PFR Consolidated Cases Readings Number 4

No. L-16439. July 20, 1961.
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON.COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR

LAZO,respondents.
Doctrines/Principles Involved
NCC 40 – 41
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in
the following article. (29a)
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life
of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 12
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government.
P.D. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), Art. 5
Article 5. Commencement of Civil Personality. - The civil personality of the child shall
commence from the time of his conception, for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the
requirements of Article 41 of the Civil Code.
FC 164, 2nd Para., FC 180
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his
wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)
RPC Arts. 256 – 259
Article 256. Intentional abortion. - Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of the
pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor if, without using violence, he shall act without the consent of
the woman.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman shall
have consented.
Article 257. Unintentional abortion. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium period shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence,
but unintentionally.
Article 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself of by her parents. - The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman
who shall practice abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other person should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
If this crime be committed by the parents of the pregnant woman or either of them, and they
act with the consent of said woman for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, the offenders
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Article 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. - The
penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in its maximum period, respectively, upon
any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall
cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall dispense any
abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000).
Jurisprudence
Criminal Law; Abortion; Consent of woman or husband does not excuse criminal act.—

Abortion, without medical necessity to warrant it, is a criminal act, and neither the consent of
the woman nor that of the husband would excuse it.
Damages; Unborn foetus without personality; Award for death of a person does not cover
unborn foetus.—The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Same; Same; Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. —Since an
action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn
child.
Same; Same; Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.—The damages

which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the
illegal arrest of the normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil Code).
Facts
 Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the
petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot.
 Nita had undergone 3 times abortion. First, in order to conceal it to her parents;
Second, when she was employed at COMELEC and found it inconvenient; and Third,
when her husband was campaigning for his election to the Provincial Board. He
doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
 The Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals ordered the Petitioner to pay the
Respondents an amount of P3,000.00 for damages.
Issue(s)
Whether or not an unborn child can have a juridical personality or capacity.

Held
The Petition is meritorious. The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the
case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights
and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the
parents or heirs of an unborn child.
No. 26795. July 31, 1970.

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and
JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
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JURISPRUDENCE
Support; Right of unborn child to support.—A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is

given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a
right to support from its progenitors even if the said child is only “en ventre de sa mere”; just
as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article
742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such
child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
Persons; Natural persons; Unborn child; Proviso of Article 40 of Civil Code explained. —
Article 40 of the Civil Code prescribed that “the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it” and adds further “provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article (i.e., that the fetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This provision, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective.
Damages; Victim of rape may recover moral damages.—A woman forced to submit to the lust
of a man may recover damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The rule of Article 21 is
supported by Article 2219 of the same Code providing for moral damages in rape cases.
Notes.—Cause of action; Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.—A “cause of action” is an act
or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other, and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and some act
or omission of the defendant in violation of that right (Maao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79
Phil. 666).Article 19 of the new Civil Code, appearing in the preliminary title dealing with
human relations and providing that persons must act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith, and Article 21 of the same Code, making persons willfully
causing loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy, liable to compensate for the damage, are not mere declarations of principle but
designed to assure legal remedies for various moral wrongs the precise nature of which could
not be foreseen (Velayo vs. Shell Co., L-7817, Oct. 31, 1956, 54 O.G. 63).
FACTS
 Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin.
She sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her
complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of complaint.
 Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having
sexual relations with her through force and intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She
then claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.
 The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to
allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed
the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.
ISSUES
Whether or not the case is covered by Article 40 of the New Civil Code which will entitle the
child to claim support through the mother.
HELD
Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of the intercourse, she had
later given birth to a baby girl. The Supreme Court says that since, as provided in Article 40 of
the New Civil Code (the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to
it, provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in following article), petitioner
Quimiguing’s child, since time of conception, and as having fulfilled the requirement of having
been born later, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee. Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order
dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
[No. 39110. November 28, 1933]

