
from the first commentary, and adapt them to the experimental system presented in his Optics.
This would explain the similar treatment of common notions in the Íall shukÙk and the Optics,
where the primary (unprovable) status and innateness of the common notions is rejected.
Íall shukÙk first glosses over the definitions and postulates, which were already covered
in SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt, reiterates some arguments and fills a few gaps. Ibn al-Haytham’s (1985, 27–
37) focus in the opening of the second commentary is thus on the common notions (listed
above), which he refers to alternatively as “first knowledge” (ÝulÙm Þuwal) or “accepted
knowledge” (ÝulÙm mutaÝÁrafa).
Ibn al-Haytham (1985, 28) explains that while these common notions were well
established (maqrÙr) in Euclid’s time, they should be questioned and elucidated in his own time
(yumkin Þan tuÝÁnad wa tuÝtaraÃ). He argues, in fact, that “these statements became accepted due
to their frequent use by people (kathrat istiÝmÁl al-nÁs lahÁ), not due to their being first
knowledge acknowledged [as such] in the innate intellect (fiÔrat al-Ýaql)” (1985, 28). He then
likens the common notions to the knowledge that ‘two by two is four’: “Two by two is four
became accepted (ÒÁra mutaÝÁraf) among the people due to its repetition and due to the simplicity
of ‘two by two’, but not because it is in the innate in the intellect (fiÔrat al-Ýaql)” (1985, 29).
Indeed, the multiplication of ‘two by two’ is no different from any other multiplication,
except in its simplicity and frequent repetition; therefore, if it were in fiÔrat al-Ýaql, then all
multiplications would be in fiÔrat al-Ýaql too. To put it in Ibn al-Haytham words: “The proof why
14


‘two by two is four’ is not innate in the intellect is that ‘two by two’ is a multiplication of a
number with [another] number, and if it were innate in the intellect then the multiplication of any
number with any [other] number would be innate in the intellect, and if the multiplication of any
number with any [other] number were innate in the intellect, then everybody would know the
product [lit. area (musaÔÔaÎ)] of every two numbers one of which is multiplied by the other”
(1985, 29).
But common people (ÝawÁmm al-nÁs) do not know complicated multiplications, so ‘two
by two is four’ cannot be in fiÔrat al-Ýaql either. Similarly, Ibn al-Haytham claims, the common
people would not acknowledge (perhaps even fail to understand) the common notions, if they
hadn’t received appropriate instruction (1985, 29).
Once Ibn al-Haytham is satisfied that the common notions are not innately self-evident,
and require justifications, he takes it upon himself to provide these justifications. First, to prevent
irrelevant concerns, he qualifies that the term “thing” (shayÞ) in the common notions refers only
to magnitudes, rather than anything whatsoever (ÞinnamÁ yurÐd bi al-ÞashyÁÞ al-maqÁdÐr) (1985,
30).28
Then he proceeds to the first common notion. He states that this notion and other
common notions referring to equality depend, in turn, on Euclid’s fourth common notion, stating
that “things which do not exceed (yafÃul) each other when they are superposed (inÔabaqa Ýalayhi)
are equal” (1985, 31), and its inverse: “figures which are equal [in area] and similar [that is, of
the same shape], if each part of the one is superposed on the corresponding similar part of the
other, they will not exceed each other” (1985, 31).
To ground the latter two statements without granting them the status of first knowledge,
Ibn al-Haytham argues that they are “taken from the senses (maÞkhÙÆa min al-Îiss), namely, any
15


two bodies, one of which is superposed on the other, with its length not exceeding the other’s –
the intellect (Ýaql) judges their lengths equal” (1985, 31).
This holds for width, area and curves as well. Due to frequent and prolonged use, this
sensual truth goes from the “sense to the imagination (takhayyul)” (1985, 32), and is “settled in
the soul (ÒÁra mustaqirran fÐ al-nafs)” (1985, 31). To sum up, “the origin of equality is in the
totality of equalities that occur in the faculty of distinction (tamyÐz)” (1985, 32). We see here
again the two levels of imagination and distinction at play, as in SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt. But here they
establish a common notion, not just geometrical forms and concepts.
Once this common notion is justified, new statements can be derived, such as the first
common notion (two things that equal a third equal each other): “They [i.e. the people] imagined
the two magnitudes equal to [a given] magnitude, such that one of the magnitudes is
superimposed on the [given] magnitude without exceeding each other because they are equal...
Then they imagined the second magnitude also superposed on the [given] magnitude, necessarily
not exceeding each other. [As a result,] one imagines that the second magnitude is superposed on
the first magnitude without exceeding each other, and the power of distinction (tamyÐz) judged
the second magnitude to be equal to the first” (1985, 33).
Note the formal similarity between this argument and the argument of Apollonius
presented in the third section of this paper. However, while Apollonius’ argument (at least as
presented by Proclus) attempts to provide a logical deduction, Ibn al-Haytham’s argument is a
reconstruction of the epistemological derivation of the common notion, starting from experiential
observations and processing them by the faculties of the human mind.
It is interesting to note that the derivation is then extended to magnitudes that are equal in
area without being similar or congruent (like a square and a triangle equal in area). In such cases:
16


