4 Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent Force Level and Missile Capabilities ‘There is no obvious ‘Pakistani nuclear inferiority’ in South Asia, uss! * This chapter continues the analysis of Pakistan's postests nuclear posture, and the strategic dilemmas and challenges that Islamabad confronts in crafting that posture, particularly focusing on Pakistan’s current strategic force level and its approach to building a force structure. In absence of any official government source materials, considerable ambiguities do exist regarding Pakistan's current nuclear force level and its deterrent force structure. payload and range ofits missiles and, above all, on how and from whom it acquired its missile systems. But it is generally assumed that Pakistan has built a robust deterrent force relative to its chief strategic rival, India, and that that force has a sufficient evel of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles. This chapter proceeds in the following manner: initially it explores the current level of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads, and its force-building approach. Following on, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of Pakistan's deliv- ery capabilities, particularly its missile systems and the approach to procure them. Current level of nuclear warheads . ‘As noted in the preceding chapter, Pakistan has adopted a minimum nuclear deterrence strategy. Although the notion — ‘minimum’ ~ is extremely vague in terms of actual force level, it nonetheless highlights Islamabad's intention to build a smal, albeit credible, nuclear deterrent force. Islamabad adopted a ‘quantitative’ force build-up approach following the May 1998 nuclear tests and set a numerical target for its minimitm deterrent. It seems as will be discussed in what follows, that Islamabad succeeded in achieving the set target in the ensuing years, although outside the close government circles no one is exactly certain about the actual size of the current Pakistani nuclear arsenal. As the following tible suggests, there are considerable variations in the estimates about Pakistan’s current force level.iss! ear posture, confronts in ent strategic sence of any es do exist ree structure, 1 relation to Pakistan has dia, and that vehicles. explores the 1g approach. istan's deliv- h to procure 1um nuclear ly vague d's intention. adopted a nuclear tests 8 as will be ving the set ont circles no stani nuclear variations in i Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent 59 Table 4.1 Estimates of the Pakistani Nuclear Arsenal Centre for Defence Information (2005) 24-48 weapons, plus stockpile of 30-52 more Camegie Endowment for International stockpile of 60-130 weapons Peace (2005) Arms Control Association (2005) 30-50 warheads ‘Natural Resource Defence Council Stockpile of 55-90 weapons, including (2005) 40-50 assembled Contre for Contemporary Conflict (2006) stockpile of 65-110 weapons Stockholm International Peace Research 60 weapons Institute (2006) International Institute for Strategic 50 warheads, plus stockpile of 76-90 Studies (2007) ‘weapons mm a As at the beginning of 2008, Pakistan probably possesses 60-80 nuclear warheads This figure is based on the following argument. After the May 1998 nuclear tests, Islamabad indicated that it would pursue a minimum nuclear deterrence strategy and’ build a minimum nuclear deterrent cap- ability. It is difficult to infer tended size of the a this vague expression, However, the strategic thinking regarding minim- ality in quantitative terms was reflected in the argument of Samar Mubarakmand, an influential scientist in Pakistan's nuclear hierarchy who headed the nuclear test team in 1998, that 60 to 70 nuclear warheads would be sufficient to give Pakistan a credible nuclear deterrence against India? In a similar vein, Brigadier (Retd) Nacem Ahmad Selik, a former Strategic Plans Division official, has also posited that Pakistan would need 68-70 nuclear warheads to achieve minimum nuclear deterrence capability? Arguably, these views represented the strategic thinking regarding the minimum deterrent force level at the time when Islamabad undertook a nuclear warhead development plan in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests, In the tests’ aftermath, Islamabad adopted a quantitative force-building posture specifying both short-term (2000-05) and long-term (10-12 year duration) development goals The short-term goal was perhaps achieved in due time as President General Pervez Musharraf announced in early 2005: In the past we used to keep it quantified in the conventional weapons and now, ever since we have faced the nuclear and missile threat, in response we also quantified that ~ we quantified the minimum level. And today, I have been very pleased to announce that we have crossed that ‘minimum deterrence level.*60 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent ‘Musharraf's announcement meant that Pakistan had achieved the force level that was set in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. Therefore, it is rea- sonable to argue that Pakistan currently possesses 60-80 nuclear warheads. Additionally, Pakistan possesses a significant stockpile of fissile materials, As at the end of 2006, it probably had a stockpile of 1,300-301,500 kg HEU (highly entiched uranium), from which Pakistan could build approximately 65-75 weapons, and 90 kg of plutonium, which would be enough to build 11-15 bombs. By looking at the facts and figures, it is plausible to argue that Pakistan has acquired a credible level of nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis India. There is a debate regarding the actual yields of the Pakistani devices, which it tested in May 1998. Although the Pakistanis claimed to have | igh-VHeld devises, it is generally assimed thal they were of a Jow-yield HEU variety.® There is no doubt that Islamabad would strive to “build higher yield nuclear warheads, even possibly thermo-nuclear weapons, because such weapons would make Pakistan's minimum deterrence more credible, Currently Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal consists primarily of HEU weapons; hhence a-particular emphasis of Pakistani defence planners would be to increase the number of plutonium warheads. In terms of efficiency, pluto- nium warheads are lighter and smaller, and are’ therefore suitable for Pakistani missiles. A second heavy-water reactor at Khushab and the widely suspected ongoing construction of a reprocessing plant at Chasma signify this trend in Pakistan's weapons development” Pakistan's drive to build Plutonjum-based nuclear weapons will be significantly boosted when the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) completes the construction of Khushab-IL This CANDU-type reactor will be able to produce 200 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually! The exact status of Pakistan's deployment and alert posture is unknown. However, Islamabad claims that Pakistan has not deployed nuclear weapons. Pakistan at this stage does not possess a ready nuclear arsenal, neither probably does it intend to upgrade its nuclear arsenal to such a status. The strategic thinking regarding this issue in Islamabad’s military and political circles is tat while readiness to use nuclear weapons enhances the credibility of nuclear deterrence, itis preferable not to create a ready nuclear arsenal. Indeed, there sno indication from the Pakistani authorities that any weapon has been mated with the delivery systems, Even the fissile cores are believed to have been kept separated from the warheads and are stored in different places. According to George Perkovich, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are reportedly stored in com- Ponent form, with the fissile core separated from non-nuclear explosives? Instead of opting for a ready arsenal, Pakistan has adopted a strategy that ensures a quick assembly of nuclear weapons from various components within a relatively short period of time. How quickly Pakistan can assemble nuclear devices is again a matter of speculation, and experts’ views in this regard range from ‘minites” ta thous?ce level is rea heads aterials, HEU simately to build argue vis-a-vis devices, to have sre of a strive to weapons, ce more weapons; Id be to 3, pluto- table for he widely ta signify to build when the suction of 200 kg of unkiiown. ‘weapons. r probably » strategic clesis that f nuclear leed, there ‘mated been kept cording to din com- josives? categy that smponents, » assemble ws in this Army Staff Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent 61 General (Retd) Mirza Aslam Beg claims that various components of weap- cons are kept ‘many miles away’ from the delivery systems; hence the gap between the start of assembling various components and making a weapon ready for launch could be hours, or even days.'