On kai chora. Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and the Timaeus

«On kai chora. Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and the Timaeus»

by Nader El­Bizri

Source:
Studia Phaenomenologica (Studia Phaenomenologica), issue: IV (1­2) / 2004, pages: 73­98, on
www.ceeol.com.
STUDIA PHÆNOMENOLOGICA IV (2004) 1-2, 73-98

ON KAI XΩPA
SITUATING HEIDEGGER BETWEEN
THE SOPHIST AND THE TIMAEUS

Nader EL-BIZRI
(University of Cambridge)

Abstract: In attempting to address the heideggerian Seinsfrage, by way of sit-

uating it between the platonic conception of Ôn in the Sophist and of cèra in
the Timaeus, this paper investigates the ontological possibilities that are opened
up in terms of rethinking space. Asserting the intrinsic connection between the
question of being and that of space, we argue that the maturation of ontology as
phenomenology would not unfold in its furthermost potential unless the being
of space gets clarified. This state of affairs confronts us with the exacting onto-
logical task to found a theory of space that contributes to an explication of the
question of being beyond its associated temporocentric determinations. Conse-
quently, our line of inquiry endeavours herein to constitute a prolegomenon to
the elucidation of the question of the being of space as “ontokhorology.”

I. Heidegger and the “Ontological Problem of Space”

Despite a longstanding history of philosophical theories of space,

the ontological nature of space remains uncanny and its kind of being
is hitherto vexingly unclear. In view of this thought-provoking ontolo-
gical problem1 , we shall investigate some of the veiled possibilities that
are to be found in Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s Sophist
and Timaeus, which may ultimately assist us in our attempt to eluci-
date the ontological question of space.
If the history of metaphysics has been oblivious of being, it has also
been a history that neglected the ontological question of space. This dif-

1 This ontological problem gains its initial significance from the implications it has

on the unfolding of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and its elucidation of the ques-
tion of being. Regarding this ontological endeavour, see: M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit,
Gesamtausgabe Band 2, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977, § 4; M. HEI-
DEGGER, Being and Time, English trans. by J. Stambaugh, New York: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1996, § 4.
Access via CEEOL NL Germany

74 NADER EL-BIZRI

ficult inheritance has ultimately led to a gradual unfurling of a contem-

porary wake of a hesitant interest in investigating the ontological en-
tailments of Plato’s cèra2. If the Sophist has highlighted the primacy
of being (Ôn), the Timaeus did posit space (cèra) as a challenge to on-
tological thinking3. In view of this, we will attempt to situate our in-
quest between the Sophist and the Timaeus, between Ôn (Sein; being)
and cèra (Raum; space), wherein the thesis that guides this situation-
al confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) entails that: an ontological elu-
cidation of the question of being progresses by way of elucidating the
question of the being of space. Consequently, ontology as phenomenology
would not adequately progress unless the question of the being of space
is clarified by way of “ontokhorology.”
Whilst displaying a great interest in appealing to the Sophist, Hei-
degger did not show a comparable enthusiasm in reading the Timaeus.
This hermeneutic choice partly explains why the Sophist may have in-

2 In view of the growing contemporary interest in cèra, I refer the reader to: J. DER-
RIDA, Positions, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972; J. DERRIDA, Khôra, Paris: Galilée,
1993; J. DERRIDA, Foi et Savoir, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1996; J. DERRIDA, A. DU-
FOURMANTELLE, De l’hospitalité: Anne Dufourmantelle invite Jacques Derrida à répon-
dre, Mayenne: Calmann-Lévy, 1997; J. KRISTEVA, “Sémiologie et Grammatologie:
Entretien avec Jacques Derrida”, in Positions, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1972; J.
KRISTEVA, La révolution du langage poétique: l’avant-garde à la fin du XIXe siècle:
Lautréamont et Mallarmé, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1974; J. KRISTEVA, Pouvoirs de l’hor-
reur: essai sur l’abjection, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1980; J. SALLIS, Chorology: On Be-
ginning in Plato’s Timaeus, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999; J. SALLIS,
“Platonism at the Limit of Metaphysics”, in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Vol.
19, no. 2 – Vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, pp. 299-314; J. SALLIS, Spacings – Of Reason, Chica-
go: University of Chicago, 1987; L. IRIGARAY, “Place, Interval: A Reading of Aristo-
tle’s Physics IV”, in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, English trans. by C. Burke, G. C.
Gill, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993; L. IRIGARAY, “Une mère de glace”, in Specu-
lum of the Other Woman, English trans. by G. C. Gill, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1985; E. S. CASEY, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, Berkeley, CA.: University
of California Press, 1997; A. BENJAMIN, “Distancing and Spacing”, in Philosophy and
Architecture, ed. A. Benjamin, London: Academy Editions, 1990, pp. 6-11; M. THEO-
DOROU, “Space and Experience”, in AA Files, Vol. 34, 1997, pp. 45-55; N. El-BIZRI,
“‘Qui êtes-vous, Khôra?’: Receiving Plato’s Timaeus”, in Existentia, Vol. XI, Issue 3-4,
2001, pp. 473-490; N. El-BIZRI, “A Phenomenological Account of the ‘Ontological Prob-
lem of Space’”, in Existentia, Vol. XII, Issue 3-4, 2002, pp. 345-364.
3 Although many philosophers believe that the Sophist is the more mature work

of Plato than the Timaeus, and although it has been claimed that the former does not
display a “tissue of linguistic confusions” like the latter, nonetheless we are attesting
a renewed philosophical interest in the Timaeus. Concerning the allusion to the re-
ception of Plato’s Timaeus during the wake of the anti-metaphysical turn of Logical
Positivism, see: PLATO, Timaeus, English trans. by D. J. Zeyl, Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2000, p. xv.
ON KAI XΩRA 75

deed pre-set the itinerary of Sein und Zeit4 , whilst the relative neglecting
of the Timaeus may have undermined the standing of space in Hei-
degger’s ontological investigations5. This state of affairs may have par-
tially solicited him to devalue space (Raum) by contrastingly positing
time (Zeit) as the structuring horizon (Horizont) against which his in-
vestigation of the question of being (Seinsfrage) was conducted. What
concerns us herein is medially suggested by what is left unsaid in his
laconic confession, in the seminar Zeit und Sein (1962), that the attempt
in Sein und Zeit (§ 70) to derive spatiality from temporality has been
“untenable”6. In view of this, it may be argued that a closer examina-
tion of Plato’s account of cèra in the Timaeus would have ultimately
led Heidegger to establish a more informed position that recognizes the
axiality of space in this inquiry about being. After all, the ambiguous
ontological status of cèra does resist the derivation from temporality
and confronts us from the outset with an ontological challenge that is
no less difficult than that of the question of being itself.

II. Sein und Raum in Sein und Zeit

Heidegger proclaims in Sein und Zeit that “the fact that space shows
itself in a world does not tell us anything about its kind of being.” This
is the case given that “the being of space” cannot be conceived as the
same kind of being as that of the res extensa or the res cogitans. Con-
sequently, space is not simply reducible to a geometrically-determined
extensio, as Descartes proclaimed, nor is it an objective absolute, like
Newton argued, or relational, as Leibniz conjectured. Moreover, space
is not simply reducible to an a priori subjective form of intuition or that
of the appearances of outer sense, as Kant held, or to being constitut-
ed by transcendental subjectivity as Husserl claimed. Radically dissat-
isfied with the way his predecessors addressed the ontological problem
of space, Heidegger says:

4 Regarding the affinity between the Sophist lectures and Sein und Zeit, see: J.
TAMINIAUX, Lectures de l’ontologie fondamentale, Grenoble: Millon, 1989, pp. 182-
189. Concerning the intellectual context of the Sophist lectures and Sein und Zeit, see:
R. BRISART, La phénoménologie de Marbourg, ou la résurgence de la métaphysique chez
Heidegger à l’époque de Sein und Zeit, Paris: Grasset, 1993.
5 It is compelling to notice that whilst appealing many times in Sein und Zeit to

the Sophist (242c, 244a, 245e6-246e1), the Timaeus (37d) is mentioned only once in
the context of talking about time (Zeit) not space (Raum).
6 M. HEIDEGGER, On Time and Being, English trans. by J. Stambaugh, New York:

Harper, 1969, p. 23; Zeit und Sein, in M. HEIDEGGER, Zur Sache des Denkens, Tübin-
gen: Niemeyer, 1969.
76 NADER EL-BIZRI