“equality is in their quantity, and the difference is in their quality... When the distinguisher of
true distinction [compares]..., he understands that the lack of excess in the superposition [of
figures of equal area] is not due to the superposition, but to the equality [of areas]” (1985, 34).
The power of distinction here allows the replacement of the sensible superposition by the more
abstract intellectual equality. Once this truth was established among people with sound
distinction and repeated frequently, it became an established and undoubted truth, so much so
that Euclid did not bother justifying it.
The other common notions are based on this reduction of equality to superposition, with
the exception of the last one – “the whole is greater than its part” – which receives a slightly
different treatment. Ibn al-Haytham explains: “The whole is the agreed name of any joint
collection of various things and parts... Many bodies have distinguished parts [organs], such as
[the bodies of] man and other animals... The sense apprehends each of the animal’s organs, its
distinction (tamayyuzahu) and the collection of its organs (jumlat ÞaÝÃÁÞihi). The power of
distinction apprehends that the collection is greater than the one [part]... It is settled in the mind
that the whole is greater than the part” (1985, 36). Again, the process of establishing the common
notion starts with a sensual observation, and requires the power of distinction to articulate
equality or inequality, turning the observation into a statement that can be generalized.
To elucidate this argument, we should turn to Ibn al-Haytham’s famous Optics, where in
the third chapter of book 2 he also refers to the issue of common notions (Sabra 1989, vol. 1,
130–3). In this work Ibn al-Haytham adopted a similar position to the one we find in his Íall
shukÙk, which shows that both of these works are related, and that both must have been written
after SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt. The similar analysis in both texts suggests that the new approaches
17


presented in the second commentary may have been motivated by the theorizing elaborated in
the Optics.
The common notion discussed above (“the whole is greater than the part”) is analyzed in
detail in the Optics (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 133–4). The context is a general epistemological
discussion of the division of labor between the senses (vision) and various intellectual faculties.
According to this discussion, pure sight can only perceive light and color. The rest is due to the
faculties of distinction (tamyÐz), inference (qiyÁs) and recognition (maÝrifa).
Ibn al-Haytham states that: “‘the whole is greater than the part’ is perceived only by
means of a syllogism (qiyÁs), and there is no way to perceive its truth except through a
syllogism. For the faculty of judgment (tamyÐz, which we translate as distinction) has no way of
perceiving that ‘the whole is greater than the part’ except after it has understood the meaning of
‘whole’ and of ‘part’ and ‘greater’” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 133). As in the Íall shukÙk ‘whole’ is
interpreted as totality and ‘part’ as some. ‘Greater’ is a relation that denotes “that which equals
another thing in respect of a certain part of itself and exceeds the other by the remainder” (Sabra
1989, vol. 1, 133). In the context of excess, ‘whole’ and ‘greater’ coincide, enabling the
inference. “What is native to the mind is only its perception of the identity between the meaning
of ‘whole’ and of ‘greater’ in respect of excess” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 133).29
The inference then goes as follows. The particular premise is “the whole exceeds the
part” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 134), which is derived, as in Íall shukÙk, from the application of
distinction (tamyÐz) to perception. The universal premise is “everything which exceeds
something else is greater than it” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 134), which is derived in a similar manner.
The common notion is then easily inferred:
The whole exceeds the part
18


Everything which exceeds something else is greater than it
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The whole is greater than its part
The tamyÐz is responsible for the identification of “the whole” and “greater” with
“excess” and therefore with each other. Since the major universal premise is so manifest and
present in the memory, it is easily ignored, and the result of the inferential process is mistaken
for first knowledge innate to the mind.30
To understand Ibn al-Haytham’s reasoning we must recall the division of labor between
distinction and imagination.31 The Optics provides the necessary articulation. As explained
above, the sense (al-Îiss) captures only patches of light and color: “The form of the light and
color that exist in the surface of a visible object occurs in the surface of the crystalline humour
where it has the same order which it has in the object’s surface” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 139). Sight,
however, “does not possess the capacity to judge” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 128). Any judgment
concerning the properties of visible objects, such as shape, distance, similarity, etc. – requires the
faculty of distinction.32
As explained in the case of “the whole is greater than the part”, the faculty of distinction
cooperates with the inferential power. However, the syllogism portrayed above is only a
reconstruction of this inference, and not a reflection of the actual thought process: “The faculty
of judgment (tamyÐz) does not syllogize by ordering and composing and repeating the premises
as in the verbal ordering of a syllogism... [T]hat faculty perceives the conclusion without the
need for words or for repeating and ordering the premises, or the need for repeating and ordering
the words” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 131–2). The premises of such inferences are often an implicit
19


background (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 132), “settled in the imagination” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 133) or “a
universal form established in the soul” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 138).
This capacity to extract properties and inferences by the faculty of distinction is “in the
nature of man” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 136). Ibn al-Haytham’s proof for this assertion is that it
occurs even in children, who lack the capacity to reconstruct and verbalize their arguments, and
do not even know what an inference is (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 136–137). So the capacity to
distinguish is innate, but the general statements that follow this capacity are acquired.
When distinction extracts the properties of an object, these properties are registered in the
imagination. The form established in the imagination or the soul is enhanced by repetition (Sabra
1989, vol. 1, 212–3). If an object is encountered again, the faculty of distinction compares the
registered form with the newly encountered form, and establishes recognition (Sabra 1989, vol.
1, 129). This process does not require a full and careful inspection, as the faculty of distinction
often effects recognition by comparing only a few prominent signs (this is particularly manifest
when recognizing words without reading them letter by letter) (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 129–30).
When something cannot be recognized, such as a color that has not been encountered yet, sight
“will assimilate it to the nearest color it knows” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 142). Only a careful
observation will register it as a new entity.
This theory refers not only to individuals. Ibn al-Haytham explains: “When sight
perceives an individual, then repeatedly and continually perceives other individuals of the same
species, the form of that species will be confirmed in the soul, and a universal form of that
species will thus take shape in the imagination” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 211). (without sufficiently
frequent repetition, an individual or universal form may be forgotten) (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 212;
see also Smith 2001, vol. 1, lxx).
20


