Angustia, Absurdo y Sentido

Absurdity, Angst, and the Meaning of Life
Author(s): Duncan Pritchard

Source: The Monist, Vol. 93, No. 1, The Meaning of Life (January, 2010), pp. 3-16
Published by: Oxford University Press
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Absurdity, Angst, and the Meaning of Life
In his seminal paper, "The Absurd," Thomas Nagel (1970) offers a

key insight into the problem of the meaning of life.1 In particular, he sets
out a certain conception of the absurd and then argues that there are good
grounds for thinking that such absurdity applies to our own lives, thereby
rendering them devoid of meaning. We will call the view that our lives are
absurd, absurdism. I will be arguing that the conception of the absurd that
Nagel sets out is indeed key to the problem of the meaning of life, and
thus that an adequate resolution to the problem of the meaning of life must
be able to demonstrate that absurdism is false. Nevertheless, I will not be
following him in arguing that there are good grounds for absurdism.
Instead, I will be suggesting that Nagel's arguments in fact support a much
weaker epistemological claim. Even so, the truth of this epistemological
thesis ensures that a degree of angst regarding whether our lives are mean-
ingful is unavoidable.
Nagel's paper opens by noting that some of the main reasons stan-
dardly given for absurdism are unpersuasive on closer inspection. He cites
four such reasons. The first is that our existences will not matter a long time
from now. He argues that if it is indeed true that nothing that we do now will
matter in a million years then, "by the same token, nothing that will be the
case in a million years matters now" (49). In particular, he goes on, "it does
not matter now that in a million years nothing we do now will matter" (49).
The second ground for absurdism that he considers is that we are
very small in comparison to the universe as a whole. Nagel notes that even
if we suppose that we are very large compared to the universe as a whole
- infinitely large perhaps - it doesn't seem to follow from this very fact
"Absurdity, Angst, and the Meaning of Life" by Duncan Pritchard,

The Monist , vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 3-16. Copyright © 2010, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.
4 DUNCAN PRITCHARD
that our lives are thereby any les

Nagel makes a similar point as reg
he considers: that we are mortal.
forever. Would it follow that one
virtue of that ?
Finally, the fourth ground for
charge that the "chain of justifica
worry is that our lives are, at
nowhere." In support of this claim
earn money to pay for clothing,
oneself from year to year, per
career - but to what final end?"
justifications support the activiti
chain does not terminate in a sati
so that one can get money, so tha
so that one can get pleasure, and
of justification being of a sort th
it supports. Nagel's response to th
cations must come to an end som
that they end where they appear
the multiple, often trivial ordinar
controlling life scheme" (51).
II
After roundly rejecting these standard arguments for absurdism,

Nagel goes on to consider what would count as a good ground for this
thesis. The ordinary conception of absurdity is, he claims, one on which
"there is a discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and reality," (51)
and he offers the famous example to illustrate this of being knighted just
as one's trousers fall down. For the most part, we live as if our lives are
not generally absurd; as if, that is, there is not some general discrepancy
between pretension or aspiration and reality that would make our lives
absurd. What the proponent of absurdism is trying to get us to realise,
however, is that this discrepancy is inevitably in play.
With this conception of absurdity in mind, Nagel argues that there are
grounds for supposing that there is a general and inevitable discrepancy
ABSURDITY, ANGST, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 5
between pretension or aspiration and reality, and thus that our

absurd. The source of this discrepancy is the "collision between
ousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual poss
regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or
doubt" (51-52). That is, there is "always available a point of view
the particular form of our lives from which the seriousness [in
live our lives] appears gratuitous" (52).
The perspective that Nagel has in mind is one in which we v
lives from a disengaged standpoint. We can get a grip on what
in mind in this regard by how he sharply contrasts this standpoint w
in which one simply requests further steps in the chain of reason
the fourth defence of absurdism considered above). For he argue
relevant step which leads to this disengaged standpoint is "not
asking for still another justification in the chain, and failing to g
Rather, what happens is that we "step back to find that the who
of justifications and criticism, which controls our choices and sup
claims to rationality, rests on responses and habits that [. . .] we s
know how to defend without circularity" (53). The problem, th
the regress of justifications, but rather the fact that there is a p
that we can take on our justifications which seems to demonstr
they are not justifications at all.2
As Nagel makes clear, it is far from obvious how one is to ad
respond to this problem. Suppose, for example, that one tries to
required justification in terms of the role that one's life plays wi
greater good, such as by appealing to one's "service to society" or
in some divine scheme (53). The problem with these appeals, how
that "a role in some larger enterprise cannot confer significance u
enterprise is itself significant" (53). Moreover, "any such larger
can be put into doubt in the same way that the aims of an indiv
can be, and for the same reasons" (54). That is, the crux of the
that the disengaged standpoint calls any justification into questio
justification with a relative generality, like a justification that
one's role in a divine scheme. Absurdism looks unavoidable.
With the problem so construed, we can also diagnose why one might
be tempted to think that such considerations as one's mortality or relative size
could constitute grounds for absurdism. For while such considerations do not
motivate absurdism, it is unsurprising that by reflecting on our mortality,
6 DUNCAN PRITCHARD
or our relatively tiny physical si