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs.CESAR SYQUIA, defendant
and appellant.
JURISPRUDENCE
PARENT AND CHILD; NATURAL CHILD; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY.—The

acknowledgment of paternity required in No. 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code is satisfied by
the production of more than one document of indubitable authenticity, containing, all together,
the admission of the father recognizing a particular child as of his paternity, the admissions of
one writing being supplemented by those of another.
It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is as yet unborn
is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of
an unborn child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the
recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and
resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence
to connect the particular individual intended with the name used.
FACTS
 Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.
 Cesar Syquia got acquainted with Antonia and had an amorous relationship. As a
consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on (June 17, 1931).
 In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. He
even wrote a letter to a reverend father confirming that the child is his and he wanted
his name to be given to the child.
 Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding
her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr.
Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in
Manila.
 After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street
Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of
second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another
woman at this time.
 It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
 Antonia sought damages arising from (1) breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel
the defendant to recognize Ismael as his natural child and pay maintenance for him
ISSUES
Whether the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the
said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
HELD
Cesar Syquia cannot be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural
son because there exists not an indubitable writing of his in which he expressly acknowledges
his paternity of said child, and because the said child has not enjoyed the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child of the said defendant-appellant, justified by his own
conduct or that of his family, as required by article 135 of the Civil Code. The decision
appealed from should, therefore, be reversed and the complaint dismissed.
The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of
contract. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of
the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which
a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco. The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.

ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), respondents.
JURISPRUDENCE
Civil Law; Civil Personality; Death of a Party; Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not
provide at all a definition of death; While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die—one need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die.—Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition
of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die. And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with
the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to
the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs); Bereavement
Leave and Death Benefits; The unborn child can be considered a dependent under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the parties in the instant case.—The unborn
child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines,
a dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition, even an
unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for
sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that
the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality,
as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its
more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; A legitimate child is a product
of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.—The term legitimate merely
addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,
469 SCRA 363 (2005) we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz.: A legitimate
child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element
of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
attaches upon his/her conception.—It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the
aforecited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly
married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said
child legitimate upon her conception.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being for the benefit of the employee, Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof; It cannot be said that the
parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case,
had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.—We emphasize that bereavement leave
and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the
grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be
said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who,
in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than
that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. Being for the benefit of the
employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and
CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
FACTS
 Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity

Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the CBA. The company granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but
denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits.
 The claim was for Hortillano’s unborn child who died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature
delivery while she was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during
the labor.
 Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality.
 Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate death of an
unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are two
elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate
dependent. None which existed in Hortillano’s case. The death of a fetus, at whatever
stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was
contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus,
which did not acquire any juridical personality. Hence, according to petitioner, the
unborn child never died.
 Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the
parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but
CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s decision.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not the dead fetus has the status of legal or juridical personality, considering that
bereavement leave and death benefits was filed because of the latter.
HELD
Petition is denied.
SC held the reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the
legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article
42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
The Civil Personality is not related in this case. Article 37 provides for the following:
“Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.”
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death
that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave
and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child
upon the latter’s death. Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all
a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality
may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die. And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life
is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, 25 that the State must protect equally with
the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to
the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental
Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to
exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general
definition, even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s
wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that
the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child
dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality,
as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its
more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE
M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity
as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff,
respectively, respondents.
Doctrine and Principle Involved:
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
Jurisprudence:
Remedial Law; Motions for reconsideration; In all motions for reconsideration,
movant have the burden to show compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of
the court. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the
burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling
reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been
established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court decision. After a
thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the
Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by
petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Courts decision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Death of Mr. Marcos has not changed the factual
scenario under which the Court decision was rendered. The death of Mr. Marcos,
although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual
scenario under which the Court decision was rendered. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a
catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of
erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the
Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the bases for the decision to bar their return
when she called President Aquino, illegal claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs.
Aquino, who is the legal President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter
„should be brought to all the courts of the world.
Constitutional Law; The President has unstated residual powers which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. Contrary to
petitioner’s view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under
the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions
of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of
the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a
limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
Same; Same; Court cannot subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President
implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the
President implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another
dictatorship. Despite petitioners strained analogy, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6.
Same; Same; Same; No similarity between the residual powers of the President
under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6.·There is no similarity between the
residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all,
Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then,
Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of
legislation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the duty to protect and promote the
interest and welfare of the people. Among the duties of the President under the
Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote
the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and, subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the
absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave
abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.
Ruling:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit."
Facts:
 On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
 The Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines.
 On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners.
petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents
to issue the necessary travel documents to enable the family of the
deceased former President to return in Philippines, and enjoin respondents
from implementing President Aquino’s decision to bar the return of the
remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.
 the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and
academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that the
formal rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label “right to return”,
including the label “return of Marcos” remains, is in reality or substance a
“right” to destabilize the country, a “right” to hide the Marcoses incessant
shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization.
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issue:
 W/N the Death of Mr. Marcos alter the Factual scenario under which the
Court decision was rendered. Even if the corpse can no longer be
considered as a person, consequently extinguished its Juridical Capacity.
Held:
 No. The documented historical facts of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at
this time would only intensify the violence directed against the state and
initiate more chaos.
 The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still relevant
they are perceived as suitable to become serious and direct protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of the government.
 The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 188944 July 9, 2014
SPOUSES RODOLFO BEROT AND LILIA BEROT, Petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE C. SIAPNO, Respondent.
Jurisprudence:
Civil Law; Legal Capacity; Capacity to Sue; Considering that capacity to be sued is
a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have
the capacity to be sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.·
Petitioners were correct when they argued that upon Macaria Berot’s death on 23
June 2003, her legal personality ceased, and she could no longer be impleaded as
respondent in the foreclosure suit. It is also true that her death opened to her heirs
the succession of her estate, which in this case was an intestate succession. The
CA, in fact, sustained petitioners’ position that a deceased person’s estate has no
legal personality to be sued. Citing the Court’s ruling in Ventura v. Militante, 316
SCRA 226 (1999), it correctly ruled that a decedent does not have the capacity to
be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case: A deceased person does not
have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to
substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An action begun by a
decedent’s estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person, since an
estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the
party plaintiff will not, likewise, lie, there being nothing before the court to amend.
Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the
same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be
named a party defendant in a court action.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; As the compulsory
heir of the estate of Macaria, Rodolfo is the real party-in-interest in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.·It should be noted that Rodolfo
Berot is the son of the deceased Macaria and as such, he is a whether the proper
parties have been impleaded. They instead focused on the issue whether there was
need for a formal substitution when the deceased Macaria, and later its estate, was
impleaded. As the compulsory heir of the estate of Macaria, Rodolfo is the real
party-in-interest in accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for foreclosure, as well as the time it was
amended to implead the estate of Macaria, it is Rodolfo · as heir · who is the real
party-in-interest. He stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Compulsory heir of his mother. His substitution is mandated by Section 16, Rule 3
of the Revised Rules of Court. Notably, there is no indication in the records of the
case that he had other siblings who would have been his coheirs. The lower and
appellate courts veered from the real issue whether the proper parties have been
impleaded. They instead focused on the issue whether there was need for a formal
substitution when the deceased Macaria, and later its estate, was impleaded. As
the compulsory heir of the estate of Macaria, Rodolfo is the real party-in-interest in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. At the time of the
filing of the complaint for foreclosure, as well as the time it was amended to implead
the estate of Macaria, it is Rodolfo · as heir · who is the real party-in-interest. He
stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 305
(1995), the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that a formal substitution of the heirs in place
of the deceased is no longer necessary if the heirs continued to appear and
participated in the proceedings of the case. In Vda. de Salazar v. Court of Appeals,
250 SCRA 305 (1995), we ruled that a formal substitution of the heirs in place of the
deceased is no longer necessary if the heirs continued to appear and participated in
the proceedings of the case. In the cited case, we explained the rationale of our
ruling and related it to the due process issue. Civil Law; Obligations; Solidary
Obligations; Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (CCP), the
general rule is that when there is a concurrence of two or more debtors under a
single obligation, the obligation is presumed to be joint; The law further provides
that to consider the obligation as solidary in nature, it must expressly be stated as
such, or the law or the nature of the obligation itself must require solidarity. Under
Article 1207 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the general rule is that when there
is a concurrence of two or more debtors under a single obligation, the obligation is
presumed to be joint: Art. 1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two
or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the
formers has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render,
entire compliance with the prestation’s. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity. The law further provides that to consider the obligation as
solidary in nature, it must expressly be stated as such, or the law or the nature of
the obligation itself must require solidarity. In PH Credit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 370 SCRA 155 (2001), we held that: A solidary obligation is one in which
each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of the creditors is
entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the
debtors. On the other hand, a joint obligation is one in which each debtor is liable
only for a proportionate part of the debt, and the creditor is entitled to demand only
a proportionate part of the credit from each debtor. The well entrenched rule is that
solidary obligations cannot be inferred lightly. They must be positively and clearly
expressed. A liability is solidary „only when the obligation expressly so states, when
the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Under Section 7,