The “appearance, shape, colour and all properties which constitute the appearance of
every individual of a certain species is a universal form of that species” (Sabra 1989, vol. 1,
213). The faculty of distinction naturally compares new forms to registered individual and
universal forms to identify objects and their species (Sabra 1989, vol. 1, 214).
The imagination, where universal forms are registered, can be further characterized by
looking at the first pages of the Íall shukÙk. First, the imagination is the realm of abstraction.
Indeed, “the mathematical magnitudes, which are the body, the surface and the line, exist in the
imagination. They exist by means of extraction from the sensible bodies” (Ibn al-Haytham 1985,
7). This holds for points, angles and circles as well. Moreover, the “existence of all mathematical
concepts is only in the imagination” (1985, 19).
In fact, there are two kinds of entities: those that exist in the sense, and those that exist in
the imagination. The difference is that “that which truly exists, exists in the imagination and the
faculty of distinction (tamyÐz). But that which exists in the senses does not exist truly (ÝalÁ al-
taÎqÐq) for two reasons” (1985, 20).33
The first reason is that the sense is prone to error. The second reason is that “the sensible
things are generated and corrupted (kÁÞina fÁsida). They are ever in transformation and are not
fixed to a single description, not even for a single moment, and have no fixed truth. If they have
no fixed truth, they don’t exist truly. That which exists in the imagination exists absolutely truly,
because the form that occurs in the imagination is imagined according to its truth. It does not
transform nor change, unless the person imagining it is changed” (1985, 21).
The same approach is present already in the SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt (in the definition of points,
lines and surfaces and the construction of circles and parallel lines by moving lines in the
imagination).34 It is also mentioned in On Analysis and Synthesis, where these imagined
21


geometrical entities are recalled (Rashed 2002, 250), and in On Place, where the imaginary lines
that extend between points on the surface of an object make up its place, which can be filled by
the sensible material of an object (Rashed 2002, 674–82).35 In fact, Ibn al-Haytham’s (1985)
discussion of the first proposition of Book I, imaginary lines can even exceed the size of the
diameter of the world.
But the imagination has an important limitation: it is finite. According to Ibn al-
Haytham, we can only imagine finite line segments, and not infinite lines. Indeed, “whatever has
no end has no totality, and whatever has no totality, its totality can’t be imagined. If the
imagination does not comprehend the totality of the thing and yet imagines it, the imagined is its
part. ... So everything imagined has an end, and every line is imagined and therefore has an end”
(1985, 10). The imagination can abstract from the senses, but cannot exceed their finite
limitations.
The purpose of this section was to note the similarities between, on the one hand, the
extraction of mathematical common notions from experiential observations and acts of
distinction in the Íall shukÙk, and, on the other, the process of constructing mental entities and
judgments in the Optics. Both processes depend on the same epistemological infrastructure, and
were probably formulated in temporal proximity to each other. The strengthening of the role of
experiential observation, which even the common notions cannot escape, probably reflects Ibn
al-Haytham’s commitment to an experimental methodology in the Optics. 36
Distinction and imagination in context
As already noted, Ibn al-Haytham’s philosophy of mind is in line with the general
scheme of Arabic philosophy, combining an Aristotelian framework with some Neo-Platonist
tendencies. However, while many Arabic philosophers were focusing on the reconciliation of
22


worldly experience with divine knowledge and order, Ibn al-Haytham is motivated by other
concerns, namely establishing his method of scientific investigation.
Ibn al-Haytham’s process of shaping universals is obviously similar to the one presented
by Aristotle. But it is important to note a crucial difference. Aristotle’s universal forms extract
the essential properties of a species, rather than just any similarities between individuals of a
given species. Ibn al-Haytham’s approach thus leaves more flexibility to the articulation of
species and their characterization, and renders the entire process more exploratory. The texts
under study do not suggest that a higher faculty is engaged in rationally extracting the truly
essential features of species, but they do not preclude it either.
A Neo-Platonist overtone can be gleaned from Ibn al-Haytham’s claim that existence in
the imagination is truer than existence in sense perception.37 However, this tone is mitigated by
several caveats. First, the imagined form, as explained above, can change as “the person
imagining it is changed”– it is not a purely objective given, although it is not clear how much
freedom of interpretation this leaves (Ibn al-Haytham 1985, 21). Second, the geometric forms are
not simply “remembered”, or induced by an active intellect, or derived purely rationally – they
are extracted from experience and processed by the faculties of imagination and distinction. Even
the most elementary properties of geometric forms are not simply a matter of pure or active
intellect, as the common notions themselves depend on experience.
So the Neo-Platonic elements of Ibn al-Haytham system do not resolve the problem of
linking worldly experience to universal truth and order. Indeed, there is no indication that this
was ever his purpose. We suggest that Ibn al-Haytham’s purpose was to construct a
philosophical theory that encompasses experimental exploration. Indeed, his Optics dedicates an
entire chapter (maqÁla) to visual illusions – things that seem different than they are. But to
23


correct these errors, Ibn al-Haytham does not rely on a divine light or pure reason – he relies
simply on other, more careful observations (say, getting closer to the object, or viewing it from a
different angle). Ibn al-Haytham’s mathematical reconstructions that correct errors due to
refraction and reflection are also grounded in experience, since even the mathematical common
notions are so grounded.
Ibn al-Haytham does not deny innate capacities. Indeed, he explicitly assumes that the
imagination is innately capable of extracting stable representation from the continually changing
objects of experiential reality (such as straight lines), and provides a realm where these
representations can be manipulated and judged by the power of distinction. The power of
distinction, in turn, is innately capable of judging equality or inequality of magnitudes (either
sensible or in the imagination) and concepts (such as greater and whole in the context of excess).
But Ibn al-Haytham denies that any general statements are innate – including the most
obvious ones, such as the common notions. The innate capacities of the imagination and
distinction help us derive concepts from observations and general statements that are based on
comparing these concepts. This process must be scrutinized and explained. Even for the most
elementary common truths, such as the “whole is greater than the part” or “congruent figures are
equal”, one requires a process that starts with observations, goes through imaginative abstraction
and an act of distinction, and only subsequently and by habit, which covers over a syllogistic-like
process, yields an established truth.
This elaborate account establishes a methodological continuity from the exploratory
forefronts of mathematics and experimentation to their everyday experiential foundations. It is
not about reconciling Aristotle with Plato or Islam, as was the case for other Arabic thinkers. It is
24


