630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

*
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS

MANZANO and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Certainly, petitioner had, and

still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time
he sought to intervene; The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several
cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is
contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.—Private respondent
argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor
an interest to protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-
Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately
disqualified by final and executory judgment.” The flaw in this argument is
it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings
before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results
of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of
which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact,
however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from
the race at the time he sought to intervene.

_______________

* EN BANC.

631

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 631

Mercado vs. Manzano

The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases,only applies to
cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question
is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be
declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a
“Motion for Leave to File Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been no
proclamation of the winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have
private respondent disqualified “from running for [an] elective local
position” under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who
originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of
Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the
latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Same; Same; Same; That petitioner had a right to intervene at that
stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent
is clear from §6 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987.—Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation
any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998,
after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a
right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.—Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the
motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.—The
failure of the COMELEC enbanc to resolve petitioner’s motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner
in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC enbanc instead
decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only
with the denial of petitioner’s motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondent’s alleged disqualification on
the ground of dual citizenship.

632

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from dual

allegiance.—Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states.For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis
is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso
facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering the
citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino
mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the
laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individual’s volition.
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160,
§40(d) and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring
to “dual allegiance.”—In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the
concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se
but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship”
in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons

633

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 633

Mercado vs. Manzano

with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable

consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Balane, Tamase, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private
respondent.
 Raul A. Daza collaborating counsel for private respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.

Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III.
The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
1
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a

pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States. 2
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citi-

_______________

1 Petition, Rollo, p. 5.
2 Per Commissioner Amado M. Calderon and concurred in by Commissioners
Julio F. Desamito and Japal M. Guiani.

634

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

zenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELEC’s Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of

Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of
Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the
ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the
Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a
Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco,
California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen
under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American
citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent
Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual
citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from
the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for
the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo
Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati
City.

On May 8, 31998, private respondent filed a motion for

reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the
election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated
May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvass-

_______________

3Id., Annex E, Rollo, pp. 50-63.

635

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 635

Mercado vs. Manzano

ers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 41998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification. Petitioner’s motion was opposed by private
respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the
COMELEC enbanc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC enbanc reversed the ruling
of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to
run for vice
5
mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC
enbanc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San

Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of
the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jussoli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time
of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines
using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered
him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued
an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of
his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and
did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority,
he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.
Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second
Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respon-

_______________

4 Rollo, pp. 78-83.

5 Per Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and concurred in by Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe,
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, Japal M. Guiani, and Luzviminda G. Tancangco. Commissioner Julio
F. Desamito dissented.

636

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

dent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates
for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight
hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S.
Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two
hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be
far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex
legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257
SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission enbanc hereby REVERSES the
resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the
cancellation of the respondent’s certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be
QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in
the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of
Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the
respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for
vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC enbanc, the board of

canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid
resolution of the COMELEC enbanc and to declare private
respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City. Petitioner contends that—

[T]he COMELEC enbanc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when

he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of

majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered
himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.

637

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 637

Mercado vs. Manzano

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of

Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that,
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even
assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private

respondent Manzano—whether petitioner Mercado has personality
to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioner’s motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the

Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that
petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this
suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

SECTION 1. Whenproper and when may be permitted to intervene.—Any

person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the
trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its
discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
such action or proceeding.
....
SECTION 3. Discretion of Commission.—In allowing or disallowing a
motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of
its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate
action or proceeding.

638

638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in

the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who]
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment.”
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner
sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there
had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the
vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which
petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact,
however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race6 at the time he sought to intervene.
7
The rule
in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to
cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the
time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File Intervention” on
May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified “from running for [an] elective local position” under
§40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally
instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of
Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner
since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation any less
because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998,
after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That
petitioner had a right to intervene at that
_______________

6 176 SCRA 1(1989).

7 Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991); Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA
436 (1994); Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 (1995); Frivaldo v. COMELEC,
257 SCRA 727 (1996).

639

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 639

Mercado vs. Manzano

stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private

respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as
the Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified

shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings

for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC enbanc to resolve petitioner’s
motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion,
justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the
COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the
present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioner’s motion for intervention but also with the substantive
issues respecting private respondent’s alleged disqualification on the
ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private
respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether
he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati
City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR

DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought

under §40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
which declares as “disqualified from running for any elective local
position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizen-

640

640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

ship.” This
8
provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of
Makati.
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the
Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that
through §40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
“command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.”
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.
The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person
9
is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign

countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children
are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s
country the former are considered citizens, unless by their
act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines

may, without performing any act, be also a citizen

_______________

8 R.A. No. 7854, the Charter of the City of Makati, provides: “SEC. 20—The
following are disqualified from running for any elective position in the city: . . . (d)
Those with dual citizenship.”
9 JOVITO R. SALONGA, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 166 (1995).

