PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL

JUSTICE

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO:

Shubham Bajaj Ms. Shivani

209/16

1
 TABLE OF CASES

Jain and Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, 1986

2
Cooper v Wardsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180
3
Bapurao v. State, AIR 1956
4
Per Justice Douglas in Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Committee v. Megrath……………………………..6
5
AIR 1968 SC 850
6
AIR 1968 SC 850
7
Franks committee report, para 21…………………………………………………………………………………………………….7

8
Per Mukherji, J, in Secretary to Govt. Transport Department v. Munuswamy, AIR 1988 SC 22332
9
(1948) AC 87
10
J. Mohaptra and Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1984 SC 1572
11
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611
12
Per Stephen, J.R. v. Farrant, (1987) QB 58 (60)
13
Principles of Administrative Law, 4th Edn.,p.156.
14(
1610) 8 Co. Rep. 113 (b)…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..8

15
AIR 1957 SC 425.
16
Griffith and street : Principles of administrative law, 4 th Edn, p. 156
17
AIR 1960 SC 468
18
AIR 1959 SC 86
19
AIR 1970 SC 150…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………9

20
Ibid p. 150
21
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454 (468)
22
Administrative law, 4th Edn,.p. 156
23
AIR 1964 MB 111.
24
AIR 1959 SC 309
25
AIR 1961 SC 82…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………10

26
Administrative Law, 1988, pp. 489-93.
27
Griffith and Street, Administrative Law, 4th Edn,.p. 156
28(
1969) WLR 815.
29
Halsbury Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol 2 para 5551, p.282
30
Airport Authority v. V.K.D. Bali, AIR 1988 SC 1099.
31
Ibid, p.429
32
Secretary to Govt. Transport Deptt. V. Munuswamy, AIR 1988 SC 2232 (2234)………………………………11

2
33
Wade, Administrative Law, 2nd Edn. 168.
34
Municipal Board Pushkar v. State Trasnport Authority, AIR 1965 SC 458.
35
Cooper v. Wandsworth (1863) 45 B (NS) 180
36
S5(a), American Administrative Procedure Act, 1946………………………………………………………………………12

37
N.S Transport Co. v. State of Punjab, air 1976 sc 57.
38
AIR 1978 SC 930
39
State of J.&K. v. Haji Wali Mohd., AIR 1972 SC 2538
40
Annamuthado v. Oilfields Workers. (1961)
41
(1863) 14 CB (NS) 180.
42
(1964) AC 40
43
Allen, Law and Orders, 1966 p. 242.
44
Wade, H.W.R. Administrative Law, 1988, p. 543.
45
Local government Board v. Ariidge (1915) AC 190.
46
F.C.C. v. W.J.R,. (1949) 337 U.S 265 (276)…………………………………………………………………………………………13

47
A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 (43)
47
Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v. A.P.C.R.T.C,. AIR 1959 SC 308.
48
Local Government v. Arridge, 1915 AC 120
49
Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719.
50
State of Gujarat v. Anand Municipality, AIR 1993 SC 1196.
51
AIR 1980 SC 840.
52
R. v. Gaming Board exparte Benaim, (1970) 2B. 417. ……………………………………………………………………….14

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my teacher Ms. Shivani who gave me
the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic Principles of Natural Justice,
which also helped me in doing a lot of Research and I came to know about so many new
things I am really thankful to them.
Secondly I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finalizing
this project within the limited time frame.

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 NATURAL JUSTICE
Natural justice is envisaged in administrative law for ensuring fair exercise of power by
administrative agencies. Fair exercise of the power of administration is possible when the
power is used according to fair procedure. The universal rule of fair procedure is audi alteram
partem- Hear the other party. Thus, hearing means ‘natural justice’ or ‘fairness’. 1 Therefore it
follows that in administrative law, hearing means fair hearing. If a dispute arises between two
parties and both parties are given opportunity to present their case, the decision would be fair.
If one party is heard, the other party must have the right to be heard. There is, therefore, great
emphasis on fairness.

(a) Conceptual Dimensions.

