FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:

Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

DOCTRINE: The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the will.
Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age does not
render a person incapable of making a will.

FACTS:
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Forentina Rella, and their four children, Francisca
Alsua-Betts, Pablo, Fernando and Amparo Alsua, entered into a duly notarized
agreement, Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial. The said agreement specifically
partitioned one-half of the properties of the spouses to their legitimate heirs of their
respective shares, while they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and
Doña Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs, and they
mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well
as in all properties which they might be acquired subsequently.

In comformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition, spouses Don Jesus

and Doña Florentina executed their respective holographic wills as well as codicils,
separately.

Upon the death of Doña Tinay, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will and instructed
his lawyer to draft a new will which was duly signed by him and his attesting witnesses.
The notarial will and testament had essential features, one of them was that it instituted
his children as legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the
properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death,
were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming Francisca as executrix to serve
without a bond.

When Don Jesus died, Fransisca, as executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the
new will of Don Jesus. Pablo, Amparo and Fernando opposed, one of their contention
was that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of
the alleged will. That his mental faculties or his possession of the same had been
diminished considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84 years of
age and in view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual administration of his
properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta who, for his part received
instructions from Francisca and her husband.
ISSUE: Were the weakness of mind and advanced age of Don Jesus renders him
incapable of making a will?

RULING: NO

The weakness of mind and advanced age of Don Jesus does not render him incapable
of making a will.

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act,

The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the will. Mere weakness
of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age-does not render a person
incapable of making a will.

Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably
carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally
known as insanity or Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or
partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and
how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by
disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily
require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14
Phil. 163).

The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will, it is
essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution, and under
Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind in the absence of
proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the acceptance by the Court of Appeals of the
findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of the last will and testament of
Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will was not
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned
from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior of Don Jesus
is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor one suffering from "senile dementia"
as claimed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando. From these accepted facts, We find that:
(a) it was Don Jesus himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he
wanted to divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his properties
should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his lawyer was
even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of the will at his house in
Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which
ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of
the will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don
Jesus of the purpose of their meeting or gathering. Clearly then, Don Jesus knew
exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof.

ALFONSO ALBORNOZ, vs DOLORES ALBORNOZ and

JOSE ALBORNOZ
[GR No. 47428. April 8, 1941.] 
DIAZ, M.:

Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

DOCTRINE: The fact that two days before the execution of the will, the deceased
could barely move and talk and if she spoke, her words were incoherent and thereafter
lost her speech, it was of course impossible for her to execute her will.

FACTS:
Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano executed a will. The will was presented by Alfonzo and
Dolores Albornoz for probate but it was rejected by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte and ruled that Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano had no mental capacity when she
executed her will.

Perpertua died on June 25, 1936, in the municipality of Laoag of the Province of Ilocos
Norte, then she was 68 years old. She suffered from diarrhea and enteritis with
complications of myocarditis from June 3, 1936 until the time of her death. On June 22,
1936, Perpetua could barely move and talk and if she spoke, her words were
incoherent. And on June 23, 1936, she completely lost speech, and although her eyes
were open, they no longer move. In these circumstances, it was physically impossible
for her to execute her will considering that the document shows on its face that it was
executed at 6 am on June 24, 1936.

Dolorez Albornoz, for her part, stated that the late Perpetua in executing her will, was
with complete freedom, being in full enjoyment of her mental faculties and in the
presence of witnesses whose names and signatures are mentioned and appear in the
testimony clauses of her will.

ISSUE: Does Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano have the mental capacity to execute her
will?
RULING: NO.

The deceased was not poor and did not lack the means to procure domestic services:
she did not live alone or was alone in her home since she became ill; and in fact, the
deceased had nine servants at her service. The deceased was never without company
in her room during her illness, especially during her last days, because she required
continuous care. Therefore, it is incredible that Adriano Ruiz and the other instrumental
witnesses of the alleged testament of June 24, 1936 could enter inside the room of the
deceased or even inside her house, without being seen or noticed by anyone. The
granting of the will in question could not be done in a short moment; it had to take a long
time, enough time for those in the house to realize that there were strangers in it, at a
time when it is not customary to visit.

