A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.

*
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 20, Manila, respondent.

DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
EFFECT AND RETROACTIVITY

EO 209: FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

EO 209, as amended by EO 227; RA 6809; RA 7610

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 227 July 17, 1987

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES"
I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Article 26 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 26. All marriage solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouses shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law."

Sec. 2. Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."

Sec. 3. Article 39 of the Executive Order No. 209 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of
marriages celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall have taken
effect."

Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect upon the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

Republic Act No. 6809             December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the
age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar
instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
Republic Act No. 7610             June 17, 1992
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
ARTICLE I
Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms
Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and discrimination and other conditions,
prejudicial their development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence
of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of
the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the
child against abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.1awphi1@alf
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances
which affect or will affect their survival and normal development and over which they have no control.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning them, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with
the principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. Every
effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves
or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition;
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children" include, but are not
limited to, the following;
(1) Being in a community where there is armed conflict or being affected by armed conflict-related activities;
(2) Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and normal which unduly interfere with their normal development;
(3) Living in or fending for themselves in the streets of urban or rural areas without the care of parents or a guardian or basic
services needed for a good quality of life;
(4) Being a member of a indigenous cultural community and/or living under conditions of extreme poverty or in an area
which is underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to basic services needed for a good quality of life;
(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or
(6) Circumstances analogous to those abovestated which endanger the life, safety or normal development of children.
(d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination" refers to the coordinated program of
services and facilities to protected children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;
(2) Child trafficking;
(3) Obscene publications and indecent shows;
(4) Other acts of abuses; and
(5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children.1awphi1Ÿ
ARTICLEII
Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Section 4. Formulation of the Program. – There shall be a comprehensive program to be formulated, by the Department of
Justice and the Department of Social Welfare and Development in coordination with other government agencies and private
sector concerned, within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, to protect children against child prostitution and other
sexual abuse; child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances which
endanger child survival and normal development.
ARTICLEIII
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the
prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or
which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. – There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5,
paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room
or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any
other hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to
be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving
services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower
by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the
principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised
Penal Code.
ARTICLEIV
Child Trafficking
Section 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children including, but not limited
to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age.
Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. – There is an attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 7 of this
Act:1awphi1@alf
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and without clearance issued by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal guardian;
(c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or couples to bear children for the
purpose of child trafficking; or
(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person simulates
birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or
(e) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day-care
centers, or other child-during institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child trafficking.
A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 7 hereof shall be imposed
upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under this Act.
ARTICLEV
Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows
Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. – Any person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce
a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or
pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age, the penalty shall be imposed in
its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall cause and/or allow such child
to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act, movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
ARTICLEVI
Other Acts of Abuse
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10) years or more
his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage
parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and
a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000): Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or
acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty.
(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his company a
minor as provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not
less than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be an ascendant, stepparent or
guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its maximum period, a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of parental authority over the minor.
(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or private place of accommodation,
whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including residential places, who allows any person to take along with him
to such place or places any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of the license to operate such a place or establishment.
(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;
(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and
263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other
intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815,
as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the
offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by
law when the victim is under twelve (12) years age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ARTICLEVII
Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises
Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct Activities Constituting
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse, Child Trafficking, Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows, and Other
Acts of Abuse. – All establishments and enterprises which promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse,
child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be immediately closed and their
authority or license to operate cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof being prosecuted under this Act
and/or the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A sign with the words "off limits" shall be conspicuously
displayed outside the establishments or enterprises by the Department of Social Welfare and Development for such period
which shall not be less than one (1) year, as the Department may determine. The unauthorized removal of such sign shall be
punishable by prision correccional.
An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking,
obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse if the acts constituting the same occur in the premises of
said establishment under this Act or in violation of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a sauna,
travel agency, or recruitment agency which: promotes the aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists; exhibits
children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex and said services include
any lascivious conduct with the customers; or solicits children or activities constituting the aforementioned acts shall be
deemed to have committed the acts penalized herein.
ARTICLEVIII
Working Children
Section 12. Employment of Children. – Children below fifteen (15) years of age may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and where only members of the
employer's family are employed: Provided, however, That his employment neither endangers his life, safety and health and
morals, nor impairs his normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said minor
child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation in public & entertainment or information through cinema, theater, radio or
television is essential: Provided, The employment contract concluded by the child's parent or guardian, with the express
agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, That
the following requirements in all instances are strictly complied with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of the child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination taking into account the system
and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of competent authorities, a
continuing program for training and skill acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first secure, before engaging such
child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above
requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of
this Section.
Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. – The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
promulgate a course design under its non-formal education program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and
vocational efficiency of working children who have not undergone or finished elementary or secondary education. Such
course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most effective under given circumstances.
Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. – No person shall employ child models
in all commercials or advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts and
violence.
Section 15. Duty of Employer. – Every employer shall comply with the duties provided for in Articles 108 and 109 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
Section 16. Penalties. – Any person who shall violate any provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not
less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than
three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the court; Provided, That, in case of repeated
violations of the provisions of this Article, the offender's license to operate shall be revoked.
ARTICLEIX
Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. – In addition to the rights guaranteed to children under this Act and
other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural communities shall be entitled to protection, survival and development
consistent with the customs and traditions of their respective communities.
Section 18. System of and Access to Education. – The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall develop and
institute an alternative system of education for children of indigenous cultural communities which culture-specific and
relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their communities. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports
shall also accredit and support non-formal but functional indigenous educational programs conducted by non-government
organizations in said communities.
Section 19. Health and Nutrition. – The delivery of basic social services in health and nutrition to children of indigenous
cultural communities shall be given priority by all government agencies concerned. Hospitals and other health institution
shall ensure that children of indigenous cultural communities are given equal attention. In the provision of health and
nutrition services to children of indigenous cultural communities, indigenous health practices shall be respected and
recognized.
Section 20. Discrimination. – Children of indigenous cultural communities shall not be subjected to any and all forms of
discrimination.
Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous cultural communities shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000).
Section 21. Participation. – Indigenous cultural communities, through their duly-designated or appointed representatives
shall be involved in planning, decision-making implementation, and evaluation of all government programs affecting
children of indigenous cultural communities. Indigenous institution shall also be recognized and respected.
ARTICLE X
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict
Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. – Children are hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be the responsibility of
the State and all other sectors concerned to resolve armed conflicts in order to promote the goal of children as zones of
peace. To attain this objective, the following policies shall be observed.
(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall be entitled to special respect. They shall be protected from any form of
threat, assault, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;
(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of its civilian units or other
armed groups, nor be allowed to take part in the fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies;
(c) Delivery of basic social services such as education, primary health and emergency relief services shall be kept
unhampered;
(d) The safety and protection of those who provide services including those involved in fact-finding missions from both
government and non-government institutions shall be ensured. They shall not be subjected to undue harassment in the
performance of their work;
(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and rural health units shall not be utilized for military purposes such as
command posts, barracks, detachments, and supply depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated due to armed conflict.
Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict. – Children shall be given priority during evacuation as a result
of armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be tapped to look after the safety and well-being of children
during evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that children evacuated are accompanied by persons
responsible for their safety and well-being.
Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. – Whenever possible, members of the same family shall be housed in the
same premises and given separate accommodation from other evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal family
life. In places of temporary shelter, expectant and nursing mothers and children shall be given additional food in proportion
to their physiological needs. Whenever feasible, children shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports and
outdoor games.
Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. – Any child who has been arrested for
reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following rights;
(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development or any responsible member of the community as determined by the court.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the court should find that the aforesaid child committed the acts
charged against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him.
However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit
such child to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution
operated by the Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he has had reached eighteen
(18) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other officer as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it
may prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as appeals in
criminal cases.
Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict. – The chairman of the barangay
affected by the armed conflict shall submit the names of children residing in said barangay to the municipal social welfare
and development officer within twenty-four (24) hours from the occurrence of the armed conflict.
ARTICLEXI
Remedial Procedures
Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. – Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against the children as
enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;1awphi1@ITC
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred.
Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. – The offended party shall be immediately placed under the protective custody
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the regular
performance of this function, the officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from any
administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 603.
Section 29. Confidentiality. – At the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from the public until the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer in
case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and director of the film in case of the movie industry, to cause undue and
sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of this Act which results in the moral degradation and suffering of the
offended party.Lawphi1@alf
Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. – Cases involving violations of this Act shall be heard in the chambers of the judge
of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile and Domestic Court.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and with the exception of habeas corpus, election cases, and
cases involving detention prisoners and persons covered by Republic Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the
hearing or disposition of cases involving violations of this Act.
ARTICLEXII 
Common Penal Provisions
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. –
(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender has been previously
convicted under this Act;
(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officer or employee thereof who is responsible for the
violation of this Act shall suffer the penalty imposed in its maximum period;
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent
guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an
establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;
(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service of sentence and forever barred from
entry to the country;
(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a public officer or
employee: Provided, however, That if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal, then the penalty of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification shall also be imposed: Provided, finally, That if the penalty imposed is
prision correccional or arresto mayor, the penalty of suspension shall also be imposed; and
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family
if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
ARTICLEXIII
Final Provisions
Section 32. Rules and Regulations. – Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the Department of Justice, in coordination with
the Department of Social Welfare and Development, shall promulgate rules and regulations of the effective implementation
of this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Section 33. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
Section 34. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full force and effect.
Section 35. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Section 36. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 17, 1992.