@ Despite Islamabad's claim of ‘non-deployment’ of nuclear weapons and its decision not to create 2 ready arsenal, the actual deployment status of nuclear weapons raises questions, There are indications that Islamabad began the process of arming the armed forces with nuclear weapons follow- ing the 1998 nuclear tests. Pakistan has created @ tri-command structure within the three armed services. The process of integration is also visible in other operational activities of the armed forces, For example, in July 2002, the Strategic Plans Division participated in the week-long joint forces war game at the National Defence College.”” Strategiqg force commanders are now regularly invited to participate in the meetings of the core commanders. Pakistan's storage faciities-are located on the military bases. This is con- sistent with the current understanding of deployment and means that weap- ons components have been transferred to military units for storage and for rapid mating of components with the delivery systems This led David Albright to conclude that Pakistan’s case is indeed a ‘partial deployment." From another angle, the deployment status and the alert level of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons also raise questions because for Pakistan thesé issues are to be determined, to some extent, by forces beyond its control. For example, the ‘India factor’, in general, and Islamabad’s perception of Indian threat level at a particular time and in a given context, in particular, will critically influence Pakistan’s nuclear weapons deployment and alert status. Currently, of course, it does not appear that the Indian threat level is con- sidered by the Pakistanis to be very high. Hence, there is no urgency to raise the alert level. Given the history of the crisis-prone it is FeasOnAbTe To argue That tie current deploy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may change very rapidly in the context of Indo- Pakistani strategic dynamics, Nuclear delivery systems Pakistan possesses two types of nuclear delivery vehicles: aircraft and mis- siles, Initially in the pre-tests era, Islamabad depended solely on aircraft as, its chief means of delivering nuclear weapons. In the early 1990s, Pakistan acquired a few dozen missiles from China, and, subsequently, it developed a ‘umber of missile systems which became its mainstay of nuclear delivery. | Aircraft Aircraft constitute an important component of Pakistan’s nuclear delivery force, As noted above, initially Islamabad solely relied on aircraft for nuclear delivery. Although missiles replaced aircraft as the chief means of delivering62 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent nuclear weapons in the 1990s, aircraft still remains an important component of Pakistan's nuclear delivery force. The retaining of aircraft as nuclear delivery vehicles diversifies Pakistan’s nuclear delivery capability and strengthens the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. Pakistan possesses nuclear deliverable French-origin Mirage-5, US-supplied F-16, and Chinese A-S aircraft. Table 42 Nuclear-Capable Pakistani Aireraft eee Type ‘Range Inventory Fie am 925 km us 358 Mirage 5 PA 1,300 km 50 AS 1600 kn ee eee any Missile systems: current capabilities and politics of acquisition A survey of the global ballistic missile proliferation trends in recent dec- ‘ades “Conducted by Camegie Endowment for International Peace — reveals that while ballistic missile proliferation was alarmingly upward in the 1980s, it began to drop from the beginning of the 1990s. Compared to the late 1980s, the Carnegie study found that the number of countries possessing ballistic missiles, and the sheer number of missiles and their sophistication had substantially reduced at the beginning of the 21st century." Against this slobal trend, ballistic missile proliferation and the growing sophistication of ballistic missiles continued unabated in South Asia throughout the 1990s Both India and Pakistan persistently strived to upgrade their missile cap- abilities in a competitive fashion, and this trend, quite alarmingly, still con- tinues. To date, bath Pakistan and India possess substantively advanced and lethal missile arsenals. . Missile capabilities of Pakistan: an inventory Pakistan's missile arsenal is composed of varied types of short- and medium- range ballistic missile systems as well as two types of cruise missile systems Ballistic missiles are made of both solid and liquid propellant and can carry conventional as well as non-conventional ammunition. To be precise, Pakistan’s ballistic missiles capabilities include the solid-fuelled Hatf battle~ field missile series, the liquid-fuelled Ghauri intermediate-range ballistic mis- siles, and the solid-propeltant Shaheen series. In addition to ballistic missiles, Pakistan has developed two types of cruise missile systems — the Babar and the Raad. Additionally, Pakistan possesses several dozen M-11 missiles, Which Beijing supplied to Pakistan in the early 1990s E Table ‘Missil Syster Hasf- Haif- ‘Abd Hatf- Gia Hat. Sha Hatf Gh Haif She MlPakistan's Nuclear Deterrent 63 Table 4.3 Pakistan's Missle Capabil ee Missile Type First Test Rangelkos — Payloadikg Fuel System Hatf-l BRBM — early 1989 50-90 450 solid Haff} BRBM early 1989 70-200 450 solid ‘Abdali Hatf-it! SRBM 26 May 2002 —100-290 800 solid Ghaznavi Hatf-IV! IRBM 15 April 1999 200-650 850 solid ‘Shaheen-1 Hatf-V IRBM 6 April 1998 300-1300 680, liquid Ghauri-1 Hatf-V1 TRBM = 9 March 2004 700-2,200 1,100 solid Shaheen-2 Ghawri-2 IRBM 14 April 1999 1,800 1,500 liquid Ml SREM 280-300 800-1200 Solid Hatf-VO11 SLCM 12 August 2005 500 ‘Babar Hay Va) ALCM 25 August 200% 350, aad. ———————— BRBM = battlfield-range ballistic missle; SRBM = short-range ballistic missile; IRBM = intermediate-range ballistic missle; SLCM = submarine-launched eruise missile; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, .Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks: A net assessment Condon: MISS, 2007), p. 23; Major General (Retd) Makmud, Ali: Durrani, "Pakistan’s Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons’, Cooperative Monitoring Centre Occasional Paper, SAND 2004 3375, Sandia National Laboratories, July 2004; Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 39, July 2002, pp. 12431; available at hetp:/wwwpakistanidefence com/Nuclear&Missiles/Pakist ‘ani Ballistic Missileshtml; The News (Rawalpindi), 25 August 2007, ATE. ‘The original variant of Haif-I was a single-stage, solid-fuelled rocker, which had a range of 50-90 km, and could carry a 450-kg-payload ordnance.'* It ‘was first tested in early 1989, but its accuracy remained unknown and hence analysts suspected the accuracy of this missile system. It is also very doubtful whether the original variant of Hay/1 could actually cary a nuclear war- head. It is more likely that it was intended to carry high explosives, sub- ‘munitions, and possibly chemical weapons. After its first test, Haif-I went into oblivion for a long period of time, and only came back to the limelight when a modified variant, with about 2 100-km range, was test-fired in February 2000.1? There is no clear explanation from the Pakistani autho- tities as to why it was kept dormant for such an extended period of time, or why it reappeared. A plausible explanation for reviving Hay/-1 missile is, pethaps, that after the experience in the 1999 Kargil War a tactical delivery vehicle was felt to be necessary. Islamabad is widely believed to have received os64 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent Chinese technical assistance in the development of this missile in the 1980s. This missile system has already been deployed and Pakistan probably cur. ently possesses as many as 80 Harf-1 missiles.'