PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, VOL. 11, NO.

What is Race?

Angela White

The Context
While it has been widely established as a matter of fact that race has no
sufficient biological basis, lone has only to look at the prevalence of racial
discrimination and prejudice in the world to conclude that, in some sense,
the concept ofrace is real. But, as Charles W. Mills notes in "The Racial
Polity," there "continue to be general declarations about the evils of dis-
crimination ... [i]n philosophy; however, race remains conceptually and
theoretically residual" (Mills 1999, p. 14). Insofar as race continues to
be a basis for discrimination against others, it seems important to make
explicit the bases for our beliefs about racial categorization, in order to
more effectively challenge those who believe that races are, as a matter of
fact, hierarchical. Thus I submit, following Mills, there is a need to
develop better accounts of what underlies our practice of categorizing
people according to their race. By making our practices explicit, it
becomes possible to evaluate our differential treatment of people on the
basis of race.
Racial categorization is useful not only for negative ends, such as
oppression and domination. There may be morally defensible reasons for
treating a person differently on the basis of her race, as well. Consider
a doctor who takes a patient's personal history, in order to assess the
patient's potential risk for various medical conditions. The race to which
a person belongs is relevant in this context, since evidence supports that
certain races have a greater risk for certain diseases. For instance, Black

© Professional Ethics 2003. Correspondence may be sent to Angela

White, University of Western Ontario, Department of Philosophy,
London, Ontario N6A 3K7, Canada; or via email: awhite33@uwo.ca.
24 Professional Ethics

people have a greater risk of having the inheritable chromosomal mutation

responsible for sickle-cell anemia. 2 Additionally, many members of racial
groups-including people who have been discriminated against because of
their race-reject proposals to eliminate racial categorizations because they
hold their membership in these groups to be an essential part of their
identities. These are just two of many reasons that are given not to reject
racial categorization.

The Thesis
In this paper, I will analyze the 'true' nature of race, rather than focusing
on the normative argument that racism is wrong, although the latter does
motivate my project. I will argue that race gains its meaning through the
interactions among individuals, in a way similar to constructivist accounts
that have been presented in moral and epistemological theories. In this
paper, I will examine two accounts of race that claim that it is a product
of implicit agreement among members of society. After establishing the
plausibility of race as a social construction, however, it remains to be
determined what substantive qualities make a person count as a member
of a particular race. In the second section, I will attempt to answer the
question of what makes a person belong to one race, rather than another.
Finally, I will briefly explore the practical implications that are suggested
by the constructivist account of race I defended.
Before I begin to discuss what might be called the 'metaphysics' of
race, I wish to make explicit certain assumptions I hold when I refer to
'race' as a concept. I take our present structures of racial categories to be
hierarchical in nature, and, thus, belonging to a particular race will have
further implications in other aspects of one's life. 3 For example, one's
race will bear on one's position and opportunities, economically and
politically, and how others perceive one's moral and intellectual capacities
(Mills 1998, p. 3; Appiah 497). These, of course, are not exhaustive of
how the race a person belongs to may have implications for other aspects
of her/his life; they are only examples meant to raise the point.

The Metaphysics of Race

In his article, "'But What Are You Really?' The Metaphysics of Race,"
Charles Mills argues that a "social world" exists, whose ontological and
 What is Race? 25

metaphysical foundations we can theorize about, in much the same way

that we theorize about the metaphysics and ontology of the physical world
around us or about morality. One aspect of that social world we live in
is race. While Mills recognizes that a theory about race is not going to be
sufficient to explain entirely the nature of our social world, race is
undeniably a real part of that world. Such being the case, Mills sets out
to explore the metaphysical and ontological groundings of race. Similarly,
Anthony Appiah, in his article "'But Would That Still Be Me?' Notes On
Gender, 'Race,' Ethtlicity as Sources of Identity," explores answers to
what he describes as a question of the relationship between a person's
metaphysical identity and her or his racial identity, answers that entail an
understanding of the grounding of race. I will discuss Mills' position.
Following from his analogy between social metaphysics and
metaphysics simpliciter, Mills makes use of the various theories that have
been developed within the latter context in his project to investigate the
social world. He divides the various theories he intends to give attention
to into two classes: objectivist and anti-objectivist theories. Objectivist
theories are held to explain the nature of their subject matter as existing
independently of our choices or beliefs, whether that subject matter is,
e.g., race, "objects" in the physical world, or morality. Within the class
of objectivist theories, there are two main subclasses.
The first objectivist theory Mills considers, racial realism, following
scientific or moral realism, holds that races are "natural kinds." The
realist bases for distinguishing between different races may vary from
morphological differences to deeper differences, such as intellectual or
moral capacities, that are held to be characteristic of a particular race.
Thus, this position is realist in the sense that it is believed that these
qualities necessarily belong to all members of a certain race. On this
view, a person will have the traits associated with members oftheir race,
no matter what their own past experiences, or those of their ancestors,
have been. What the person's ancestors experienced, or what social,
economic, and political factors were present, are viewed as being
irrelevant to shaping the person. Whatever qualities are held as essential
to belonging to a particular race will be characteristic of everyone who
belongs to that race, regardless of what they have experienced, or what
they go through. Further, these qualities have an objective truth for the
26 Professional Ethics