Natural justice is an ethico-legal concept which is based on natural feeling of Human
Being. Rules of natural justice have developed with the growth of civilization and the
content thereof is often considered as a proper measure of the level of civilization and
Rule of Law prevailing in the Community.2

(b) Functional Dimensions.

It is settled law and there is no dispute that the principles of natural justice are
applicable to judicial and quasi judicial functions. But important questions are : Whether
these principles are applicable to administrative action? Formerly courts had taken the
view that the principles of natural justice were inapplicable to administrative orders. It
would be erroneous to import into the consideration of an administrative order the
principles of natural justice.3

(c) Right to Hearing.

Right to hearing is an important safeguard against abuse of administrative power.
Natural justice is counter part of American “due process”/ notice and opportunity to be
heard are fundamentals of due process of law.4

1
Jain and Jain, Principles of Administrative Law, 1986
2
Cooper v Wardsworth Board of Works, (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180
3
Bapurao v. State, AIR 1956
4
Per Justice Douglas in Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Committee v. Megrath,

5
 Principles of Natural Justice

Natural justice is not a fixed but flexible concept. The standards of natural justice with
vary with situations. In Union of India v. P.K. Roy,5 speaking for the Supreme Court,
Ramaswami, J. observed:
“The extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be
imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine
depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority,
upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the
statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case.” 6
The concept of natural justice entails two principles:
(1) Nemo judex in causa sua- No man shall be judge in his own cause or the deciding
authority must be impartial and without bias- Rule against Bias.
(2) Audi alteram parterm.- Hear the other side, or both sides must be heard, or no man
should be condemned unheard or that there must be fairness on the part of
deciding authority.- Rule of hearing or fair hearing.
(1.) Rule against Bias-

(a) General
The first principle of natural justice is rule against bias. It means that the deciding
authority must be impartial and neutral. That bias disqualifies an individual from
acting as Judge follows two principles:
(1). No one should be a judge in his own cause;
(2.) Justice should not only be done. Proceedings before a deciding authority
may be vitiated if he is biased or has his own interest in the case before him. Franks 7
has rightly observed that the rule against bias is justified on the ground that
impartiality is a characteristic of good administration.
(b) Meaning of Bias
A predisposition to decide for or against one party without propoer regard to the
true merits of the dispute is bias.8 In Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country
Planning9, Lord Thankerton defines bias as follows:

5
AIR 1968 SC 850
6
AIR 1968 SC 850
7
Franks committee report, para 21
8
Per Mukherji, J, in Secretary to Govt. Transport Department v. Munuswamy, AIR 1988 SC 22332
9
(1948) AC 87

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 “My lords, I could wish that the use of word ‘bias’ should be confined to its
proper sphere. Its proper significance in my opinion is to denote a departure from
the standard of even handed justice with the law requires from those who occupy
judicial office, or those who are commonly regarded as holding a quasi-judicial
office, such as an arbitrator.”
(c) Principle explained
It is well settled principle of law that justice should not only be done but be seen to
be done. Justice can never be seen to be done if a man acts a judge in his own cause
or is himself interested in its outcome. This principle is applicable not only to judicial
proceedings but also to quasi as well administrative proceedings. 10 A decision which
is a result of bias is a nullity and the trial is “coram non-judicie”.11
(d) Types of Bias
Bias appears in various forms which may affect the decision in variety of ways. The
various types of bias are:
(i) Pecuniary Bias
(ii) Personal Bias
(iii) Subject-matter Bias
(iv) Departmental Bias
(v) Policy Bias

(i) Pecuniary Bias

As regards pecuniary bias ‘the last pecuniary interest in the subject matter of
litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a judge.12 According to Griffith
and Street,13 “a pecuniary interest, however slight, will disqualify, even though it
is not proved that the decision is any way affected.” In Bonham Case,14 Dr.
Bonham, a Doctor of Cambridge University was fined by the college of physicians
for practicing in the city of London without the license of the college. Coke, C.J
disallowed the claim as the college had a financial interest in its own judgement
and was judge in its own cause.
In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand15 , Gajendragadkar, J. observed : “It is obvious
that pecuniary interest, however small it may be in a subject matter of the
proceedings, would wholly disqualify a member from acting as a judge.”