641
 VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 641
Mercado vs. Manzano

of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution
provides: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law.” This provision was included
in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of10 Commissioner Blas F.
Ople who explained its necessity as follows:

. . .I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee
according to which a dual allegiance—and I reiterate a dual allegiance—is
larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is
seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of
the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not
question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional
cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know
what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese
Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the
country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely
known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the
sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People’s Republic of China,
they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein
all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled
kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already

_______________

10Id.,at 361 (Session of July 8, 1986).

642

642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano
Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second
allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner
Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough
assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the
great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by
Filipino-Chinese—it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a
tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also
means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask—that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship
which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO
CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople11

spoke on the problem of
these citizens with dual allegiance, thus:

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about

dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a
double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling
debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the
Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which
elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations
exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner
Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those
debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the
People’s Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these
naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is
asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter intothe

_______________

11Id.,at 233-234 (Session of June 25, 1986).

643

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 643

Mercado vs. Manzano

spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about
double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the
Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future
legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the
security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of
double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a
proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or
regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of

the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase
“dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
§20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.”
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: “[D]ual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship
of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
whether or not she is considered a citizen 12
of another country is
something completely beyond our control.”
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same
time forswear allegiance to the other country of which

_______________

12 1 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 203 (Session of

June 23, 1986).

644

644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following
discussion
13
on §40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly
shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification
of line 41, page 17: “Any person with dual citizenship” is
disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-
born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a
natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect
or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports,
one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify
the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means
that at the moment when he would want to run for public office,
he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport
but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that
person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire
to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution
does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen
without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is:
Under the Gentleman’s example, if he does not renounce his
other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he
is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in
the

_______________

13 Transcript, pp. 5-6, Session of Nov. 27, 1990.

645

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 645

Mercado vs. Manzano

Certificate of Candidacy that: “I am a Filipino citizen, and I have

only one citizenship.”
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one
citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in
the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization

must renounce “all allegiance 14and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty” of which at the time he is a subject
or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of15 naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that

he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of
our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should
interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the
Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we
would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise
to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact.
That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It
would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.

_______________

14 C.A. No. 473, §12.

15 86 Phil. 340, 343 (1950).

646

646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

III. PETITIONER’S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis,while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC enbanc held that, by participating
in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
“effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law,” so
that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking
part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation
and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when
private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it
should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private
respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC
must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that “A person who is a national
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his
nationality by: . . .(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state
or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory.” To be sure this provision was
declared
16
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim
v.Rusk as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate
foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when
he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondent’s certificate of candidacy, filed

_______________

16 387 U.S. 253, 18 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1967), overrulingPerez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 2
L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958).

647

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 647

Mercado vs. Manzano

on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under

oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF “NATURAL-BORN” OR

“NATURALIZED”) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A,
BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT
TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I
WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND
ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS,
LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE
 DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION
UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL
RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY
CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE
AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his

American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might17 have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was
held:

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American.

Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would
disqualify him “from running for any elective local position?” We answer
this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo
was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even
before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
wrote that he “had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship—long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the

_______________

17 257 SCRA 727, 759-760 (1996).

648

648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. Manzano

interim—when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before

he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.”
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19,
1995:

“By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.”

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long
before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee.
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive
upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or
abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner’s contention that the oath

of allegiance contained in private respondent’s certificate of
candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American
citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioner’s contention that, to
be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the
election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted
that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on
April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship.
The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion
of his American nationality before the termination of his American
18
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC applies
mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

_______________

18 185 SCRA 703, 711 (1990). See also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717,
96 L. Ed. 1249 (1952).

649

VOL. 307, MAY 26, 1999 649

Mercado vs. Manzano

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino . . . . [T]he Certification that he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he
is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be “express,” it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship
when there is no renunciation, either “express” or “implied.”

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is

a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of
the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before
as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
 profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill
his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there
are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through19expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country
of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any

_______________

19 169 SCRA 364 (1989).

650

650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Andal vs. People

one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign

nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,

Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., On leave.
Pardo, J., No part.

Petition dismissed.

Note.—Ineligibility refers to the lack of the qualifications

prescribed in the Constitution on the statutes for holding public
office. (Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., 271 SCRA 767 [1997])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.