engaged standpoint from which
III
One of the most interesting as

he connects the problem of the
problem of radical scepticism, i
arises out of the adoption of a d
claims that in both cases one re
pose certain claims which cannot
threat of circularity. Moreover,
contrast to a more mundane con
In both cases the final, philosoph

challenged certainties, though it is
of doubt within the system of evi
other certainties is implied. In
capacity to transcend those limita
tations, and as inescapable). (55)
According to Nagel, then, the ep

is thus radical scepticism, where
when taking the disengaged stan
epistemic or more generally, are
Whether this analogy between
mological conception is apt is an
IV
Nagel thus offers some compe

surdism is true; and, indeed, for
teresting ways to the problem o
sections of the paper, however, s
of the article has been devoted t
fide , we now find Nagel hurrie
before. As he puts it, our "absurdi
defiance" (58). And here we get h
If a sense of the absurd is a way of perceiving our true situation

the situation is not absurd until the perception arises), then wha
we have to resent or escape it? Like the capacity for epistemol
cism, it results from the ability to understand our human limita
not be a matter for agony unless we make it so. (59)
But this is bizarre. How can it be that one can recognise tha
situation" is as the absurdist claims and yet merrily carry o
Indeed, Nagel's final remark in this respect, that we should "
absurd lives with irony" (59), further compounds the oddity
going on here. How would such an ironic approach to on
work? More specifically, wouldn't such an ironic approach m
tuate the absurdity of one's existence, rather than militate ag
Given that Nagel's critical remarks in this regard do not hit home, what
we are left with is the apparently compelling argument he presents for ab-
surdism. It thus becomes imperative for us to find some way to block this
argument, at least if we are to avoid the conclusion that our lives are mean-
ingless. Fortunately, as we will now see, there is a crucial lacuna in Nagel's
argument for absurdism, and hence he has not yet established this thesis.
Before we can demonstrate this, we first need to flesh out Nagel's
conception of the problem of the meaning of life. I take it that for Nagel
this problem is essentially a problem of value. That is, what we seek is a
concrete underpinning of the most fundamental values that make up our
lives. If these values are indeed just arbitrary, and hence not really
valuable at all, then one's life is rendered devoid of the meaning that we
ascribe to it in virtue of it exhibiting such (apparently genuine) values.
The problem, then, as Nagel sees it, is that we recognise from the disen-
gaged perspective that there is nothing underpinning these values, and it
is from this fact that the absurdity arises.
Let us define a fundamental goal of one's life as being a goal the
value of which does not depend on the value of any of one's other goals.
So, for example, we could imagine an agent who just has two goals in life.
One is to further his career (in advertising, say, or academia). The other is
the fellowship of his friends and family (i.e., he does what he can to spend
quality time with them, he cherishes them, he does what he can to ensure
8 DUNCAN PRITCHARD
that their lives are happy and fulf

imagine that of these two goals o
agent ultimately only cares about
a certain quality of life which
quality time with his family and
the goal of furthering one's own
entail that this life is absurd, since
relative to a further end anyway. W
mental goal of this agent's life -
- is appropriately valuable. If it
between pretension and aspiratio
of the absurd, for it would now
invests in his life is not matched
Notice that we are construing
clearly interested in those goals
than, for example, the goals whi
could of course be different). In
may think that his life is guided b
fact the case.
It follows on this view that a

is thereby devoid of meaning in
seem quite harsh, but it stands u
life with no fundamental goals w
which has no goals at all, but wh
agent concerned simply tossed b
an existence seems almost a pa
Another example of a life witho
the agent's goals are valued as a me
the privileged role of being a
might be a life in which the age
financial enrichment, and an elev
that all three goals are on a par
other two. All would agree, I'm s
of a meaningless life, and the ov
a life is beset with incoherency.
other but merely as a means to eac
this agent's existence.
Now one might want to object at this juncture that this is a