10
J. Mohaptra and Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1984 SC 1572
11
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611
12
Per Stephen, J.R. v. Farrant, (1987) QB 58 (60)
13
Principles of Administrative Law, 4th Edn.,p.156.
14
(1610) 8 Co. Rep. 113 (b).
15
AIR 1957 SC 425.

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 (ii) Personal Bias
Personal bias arises in a number of circumstances involving a certain relationship
equation between the deciding authority and the parties which incline him
unfavourably or otherwise on the side of one of the parties before him. Here a
judge may be relative, friend or business associate of a party. In view of these
factors there, is every likelihood that the judge may be biased towards one party
or prejudiced towards the other.16
In Mineral Development Ltd. V. State of Bihar,17 the petitioners were granted
mining license for 99 years in 1947 but the minister who had political rivalry with
the petitioners cancelled the license. The court held that there was personal bias
against the petitioners and the Minister was disqualified from taking any action
against the petitioners. .
In State of U.P v. Mohd Nooh18, a departmental inquiry was held by a Dy. S.P
against a Police Constable. The court held that the presiding officer discarded the
rules of natural justice and all the cannons of fair play were greviously violated
by the officer concerned.
In A.K Kraipak v. Union of India,19 one Naquishbund was candidate for selection
to the Indian Foreign Service and was also a member of the Selection Board.
Naquishbund did not sit on the Selection Board when his name was considered.
He was recommended by the board and he was selected by the Public Service
Commission. The other candidates challenged the selection of Naquishbund on
the grounds of violation of natural justice. The SC quashed the selection and
observed : “It is against all cannons of justice to make a man Judge in his own
cause. It is true that he did not participate in deliberations of the Committee
when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was member of
the Selection Board must have its own impact on decision of the Selection of the
Board.
Bhagwati, J. has observed : A.K Kraipak20 is a landmark in the development of
administrative law and it has contributed large measure to strengthening of the
rule of law in this country. We would not like to whitle down in the slightest

16
Griffith and street : Principles of administrative law, 4th Edn, p. 156
17
AIR 1960 SC 468
18
AIR 1959 SC 86
19
AIR 1970 SC 150
20
Ibid p. 150

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 measure the vital principle laid down in this decision which has nourished the
roots of law and injected justice and fair play in legality.21

(iii) Subject-matter bias

Subject-matter bias may arise when the Judge has a general-interest in the
subject-matter. According to Griffith and street,22 “Only rarely will this bias
invalidate proceedings.” A mere general interest in the general object to be
pursued would not disqualify a judge from deciding the matter. There must be
some direct connection with the litigation.
In Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh,23 The chairman of an Election Tribunal was not
declared disqualified from deciding from deciding the dispute relating to the
petitioner’s election on the ground that the Chairman’s wife was member of
Congress party whose candidate the petitioner has defeated.

(iv) Departmental Bias

Departmental Bias is inherent in administrative process. If it is not checked it will
negate the concept of fairness in administrative process. The leading case on this
point is Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation24. In this case, the transport Ministry issued a direction to the
Secretary to the transport Department to hear objections under section 68 (a) of
the motor Vehicles Act to the proposed scheme of nationalization. The SC
observed that the official who heard the objections was ‘in substance’ one of the
parties to the dispute and this was against the principles of natural justice.
In Mahadayal v. C.T.O.25 according to the opinion of the Commercial tax Officer,
the petitioner was not liable to pay tax. Even then he referred the matter to his
superior officer. On receipt of instructions from him, he imposed tax. The SC
quashed the decision.
(v) Policy Bias
Sometimes it happens that the Ministry or the official concerned may announce
beforehand the general policy which he intends to follow. The question is
whether such a statement would disqualify him from acting as the deciding
authority on the ground that this indicates his partiality to the issues in dispute.
Ministerial or departmental policy cannot be regarded as disqualifying basis.
21
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 454 (468)
22
Administrative law, 4th Edn,.p. 156
23
AIR 1964 MB 111.
24
AIR 1959 SC 309
25
AIR 1961 SC 82