racial realist, in the sense that our judgements about race are based on
facts, rather than on judgements based on, for example, the desire to
privilege one group of people, and oppress another.
Mills rejects racial realism on three points. First, racial realism
seems to imply the possibility of a natural hierarchy, yet the fields of
biology and sociology seem to have established that the belief there is a
"natural" hierarchical ordering among races is false. Second, rather than
attempting to explain race as a "natural kind," as realism does, it seems
we might better explain racial categories by means of a theory that takes
into account the history that is particular to the group in question. This is
a point to which I will return in the next section. Third, contrary to the
assumption racial realism holds, that members of a race would belong to
that group, regardless of time or place, Mills notes that "the very
categories we use to identify 'races' are themselves transworld relative."
(Mills 1998, p. 8, emphasis added). For example, a person is not neces-
sarily black everywhere slhe lives; one can actually be considered black
in North America, but be held as belonging to a different race somewhere
else. What qualifies a person as a member of a particular race seems very
much dependent on where and when a person lives.
However, just because this argument for racial realism does not hold
water, this is not to say that race does not exist; it is to say that race is not
real. So Mills next turns his attention to theories that hold that race is
nothing more than the judgements of people, individually or collectively,
deciding who is to be considered a member of which race. In the case of
subjectivism, there seem to be no constraints on what makes those
judgements true or false, independent of the person holding the beliefs.
Mills objects to racial subjectivism, which holds ". . . that since racial
designations are arbitrary . . . one can choose one's race for one-
self"(ibid., p. 11). However, race seems to be more than just whatever
one chooses it to be for herself. Mills also denies that race can be
adequately explained by traditional conceptions of relativism. "Relativism
proper," as Mills refers to it, seems to imply that a group of people could
effectively change their race if all members within the group were in
agreement. However, Mills denies that "it is possible to change race
through the decisions of a sub-community of like-minded people within the
larger population" (ibid. , p. 11). So even if all the members of a group
 What is Race? 27

were to agree that they were no longer of a particular race, it seems

possible that others outside that group could still be correct, in an
important way, to assert that those members do still belong to the same
race they always have, although they mistakenly believe otherwise.
An alternative, anti-realist, position introduced by Mills is racial
nihilism. Racial nihilism not only holds that "races have no biological
reality but also that they have no reality as social entities"(Mills 1998, p.
11). Nihilism effectively denies that race has any basis at all. But even
if our judgements about people's particular race are found to be based
upon the most arbitrary criteria, or upon unfounded suppositions about
traits an entire group shares, they would still constitute a basis for our
judgements, nonetheless. Perhaps here the nihilist may want to enter into
a discussion about whether such a system should exist, or is justified. But
what I am seeking, for the present, is an adequate theory about what
grounds racial categorization, not a theory of whether the practice is justi-
fied. For I am supposing that one cannot make judgements about where
the practice goes wrong, without understanding first what that practice is,
including its basis.
So Mills has rejected racial realism, the view that race has an objec-
tive basis as a natural kind. And he has also rejected anti-realist theories,
according to which no "objective" criteria on which to base our judge-
ments about race exists. So what alternative is left open to Mills? The
positive argument he makes is that there are facts of the matter about race,
but these facts are a product of the judgements we make about race. Fur-
thermore, these judgements are contingent upon the conditions in which
they are made. Race, thus understood, is relative in the sense that it is
grounded in no more than human judgements, but objective in the sense
that our practice of racial categorization has given rise to certain "facts"
about race. Hence the name "intersubjective constructivism." So, while
it is true that these facts have no more grounding than human beings' own
judgements and practices, our beliefs about these standards are what
makes them as real as our beliefs about scientific and moral facts about the
world.
However, as Mills points out, "the intersubjectivist agreement in
moral and scientific constructivism is a hypothetical agreement of all
under epistemically idealized conditions"(ibid., p. 10). Thus, the con-
straints on the construction of our moral and scientific knowledge arise
28 Professional Ethics