about pursuing his scientific methodology “all the way down” to the very foundations of rational
thought.
Conclusion
Our comparison between the three works of Ibn al-Haytham – his two commentaries on
Euclid’s Elements and his Optics – shows a radical change with respect to the epistemological
status of common notions. In his first commentary, SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt, Ibn al-Haytham tends to
view the common notions as knowledge primary and unprovable. Yet, in his second
interpretation, Íall shukÙk, we notice that this position has changed, and that Ibn al-Haytham
derived common notions from a combination of experiential evidence, imaginative abstraction,
the power of distinction and inference. Common notions are therefore not qualitatively different
from other forms of knowledge, which are based on intellectually processed observations of the
physical world.
The imagination is the power responsible for abstracting the geometric shapes from the
material objects, and the power of distinction is the one that judges their relations. According to
this approach, even common notions are abstractions and generalizations of the physical
relations between sensible objects. Yet, the frequent use of common notions by people, together
with their relative simplicity, granted them the false status of innate knowledge.
This position is explained in detail in Íall shukÙk as well as in the Optics. Since these
two works share the same epistemological picture, it seems plausible that their intellectual
development occurred in relation to each other. In our opinion, the similarity between the two
interpretations (manifest in the context of the common notions), which relate to the different
sciences of mathematics and optics, has to do with Ibn al-Haytham’s engagement with his
experimental study of light, as unfolded in his Optics. According to this method, the origin of all
25


knowledge, including common notions, has to do with experience, and not with the intellect
alone. His conviction that light radiated from objects to the eye (contrary to the then common
view asserting the opposite) may have led him to question even the most established truths. Or
perhaps it was a more general experimental methodological commitment which motivated his
experiential grounding of common notions. Ibn al-Haytham’s later position is that all scientific
knowledge is experientially grounded and susceptible to experimental scrutiny, and that it is this
scrutiny that validates it, rather than metaphysical constructs such as the active intellect or divine
light. Scientific knowledge then remains as fallible as our observations and as our ensuing
abstractions and judgments. Ibn al-Haytham is, therefore, one of the forefathers of the
experimental method not only because of his commitment to experimentation, but more deeply
because he established a philosophical system that grounds all our knowledge in our fallible
observations and our fallible innate intellectual capacities, thereby rejecting the innateness or
primality of any general proposition.
References
Adamson, Peter, and Peter E. Pormann. 2012. The Philosophical Works of Al-KindÐ. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Al-BaghdÁdÐ, AbÙ al-BarakÁt. 1357 hijra. Al-MuÝtabar fÐ al-Îikma. Hyderabad: DÁÞirat al-MaÝÁrif al-
ÝUthmÁniyya.
Al-FÁrÁbÐ. 1985. Al-TanbÐh ÝalÁ sabÐl al-saÝÁda. Edited by JaÝfar ÞÁl YÁsÐn. Beirut: DÁr al-ManÁhil.
———. 1986. KitÁb al-ÎurÙf. Edited by MuÎsin MahdÐ. Beirut: DÁr al-Mashriq.
Al-GhazÁlÐ. 1996. Al-Munqidh min al-ÃalÁl. Edited by JamÐl ÑalÐbÁ and KÁmil ÝAyyÁd. Beirut: DÁr al-
ÞAndalus.
Al-KafawÐ. 1993. Al-KulliyyÁt. Edited by ÝAdnÁn DarwÐsh and MuÎammad al-MaÒrÐ. 2nd ed. Beirut:
26


MuÞassasat al-RisÁla.
Alon, Ilai, and Shukri Abed. 2007. Al-FÁrÁbÐ’s Philosophical Lexicon. Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust.
Al-QifÔÐ. 2005. ÞIkhbÁr al-ÝulamÁÞ bi ÞakhbÁr al-ÎukamÁÞ. Edited by IbrÁhÐm Shams al-DÐn. Beirut: DÁr al-
Kutub al-ÝIlmiyya.
Al-ShahrastÁnÐ. n.d. NihÁyat al-ÞiqdÁm fÐ Ýilm al-kalÁm. Edited by Alfred Guillaume. Cairo: Maktabat al-
ThaqÁfa al-DÐniyya.
Besthorn, Rasmus O., and Johan L. Heiberg. 1893. Codex Leidensis 399, I. Euclidis Elementa Ex
Interpretatione Al-Hadschdschadschii Cum Commentariis Al-Narizii. Arabice et Latine Editerunt
Notisque Instruxerunt. Copenhagen: Libraria Gyldendaliana.
El-Bizri, Nader. 2005. “A Philosophical Perspective on Alhazen’s Optics.” Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy 15 (1): 189–218.
———. 2007. “In Defence of the Sovereignty of Philosophy: Al-BaghdÁdÐ’s Critique of Ibn Al-
Haytham’s Geometrization of Place.” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 17 (1): 57–80.
Black, Deborah L. 1993. “Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna: The Logical and Epistemological
Dimensions.” Dialogue 23 (1): 219–58.
———. 2000. “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations.” Topoi 19
(1): 59–75.
Brentjes, Sonja. 2001. “Observations on Hermann of Carinthia’s Version of the Elements and Its Relation
to the Arabic Transmission.” Science in Context 14 (1–2): 39–84.
Davidson, Herbert A. 1992. Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on the Intellect. New York/Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Dear, Peter. 1995. Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Elghonimi, Reem. 2015. “The Re-Presentation of Arabic Optics in Seventeenth-Century Commonwealth
England.” M.A. thesis, University of Texas.
Fakhr al-DÐn al-RÁzÐ. 1991. KitÁb al-muÎaÒÒal. Edited by Íusayn AtÁy. Cairo: Maktabat DÁr al-TurÁth.
27