® HATPAABDALE 1-fuel ballistic missile system which has a 70-200 km range and can carry 450-kg-payload munitions." Its first test took place in early 1989 simultancously with Haif-J, Pakistan is believed to have received technical assistance from the Chinese in order to develop this missile, just as it did with Hag-I. Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that Pakist had admitted that they had received Chinese assistance in i missile programme and specifically mentioned Chinese help in developing the guidance system of Hayf-I and Haf-I After its first test in 1989, nothing was heard about Hai/-I/ until the project was revived in 1997. There oo “~--is av etpianadon 9H Tle Palani goverament acters the project was suspended and later revived. A number of reasons can be inferred for the suspension of the Hatf-I1 project. One probable reason is that the project suffered technical difficulties which forced Islamabad to suspend it. Another reason could be that it was merged with another Project. Or it could even be that the project was abandoned as this missile resembled the M-11 missile system which China supplied to Pakistan in the early 1990s?! The project was revived in 1997, probably in light of its potential use as a battlefield Gclivery system. A new variant of Haif-II was developed upon the project’s renewal, and was tested on 28 May 2002. Pakistan conducted a series of tests of this missile system in 2003, 2005, and 2006. This missile system is generally considered to be very accurate. Hence it can be used against specific targets, such as military bases, airfields, etc. It is carried on a road mobile transporter-crector-launcher (TEL) vehicle, As it is solid-fuel system and as it uses a TEL vehicle, this missile is easy to store, ‘transport, and launch. Given these characteristics of this missile system, its Potential use as a tactical weapon in a limited war context is enormous WATE-HUGHAZNAVE Hagf-I1 is a solid-fuel, single-stage ballistic missile which has a maximum range of 290 km and is capable of carrying a 800-kg payload. It can deliver both conventional ordnance as well as nuclear warheads It was first tested on 26 May 2002. This system closely resembles the Chinese M-9 missile2? Ghaznavi missiles were formally inducted into the Army's Strategic Forces Command in February 2004. » MATRIVISHAHEEN-1 [tis a solid-fuel, road-mobile missile system, which has a maximum range of 650 km, and is capable of carrying a 850-kg-payload warhead. It is widely believed to t missile syste (NDC), a sul its serial prov Strategic For HATE VIGHAL® | Ghawr-l is a ballistic missi city of 680 4 India’s devel. developed in place on 6 Ar © Army's Sirate resembles Ne Pakistan obta from North ¥ Democratic F ‘enrichment pr HATE-VIISHAH Shaheen-2 is a is an improvec and is capable Shaheen-II ha system * It is a separating re displayed durit was tested on ‘ ouavera Ghauri2 isanis Like Ghauré-1, stage IRBM. kg-payload am welt Pakistan has a which Beijing, mobile, solid-pr and is capable ¢Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent 65 believed to be a scaled-up version of China's M-11 missile* The Shaheen missile system was developed in the National Development Complex (NDC), a subsidiary of the PAEC. It was first tested in April 1999, although its serial production began in 1998.7 It was inducted into Pakistan Army's Strategic Forces Command in March 2003, MATP-VIGHAURE-1 Ghauri-1 is a single-stage, liquid-propellant, road-mobile intermediate range ballistic missile (RBM), and has a range of 1300 km with a payload capa- city of 680 kg. Pakistan specifically developed the Ghauri in response to India’s development of the Prithvi missile system2* The Ghauri-1 was developed in the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and its first test took place on 6 April 1998. The Ghauri-I was formally inducttd into the Pakistan Ammy’s Strategic Forces Command in January 2003. This missile closely resembles North Korea's Nodong missile, and it is widely believed that Pakistan obtained the design and technologies to build this missile system from North Korea in the early 1990s in exchange for its assistance to the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea's (DPRK's) clandestine uranium- enrichment programme.” HATE-VISHAHEEN-2 ‘Shaheen-2 is a road-mobile, two-stage, solid-fuel ballistic missile system and is an improved version of Shaheen-1. It has a maximum range of 2,200 km and is capable of carrying a 1,100-kg-payload warhead. Many speculate that Shaheen-iI bas been developed from the design of Chinese M-18 missile system* It is a considerably sophisticated and accurate missile system with 4 separating re-entry vehicle, Before it had a test-flight, this missile was first displayed during the Pakistan Day Parade on 23 March 2000 and eventually ‘was tested on 9 March 2004, oMAURL2 Ghauri-2 is an improved version of the original variant of this series — Ghauri Like Ghauri-1, itis iquid-propellant, but unlike its predecessor, itis a two- [stage IRBM. It has a range of 1800 km and is capable of carrying a 1,500 kg-payload ammunition. Its first test fight took place on 14 April 1999. went Pakistan has about three dozens of Chinese-manufactured M-11 missiles, which Beijing, as noted earlier, supplied in early 1990s. M-IL is a road- mobile, solid-propellant missile system, which has a range of 280-300 km and is capable of carrying a maximum payload of 1200-kg of munitions.66 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent HATF-VIUIBABAR Babar is a subsonic, low-level terrain-mapping and terrain-hugging cruise’ missile system. It closely resembles the American BGM-109 Tomahawk raise mise Barbar wns developed as part ofthe Hf sexien (Ha/-Vi and as & PATBEOP-SO kin. is frst est ight ‘After modifcations it may be possible to launch this mise from ships, submarines, and aircraft. Islamabad probably has undertaken a new project. to upgrade the Babar and develop a new variant of this missile system (Babar-2) that will increase its range and payload. Serial production of the original variant of Babar began in October 2005. HATP-VIIURAAD This is an air launch cruise missile (ALCM) with a range of 350 km and can carry a varied payload of munitions, According to Pakistan military sources, the ‘Raad can carry all types of warheads and has an accuracy comparable to Pakistan's longer Babar cruise missile’. Dynamics of Pakistan’s missile capability build-up: origins and its evolution In the absence of any authentic government source materials, itis dificult to be certain about when the Pakistani authorities began to pay serious atten- tion to developing the country’s missile capabilities or when it actually launched a missile development programme. However, activities surround ing the country’s space programme in the early 1980s indicate that Islamabad probably at that point realized the necessity of building missile capabilities. In 1981, while elaborating a 10-year national space programme, Salim Mahmood, chairperson of Pakistan Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO), pointed out that the government had been studying in detail the configuration of a satellite which could” ‘serve strategic purposes by taking pictures of military installations, army move- ments and acting as control, command and communication bases’? It is noteworthy that SUPARCO came into being in 1981 against the backdrop of India’s fight-testing of the SLV-3 in July 1980 and the widespread concern that it generated in Pakistan due tothe possibilty that New Delhi might use it forthe development of strategic mi considerable importance tothe works of SUPARCO, The fat that President Zia-ul Haq himself headed the organization itself was a clear indication that the government was priaritizing its works. Notwithstanding the growing awareness within the Pakistani military, political