FC 256, cf. FC 36 in relation to 39, FC 105; FC 162; FC 257

FC 256
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

FC 36 and 39
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.  (As amended by
Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase"However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity
of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken
effect"has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).

FC 105
Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.

The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before
the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)

FC 162
Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. (n) 

FC 257
Art. 257. This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as
certified by the Executive Secretary, Office of the President.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
JURISPRUDENCE

Civil Law;  Family Code;  Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. —Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

Same; Same; Remedial Law; The retroactive application of procedural law is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected.—The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Same;  Same;  Same;  Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko
were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister
motives and bad faith.—Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963.
At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent
was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time.
His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

Courts; Judges; Respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. —It is
evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While the deceit
employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of
cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

Same; Same; A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life.—The Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial
guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the judiciary.
Note.—A marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid. Hence, contracting a subsequent marriage
with another woman would be bigamous and criminal in character. (Terre vs. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 [1992]
FACTS

 An administrative complaint was filed by Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against J.
Brillantes, Presiding Judge of MTC, Manila.
 It was alleged in the complaint that Brillantes has been cohabiting with Yolanda De Castro with whom Atienza had
2 children and when Brillantes was already married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children.
 Respondent denied having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having 5 children with her.
 The Respondent alleged that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony, the same was not valid for
lack of marriage license. Also, the second marriage between the two also lacked the required license.
 The Respondent claimed that when he married De Castro in LA, California, he believed, in good faith and for all
legal intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. 
 Respondent argued that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his
first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage
took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the retroactivity will be applied in this case.

HELD

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired
by the application of Article 40 to his case.

Respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to
reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations. This decision is immediately executory.

G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002.*

ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.

DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

Same; Same; Same

JURISPRUDENCE

Civil Law;  Family Code;  Maternity and Filiation;  Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child
must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. —Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on
whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to
dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate
family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the
child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.”

Same;  Same;  Same;  The Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should
not be prejudiced or impaired.—Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior
to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows: “ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”

Same;  Same;  Same;  The rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive
period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. —Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v.
Rovira, the Court said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the
prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children.
FACTS

 The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo.
 The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
 Carolina, in behalf of Adrian filed the complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son
of Fiscal Bernabe.
 The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of the putative
father had barred the action.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was
the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already
vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code
HELD

Petition has no merit.

Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to
file an action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment. The right of children to seek
recognition granted by the NCC to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect cannot be
impaired. NCC185 allows an illegitimate child to file for recognition within 4 years of attaining age of majority, thus gave
child a vested right which the FC cannot impair.

G.R. No. 178902.  April 21, 2010.*

MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, petitioners, vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R.
JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO, respondents.

DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

Same; Same; Same

JURISPRUDENCE

Civil Law; Family Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Partner ship; The Family Code provisions were also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. —The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains  expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on  Property
Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing
conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. Thus:  Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code,
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (n)

Same; Same; Same; Same; In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property; It simply provides that
without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.—In contrast to Article
173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a
court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:  “Art. 124. x x x In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contracts; A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning; And this
rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
without the other spouse’s written consent.—Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive
provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. This action,
according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.

Same; Property Relations; Possession; Possessor in Good Faith; He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of
the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. —He is
deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for
their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. What is more, they are entitled
under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a right of retention until the
reimbursement is made.
FACTS

 Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City.
 On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano
did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.
 Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the
documents of sale.
 The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the
lot's title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the
consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel.
 Upon Tarciano's compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay
him an additional P140,000.00 or P160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house
standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners
of the lot without any further formality and payment.
 The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other requirements of the sale.
According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
consent.
 On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
 Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle
R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano's sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her son,
John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707.
 The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano's wife, Rosario, did not give her. consent to
it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to
them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano
 The spouses denied the Rocas' allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he personally saw
Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988.
 He admitted, however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months.later on January 11, 1989.
 Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it.
Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
 RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes. However, CA ruled in favor of the Rocas.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the family code is to be applied on this case, given that Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950.
HELD

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property without the consent of his wife on
January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code which gives the wife right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within
ten years from the date of the sale, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave
no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such
an action.
 
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title
VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were
also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.

Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)

Repeal/Amendment

FC 254, FC 255

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code
of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of  Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid.

Obergefell et al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al. 576 US (2015)

DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

FC 1 cf. NCC 52, FC 149

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)

NCC Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain extent fix the property
relations during the marriage. (n)

FC Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a)

Art. II Sec 12, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.

