Today is Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171914               July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, 
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of
property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
subsequent marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
2005,  whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional
1

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.  The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in
2

a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque,
Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal,
Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar
Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each
other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled
"AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial
Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY.
LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where
ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor
of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for
₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas
law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15,
1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100);
GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100);
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still
registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand
used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12,
1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found
therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm
named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment
became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had
no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso
share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed
to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from
her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of
ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned facts,  disposing thusly:
4
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas
Luna through his sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to
deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA. 6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE
SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY
FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT
IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND
LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE
DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG
SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR
 ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE. 7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE
OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW
OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES
AND ESTOPPEL. 8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,  holding and ruling:
9

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce
decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x 10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the
heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds
and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage) was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium
unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect
to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna"
to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby
declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 11

On March 13, 2006,  the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
12 13

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s approval of the
Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books. 14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in
the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the
second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the
Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia

subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947.
The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.  Pursuant to the
15

nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the
death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino
spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,  even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.  Indeed, the only two types of defective
16 17

marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the
Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.  Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the
18

divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up
to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution,  and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of
19

a conjugal and family life.  The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the
20

sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10,
1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the
Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the
event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil
Codeclearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of
the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership
of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil
Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the
petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition
for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code
concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)

But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for
divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to
the grounds raised in the action for divorce.  With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being
21

contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their
marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being
bigamous,  on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
22

rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.  A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
23 24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the
properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of
the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.  To establish co-ownership,
1âwphi1

therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court
explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals: 25

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by
the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase
of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in
the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.  The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed
1âwphi1

for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed,
the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence. 26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the
aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna
had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;  and that such aggregate contributions of
27

₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to
₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.  The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely
28

out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note;  that she had the financial capacity to
29

make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of
the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual contributions through the following
findings and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil
Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil
Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and thus it created a void
at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other
(for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community
between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another,
his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the
exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce
decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No.
L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used
for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial
court, viz.:

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which
was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978
in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan
of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the
loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that
the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was
simply not established. x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for
SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the
same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners
in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for
the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were
loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L.
Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually
purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask
from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were substantiated by the records and
because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,  did not serve
31

the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty.
Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the
properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole
ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,
1

Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.

2
 Id. at 198-210.

3
 Id. at 37-39.

4
 Id. at 198-210.

5
 Id. at 210.
6
 Id. at 211-214.

7
 Id. at 217-219.

8
 Id. at 283.

9
 Supra note 1.

10
 Rollo, p. 44.

11
 Id. at 50-51.

12
 Id. at 52-53.

13
 Id. at 54-65.

14
 Id. at 17.

15
 Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil Code, states:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

16
 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas(G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 277), the Court declares:

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and voidable marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before
or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union
for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.

17
 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.

18
 Rollo,p. 37.

19
 Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.

20
 Article 1, Family Code.

21
 Id. at 74, 81-82.

22
 Id. at 48.

23
 Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155, 158.

24
 The Civil Coderelevantly states:
 Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;

xxxx

 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

25

 Id. at 686-687.
26

 Rollo, pp. 23-24.

27

 Id. at 25.
28

 Id. at 27.
29

 Id. at 45-50.
30

 Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593, 602.
31

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Today is Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 205487               November 12, 2014

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, 

vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari  filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1

Court, assailing the decision  dated August 23, 2012 and the resolution  dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
2 3

CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.

The Factual Antecedents

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja
(Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung
Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.

At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186]  and 4

Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118]  were for sale for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to
5

the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On
August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349  for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
6

(₱100,000.00) as reservation fee.  On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350,  this time for
7 8

₱2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the
9

condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were then allegedly in
possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to
deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the
properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.

Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations
although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice
President Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 536  and Parking Slot No. 42.  CCT
10 11
No. 18186 representing the title to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for anannotation under Entry No.
73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to approval by the
Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on June 16,
2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in
possession of Perez.