from our concern with "getting at the truth"(ibid.). He compares this to

a constructivist theory of race, in which it seems that political concerns
constrain the social construction of race. Not requiring the same basis of
truth does not mean that race is not real-as Mills points out, it only
means that race requires a different kind of theoretical explanation for its
existence and continuance. The facts of the matter about race just are
what is decided upon, and what is decided upon is not based on any kinds
of facts that exist in the world, independent of human beings, e.g., natural
kinds. Mills argues that the metaphysical grounding of race is the product
of social activity, which is contingent on time, place, and circumstances.
Appiah makes a similar point by comparing the groundings of race
and gender. He concludes that, although gender has at least some basis
in the physiological characteristics of an individual, "a different theoretical
account of [racial] identities is required"(496). While gender is at least
loosely based on certain biological facts (e.g., chromosomal counts), there
is "[n]o coherent system of biological classification of people [that]
corresponds to the folk -theoretical classifications of people into Caucasian,
Negro, and such" (496). Appiah denies that morphological differences
can serve as "markers of deeper biologically-based racial essences, corre-
lating closely with most (or even many) important biological (let alone
nonbiological) properties" (496). However, Appiah' like Mills, does not
deny that race does exist. Having rejected any biological basis for
classifying people into certain races, one might ask what positive
alternative explanation Appiah offers to explain the practice of racial
classification. He accordingly proceeds to "construct an account of what
it is that people take to be grounds for assigning people to these racial
categories" (496).
So, having argued for and hopefully having established that a con-
structivist account best explains a metaphysical grounding of race, I will
now return to the question raised earlier, concerning the criteria for our
judgements about race.

The Criteria of Race

Appiah claims that the race a person belongs to is determined by an indi-
vidual's ancestry. Appiah is not denying that a person's morphology may
be important, but that it is only important insofar as it is generally held to
 What is Race? 29

be an indicator (if a somewhat fallible one) of a person's ancestry.

Regarding ancestry, Appiah draws on the experiences of African-
Americans, and claims that:
... what matters to them is almost always not the unqualified
fact of that descent, but rather something that they suppose to go
along with it: the experience of a life as a member of a group of
people who experience themselves as-and are held by others to
be-a community in virtue of their mutual recognition-and their
recognition by others-as people of a common descent (497).
So besides having the "proper" ancestry, both the individual and others,
within as well as outside of the group, must recognize the individual as a
member of the group, all of which members share that same ancestry.
This idea seems consistent with the role that 'intersubjective agreement'
has within Mills' racial constructivism. For, following Mills, intersubjec-
tive agreement about racial categorization is objective in one sense, insofar
as it is outside of the authority of the individual or members of a group to
determine one's categorization. Nevertheless, race is also determined
relative to intersubjective agreement about something that is not based on
natural fact(s) in the world. For Appiah, that something seems to be a
history of shared ancestry and experiences.
Mills uses several case examples to investigate the relationship
between ancestry and race. The purpose of his examples is to determine
what is essential in racial identity, since typically several characteristics
occur in conjunction when we form our judgements about racial identity.
In his examples, Mills analyzes these qualities, so that the importance of
each can be evaluated on its own. Specifically, Mills is interested in
ascertaining whether racial categorization is best explained by (i) the
actual fact of the individual's ancestry; (ii) the person's awareness of her
ancestry; (iii) others' awareness of the person's ancestry, or any combina-
tion of these three. Thus far, Mills' project seems consistent with the
position that Appiah advances; that is, belonging to a particular race is
more than just having the proper ancestry, and furthermore, one must
identify with the group of that same ancestry, as well as be identified by
others as a member of the group that shares that ancestry. Next, I will
examine three of the examples intended to illuminate the nature of the
relationship between ancestry and race that Mills presents.
30 Professional Ethics