Fennane, Khalid Bouzoubaâ. 2003. “Réflexions sur le Principe de Continuité à Partir du Commentaire
d’Ibn Al-Haytham sur la Proposition I.7 des Eléments d’Euclide.” Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy 13 (1): 101–36.
Freudenthal, Gad. 1988. “La Philosophie de la Géométrie d’al-FÁrÁbÐ: Son Commentaire sur le Début du
Ier Livre et le Début du Ve Livre des Eléments d’Euclide.” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam
11 (1): 104–219.
Gutas, Dimitri. 2012. “The Empiricism of Avicenna.” Oriens 40: 391–436.
Hasse, Dag N. 1999. “Das Lehrstück von den vier Intellekten in der Scholastik - von den arabischen
Quellen bis zu Albertus Magnus.” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 66 (1):
21–78.
———. 2001. “Avicenna on Abstraction.” In Aspects of Avicenna, edited by Robert Wisnovsky, 39–72.
Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers.
Heath, Thomas L. 1968. The Thirteen Books of the Elements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Donald. 1993. Islamic Science and Engineering. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Ibn al-Haytham. 1985. KitÁb fÐ Îall shukÙk kitÁb UqlÐdis fÐÞ al-ÞuÒÙl Wa sharÎ maÝÁnÐhi. Edited by Fuat
Sezgin. Publications of the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science 11. Frankfurt am
Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe
University.
———. 2005. SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt kitÁb UqlÐdis. Edited by AÎmad ÝAzab AÎmad. Cairo: MaÔbaÝat DÁr al-
Kutub wa al-WathÁÞiq al-Qawmiyya.
Ibn al-NadÐm. 1996. Al-Fihrist. Edited by YÙsuf ÓawÐl. Beirut: DÁr al-Kutub al-ÝIlmiyya.
Ibn Íazm. 1983. RasÁʾil ibn Íazm, edited by IÎsÁn ʿAbbÁs. Beirut: Al-Muʾassasa al-ʿArabiyya li al-
DirÁsÁt wa al-Nashir.
Ibn KhaldÙn. 1958. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. New
York: Bollingen Foundation.
Ibn SÐnÁ. 1975. “Al-Nafs.” In Al-ShifÁÞ, edited by IbrÁhÐm MadkÙr. Cairo: Al-HayÞa al-MiÒriyya al-
28


ÝÀmma li al-KitÁb.
Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa. 1995. ÝUyÙn al-ÞanbÁÞ fÐ ÔabaqÁt al-ÞaÔibbÁÞ. Edited by August Müller. Publications of
the Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science 2. Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the
History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University.
Kheirandish, Elaheh. 2009. “Footprints of ‘Experiment’ in Early Arabic Optics.” Early Science and
Medicine 14 (1): 79–104.
Kukkonen, Taneli. 2014. “Ibn SÐnÁ and the Early History of Thought Experiments.” Journal of the
History of Philosophy 52 (3): 433–60.
Lindberg, David C. 1976. Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Mahdi, Muhsin. 1962. Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe.
McGinnis, Jon. 2003. “Methodologies in Medieval Islam.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (3):
307–27.
———. 2008. “Avicenna’s Naturalized Epistemology and Scientific Method.” In The Unity of Science in
the Arabic Tradition, edited by Shahid Rahman, Tony Street, and Hassan Tahiri, 129–52. Logic,
Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 11. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McKirahan, Richard. 2008. Philoponus: On Aristotle’s Posterior Analytic I.1-8. London: Bloomsbury.
Mueller, Ian. 1990. “Aristotle’s Doctrine of Abstraction in the Commentators.” In Aristotle Transformed:
The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, edited by Richard Sorabji, 463–80. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
NaẓÐf, Mustafa. 1942. Al-Íasan ibn al-Haytham: buÎÙthuhu wa kushÙfuhu al-baÒariyya. Cairo: MaÔbaÝat
NÙrÐ.
Omar, Saleh. 1977. Ibn Al-Haytham’s Optics: A Study of the Origins of Experimental Science.
Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica.
———. 1979. “Ibn Al-Haytham’s Theory of Knowledge and Its Significance for Later Science.” Arab
29


Studies Quarterly 1 (1): 67–82.
Proclus. 1970. Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements. Translated by Glenn R. Morrow.
New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Rahman, Fazlur. 1952. Avicenna’s Psychology, An English Translation of Kitab Al-Najat, Book II,
Chapter VI with Historico-Philosophical Notes and Textual Improvements on the Cairo Edition.
London: Oxford University Press.
Rashed, Roshdi. 1993. Les Mathématiques Infinitésimales du IXe au XIe Siècle: Ibn Al-Haytham,
Théorie des Coniques, Constructions Géométriques et Géométrie Pratique. Vol. 2. London: Al-
FurqÁn.
———. 2002. Les Mathématiques Infinitésimales du IXe au XIe Siècle: Ibn Al-Haytham, Méthodes
Géométriques, Transformations Ponctuelles et Philosophie des Mathématiques. Vol. 4. London:
Al-FurqÁn.
Raynaud, Dominique. 2016. A Critical Edition of Ibn Al-Haytham’s On the Shape of the Eclipse: The
First Experimental Study of the Camera Obscura. Berlin: Springer.
Risi, Vincenzo de. 2016. “The Development of Euclidean Axiomatics.” Archive for the History of Exact
Sciences 70: 591–676.
Rosenfeld, Boris A. 1988. A History of Non-Euclidean Geometry. Berlin: Springer.
Rosenfeld, Boris A., and Ekmeleddin Ihsanoºlu. 2003. Mathematicians, Astronomers, and Other Scholars
of Islamic Civilization and Their Works (7th-19th C.). Istanbul: IRCICA.
Sabra, Abdul I. 1971. “The Astronomical Origin of Ibn Al-Haytham’s Concept of Experiment.” In Actes
Du XIIe Congrès International d’Histoire Des Sciences, vol. 3A, 133–6. Paris: Blanchard.
———. 1972. “Ibn al-Haytham”. Dictionary of Scientific Biography. New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons.
———. 1989. The Optics of Ibn Al-Haytham. London: Warburg University Institute.
———. 1998. “One Ibn Al-Haytham or Two? An Exercise in Reading the Bio-Bibliographic Sources.”
Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften 12: 1–40.
30