restrictive account of the meaning of life, for couldn't a life be give
even though the goals of the agent aren't in any way responsive to t
in question that undergirds such meaningfulness? Perhaps, for
the wretched creature just described who has no fundamental
ertheless enjoys a meaningful life since that life forms part o
purpose which thereby confers value, and hence meaning, on th
On closer inspection, however, this possibility just doesn't m
sense. That is, the idea that meaning can be conferred on a life
in this way just doesn't hold water, for a necessary condition wo
the agent appropriately identifies with the value-conferring p
question. Imagine, for example, a life lived completely without p
yet which nonetheless served some purpose beyond that life - pe
example, an entirely incidental byproduct of this life was that s
life was spared and this other life fulfilled some wonderful pur
this is so may make us value this life in a certain kind of way, b
not suffice to make this life valuable in the relevant sense for it to count
as a meaningful life. Quite the contrary: this life is meaningless.
VI
In any case, with this conception of fundamental goals in hand, we

can get a clearer handle on what Nagel has in mind in his conception of
the problem of the meaning of life. For his idea, as I construe it, is that
there is necessarily a perspective relative to which one's fundamental
goals are lacking in value. If that's right, then we are subject to a standing
worry that our lives are absurd, since relative to this perspective there will
indeed be the discrepancy between pretension or aspiration and reality
that Nagel thinks is the mark of the absurd.
Even if we grant that Nagel has characterised the problem correctly,
it is still a further question whether he has indeed established that it is true,
relative to the disengaged perspective, that our lives are absurd, and
therefore meaningless. Crucially, Nagel has established no such thing.
Whether or not the sceptical conclusion that Nagel canvasses does
indeed follow from this conception of the meaning of life and the possi-
bility of a disengaged standpoint rests on whether there exists final (i.e.,
10 DUNCAN PRITCHARD
noninstrumental) value. For if on

valuable, then one will not need t
order to defend their value since
Of course, that there exist such
certainly candidates to stop the r
gaged perspective which leads to
Nagel understands it. Moreover,
supposing that such value is im
argument, the case he presents fo
VII
Why does Nagel fail to spot this line of response? I think there are
two reasons why he may have overlooked this possibility. The first is that
Nagel crucially overstates one of the claims that he puts forward in defence
of absurdism. He correctly notes (§3) that simply seeking a validation of
one's goals by appeal to some greater good beyond one's life will not itself
do the trick, since one can also ask the question of why this greater good
should be thought valuable in the relevant sense. As he puts the point:
If we can step back from the purposes of individual life and doubt their point,
we can step back also from the progress of human history, or of science, or
the success of a society, or the kingdom, power, and glory of God, and put
all these things into question in the same way." (54)
This is entirely the right thing to say on this score, since simply appealing to
further goods, even goods from outwith one's own life, won't achieve any-
thing unless those goods have the required value. But that such an appeal
to a greater good will not thereby resolve the problem that Nagel has identified
does not demonstrate that an appeal to a greater good is necessarily impotent
at disarming the case for absurdism, for whether that further claim is true
depends on whether the greater good in question has the requisite final
value. Indeed, I take it that the very reason why one might be tempted to
appeal to a greater good in this way in order to validate the meaning of
one's life is precisely because if there are such things as final values, then
it is quite natural to suppose that they reside in goods that are external to
our own lives, such as the goodness that might be underwritten by a creator
God. What is going on here, then, is the implicit appeal to final values.
ABSURDITY, ANGST, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 1 1
The second reason why I think Nagel fails to notice the relev
final value to the problem in hand is that he in effect confuses a
mologica! thesis with a metaphysical thesis. That is, when on
closer at Nagel's argument for absurdism it becomes apparent th
conception of the problem of the meaning of life is essentially ep
logical. On his view, what we recognise, from a disengaged persp
is the possibility of legitimately questioning whatever value we as
our fundamental goals. It follows that there is an epistemological
about attaining a properly grounded subjective assurance that ou
have the value that we instinctively ascribe to them. Notice, howe
this epistemological claim falls short of the metaphysical claim th
proffers. In particular, the epistemological conclusion does not su
establish absurdism: that there is a perspective from which one c
nally doubt the final value of one's fundamental goals does not en
such goals lack final value. It might entail that we are unable to kn
they have final value, but that is a different matter entirely. What N
arguing for, then, is at most the opacity of the meaningfulness
life, which is a very different claim to the absurdist thesis. I will
further on this 'opacity' claim in a moment.
I think this mistake also explains why Nagel wrongly suppos
the problem posed by the meaning of life is structurally analogou
problem of radical scepticism. These problems will indeed lo
similar if we construe the former in epistemological terms. But
distinguish between the epistemological thesis and the metap
thesis (i.e., absurdism), then it becomes clear that these two philo
problems are disanalogous in a crucial respect. In particular, whe
relevant epistemological thesis just is the problem of radical scep
the analogue epistemological thesis as regards the problem of the
of life is not equivalent to absurdism.
VIII
What I am suggesting, therefore, is that we should take Nagel's argu-