Additionally, the calligraphy expert Arcadio Laperal, who made a thorough study of the
signatures "PERPETUA A. VDA. DE SORIANO” that appear in the will comparing them
with the authentic ones of the deceased and those that appear in the testament and in
the codicil legalized by the Court a quo, which were not discussed, express the opinion
that they could not have been written by the same person, helped or not by another
because they differ in all respects. 

We believe that the opinion of the aforementioned expert is based on the facts,
especially considering that the deceased could no longer see well, as one of the
testament witnesses said, and yet the signatures are written with great symmetry,
rightly, and keeping the letters to each other, almost the same distance. And even if the
decedent had been helped by another to stamp these signatures, they would not have
come out as well as they appear in the expressed document.

TRINIDAD NEYRA VS. ENCARNACION NEYRA

C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946
DE JOYA, J.:
Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

DOCTRINE: Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the
execution of the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other
persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still
effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator
was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.
FACTS:
Encarnacion Neyra and her sister, Trinidad Neyra had a litigation in the Court of First
Instance regarding the properties left by their father.

During the course of the litigation, Encarnacion Neyra had been suffering from
Addison’s disease and on the day before her death, Encarnacion and Trinidad
reconciled and had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which they talked
about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court
of Appeals, they then agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the
property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter
should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion.

On November 3, 1942, Attorney Panis prepared a document of compromise embodying

their agreement and prepared Encarnacion’s last will and testament.

On November 4, 1942, Encarnacion unexpectedly died allegedly from heart attack, as a

consequence of Addison’s disease.

Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, and other relatives of
hers, filed a petition claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement could not have
been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of
death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day.

ISSUE: Was Encarnacion Neyra of sound mental condition at the time of the execution
of the compromise and of her last will and testament?

RULING: YES.

Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the
compromise and of her last will and testament.

Presentacion Blanco, niece of Encarnacion, in the course of her cross-examination,

frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing
and execution of the agreement and will in question.

It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering
from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to
the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of
physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or
diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.

The logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the
necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the
agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.
 EULALIO HERNAEZ VS. ROSENDO HERNAEZ
G.R. No. 857 February 10, 1903
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

DOCTRINE: The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in
a stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some
days before making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by
proof could no lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental
soundness of a person who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental
faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven .

FACTS:
Eulalio Hernaez, one of the sons of the testatrix Doña Juana Espinosa, filed an action
for annulment of the will executed by the latter, which will disposes those of the third
part of the hereditary estate of free disposal to her eldest son, Rosendo, and the
distribution of the remaining third in six equal parts among her five children and two
grandchildren.

One of the grounds Eulalio presented was the incapacity of the testatrix to make a will.
That on the day of the execution of her will, Doña Juana was over 80 years of age and
was so ill that three days before she had received the sacraments and extreme unction,
and that two days afterwards she died; and that prior thereto she walked in a stooping
attitude, and gave contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility.

ISSUE: Does the testatrix have the use of the necessary mental faculties for the
purpose of the execution of the will?

RULING: YES.

The testatrix have the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purpose of the
execution of the will.

It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the interrogatories nor the
documents presented with the complaint can the conclusion be reached that the
testatrix was deprived of her mental faculties.

The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping
position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some days before
making her will, are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could no
lead the court to establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person
who is to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the
contrary is conclusively proven.

The notary certifies that in his judgment the testatrix had the necessary legal capacity
and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purposes of the execution of the
will. "The Code might have adopted either one of two systems [with respect to the
mental capacity of the testator] — that of establishing as a general rule the presumption
of soundness of the mental faculties until the contrary be proven, or that of presuming
mental weakness in the absence of proof that the act was performed while the mental
faculties were in their normal condition. Under the first presumption a will made should
be declared valid in all cases, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Under the
second it would have to be considered as void upon the presumption that it was
executed by a person demented, unless the contrary is shown. The Code has adopted
the first system as being the most rational, by accepting the principle that mental
soundness is always to be presumed with respect to a person who has not been
previously incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated and proven by the proper
person and the correctness of this choice is beyond doubt; in the meantime the
intervention of the notary and the witnesses constitutes a true guaranty of the capacity
of the testator, by reason of their knowledge of the matter. 

