International Journal of Inclusive Education

Vol. 14, No. 1, February 2010, 87–96

Special needs: a philosophical analysis

Simo Vehmas*

University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland

(Received 31 March 2008; final revision received 27 June 2008)
Taylor and Francis
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10.1080/13603110802504143
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simo.vehmas@edu.jyu.fi
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SimoVehmas
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Education

This paper attempts to illuminate a central concept and idea in special education
discourse, namely, ‘special needs’. It analyses philosophically what needs are and
on what grounds they are defined as ‘special’ or ‘exceptional’. It also discusses
whether sorting needs into ordinary and special is discriminatory. It is argued that
individualistic tendency in special need rhetoric has serious shortcomings,
although it does not inevitably lead to discrimination against those with ‘special
needs’. Improving individuals’ capabilities as well as social conditions are the
means to create societies and schools which are inclusive, and which put justice
into practice.
Keywords: capabilities; discrimination; inclusion; justice; special need; well-being

Introduction
A continually growing number of individual characteristics are seen to be problematic
in educational settings. Despite various efforts to avoid stigmatisation of people in
special educational discourse, in practice increasingly more people are seen as prob-
lematic in the school organisation. They do not act and behave in ways considered
desirable. The complex nature of learning and behavioural problems has been recog-
nised for quite some time now with the result that endeavours merely to correct
individuals is considered improper. Interaction between an individual and his or her
environment is fundamentally a social phenomenon which implies that problems in
that interaction cannot be understood simply in terms of an individual’s characteristics
but, rather, in terms of social arrangements. Problems in academic proficiency or
behaviour in general cannot be reduced to individuals – society, and its institutions
(e.g. school), are partly to blame as well.
Special education appears to move on in cycles of moral and political legitimati-
sation. Part of this process is the renewal of terminology used to depict individuals, as
well as their individual characteristics and ways of behaviour. The language of devi-
ancy and inferiority has been forsaken and replaced with a discourse that emphasises
people’s needs that are now categorised between ordinary and special (or exceptional).
The purpose of the terminological change in the early 1980s was to get rid of the rigid
categories and organisations based on specific impairments. The aim was to arrange
education on the grounds of a detailed assessment of pupils’ needs and in particular
educational needs. However, impairment categories still prevail in practice and also in
law, for example in the UK and United States (e.g. Barton 1988; Farrell 2008, ch. 1;

*Email: simo.vehmas@edu.jyu.fi

ISSN 1360-3116 print/ISSN 1464-5173 online

© 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13603110802504143
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88 S. Vehmas

Frederickson and Cline 2002, 33–61; Sandow 1994; Winzer 2007; Ysseldyke and
Algozzine 1984, 6–28).
Changes in educational terminology and policy reflect the general intellectual and
ideological shift from a psycho-medical individualistic understanding of difference
and disability to a group of social–contextual approaches that emerged in the 1960s
and 1970s. These views, including, for example, the Scandinavian normalisation prin-
ciple (and its US adaptation social role valorisation), the US minority group models,
and the British social model of disability, emphasise the material, structural and ideo-
logical factors that underlie the categorisation of people on the basis of impairments
and needs, as well as the institutional responses to human diversity in general. Due to
the changes in Western social and political climate, explaining difference and devi-
ance merely in terms of individual aptitudes and faculties is now generally considered
as an intellectually deficient and ethically dubious endeavour. The psycho-medical
rhetoric highlighting individual deficits has been replaced with the politically correct
discourse of inclusion and equality (e.g. Brodin and Lindstrand 2007; Dyson 1999;
Kavale and Forness 2000; Shakespeare 2006, ch. 2).
Special education is based on the examination of the assumed characteristics of
certain groups of people, and on meeting the needs that are explained by these
people’s individual features. In other words, special education is about identifying
categories of special (educational) need1 and relating special curricula to them. As the
focus of assessment is nowadays purportedly on the identification of special
educational needs instead of psycho-medical diagnoses of impairments, it is assumed
that special education practices are no longer based on rigid impairment categories.
Historically, special educational practices have been based on the assumption that
each category of impairment inevitably implies such severe problems that they cannot
be dealt properly within a regular school environment; children with a similar impair-
ment share the same problems and educational needs which purportedly implies that
they should be educated in similar settings, in a similar manner (e.g. Booth 1998; Pijl
and Van den Bos 1998).
The special education discourse has traditionally assumed that the various inter-
ventions aimed at pupils with special needs are at their core rational, beneficial and
work for the good of children (Skrtic 1991, 54, 66–8). These beliefs are based on
certain assumptions about the nature and causes of the variation in children’s
academic competence, as well as on assumptions what human needs are, and what
makes them special or exceptional. The present paper offers a philosophical analysis
about needs and the categorisation of them into (educationally) ordinary and special
(or exceptional) needs. Is the whole enterprise of discriminating needs into different
categories a sensible, meaningful and morally justified endeavour? Or is the definition
of special needs ultimately based on discriminative attitudes that in part support the
maintenance of exclusive educational and social arrangements? The aim is not to give
extensive and definite answers to these questions but, rather, to offer conceptual tools
that could be of help when resolving the ethical and political issues that surround
special and inclusive education.
Very little attention has been paid to defining the term ‘special need’. Rather, in
the literature and in educational practice, the main attention has been given to the
recognition of certain features seen as special needs and how these needs should be
met. Despite the fact that the concept of special need has not been defined (at least to
my knowledge) satisfactorily, it is used in special education practice as a kind of semi-
technical or specialised term which creates the impression that everyone already
 International Journal of Inclusive Education 89