The perplexity still present today, with regard to the interpretation of the
being of space is grounded not so much in an inadequate knowledge of
the factual constitution of space itself, as in the lack of a fundamental trans-
parency of the possibilities of being in general and of their ontologically
conceived interpretation. What is decisive for the understanding of the
ontological problem of space lies in freeing the question of the being of
space from the narrowness of the accidentally available and, moreover,
undifferentiated concepts of being, and, with respect to the phenomenon
itself, in moving the problematic of the being of space and the various
phenomenal spatialities in the direction of clarifying the possibilities of
being in general7.
Accordingly the question of the being of space may be better un-
derstood if the question of being is adequately attended to in accor-
dance with the spatiality (Räumlichkeit) of Dasein’s being-in-the-world
(In-der-Welt-sein). Given that Heidegger holds that temporality pro-
vides the meaning of Dasein, he initiates a serious attempt to derive spa-
tiality from it8. Furthermore, his stress on Dasein’s being-in-the-world
is itself an eloquent affirmation of the inherence of the “incarnate sub-
ject” in the world that points to the originary (originär) character of
space as opposed to taking it to be constituted or derived from what
is other than itself, be it time, Dasein, or transcendental subjectivity.
Having said that, it nonetheless remains to be the case that temporali-
ty (Zeitlichkeit) is grasped in Sein und Zeit as being the horizon of the
existential analytic of Dasein (existenziale Analytik des Daseins)9.
Heidegger affirms that the temporality of the spatiality character-
istic of Dasein is unlike that of the objective world-space that is marked
by Vorhandenheit, which is itself founded on the functional and tem-
poral mode of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In this sense, the phe-
nomenological maxim, that calls for “going back to things themselves”10,
is itself manifested in the way Heidegger goes back to space itself in his
description of spatial experience without an appeal to the vorhanden
world-space. Given Heidegger’s belief that the constitution of Dasein
is ontologically possible only on the foundational basis of temporali-
ty, Dasein’s spatiality is itself seen as being grounded in time whilst con-
comitantly granting the possibilities of the disclosing of space in the
world. However, this state of affairs does not correspond with the claim

M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., § 24.

7

M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., § 70.

8
9 Regarding the axial role assigned to temporality in Heidegger’s thinking, see: F.

DASTUR, Heidegger et la question du temps, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,

1990. Also refer to Janicaud’s line in thinking, which was partly influenced by Hei-
degger’s thought, in questioning humanism and temporality, see: D. JANICAUD,
Chronos: pour l’intelligence du partage temporal, Paris: B. Grasset, 1997.
10 M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., § 7.
ON KAI XΩRA 77

that time has an ontic (ontisch) priority over space as it is attested with
Kant’s account of the forms of intuition in Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
Heidegger does assert that Dasein can be spatial (räumlich) only as
care (Sorge). Hence, manifesting a factical (faktisch) mode of being that
is not reducible to an objective presence (Vorhandenheit), and whose
spatiality is unlike that of other beings, given that Dasein is not posi-
tional but rather takes space in by way of making room (Einräumen)
for a leeway (Spielraum) and clearing (Lichtung)11. This spatial state
of affairs does in itself lay down the conditions that allow a geistig Da-
sein to inquire about space, to theorize about it, thematize it, make repre-
sentations of it, or attempt to produce it12. The making room of Dasein’s
spatiality is herein constituted by directionality (Ausrichtung) and de-
distancing (de-severance, Ent-fernung) due to which ready-at-hand use-
ful things (zuhanden) and their instrumental groupings are encountered
in the surrounding world. By coming across these things and handling
them, Dasein already reveals a region (Gegend) that is founded on hand-
iness (Zuhandenheit). After all, being-in-the-world is the mode of be-
ing of a being that takes care of things, which in doing so becomes directed
as well as directing itself. In this sense, the self-directive discovering of
a region is itself set against the horizon of a discovered world in which
making room is a bringing-near as a de-distancing of handy things, which
is grounded by a making-present (Gegenwärtigen) that belongs to the
unity of temporality.
Dasein’s making room for space is not reducible to a locational po-
sition, but is rather a leeway or clearing of the opened up range of use-
ful present things that are encountered and moved around in a directional
de-distancing. The making-present of these things lets space presence
by way of making room for it as leeway or clearing. However, this mak-
ing-present is absorbed in the nearness of what the directional de-dis-
tancing brings near, which makes the handling of things possible. This
involving state of affairs, which is restricted to what is made-present,
does allow Heidegger to proclaim that only on the basis of temporali-
ty would it be possible for Dasein to break into space through a self-di-
rective de-distancing that discloses a region in the world. However,
Heidegger does also concede that, although space is founded on tem-

11 The verbal räumen is itself indicative of the act of clearing. As for the phenom-

enon of clearing qua Lichtung, it is in a more basic sense also conceived as a clearing
qua Räumung. In this regard, Raum and Lichtung may be seen as being etymologi-
cally entangled.
12 Most serious architectural endeavours are aimed at producing space, and this is

particularly confirmed within the unfurling of 20th century modernist architecture and
is furthermore attested in many cases of avant-garde modern art.
78 NADER EL-BIZRI

porality, Dasein would nevertheless reveal a “dependency” upon space,

which is made manifest in the articulation of signification and repre-
sentation, and is itself intelligible from the standpoint of the self-inter-
pretation of Dasein, wherein the priority of the spatial is grounded in
the kind of being of that being. Temporality may itself be understood here
from the standpoint of the spatial relations that making-present finds
in what is present-at-hand or in what is objectively-present. So, if tem-
porality does indeed depend on spatiality, would it then be the case that
space is readily derivable from time?
Although it is said that Dasein as care is spatial due to a circumspect
directionality and de-distancing, the space that is discovered in the re-
sultant phenomenon of a region may still be seen as being merely a con-
text to which handy and present things belong. However, making room,
as a mode of giving space (Raum-geben), frees things from their en-
trapping positional locality and lets them be encountered as innerworldly
(innerweltlich) beings. Space is itself disclosed originarily within this
absorption with things by way of making room for them. It is from
the grounds of this constitutive directed de-distancing that space beco-
mes accessible to cognition as what is found in the world by way of
Dasein’s being-in-the-world that discloses it. It is in this sense that one
may understand Heidegger’s proclamation that space is neither in the
subject nor is the world in space, and that it is rather the case that Da-
sein is spatial in a primordial sense, and that space is discovered in the
world whilst showing itself as being a priori; namely as being encoun-
tered in a discovered region. On this view, Heidegger is not advocat-
ing the existence of an absolute and objective space that belongs to a
subjectless world, nor is he claiming that space exists in a radical tran-
scendental sense as what belongs a priori to a supposedly wordless sub-
ject. The spatiality of the totality of innerworldly things at hand loses
its sense of circumspect relevance in thematization. Spatiality thus turns
into an object of research and study, and the places of things at hand
are thus turned into a multiplicity of random or ordered positions. In
this sense, the surrounding world is itself neutralized to pure measur-
able positional dimensions by way of being construed as a homogeneous
natural world-space that warrants the connections that exist between
extended objectively present beings. However, whether in showing it-
self in the world through a region that is disclosed by directionality and
de-distancing, or whether being disclosed as the totality of extended
objectively present beings, the kind of being of space remains obscure
and its ontological problem persists. For, the kind of being of space is
unlike that of useful things-at-hand, unlike that of objectively present
things, and unlike the kind of being of Dasein. But if these are the only
ON KAI XΩRA 79

kinds of being that are discoverable in the world, then, from the stand-
point of being-in-the-world, what would the kind of being of space be
if space does show itself in the world? The confusion that we face in
our investigation of the being of space may indeed be attributed to the
ontological lack of a fundamental transparency of the possibilities of
being and its interpretation. So, what is decisive for the understanding
of the ontological problem of space depends on the priority (Vorrang)
of attending to the question of being.
The phenomenon of space can only be understood by going back
to the world and by being founded on the essential spatiality of Da-
sein. This insight is derived from the interpretation of Dasein as time
as it is early-on set in Der Begriff der Zeit. Therein, it is said that Da-
sein is not in time but rather that Dasein is temporality13. This view cor-
responds with the accounts presented in Sein und Zeit with respect to
Dasein’s mode of being-ahead-of-itself, wherein its potentiality of be-
ing has an unfinished quality and its wholeness (Gänze) is reached only
in death (Tod). For as long as Dasein is, it has not-yet attained its whole-
ness14. If the views in Der Begriff der Zeit correspond with the inter-
pretation of Dasein against the horizon of temporality in Sein und Zeit,
and if it were indeed the case that the spatiality of Dasein is not read-
ily derivable from temporality, then re-thinking space becomes neces-
sary for the clarification of the question of being. However what might
need to be observed in this regard is that the elucidation of the onto-
logical problem of space should proceed by way of pondering over the
question of the being of space away from setting time as the horizon
of such inquiry. We thus ought to avoid Heidegger’s persistent tem-
porocentrist commitment to the accentuation of the principality of tem-
porality over that of spatiality, which has haunted Sein und Zeit15. For,
even towards the end of this treatise, Heidegger does assert that although
dated-time is determined numerically in terms of spatial distances and
locational changes, by no means does time turn into space. Rather, what
is ontologically decisive lies in the specific making-present that renders
the measured spatialization of time possible; and this is taken to be of

