CADBURY COMMITTEE

INTRODUCTION:

The Cadbury Report, titled Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, is a report issued by
"The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance" chaired by Adrian Cadbury
that sets out recommendations on the arrangement of company boards and accounting systems to
mitigate corporate governance risks and failures. The report was published in draft version in
May 1992. Its revised and final version was issued in December of the same year. The report's
recommendations have been used to varying degrees to establish other codes such as those of the
OECD, the European Union, the United States, the World Bank etc.

The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance known as "The Cadbury
Committee" was set up in May 1991 for other reasons than the Maxwell case; it gives an
interesting reading of the situation at the time. The Committee was sponsored by the London
Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting Council and the accountancy profession. It published
its final report and recommendations in December 1992. Central to these was a Code of Best
Practice and the requirement for companies to comply with it or to explain to their shareholders
why they had not done so. The recommendations and the Code provided the foundation for the
current system of corporate governance in the UK and have proved very influential in corporate
governance developments throughout the world. While academics and practitioners have
explored and discussed the developments in corporate governance since 1992, little attention has
been paid to the processes of code and policy development.

OBJECTIVES:

The stated objective of the Cadbury Committee was ‘to help raise the standards of corporate
governance and the level of confidence in financial reporting and auditing by setting out clearly
what it sees as the respective responsibilities of those involved and what it believes is expected
of them’.

NEED OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

The Committee investigated the accountability of the board of directors to shareholders and to
the society. It submitted its report and associated ‘Code of Best Practices’ in December 1992
wherein it spelt out the methods of governance needed to achieve a balance between the essential
powers of the board of directors and its proper accountability.

The resulting report and associated ‘Code of Best Practices’ was generally well received. While
the recommendations themselves were not mandatory, the companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange were required to clearly state in their statement of accounts whether or not the code
had been followed. The companies, which did not comply, were required to explain the reasons
for the lapse.

The Cadbury Code of Best Practices had 19 recommendations. The recommendations are in the
nature of guidelines relating to the board of directors, non-executive directors, executive
directors and those on reporting and control.

Relating to the board of directors, the recommendations were as follows:

The board should meet regularly, retain full and effective control over the company and monitor
the executive management.

There should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of a company, which
will ensure balance of power and authority, such that no individual has unfettered powers of
decision making. In companies where the chairman is also the chief executive, it is essential that
there should be a strong and independent director on the board, who is a recognized senior
member.
The board should include non-executive directors of sufficient caliber and number, for their
views to carry significant weight in the board’s decisions.

The board should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to it for decisions to
ensure that the direction and control of the company is firmly in its hands.

There should be an agreed procedure for directors in the furtherance of their duties to take
independent professional advice, if necessary, at the company’s expense.

All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company secretary, who is
responsible to the board for ensuring that board procedures are followed and that applicable rules
and regulations are complied with. Any question of the removal of company secretary should be
a matter for the board as a whole.

Relating to the non-executive directors, the recommendations were:

Non-executive directors should bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy,

performance, resources, including key appointments and standards of conduct.

The majority should be independent of the management and free from any business or other
relationship, which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgment,
apart from their fees and shareholding. Their fees should reflect the time, which they commit to
the work of the company.

Non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms and reappointment should not
be automatic.

Non-executive directors should be selected through a formal process this process and their
appointment should be a matter for the Board as a whole.

For the executive directors, the recommendations in the Cadbury Code of Best Practices were as
given below:

 Directors’ service contracts should not exceed 3 years without shareholders’ approval.
  There should be full and clear disclosure of their total emoluments and those of the
chairman, including pension contributions and stock options. Separate figures should be
given for salary and performance related elements and the basis on which performance is
measured should be explained.
 Executive directors’ pay should be subject to the recommendations of a remuneration
committee made up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors.

On reporting and controls, the Cadbury Code of Best Practices stipulated the
following:

 It is the board’s duty to present a balanced and understandable assessment of the

company’s position.
 The board should ensure that an objective and professional relationship is maintained
with the auditors.
 The board should establish an audit committee of at least three non-executive directors
with written terms of reference, which deal clearly with its authority and duties.
 The directors should explain their responsibility for preparing the accounts next to a
statement by the auditors about their reporting responsibilities.
 The directors should report on the effectiveness of the company’s system of internal
control.
 The directors should report that the business is a going concern, with supporting
assumptions or qualifications, as necessary.

The stress in the Cadbury Report is on the crucial role of the board and the need for it to observe
the Code of Best Practices. Its important recommendations include the setting up of an audit
committee with independent members. The Cadbury model is one of self-regulation. It was
recognized that in the event British companies failed to comply with the voluntary code,
legislation and external regulation would follow.

It would be interesting to note how the corporate world reacted to the Cadbury Report. The
report in fact shocked many by its boldness, particularly by the Code of Best Practices
recommended by it. The most controversial and revolutionary requirement and the one that had
the potential of significantly impacting the internal auditing, was the requirement that the
directors should report on the effectiveness of a company’s system of internal control. It was the
extension of control beyond the financial matters that caused the controversy.