———. 2002/3. “One Ibn Al-Haytham or Two? Conclusion.” Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-
islamischen Wissenschaften 15:95–108.
Schramm, Matthias. 1963. Ibn Al-Haythams Weg zur Physik. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
Sezgin, Fuat. 1974. Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. Vol. 5. Leiden: Brill.
Shamsi, Fazal Ahmad. 1984. “Al-Farabi’s Treatise on Certain Obscurities in Books I and II of Euclid’s
Elements.” Majallat tÁrÐkh al-ÝulÙm al-Ýarabiyya 8: 31–45 (English), 127–38 (Arabic).
Shihadeh, Ayman. 2015. Doubts on Avicenna - A Study and Edition of Sharaf Al-DÐn Al-MasÝÙdÐ
Commentary on the IshÁrÁt. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Smith, A. Mark. 2001. Alhacen’s Theory of Visual Perception: A Critical Edition, with English
Translation and Commentary, of the First Three Books of Alhacen’s De Aspectibus, the Medieval
Latin Version of Ibn Al-Haytham’s Kitab Al-Manazir. Philadelphia: American Philosophical
Society.
Sude, Barbara H. 1974. Ibn Al-Haytham’s Commentary on the Premises of Euclid’s Elements (SharÎ
muÒÁdarÁt kitÁb UqlÐdis fÐ al-ÞuÒÙl). Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University.
Tannery, Paul. 1884. “Sur l’Authenticité Des Axiomes d’Euclide.” Bulletin Des Sciences Mathématiques
et Astronomiques 2e Ser. 8 (1): 162–75.
Toomer, Gerald J. 1964. “Review: Ibn Al-Haythams Weg zur Physik by Matthias Schramm.” Isis 55 (4):
463–5.
Walzer, Richard. 1985. Al-Farabi on the Perfect State. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wee, Cecilia. 2016. “Ibn Al-Haytham and the Experimental Method.” In The Bright Dark Ages:
Comparative and Connective Perspectives, edited by Arun Bala and Prasenjit Duara, 93–108.
Leiden: Brill.
Wolfson, Harry A. 1935. “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts.” Harvard
Theological Review 28 (2): 69–133.
31


Notes

1
Several authors attribute to Ibn al-Haytham a pioneering role in the formation of the
experimental method. Among them, Sabra insists on a distinction between Aristotelian
empiricism (tajriba) and a methodological experimentation (iÝtibār) that draws on the Ptolemaic
tradition. The latter involved operating “consciously and systematically with a concept of
experiment as a distinct method of proof, and not merely to perform or refer to experiments”
(1971, 136). This approach has predecessors in NaẓÐf (1942, vol. 1, 43–7) and in Schramm
(1963). Later proponents of related views include Omar (1977), Wee (2016), and Raynaud
(2016, 95–7). However, other scholars (Toomer 1964; Dear 1995, 51–3; Smith 2001, vol. 1,
cxv–cxvi) take more reserved positions with respect to Ibn al-Haytham’s experimentalism. For
our context, the distinction is not crucial, but to prevent confusion, when referring to Ibn al-
Haytham’s methodology we will use the term “experimental”, and when referring to looser
forms of scientific observation we will use the term “experiential”. The term “empirical” will be
reserved for the Aristotelian context. In this latter context, note that some scholars (Hasse 2001;
McGinnis 2003; Gutas 2012; Kukkonen 2014) have recently insisted on the empiricist
interpretation of the work of Ibn al-Haytham’s contemporary, Ibn SīnÁ, and on the likelihood of
his influence on early modern European empiricism. In this context see also Kheirandish (2009)
on Ibn al-Haytham’s predecessor Ibn ÝÏsā.

2
According to Rashed (1993, 8–19), the name Ibn al-Haytham refers to two different scholars.
Sabra (1998, 2002/3), on the other hand, rejects this thesis. Since the treatises referred to in this
paper were clearly all written by the same person, we leave this question aside.
3
According to some versions, his failure in the Nile project, or claim that the project was
unfeasible, led to his imprisonment.
32



4
In his biography of Ibn al-Haytham, Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa quotes the latter’s own autobiography
up to 1027. This autobiography was preserved in Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa (1995, vol. 2, 91–7); see
also Sabra (1972, vol. 6, 190).

5
For his different mathematical writings, see Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa (1995, vol. 2, 93–4) and
Sezgin (1974, 358–74). For more details about Ibn al-Haytham’s life and works, see Rashed (1993,
1–28, 512–34), Sabra (1972, vol. 6, 189–90; 1989, vol. 2, xix–xxxiv), and Rosenfeld and Ihsanoºlu
(2003, 131–8).
6
The Elements was one of the first scientific books translated into Arabic. It was first translated,
and subsequently revised, by the famous translator al-ÍajjÁj ibn MaÔar (d. 833). Later it was
translated again by the celebrated translator ÞIsÎÁq ibn Íunayn (d. 910) as part of his translation
activities in Bayt al-Îikma institution (The house of wisdom) in Baghdad. ÞIsÎÁq’s translation was
revised by the great mathematician ThÁbit ibn Qurra, who died at the beginning of the tenth
century (Ibn al-NadÐm 1996, 427; Al-QifÔÐ 2005, 55; Ibn ÞAbÐ ÞUÒaybiÝa 1995, vol. 2, 90–
8; Rashed 2002, 689; Brentjes 2001). The Elements was also subject to many commentaries and
summaries (Rashed 2002, 687–8). For more details about the various commentaries and
summaries written on the Elements in Islamic culture, see Sezgin (1974, 104–15).
7
The first six treatises of the Arabic text were published as a PhD thesis along with an English
translation (Sude 1974). Later, in 2005, the full nine treatises of the Arabic text (treatises 8, 9, 12
and 13 were not covered by Ibn al-Haytham as they included no further definitions) were published
in Cairo (Ibn al-Haytham 2005). Henceforth we will refer to the latter edition, and when the
English is necessary we will refer both to Sude’s translation in her PhD dissertation and the Arabic
edition). For more information about this text: Rashed (2002, 7–8).
33