13 M. HEIDEGGER, The Concept of Time, English trans. by W. McNeill, Oxford:

Blackwell, 1996, p. 20. Der Begriff der Zeit, Gesamtausgabe Band 64.
14 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., § 46. We have also discussed this matter

elsewhere in: N. EL-BIZRI, The Phenomenological Quest Between Avicenna and Hei-
degger, Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000, pp. 63-69.
15 This temporocentrism arises also in Der Begriff der Zeit and in Prolegomena zur

Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Gesamtausgabe Band 20, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio

Klostermann, 1994.
80 NADER EL-BIZRI

the order of the Vorhandenheit16. Nonetheless, and in spite of this in-

clination in thinking, it is quite fair to say that Heidegger did not dog-
matically continue to think that being cannot be conceived but on the
basis of time, given that in his Logik, Die Frage nach der Wahrheit17, he
speculated about some potential other possibilities to be disclosed. Fur-
thermore, the instrumental and temporocentric interpretation of space
in Sein und Zeit, that is mainly mediated by an analysis of Zuhanden-
heit and Vorhandenheit, and the issuing directionality, de-distancing,
and regionality, was ultimately relinquished in the middle period of his
intellectual development. And it is in view of this opening that our inqui-
ry might constitute a humble preparatory step on the way to attending
to the question of being on the basis of space.

III. Critical Responses to the

Conception of Space in Sein und Zeit

Aided by developments in hermeneutic phenomenology, we could

appeal to some unequivocal as well as tacit critical responses to Hei-
degger’s instrumental and temporocentric consideration of space in Sein
und Zeit. As Didier Franck eloquently observes, in a manner that is in-
formed by what he encounters with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s con-
ception of “la chair du monde” (“flesh of the world”), the hands and
the flesh undermine the positing of temporality as the comprehensive
primordial (ursprünglich) horizon for the existential analytic of Dasein18.
This view is confirmed by what is enunciated in Le visible et l’invisi-
ble, wherein Merleau-Ponty observes that the experience of one’s own
flesh is a prototype of being (l’expérience de ma chair comme proto-
type de l’être). In this sense, and based on the conception of the Zuhan-

16 M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., § 80.

17 M. HEIDEGGER, Logik, Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe Band 21,
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995, p. 267.
18 D. FRANCK, Heidegger et le problème de l’espace, Paris: Les Éditions de Minu-

it, 1986; M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Le visible et l’invisible, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1964.

We have also addressed this matter in: N. EL-BIZRI, “The Body and Space”, in CAST,
Vol. III, 2000, pp. 92-95; N. EL-BIZRI, “A Phenomenological Account of the ‘Onto-
logical Problem of Space’”, art. cit. In view of eschewing any implied confusion, it must
be noted herein that, in spite of evident chronological or philosophical gaps that sep-
arate philosophers (who found their own traditions in thought) from exegetes, an ap-
peal to figures like Merleau-Ponty and Franck, or, to that effect, to Levinas and Arisaka,
does in this context creditably highlight the variegated nature of the responses to the
heideggerian Seinsfrage, together with their embedded bearings on explicating the on-
tological problem of space and addressing its exigencies.
ON KAI XΩRA 81

denheit and the Handlichkeit, and from the standpoint of the living body
(Leib; le corps vécu) and its Handwerk, space ought to be seen as de-
temporalized. This matter is furthermore reflected in Merleau-Ponty’s
stress on the body-subject’s (le corps propre) inherence in the world
wherein being is taken to be synonymous with being-situated (l’être
est synonyme d’être situé)19. According to this line in thinking, the on-
tological significance of space is tightly linked to the kinaesthetic bod-
ily movements of Dasein’s engaged corporeal being-in-the-world. This
is even accentuated in the phenomenon of dwelling, which is indica-
tive of Dasein’s inherence in the world20.
It is perhaps worthy stating herein that the question of embodiment,
which has generated significant polemics among heideggerian com-
mentators, does carry some bearings on endeavours to address the on-
tological problem of space. Whilst some exegetes affirm that Dasein’s
spatiality is characteristic of Leiblichkeit, others maintain that this no-
tion does not sufficiently figure in Heidegger’s thought, given his seem-
ing “unwillingness” to confront it “satisfyingly.” It is moreover argued,
that whilst Dasein’s spatiality might indeed be accounted for in terms
of embodiment, Heidegger’s own stress on the corporeal mode of be-
ing-in-the-world did paradoxically lead him to eschew the use of ap-
pellations like “body” and “embodiment”21.
In another context, and in view of further highlighting the prob-
lematic of instrumentalism that surrounds the question concerning space,
one could also evoke the poignant critique of the existential analysis
that Heidegger offers in Sein und Zeit that Emmanuel Levinas puts for-
ward in Le temps et l’autre. Therein, Levinas argues that since Heidegger
has written Sein und Zeit, we have been habituated to consider the world

19 M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la Perception, Paris: Gallimard, 1945,

p. 291.
20 See R. SCHÜRMANN, “Symbolic Praxis”, English trans. by Ch. T. Wolfe in Grad-

uate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Vol. 19, no. 2 – Vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, pp. 54-63.
21 In further elucidating the particulars of this controversial account of embodi-

ment in Heidegger’s thinking, I refer the reader to the following tracts: S. OVERGAARD,
“Heidegger on Embodiment”, The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology,
Vol. 35, No. 2, 2004, pp. 116-131; D. CERBONE, “Heidegger and Dasein’s Bodily Na-
ture: What is the Hidden Problematic?”, in International Journal of Philosophical Studi-
es, 8, 2000, pp. 209-230; D. M. LEVIN, in “The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment:
Heidegger’s Thinking of Being”, in The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed.
D. Welton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 122-149. A special emphasis would be placed
in this regard on the compelling thesis that was lately advanced by Overgaard, in “Hei-
degger on Embodiment”, which partly builds its case on an appeal to the recently edi-
ted volume 18 of the Gesamtausgabe (GA 18), namely: M. Heidegger, Grundbegriffe
der aristotelischen Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.
82 NADER EL-BIZRI

as being a set of tools (ensemble d’outils). Levinas adds that what seems
to escape from Heidegger’s attention is the fact that before being a sys-
tem of tools, the world is rather a set of nutrition and food (le monde
est un ensemble de nourritures) that fill us in and sustain our being-in-
the-world. Accordingly, we are already in space (dans l’espace) in han-
dling and consuming the food that nourishes our being. This view
overcomes the self-return of the self to itself and rather opens it to what-
ever is necessitated by its existing (exister)22. Levinas thus opposes what
he identifies as being a “solitude” that characterizes Heidegger’s exis-
tential analytic of Dasein wherein even the notion of Miteinandersein,
which evokes the reciprocal mode of being-with-one-another (être ré-
ciproquement l’un avec l’autre), is seen as being none other than a mere
association around a common term or truth (Wahrheit; vérité; ¢l»qeia)
rather than being a face-to-face relation with the other (Ce n’est pas la
relation du face-à-face). After all, Levinas holds that all the analysis in
Sein und Zeit was conducted in view of an impersonal everyday life of
a lonely Dasein (un Dasein esseulé)23.
In a recent reconsideration of Heidegger’s “theory of space”, Yoko
Arisaka offers a critical analysis of his endeavour to derive spatiality
from temporality, wherein she argues that the attempt to clarify Die
Kehre may require a closer consideration of section 70 of Sein und Zeit.
Henceforth, she tries to deconstruct Heidegger’s foundational approach
to spatiality by way of showing that the relation between space and time
is more likely to be equiprimordial (gleichursprunglich) than founda-
tional qua fundamental. Accordingly, space and time are not to be dis-
tinguished through a hierarchical order of dependency, rather both are
to be revealed as being co-dependent in their belonging to a unified
whole24.
Despite what we encounter with these diverse fine critics of Sein und
Zeit, be it phenomenologists who stand in their own right or exegetes,
it seems that the turn we attest with Heidegger’s ontological concern, from
focusing on the question of the meaning of being to focusing on the truth
and place of being, may have implicitly ushered a new phase in his think-