Rule 86 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court provision for claims against an estate,
a mortgagee has the legal option to institute a foreclosure suit and to recover upon
the security, which is the mortgaged property. The CA properly upheld respondents
course of action as an availment of the second remedy provided under Section 7,
Rule 86 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court. Under the said provision for claims
against an estate, a mortgagee has the legal option to institute a foreclosure suit
and to recover upon the security, which is the mortgaged property. During her
lifetime, Macaria was the registered owner of the mortgaged property, subject of the
assailed foreclosure. Considering that she had validly mortgaged the property to
secure a loan obligation, and given our ruling in this case that the obligation is joint,
her intestate estate is liable to a third of the loan contracted during her lifetime.
Thus, the foreclosure of the property may proceed, but would be answerable only to
the extent of the liability of Macaria to respondent.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the CAÊs Decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 87995 sustaining the
RTCÊs Decision in Civil Case No. 2004-0246-D is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the obligation of petitioners and the estate of Macaria Berot is
declared as joint in nature. SO ORDERED.
Facts:
 On May 23, 2002, Macaria Berot (or "Macaria") and spouses Rodolfo A. Berot (or
"appellant") and Lilia P. Berot (or "Lilia") obtained a loan from Felipe C. Siapno (or
"appellee") in the sum of ₱250,000.00, payable within one year together with
interest thereon at the rate of 2% per annum from that date until fully paid.
 As security for the loan, Macaria, appellant and Lilia (or "mortgagors", when
collectively)mortgaged to appellee a portion, consisting of 147 square meters (or
"contested property"), of that parcel of land with an area of 718 square meters,
situated in Banaoang, Calasiao, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration No.
1123 in the names of Macaria and her husband Pedro Berot (or "Pedro"),
deceased. On June 23, 2003, Macaria died.
 Because of the mortgagors’ default, appellee filed an action against them for
foreclosure of mortgage and damages on July 15, 2004 in the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City (Branch 42). The action was anchored on the averment that the
mortgagors failed and refused to pay the abovementioned sum of ₱250,000.00 plus
the stipulated interest of 2% per month despite lapse of one year from May 23,
2002.
 In answer, appellant and Lilia (or "Berot spouses", when collectively [referred to])
alleged that the contested property was the inheritance of the former from his
deceased father, Pedro; that on said property is their family home; that the
mortgage is void as it was constituted over the family home without the consent of
their children, who are the beneficiaries thereof; that their obligation is only joint;
and that the lower court has no jurisdiction over Macaria for the reason that no
summons was served on her as she was already dead.
Issue:
W/N heirs of the Estate, substituting as defendant the Estate of Macaria Berot,
which has no Personality to sue and to be sued.
W/N the heirs would be held liable to the rights and obligations transmitted from
their mother as her successors.
Held:
Yes. Upon the death of Macaria Berot, the Legal personality of had also ceased to
exist, and she could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure suit.
Her death opens the heirs the successions of her estate, which in this case was an
intestate succession. The CA, in fact, sustained petitioners’ position that a
deceased person’s estate has no legal personality to be sued.
Yes. The testimony of petitioner Rodolfo only established that there was that
existing loan to respondent, and that the subject property was mortgaged as
security for the said obligation. His admission of the existence of the loan made him
and his late mother liable to respondent.
When examined the contents of the real estate mortgage found no indication in the
plain wordings of the instrument that the debtors – the late Macaria and herein
petitioners – had expressly intended to make their obligation to respondent solidary
in nature. Absent from the mortgage are the express and indubitable terms
characterizing the obligation as solidary. Respondent was not able to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that petitioners' obligation to him was solidary. Hence,
applicable to this case is the presumption under the law that the nature of the
obligation herein can only be considered as joint. It is incumbent upon the party
alleging otherwise to prove with a preponderance of evidence that petitioners'
obligation under the loan contract is indeed solidary in character.