knows what they are talking about (Wilson 2002). I will suggest in this paper that the
special needs rhetoric is a discourse based on euphemisms without any significant
contents. However, the categorisation of special needs and its connection to oppres-
sion is far from being a simple matter; one should be cautious about making hasty
causal connections and one-sided judgements about the ethical and political question-
ableness of individualised (special) education.
Views on special needs have a great practical significance because they in their
part direct pupils to various educational and social careers. But before one can know
what special need possibly means, or should mean, first one has to clarify the meaning
of the concept of need.

Needs, desires, and aims

All needs are instrumental in the sense that their satisfaction in itself is of no intrinsic
value. The fact that somebody has a particular need can always be presented in the
following schematic form:

A needs x to achieve p,

where A refers to an individual or a group; x symbolises the content of the need in

question; and p stands for the aim which may or may not be achieved by satisfying the
need. Thus, needs do not exist without aims; if I have no aims, I have no needs either.
Since needs are dependent on aims, needs in themselves can become aims – subaims,
as it were. If the achievement of x is necessary to the realisation of p, then x also
becomes an aim. Subaims derive their origin from having some other aim. They are
pursued only because of their connection to a more fundamental aim (Häyry 1994,
105; Ylikoski 2001, 107).
Setting aims is subjective; people seek and value different things in their lives.
One can evaluate the morality or rationality of other people’s aims but ultimately the
individual herself defines her aims. However, by analysing the subjectively defined
aims we can, at least to some extent, objectively conclude what the individual’s needs
and interests are. A person may well be aware of her aims, but unaware of her needs.
For example, a ten-year old child may want to become an architect without realising
what he or she should do to achieve that aim although we can objectively infer from
that aim what his or her needs regarding architectural career are. In this sense, needs
differ from desires. A need is not tied to a subject’s perception of the object – if I
need a tablet because it will cure my headache, it will really cure it. Desires, however,
have to do with how the subject looks out on the world, that is, desires are intentional
and determined subjectively. Needs, on the other hand, have to do with whether one
thing is in fact a necessary condition of another (Griffin 1986, 41; Ylikoski 2001,
107–8).
There are two sorts of needs. (1) Some of them are clearly instrumental: they are
needs we have because of the aims we happen to choose. (2) Some needs, however,
are more basic and fundamental: they are needs we all have just by being human. For
instance, we need food to survive. In general, survival is part of what human existence
aims at and is not in any ordinary sense an object of choice (although in some excep-
tional circumstances we may choose not to survive). Basic needs such as needs for
food, rest and health are considered absolute and imperative as if they were not depen-
dent on some aims. Yet, basic needs also fit into the schematic form:
90 S. Vehmas

A needs x to achieve p.