22 E. LEVINAS, Le temps et l’autre, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991,

pp. 45-46.
23 E. LEVINAS, Le temps et l’autre, op. cit., pp. 17-19. Also refer to N. EL-BIZRI,

The Phenomenological Quest Between Avicenna and Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 69-73.
24 Y. ARISAKA, “Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in Being

and Time”, in Philosophy Today, Vol. 40, no. 1, 1996, pp. 36-46; Y. ARISAKA, “On
Heidegger’s Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus”, in Inquiry, Vol. 38, no. 4, 1995,
pp. 455-467.
ON KAI XΩRA 83

ing about space25. The shift in Heidegger’s articulation of the question

of being away from a strict adherence to the existential analytic of Da-
sein might be traced back to the Kehre, which marked a reversal in his
thinking that passes from Dasein to being itself as it is addressed from
the standpoint of Wesen, Ursprung, and Ereignis26. One might specu-
late herein whether Heidegger’s “philosophical angst” might have led
him to shrink back from the challenges posited by the ontological prob-
lem of space and the uncanny possibilities it opens up, which cannot
simply be accounted for in terms of his familiar notions like Zuhan-
denheit and Vorhandenheit. After all, he might have realized in his lat-
er works that the ontological problem of space altogether might have
not been possibly accounted for with adequacy if it were set against
the horizon of time27, and it is indeed unfortunate if this may have po-
tentially destined him on a seeming misleading path within the dense
intricacies of Sein und Zeit28.

IV. Reading Ôn in Platon: Sophistes

Opening Sein und Zeit, Heidegger cites Plato’s Sophist:

[…] for manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when
you use the expression “being” (Ôn). We, however, who used to think
we understood it, have now become perplexed […] (Sophist, 244a).
This classical and deeply-rooted philosophical perplexity may have
posited an ontic-ontological priority to raise anew the question of be-
ing, thus calling for the reawakening of an understanding of the mean-
ing of this question by way of positing time as its horizon. Given that
the classical question of being may have historically sustained the re-
search of Plato and Aristotle but thenceforth has ceased to be an axial
thematic question of philosophical investigation, Heidegger initiated his
monumental attempt to retrieve the question of being from its histo-

25 This shift in Heidegger’s ontological concern may have also been accentuated

in his investigation of the Topologie des Seins in his account of the Lichtung that makes
room for Ereignis. Regarding this matter, refer to: E. S. CASEY, “Proceeding to Place
by Indirection”, in The Fate of Place, op. cit., pp. 278-279.
26 See: W. RICHARDSON, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, The

Hague: Nijhof, 1964, p. 238; Th. SHEEHAN, “Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/Kehre”, in Ex-

istentia, Vol. XI, Issue 3/4, 2001, pp. 247-249.
27 This point is analyzed in detail in E. S. CASEY, “Proceeding to Place by Indi-

rection”, in The Fate of Place, op. cit., pp. 254-255, 258-259.

28 For instance, Dreyfus believed that Heidegger’s discussion of spatiality in Sein und

Zeit was “fundamentally confusing”. See H. DREYFUS, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary

on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1991, p. 129.
84 NADER EL-BIZRI

ry of oblivion in the attempt to reformulate it anew. He thus endeav-

oured to investigate the precedence that is partly set in Plato’s Sophist
in view of achieving this end; and it is in this regard that passage 244a
of the Sophist may have acted as the directive motto that sets the tone
of Sein und Zeit rather than serving as a mere decoration29. Nonethe-
less, it is understandable that such state of affairs does not readily en-
tail that Plato’s ontology became simply assimilated to the unfurling
of Heidegger’s elucidation of Seinsfrage.
Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s Sophist, which appeared in German
under the title Platon: Sophistes30, was a reconstruction of a lecture
course that he delivered under the same title at the University of Mar-
burg in the winter semester of 1924-192531. For the purposes of our in-
quiry, we shall primarily restrict our focus on the second chapter of
the second section of this text (principally §§ 63-71 on passages 242b-
250e of the Sophist) that is dedicated to the discussion of the ancient
(pre-Platonic) and contemporary (contemporaries of Plato) doctrines
of Ôn. In view of this, and from the standpoint of the consideration of
the question of being, one could say in general, and in a manner that
is akin to what we encounter with Aristotle, that metaphysics inquires
about being qua being (Ôn Î Ôn). As for Plato’s original venture in this
regard, it consisted of carrying the ontological (ontologisch) explication
of being over and against the ontic (ontisch) description of beings32; thus
showing early-on that there exists an ontological difference between
being and beings. For, Plato presented a general characterization of the
first ontological attempts to put forward some theses about Ôn in op-
position to those who merely say that being is many or that being is
one (Sophist, 242c-243d). He thus initially advanced a position by virtue
of which being, which is one (›n), is also said to be manifold33. He then

29 M. HEIDEGGER, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ed. Richard Taft, Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 163; M. HEIDEGGER, Kant und das Problem
der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe Band 3, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
30 M. HEIDEGGER, Platon: Sophistes, Gesamtausgabe Band 19, Frankfurt am Main:

Vittorio Klostermann, 1992; M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, English trans. by R. Ro-

jcewicz and A. Schuwer, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. For a consid-
eration of the historical context of Heidegger’s Sophist lectures, see: M. J. BRACH,
Heidegger, Platon: vom Neukantianismus zur existentiellen Interpretation des Sophis-
tes, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1996.
31 Regarding Heidegger’s thinking during that period, see R. BRISART, La phénom-

enologie de Marbourg, op. cit.

32 M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, op. cit., § 63, p. 303 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,

pp. 438-439).
33 M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, op. cit., § 64, p. 307 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,

pp. 443-444).
ON KAI XΩRA 85

offered a critical consideration of theses that hold that beings are man-
ifold versus those that hold that beings are one or that being is both
many and one (Sophist, 243d-245c). According to Heidegger, Plato’s
aim was not like what the traditional scholarly commentators on Pla-
tonism might have implied, namely to generate a “monism” by accen-
tuating the ›n as Ôn34, rather Plato’s pondering over the expression lšgein
t¦ Ônta was meant to show that in all speaking about beings something
else is said, namely being itself. This is ultimately seen as being a rad-
ical turn in philosophical thinking which suggestively anticipates the
preparation of an ontological ground for addressing the question of be-
ing. However, Heidegger’s own insistence on the priority of the ques-
tion of being is illustrated in his construal of the principal task of
ontology as being that of preparing the ground for questioning the mean-
ing of being. In this regard, the question of the meaning of being stands
at the beginning of any inquiry rather than being the derivative of on-
tology or its end-result, wherein questioning (Fragen) as the “piety of
thought”35 would be understood as being an interrogating (Befragen).
Heidegger claims that ontology is guided in its account of the ques-
tion of being by the lÒgoj and thus moves in the lšgein (addressing)36.
In Wegmarken, he tells us that the lÒgoj of the Ôn means the lšgein of
beings as beings, which designates “that with respect to which” beings
are addressed (legÒmenon)37. Now, if those who hold that being is man-
ifold face many difficulties, what could then be said with regard to those
who assert that being is one? For if we consider the position of those
who say, after Parmenides, that being is one, what they maintain is none
other than the claim that there are two names, ›n and Ôn, that are used
for one thing. Furthermore, such consideration is not yet clear in terms
of whether what it designates is being as such, or whether it is merely
a being or beings. The thesis that: being is one, or that beings are one,
is made significant by saying: “being is one”, or “beings are one”. Yet,
in already being said, as lšgein, something else is said along with this

34 Herein, Heidegger opposes the readings offered by Platonist commentators like

Zeller and Bonitz. See: E. ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Leipzig, 1922, pp.
648-649; H. BONITZ, Platonische Studien, 3, Berlin, 1886, pp. 161-164.
35 M. HEIDEGGER, “The Question Concerning Technology”, in Basic Writings, Op.

Cit., p. 317.
36 M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, Op. Cit., § 65, p. 310 (Platon: Sophistes, Op.

