Gruber

From anarchy to organization:

The neoliberal view associated with Robert Keohane that international cooperation is fundamentally a
good thing is being challenged. The convergence in liberal and realist opinion is a sign of theoretical
progress. The theory developed by Keohane has led to an overemphasis on the mutual-gains of
international cooperation. This was argued basd on 2 steps: institutions facilitate international
cooperation and step 2, cooperation in turn facilitates “utility gains” for each participating state or
government. To understand why supranational institutions are ruling the word, the authors claims to
incorporate the possibility of both winners and (absolute) losers. Gruber counters the claim that
institutions are always Pareto-efficient mechanisms to collective-action problems and that they are the
only logical possibility.

The author raises the question: why may actors in international system choose to take part in the
regime established by A and B, its “enacting coalition”? One possibility is that A and B use force,
threatening those actors wit economic sanctions or direct coercive pressure. The fact that cooperation
and institution building are voluntary choices does not imply that the institutions raise utility.
Author argues that the new regime’s beneficiaries can simply “go it alone.”

The article shows how institutionalized cooperation by one group of actors can have the effect of
restricting the options available for another group. Once the winners seem likely to establish their new
cooperative structure – something they would do for sure – the losers realize that being left out would
be worse than joining. They would be happier if this cooperative structure had never been created.
Faced with a choice between joining the winners’ new cooperative system or being completely shut out,
losers submit their applications for membership. They do so because the winners have removed the
status quo choice from them. This perspective offers new way of thinking why nations cooperate but
also provides insights into how they cooperate. “Cooperation is like beauty: its value is in the eye of the
beholder.

All of this presumes that the utility consequences of interstate cooperation may differ radically
depending on which parties or even which individuals happen to control domestic public authority.
Power may permeate and infuse international cooperation just as it permeates and infuses international
conflict. In the case of conflict though relations are not voluntary and the means of exercising power are
more transparent. The results go-it-alone power or institutional power are the same: governments
choose to participate in cooperative international structures they genuinely and intensely dislike.

The efficiency rationale for supranational governance

If we shift the theoretical focus to losers’ side, we would arrive at a more convincing answer to the
question “why do states cooperate?” Supranational regimes can be understood by having two elements:
the basic terms of cooperation are embodied in the founding charters and the procedural matters are
well defined ahead of time for a given situation. The author argues that in recent years, international
institutions have increased to the point where decision-making tasks are undertaken directly by
individual states. This change has been dramatic. The “anarchy” that once characterized the
international system has given way to a complex web of overlapping supranational networks or a
community of nations. We are nowhere near a World Parliament. Robert Keohane and other neoliberal
institutionalist explain the emergence of supranational institutions with the impossibility of nations to
achieve their policy objectives on their own.

Backing the Game Theory, the fear of being “suckered” can make difficult for a group of rational states
to coordinate their policies. In a multiplayer game, there is always a chance that one player will
misinterpret defection by a second player as cheating when in fact the second player is merely
retaliating against a third player for committing a defect in a previous round. The main point of the
analysis is that where international institutions exist and cooperate as intended – clarifying
expectations via written charters, accords, pacts and clearing up ambiguity, international cooperation
may not in fact be that difficult to achieve. GATT is an example of how it didn’t specify its ambiguities.
The movement toward supranational governance has also begun to make inroads into national security
policy. The OSCE and WTO are two manifestations of a wider trend toward international agreements
whose initial terms are intended to be flexible.
The author talks about these flexible agreements, whose terms of cooperation might allow for
subsequent changes, to be more prevalent in today’s international area. European Union is a good
example where it transfers national policy-making prerogatives to supranational entities. This flexibility
occurs because individuals who negotiate are often guided by time-sensitive domestic political concerns
and therefore rush into deals.

In the course of trying to resolve these contractual ambiguities to everyone’s satisfaction, international
cooperation can quickly devolve into chaos. It is sometimes argued, for example, that trade liberalization
on a global scale requires a hegemon to ensure compliance.

The coordination dilemma, contrary to the imprisoner dilemma, raises a different possibility: perhaps
reaching an agreement is difficult because states encounter too many, not too few, opportunities for
collective gain. The author says that successful cooperation often requires something more than the
existence of information clearinghouses. What is required in situations of high uncertainty is the
construction of a higher-level sovereign governance structures.

Whatever the distributional consequences of a particular international agreement or treaty, the longer it
has been in existence, the higher the value will government signatories place on its continuation, and
hence the lower the losers’ propensity to terminate or disrupt it.
Week 9 False promise of international institutions: - This approach to international
politics rests on the belief that institutions are a key means of promoting world
peace. In particular, Western policymakers claim that the institutions that "served
the West well" before the Soviet Union collapsed must be reshaped to encompass
Eastern Europe as well - This article examines the claim that institutions push states
away from war and promote peace. I concentrate on assessing the major
international relations theories that employ institutions as a core concept: liberal
institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory - Realists and
institutionalists particularly disagree about whether institutions markedly affect the
prospects for international stability. Realists say no; institutionalists say yes.
Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of
power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great
powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior. - My central
conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus
hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world - 5 realist
assumption: (1) the international system is anarchic, (2) states possess some
military capabilities, (3) states can never be certain about other states` intentions,
(4) states main goal is survival, and (5) states think strategically on how to survive. -
Two factors inhibit cooperation: relative gains concern and concern about cheating -
Realists recognize that states operate through institutions sometimes. However,
they believe that institutions are created and maintained by most powerful states in
the world and are used by them to increase their share of the world power. - Liberal
institutionalism: the main problem to cooperation among states is cheating.
Institutions solve this problem by letting the cheater know that he will get caught,
punished and will jeopardize future cooperative efforts. This theory does not aim to
deal with the problem of cheating by changing the norms of state behavior, but just
by changing states` calculation on how to maximize gains. This theory links
cooperation to stability. When states cooperate with each other in different fields
that would naturally lead to peace among them. - In short, liberal institutionalism is
not convincing at explaining how institutions affect peace and stability. It focuses on
explaining economic cooperation and does not directly address the question of how
institutions cause peace. Additionally, the empirical evidence is very little. -
Collective security : trust is the most important thing. States must trust each other,
and must be very confident that other states will renounce war, and when the
aggressor appear, all states will attack it and none will back off. The flaws in this
theory is that it does not explain how will states overcome their fears and learn to
trust each other. Additionally, the empirical record is little in supporting it - Critical
theory: - The main goal of critical theorists is to change state behavior in
fundamental ways, to move beyond a world of security competition and war and
establish a pluralistic security community. However, the explanation of how would
that occur is incomplete