The first such case is one in which a person is attempting to "pass"

as white, while knowing that in fact, they have black ancestry. Appiah
addresses a similar situation in his article. In both scenarios, the
individual in question successfully passes; that is, everyone else does
believe the person is white. Yet both Appiah and Mills agree that the per-
son would still be considered black. Why? Because the fact of the
person's ancestry has remained the same. Although the public is not
aware of her ancestry, and the subject's ancestry may no longer be at the
forefront of her own mind after a time, Appiah and Mills maintain that she
has not changed her race. But perhaps this has little or nothing to do with
the fact of her ancestry. Perhaps we would still consider the person to be
black, on the grounds that, even if others do not know her ancestry, the
subject does, and that is sufficient to make her experience uniquely dif-
ferent from members of the race of which she is trying to pass.
This seems to be Appiah's response, when circumstances diverge
from those he outlines as necessary conditions of racial identity. For
Appiah, the criterion for racial identity is the descent of the individual and
a certain kind of experience that goes with being of that descent. Specif-
ically, Appiah refers to the kind of experience that comes from being
recognized as being of a particular descent. This recognition is shared
both by the subject and others who are both within and outside of the
racial community. So, for a person to be a member of a particular race,
on Appiah' s view, they must in fact be of a certain descent; and the person
will experience life as a member of the particular group that shares that
descent. But if that is the case, then a question can be raised as to whether
a person is still a member of a particular race, when no one else is aware
of her descent.
Appiah's response to this question seems to be that if there is no
awareness of the person's descent, and if, therefore, there are not the
shared experiences he has described above as crucial, then holding the
belief that the person belongs to a particular racial category is unjustified
and ought to be given up. The only justification a person has for contin-
uing to hold this belief is based on "false metaphysical beliefs," beliefs
that Appiah posits are institutionalized in Western culture. He claims that
"there is still around in the culture the idea that being (partially) descended
from black people makes you 'really' black"(498). But since races are
 What is Race? 31

known not to be "biologically real," Appiah asserts that this idea should
be rejected (498-9). So Appiah's argument is that in these cases at least,
others' beliefs about race are based on entrenched false suppositions about
biology.
Mills' response is different. He proposes that the reason the person
in the example remains of the same race throughout is reflective of the
objectivity that the intersubjectivity of racial categorization creates. Mills
states it this way: "For a constructivist ... ancestry is crucial ... simply,
tautologously, because it is taken to be crucial, because there is an inter-
subjective agreement ... to classify you in a certain way on the basis of
known ancestry"(Mills 1998, p. 21). So regardless of whether others do
or do not recognize a person's ancestry, it is enough that the ancestry is
what it is, to merit the inclusion of the person into that race. Mills'
account of constructivism speaks to the process that creates the rules of
judgement; those rules take on an objectivity of their own. An objective
truth results from an intersubjective construction. As opposed to Appiah's
account, Mills' account does not place any weight on false beliefs;
someone can be fully aware of all the scientific findings that speak against
biological race, and still hold that the person whose ancestry is not recog-
nized is African-American.
Thus, while Appiah's account draws on an intersubjective agreement,
it does not lead to the same objectivity that arises from Mills' account.
The importance of this objectivity is also illustrated in Mills' next case
example, in which a person of black ancestry still successfully passes, but
this time, she, and everyone else, is unaware of her ancestry. Again, if
her true ancestry were discovered, it seems that we would want to say, as
racial categorization is typically understood, that she is black, and was
black before, even though no one knew it. But Appiah's account does not
seem to leave room for this. Once again, for Appiah, it seems that she
meets none of the criteria for belonging to the race which our intuitions
confirm. Mills' account has room for these intuitions because, although
she may not have experienced that culture herself, she is descended from
that culture, and that objective fact is all that is necessary for us to con-
sider a person as a member of that culture. It is not necessary that she
actually experiences that culture herself. But it is also not that we are
supposing that some "black traits" have been passed on to her genetically.
32 Professional Ethics

Rather, the categorization of her as black depends on the recognition of

the fact that her past has also played a role in determining who she is, and
that history is in the ancestry from which she is descended.

A Way Out of Racial Categorization?