Cit., pp. 448-449); M. HEIDEGGER, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe Band 9 (Frankfurt

am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996).
37 M. HEIDEGGER, “On the Essence of Ground”, English trans. by W. McNeill,

in Pathmarks (Wegmarken), ed. William McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-

ty Press, 1998, p. 104.
86 NADER EL-BIZRI

assertion, namely being itself. A similar difficulty does also arise with
the thesis that: Ôn (being) is a Ólon (whole); for, if Ólon is posited as
something that is itself other than Ôn, then this may entail that neither
is as such38.
Being guided by lÒgoj, Plato’s ontology is dialectic. A similar strain
is also attested in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, book Q. Therein, it is men-
tioned that the dealing with “beings in the primary sense” leads any
inquiry to what “all other beings are referred back to;” namely oÙs…a
(substance)39. Based on this reading, everything that is, namely all the
categories (other than oÙs…a), must carry the saying of oÙs…a. More-
over, it is said that the “first being” and what “is” in the primary sense
is oÙs…a, which is said to be originary in definition, knowledge, and time.
The longstanding metaphysical question: “what is that which is?”
(namely “what is being?”) is hence reducible to the question: “what
is substance?” (Metaphysics Z, 1, 1028b 2-4, t… tÕ Ôn, toàtÒ ™sti t…j ¹
oÙs…a). In this regard, Aristotle’s doctrine of being, which is reduced into
a doctrine of substance, will likewise have the two determinations: t… ™sti
and tÒde ti; whereby it answers the question about the essence of some-
thing whilst also simply being an individual (Metaphysics Z, 1, 1028a 10).
In addition, Aristotle believes that being has many meanings that are
related to sub-stantia (standing-under), which acts as some sort of
Øpoke…menon; namely as what always already lies present at the basis of
all the meanings of being (Metaphysics Z, 1, 1003a 33). Referring to the
first sentences of Q 1, one reads that “the sustaining and leading funda-
mental meaning of being, to which all the other categories are carried back”
is oÙs…a. As noted in the Beiträge zur Philosophie40, this [ousiological]

38 This reflects the ontological difficulty that confronts any thinking that ponders

over the relation between something and its attributes. This issue is further accentu-
ated in the case of mediaeval accounts of divinity, wherein the divine attributes might
be said to be other than the divine essence whilst being inseparable from it. This state
of affairs cannot be accounted for adequately from the standpoint of a thinking that
is polarized by the binary logic of non-contradiction of either/or, true or false, this or
that. For the particulars of my investigation of this matter, see: N. EL-BIZRI, “God’s
Essence and Attributes”, in The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology, ed. T.
Winter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
39 M. HEIDEGGER, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Q 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of

Force, English trans. by W. Brogan and P. Warneck, Bloomington & Indianapolis: In-
diana University Press, 1995, p. 2; M. HEIDEGGER, Aristoteles, Metaphysik 1-3: Von
Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft, Gesamtausgabe Band 33, Frankfurt am Main: Vit-
torio Klostermann, 1981. Regarding Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see the revised Greek text
with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
40 M. HEIDEGGER, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe Band

65, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989, § 157.

ON KAI XΩRA 87

interpretation belongs to the first beginning (Der erste Anfang) inso-

far that Ôn as fÚsij is related to oÙs…a by the movement of thought as
metabol». We are also told in Wegmarken, that fÚsij (natura) is oÙs…a
insofar that it is the beingness (Seiendheit) of a being, which, as Vor-
liegen (lying-present) and Vorliegendes (something that lie present), lets
something originate from itself41. After all, in the doctrinal dispute
among Plato’s contemporaries over Ôn, which is described in evocative
terms as being a battle of the giants over being: gigantomac…a per… tÁj
oÙs…aj (Sophist 246a4), one already notices the linguistic interchange-
ability of Ôn with oÙs…a as designators of being.
In elucidating the ontological dispute of his contemporaries, Plato
holds that one group reduces being to a body or to becoming (Sophist
246e-248a), by holding that oÙs…a = sîma (body), or oÙs…a = gšnesij
(becoming), whilst the other faction reduces being to a form, by hold-
ing that oÙs…a = edoj (qua form or outer look; Sophist 248a-250e). Pla-
to’s interest in the gigantomac…a per… tÁj oÙs…aj (Sophist 246a4) is
manifested in his attempt to elucidate the meaning of oÙs…a in view of
positing the question of being anew. According to him, the Greeks do
not take the question of the meaning of oÙs…a as being an ontological
theme as such, but they rather demonstrate it by way of producing the
beings which satisfy the meaning of being42. Based on Heidegger’s read-
ing, this process is oriented by the temporal grasping of being as pres-
ence (parous…a; Anwesenheit); namely as that which is already there from
the outset along with beings. Given this interpretation, the battle of the
giants is over the meaning of presence, while being as such guided by
a‡sqhsij (sense-perception) or lÒgoj. In view of this, it is more likely
that Plato would side with those directed by the latter rather than the
former, given the difficulty he faces in siding with those who deny the
existence of anything that is invisible (qua non-sensible). After all, the
faction that rigidly holds that oÙs…a = sîma (Sophist 246a-248a) does
refute lÒgoj (ratio, intellectus) on the basis of denying ¢sèmaton (the
non-bodily).
Turning to those who say that oÙs…a = edoj, it is believed that they
also hold that sîma, which is marked by gšnesij (generation qua be-
coming), is a m¾ Ôn (Nichtsein; non-being), given that it is by way of
logismÒj that we keep with oÙs…a as edoj. However, one could still ul-
timately say that Plato would conceive oÙs…a as „dša, and ultimately as

41 M. HEIDEGGER, “On the Essence and Concept of fÚsij in Aristotle’s Physics B,

I”, English trans. by Th. Sheehan, in Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 104.

42 M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, op. cit., § 67, p. 323 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,

pp. 466-467).
88 NADER EL-BIZRI

being-present43, and that this gets set against the context of the veiling
of being, wherein being remains absent in an uncanny way by main-
taining itself in concealment. However, it is in such concealing that lies
the essence of the forgetfulness (Vergessenheit) of being as experienced
by the Greeks44. After all, in commenting on Hegel’s reading of clas-
sical Greek philosophy, Heidegger holds that the terms ›n of Parmenides,
lÒgoj of Heraclitus, „dša of Plato, and ™nšrgeia of Aristotle (possibly
along with oÙs…a), are all understood within the horizon of being45. What
this amounted to within the history of metaphysics is none other than
the reduction of being into something that is other than itself, thus let-
ting the question of the meaning of being fall into oblivion. In this con-
text, the thinking attempted in Sein und Zeit sets out to overcome
metaphysics by way of recalling being to itself, and retrieving it from
its history of forgetfulness. After all, Heidegger believes that metaphysics
is founded upon that which remains concealed in the Ôn, wherein the
retrieval of the Ôn for thinking would not thus reproduce Plato’s and
Aristotle’s ontological efforts46.

V. Between Ôn of the Sophist and cèra of the Timaeus

The formula oÙs…a = edoj excludes gšnesij and k…nhsij from Ôn qua
being, whilst the formula oÙs…a = sîma excludes st£sij from Ôn qua
being. The former implies that all is at rest, whilst the latter entails that
all is in motion, and both hence deny the possibility of knowing being
and consequently undermine noàj and noe‹n47. As a living disclosure,
noàj should be marked by both k…nhsij (Heraclitus’) and st£sij (Par-
menides’) wherein both are construed as Ônta (beings). However, one
wonders whether a tr…ton (third) is already posited besides k…nhsij and
st£sij. For when it is said that k…nhsij is, and that st£sij is, it is this
“is” qua Ôn which is posited as a tr…ton. Yet, a similar state of affairs is
attested with cèra which is also an in-between tr…ton gšnoj. For cèra
is neither in motion nor at rest, and it is neither sensible nor intelligi-

43M. HEIDEGGER, “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”, English trans. by Th. Sheehan, in

Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 179.
44 M. HEIDEGGER, “On the Question of Being”, English trans. by W. McNeill, in

Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 313.

45 M. HEIDEGGER, “Hegel and the Greeks”, English trans. by R. Metcalf, in Path-

marks, op. cit., pp. 328, 331.

46 M. HEIDEGGER, “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?’”, English trans. by W.

Kaufmann, in Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 288.