and bureaucratic circles about the necessity to build missile cap- abilities, there was, however, a conspicuous lack of seriousness about pursu- ing a missile development programme in the early 1980s Shortage of68 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent reaction Islamabad geared up, albeit clandestinely, its HagfI and Hatf-If missile projects, j India, following the launching of the IGMDP, quickly developed the Prithvi and. Agni missile systems and tested them in 1988 and 1989 respec. tively. Those tests reinforced the Pakistani resolve to expeditiously build a countervailing missile force. In particular, India’s testing of the Prithvi mis. sile on 18 February 1988, which was generally considered to be Pakistan. specific, made a critical impact on the Pakistani strategic calculation. It not only expedited Pakistan's missile development endeavour, it also forced Islamabad to foster secret links with friendly countries, such as China and North Korea, in order to expeditiously build its iissile capabilities, Pakistan's sustained effort soon bore fruit, which can be observed in its development and testing of Hag/-T and Haif-il in early 1989, When asked why Pakistan was developing ballistic missiles, Pakistan's then Minister of State for Defence, Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, replied that Pakistan needed ‘to have an antidote for what our enemy (India) next door has’ +? Because of a weak industrial and technological base, Pakistan was to a large extent dependent on the supply of relevant technologies from extemal sources in order to build its missiles. From the outset, however, Islamabad confronted a hostile international environment, which severely impeded the expeditious development of its missile capabilities. For one thing, Islamabad ‘was already widely suspected of pursuing a ‘clandestine nuclear weapons Programme and was under severe pressure from the West, in particular the US, to abandon its nuclear weapons ambition. Washington imposed sa tions on Pakistan in 1979 for the clandestine procurement of uranium. enrichment | technologies, which violated the Glenn-Symington Amendment. Pakistan, therefore, was under the close watch of the West, and was a target country under the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group's (NSG) so. salled trigger Jist items Additionally, the creation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987 came as a crippling, blow to Islamabad’s search for missile technologies from the international market. Such a hostile international envionment, on the one hand, and the. strateg necessity “Of Guiickely building missile capabilities, on the other, forcéd Islamabad to use clandestine means to procure missile technologies. It was in this content that Islamabad fostered secret links with Beijing and Pyongyang. On 25 April 1988, the Pakistani government claimed that it had launched an 800-km-range ballistic missile** This raised eyebrows amongst observers as at that stage it was not realistically feasible for Pakistan to build a missile of that range. No independent source is available to verify the Pakistan claim. However, it did highlight the Pakistani concern regarding India’s Prithvi missle and Islamabad’s desperate attempt to acquire a countervailing missile force, Indeed, the Pakistani government indicated that this missile system was developed to counter India’s growing missile capability.® In carly 1989, Pakistan test-fired a 150-kg multi-stage rocket at an altitude of 640 Kilometres, which was soon followed by the testing of short-range,Hatf-I vped the ) respee- build a ‘ht mis ‘akistan- 2. It not » forced ina and abilities, d in its 1 asked tister of xed ‘to as toa external unabad ded the umabad ‘eapons ilar the i sane- Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent 69 {iid-propellant, Hay/-1 and Haif-II missles. China provided, as noted ear- lit, vital assistance to Islamabad to help it develop these two missie sys pale e ouing the test of Hagfl and Hay, Pakistan embarked upon building longer-range missile then, that Islamabad undertook new Missile projects and expeditiously pursued them. Pakistan’ then Chief of Army Staf, General Mirza Aslam Beg, stated that Pakistan had embicked on 8 Rew project to develop a missile with a range of 600 km that would ‘enable his country to strike New Delhi.” poke, Islamabad conciuded a secret deal with Beijing to purchase 34 lit-propellant M-1! ballistic misles** This deal resulted from Islamabad frantic effort to build missil to counte# India’s growing missile power and was catalyzed by two specific factors: (1) a hostile internatinal cavgonment created by the formation of the NSG and the MCTR, which ade ‘the Procurement of relevant technologies ~ for the development ot Zfissies ~ from open, international sources very difficult; and (2) the text or 1g Pakistan-specifc Prithy! missile in 1988 and the Agni missle in 1989 by India, which made, i building priorities. Washington Post, only sold manufactured M-I1_ solide janine the eaciy, 1590s, Wt had abo transferred to Pakistan the production, technology for a solid-fuel ballistic-missite manufacturing plant Islamabad also established seeret links with Pyongyang which was another sear tissile technology. It is unknown how and when this link ne established or who - Zia-ul Haq or Benazir Bhutto is, however, Nodong missile. In July Deputy Premier Kim Yong-nam, who was also Foreign Minister, visited Islamabad and discussed issues pertaining to missile Spoperation and his country’s sale of Nodong missiles to Pakistan, Io May Nag, Pakistan scientists and engincers were present at atest launch oh the | Nedong ia an unknown location in North Korea, Prime Mince Benazir Bhutto herself visited Pyongyang on 30 December 1993, which, probably was 4 tgening Point in the Pakistan-DPRK collaboration in the mise sea nuclear fields It is widely speculated that a ‘missile for nuclear technology’ Gea! was negotiated during her visit. This was followed by a vic o few Teubs liter by delegation led by the head of the Khan Reccarn p Laboratories, Dr A. Q. Khan. It is not clear what was the primary objectivead’ Hayf- sloped the "89 respec- ay build a rithyi mis- Pakistan- ‘on. It not 80 forced Shina and \pabilities, ved in its nen asked linister of veeded ‘to was toa 1 external slamabad veded the slamabad ‘weapons cular the "ed Sane sranium- ‘mington hhe West, TSG) so- Missile blow to market, strategic forced ‘twas in ngyang. runched Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent 69 Solid-propellant, Hatf-I and Hatf:H missiles. China provided, as noted ear Flic, vital assistance to Islamabad to help it develop these two missile sys, tems, Following the test of Hayf and Haff-I, Pakistan embarked upon building longer-range missiles, which was prompted by the fact that Pakistan Was still short of @ missile capability that could hit New Delhi. It is note Worthy that neither Hag nor Haif-IT had a range that could strike the Indian capital. It was not surprising, then, that Islamabad undertook new Missile projects and expeditiously pursued them. Pakistan's then Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, stated that Pakistan had embarked on @ new project to develop a missile with a range of 600 km that would enable his country to strike New Dethis? In 1989, Islamabad concluded a secret deal with Beijing to purchase 34 ‘olid-propellant M-11 ballistic missiles This deal resulted from Islamabad’ frantic effort to build missile capabilities to counter India’s growing missle Power and was catalyzed by two specific factors: (I) a hostile international environment created by the formation of the NSG and the MCTR, which made the procurement of relevgnt technologies - for the development of ‘missiles ~ from open, international sources very difficult; and (2) the test of ths Pakistan-specitic Prithri missile in 1988 and the Agni mise in 1989 by India, which made, as discussed above, a huge impact on Pakistan's miscile, building priorities. In addition to supplying M-lls, Beijing also assisted Pakistan in building an indigenous capability to manufacture missiles The Washington Post citing US intelligence