Individuals only belong to a racial group, according to Appiah, insofar as
they meet all of the conditions he presents: the individual is of a particular
descent from a shared ancestry, and the subject and everyone else is aware
of that descent. Otherwise, the belief that they belong to that racial group
is unjustified, and, therefore, it should be dropped. This notion of race
implies that in order to change the face of racial categorization, it seems,
people must become more knowledgeable about the falsity of our meta-
physical beliefs about race. However, I believe this conclusion fails to
address adequately the force of racial categorization.
Appiah's account seems to make awareness of ancestry and his condi-
tions on it essential to race, and I believe the cases Mills presents prove
to be powerful counterexamples to his point. To effectively deny that
there is any basis for racial categorization, if Appiah's conditions are not
met, seems to offer little to projects intended to alter racial categorization.
Although, on Appiah's account, we have no "real" basis for cate-
gorizing people, outside of the conditions he presents, it is evident that we
still continue to do so. I submit that failing to account for this limits his
theory's explanatory power, and thus limits its usefulness for overcoming
the discrimination that is based on racial categorization as well. This can
be compared to Mills' account, where his explanation of how one is to be
categorized as black or white also explains why it is that we believe the
individual still belongs to a particular race, even if there is no knowledge
of their descent from it.
On Mills' account, one will have to and can change the criteria we
hold as the basis for racial categorization. Mills makes the suggestion that
this could be possible without necessarily abandoning the entire system of
racial categorization altogether. Because on his account, race is contin-
gent on time, place, and circumstances in the world, including societal
ones, I believe that Mills is correct that room is left, on his theory, for
change, pending changes in societal attitudes, economic and political
structures, etc. The difference that those changes would make is not to
 What is Race? 33

the determination of whether or not an individual really belongs to a

particular race, but rather, they would challenge our reasons for holding
the criteria we do as essential to race.

Implications for Practice

Finally, I wish to return briefly to the difference between what follows in
practice from the accounts of Appiah and Mills. If one agrees with
Appiah's conclusion, this may undermine the negative practices that are
based on race. However, I submit that there are circumstances that make
it appropriate to continue to categorize people as members of a particular
race, whether or not they have the "shared experiences" that Appiah
refers to. One such context is in that of medicine, as I alluded to earlier,
in which it seems useful to use race as a category by which to classify
persons.
Also, few could deny that some groups historically have been dis-
advantaged in numerous ways, based on their race. Insofar as race
historically has been treated as a relevant difference that justified discrim-
ination against certain races, and there continues to be evidence that
people are discriminated against based on their race today, it seems that
the notion of race is still useful, and indeed necessary, to make sense of
that phenomenon. This becomes relevant to the question of compensation
or reparation for the treatment of some races by others. While the
answers are not at all straightforward, it does seem as though they will
involve understanding present circumstances, as well as past actions,
within a context in which people are, as a matter of fact, categorized by
their race. Without being able to make sense of race, it is unclear that we
could make sense of people's experiences in the ways we need to, in order
to be able to not only right past injustices, but also to understand the many
ways racially-based injustices pervade our experiences with each other.

Conclusion
I have presented two accounts of intersubjectivist constructivist theories
of race. According to the account I have defended, an objective under-
standing of race is possible, although the criteria of race have as their
source the "agreement" of individuals. I have argued that one can
34 Professional Ethics

understand race to "really" exist, contra-Appiah, without it necessarily

being the case that race is a natural kind that is based in biological differ-
ences, for example, that can be observed and clearly defined. Further, I
have suggested that how we choose to understand race in theory will affect
how we proceed in practice with one another in important ways that we
ought to consider, before deciding to take the advice of some to discard
racial categorization.

Acknowledgements
I am deeply indebted to Chris MacDonald and Sue Campbell for their
thoughtful insights on this paper, although any remaining mistakes or
oversights are mine. Also, I wish to thank those in attendance at the 2001
CSSPE Conference for the helpful comments and questions that were
raised.

Notes
1. Appiah 497.
2. Russell 186. A word of caution is in order here, as well. That is,
health care professionals are aware that there is a concern that comes with
the discovery of a link between a particular disease and race. The asso-
ciation of certain diseases with particular races can and has been (mis)used
to lend credence to negative stereotypes of particular racial groups. See
Clarke, p. 12.
3. See Outlaw, pp. 61-62, 66.

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Mills, Charles W. "'But What Are You Really?' The Metaphysics of
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 What is Race? 35

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