8
Sezgin and Schramm translated “shukÙk” as doubts. Some researchers interpret it more loosely
as problem or objection (Shihadeh 2015, 45).

9
For more technical details on this manuscript and its copies, see Sezgin (1974, 370).
10
For analyses of the list and internal citations in Ibn al-Haytham’s works, see Sabra (1989, vol.
2, xxiii–xxxii) and Rashed (1993, 512–35).

11
Paul Tannery (1884, 162–75) went so far as to argue that the common notions are interpolations
inserted into Euclid’s text by later authors. Heath (1968, vol. 1, 221–2) rejects Tannery’s
arguments.
12
See de Risi (2016) for many historical variants. Al-KindÐ, for example, uses several versions
of these axioms to prove philosophical claims about infinity (Adamson and Pormann 2012, 58–
72).
13
The postulates are: “1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point. 2. To produce a finite
straight line continuously in a straight line. 3. To describe a circle with any centre and distance. 4.
That all right angles are equal to one another. 5. That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines
make the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if
produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right angles.”
(Heath 1968, vol. 1, 154–5).

14
The elements of this division are: common sense (al-Îiss al-mushtarak, which apprehends the
individual form of an object), formative imagination (al-muÒawwira or al-khayÁl), which
preserves this form after the object disappears), estimation (al-wahm, which assigns the object a
non-sensible intention, e.g. the hostility between the wolf and sheep), memory (al-dhÁkira, which
preserves this association) and compositive imagination (al-mutakhayyila, which can generate new
unreal images from real ones by putting different forms and meanings together and taking them
34



apart) (Black 2000, 59–60). Only later, according to Ibn Sīnā, does the rational soul (al-nafs al-
nÁÔiqa) capture the abstract essence of the object (Rahman 1952, 19; Wolfson 1935).
15
“This can be perceived [even] in common people. But in the case of the elite who possess an
able mind, intellect, and the power of discernment (quwwat al-tamyÐz), the faculty of their capable
souls presents the forms of things to them separately, without their being distracted from most of
what is sensed” (Adamson and Pormann 2012, 125–6).

16
Al-GhazÁlÐ places this capacity above sense perception but below the capacity to tell necessity
and possibility in the intellect (Al-GhazÁlÐ (1996, 145; Sabra 1989, vol. 2, 63).
17
“The excellence of distinction is either when a true belief is produced by someone, or when he
can distinguish whatever he encounters (tamyÐz mÁ yarid Ýalayhi); poorness of distinction is
when he does not believe, concerning what he prefers to consider, that it is true or false” (Al-
FÁrÁbÐ 1985, 51).

18
See also Alon and Abed (2007, vol. 1, 463–4), and compare with Ibn KhaldÙn (d. 1406) who
calls the same power “the distinguishing intellect” (al-Ýaql al-tamyÐzÐ) (1958, vol. 2, 413). An
ambiguous usage of distinction as sometimes intellectual and sometimes moral can be seen
elsewhere as well, such as in the writings of Andalusian theologian Ibn Íazm (d. 1064). Compare,
for example, the identification of rational thought (nuÔq) with distinction (tamyÐz) in his al-
Taqrīb: “The rational thinking (nuÔq) which was mentioned in this science (i.e. logic) is not the
speech but the distinction between things and thinking about the sciences” to their separation in
his Tafsīr: “The intellect is the use of the commandments and the virtues (al-Ýaql huwa istiÝmÁl
al-ÔÁÝÁt wa al-faÃÁÞil), and it is different from [the power of] distinction (tamyÐz), since it is
the use of what the distinction asserts as excellent. Therefore, every rational [man] (ÝÁqil, lit. of
35



intellect) is a distinguisher (mumayyiz), but not every distinguisher is rational” (Ibn Ḥazm, 1983,
vol. 4, 130, 412). See about nuÔq Al-KafawÐ (1993, 887).

19
The AshÝarit theologian al-ShahrastÁnÐ (d. 1153), for example, divides the notion of
rationality (nuÔq) into three cognitive levels: “Rationality (nuÔq) is said about intellectual
distinction (tamyÐz), the thinking of the soul, and imaginative representation (taÒwÐr khayÁlÐ).
These are [kinds of] conception (maÝÁnin) of various perspectives of the human mind. When they
are conceived by pure intellect, they are true distinction between true and false” (Al-ShahrastÁnÐ
n.d., 318–9).
20
This is not far from what Ibn SÐnÁ (d. 1037) would later call the power of estimation (wahm),
which separates mathematical form from sensible matter for the purpose of presenting it to the
intellect. Indeed, a translation of phantasía as wahm is already available in al-KindÐ and al-RÁzÐ
(d. 925) (Black 1993, 219–58, especially section 7; Sabra 1989, vol. 2, 64). Note, however, that
according to Ibn SÐnÁ (1975, 147–8), estimation is superior to imagination, because it captures
particular immaterial meanings in objects (such as when a young sheep can estimate that a wolf is
dangerous).
21
Sude’s translation was slightly modified.
22
“The imagined dimensions that connect the opposing points of the surface that envelops the
body are the space in which the body is placed” (Rashed 2002, 683).
23
The opening of the treatise states that “knowledge (Ýilm) is, therefore, the consideration of a
concept (maÝnÁ) in itself, that is, an unchanging knowledge, as our knowledge that the whole is
greater than the part” (Rashed 2002, 445).