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 In Govindraj Mudaliar v. State of T.N.26, the govt. decided in principle to
Nationalise Road Transport and appointed a committee for the same. This
committee consisted of a Home Secretary as a member and later on, the scheme
of nationalization was finalized and published and the objections were heard by
the home secretary. It was contended that the hearing was vitiated on account
of bias as the secretary had already made up his mind on the question of
nationalization because he was a member of the Committee which took this
policy decision.

(e) Tests of bias

The position in case of pecuniary bias is that an interest, however small it may be
disqualifies a person from acting a judge.27 But that is not so in case of personal bias.
In order to challenge administrative action successfully on the ground of personal
bias, it is necessary to prove that that there is a “reasonable suspicion of bias” or a
“real likelihood of bias”. In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon 28 the test of real
likelihood of bias was given a somewhat broader content. As Lord Denning says, “the
reason is plain enough. Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is
destroyed when right minded people go away thinking the judge was biased.
In Halsbury’s Law’s of England,29 it is stated : “The test of bias is whether a
reasonable intelligent man, fully apprised of all the circumstances, would feel a
serious apprehension of bias.”30
Reasonable apprehension in the mind of a reasonable man is necessary. Such
reasonable apprehension must be based on cogent materials. 31 Moreover, there
must be reasonable evidence to satisfy that there was a real likelihood of bias.
Vague suspincions of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable people should not be
made the standard to regulate normal human conduct.32
In Ganga Bai Charities v. CIT , a lawyer had given his opinion that the assessee trust
was not entitled to tax exemption. The lawyer was elevated as a judge of High Court.
Seven years later the same judge gave his judgement on the same case against the
trust. The Supreme Court held that there was no real likelihood of bias as the
opinion had been given seven years ago and the judge may not have remembered
the routine opinion given as a busy lawyer.

26
Administrative Law, 1988, pp. 489-93.
27
Griffith and Street, Administrative Law, 4th Edn,.p. 156
28
(1969) WLR 815.
29
Halsbury Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol 2 para 5551, p.282
30
Airport Authority v. V.K.D. Bali, AIR 1988 SC 1099.
31
Ibid, p.429
32
Secretary to Govt. Transport Deptt. V. Munuswamy, AIR 1988 SC 2232 (2234).

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 (2.) Audi Alteram Partem : Rule of hearing.
The audi alteram partem rule means that no one should be condemned unheard. In
a civilized society it is assumed that a person against whom any action is sought to
be taken, or whose right or interest is being affected, shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. This jural postulate is the kernel of natural justice.
Professor H.W.R. Wade rightly says that audi alteram partem embraces the whole
nation of fair procedure or due process.33 In short, the principle is that before an
order is passed against any person reasonable opportunity of being heard must be
afforded to him. Generally, the maxim includes two ingredients: (i) notice; and (ii)
hearing.

(i) Notice
A basic principle of natural justice is that before any action is taken, the affected
person must be given notice to show cause against the proposed action and seek his
explanation. Any order passed without giving notice is against the principles of
natural justice and is void ab inititio.34
Even if there is no provision in the statute about giving of notice, if the order
adversely affects the rights of an individual, the notice is required to be given. 35
(a) Adequacy of Notice- it is not enough that notice in a given case be given, it must
be adequate also. The question of adequacy of notice depends upon the facts
and circumstances of each case. However, a notice in order to be adequate must
contain the following:
(1) Time, place and nature of hearing.
(2) Legal authority and jurisdiction under which hearing is to be held.
(3) Matters of fact and law as regard charges.36

In a number of cases, proceedings have been quashed because of inadequacy of

notice.37 In J. Vilangandan v. Executive Manager,38 the Supreme Court held that the
notice was inadequate as it did not contain words to indicate clearly to the contractor
that it was proposed to debar him as defaulter from taking any contract in future under
the Department.