To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim  dated September 8, 2003, withthe Registry of Deeds
12

of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the
titles.  Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its
13

reason.

On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang obtained another
loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof
Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.

On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42 (covered by CCT No. 9118) and
this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking lot’s title.

On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. At the pre-trial,
the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:

1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;

2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;

3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;

4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged Dacion en
Pago on October 15, 2003;

5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and

6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.

The RTC Ruling

In its decision  dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of Suzuki and
14

ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.

The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion’s. The
RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance
inthe titles. Although Orion claims to have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two
(2) months after he bought the properties because Orion never bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos.
18186 and 9116.

The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit. Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
 The CA Ruling

On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s right over the
properties. The CA further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186 pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only
serves as a warning to an SRRV holder about the implications of a conveyance of a property investment. It deviated from the
RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses for litigation and
cost of suit.

Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its January 25, 2013 resolution. Orion then
filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this Court.

The Petition and Comment

Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments: 15

1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any conveyance of
a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;

2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate copies of the CCTs;

3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any conveyance or
encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and

4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.

In his Comment,  Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal. Moreover, proof of
16

acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the presumption of conjugal
ownership.  Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of the law.
17

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly mistaken

In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-evaluation, and the Court
ordinarily abides by the uniform factual conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court.  In the present case, while the
18

courts below both arrived at the same conclusion, there appears tobe an incongruence in their factual findings and the legal
principle they applied to the attendant factual circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine certain factual issues in the
exercise of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may have been made. 19

Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property

Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this position, however, because
the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues,
and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a
reviewing court.  To consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.
20

Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the
correctness of the denial of the present petition.

It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located.  The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and
21

so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.22

Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae,
which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be
gained or lost.  This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and
23

the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. 24

This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature
may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei
sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is
undoubted. 25

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the spouses.  However,
26

the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact
to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.  He is presumed to know only
27

domestic or the law of the forum. 28

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues
pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely
attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea"  to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification,
29

does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated
bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. 30

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where
a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. 31

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Kang.  In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in
32
his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does
not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property.  In those cases, however, there was proof that the
33

properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community
properties.  Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of
34

spousal consent.

The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago

Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two or more duly executed contracts of sale.
In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003  between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion  and was
35 36

properly identified by Suzuki’s witness Ms. Mary Jane Samin (Samin). 37

It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract of sale, the seller obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates himself to pay
a price certain to the seller.  The execution of the notarized deed of saleand the actual transfer of possession amounted to
38

delivery that produced the legal effect of transferring ownership to Suzuki. 39

On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first in time,
stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and due execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.

At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove the existence of the
February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory
note dated September 4, 2002 as Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional ₱800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however,
denied the admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its order dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not
identified in court by any witness."40

Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a tender ofexcluded evidence, as provided
under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For this reason alone, we are prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5"
and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition.

Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition, the copious
inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and documentary evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion that the
Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First, there appears to be no due and demandable obligation when the Dacion en Pago was
executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orion’s witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang was in default in
his ₱1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:
 ATTY. CRUZAT:

Q: Okay, so this loan of ₱1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?

A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr. Kangand...

Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]

A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans and we have executed a dacion en
pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just execute[d] the dacion en pago rather than going
through the Foreclosure proceedings.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?

A: February 6, 2003, your Honor. 41

A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to speak of when the supposed Dacion en
Pagowas executed.

Based on the promissory note, Kang’s loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can Orion claim that Kang
had been in default in his installment payments because the wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this
loanand its interest and other charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS.  "There 42

was thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.

Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only have a vague idea of the transaction he
supposedly prepared. During his cross-examination, he testified:

ATTY. DE CASTRO:

Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?

A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.

xxxx

Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and surcharge due from Mr. Yung
Sam Kang?

A: It’s just the principal, sir.

Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?

A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually includethat but....

Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?