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA
TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE
D. ADRIANO, Respondents.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the
consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and 305. [Emphases supplied]
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall
devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon
the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses;
Jurisprudence:
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Funerals; It is undeniable that the law simply
confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner. It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right
and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s
common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 (1990), a petition for
habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her
lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his
residence. It appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy,
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the
right to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.
Same; Same; Same; The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other
right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. It is clear that
the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband
and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty
to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been
waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free
and voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and
Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human
compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family
member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no
time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they
could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to
know about Atty. AdrianoÊs death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992
in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial
Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Same; Same; Same; Considering the ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased,
it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to
have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty.
Adriano. ·Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless
prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty.
Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon heavily. It should be noted,
however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila
Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that
Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in
Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear
and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law
that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be said to have been
created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Same; Same; Same; Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased,
the law favors the legitimate family. It cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was
unavailable to bury her husband when she died, he had already renounced her right to do so.
Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral arrangements will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of
her legal right to bury the remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed
to have been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to the
true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to
exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact
that she was joined by the children in this case.
Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of
the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. Even
assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family
plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code
provides: Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall
determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by
the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of
the family. From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the „form of
the funeral rites‰ that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly explained
earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements reside in the persons specified in
Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be
interpreted to include the place of burial among those on which the wishes of the deceased
shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law,
commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes of the
deceased should be established by some form of testamentary disposition. As Article 307
itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred
lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with
Valino. It bears stressing once more that other than Valino claim that Atty. Adriano wished to
be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.
Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is

outside the commerce of man. It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is
outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession
over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right,
arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to
take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the
respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this
right may recover the corpse from third persons.
Ruling:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition should be GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61613, reversing the October 1, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City, must be SET ASIDE. Petition denied.
Facts:
 Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio
Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955.
The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters,
Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
 The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were
eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his
clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their children
(respondents).
 In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the
United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family members
was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for
Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her husband, she immediately
called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the
mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were
not able to attend the interment.
 Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano
before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to
his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be
indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
 In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated
for more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout
the time they were together, he had introduced her to his friends and associates as his
wife. Although they were living together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his
obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took
good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously
ill. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying,
Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last
wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila
Memorial Park.
 Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by
respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
Issue:
W/N the Common law wife is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano
Held:
Yes. As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano.
The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United
States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in
effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty
to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having
been waived or renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end. 9 While there was disaffection
between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the
Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door
to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an
undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino
for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the service and view
the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s
death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines),
the respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to
express their request, but to no avail.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
Doctrine and Principle Involved: Art. 31. If there is doubt, as between two or more
persons who are called to succeed each other. As to which of them died first,
whoever the alleges the death of one prior to the other. Shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to other.
Jurisprudence:
SURVIVORSHIP; EVIDENCE; WHERE FACTS ARE CLEAR PRESUMPTIONS
CANNOT LIE. On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was
raging, the spouses of JN, Sr. and AJ, together with their three daughters, P, C, and
N, and their son JN, Jr. and the latter's wife, AC, sought refuge in the ground floor of
the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis
Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells
were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to
escape. The three daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and
JN. Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They
could not convince AJ, who refused to join them and so JN, Sr., his son JN, Jr., and
the latter's wife, AC and a friend and former neighbor FL, dashed out of the burning
edifice. As they came out JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises
to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed,
trapping many people inside, presumably including AJ: JN, Sr., Mrs., JN, Jr. and FL
managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, and stayed there about three days, until
February 10, 1945, when they were forced to leave the shelter because the shelling
tore it open. They fled toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but
unfortunately met Japanese patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing JN, Sr. and his
daughter-in-law. At the time of the massacre, JN, Sr. was at the age of 70; his wife
was about 67 years old; JN, Jr. about 30; P was two or three years older than her
brother ; while the other sisters C and N were between 23 and 25. With this, three
proceedings were instituted, which were jointly heard, for the summary settlement of
the estates of the deceased, by the petitioner, an acknowledged natural child of AJ
and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and by the respondent son of JN, Sr. by
first marriage. The controversy relative to succession is focused on the question
whether the mother, AJ, died before her son JN, Jr. or vice versa. The trial court
found the mother to have survived her son but the appellate court found otherwise.
Held: The facts are quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between AJ
and JN, Jr., and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in
the light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair and reasonable inference can be
arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr., died before his mother. The presumption that AJ died
before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any
sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory that the mother outlived her son
is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender
the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance
of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It cannot
be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the
ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with
which the defendant fired was charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in
consequence of fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R.
468.) 2.ID.;
EVIDENCE OF SURVIVORSHIP. —The evidence of survivorship need not be direct;
it may be indirect, circumstantial or inferential. Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not
step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence controls. 3.ID.; ID.;
PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED. —Section 68 (ii) of Rule 123 does
not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided
be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be
inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking
of inference, the rule cannot mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but
it may be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bhenko's Estate, 4 N. Y. S.
2d. 427, citing Tortera vs. State of New York, 269 N. Y. 199 N. E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson
River' Bridge Co., 80 N. W. 622.) 4.
EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY; UNDESPUTED EVIDENCE CONTRADICTED EVIDENCE
DISTINGUISHED. —Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence
another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not
impeached or contradicted, But when the evidence is purely documentary, the
authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be
placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where
all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. (1 Moran Comm. on the Rules of Court, 3rd Ed. 855, 857.)
INTERMIDDLING WITH COURT DECISIONS; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. —The
prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to
decisions supported by substantial evidence. But substantial evidence is meant real
evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the
exception to the general rules.
Ruling: We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the
distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision
of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of
"reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs.Angela
Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
Facts:
 "On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging,
the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three
daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the
building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San
Luis Streets of this City.
 During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were
trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the
entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the
premises to seek a safer heaven.
 They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife,
Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out
of the burning edifice.
 As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese
soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of
the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already
on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela
Joaquin.
 Francisco a survivor, attested that Joaquin died first.
Issue: W/N the Art. 43 is applicable as basis of the rights of succession of the
decedents.
Held:
No. Article 43 was not applied. There was no need to apply the
presumption in Article 43 since there was evidence to show who died first.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result
precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward
on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son.
Reserva Troncal – The ascendat who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came.
G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007
CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-MILAN,

ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and GEMMA
CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES CATALAN, respondents.
NCC, Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Jurisprudence
Civil Law; Property; Contracts; Donations; A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person
disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another who accepts it; Requisites of Consent
in Contract.—A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing
or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a
vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the
donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the donation; The burden of proving
incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it.—In order for donation of property to be
valid, what is crucial is the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the donation.
Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given.
However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose
his competence to intelligently dispose his property.—From these scientific studies it can be
deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence
to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia,
petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts
correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued
to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give
consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have
existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the
contrary is shown.—It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s
capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental
competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he
executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that
Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the
existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown
to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until
the contrary is shown.
Facts
 FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service. The
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was
unfit to render military service due to his "schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type,
which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with
worries, withdrawal, and sparce and pointless speech.
 On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo
 June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute Deed of Donation," wherein
Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half
of the real property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Pangasinan. Containing an area of Eight
Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less.
 The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax
Declaration No. 18080 to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her.
 The remaining half of the property remained in Feliciano’s name under Tax Declaration
No. 18081.
 On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings
before the CFI to declare Feliciano incompetent.
 On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of
Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance7of
Feliciano.
 The following day, the trial court appointed People’s Bank and Trust Company as
Feliciano’s guardian. People’s Bank and Trust and is presently known as the Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI)
 On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia
and Jesus Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued
in the name of respondents.11
 On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned
property registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada
Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida
Catalan.
 BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership,13 as well as damages against the
herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was
void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI
averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation
would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving
valid consent.
 August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to
substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666
 Court of Appeals decision affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, and damages.
Issue/s
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Held
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and
denied the petition.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential.
Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites:
(1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
(2) it should be free; and
(3) it should be spontaneous.
The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any
contract, renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does
not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that
at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalanhad lost total control of his
mental facilities.
Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and
this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the
donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she
chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’
sale of property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the
property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
GR No. 11872. December 1, 1917
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs and appellants, vs. JOSE ESPIRITU,
administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant and appellee.
NCC, Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements. (32a)
NCC,Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are
governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is
not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
NCC, Art 1431. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.
Jurisprudence
1.VENDOR AND PURCHASER; MINORS.—The annulment of a deed of sale of a piece of land