24
This transition is apparent in Ibn al-Haytham (2005, 83–98).
25
See also an early edition of this text in Shamsi (1984, 31–45 (English), 127–38 (Arabic)).
36



26
The active intellect is an entity external to the human mind which communicates the first
principles that condition philosophical knowledge. See Davidson (1992, ch. 3).
27
On the shukÙk genre, see Shihadeh (2015, 45–6).
28
This problem arises from the Arabic translation. The Greek origin does not require a word for
the subject of the sentence.

29
Note that Ibn SÐnÁ applies a similar argument to statements like “four is an even number”
(namely adding an implicit syllogism after the notions of “four” and “even” have been understood),
but claims that no syllogism intervenes on the path from the abstraction of notions such as “part”,
“whole” and “greater” to the actual common notion relating them. See Hasse (1999, 31–6) and
Gutas (2012, 404–18).

30
See about this epistemological process in Ibn al-Haytham that may lead to errors and
misconceptions: Omar (1979, 73–4) and Smith (2001, vol. 1, lxii–lxxviii). In his treatise FÐ al-
taÎlÐl wa al-tarkÐb (On Analysis and Synthesis), Ibn al-Haytham, refers to the importance of the
demonstration (burhÁn) in mathematics (Ýilm al-taÝÁlÐm), on the grounds that mathematics is
based on series of syllogisms with the aim to infer the unknown from well-grounded premises
(Rashed (2002, 231).

31
Related reconstructions of Ibn al-Haytham’s epistemology, with different focus and emphasis,
are available from Sabra (1989, vol. 2, 62–73, 78–81) and Omar (1977, ch. 2).
32
For a discussion of this architecture from a phenomenological point of view, see el-Bizri (2005).
33
See a discussion of this paragraph also in Rashed (2002, 9).
34
See the commentary in Fennane (2003, 119–26).
35
For a discussion of the critical response to this position, see el-Bizri (2007, 57–80).
37



36
A relation between the rejection of axiomatics and Ibn al-Haytham’s experimentalism was
suggested, without argument, in Hill (1993, 71–5).

37
This contrasts with Aristotle’s claim in De Anima iii 3, 428a5–16.
38



Ibnal-Haytham Revision of The Euclidean Foundations of Mathematics

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ibnal-Haytham Revision of The Euclidean Foundations of Mathematics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Research Collection

Ibn al-Haytham’s Revision of the Euclidean Foundations of

Originally published in:

qualification as innate, self-evident or primary. We suggest that Ibn al-Haytham’s engagement

notions in a way that would fit his experimental approach.

observations processed by intellectual faculties.

Ibn al-Haytham’s approach is echoed in his second commentary of Euclid’s Elements,

Haytham’s philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of mind as expressed in the two

context, and analyze the motivation that led to its revision.

contemporaries and predecessors: it is true to a basic form of Aristotelian “empiricism”, but

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

engagement with experimentation.1 Ibn al-Haytham’s cognitive architecture provides a detailed

faculties of imagination (takhayyul) and distinction (tamyÐz), connecting experiential,

Ibn al-Haytham, the Elements, and the two commentaries

died in Cairo after 1040.

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

Meanings), and is preserved as a manuscript with a modern facsimile edition.9

reveals essential differences between the two commentaries.

subsequent Íall shukÙk, we notice a new development in Ibn al-Haytham’s thinking, as he

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

commentary, and draw our conclusions.

The Premises of the Elements in the Greek and Arabic traditions

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

known as axioms (Heath 1968, vol. 1, 155):

2. If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal.

3. If equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal.

5. The whole is greater than the part.

therefore not entirely canonical.

treat this last common notion as a postulate.13

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

our context depends on one of Proclus’ suggested interpretations of Aristotle’s Posterior

Heiberg 1893, 14–26).

1999, 31–6; McGinnis 2008, 140–1; Gutas 2012, 404–18).

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

grants it much more weight.

Theories of cognition in Arabic science

The classical tradition manifests several approaches to Aristotle’s epistemology of

not refer explicitly to mathematics.

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

7-fold) division of the internal senses.14

require a more detailed contextualization.

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

sense and retention (Sabra 1989, vol. 2, 65–6).

(Alon and Abed 2007, vol. 1, 120–2).20

Ibn al-Haytham’s first commentary, SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt

SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt kitÁb UqlÐdis is Ibn al-Haytham’s first commentary on Euclid’s

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

statements to new, unknown statements (istikhrÁj al-majhÙlÁt). The validity of mathematics

premises is the main purpose of SharÎ muÒÁdarÁt.

Mathematics, according to Ibn al-Haytham (2005, 83), is the research of mathematical

Al-FÁrÁbÐ 1986, 100–1).

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

treatise bearing that title (FÐ al-maÝlÙmÁt) (Rashed 2002, 249).23

by means of the power of distinction.24

It is interesting to compare Ibn al-Haytham’s epistemology with that of al-FÁrÁbÐ, as

elaborate interpretation).25 According to this interpretation, Aristotelian abstraction of bodies

This content downloaded from 205.208.116.024 on November 17, 2017 02:32:08 AM

without bringing in sensible givens” (Davidson 1992, 167).

working model of the mind.

Moreover, whereas al-FÁrÁbÐ restricts his analysis to definitions of geometrical entities

(2005, 119) analysis probes deep into the latter.

describes the postulates as “something assumed without proof though it is ‘matter of

proofs would confuse the novice.