A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as of February 10, 2003, the
 outstanding obligation which is due and demandable principal and interest and other charges included amounts
to ₱1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.

xxxx

Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other charges, based on this document?

A: Yes, based on that document, sir. 43

Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the ₱1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate mortgage.
However, no document was ever presented to prove this real estate mortgage aside from it being mentioned in
the Dacion en Pago itself.

ATTY. DE CASTRO:

Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that Credit Line Agreement referring to
this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that there was a subsequent collateralization or
security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]

Kang for the loan?

xxxx

A: The [dacion en pago], sir. 44

Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin demanded the delivery of the titles
sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it was only
on October 9, 2003, when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates first spoke of the Dacion en
Pago.  Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on October 1, 2003, when he personally received a letter demanding the
45

delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter and opted to first consult with his lawyer.
46

Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital of facts surrounding the execution of the
Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that "on [September 4, 2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and was
granted a new Credit Line Facility by [Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,800,000.00)."
Perez, however, testified that there was "no cash movement" in the original ₱1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony, he said:

COURT:

xxxx

Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate mortgage for that first ₱1,000,000.00
loan?

A: It’s a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.

xxxx

Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this ₱1,000,000.00 loan?
 A: None sir.

Q: No payments?

A: None sir.

Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to the principal, by way ofpayment of
interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this loan?

A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.

Q: There was no actual cash?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an ₱800,000.00 additional right?

A: Yes, sir. 47

Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in
possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the
property even six (6) months after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer
possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon. If Orion really purchased the
condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true owner, why did it not assert its ownership immediately after the
alleged sale took place? Why did it have to assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles? These
gaps have remained unanswered and unfilled.

In Suntay v. CA,  we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete absence of anattempt on the part of the
48

vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the property in question. After the sale, the vendee should have entered the land
and occupied the premises. The absence of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion over the property
allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding the execution of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in
possession of the disputed condominium unit – from the time of the execution of the Dacion en Pagountil the property’s
subsequent transfer to Suzuki – unmistakably strengthens the fictitious nature of the Dacion en Pago.

These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of Orion’s witness, indubitably
prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en Pago.

The fact that the Dacion en Pago

is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance

Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be considered as containing all the terms
of the agreement.  While a notarized document enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of
49

the validity of its contents."  The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear
50

and convincing evidence to the contrary. 51

In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the execution of the Dacion en Pago and the loan
documents was challenged in the proceedings below where their prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly questionable
circumstances surrounding their execution. 52

Effect of the PRA restriction on

the validity of Suzuki’s title to the
property

Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In particular, Orion assails the status
of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view of the express PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186. 53

We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect the conveyance in favor of
Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur withthe following findings of the CA:

x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special Resident Retiree’s Visa(SRRV) that he shall
lose his visa if he disposes his property which serves as his investment in order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the
Implementing Investment Guidelines under Rule VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Executive Order No. 1037,
Creating the Philippine Retirement Park System Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the
Philippine Retirement Authority) states:

Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or transfer the same to another domestic
enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his condominium unit or units to another person, natural or juridical without the prior
approval of the Authority, the Special Resident Retiree’s Visa issued to him, and/or unmarried minor child or children[,] may be
cancelled or revoked by the Philippine Government, through the appropriate government department or agency, upon
recommendation of the Authority. 54

Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction. Orion
knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted with Kang. Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating Kang’s request to cancel
the mortgage annotation despite the lack of payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from impugning
the validity of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and "attempted" to
circumvent.

With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason for the application of the
rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code. Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to
establish the validity of conveyance in his favor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
 Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 8-31.

 Id. at 35-51; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-
2

Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurring.