The difference between basic and instrumental needs is thus not necessarily a
conceptual issue but an issue of contents. We need food to survive, rest to go on
functioning and health to do much of anything. These are the kinds of facts that are
not optional in any meaningful sense due to the laws of nature and human constitu-
tion. Therefore, the rough explanation of basic needs is clear: they are what human
beings need to survive, to be healthy, to avoid harm, to function properly (Alkire
2005; Griffin 1986, 41–2).
Sometimes, however, one’s desires and views on well-being may clash with one’s
basic needs. For example, a desire to smoke cigarettes is in conflict with a basic need
to stay healthy. Despite this, one may view smoking as a legitimate habit on the basis
of one’s view of human life; that is, human life is and should not be merely biological,
it is and should be biographical life as well. In other words, one may think that being
alive, in the biological sense, is not important as such. What is of value to a person is
having a life which is a sum, say, of his or her aspirations, decisions, activities,
projects, relationships and pleasures (e.g. Rachels 1986). Therefore, one’s central aim
can be a good life which does not necessarily imply merely a healthy and as long a
life as possible, but also the pursuit of various indulgences. Smoking cigarettes may
thus be in conflict with one’s physical well-being but, at same time, be in line with
one’s mental well-being.
Aims and consequently needs as well can thus be seen either as basic and neces-
sary or instrumental and contingent. Someone may have the aim of getting a huge
collection of modern art. However important this aim may be to that person, it can
hardly be seen to be morally as weighty as the aims of avoiding malfunction, harm or
ailment. Basic needs seem to have the kind of moral and political importance that
instrumental needs do not have simply because the previous are necessary and the
latter are contingent. This is why basic needs have a strong link with obligation: my
ailment makes a claim on others that my whims, hankerings and pleasures cannot
(Alkire 2005; Griffin 1986, 42; Häyry 1994, 105–6). For example, in modern welfare
society I have a legitimate claim on others to provide me with sufficient nutrition,
whereas I do not have such a strong claim on others to help me to get an art collection.
Sorting necessary and contingent needs, however, is far from being a simple task.
This is because it is extremely difficult to evaluate the moral weight of the various
aims that define needs. It seems clear that the basic needs necessary for our survival
should be met in modern welfare societies. But to many people contingent needs may
be crucial elements to their well-being; the kind of things they could not imagine to
live without. These kinds of contingent needs may be related to work, hobbies or rela-
tionships. An objective, universal evaluation of the morality and rationality of contin-
gent needs seems impossible due to the various subjective, historical, cultural and
social factors that influence on how significant certain aims are to people.
Aims, needs and their significance seem to be related to the prevailing cultural
context which makes their evaluation difficult. But things get even more difficult
when one starts talking about special needs.

When do needs become ‘special’?

‘Special’ is an ambiguous term that can, depending on the context, mean ‘peculiar’,
‘unusual’ or ‘of special importance’. ‘Special’ may refer, for example, to an individual’s
 International Journal of Inclusive Education 91