Art. XV Sec 2, 1987 Constitution

SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
JURISPRUDENCE

The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a
marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State.
(a) Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it is appropriate to note the history of the subject now before
the Court.

(1) The history of marriage as a union between two persons of the opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases. To the
respondents, it would demean a timeless institution if marriage were extended to same-sex couples. But the petitioners, far
from seeking to devalue marriage, seek it for themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and
responsibilities, as illustrated by the petitioners’ own experiences.

(2) The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. Changes, such as the decline of arranged marriages and the
abandonment of the law of coverture, have worked deep transformations in the structure of marriage, affecting aspects of
marriage once viewed as essential. These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution. Changed
understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new
generations.

This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with gay and lesbian rights. Well into the 20th century, many States
condemned same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was treated as an illness. Later in the century, cultural and
political developments allowed same-sex couples to lead more open and public lives. Extensive public and private dialogue
followed, along with shifts in public attitudes. Questions about the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon reached the
courts, where they could be discussed in the formal discourse of the law. In 2003, this Court overruled its 1986 decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 , which upheld a Georgia law that criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding
laws making same-sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 . In
2012, the federal Defense of Marriage Act was also struck down. United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___. Numerous same-
sex marriage cases reaching the federal courts and state supreme courts have added to the dialogue.

(b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex.

(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 –486. Courts must exercise reasoned
judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. History and
tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. Applying these tenets,
the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. For example,  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ,
invalidated bans on interracial unions, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 , held that prisoners could not be denied the right to
marry. To be sure, these cases presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S.
810 , a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not
present a substantial federal question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed broader principles.
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, at 574. In assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, the
Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected. See, e.g.,Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454.
This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.

(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with
equal force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty
is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12. Decisions about
marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual
orientation.

A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was
central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception,
381 U. S., at 485, and was acknowledged in Turner, supra, at 95. Same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex
couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extending beyond mere freedom from laws making same-sex intimacy a
criminal offense.

A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related
rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 . Without the
recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a more difficult and
uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples.This does not
mean that the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. Precedent protects the right of a
married couple not to procreate, so the right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment to procreate.

Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order.
See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 . States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the
center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with
respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage
and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex
couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.

The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the
central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. Pp. 12–18.

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and
rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet each may be instructive
as to the meaning and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court invoked both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause; and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374 , where the Court invalidated a law
barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from marrying. Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and
unchallenged, this Court has invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on
marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455 –461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and equality,
see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102 –121.

The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of
gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws
burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in
essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a
fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and
continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians.

(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.
Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. Bakerv. Nelson is overruled. The State laws challenged by
the petitioners in these cases are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same
terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.

(5) There may be an initial inclination to await further legislation, litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative debates,
and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and extensive litigation in state and federal courts have led to an
enhanced understanding of the issue. While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for
change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. Bowers, in effect,
upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right. Though it was eventually repudiated, men and women
suffered pain and humiliation in the interim, and the effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was
overruled. A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect and would be unjustified under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The petitioners’ stories show the urgency of the issue they present to the Court, which has a duty to address
these claims and answer these questions. Respondents’ argument that allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage
as an institution rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couples’ decisions about marriage and parenthood. Finally,
the First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others have protection as they seek
to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.

(c) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. Since same-
sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character.
FACTS
  The petitioners were two men whose same-sex partners had died and fourteen same-sex couples who all brought
cases in their respective District Courts challenging either the denial of their right to marry or the right to have their
marriage performed elsewhere recognized in their own state.
 Petitioners filed their lawsuits in the federal district courts in their home states.  Each district court ruled in favor of
the petitioners.  The four states appealed (Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee).
 Each of the respondents, who were state officials responsible for enforcing the relevant laws, appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated the respondents’ appeals and reversed the decisions, holding that a
state has no obligation to license same-sex marriages, or to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in another
state.
 The petitioners then sought certiorari in the Supreme Court. The situation of three of the petitioners illustrates the
nature of the cases.
 James Obergefell and his partner of over twenty years, John Arthur travelled from Ohio to Maryland in order to
marry. John died three months later of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis but Ohio law prevented James being listed on
John’s death certificate as surviving spouse.
 Same-sex partners April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse have three adopted children; however, Michigan permits only
opposite-sex married couples or single persons to adopt, with the result that each child is treated as having only one
parent, and if that partner passed away, the other would have no legal right to the children.
 Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura married in New York, where same-sex marriage was legal, before Ijpe was
deployed to Afghanistan. Upon his return, they settled in Tennessee where their marriage is not recognized, with the
result that their legal status in relation to each other changes as they travel between states.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?

Whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in
another state that allows same-sex marriage?
HELD

Yes. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed.

Reasoning:

History Shows that Same-Sex Marriage Must Be Permitted

The fact that same-sex couples desire to participate in the institution of marriage shows their deep respect for the institution.
Thus, opponents of same-sex marriage are wrong to claim that allowing same-sex couples to marry demeans the institution.
Also, though the institution of marriage has been around for centuries, its history has been characterized by change.
Arranged marriages, the law of coverture, and other antiquated notions of marriage have given way to more modern
conceptions of the institution. Such evolution has not weakened, but rather strengthened, the institution. In fact, the
acceptance of same-sex couples over the last several decades shows that public attitudes shift over time.

Same-Sex Marriage is a Right Under the Due Process Clause

Requiring states to license same-sex marriage is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause. The right to
marry, including for same-sex couples, is fundamental under the Constitution for four reasons: (i) individual autonomy
dictates our personal choice on who to marry; (ii) we have a right to enjoy intimate association; (iii) it protects children and
families, because children suffer if they are raised by unmarried parents; (iv) marriage is a keystone to our nation’s social
order.

Same-Sex Marriage is a Right Under Equal Protection

The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection also requires that all states license same-sex marriage.
Burdening the liberty of same-sex couples, but not that of opposite-sex couples, shows that current laws are inherently
unequal.

Waiting for Further Legislative Action is Untenable

The desire to wait for political/legislative action would be unwise in this case because it would amount to allowing further
discrimination against same-sex couples. The Court sees immediate harm being inflicted upon the petitioners due to the laws
at issue in the case. Therefore, it would be improper to wait any longer to remedy that harm, particularly when the laws at
issue infringe upon the petitioners’ fundamental right to marry.
Finally, because all states must license same-sex marriage as a fundamental right, it naturally follows that states must also
recognize same-sex marriages licensed in other states.

Dissenting Opinions:
Dissenting Opinion (Roberts):
Even if allowing same-sex marriage is rooted in fairness, it is not addressed by the Constitution. Accordingly, the decision
on whether to allow same-sex marriage should be left up to the states. Other Court expansions of marriage laws are not
applicable here because they did not change the very definition of marriage. Further, the majority opinion relies on an overly
expansive view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The Court should not go too far
into judicial policymaking.

Dissenting Opinion (Scalia):

The majority opinion overstepped the Court’s authority by making a legislative determination. Rather, it is for the states to
make a legislative determination about how marriage is defined, and the Constitution leaves that determination to the states.