sowrccs, zepo.ied that China Had not gnly Sold manufactured M-11 solid-fuel missles to Pakistan in the early 1990s, it had also transferred to Pakistan the production technology for a solid-fuel ballisticumissile manufacturing plant. Islamabad also established secret links with Pyongyang which was another Source of missile technology: It is unknown how and when this link was _ Sstablished or who ~ Zia-ul Haq or Benazir Bhutto — took this initiative. It gis however, evident that after becoming Prime Minister in December 1988, Benazir Bhutto gave her full support to the missile programme and did everything to expedite the building of the country's missile capability. It was Tported that Pakistani officials visited DPRK's Sanum-dong Missile Development Centre in late 1980s to examine the Nodong mise In July 1992, the North Korean’ Deputy Premier Kim Yong-nam, who was alsy Foreign Minister, visited Islamabad and discuss ‘cooperation and his country’s sale of Nodong 1993, Pakistani scientists and engineers were present at a test launch of the Nodong in en unknown location in North Korea, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto herself visited Pyongyang on 30 December 1993, which probably was @ fuming point in the Pakistan-DPRK collaboration in the missile and j nuclear fields. It is widely speculated that a ‘missile for nuclear technology’ deal was negotiated during her visit. This was followed by a visit a feor {months later by 2 delegation led by the head of the Khan Research ‘Laboratories, Dr A. Q. Khan. Its not clear what was the primary objective70 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent of Khan's visit or whether he discussed the missile for technology barter deal. However, evidence suggests that further negotiations were conducted uring 4 visit of Marshall Choe Gwang, former vice-chairporcon of Ne Koret’s National Defence Commission, to Islamabad ia late 1995. Post | 4 barter deal was at a final stage of negotiations at that time, Interestingly! pie Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat, also paid oie to Pyongyang in December 1997 and this highlighted the development of strategic partnership between the two countries! ‘he end of the Cold War and the emergence of new internation Fanon me intde Pakistan strategically more vulnerable than before, whieh reinforced Pakistan's sense of urgency to capability and a compatible missile deliv War international environment, iggested that the Army version of Indian missiles had been deployed inr Jutlundur, ery lose to the Indo-Pakistani border. New Delhi denied the “deploy. Fant of Prthyi missiles, but said a batch of missiles had merely been nang from production facilites in South India to the nosth, Responding to this Hevclepment, Pakistan tested @ nuclear capable missile ~ Hail” wie highlighted Tslamabad's determination to match India’s expanding missile capabilities 56 Pakistan developed the liquid-propellant, road-mobile Ghauri (Hay-V), With an estimated range of 1,300 kan and a payload capacity of 686 kg, to SSunler India’s Prith missle. According to Pakistani officals: ‘the Giusy teed of Penk tkisan’ lack of strategic depth... it) serves the strategie need of Pakistan to be able to hold India in a postion of vulnocty y Siar to itself” Pakistan also developed a solidcfuel missile system — Plaheen-} (Hayf-1¥) - and tested it on 13 April 1999, Pakistan's Prectent Farood Ahmed Leghari maintained that Pakisian was compelled to join a Sill Face with India since the Prithvi missle and other Indian nities constituted a lethal threat to Pakistan's own security.5® Pakistan has continued to upgrade its missile capabilities following the May 1998 muclear tests. Pakistani developed a new variant of Ghawy missile, Althor develo the 19 strateg dition: robust more:gy barter onducted of North ° Possibly restingly, a visit to rent of a smational wre, whieh deterrent sost-Cold 4s earlier Pakistan, akistan in a enjoyed te in the endment ty-in-the rupted in Pakistan lelivery. ongyang, xt of the Nar, of Indian, which is ‘deploy- sn moved & to this — which g missile ‘Haif-V), 30 kg, to © Ghauri strategic serability system — | Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent 71 Ghaurk-2, and tested it on 14 April 1999. It also conducted a test flight of the ‘Shaheen-1 (Hatf-1V) on 15 April 1999, Pakistani officials stated that the test flights of Ghauri2 and Shaheen-] would ensure that Pakistan's ‘minimum deterrent capability’ was technically credible and would maintain ‘strategic balance in South Asia.’S? ” Following these tests, Islamabad halted missile tests ‘for now’ and called on New Delhi to join in a ‘strategic restraint regime? in order to limit the development of missile and nuclear weapons technology and deployment. Pakistan observed the self-imposed moratorium on missile testing for the next three years and in fact did not respond to India's test of the Agni-2 in January 2001 or the Dhanush in September 200k with any missile test of its own, However, Pakistan resumed missile testing in May 2002 against the backdrop of a military stand-off with India. This crisis erupted as India mobilized its troops along the Indo-Pakistani border in response to the terrorist attack on the Indian Pasliament in December 2001, which was allegedly carried out by Pakistani-based terrorist organizations. During the course of the crisis, Pakistan tested three types of ballistic missiles — Ghauri-1, Ghaznavi, and Abdali - in quick succession. The testing of these “rilsiles;-aeeordingte «reiited Pakiscan Atmy OMncez "Was the inost explicit. signal by Pakistan of the readiness of its missile-deliverable deterrent during the composite crisis period’ According to Intemational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), three probable political messages underscored the Pakistani missile tests: first, they were intended to placate domestic critics; second, they were intended to increase pressure on India to refrain from launching military strikes; and, third, they were intended to indicate that Pakistan was capable of using short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles With nuclear warheads and was prepared to do 80, if required.® Pakistani leaders took the view that missile testing determined the course of the crisis and contributed to its de-escalation. As Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf posited: By testing, with outstanding success the delivery systems of our strategic capability, these men [scientists] validated the reliability, accuracy, and the deterrence value of Pakistan's premier surface-to-surface ballistic missile systems of the Hatf series, namely - Ghauri, Ghaznavi, and Abdali — wwe need to ensure that the three basic ingredients of the deterrence — capability, credibility, and resolve — never get compromised. Although various factors accounted for Pakistan's missile procurement and development approach since the start of its missile build-up programme in the 1980s, the strongest impetus for its missile acquisition came from the strategic necessity of defending itself against the perceived threat of its tra- ditional security rival, India. In the time since the 1980s, Pakistan has built a robust missile force. Some even consider that Pakistan's missile programme is more advanced than India’s72 Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrent Conclusion Pakistan, as the Pakistani authorities claim, has built a minimum, but cred- ible, nuclear deterrent force. It has quantified the minimum level of nuclear Watheads and it possesses a robust missile force with the capability of strik- ing deep inside India. In other words, Pakistan has acquired sufficient deterrent capability to put India into mutual vulnerability, However, some dilemmas and challenges remain in the building of a force structure and an alert posture, and those dilemmas and challenges may be common to all small nuclear powers in the second nuclear age. Islamabad 4 finds the ‘minimum’ force level slippery as it cannot be defined or deter- mined in quantitative and static terms because of the dynamic nature of the South Asian strategic environment and changing strategic