exceptional talent or a lack of talent for a certain activity (e.g. ‘Tom is an especially
talented football-player’) or to an individual’s exceptional property or characteristic
(e.g. ‘Tom has feet with a special kind of structure, so he needs football boots made
especially for him’). Thus, ‘special’ can contain either a positive or a negative value
judgement. In special education, however, ‘special’ usually refers to an individual’s
undesirable characteristic or way of functioning in relation to an end considered as
crucial (Wilson 2002, 62–3).
In special education context ‘special need’ refers to an ability or activity that is
viewed as important or even necessary for people. For example, pupils are seen to
have a need to learn to read and write. If an individual pupil does not learn to read and
write with the help of ordinary teaching methods, in an ordinary way and pace, he or
she is seen to have a special need to learn to read and write. And when someone is
said to have a special need, it is implied that his or her need is unusual and involves
an aim of special importance. But what exactly makes literacy an important or indeed
a necessary ability?
In contemporary Western society literacy is considered as a necessary ability prob-
ably on strictly pragmatic grounds; an illiterate individual would have great problems
in managing in social life. Given our society as it is, pragmatic reasons do carry much
weight although they are, of course, culture-bound; just as it is important to learn to
read and write in our society, it is equally important to learn to fish and hunt in some
other society (or even more necessary regarding survival). Therefore, being literate
and numerate can perhaps be seen, if not necessary, at least highly important abilities
in our society on pragmatic grounds. But this does not seem to apply to many things
which pupils are assumed to learn at school; for instance, is it actually necessary to
learn history or music or physics? Perhaps it is, but not on as obvious grounds as it is
necessary for us to get food. One could, of course, argue that without any knowledge
about politics and history people would not be able to function as autonomous
members of democratic society, or that if children were not introduced to and did not
learn to appreciate literature and other art forms, they would end up being morally and
emotionally incompetent (Wilson 2002, 63–4). These kinds of arguments may be
sound, but at the same time it should be admitted that a lot of people are capable of
living politically, morally and emotionally in a more or less responsible manner even
though they are practically ignorant of history, literature and of other things they were
supposed to learn and adopt at school.
It is impossible to define something as a ‘special need’ in educational practice
without some criteria of what kinds of learning outcomes (knowledge and ability) are
desirable, important or, perhaps, even necessary. Ultimately, making the distinction
between ordinary and special needs is not a matter of empirical fact. Rather, it is a
matter of making normative value judgements of what is good and valuable for pupils,
and people in general.
The ‘special need’ rhetoric is, in fact, based on the traditional individualistic,
psycho-medical assumptions about the nature and origins of disability and difference
in which all the problems are explained by the individual’s deficits. Although in the
contemporary special education practice talking about deviance is considered some-
thing to be avoided due to the negative association the term carries, the concept of
‘special need’ does, however, maintain and strengthen the idea of pupils with special
education needs as deviant. When a person has a need, he or she is inside the bound-
aries of normality (statistically and normatively) because having a need in itself does
not express in any way whether he or she is capable of achieving the aim that defines
92 S. Vehmas

the need in question. However, when a person has a ‘special need’ his or her condition
is deviant and undesirable (either from other people’s or from the person’s own
perspective). Having a ‘special need’ implies that an individual has the kind of
characteristics that it is unlikely, or at least uncertain, whether he or she would achieve
the aim that defines the need in question without special instruction, procedures that
are out of ordinary.
In a sense, the concept of ‘special need’ is actually euphemism for terms ‘deviant’
and ‘disabled’. It reflects the norms of school organisation and society as a whole
regarding good and desirable way of functioning and learning and, also, directs pupils
on the basis of their needs to different educational and social careers. As Ysseldyke
and Algozzine (1984, 27) have put it: ‘special education exists because members of
society believe in the concepts of normality and abnormality’. Yet, ‘special need’ does
not necessarily carry the same negative moral connotations as ‘deviance’. Historically
speaking, the idea of deviance reflects pre-modern moralistic explanations of difference
where disablement was explained by supernatural causes or as a result of people’s moral
failures. Special need, on the other hand, is more associated to the medicalising
discourse in which difference is explained by individual’s pathological condition
(Conrad and Schneider 1992).
Apparently, the change in terminology has not changed the premises and practices
of special education. That is, if there are problems in school, special education
discourse directs us with determination as unshaken as ever to the usual source: devi-
ant pupil. Those who for some reason have difficulties managing in the way school
expects them to manage are the true source of the problem. Now it seems clear that
the foundation of special needs discourse is untenable. It is a poorly reflected concept
and a concomitant practice that is liable to discrimination against pupils that do not fit
into the (perhaps even arbitrary) norms of school organisation.

Special needs and discrimination

It seems that we inevitably face the question of the connection between educational
practices and discrimination against those that have not done well at school. Thus, is
the whole practice of categorising needs into ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ actually another
way of marginalising and oppressing certain people? From the viewpoints of disability
rights as well as inclusive education this would seem to be the case. It appears from
this vantage point that the ‘special needs’ language should be abolished; there are
merely needs that are unique to every individual. Needs and individuals on the basis
of them should not be portrayed negatively. There is a variety of characteristics and
needs, and they should all be met equally (Barton and Armstrong 2001; Thomas and
Loxley 2001, 47, 114).
Although this criticism seems to be, at least to some extent, appropriate, it is also
simplistic and one-sided. Consider the example of literacy. There is probably very
little disagreement over the fact that literacy is, if not good or necessary as such, at
least a highly useful ability in contemporary Western society. In this present societal
situation, a person who has considerable difficulties of learning to read and write
indeed has a special need regarding literacy in order to manage socially, to be able to
participate successfully in society. And in this situation where certain norms about
literacy or social ability prevail, the existence of this individual’s ‘special need’ indeed
is a matter of empirical fact. This being the case, we face the question how reasonable,
fair or morally justified the contemporary social organisation on the whole is.
 International Journal of Inclusive Education 93