Dissenting Opinion (Thomas):

The legislative history of the due process clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments was rooted in retraining
government power, not granting entitlements. The majority decision also infringes on religious rights. The states, through
the legislative process, should be allowed to make that judgment between competing interests of same-sex couples and
religious communities.

Dissenting Opinion (Alito):

Because the Constitution does not address the right to marry, it left that determination to the states. The majority creates a
new right here, which is a dangerous departure from proper judicial authority under the Constitution.

No. 11263. November 2, 1916.]

ELOISA GOITIA Y DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff and appellant, vs.JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant and appellee.

DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES INVOLVED

FC 1
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)

Cf. Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa), 1989 Rules of Evidence

RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

NCC 220
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.

Muslim Code, PD 1083 Sec. 14

Chapter Two
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
Section 1. Requisites of Marriage
Article 14. Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain
extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
JURISPRUDENCE
MARRIAGE; NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION.—Marriage is something more than a contract, though founded upon the
agreement of the parties. When once formed a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change by
agreement, and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement but upon the law. The spouses must be
faithful to, assist, support, and live with each other.

HUSBAND AND WlFE; ACTION FOR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE.—The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal
abode by her husband without fault on her part, may maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when
she has no other remedy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to
furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the
one having the right to the same.

ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.—The complaint of the wife which alleges unbearable conduct and treatment
on the part of the husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for separate maintenance.

FACTS

 Plaintiff Eloisa and defendant Jose were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when
the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents.
 According to Eloisa, defendant Jose, one month after he had contracted marriage with her, demanded of her that she
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Eloisa spurned the obscene demands of the defendant
and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. Jose, since that date had continually on other
successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on her, who always spurned them, which just refusals
exasperated the defendant and induced him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her
face and different parts of her body.
 As Eloisa was unable by any means to induce Jose to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating
her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
 Under Article 149 of the Civil Code, the husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by
paying her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home.
 Jose argues that Eloisa must first return to their conjugal home before he supports her by virtue of the above option
given to him.
 The Court of First Instance agreed with the argument of Jose and held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to
support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or
separation from the defendant. Thus, this appeal by Eloisa.
ISSUE(S)

Whether or not the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose the option and be compelled to pay the pension?
HELD

Yes. Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities established by General
Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of the parties. Upon the termination
(completion) of the marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. To this extent a marriage
partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,
duties, and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations.

Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. When the legal existence
of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable. With these principles to guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and
governing the question under consideration.

[G.R. No. 109454. June 14, 1994.*]

JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS
FELIZARDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
 Doctrines/Principles included:

Family Code 1
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

Rule 131 Sec. 3 (aa), 1989 Rules on Evidence

(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage

New Civil Code 220

Article 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.

Muslim Code, (P.D. 1083) Sec. 14

Article 14. Nature. Marriage is not only a civil contract but a social institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by this Code and the Shari'a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements may to a certain
extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

JURISPRUDENCE

Criminal Law; Bigamy; Marriage; Rule on Constructive Notice; Rule on constructive notice cannot apply in the crime of
bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused.—While we concede the point that the rule
on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, we
agree with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the
possibility of its being more favorable to the accused.

Same; Same; Same; The principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse
of the previous subsisting marriage.—This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied
in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into
by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment
to contract another marriage.

Same; Same; Same; The criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was applied, involved therein
were land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.—In the case of real property, the registration of any
transaction involving any right or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property is
located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving the said property can
easily be made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or the
authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender
is not known to be still a married person. Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive
notice was applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.

Same; Same; Same; While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the
existence of his previous subsisting marriage.—The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive
notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the
offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of
public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those
concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He
likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a
place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the
discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the
prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by
the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).

Same; Same; Same; The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution
cherished and protected by law.—Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the
violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless
violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of
the marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various local civil registries.—To this we may also add that the rule
on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National
Census Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even third marriage
has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a task to even contemplate.

Civil Law; Property Registration Decree; Civil Register; Section 52 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lien, lease, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or
entry affecting registered land filed in the Register of Deeds. No legal basis exists for applying constructive notice rule to
documents registered in the Civil Register.—While Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or
entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies from the time of such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act No.
3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there
is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register.

Family Code; Marriage; Marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our
society.—Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right
into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and
other similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of
which is a primary concern of our society.

FACTS

 On May 26, 1992, petitioner, Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C.
Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
 Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished
by prescription.
 In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise
denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
 Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
 Petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the
second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,7 such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party
therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information
for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
 On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the
crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

ISSUE

Whether or not, the prosecution of Jose Sermonia for bugamy has already prescribed

HELD

No.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well
entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive
period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof
for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public
record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those
concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married
person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be
anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would
take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from
the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is
AFFIRMED.

[No. L-28248. March 12, 1975.*]

LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO,
PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO,
joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO
PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO,
ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners, vs . MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO,
JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO,
JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.

Doctrines/Principles included:
^ same with the prior case^

JURISPRUDENCE

Evidence; Presumption of marriage and legitimacy of children; Presumption may be overcome only by cogent proof
on the part of those who allege illegitimacy.—The statement of the civil status of a person in a certificate of title
issued to him is not conclusive to show that he is not actually married to another. It is weak and insufficient to rebut
the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption,
especially where the legitimacy of the issue is involved, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those
who allege the illegitimacy .

Same; Same; Reason for presumption of marriage.—The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is
that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and law.

Appeals; Findings of appellate court on matters involving appreciation of evidence binding on Supreme Court;
Reason.—The issue raised also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently , the finding of the
appellate court on the matter is binding on the Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination
of all the evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the
circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an
appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal
on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has
been established.

FACTS
  Lucio Perido of Hima maylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime.
 His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3 ) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita.
 After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria,
Sofronia, and Gonzalo.
 Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
 Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living.
 On August 15 , 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a
document denominated as “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,” whereby they partitioned among
themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Hima maylan ,
Occidental Negros.
 The children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8,
1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which comp laint was later
amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for th e annulment of the so-
called “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition” and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein
among the plaintiffs alone.
 They alleged, among other th ings, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in
question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in
said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong; and that the
five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all ille gitimate and therefore had no successional righ ts
to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
 After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the “Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-judicial Partition.” However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively
in view of its findings that the fiv e children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot
No . 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
 The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio
Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofron ia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots
Nos. 471, 506, 511 , 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Hima maylan, Negros Occidental, and in
not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.
 Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The
appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down .

ISSUE

Whether or not, the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido is legitimate and entitling them to
partition of land

HELD

Yes.

This presumption, especially where the legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent
proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court explained the
rationale behind this presumption, thus: “The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as bein g, they would be living in th e constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.’ (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio—Always presume marriage.”

In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

[G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007]

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Doctrines/Provisions included:
^same with the prior case^

JURISPRUDENCE

Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification; A
change of name is a privilege, not a right.—The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority.

Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA 9048 now governs the change of first name,
and vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned; The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied—in sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.—RA 9048 now governs the
change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and
subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does
not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his
first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does
not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s
first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a
person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is not within that court’s primary
jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the local civil registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.
—The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s
primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be
legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him
at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.

Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error—it is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.—
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.—As used in
this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x xxx x x x (3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in
Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and
408 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; No reasonable interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code
can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment; To correct simply means “to make
or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.”—The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407
of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means “to make or set
aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same
kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.—“Status” refers to the
circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity
to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations—it is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status; There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.—A
person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In
this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law (Act 3753); Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth—thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the
birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant; Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.—Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent; The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used
in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in
their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary; Sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities
of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female”; The words
“male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment; While a
person may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.— When words are not defined in a statute they
are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male”
and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should
therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the
distinction between male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which had at the
time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued
that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual to be included in the category “female.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in
his birth certificate.

Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the changes in name and sex sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations—it will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).—The changes sought by petitioner will have
serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was
but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal
capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil Code which mandates that “[n]o judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation; In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the
Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to
do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statutebased.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a law where no law exists.—
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the
civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures
shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on
that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written
word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal, but the
remedies involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.—Petitioner pleads
that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No
argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

FACTS

 On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. (SP Case No. 02-105207)
 Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
 Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
 He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female"
and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.
 He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform
himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand.
 He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
 From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name
in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
 On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.
 On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
 On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason
of sex alteration.
 On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
 Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
 The petition lacks merit.

ISSUE

Whether or not, change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment

HELD

No.

A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave
complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s
primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be
legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA
9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him
at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first
name was concerned.

The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

[G.R. No. 187683 February 11, 2010]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
VICTORIANO DELA CRUZ y LORENZO, Appellant.

Doctrines/Provisions included:
^same with the prior case^

JURISPRUDENCE

Criminal Law; Aggravating Circumstances; Parricide; Parricide—other than the fact of killing—is the relationship of the
offender to the victim. In the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in
itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest.—It is
committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of
the accused. The key element in Parricide—other than the fact of killing—is the relationship of the offender to the victim. In
the case of Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. In this case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in itself, is ample proof of
such relationship as the testimony can be taken as an admission against penal interest. Clearly, then, it was established that
Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

Same; Evidence; Credibility of the Witnesses; The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying.—The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no reason to discredit Joel’s
testimony and Dr. Viray’s Report. Besides, well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. The Court does not find any arbitrariness or error on the part of the
RTC as would warrant a deviation from this well-entrenched rule.

FACTS

 Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide in an Information dated January 2, 2003
 That on or about the 18th day of August, 2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill his wife Anna Liza
Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence and stab the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on
her trunk and on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly
caused her death.
 Contrary to law.
 Upon arraignment, Victoriano, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
 RTC - WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Victoriano L. dela Cruz Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and pay damages
 Petition appeled on CA.
ISSUE

Whether or not, petitioner is guilty of Parricide

HELD

Yes.
Circumstancial evidence is sufficient for conviction.

We note the presence of the requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. First, immediately preceding the
killing, Victoriano physically maltreated his wife, not merely by slapping her as he claimed, but by repeatedly punching and
kicking her. Second, it was Victoriano who violently dragged the victim inside their house, by pulling her hair. Third, in Dr.
Viray's Report, Anna sustained injuries in different parts of her body due to Victoriano's acts of physical abuse. Fourth, the
location and extent of the wound indicated Victoriano's intent to kill the victim. The Report revealed that the victim sustained
a fatal stab wound, lacerating the upper lobe of her right lung, a vital organ. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the
deceased manifests Victoriano's intention to extinguish life. Fifth, as found by both the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano
and Anna were inside the house, other than their young daughter. Thus, it can be said with certitude that Victoriano was the
lone assailant. Sixth, we have held that the act of carrying the body of a wounded victim and bringing her to the hospital ―
as Victoriano did ― does not manifest innocence. It could merely be an indication of repentance or contrition on his part.

The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court finds no reason to discredit Joel’s testimony and Dr. Viray's
Report. Besides, well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying. The Court does not find any arbitrariness or error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a
deviation from this well-entrenched rule.

In sum, Victoriano failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in its assailed Decision. His guilt
was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in, finding appellant, Victoriano dela Cruz y Lorenzo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, the amounts of
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. No costs.

[G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010]

MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special
Administrator, Respondent.

Doctrines/Provisions included:
^same with the prior case^

JURISPRUDENCE

Civil Procedure; Parties; Intervention; A court’s power to allow or deny intervention is circumscribed by the basic demand of
sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.—A court’s
power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial
procedure that only a person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise stated, a court
has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.

Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Certiorari; When a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a
case, the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction.—When a court commits a mistake and allows an
uninterested person to intervene in a case—the mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such
event, the allowance is made in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion
gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari.

Civil Law; Documentary Evidence; Marriage Certificate; The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate.—While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

FACTS
  Rodolfo G. Jalandoni died intestate on 20 December 1966. He died without issue.
 On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni, the brother of Rodolfo, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the
latter’s estate. The petition is currently pending before the intestate court.
 The petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they
introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis —who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of
Isabel Blee with one John Desantis.
 The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother—Isabel—was, at the time of Rodolfo’s death, the
legal spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
 Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be allowed to intervene on her
behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.
 As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former
predeceasing the latter.
 To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation, the following documents:

a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;

b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia; and

c.) Their respective proof of births.

 The respondent called attention to the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.
As it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John Desantis.
 The document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."
 Isabel’s previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with
Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.


ISSUE

Whether or not, the marriage of Isabel and Rodolfo was valid

HELD

No.

On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the intestate court.

Sylvia’s birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated—which includes the civil status of her
parents. Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.

The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any other evidence proving that the
marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the
latter marriage—the Isabel-Rodolfo union—is a nullity for being bigamous. From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered
as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the
estate of Rodolfo.

Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED

[G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015]

ROSARIO BANGUIS-TAMBUYAT, Petitioner

vs.
WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, Respondent.

Doctrines/Provisions included:
^same as the prior case^
 JURISPRUDENCE

Civil Law; Certificates of Title; Property Registration Decree (Presidential Decree [PD] No. 1529); Procedure in the Erasure,
Alteration, or Amendments of a Certificate of Title.—Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure,
alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any
description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have
arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed; (5) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has
been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned
registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there
is reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. The present case falls under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of
Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E.
Banguis” when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda — and not Banguis — is Adriano’s lawful spouse.

Same; Same; Same; Proceedings under Section 108 of the Property Registration Decree are “summary in nature,
contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.”—
Proceedings under Section 108 are “summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only
clerical but certainly not controversial issues.” Banguis’ opposition to the petition for cancellation ostensibly raised
controversial issues involving her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her son by
Adri ano. However, apart from the fact that evidence of Banguis’s ownership is irrelevant in Wenifreda’s petition, the
evidence apparently indicates that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a resolution of the issue of
succession is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination of Wenifreda’s petition. The Court is thus led to the
conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in including Banguis in TCT T-145321 as Adriano’s spouse.