47 M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, op. cit., § 70, p. 337 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,

pp. 487-488).
ON KAI XΩRA 89

ble (Timaeus, 48e, 52a-52b). If cèra itself is posited as a tr…ton in-be-

tween k…nhsij and st£sij, would we not then say that the “is” which
marks these three kinds is itself to be posited as a fourth? And given
this, would we not question Heidegger’s leap in positing this “is” as
“third” as being indicative of a bypassing of the platonic tr…ton of the
Timaeus, namely cèra? So, in view of this, are we not facing a prob-
lematic ontological lacuna? And what would the consequences be in this
regard if we address the dialogues of the Timaeus and the Sophist in a
gathered togetherness in view of preparing the groundwork for asking
the question of the meaning of being by evoking what self-announces
itself through and through, namely cèra? After all, such a move seems
to have eluded Heidegger’s reading of the Sophist; and we conjecture in
this regard that if he has ever ardently grappled with this ontological as-
say, perhaps the course of development of Sein und Zeit and what em-
anated from it would have itself been partially altered. We thus may
need to re-highlight the entailments of Plato’s extraction of Ôn as tr…ton
in the Sophist from the pre-given k…nhsij and st£sij, and to do this from
the standpoint of presence. This is reflected in the weighty question for
the Greeks, as reconstructed by Heidegger, namely the one that is set
by way of asking: “how can there be something which is neither at mo-
tion nor at rest, and yet nonetheless is, given that beings are either moved
or are at rest?” However, although there seems to be something that
resides beyond mere rest or motion, which nevertheless is, it is nonethe-
less the case that such mode of being is not solely reserved to Ôn as set
in the Sophist, but we argue that it is also attested with the case of cèra
in the Timaeus.
Whilst Ôn as tr…ton constitutes proper being (Sein) in the Sophist, cèra
as tr…ton in the Timaeus is posited as a difficult and hard to grasp per-
plexing matter for ontology that itself re-posits the question of the mean-
ing of being anew. Perhaps this matter renders Heidegger’s ontological
task more difficult, given that cèra remains to be exemplary of what-
ever is resistant to thinking48. It may well be the case that this matter
is itself reflected in Heidegger’s highlighting of the difficulties that face
attempts to elucidate Ôn through its positing as tr…ton alongside k…nhsij
and st£sij whilst also encompassing them as ›n. In this, being (in the
Sophist) announces itself as a third kind, and this is itself akin to what
we encounter with the manner cèra lets itself be seen in the Timaeus.
Both being (Ôn; Sein; être) and space (cèra; Raum; espace) appear as
what is other than what is either moved or at rest. In this sense, Ôn and

48 At least this is what we attest in the contemporary reception of Plato’s Timaeus

by thinkers like Derrida, Kristeva, Irigaray, Sallis, and Casey.

90 NADER EL-BIZRI

cèra, as both occupying the baffling place of the tr…ton, are thus an ›teron
(other) over and against k…nhsij and st£sij which do not render being
intelligible. In this, Plato’s ontology un-grounds itself by way of high-
lighting the question concerning the meaning of being within the bi-
nary system that distinguishes motion from rest. This double-fold
logical/onto-logical model of sensible versus intelligible, motion versus
rest, does not only fail to elucidate the meaning of Ôn (as Heidegger ob-
serves), but it also fails to elucidate the meaning of cèra (as Heideg-
ger does not observe)49. In this regard, Ôn and cèra, as both being a tr…ton
qua ›teron, are “the most impossible of all” to understand and clarify.
Heidegger holds that Plato’s determination of Ôn as dÚnamij (potentiality
or possibility) is revealed as being an ›teron (other)50. Thus, oÙs…a is
posited separately cum differently as cwr…j, wherein cèra is a way of
affecting a cwr…zei (separating) by way of placing a cwrismÒj (separa-
tion). After all, Heidegger concedes elsewhere that place constitutes the
possibility of the proper presence of beings51. This state of affairs might
itself point to an axial claim held by him regarding the ontological dif-
ference between being and beings. For, he tells us that this difference
remained un-thought in the history of metaphysics, given that the dif-
fering dimension, that allows for this ontological difference to take place,
was itself left un-thought. Yet, if this differing determines and delim-
its the ontological difference between being and beings, whilst at the
same time overcoming it, then would it not be the case that this very
differing is of the workings of cèra? After all, cèra does determine
and delimit the ontological difference between being and becoming, be-
tween the intelligible and the sensible, between rest and motion, whilst,
at the same time, and as a tr…ton gšnoj, it overcomes it52. So, would it
not then be the case, that in the context of Heidegger’s examination of
the Sophist, and in view of our reading of the Timaeus, the ontologi-
cal difference between being and beings would remain un-thought un-
less it passes by way of thinking about cèra? And would it not be the
case that the clarification of the question of being has to pass by way

49 Refer to J. DERRIDA’s interpretations in Positions, Khôra, Foi et Savoir, and De

l’hospitalité (Ut supra note 2).
50 M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, op. cit., § 68, p. 329 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,

pp. 475-476).
51 This is particularly the case with Heidegger’s reading of book IV of Aristotle’s

Physics, wherein it is claimed that place has a certain power. See: M. HEIDEGGER, Pla-
to’s Sophist, op. cit., § 15, p. 73 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit., pp. 105-107); ARISTOTLE,
Physics, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, IV. 1, 208a27-209a30.
52 As J. Sallis also says, the One and khôra are beyond being and beings. See J. SAL-

LIS, Chorology, op. cit., pp. 113-124.

ON KAI XΩRA 91

of elucidating the ontological problem posited by what falls under the

appellation cèra? Plato must have indeed experienced the distinction
between being and beings or else he would not have been able to think
the cwrismÒj between them53. In considering Was heißt Denken? Hei-
degger observes that what prevails between being and beings is the
cwrismÒj (namely the posited cèra as locus, site, and place?). Being and
beings are thus in different places; they are located with difference54.
Given that their ontological difference is that of emplacement, would
it not then be the case that thinking about that difference is a “khoro-
logical” undertaking that attends to being by way of thinking about the
cwrismÒj of cèra?
Like the Ôn of the Sophist, the cèra of the Timaeus is a tr…ton gšnoj
qua ›teron that cannot be accounted for from the standpoint of logos
nor muthos, hence requiring a “third genre of discourse”55. After all, cèra,
which pertains to the question of the stranger (la question de l’étranger),
remains resistant to metaphysical thinking. However, as Derrida reminds
us, the stranger herein is also the interlocutor in Plato’s dialogues, name-
ly the one who asks the critical questions, and who lies between the fac-
tions that are in dispute over the question of being. This emplacement
is itself affirmed in the Sophist, wherein the stranger asks the intolera-
ble question that defies the principal thesis of Parmenides56; namely by
daring to posit m¾ Ôn (non-being; non-être; Nichtsein) as itself “being”,
thus polemically implying that Ôn (being; être; Sein) is not (n’est pas).
The question of the stranger is itself taken to be the question of hos-
pitality (la question de l’hospitalité) which evokes the unconditional re-
ceptivity of cèra57. So, do we not herein attest the veiled sense of a
possible ontological entanglement between Ôn and cèra that points to
the spatial signification (Raumbedeutungen) of the question of being?
This observation may be accentuated by the positioning of Plato him-

53 See: W. MARX, Heidegger and the Tradition, Evanston: Northwestern Univer-

sity Press, 1971, p. 128.
54 M. HEIDEGGER, Was heißt Denken?, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954,

p. 135, Gesamtausgabe Band 8, 2002; M. HEIDEGGER, What is Called Thinking?, Eng-

lish trans. by J. G. Gray, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, p. 227.
55 I have also discussed this matter in N. EL-BIZRI, “‘Qui êtes-vous, Khôra?’’: Re-

ceiving Plato’s Timaeus”, op. cit., pp. 473-490.