The core of social and political injustice is the treatment of some people or groups
as moral inferiors. In order to avoid this, people with ‘special needs’ should be secured
with a standing as full citizens; they should have ‘good enough access to public
accommodations that they can function as equals in civil society’ (Anderson 1999,
334). However, it would be a serious mistake always to equate discrimination and loss
of opportunity in the context of special need and disablement. For example, even
though mental incompetence is socially constructed in the sense that society deter-
mines the cognitive complexity of many tasks and sets the minimum standards for
proficiency, decreasing the complexity of those tasks or lowering the standard for
proficiency may have considerable costs and endanger the interests of those without
‘special needs’. While those disabled by the dominant institutional infrastructure have
an interest in reforming it so as to permit themselves to thrive and participate equally,
those who are able to participate effectively under those circumstances have an inter-
est in maintaining the most productive practices in which they themselves can flourish
(Buchanan et al. 2000, 292; Wasserman 2001).
Thus, we should find a balance between all interest groups without violating
anyone’s rights. This inevitably seems to imply that some of our institutions and social
practices are selective in the sense that some people are more proficient than others
due to their aptitudes and individual characteristics. And it would seem absurd to
claim that an institution (such as medicine or university) is automatically oppressive
if it sets requirements of competence and quality to people who aim at functioning in
it. For instance, a person who cannot stand the sight of blood or needles simply cannot
and should not work as a surgeon. However, if there are some individual properties
that would be relevant reasons for overlooking that individual’s incompetence in
educational setting, what and on what grounds would qualify as such properties:
impairment, laziness, short attention span or what?
In any case, the school organisation is inevitably a more or less selective institution
because one of its main functions is to serve the good and the interests of society; that
is, to make pupils the kind of persons who are capable of contributing to social life.
Education of children does not, cannot and should not be based merely on children’s
or their parents’ interests. Society’s interests count as well and the state should play
some role in the supervision of upbringing. This role is fixed by the notions of the state
as, what David Archard (Archard 2003, 119–22) calls, parens patriae and by the
reproductive role of the state. The first notion refers to the idea of the state being a
parent to its citizens; it provides protection to those who cannot care for themselves in
case there are no others who would assume responsibility for individuals who are in
need of protection (e.g. children and people with severe cognitive impairments). The
reproductive role of the state concerns its interest in securing the conditions of its own
future existence. Children are the society’s future components; its citizens, workers,
politicians and so on. It is thus obvious that the state must be concerned with children
and their upbringing because it needs future citizens who are capable, productive
individuals and able to play their part in democratic governance.

Needs, capabilities, and justice: conclusion

On the whole, it seems inevitable that school organisation has to specify its pupils’
needs and capabilities because, at the end of the day, school is not supposed serve
merely the good of children, but the good of society as well. And it seems intuitively
clear that there is nothing wrong per se with this function if it is assumed that the
94 S. Vehmas