posture of India, Further, Islamabad’s dilemma also arises from the fact that it needs to make & trade-off between building a nuclear force and alert posture for peacetime and building a nuclear force and alert posture for times of crisis. Lack of Sophisticated technology edditionally compounds Pakistan's dilemiti in ths building of a nuclear force posture. Pabistan’s approach to building a missile force offers some interesting insights about missile proliferation in the developing world. In particular, its secret links with North Korea (and China) in order to build its missile cap. ability indicate that the traditional supply-side approach to prevent the pro- liferation of missites (and nuclear weapons) is gradually becoming redundant in the second nuclear age. Collaboration between newly emerged supplicts of missile and nuclear technology will be a key challenge to global security ‘managers in the control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the new nuclear era. Every trol st develo weapo appro) autho: Morec no in: take p of nuccares 5 Command and Control System! of nuclear ty of strik- 1 sufficient ofa force ves may be Islamabad | or deter- ture of the # of India. ‘The paradox is that dispersal of authority, while it enhances survivability of the poe Auenal, correspondingly increases the probability of [an] unauthorized launch Peacetime from a mobile missile unit. 3. Lack of Pervaiz Hoodbhoy? ‘ma in the Every nuclear weapons state has to construct a nuclear command and cone trol structure for the efficient manigement of its muclear forces. Tt sets up the development, deployment, and employ went accounts shai Neapors 'K iuclear weapons possessor needs, in particular, to develop an ‘-€ppropriate alert posture and a chain of contmand so as to ensure the authorized and verified use of nuclear weapons should deterrence fai, Moreover, nuclear powers need to establish preventive mechanisms so that fa anadvertent, unauthorized, or accidental use of nuclear weapons does interesting ticular, its -issile cap. t the pro- cedundant ippliers of I security ad missile F the weapons falling into the ‘wrong hands” As the second nuclear age unfolds, the question that arises is what type of fommand and control system is it that the new nuclear nations intend to tulg: Its important to note that the type of command and control system {hat the new nuclear powers build will have a profound impact om ihe deterrence stability in various regions. Infact, this issue has been of intense debate in recent years. Proliferation optimists argue that the command aed Control systems of the small nuclear powers ¢ to maintain deterrence as the nuclear arsenals are small and simple com, fered to the ones that the superpowers had during the Cold War? Pessimists on the other hand, posit that serious questions remain’ with regard to the ability of small nuclear powers in building proper command and control structures. Hence, the possibility of unauthorized or accidestel F miclear use is greater in the context of small nuclear powers" Moreover, small ones. Peter Peaver, for example, argues that irrespective of the site nf f the muclear arsenal, possession of nuclear weapons always carrie cceare74 Command and Control System dilemmas; if control of the muclear weapons is too loose, deterrence can ‘fail deadly’ triggering unauthorized or accidental launch, but if control is too tight, deterrence can ‘fail impotent’ when a first strike against the nuclear command leadership eliminates any chance of retaliation.’ He notes that leaders are bound to choose one of the two options ~ negative control (pre- vention of unwanted use) and positive control (assurance of wanted use). The first option puts in place an assertive control mechanism in which the decision to launch nuclear weapons is retained exclusively by the most senior political leaders, while the second option establishes a ‘delegative control’ mechanism in which subordinate commanders are authorized to use nuclear ‘weapons in defined circumstances.® Depending on its security environment, national style, strategic priorities and requirements, a state can institute an assertive’ or a ‘delegative’ control system. Pakistan is a good example to use when revisiting the debate and competing claims.o€ the pualiferatian optimists and pessimists about the new nuclear nations’ nuctear command and control structures. This chapter examines the Pakistani attempt to construct a nuclear command and control system, the challenges and strategic dilemmas that it confronts in building this structure, and assesses the efficacy of the Pakistani command and control system. Background It is not known exactly what type of command and control structure Pakistan developed for the management of its nuclear forces before the nuclear tests of May 1998. What is known regarding nuclear decision- ‘making and management of the nuclear programme in the pre-lests era is, at best, sketchy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reportedly constituted an inter-ministeria ‘committee to manage the newly launched muclear weapons programme, and he later abolished the committee after the 1974 Indian nuclear test. In the 1980s another committee was created for nuclear management, which was headed by Ghulam Ishaq Khan. But how that committee functioned is not entirely clear. As Pakistan pursued a policy of nuclear ambiguity and opacit} and as Islamabad’s primacy concern was to protect the nuclear weapons programme from external interference, it is arguable that Pakistan did not develop an elaborate command and control structure in the pre-tests era in the same fashion as did by traditional nuclear weapons states. Further, the A. Q. Khan saga, as will be illuminated in Chapter 7, highlights the fact that Pakistan failed to build a command and control structure before 1998 that could have prevented the misuse of Pakistani technology by the Pakistani metallurgist. Following the nuclear tests, however, Islamabad paid considerable atten- tion to constructing a command and control system. Of course, it was a logical step given Pakistan's new identity as an overt muclear power and, also, in view of a new muctear environment that was heralded after the South Asian nuclear “big bangs’. Soon after the tests, the Sharif government accorded the re structure to the chief submitted which he prop (SPD)-combin Plans Directora Accorditty to tt of all nuclear @ ity contro! over the plan and th General Per October 1999. member Natio military persor state’. Althoug it broadly deal security and s1 role of the arn on nuclear ma ‘The National On 2 Februar the setting up employment @ organizations president and Islamabad cre decisions tela nuclear weape nuclear comm military coms control of Laboratories The NCA and the Dew Division (SPI major nuclea the country. vides policy employment of senior mil Prime Minis also includes2 can ‘fail rol is too e nuclear totes that utrol (pre- ated use), which the ost senior + control’ -¢ nuclear ronment, stitute an ompeting ¥ iictear nines the stem, the structure, tem. structure Hore the decision- era is, at inisterial ame, and. t. In the hich was 2d is not {opacity ‘weapons did not ts era in ‘her, the fact that 998 that ?akistani le atten- it was a ver and, ve South emment Command and Control System 75 accorded the responsibility of developing a nuclear command and control structure to the chief of army staff General Pervez Musharraf. The army chief submitted a draft plan to the Pakistan government in April 1999 in which he proposed the creation a new body - Strategic Plans Division (SPD) ~ combining the Combat Development Directorate, the Operations and Plans Directorate, and the Command and Control and Intelligence Directorate According to the proposal, the new body would act as the coordinating body of all nuclear activities and would exercise operational, financial, and secur- ity control over all strategic organizations” The Sharif government accepted the plan and the SPD became operational soon thereafter, General Pervez Musharraf seized power through a military coup in October 1999. After taking over the government, Musharraf created a 13- member