56 It is also the stranger who inquires about the provenance of measure in Plato’s

Laws (NOMOI), namely whether the legal measure is of a divine origin or of a hu-
man making. See: PLATO, Laws I, ed. R. G. Bury, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1952, book I, 624a. I have addressed the ethical-political horizon of the
question of the stranger in: N. EL-BIZRI, “Religion and Measure”, in Phenomenolog-
ical Inquiry, Vol. 27, 2003, pp. 128-155.
57 J. DERRIDA, De l’hospitalité, op. cit., pp. 11-15.
92 NADER EL-BIZRI

self in the mšson (Mitte), namely in the space between the opponents of
the raging battle over being, which itself hints to the workings of cèra
as what determines the mšson, the middle in-between, the neither/nor.
Drawing on the affinity between the difficulties faced in elucidat-
ing Ôn and m¾ Ôn, it might indeed be the case that if we succeed in bring-
ing one of them to show itself in a more clear way, then by that very
token the other becomes visible and shows itself58; and perhaps this may
well apply to what we are attempting to do with regard to cèra. The
ontological transition affected by Plato, and picked-up by Heidegger,
shows that the challenges posited up and against thinking are still wor-
thy being pursued even if we are not yet well prepared to deal with them.
It is in this sense that we could grasp Sein und Zeit as being a prepara-
tory work that lays down the grounds for the consideration of the ques-
tion of being. However, if Heidegger’s ontological preparation was set
in view of facing the difficulties posited by thinking about Ôn and m¾
Ôn, it may still be the case that his Ontologie arguably remained in-
complete in scope given its polemical seeming exclusion of cèra from
such undertaking.

VI. Cèra in the Timaeus

To recapitulate some of what we have highlighted above, and based

on what is relegated to us on the authority of the Pythagorean as-
tronomer Timaeus of Locri, we learn that cèra (space), as a decÒmenon
(recipient or receptacle) and m»thr (mother), is a tr…ton gšnoj (third
genus) that is neither sensible nor intelligible (Timaeus, 48e, 52a-52b)59.
In spite of being phenomenally invisible and unshaped, cèra is never-
theless said to be apprehensible by a kind of bastard reasoning (logis-
mÒj tini nÒqJ) by the aid of non-sensation, and is barely an object of
belief (Timaeus, 52a-52b). Always receiving all things without ever tak-
ing on the character of what enters it, cèra is amorphous and free from
all characters (Timaeus, 50b - 51a). Like edoj (form), it is an everlast-
ing (¢…dioj) place that admits not of destruction (Timaeus, 52a-52b).
Accordingly, it constitutes an originary depth (b£qoj), that is like the
boundless ¢pe…ron60 , whilst even being akin to c£oj.

58 Alluding to the Sophist 250e8 and 251a1 in: M. HEIDEGGER, Plato’s Sophist, op.

cit., § 71, p. 344 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit., pp. 497-498).

59 PLATO, Timaeus, English trans. by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, 8th reprint.

60 If cwrismÒj, which is determined by cèra, allows for the occurrence of bound-

aries, whilst being beyond them, then it is possible to say that cèra is akin to ¢pe…ron.
ON KAI XΩRA 93

Thinking about this cèra, in view of the spatial significance of the

question of being, leads us to the poetic turn in Heidegger’s later think-
ing in the 1950’s from the other side of Die Kehre. In quest of hearing
the speaking of language, some aspects of the topological account of be-
ing get pronounced in Heidegger’s reading of Georg Trakl’s “Ein Win-
terabend” (“A Winter Evening”) as set in Die Sprache61. What interests
us in this poem is the verse: “Pain has turned the threshold to stone”62.
As Heidegger explains, the “startling” words in this saying name some-
thing that has persisted and continues to persist. It is only by turning
into stone that the threshold (Limen) qua ground-beam persists as what
sustains the middle and bears the in-between, in which the outside and
the inside co-penetrate each other, without itself yielding either way.
What persists as such is hardened by a petrifying pain that “rends”63.
This pain is the rift (Riss) that separates yet at the same time that gath-
ers back into itself what it rends. It thus joins in separating, and rends
while drawing what it disperses back to itself. As a separating that gath-
ers, pain is the joining of what is held apart by the rift. It is a thresh-
old that settles the liminal self-opened middle in-between and gathers
difference. Pain is ultimately the difference itself as the separation of
the between and the gathering of the middle that self-shows itself as a
recollected presence. The rift of difference is a primal calling of the world
and things into their intimacy, wherein the seam that binds their be-
ing toward one another is pain. This primal calling, which bids the in-
timacy of world and things by way of bidding them to come to the
between of difference, occurs in the poem as the speaking of language
which commits the bidden to the bidding of difference that stills the thing
into the world. For, in stillness, world and thing never escape the work-
ings of difference, which commands their gathering into the oneness of
the pain of intimacy. In this, language speaks as the command of the dif-
ference, and takes place as the occurring of a difference between being

Regarding this point see: Ch. H. KHAN, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cos-
mology, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, appendix 2; P. Seligman, The
Apeiron of Anaximander: A Study in the Origin and Function of Metaphysical Ideas,
London: Athlone Press, 1962; N. EL-Bizri, “‘Qui êtes-vous, Khôra?’’: Receiving Pla-
to’s Timaeus”, op. cit., pp. 482-486.
61 See G. TRAKL, “Ein Winterabend”, in Die Dichtungen. Gesamtausgabe mit einem

Anhang: Zeugnisse und Erinnerungen, edited by K. Horwitz, Zürich: Arche Verlag,

1946. M. HEIDEGGER, “Die Sprache”, in Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen: Neske,
1959, Gesamtausgabe Band 12; M. HEIDEGGER, “Language”, in Poetry, Language,
Thought, English trans. by A. Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, 1975; here-
inafter “Language.”
62 M. HEIDEGGER, “Language”, op. cit., pp. 196, 203-205.
63 M. HEIDEGGER, “Language”, op. cit., pp. 204-205.
94 NADER EL-BIZRI

and beings that challenges us to think about the differing that is at work
in this difference64. After all, and as indicated in Die Grundprobleme
der Phänomenologie65, phenomenology is grounded on the ontological
distinction (Unterscheiden) that splits being apart from beings.
In Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Heidegger also pictures the strife
between clearing and concealing, in the opposition of world and earth,
as a rift that is not merely a cleft ripped open, but that is also an inti-
macy within which the opponents belong to each other. This rift car-
ries the opponents into the provenance of their unity by virtue of their
common ground; thus not letting what it separates break apart. In this,
the rift is a “drawing together into unity” of design and common out-
line. Truth establishes itself here as a strife that opens up within a be-
ing and brings that being forth by bringing it into the rift that sets itself
back into the heaviness of stone, the mute hardness of wood, or the dark
glow of colors. What emerges from this bringing forth and setting back
is the generation of a work wherein truth gets fixed in a Gestalt qua
figure or shape (morf»), namely as a structure in whose shape the rift
composes itself. The Riss, as a cleft, tear, crack, and laceration, is also
what releases a design, plan, sketch, blueprint or profile. Insofar that
it is a strife, it designs, outlines and configures. The Gestalt that surges
from this Riss is to be thought in terms of a particular Stellen (placing)
qua qšsij, and as a Ge-Stell (en-framing or framework) that occurs as
a work that places itself up and sets itself forth. In this, the earth is used
in “the fixing in place of truth in the figure.” In the creation of a work
(œrgon), the strife, as rift, must be set back into the earth, and the earth
must itself be set forth and put to use66. The fixing in place of truth in
the figure, entails that a thesis is posited in outlining by way of which
presencing occurs, wherein something is admitted into a boundary
(pšraj). The limit of something is thus not fixed as something motion-
less, for the limit of something is not where that thing ends but is rather
where that thing shines and presences. By its contour, a thing stands in
repose in the fullness of motion. Thus a being comes forth into the rift-
design as bounding outline. This bringing forth of something, either oc-
curs out of itself being brought into the open, or is brought forth by

64 M. HEIDEGGER, “Language”, op. cit., pp. 205-207. I have also argued elsewhere

that even the movement of Derrida’s différance does itself manifest veiled khôric traits,
see N. EL-Bizri, “‘Qui êtes-vous, Khôra?’’: Receiving Plato’s Timaeus”, op. cit.
65 M. HEIDEGGER, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe Band

24, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997; M. Heidegger, The Basic Prob-
lems of Phenomenology, English trans. by A. Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1982.
66 M. HEIDEGGER, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, op. cit., pp. 188-189.
ON KAI XΩRA 95

Dasein who performs this bringing that lets what is present come to
presence67.
In Einführung in die Metaphysik68, as well as the Beiträge zur Philoso-
phie and Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, we notice that Dasein is con-
strued in rather metaphorical terms as being the Stätte (site) of the strife
(Streitraum) between earth and world, which Sein requires in order to
disclose itself. Therein, Heidegger breaks away from the hegemony of
Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit69. Moreover, in Bauen Wohnen
Denken, he argues that the thinging (dingen) things act as the Ort (lo-
cus) for the gathering (versammeln) of the fourfold (das Geviert) by
making room for the bringing together of earth, heaven, mortals, and
divinities70. This is also confirmed in his consideration of the role of
language in building, plastic creation, and place-making. For, in Der
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, he asserts that place-making always hap-
pens already in the open that guides the saying and naming and acts as
the clearing of truth that makes room for Ereignis (disclosing event of
appropriation or “en-owning”)71, by gathering the fourfold and allowing
them to come to light; hence, letting the authentic mode of being-in-
the-world as dwelling occur, wherein the meaning of being is sheltered72.