FACTS
 Adriano M. Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat were married on September 16, 1965.
 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700-square-meter parcel of land located
at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (the subject property), which was bought on November 17, 1991.
 The deed of sale over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses to the
deed of sale was petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat, who signed therein as “Rosario Banguis”.
 When Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject property was issued, however, it was made under the name
of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.”
 All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco. They were married on October 15, 1975,
and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was alive, and his marriage to petitioner subsisted and was never
annulled.
 On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate.
 Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title assigned to Branch 10 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.
 She alleged therein that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano, that Transfer Certificate of Title was erroneously
registered and made in the name of “ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS”; that per
annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco; that Banguis could not have been married to
Adriano; that the issuance of the title in Banguis’s name as Adriano’s spouse was due to “an insidious machination
by her and the person who brokered the sale of the subject property, allegedly a cousin or relative of hers”; and that
consequently, she suffered damages.
 Banguis denied specifically that the subject property was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage.
She claimed that on the other hand, she alone bought the subject property using her personal funds; that she and
Adriano were married on September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a married couple; that their union
produced a son, who was born on April 1, 1990; that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for
cancellation.
 The Malolos RTC rendered decision dismissing the counterclaim of the oppositor for lack of merit.

ISSUE

Whether or not, Banguis should be included to the subject property as Adriano’s spouse, or Wenifreda

HELD
No.

It was unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different from the
certificate of title to it.

Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better
title than what he actually has.

Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence, Banguis may have felt obliged to prove
that beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is not convinced of her
claimed ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have been co-owners of the
subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, while the
deed of sale covering the subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts, so it
must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and binding. Moreover, the
Court notes that while Banguis claims that she alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from
her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its
acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious doubts on her claim; basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the
property, it would only be logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale as the vendee,
and not as mere witness – which is what actually occurred in this case. On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its
purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to
explain why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano to be denominated as the
sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. “Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining
the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against
him.” One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and
common sense.”

Neither can the Court believe Banguis’s assertion that Wenifreda’s petition for cancellation of TCT is in reality a partition of
Adriano’s estate which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests Banguis and her son Adrian of
their rights and interests therein.

This is simply a case for the correction of the wrongful entry in TCT; it simply aims to reflect the truth in the certificate of
title – that Adriano is married to Wenifreda – and nothing else. It would have been a summary proceeding, but Banguis
complicated matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which are irrelevant in the first place for, as earlier stated,
registration is not the equivalent of title.

Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner.

The petition is denied.

Calimag vs. Heirs of Macapaz, G.R. No. 191936, June 1, 2016

Articles/Doctrines Applied:

RULE 131
Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the
money or delivered the thing accordingly;
(l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner
that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon
by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration;
(t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the
instrument is dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for
all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he
disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may
be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for
four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known
for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already death. In case of disappearance,
where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of copartneship;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire
properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding
shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such
termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to
have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage.
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to
have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the
book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to
him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or
conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the
survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived;
2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be
the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died
first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be
considered to have died at the same time. (5a)

New Civil Code 220

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.

Jurisprudence:

Civil Law; Filiation; While it is true that a person’s legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al., 559 SCRA 186 (2008), the Supreme Court (SC) deems it
necessary to pass upon the respondents’ relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property.
—While it is true that a person’s legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, as
held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al., 559 SCRA 186 (2008), this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the
respondents’ relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the question of
whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the
parties in the pretrial.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence
provides that: “When the subject of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, x x x.” Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary
evidence subject to certain requirements specified by law.—At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage
between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz.: (1) fax or photocopy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of
marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of
the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: “When the subject of the inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x.” Nevertheless, a
reproduction of the original document can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified
by law.

Same; Same; Same; Canonical Certificate of Marriage; A canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document.—A
canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early as in the case of United States v. Evangelista, 29 Phil.
215 (1915), it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized
public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence. Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and due execution of the
canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate.—It is well-settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents. Thus,
in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Live Birth; A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries
(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil
Registrar).—“A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public
records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar).” Thus, being public
documents, the respondents’ certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the
facts stated in them. “Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or
defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.”

Civil Law; Filiation; Under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall
be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child
does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the mother
if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.—Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,  the declaration of either parent of
the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’—In a catena
of cases, it has been held that, “[p]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’  Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage.” Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the
Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded. Thus: Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions
favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

Facts:

 Virginia D. Calimag co-owned the property with Silvestra Macapaz.

 Respondents are children of Silvestra’s brother, Anastacio Macapaz Sr. and Fidela Macapaz.
 The Subject property was duly registered in the names of the petitioner and Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 183088. In said certificate of title, appearing as entry no. 02671 is an annotation of adverse claim of
Fidela asserting rights and interest over a portion of the said property.
 Silvestra died on November 11, 2002, without issue.
 The Transfet Certificat of Title was cancelled and new certificate of title was issued in the name of the petitioner by
virtue of a Deed of sale dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99 sqm portion to the petitioner
for 300,000.
 Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit 9 dated
July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of
adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same
legally ineffective.
 On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
  Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and
172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.11 However, said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.
 The respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale
and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.
 The Petitioner averred that the respondent have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they
are illegitimate children of Anastacio Sr.
Issue:

W/N Anastacio Sr and Fidela were married, therefore recognizing their children as legal heirs of Silvestra.
Held:

Yes. The trial court found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela with a certification from the NSO that their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, and further claiming the absence of a marriage license. The Court however deems it necessary to
pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. The
respondent presented a Canonical Certificate of Marriage however it cannot be admitted in evidence. Notwithstanding, it is
well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued
by the National Statistics Office where Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents. A perusal of said
documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the same parents — their father's name is  Anastacio Nator
Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents were married
on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte.

The Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law
respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said
documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as
legitimate children.

Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as
husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children — the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being
born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish the validity of
marriage.

Espinosa vs. Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

Articles/Doctrines Applied:
MARRIAGE
Requisites of Marriage

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (52a)

New Civil Code 221

Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute
community of property between husband and wife;

(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage;

(4) Any simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime.

PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
Jurisprudence:
Family Law; Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.—
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly
what Omaña did in this case.

Notary Public; A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve
himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.—We can- Espinosa vs.
Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

Family Law; Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.—
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly
what Omaña did in this case.

Notary Public; A notary public is personally responsible for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve
himself of this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries or any member of his staff.—We can- Espinosa vs.
Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011

Facts:

 On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s legal advice on whether
they could dissolve their marriage and live separately.
 Omana prepared a document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the
conditions of the said contract.
 Marantal took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the conjugal property.
 Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the
contract executed by Omana was not valid.
 They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-CBD.
 Omana denied that she prepared the contract.
 She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it
was illegal.
 Omana alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her
part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract.
Issue:

W/N the Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay, executed by Rodolfo Espinosa and Elena Marantal is valid to nullify their marriage.