33
Wade, Administrative Law, 2nd Edn. 168.
34
Municipal Board Pushkar v. State Trasnport Authority, AIR 1965 SC 458.
35
Cooper v. Wandsworth (1863) 45 B (NS) 180
36
S5(a), American Administrative Procedure Act, 1946.
37
N.S Transport Co. v. State of Punjab, air 1976 sc 57.
38
AIR 1978 SC 930

11
 (b) Reasonable Opportunity- Moreover, the notice must give a reasonable
opportunity to comply with the requirements mentioned in it. Thus, to give 23
hours time to dismantle a structure alleged to be in a dilapidated condition is not
proper and the notice is not valid.39 Where a notice of one charge has been given,
the person cannot be punished for a separate charge of which he had no notice,
even though he may not have appeared to defend himself against the original
charge.40
(ii) Hearing
The second requirement of the audi alteram partem maxim is that the party
concerned must be given an opportunity of being any adverse action is taken against
him. In the leading case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works,41 the board had
power to demolish any building without giving an opportunity of hearing if it was
erected without prior permission. The Board did the same. Although the action of
the Board was not in violation of the statuatory provision, the Court held that the
Board’s power was subject to the qualification that no man can be deprived of his
property without having an opportunity of being heard.
The historic case of ridge v. Baldwin42 has been rightly described as the ‘magna carta’
of natural justice.43 The house of Lords by a majority of 4:1 held that the [pwer of
dismissal could not be exercised without giving a reasonable opportunity of being
heard and without observing the principles of natural justice.
(a) Oral Hearing
Generally, ‘hearing’ means oral hearing where the parties have right to legal
representation to produce witnesses who may be cross-examined.44 But in
England45 and America,46 it is settled as a general rule that in absence of
statuatory provisions, an administrative authority is not, bound to afford to the
concerned person an oral hearing. A person cannot claim the right to oral or
personal hearing,47 unless such right is conferred by the statute.
However, the importance of oral hearing should be emphasized where complex
and technical questions are involved adjudicating the authority and one of them
is allowed to give oral hearing, the same facility must be afforded to the other as
well.
39
State of J.&K. v. Haji Wali Mohd., AIR 1972 SC 2538
40
Annamuthado v. Oilfields Workers. (1961)
41
(1863) 14 CB (NS) 180.
42
(1964) AC 40
43
Allen, Law and Orders, 1966 p. 242.

44
Wade, H.W.R. Administrative Law, 1988, p. 543.
45
Local government Board v. Ariidge (1915) AC 190.
46
F.C.C. v. W.J.R,. (1949) 337 U.S 265 (276).
47
A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 (43)

12
 (b) Fair Hearing
Natural Justice is primarily identified with fair hearing. While fair opportunity to
be heard should be given to the parties, the principle does not imply, unless
expressly provided by the statute,48 a right to a personal hearing.49 The
requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given
in view of the proposed action.
Where evidence is given viva voce against a person, he must have opportunity to
hear it and to put the witnesses in cross-examination. Refusal to allow such
cross-examination would amount to violation of the principles of natural
justice.50
Fair hearing depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.51 In Kishan
Chand Chellaram v. C.I.T.52 the SC held that that when the Income-tax Officer was
relying on a letter said to have been written by the Manager of the Bank to the
I.T.O., it was necessary to provide an opportunity to the assessee to cross-
examine the Manager.
In USA, the right to cross examination is ensured under due process clause and
also under the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946. In England the position is the
same as in India and the Courts are seeking to work out the details of the right to
cross-examination.53

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Upadhyaya,J. (2015) , Central Law Agency, 07, Darbhanga Castle,
Allahabad .
2. https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/449421/?formInput=gullapalli%20
48
Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v. A.P.C.R.T.C,. AIR 1959 SC 308.
49
Local Government v. Arridge, 1915 AC 120
50
Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719.
51
State of Gujarat v. Anand Municipality, AIR 1993 SC 1196.
52
AIR 1980 SC 840.
53
R. v. Gaming Board exparte Benaim, (1970) 2B. 417.

13
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