ment for absurdism as being essentially conditional. That is, rather than
holding that our lives are absurd we should instead hold that if the funda-
mental goals of our life lack final value then our lives are absurd.
12 DUNCAN PRITCHARD
This
way of thinking about the
number of different approaches to
those who think that appeal to a
if one's life is to have meaning are
this way could the final value of t
propriately underwritten. More g
internalists' and 'externalists' w
meaning of life - i.e., the debate b
to the problem resides in facts th
and those who think that it isn't
where the relevant final value might
view suspicious of final values tha
and so try to accommodate the th
terms. Externalists, in contrast, are
of one's fundamental goals could b
to nonsubjective factors.
This is not the place to get into th
The point is that we have highlig
the issue of the problem of the m
fundamental goals have (or even c
turn raises a host of further ques
final value and the manner in wh
manifest itself. It could be that th
hence Nagel's sceptical conclusio
whether or not this is true turns on wider considerations that are not
exclusive to the debate about the meaning of life.
IX
I've noted that the epistemological thesis that Nagel argues for falls
short of absurdism, and thus that we have grounds for resisting absurdism.
Should we accept the epistemological thesis? I'm inclined to think that we
should, at least once it is understood in the right way.
The epistemological thesis, recall, is that from the disengaged per-
spective we recognise that it is entirely dubitable that the fundamental goals
of our life have final value. Thus it is likewise dubitable that our lives are
not absurd. The first thing to notice here is that the epistemic demand
being imposed is very severe. In effect, what Nagel is asking for i

jective guarantee that our lives are meaningful. We would not no
insist that in order to have knowledge the proposition known sh
beyond doubt in this way. Thus, it is in principle possible to grant
temologica! thesis while claiming that an agent could well kn
absurdism is false.
Still, even though this demand is extremely severe, given how important
it is to us that our lives have meaning it is not implausible that we should
want our beliefs in this regard to meet this high epistemic standard. Moreover,
Nagel is surely right that we are unable to meet this standard, as regards
any belief. The result that is we are inevitably subject to a degree of angst
regarding whether our lives are meaningful.
Once we understand the nature of the epistemic demand in play here,
I think it becomes clearer why Nagel thinks that there is a sense in which
the problem of radical scepticism is insoluble and also why he maintains
that when it comes to both the problem of the meaning of life and the
problem of radical scepticism that the issue is not merely the potential regress
of reasons. The first point follows immediately from the austere epistemic
demand in play. If what we want in response to the problem of scepticism
is a subjective guarantee that we are not radically deceived, then this is not
going to be forthcoming. A general epistemic angst of some degree is thus
unavoidable.5 The second point follows once we recognise that the un-
availability of reasons of this very specific sort is entirely compatible with
there being supporting reasons available. That one can question any ground
that is offered in favour of a belief does not itself entail that the belief is
ungrounded. Similarly, that one can question the final value of any partic-
ular fundamental goal does not mean that one lacks good grounds for
supposing that this fundamental goal is finally valuable.
One of the consequences of this conception of the meaning of life is

that it entails that the meaning of one's life is necessarily opaque to one,
in that one will not have a subjective guarantee that one's life is not
absurd. This is not the only respect in which it is opaque either, for as we
noted above, it need not - indeed, is unlikely to be - a transparent matter
what one's fundamental goals are. Human beings are prone to self-deception
14 DUNCAN PRITCHARD
and a lack of pertinent self-knowled

to those goals which are fundamenta
Moreover, if what is required is a
that is surely lacking.
Indeed, there is a further sense
opaque to one. After all, while th
is necessary for one's life to hav
clearly further conditions will ne
would need to be sufficiently succ
sole finally valuable fundamental
yet one fails miserably, then that
meaning. Moreover, presumably w
be properly related to one's own
agent has a finally valuable fundam
in attaining this goal, and yet the
Given that one's success in attain
had nothing to do with one's own
confer any value onto one's life?6
There may be other constraints
meaningful life. What is important
constraints just offered will comp
life. After all, that one is successf
will almost certainly be a nontrans
that one is successful, this success
to some other factor (such as luck
meaningful life thus gives us furt
possible to have a subjective guara
hence for supposing that some deg
ness of one's life is in order.
XI
Contra Nagel, then, the possibility of the disengaged perspective that