was sought on the ground that two of the four parties thereto were minors, 18 and 19 years
old, respectively, on the date when the instrument was executed, but no direct proof of this
alleged circumstance was adduced by means of certified copies of the baptismal certificates
of the two minors, nor any supplemental proof such as might establish that in fact they were
minors on that date. Held: That the statement made by one of the adult parties of said deed,
in reference to certain notes made in a book or copybook of a private nature, which she said
their father kept during his lifetime and until his death, is not sufficient to prove the plaintiffs'
minority on the date of the execution of the deed.
2.ID.; ID.—The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, effected by minors
who have already passed the ages of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age
when they pretend to have already reached their majority, while in fact they have not, is
valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with
the obligation assumed by them or to seek their annulment. (Law 6, title 19, 6th partida.) The
judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint
filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property nor the
rules laid down in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, of April
27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) This doctrine is entirely in accord with the
provisions of section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which determines cases of estoppel.
Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215, No. 11872 December 1, 1917
Facts
 By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the
complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator
of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu.
 The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed
Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the
deceased Luis Espiritu.
 That Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land
of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panduco, which hereditary portion had
since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters, through their father Wenceslao
Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu;
 That, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a
deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the sum of P400, which amount was
divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding
the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at P3,795;
 that one-half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this
share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their
two sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs
could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to
P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the
time of his death.
 Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to
be null and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis
Espiritu, and that the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the
shares of the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased
mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since 1901,
or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum.
 Defendant’s contended - denying each and all of the allegations therein contained, and
in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint, had an area
of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the deceased
Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of her
husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of
P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen
cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo
Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his
children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the
remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the
expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still
insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money
aggregating a total of P600;
 May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their
sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted integrally
in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said sale
under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother Margarita Espiritu,
effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum of
P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of
P400, the property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they
acknowledged having received from the aforementioned purchaser.

Issue/s
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves that they were
of legal age.
Held
YES. The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid since it was executed by
minors, who have passed the ages of puberty and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and
that the minors pretended that they had already reached their majority.
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements.
Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with
the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This is in accordance with the
provisions of the law on estoppels.
*This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppel.
Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered

conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.
This is also in accordance with the provisions of Rule 123, Sec 68, Par. A
Rule 123, sec 68, Par. A...”Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
cannot be permitted to falsify it
G.R No. 27710 January 30, 1928
ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GERMAN MARAMBA and
GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants and appellants.
Civil Code, Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his
acts or from property relations, such as easements.
Civil code, Art. 1327. The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
Civil code, Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud.
Jurisprudence
1.CONTRACTS; PURCHASE AND SALE; MINORITY.—The contract of purchase and sale of real
property executed by a minor is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards said minor.
2.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; REGISTRATION.—A contract of purchase and sale of real property registered
in accordance with the Torrens system, does not bind the property if it is not registered and
is only valid between the parties and as authority for the register of deeds to make the
proper registration. Therefore, the purchaser, by virtue of the deed of sale alone, does not
acquire any right to the property sold and much less if the vendor is a minor.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; MERCADO vs. ESPIRITU.—The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and
Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from
contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be of age, is not applicable when the
vendor, a minor, did not pretend to be of age and his minority was known to the purchaser.
Facts
 The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint
wherein it is alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens
title, of the land here in question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of
the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so,
the fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold
the land in question to the defendants.
 The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit
1, dated July 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said
document, yet he did so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the
defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former with imprisonment. While
the evidence on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's
allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the
said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor, which
is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention to sell
the land in question.
 What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second
husband Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan
from Genoveva Muerong in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and
according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having
learned later that the land within which was included that described in said Exhibit 3,
had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only
heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.
Issue/s
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.
Held
The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of execution. The
Doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs. Espiritu is not applicable to this case, because
the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him as a minor.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness
Paula Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that
of the defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of
the land in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award the
damages claimed by the plaintiff.
[No. L-1720. March 4, 1950]
SIA SUAN and GAW CHIAO, petitioners, vs. RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
NCC, Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements.
NCC,Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
NCC Art 1431. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.
Rule 123, sec 68, Par. A - Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act
upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission,
cannot be permitted to falsify it
Jurisprudence
1.VENDOR AND PURCHASER; MINOR; VALIDITY; CONSIDERATION NOT
NECESSARILY CASH.—Under the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado
vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of
legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the contract is
supported by a valid consideration. Preexisting indebtedness is a valid consideration which
produces its full force and effect, in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate
the sale.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL; KNOWLEDGE OF VENDEE OF MINORITY THEREAFTER.