society we are living in is at least mostly fair to its members. At the same time,
however, it should be admitted that the individualistic tendency in special education
as well as in the school organisation as a whole, indeed is a serious shortcoming. Part
of this individualistic tendency is the discourse of special needs with its psycho-
medical approach to human diversity, and with the potential for social exclusion and
discrimination against those considered as special, exceptional or anomalous.
Yet, in all fairness, it must be noted that the individual-centred approach in special
education has a rational and benevolent origin. It is based on the well-founded idea
that each individual is unique and his or her learning needs are unique as well. The
problem, however, is the negative characterization of these differences. As I pointed
out earlier, having a ‘special need’ implies an undesirable state of functioning or being
of an individual. Special education is thus dedicated to remedying children’s deficits.
Within this tradition, very little attention is paid to the normative premises of this
policy (i.e. what amounts to a deficit and on what basis) and its influences on those
considered to be outside the boundaries of normality.
The ethical and political significance of needs is usually linked to basic needs, to
the physical prerequisites of human life. Some authors, however, have argued that
needs can be understood and conceptualised in terms of ethical and political objectives
as well. These ‘agency needs’ are aspirations whose realisation enable agents’ to carry
out valued social tasks and roles (Hamilton 2003, 35–47). Thus, conception of
(special) needs relates ultimately to views about rights, well-being, and good life;
since basic needs are seen to be vital for avoiding harm, there has to be some under-
lying account(s) of human well-being as well (Alkire 2005). One such account, and a
very fruitful one in this context, is Martha Nussbaum’s (Nussbaum 2006) capabilities
approach (also Sen 1992). According to this account, equality, justice and social
arrangements in general should be evaluated in terms of the real opportunities and
freedoms that people have to achieve the kinds of valued functionings that are consti-
tutive to their well-being. For example, it is not crucial as regards material resources
what people have but, rather, how they are capable of utilising commodities available
to them; bicycle does not guarantee the mobility of a person with paralysed legs
whereas a wheelchair combined with an accessible environment does. In Nussbaum’s
theory society and its members are seen to have a duty to ensure a minimum level of
each central capability necessary for human dignity and well-being. Such capabilities
include, for example, health, adequate nourishment, bodily integrity, social bases of
self-respect and non-humiliation, and right of political participation (Nussbaum 2006,
69–81).
In the capabilities approach people’s lives are seen to consist of both social and
individual features. This has inevitable implications regarding social arrangements.
First of all, capabilities crucial for well-being and good life are determined largely on
the grounds of environmental factors. For instance, the level of free education that the
state should provide its citizens with or what is the proper school-leaving age depends,
to an extent, upon the type of economy and employment in the state. Secondly, capa-
bilities and their realisation relate to an individual’s features. Freedom of religion or
right to vote may have very little importance to an individual with a difficult intellec-
tual impairment, whereas the recognition of his or her needs for individualised support
and care may be vital. All institutional arrangements of education or care must
acknowledge human diversity in order to be efficient and of use. However, Nussbaum
(2006, 186–95) emphasises the political, strategical and normative significance of
insisting that capabilities are important to all individuals despite their characteristics.
 International Journal of Inclusive Education 95

This is important because ‘it reminds us of the respect we owe to people with mental
impairments as fully equal citizens’ and because it ‘also reminds us of the continuity
between so-called normal people and people with impairments’ (Nussbaum 2006,
190–1).
It thus appears that interventions with the aim to improve individuals’ capacities
as well as social arrangements should both be parts of a fair institutional response to
human diversity. This kind of strategy would, hopefully, help us to create societies and
schools which welcome people without qualitative criteria concerning their aptitudes
but at the same time would support citizens’ efforts to attain central capabilities and
elements of human well-being.
A genuine inclusion in social life manifests in three ways. Firstly, there is the tech-
nical inclusion in social life which means the provision of the material facilities that
enable persons to take part in social life (e.g. accessible built environment). Second
element is the institutional inclusion in social life which refers to an institutionally
enforced position as a person and a citizen (typically manifested in rights). Finally,
there is the interpersonal inclusion in social life which means being included in
concrete events and contexts of interaction through the attitudes or attention by rele-
vant others who are also partakers in them – that is, to be respected, valued and loved
by other people (Ikäheimo 2008). It seems reasonable to argue that these ideas of social
inclusion contradict segregated teaching and support the notion of inclusive education.
It seems also clear that proper inclusion is based on the respect human diversity, differ-
ence and individuality. But it is not clear whether naming and categorising differences,
for example, in terms of educational needs or impairments is automatically in conflict
with social inclusion (Vehmas and Mäkelä 2008). And whether it is possible to
improve everyone’s capabilities in the best possible manner in the same setting is an
empirical matter that should be judged in relation to different values such as justice,
human well-being and common good.

Note
1. The distinction between special needs and special educational needs is disregarded in this
paper because it is not of philosophical importance.

Notes on contributor
Simo Vehmas is a Professor of Special Education at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. His
research interests include philosophical issues in disability studies and special education.

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