Held:

No. SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court
has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this
case.

Mariategui vs. CA, 205 SCRA 337

Articles/Doctrine Applied:
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
 Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
Jurisprudence:

Same; Evidence; Disputable presumption; Once a man and woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is
not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact.—Courts look upon the
presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale: "The basis of human society throughout
the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law x x x."

Same; Evidence; Disputable presumption; Once a man and woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is
not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact.—Courts look upon the
presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale: "The basis of human society throughout
the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law x x x."
Same; Same; Wills and Succession; Repudiation; Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not
operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.—Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not
operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the
Court held: "Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of
the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other coowners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property
for the period required by law." x x x "It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it
has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration operates as a universal notice of title." Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in
fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the
petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had
registered in their names the lots involved.

Facts:

 Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953.

 Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8,
1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and
was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana.
  Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children,
namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938.
Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941.

 At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried.
These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate.

 On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana,
Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico,
all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No.
163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed
by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of
the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently,
the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate
transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties.

 On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with
the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were
owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs,
they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition
of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967.
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint as
unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and
rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruit.

Issue:

W/N the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

Held:

YES. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is
legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present.

De Mijares vs. Villaluz, 274 SCRA 1

Articles/Doctrines Applied:

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;

(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:

(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. (81a)

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:

(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own
spouse.

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below
twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with
the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues
and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
Revised Penal Code 350
Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall
have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.

Jurisprudence:
Same; Same; Respondent’s subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a “sham” marriage will not justify his
actuations.—Respondent’s subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a “sham” marriage will not justify his
actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does
not convince, it does not speak well of respondent’s sense of social propriety and moral values. This is aggravated by the fact
that he is not a layman nor even just an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and, thereafter, a
Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully aware of the consequence of a marriage celebrated with all
the necessary legal requisites.

Same; Same; The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.—
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for continued
membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct
and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.

Facts:

 Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City while respondent Onofre
A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.

 Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares. She obtained a decree
declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years. Thus, she got married to respondent in a
civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.

 They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that time the Presiding Judge of
the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case involving the death of the son of Mijares.
  During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit affair with another
woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the complainant judge. As a result, they lived
separately and did not get in touch with one another and the respondent did not bother to apologize for what
happened.

 Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia Geraldez. Complainant then
filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter immorally and bigamously entered into a second
marriage while having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as single.

 In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham marriage”; that he voluntarily
signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her legal
researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he contracted his marriage with complainant, he had a subsisting
marriage with his first wife because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final
and executory or published.

 Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and later on affirmed by the
Court.

Issue:

W/N marriage of Mijares and Villaluz is valid

Held:

Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family
Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance that he was facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the
sake of argument that the judgment in civil case declaring the annulment of marriage between respondent and the first wife
had not attained complete finality, the marriage between complainant and respondent is not void but only voidable.

Hermosisima vs. CA, 109 Phil 629

Articles/Doctrines applied:

HUMAN RELATIONS (n)

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (n)

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who
has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement
hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;

(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the
buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at
the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his
sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and
person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;

(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;

(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

Jurisprudence:

1.DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT ACTIONABLE. —It is the clear and manifest intent of
Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry.
2.ID.; ID.; SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION
CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL CODE.—The "seduction" contemplated in Article 2219 of the
New Civil Code as one of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is the crime punished as such in Articles 337
and 338 of the Revised Penal Code.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST.—Where a woman, who was an insurance agent and former
high school teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10 years older than the man, "overwhelmed by her love" for a
man approximately 10 years younger than her, had intimate relations with him, because she "wanted to bind" him "by having
a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said that he is morally guilty of
seduction.

Facts:
 Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a teacher in the in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost 10 years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage
prior thereto.

 One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she
was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez.

 On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of
her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise.

 Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the later, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.

 The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which
was, on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for
actual and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's
fees.
Issue:

W/N moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry.
 Held:

No.  It has been ruled for many cases that promise to marry is not actionable. Respondent surrendered herself because by her
love for him, she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.*

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PRINCIPLE
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of
birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner.

JURISPRUDENCE
Change of Name; The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification; A change of
name is a privilege, not a right.—The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection,
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

Same; Clerical Error Law (RA 9048); Administrative Law; Jurisdictions; RA 9048 now governs the change of first name, and vests
the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned; The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied—in sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.—RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority
to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law,
therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Sex Change; A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.— Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose
may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name,
he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as
a result of using his true and official name.

Same; Same; A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as
the petition should be filed with the local civil registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.—The petition in the
trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition
should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because
the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of
his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s
petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

Same; Same; Sex Change; No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment;
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error—it is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.—Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a
“clerical or typographical error” is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x     
x x x      x x x (3) “Clerical or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in
Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction; No reasonable interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment; To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute.”—The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from”
while to change means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.” The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.

Same; Same; Same; Same; “Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.—“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting
the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term
status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis
supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations—it is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status; There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.—A person’s sex
is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection,
Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s
cause.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Register Law (Act 3753); Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of birth—thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant; Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.—Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent; The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary; Sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function
that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and female”; The words “male” and “female” in everyday
understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment; While a person may have succeeded in altering his body
and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason.— When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a
contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent
to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a
female” or “the distinction between male and female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that
has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in everyday understanding do not
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a
well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since the statutory
language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included
in the category “female.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Same; Same; Same; Marriage; To grant the changes in name and sex sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations—it will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).—The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging
legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his
eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities
under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Legislation; Article 9 of the Civil Code which mandates that “[n]o judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation; In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment.—It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our
system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition
of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims
asserted are statute based.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to
change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing
the conferment of that privilege; The Supreme Court cannot enact a law where no law exists.—To reiterate, the statutes define who
may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on
a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to
enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for
this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has
no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply
or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal, but the remedies involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.—Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are
also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes
that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

FACTS
 Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery.
 From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE
WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or
difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the
change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The
Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on
the ground of sex reassignment.

Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority which was amended
by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person
can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no
entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article
413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a
birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern
surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition
for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to
be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.*

 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Conflict of Laws; Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce, hence, our courts
cannot grant it, and a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad.—At the outset, we lay
the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.—A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence.—Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document
—a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Proof of Foreign Public or Official Records; Requisites.—Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132,
on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication, or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The divorce
decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A party’s failure to object properly renders a foreign divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the court of another State.—Fortunately for respondent’s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner’s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence
and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizenship; A former Filipino is no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquires
another State’s citizenship.—Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary, respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action; Where a divorce decree is a defense raised by a party, the burden of proving the pertinent foreign
law validating it falls squarely upon him.—The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws—like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved.—It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know
by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a
cause arising after marriage; A decree nisi or an interlocutory order—a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce—is in effect
the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during
which no reconciliation is effected.—Respondent’s contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent. Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree—a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in
effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; A divorce decree does not raise a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to the
civil status of the person presenting it where no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under the
foreign law.—We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive evidence
as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Certificate of Legal Capacity; The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned; The certificate of legal capacity mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code is sufficient to establish the legal
capacity of a foreign national—a duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.—Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry. We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima
facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The absence of a certificate of legal capacity is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirements for procuring a marriage license, an irregularity which will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of
a marriage license issued without that certificate.—In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity
in complying with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will
not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium,
pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code
of the Philippines Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.).