—The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee
informed the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous
misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract.
Facts
 On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons
Damaso Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land.
Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old.
 On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan) received a letter from Francisco
Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara
was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by Gaw
Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez,
attorney of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said
occasion Ramon Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the
meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores
inherited the same.
 On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the CFI of Laguna
for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels
of land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna.
 Said action was against Sia Suan and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores,
Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter two being, respectively, the brother
and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of Appealed which reversed the
decision of the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding against
Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution.
Issue/s
Whether sale of the land to Maramaba and Muerong is valid.
Held
Yes.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and they
will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted
by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th
Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the
complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property,
nor the juridical rules established in consonance therewith.
To bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to
actually part with cash, as long as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since
appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing
indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full force and effect
in the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that
the deed of sale is null and void on any ground other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's
contract has become fully efficacious as a contract executed by parties with full legal capacity.
GR No. L-12471. April 13, 1959]

ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE,
respondent.
NCC, Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property
relations, such as easements.
NCC,Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act:
age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
Jurisprudence
1.CONTRACTS; INCAPACITY OF PARTIES; MlNORITY; WHEN CAN BE MADE THE BASIS OF AN
ACTION OF DECEIT.—The failure of the minor to disclose his minority when making a contract
does not per se, constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. In
order to hold the minor liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF MINOR UNDER THE CONTRACT.—Although the written contract is
unenforceable because of non-age, however, the minor shall make restitution to the extent
that he may have profited by the thing he received.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ANNULMENT; FOUR YEAR PERIOD WHEN NOT APPLICABLE.—Where minority is
set up only as a defense to an act on, without the minor asking for any positive relief from
the contract, the four-year period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code may not be applied.
Braganza, et al. vs. De Villa, Abrille, 105 Phil. 456, No. L-12471 April 13, 1959
Facts
 Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the
Court of Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F.
de Villa Abrille the sum of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.
 The above petitioners, appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30,
1944 P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing
to pay him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the
present hostilities or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the
Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
 Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.
 In their answer before the Manila CFI, defendants claimed to have received P40,000
only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note.
 Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they
were not yet of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have
appraised him on their incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative
to their age, parted with his money, then he should have contended with the
consequence of his act. But, that was not the case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to
acquire much-needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory note,
without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to Guillermo and Rodolfo. When
minor, like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact, they were not, they
will not, later on, be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled.
Issue/s
Whether the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of loan
they have signed.
Held
No, in order to hold them liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has been held
that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a fraud which
can be made the basis of an action of deceit.
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief
that he is of full age must be actual, not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose
his age is not sufficient.
However, the boys though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay
the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written
contract is unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent
that they may have profited by the money received.

PFR Consolidated Cases Readings Number 4

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PFR Consolidated Cases Readings Number 4

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No. L-16439. July 20, 1961.

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON.COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR

1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 12

P.D. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), Art. 5

FC 164, 2nd Para., FC 180

RPC Arts. 256 – 259

Criminal Law; Abortion; Consent of woman or husband does not excuse criminal act.—

Same; Same; Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.—The damages

Whether or not an unborn child can have a juridical personality or capacity.

No. 26795. July 31, 1970.

Support; Right of unborn child to support.—A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is

[No. 39110. November 28, 1933]

PARENT AND CHILD; NATURAL CHILD; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY.—The

G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.

 Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity

Doctrine and Principle Involved:

Republic of the Philippines

Doctrine and Principle Involved:

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Under Section 7,

Republic of the Philippines

Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is

Republic of the Philippines

 Francisco a survivor, attested that Joaquin died first.

G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-MILAN,

GR No. 11872. December 1, 1917

1.VENDOR AND PURCHASER; MINORS.—The annulment of a deed of sale of a piece of land

*This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on estoppel.

Art 1431 of Civil Code. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered

G.R No. 27710 January 30, 1928

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ESTOPPEL; KNOWLEDGE OF VENDEE OF MINORITY THEREAFTER.

GR No. L-12471. April 13, 1959]

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