National Security Council (NSC) comprising both civilian and ailitary personnel, which would work as ‘2 forum iter consultation or si ‘epic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, the integrity and security of the state’. Although the NSC is not directly involved in nuclear decision-making, it broadly deals with muclear issues as it is a consultative body on national security and strategic affairs. Impottantly, it broadened and formalized the tole of the army in Pakistan's security and defence policy-making, including on nuclear matters ‘The National Command Authority On 2 February 2000, the National Security Council of Pakistan announced the setting up of @ National Command Authority (NCA) and delegated all employment and deployment control over all strategic forces and strategic organizations to this apex nuclear decision-making body: It is chaired by the president and the prime thinister serves as its vice-chair. In the NCA, Islamabad created a consolidated and centralized authority for all nuclear decisions relating to policy planning, procurement, deployment and use of F Buclear weapons Prior to this formal and public announcement, a de facto nuclear command and control arrangement did exist as part of the national military command structure.'® In November 2000, the NCA. took formal control of all nuclear laboratories, including the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), which previously functioned almost independently. ‘The NCA is composed of the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC) and the Strategic Plans vision (SPD) serves as its secretariat. The ECC is the main body where | major nuclear decisions are taken, including defining the nuclear strategy of the country, It assesses the existing or emerging threat to the country, pro- vides policy direction during peacetime, and decides the deployment and employment of nuclear weapons if the necessity should arise. It is composed of senior military and political leaders with the President as its chair!" the Prime Minister as vice-chair, and the Foreign Minister as deputy-chair. Tt also includes the ministers for defence, the interior, and finance,” the three76 Command and Control System President (Chaitman) Prime Minster (Vice Chairman} [-— SwategicPlans Division (see opposite) ee 1 Deputy Chair Foeign Minister Deputy Chal Chman Joint Chis * Minister of Defence of Statfcommitee 1 Minterf intron 1 Chet of Army Stat ce Chief of 8 Mister oFnarce ‘amy Sa ' Chaleman Joint Chie of 5 Ce of Noval tat St commites 1 Chet of asta Ceo uy Stat? 1 Heads of concerned strategie ors Vie Chef of Ary Stat 2 Secretary: Decor General 1 Che of Noval ttt ‘ofthe Static Plans Division 1 Chiefof A sat 1 Secreta: Oracar General ‘ofthe Seategic Pans Dvaion | others asrequined am win ale (echnical Training & Administrative Control) Figure 5.1. National Command Authority Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, AQ. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks (London: USS, 2007), p.110. service chiefs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee aso, and the Director-General (DG) of the SPD (who serves as its secretary} The chief function of the DCC is to implement weapons development plans and upgrade the nuclear forces in accordance with the strategie force” goals set by the ECC. The DCC has the overall control of technical, finan. cial, and administrative matters relating to weapons development, It is also assigned the responsibility of controlling all the strategic organizations, including national laboratories and research and development organizations and entrusted with the development and modernization of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. It is chaired by the president. Other members of this body include the prime minister (vice-chairperson), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (deputy-chair), the three services chief, the DG of the Strategic Plans Division (secretary), and the heads of the concerned strategic-scientific organizations. The Strategic Plans Division acts as the secretariat of the NCA and coor dinates all nuclear activities in Pakistan, It functions under the chairman Headqua F and coo intelligen and the + organiza standard assert th tegic ass the cent! as a ‘nu As pa tegic for and the istrative NCA at the chai has, at 1 weapon: Assessi While it appearszations eapons bers of of the he DG veerned d.coor- airman Figure 5.2 Strategic Plans Division Source: International Insitute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, 4-Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks (London: 1188, 2007), p. 111. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and is located at the Joint Services” Headquarters, It is headed by a three-star general. The DG of the SPD plans and coordinates the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems, and reports directly to the president, the prime minister, and the chairman of the JCSC. The SPD also assists in developing nuclear policy, and has an arms control agency and a nuclear security watchdog, Pakistan, through the SPD, has established firm control over the strategic organizations and has brought them into a coherent whole, It has created standard procedure for their operation and security. Perhaps it is plausible to assert that Pakistan has undertaken considerable measures to prevent stra tegic assets from theft, misuse, and recurrence of the Khan phenomenon. As the central coordinating body of all nuclear activities, the SPD has emerged as a ‘nuclear enclave’ within Pakistan.!? As part of the command and control structure, Pakistan has created stra- tegic force command in al services of its military — the Army, the Air Force, p and the Navy. Each of the services exercises training, technical, and admin- istrative control over its strategic forces But operational control lies with the NCA. and, if necessary, the military direction is to come from the NCA to f the chairman of the JCSC for any required action. Through this, Pakistan has, at least theoretically, created a chain of command for the use of nuclear weapons should deterrence fail, Assessing the Pakistani command and control system F While in theory Pakistan's plan to develop a command and control structure appears sound, how far Pakistan will be able to put the plan into practice78 Command and Control System and how efficacious it will be remain to be seen, Some analysts posit that financial and technological constraints are“bound to have a critical impact on Pakistan's ability to build a robust command and control struc: ture In particular, Pakistan lacks the technologies that are necessary for ensuring the safety of nuclear weapons and for preventing accidental use ‘of nuclear weapons. Hence, whatever measures Pakistan undertakes, there ill be some builtin structural weaknesses in Pakistan's nuclear control structure. In the absence of any official indication it is unclear what nuclear employment mechanism Islamabad has adopted or will prefer to adopt Whichever way Pakistan leans, there will always be a dilemma, as identified by Peter Feaver, that if control of nuclear weapons is too loose (delegative control), deterrence can “fail deadly’ which may lead to unauthorized ot accidental launch; on the other hand, if control is too tight (assertive. con- wo), deterrence can “fail impotent’ as a first strike against the nuclear com- mand leadership will short-circuit any chance of retaliation.!5 Based on the Pakistani conditions, it is plausible to argue that Islamabad has adopted or, ifit has not done so, will probably prefer a delegative control system."© A number of factors can be presented in support of this argument. First, as the weaker party in the asymmetrical power balance in South Asia, Pakistan is ‘more vulnerable’ to the risk of losing its ‘deployed and unde. ployed muclear assets to either conventional or nuclear attack’ of India.!? This condition, moreover, is exacerbated by Pakistan's lack of geographical depth, thereby making its nuclear assets and command structure vulnerable to Indian pre-emptive ot surprise air attack.'