he describes does not suffice to give us reason to think that absurdism is
true, since this thesis in fact depends on further substantive issues, such as
the existence and nature of final value. What Nagel does demonstrate, how-
ever, is the unavoidability of a certain kind of angst regarding whether our
lives are meaningful (not to mention a parallel angst regarding w

have the widespread cognitive engagement with reality that we
suppose ourselves to have). That we are necessarily subject to su
is, I suggest, simply an incontrovertible feature of the human co
Duncan Pritchard
University of Edinburgh
Notes
1. In what follows, page numbers are given to the 1987 reprint of this
excellent survey of recent work on the problem of the meaning of life,
See also Metz (2007).
2. The philosophical implications of the disengaged perspective is,
recurring motif in his work. See especially Nagel (1986).
3. For two classic discussions of final (as opposed to specifically intrin
Korsgaard (1983) and Rabinowicz and Roennow-Rasmussen (1999; cf. R
Roennow-Rasmussen 2003). For scepticism about final value (at least i
value is distinct from intrinsic value), see Bradley (2002). For a recent di
problem of the meaning of life which appeals to final value, see Brogaa
(2005).
4. Externalism - at least if taken as simply the denial of internalism as I do above,
which not everyone does (see, e.g., Brogaard and Smith 2005, §1) - is the more popular
option, both historically and in the contemporary literature. For a relatively recent, and
prominent, exponent of internalism, see Frankfurt (1982).
5. I discuss epistemic angst of this sort in its own right in Pritchard (2005b). See also
Pritchard (2005a, passim).
6. This idea that a meaningful life exhibits a certain structure, with both internal
aspects (such as appropriate motivational states) and external aspects (such as finally
valuable fundamental goals successfully attained through one's own efforts), is a common,
though far from uncontentious, theme in contemporary accounts of the meaning of life.
For discussion of proposals of this general sort, see Kekes (1986; 2000), Brogaard and
Smith (2005) and Levy (2005).
References
Bradley, B. 2002. "Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?" Philosophical Stud

Brogaard, В., and Smith, B. 2005. "On Luck, Responsibility, and the
Philosophical Papers 34: 443-58.
Frankfurt, H. 1982. "The Importance of What We Care About," Synt
Kekes, J. 1986. "The Informed Will and the Meaning of Life," Philos
nological Research 47: 75-90.
16 DUNCAN PRITCHARD
Korsgaard, C.M. 1983. "Two Distinctions in Good

169-95.
Levy, N. 2005. "Downshifting and Meaning in Life," Ratio 18: 176-89.
Metz, T. 2002. "Recent Work on the Meaning of Life," Ethics 112: 781-814.
Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/life-meaning/
Nagel, T. 1970. "The Absurd," Journal of Philosophy
Meaning: A Reader , (ed.) О. Hänfling, 49-59, Oxf
Pritchard, D.H. 2005я. Epistemic Luck , Oxford: Oxford
of Philosophy 83: 185-206.

Rabinowicz, W., and Roennow-Rasmussen, T. 1999. "A D
For its Own Sake," Proceedings of the Aristotelian S

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Absurdity, Angst, and the Meaning of Life

Author(s): Duncan Pritchard

In his seminal paper, "The Absurd," Thomas Nagel (1970) offers a

"Absurdity, Angst, and the Meaning of Life" by Duncan Pritchard,

that our lives are thereby any les

After roundly rejecting these standard arguments for absurdism,

between pretension or aspiration and reality, and thus that our

or our relatively tiny physical si

One of the most interesting as

In both cases the final, philosoph

According to Nagel, then, the ep

Nagel thus offers some compe

If a sense of the absurd is a way of perceiving our true situation

that their lives are happy and fulf

It follows on this view that a

Now one might want to object at this juncture that this is a

In any case, with this conception of fundamental goals in hand, we

noninstrumental) value. For if on

What I am suggesting, therefore, is that we should take Nagel's argu-

being imposed is very severe. In effect, what Nagel is asking for i

One of the consequences of this conception of the meaning of life is

and a lack of pertinent self-knowled

Contra Nagel, then, the possibility of the disengaged perspective that

lives are meaningful (not to mention a parallel angst regarding w

Bradley, B. 2002. "Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?" Philosophical Stud

Korsgaard, C.M. 1983. "Two Distinctions in Good

Pritchard, D.H. 2005я. Epistemic Luck , Oxford: Oxford

of Philosophy 83: 185-206.

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