Same; Same; Same; Same; A divorce decree does not ipso facto clothed a divorcee with the legal capacity to remarry—he must still
adduce sufficient evidence to show the foreign State’s personal law governing his status, or at the very least, he should still prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.—Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner’s contention
that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court may not declare the second marriage of a divorcee null and void on the ground of bigamy
where there is a possibility that, under the foreign law, the divorcee was really capacitated to remarry as a result of the divorce decree
—the most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show the divorcee’s legal
capacity to remarry.—Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the
divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
 FACTS
 Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was
married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

 Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
 On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first
marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
 On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending ,
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had
irretrievably broken down.”
 The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that the Australian
divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

HELD
1.) The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2.) Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence
of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court,
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot
grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to
marry.

G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000.*

ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.

Actions; Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; Words and Phrases; “Prejudicial Question,’’ Explained; The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.—A prejudicial question
has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

Same; Same; Same; Marriage; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Bigamy; The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
marriage has no bearing upon the determination of the accused’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted; The
ruling in People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843 (1954) and People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957) that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned—the prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the
Family Code.—The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of
his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a
declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in
People vs. Mendoza and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was
already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in
a judicial proceeding.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; There is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.—
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRO
Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that
there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the other is civil.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Professional Regulation Commission; The Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice
of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended
notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative
case.—Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly
provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil
case against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case: The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases
in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts
as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The
Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final
decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.

Criminal Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion—the appellate court will
not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not
yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.—The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. In
this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the
demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will
not review in a special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in advance that such evidence has or has not
yet established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against
petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.

Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; The trial court’s observation that there was a prima facie case against the accused only meant
that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that the accused had committed the offense of bigamy,
and unless he presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion—said declaration by the trial court should not be
construed as a pronouncement of guilt.—The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his
demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement
that he is liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was
not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or
not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the case. The RTC’s observation that there was a prima facie case against
petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed
the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. Said declaration by
the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that the trial court
denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the
evidence adduced by both parties.

Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; Bias and Partiality; While bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons
for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial
is not enough.—We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively
show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the case. In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that
while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the
rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of bias and partiality.

Same; Same; Same; The test for determining the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether the movant was deprived a
fair and impartial trial.—This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to
inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived of a fair and impartial
trial. The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not
deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to suspend the criminal
proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in the
requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him
unprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was
not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.

Facts
 Petitioner and private respondent were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21,
1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.
 On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a
certain Julieta Santella.
 When she learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the
(RTC).
 July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC an action for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he was forced to
marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that
she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
 Private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner
and Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses.
 Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo. Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC, where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in
view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy in
Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.
 The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.
 The appellate court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s failure to show any concrete evidence
that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. Likewise affirmed the RTC’s denial of the demurrer
to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the
prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.

ISSUE/S:
1. W/N Public respondent committed a serious error in refusing to suspend the legal [criminal and administrative]
proceedings despite the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage.
2. Public respondent committed a serious legal error in not holding that the trial judge a quo should have inhibited himself.

HELD
The petition has no merit.
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined1 The rationale
behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner
against private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be
suspended until said civil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper
is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his
marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a
 declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable.

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption of marriage exists.

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did
not give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at
the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to inhibit. The test for
determining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial. The instances
when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a
fair and impartial trial. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 191425. September 7, 2011.*

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. ‒ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

The applicable Articles in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents are governed by
this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property
relations of the spouses.
Art.15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali)
has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age and any Muslim female of the age of
puberty or upwards and not suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is
presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be
declared publicly in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be
set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the person
solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the
solemnizing officer who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge, should the proper wali
refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge, office of the
Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before,
during or after the celebration of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl)
shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.

JURISPRUDENCE
Criminal Law; Bigamy; The elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.—The elements of the crime of bigamy are: 1. That the offender has been legally married. 2. That the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code. 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage. 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat;
(2) Nollora and Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the
existence of his second marriage to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.

Family Code; Code of Muslim Personal Laws; Marriages; Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “[i]n case of
a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of
the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply.”—Article 13(2) of the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws states that “[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the
Philippines] shall apply.” Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were
solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the
crime of bigamy.
FACTS
 Atilano Nollora Jr was married to Jesus Nollora. Their marriage was still subsisting when he contracted a 2nd marriage with
Rowena Geraldino, who is herself aware of his marriage with Jesusa but still agreed and contracted marriage with him.
Evidence for the Prosecution
 Witness Jesusa Pinat Nollora testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and they got
married/ While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of anxiety and
emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the Philippines. Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private
complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino
when she secured a certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. from (NSO).
 Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at the latter’s workplace in CBW,
FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which
Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant also knew that
Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was
brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latter’s residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr.’s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she heard everything that they were
talking about.
Evidence for Defense
 Accused admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with
Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was a Muslim convert even before he contracted the first marriage with
the private complainant. As a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry 4 wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam
belief.
 To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion
dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it
is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992. Aside from said certificate, he
also presented a Pledge of Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved
by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin

ISSUE
Whether or not Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
 HELD
Yes. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and pursuant to Art 35 of the Family Code, it is void ab initio. Nollora’s
religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law. The SC ruled that his two
marriages were not conducted according to the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation may not be used as a defense.
The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is legally married to Pinat; (2) Nollora and
Pinat’s marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his
second marriage to Geraldino; and (4) Nollora and Geraldino’s marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack
of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu
of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s
marriages were solemnized according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption
from liability for the crime of bigamy.

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Nollora’s marriage
contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one’s religion in the marriage
certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nollora’s liability for bigamy.
Nollora’s false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.

G.R. No. 173540. January 22, 2014.*

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, petitioner, vs. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, respondent.

Civil Law; Documentary Evidence; Marriage Certificates; While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.—We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the
trial court. Quite recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 636 SCRA 420 (2010) we said, citing precedents,
that: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
FACTS
 This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now
deceased.
 Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
(Eustaquio).
 Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by
the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil registrar, the records of
the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but Eustaquio left his family in
1954.
 In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims
must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla presented eyewitnesses to the ceremony,
the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the fact that the marriage certificate/records were destroyed.
 Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989,
their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the marriage contract between her and Eustaquio.
 RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such
certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon over the lack of records.
 The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio
as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and testimonial evidence created sufficient proof of
the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE
Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

HELD
TECLA
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted. 

The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized
the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. 

In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the event. The subsequent
loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law.