SANTIAGO GALVEZ, V. CANUTA GALVEZ

[G.R. NO. 6650. DECEMBER 5, 1913. ]
TORRES, J.:
Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

DOCTRINE: In order to hold that a testator, as the result of cholera, was not of sound
mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and was incapable of executing a valid
will, it is indispensable that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental
incapacity and of his lack of reason and judgment at the time he executed his will in due
form.

FACTS:
This case deals with the probate of the second will executed by Victor Galvez and
signed in his presence by the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J.
Leoquinco, and, as the testator was no longer able to sign on account of his sickness,
Lorenzo Galvez, at his request, affixed his own signature to the instrument, for him and
below his written name.

The other will was presented during the proceedings; it was the first one the testator
executed on the same date, and, for the purpose of correcting an error contained in this
first will, he executed another will, the second, which is the one exhibited for probate. 
Canuta Galvez, the testator’s daughter, opposed on the probate of the will alleging that
her father, owing to his very serious sickness with cholera, lacked the intellectual
capacity and clear judgment requisite for making a will.

ISSUE: Does Victor Galvez by having a very serious sickness with cholera lacked the
capacity and clear judgment for making a will?

RULING: NO.

The record sufficiently proved that the subscribing witnesses to the will affirmed under
oath that they were present when Victor Galvez, then such in his house, stated to them
that the document read before them by Lorenzo Galvez contained his last will and
testament, and that, as the testator was no longer able to sign, he charged his nephew
Lorenzo to do so in his stead, which the latter did by affixing his own signature to the
document, after having written at the foot of the same the name and surname of the
testator, Victor Galvez, who, as these witnesses observed, was of sound mind and in
the full enjoyment of his mental faculties; he talked intelligently and with perfect
knowledge of what was taking place. They further testified that they all, including
Lorenzo Galvez, signed the will in the presence of the testator, Victor Galvez, who was
at the time lying on his bed.

In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of serious sickness, was not then of
sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and, therefore, was incapable to
execute a will, it is necessary that the proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his
mental incapacity and of his evident lack of reason and judgment at the time he
executed his will in the presence of the witnesses whose signatures appear at the foot
thereof, for these witnesses positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his will,
showed that he was in full possession of his intellectual faculties and was perfectly
cognizant of his acts.

The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects and results
of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular course of this disease; but
his statements, taken in general, cannot, in the present suit, serve as a ground upon
which to predicate incapacity, for the reason that he did not examine Victor Galvez, nor
did he even see him between the hours during which period the testator ordered his will
drawn up and the attesting witnesses signed it.

It may be true that cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become incapacitated in
the manner described by the witnesses; but there may be exceptions to the general
rule, and to judge from the testimony of the witnesses who saw and communicated with
the patient Victor Galvez at the time he executed his will, his physical and mental
condition must have been an exception, since he demonstrated that he had sufficient
energy and clear intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
 
Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents of the will
and the testator’s positive determination to rectify the error he incurred in the execution
of this first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his sound mind and was perfectly aware
of his duties in respect to the legal, inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir,
Canuta Galvez.

Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will, signed in the name of the
testator by Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses Juan Dimanlig, Nazaria Galvez, and J.
Leoquinco, the formalities prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure
were observed, for the testator’s name appears written at the foot of the will and under
this name Lorenzo Galvez signed by direction of the testator himself, and the instrument
was also signed by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that they
heard and attested the dispositions made by the testator and witnessed the reading of
the will, that they were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez signed the will in the
name of the testator and that they signed it in the presence of all the persons
assembled in the latter’s house, the conclusion is inevitable that Victor Galvez, in
executing his will, did so with a sound mind and the full use of his mental faculties;
therefore, the will must be admitted to probate.