3
 Id. at 53-55.

4
 Records, Vol. I, pp. 257-258.

5
 Id. at 259-260.

6
 Id. at 250.

7
 Id. at 251.

8
 Id. at 252.

9
 Id. at 253-254.

10
 Id. at 270

11
 Id. at 271.

12
 Id. at 262.

13
 Id. at 263-264.

14
 Id. at 92-135.

15
 Id. at 8-31.

16
 Id. at 65-89.

17
 Id.
  Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157, 166.
18

 Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 (1942). See also New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005),
19

citing Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 401 SCRA 79, the Supreme
Court recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: "(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion."

 Hubert Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 368 SCRA 134, 145.
20

 Agpalo, Ruben E., Conflict of Laws, 2004 Ed., p. 182.

21

 Salonga, Jovito R., Private International Law, 1995 Ed., p. 132, citing Wolff 515.
22

 Agpalo, Ruben E., Conflict of Laws, 2004 Ed., p. 183.

23

 Id.
24

 Id.
25

 Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the
26

property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration
of the marriage and their residence.

This rule shall not apply:

(1) Where both spouses are aliens;

(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
executed in the country where the property is located; and

(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.

 ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010, 632 SCRA 528, 534.
27

 Id.
28

 Rollo, pp. 57-58.

29

 Id.
30
  Supranote 26.
31

 Stuart v. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083, 1084-1085 (1962); Magallon v. Montejo, 230 Phil. 366, 377 (1986).
32

 Bucoy v. Paulino, 131 Phil. 790 (1968).

33

 See Mendoza v. Reyes, 209 Phil. 120 (1983).

34

 Records, Vol. I, pp. 213-214.

35

 Id. at 291.
36

 TSN, February 28, 2005, pp. 29-36.

37

 NEW CIVIL CODE, Article 1458.

38

 Id., Article 1496 in relation to Article 1498.

39

 Records, Vol. II, p. 395.

40

 TSN, June 1, 2007, pp. 32-33, emphasis supplied.

41

 Records, Vol. II, p. 369. In fact, so important was the single payment arrangement that Orion only allowed
42

installment payments upon additional payment of Two Percent (2.00%) per annum service fee and a written
notice to Orion of not less than thirty(30) days prior to the proposed payment.

 TSN, December 17, 2007, pp. 29-32, emphasis supplied.

43

 Id. at. 22.

44

 Records, Vol. II, pp. 371-372.

45

 Records, Vol. I, pp. 263-267.

46

 TSN, December 17, 2007, pp. 14-16, emphasis supplied.

47

 321 Phil. 809, 831-832 (1995).

48

 Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209, 215 (1919).

49

 Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 707, 725 (2000);San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April 24, 2009,
50

586 SCRA 439, 445-446.

 Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 298, 309; Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396,
51

406 (2003).

 San Juan v. Offril, supra note 50.

52
  Entry No. 73321/C-10186-RESTRICTIONS: IN an instrument duly subscribed and sworn to, VERNETTE
53

UMALI-PACO, CESO II, Phil. Retirement Authority, states that the property described herein is subject to the
following restriction: "The sale, transfer, or encumbrance of this property is subject to the approval of the
Philippine Retirement Authority, the owner-named herein being a holder of Special Resident Retiree’s Visa
(SRRV), and is therefore, subject to the provision of Executive Order No. 1037 and it0`s implementing Rules and
Regulations." (Doc. No. 68, p. 14, Bk.XIV, s. of 2000 of Not. Pub. For Mand. *City, Eddie Fernandez, dated June
23, 2000.) Date of Inscription-June 23, 2000-1:33 p.m.

 Rollo, p. 47.
54

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Today is Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, 
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Orders  dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu),
1

which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990.  On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of
2

the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland.  At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.  Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
4 5

Philippines. 6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or less).  However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
7

Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been
residing thereat.  Respondent and his new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
9

Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.  To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
10

City.
11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
refused to receive the letter. 12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner.  Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.  Thereafter,
13 14

the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged
against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against respondent. Consequently,16

respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.  Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection
17

Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.  Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.  Subsequently,
18 19

without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.
20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,  dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent
21

on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused,
he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and
ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010. 22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under
Article 195  of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons
23

in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."
24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order  denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its
25

previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution.
Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The
Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent
to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence,
the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010. 26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the same was
directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,  which
28

lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only
questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the
instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of
the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability of a foreign
national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights
and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which
will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the
CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and
economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s
contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support
exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 195  of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends
30
that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,  respondent is not
31

excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her
minor son, are entitled to financial support.  Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated
32

topetitioner for any financial support. 33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195  of the New Civil Code in demanding support
34

from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15  of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other
35

words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,  the Court held that –

38

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code
cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code
as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law.  In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on
40

the matter of provision of and capacity to support.  While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
41

position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,  has already enunciated that:
42

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.  Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation
44

to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,  the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may
45

be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,  which was not disputed by respondent.
46
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation
to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the
ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,  to wit:
47

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law
would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said
foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up
of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any
one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize
the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to
the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance
with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,  to wit:
49

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262
for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right
to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat
of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following
acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.
51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered anact of violence against
women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides
that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging
violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of
crime  under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
52

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under
Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,  which started in
53

1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1896 dated
November 28, 2014

1
 Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; Annexes "A" and "B" to Petition, respectively, rollo, pp. 22-26.

2
 Rollo, p. 6.

3
 Id.

4
 Id. at 7.

5
 Annex "F" to Petition, rollo, p. 31.

6
 Id. at 32.
7
 Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 23-24.

8
 Id. at 24.

9
 Id.at 32.

10
 Id.

11
 Supra note 7, at 23-24.

12
 Supra note 5, at 32.

13
 Rollo, p. 7.

14
 Id.

15
 Id. at 22.

16
 Id.

17
 Id. at 24.

18
 Id. at 8.

19
 Id.

20
 Id.

21
 Supra note 7.

22
 Id.at 24.

 Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to
23

the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.

24
 Annex "R" to Petition, rollo, p. 102.

25
 Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 25.
  Id.
26

 Rollo, p. 10.
27

 G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.

28

 Id.at 332-333.
29

 Supra note 23.

30

 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
31

where they were solemnized, and valid there assuch, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

 Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, p. 123.

32

 Id. at 122.
33

 Supra note 23.

34

 Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
35

binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

 Supra note 7, at 24.

36

 Id.
37

 G.R. No. L-25441, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 616.

38

 Id. at 625-626. (Emphasis supplied)

39

 EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).

40

 Annex "N" to Petition, rollo, p. 84.

41

 399 Phil. 342 (2000).

42

 Id. at 354. (Emphasis supplied)

43

 Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999).
44

 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

45

 Rollo, p. 18.
46
  Supra note 44.
47

 Id.at 1296-1297. (Emphasis supplied)

48

 543 Phil. 275 (2007).

49

 Id.at 290.
50

 Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. (Emphasis supplied)

51

 Rollo, p. 15.
52

 In People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 722 (2009), it was held that:
53

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of acts
but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime
committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR
No. 193707, 2014-12-10

Facts:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman

Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.[3]

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a

Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that
time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.[5] Thereafter,
petitioner and her son... came home to the Philippines.[6]

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly

support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene

However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in... the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.[8]

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in

Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.

To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living
in Cebu City.[11]

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter

demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter.[12]

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-

affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City

Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold
Departure Order against respondent.[16]  Consequently, respondent was
arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.

Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order

Subsequently,... respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21]
dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25] denying

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

Issues:

Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor

child under Philippine law

Ruling:

We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with

petitioner's contentions.

we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of

the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family
rights and duties.  Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of
his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
[37]

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to

support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.

This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support...
petitioner's son altogether.

In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the

Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is... the
same as our local or domestic or internal law.[44] Thus, since the law of
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which... enforces the obligation of parents to
support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

the

Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show

that he is not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree
was issued.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national
law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their
children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would
still not find applicability,... Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a... foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the

principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a
single cause of action.

Principles:

the doctrine of processual presumption