ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE 343

Book Review
P.N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models (Cambridge University Press, New York,
1983); 480 pages, £10.95 (paperback), £30 (hard cover), ISBN 0-521-24123-5.

Reviewed by: Robert Phelps

Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, U.K.

Whether you end up agreeing with it or not, this book should be required
reading for anyone interested in knowledge representation, reasoning or in-
ference. Its central thesis is that human reasoning proceeds by constructing
mental models which simulate aspects of the real world in a more or less
concrete manner. These models can then be examined or manipulated to reach
conclusions. This proposal is developed in detail and includes reports of a
number of computer implementations to back up the theory. The attraction of
the book for AI workers lies in its presentation of a theory of reasoning rather
than in the detailed mechanisms proposed and implemented for certain aspects
of that approach. Indeed, it would be possible to disagree with all of the
computational details suggested while still finding the approach as a whole a
major contribution to both AI and psychology. This contribution resides as
much in the theories it opposes, since at present these have a tenacious hold on
thinking in these fields, as in the approach it proposes.
The form of reasoning examined as a starting point for the development of
this thesis is the syllogism. The mode of reasoning classically developed for the
syllogism is logic. Johnson-Laird presents a mass of evidence to the effect that
humans do not reason using the rules of logic---even when solving syllogisms
where these rules would be especially appropriate. Instead, he argues that
experimental evidence points to the view that people construct simple mental
models (specific realizations of the abstract syllogism premises) using mental
"tokens" to represent the specific objects in the model. Generally, a number of
different such realizations (models) can be constructed consistent with the
syllogism premises; only by checking that conclusions drawn from one model
are valid for all models can valid conclusions be obtained. This process both
allows valid reasoning without the need for the rules of logic and accounts for
errors by the incomplete checking of conclusions drawn from only some (or
one) of the models.
The book deals with inferences from linguistic statements. To do this,
Artificial Intelligence 28 (1986) 343-344
0004-3702/86/$3.50 ~ 1986, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)
344 f~¢)()K RE~,IE~A

information contained in sentences must firstb be "'understood.' A ,,ection o~

the book, therefore, deals with questions of semantics. It argues against formaJ
theories which suppose propositional definitions of words: argues for a "'co|~-
structivist'" approach to sentence understanding where context and default
implications are important and proposes that the meaning of a statement is
captured by the construction of a particular mental model (from the set of
possible models) satisfying the statement conditions. An associated section
looks at theories of grammar and examines possible schemes for parsing
sentences as a preliminary to sentence understanding.
Having presented the basic elements of the mental model theory, the
remainder of the book discusses associated topics including procedures which
operate on mental models, images, computational constraints on the size and
processing of models and their relation to consciousness.
Some parts appear more thought-out than others, but throughout the style is
lucid and thoughtful and does not require significant technical knowledge in
order to follow its arguments. The presentation and indexing seems entirely
adequate.
The contentiousness of this book arises from the ideas it explicitly or
implicitly attacks, especially that logical rules have any central role in human
thinking and that concepts are propositionally represented. These ideas lie at
the heart of much thinking in AI. Why they should do so is not clear and. given
personal experiences of thinking, perhaps surprising. It may be that an emo-
tional view of logic as the pinnacle of thought lies behind its apparently rational
appeal. Nonetheless, if logic is not central to human thought, there may well be
good computational reasons why not; if this book simply causes more A!
researchers to question such standard beliefs it will have served an important
purpose in the development of AI as a science.