® Pakistani concern is that India, with its superior strike capability, may undertake a decapitating attack, which would drastically reduce Pakistan's ability to retaliate. Islamabad, therefore, would adopt a delegative and mobile command and control system in order to ensure the ability to use nuclear force against India. Two, as discussed in Chapter 3, Pakistan has adopted a doctrine of massive retas Tiation and a policy of nuclear first-use to offset its strategic vulnerabifties vis-d-vis India. In a similar fashion, it is very likely that Islamabad would adopt a delegative control system in order to offset its strategic ‘vulnerabilities and enhance the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. ‘Three, if history is any guide, there should be little doubt that the Pakistani army, at least in the foreseeable future, will play a leading role in managing the country’s security policy and the nuclear force. Indeed, the army, as discussed above, dominates Pakistan’s nuclear command structure ‘The very composition of the nuclear command and contzol structure that Islamabad announced in February 2000 clearly reflects the army's leading role in Pakistan's nuclear*decision-making. Specifically, the formation and the modus operandi of the SPD, the focal point of Pakistan's nuclear activ ities, clearly reveal the dominant role of the Pakistan army in nuclear mat- ters and in the management of the country’s nuclear forces. As a retired Pakistani army General points out: ‘There is no déubt that the military will continue t ‘the preser people: th prime min decision-n ‘backdrop, nuclfar w inconsiste: policy. As would be Pakista: increase t] prone Sot India and (bath ma, wars then nuclear a Pakistan Indian pa tially exp Pakistan's uncertain Further short flig approach cation of is that t want asst if deterre tension @ nuclear u It is g strengthe: Asian cor because ¢ Asia it m ‘ons resuh an early. Asia, the technolog Pakiste means th the credi nuclear + of courseCommand and Control System 79 s posit continue to play a major role in the nuclear decision making process ... In critical ‘the present environment, the final decision will probably rest with three ae people: the President, the Prime Minister, and the Army Chief.” As the essary prime minister in Pakistan is generally hand-picked by the Army, the nuclear ital Gas decision-making is almost absolutely controlled by the military. Against this 4 there backdrop, a pre-delegation of authority to field commanders to launch Saal nuclear weapons would not be very surprising and certainly would not be inconsistent with the Pakistani style of managing the country's security aie policy. As a leading Pakistani analyst concludes: ‘even corps commanders adopt ‘would be involved in the decision to use nuclear weapons.” intified Ee Pakistan’s delegative control system is fraught with risks; it is bound to cgative increase the likelihood of unauthorized or accidental nuclear use in a crisis- zed ot Me Prone South Asian strategic environment, Since theig independence in 1947, ‘econ. 4° India and Pakistan have fought four wars and weathered numerous crises sant (both major and minor). The simple equation is that the more crises and wars there are, the more likelihood there is of unauthorized or accidental moabad nuclear launch. In recent vears, terrorism has added a new twist to the Indo- sontrol Pakistan crisis-prone relationship; for example the terrorist attack on the aa Indian parliament in December 2001 set off a tense, escalating, and poten- tially explosive military sand-off that had clear nuclear connotations. How Pakistan's pre-delegative command system will function in different crises is uncertain, Furthermore, the geographical proximity of India and Pakistan and the short flight-time of delivery vehicles specifically makes the Pakistani approach risky in a strategically volatile region like South Asia. The impli- cation of the ‘geographical proximity’ factor for Pakistan's nuclear strategy is that the Pakistani nuclear command and the field commanders would want assurance that there would be prompt employment of nuclear weapons if deterrence fails, and during a crisis it may raise - primarily due to tension and miscalculation — the possibility of accidental or inadvertent nuclear use. It is generally assumed that @ robust early-waming system helps to strengthen deterrence stability between two nuclear antagonists, In the South Asian contest, however, an early-warning system may prove to be less effective because of geographical proximity between the two adversaries?) In South Asia it may even increase the possibility of inadvertent use of nuclear weap ‘ons resulting from tension and Pakistan's strategy of pre-delegation. Even if ‘an early-warning system would help to build a stable deterrence in South Asia, the question remains how far will Pakistan — given the state of its technological capability ~ be able to construct a robust early-warning system. Pakistan's adoption of a negative control posture, therefore, necessarily means that Islamabad emphasizes certainty of muclear use, which enhances the credibility of its nuclear deterrent while compromising the safety of nuclear weapons and increasing the likelihood of muclear use. There is, of course, no reason to be exceedingly alarmist about Pakistan's policy of80 Command and Control System re-delegation or the safety and security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.2? Since the nuclear tests, if not during the era of nuclear ambiguity and opa- city, Islamabad (also New Delhi) perhaps has learnt useful nuclear lessons from the experience of a number of crises (i.e. Kargil War, the 2001-02 military stand-off). These lessons may be helpful in the development of doctrinal concepts, modifying operational pro nuglear force during erseS ‘Conhicts, and wars. However, as discussed above, sub- stantive problems remain with the Pakistan pre-delegation strategy. No one can be absolutely certain about non-use of nuclear weapons in a future crisis: Conclusion Following the nuclear tests of May 1998, Islamabad began to pay serious attention to building a nuclear command and ‘control structure that would institutionalize the nuclear decision-making and set up appropriate proce- dures for miclear management, as well as a chain of command for nuclear use should it become necessary, In February 2000, the Pakistani authorities formally announced the setting up of the National Command Authority which took control ofall strategic assets and nuclear decision-making. It was 4 key step toward creating a robust nuclear management structure, However, how Islamabad puts the plan into action remains to be seen. The formidable dilemmas and challenges that lie ahead will constrain the building of a nuclear command and control structure. Specifically, resource constraints and the lack of up-to-date technology will compound the Pakistani dilemma and impede the development of proper measures to ensure the safety of strategic assets. Islamabad, in the course of building the nuclear command and control structure, may find it daunting to balance the survivability and physical security of nuclear forces. Lewis Dunn notes: ‘The traditional ‘procedural solutions to survivability and physical security may be seen to entail too high a price, economically and in terms of #educed military readiness in time of crisis’ This may be a common problem for all small nuclear powers in the second nuclear age. Additionally, lack of sophisticated technology will impede the development of measures that are necessary to ensure against accidental nuclear detonation Islamabad is likely to adopt 2 delegative contzol mechanism, As discussed in this chapter, although there is no reason to be exceedingly alarmist, for- midable risks do exist in Pakistan’s strategy in a crisis-prone South Asia togion, The thearstical implication of the Paks therefore is Proliferation optimists gre too optimists about the robustness of the com- mand and control system of the small nuclear powers, while pessimists are alarmists On balance, however, it is plausible to argue that nuclear com- mand and control and nuclear deterrance should work in the case of small nuclear powers.