67 Refer to the addendum of 1956, which was added to the German text of the

Reclam edition and translated into English in Basic Writings: M. HEIDEGGER, Ad-
dendum to “The Origin of the Work of Art”, op. cit., pp. 208-209.
68 M. HEIDEGGER, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe Band 40, Frank-

furt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983; M. HEIDEGGER, An Introduction to Meta-

physics, English trans. by R. Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959, p. 205.
69 M. HEIDEGGER, “The Origin of the Work of Art”, in Poetry, Language, Thought,

English trans. by A. Hofstadter, New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Regarding Hei-
degger’s investigation of the role of space in plastic arts, see M. HEIDEGGER, “Die Kun-
st und der Raum” (1969), in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe Band
13, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983; M. HEIDEGGER, “Art and Space”,
English trans. by Ch. H. Seibert, Man and World, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1973, pp. 3-5.
70 M. HEIDEGGER, “Bauen Wohnen Denken”, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, Pfullin-

gen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1954, pp. 145-162 [Gesamtausgabe Band 7, 2000]; M. Hei-
degger, “Building Dwelling Thinking”, in Basic Writtings, ed. D. F. Krell, 2nd ed., New
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993, p. 356.
71 The term “en-owning” was coined by P. Emad and K. Maly as a rendition of

“Ereignis”, which was usually translated as “event”, “appropriation”, “event of ap-

propriation”, and “befitting.” For further particulars refer to the “Translators’ Fore-
word” in M. HEIDEGGER, Contributions to Philosophy (From En-owning), English trans.
by P. Emad and K. Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. xix-xxii.
Also see M. HEIDEGGER, Beiträge zur Philosophie, op. cit., particularly §§ 127, 156-
159 on Die Zerklüftung (cleavage).
72 See M. HEIDEGGER, “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”, in Holzwege, Gesam-

tausgabe Band 5, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977; M. HEIDEGGER,

“The Origin of the Work of Art”, English trans. by A. Hofstadter, in Basic Writings,
op. cit., pp. 143-203; esp. pp. 198-199.
96 NADER EL-BIZRI

After all, and as Heidegger notes in the Beiträge zur Philosophie, Da-
sein is itself to be grasped as being the self-opening middle (die sich öff-
nende Mitte) and between (Zwischen) as the occurrence of the
Erklüftung as Er-eignung that grounds the Zeit-Raum relation73.
Taking these developments into account, one wonders why Hei-
degger did not give cèra the attention it deserves in his attempt to elu-
cidate the question of being. This matter remains puzzling when we find
that the workings of cèra seem to be akin to what we attest with the
rift, gap, threshold, middle, open, cleavage, in-between, which we par-
ticularly encounter in Die Sprache, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, and
Beiträge zur Philosophie. One senses in these instances the hint of a wake
of a significant interest in space that lets itself surface from the depth
of Heidegger’s thought. Perhaps this rather un-thought phenomenon
reflects an anticipatory philosophical state of affairs that is gradually
manifesting itself in the post-humous unfolding of his thought74. For,
it is indeed confounding that the (khôric) observations that Heidegger
makes in this regard are ultimately missing from his most direct con-
sideration of cèra as set in his reading of passage 50e of the Timaeus
in Einführung in die Metaphysik75. For, cèra is taken therein to be the
medium in which the thing that is in process of becoming forms itself
and out of which it emerges once it becomes. However, Heidegger draws
a careful distinction between what we, as moderns, call “space” (Raum;
espace) and what the Greeks refer to as cèra and as tÒpoj. In this re-
gard, he aptly observes that the Greeks did not have a word for space
(Raum; espace) as such, given that they experienced the spatial on the
basis of tÒpoj rather than extensio76. It could therefore initially be said
that the Greeks experienced the spatial as cèra; insofar that cèra is akin

73 M. HEIDEGGER, Beiträge zur Philosophie, op. cit., §§ 190, 191.

74 See E. STRÖKER, Investigations in Philosophy of Space, English trans. by A. Mick-
unas, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987, pp. 13-170; R. FRODEMAN, “Being
and Space: A Re-reading of Existential Spatiality in Being and Time”, in Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1992, pp. 33-41; G. SEFFER, “Hei-
degger’s Philosophy of Space”, in Philosophy Today, Vol. 17, 1973, pp. 246-254; M.
D. VILLELAPETIT, “Space According to Heidegger – Some Guidelines”, in Études
Philosophiques, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 189-210; P. FAVARON, “The Problem of Space in Hei-
degger”, in Verifiche, Vol. 29, 2000, pp. 229-270; S. ELDEN, “Heidegger’s Hölderlin
and the Importance of Place”, in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol.
30, no. 3 (1999), pp. 258-274; Vide supra notes 2, 18, 24.
75 M. HEIDEGGER, An Introduction to Metaphysics, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
76 I have argued elsewhere that the most evident shift in the conception of spa-

tiality, from a focus on topos to a construal of a notion of extensio, is attested early-

on in the geometrization of place as demonstrated in the Treatise of Place (Qawl
fî’l-makân) of the 10th century polymath, Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham, ca. 965 CE Basra
ON KAI XΩRA 97

to tÒpoj and not to extensio. Nonetheless, and as Heidegger interest-

ingly adds, cèra is simply neither space nor place. Rather cèra is “that
which is occupied by what stands there.”
In interpreting Aristotle’s Physics (Book B), we learn from Heidegger
that fÚsij as oÙs…a is the ¢rc» of the k…nhsij of what moves of itself77.
Herein, the essence of oÙs…a is said to be understood by the Greeks as
being a stable presencing (Anwesung) that is a mode of coming forth
into the unhidden (parous…a) that is not a mere presenteness as Anwe-
senheit nor an objective presence as Vorhandenheit, which is also grasped
as Raum geben78. The lÒgoj, which belongs to the lšgein, also con-
tributes to the gathering into the unhidden of presencing as parous…a
by letting beings be unconcealed in their self-showing79. The question
of presencing is ultimately revealed as being a topological/khorological
question concerning the locus-character of being. The tÒpoj thus be-
longs to the thing itself, and all that becomes is received within cèra
and presences from it. This reading is further confirmed by Reiner Schür-
mann who remarked that in moving from the Sinn of being to the ¢l»qeia
of being to the topology of being, we are brought closer and nearer to
the appropriate starting point in Heidegger’s thinking. Accordingly, the
question of the meaning of being construes the manifold as regions: en-
tities ready for handling, entities given as objects, being-there (Da-sein).
The question of the truth of being approaches the manifold as epochs:
Greek, Latin, Modern, Technological. The question of the place of be-
ing, construes the manifold as neither being regions nor epochs but as
rather acting as “a-coming-to-presence”. It is thus an event (Ereignis)
of multiple origination which renders the spatial, temporal, linguistic,
and cultural loci possible80. We would add that this “coming-to-pres-
ence”, as a coming forth into the unhidden, that orients the elucidation
of the question concerning the place of being, happens by way of what
presences in the “standing there” that occupies cèra.
To reconsider the pathways that we have traversed so far, it seems
that what is lost in our transformed modern conception of space as ex-

- 1039 CE Cairo). See N. EL-BIZRI, “La perception de la profondeur: Alhazen, Berke-

ley et Merleau-Ponty”, in Oriens-Occidens, Cahiers du centre d’histoire des sciences
et des philosophies arabes et médiévales, CNRS, Vol. V, forthcoming 2004.
77 M. HEIDEGGER, “On the Essence and Concept of fÚsij in Aristotle’s Physics B,

I”, op. cit., p. 203.

78 M. HEIDEGGER, “On the Essence and Concept of fÚsij in Aristotle’s Physics B,

I”, op. cit., pp. 206-208; M. HEIDEGGER, Beiträge zur Philosophie, op. cit., § 150.
79 M. HEIDEGGER, “On the Essence and Concept of fÚsij in Aristotle’s Physics B,

I”, op. cit., pp. 213-215.

80 R. SCHÜRMANN, “How to Read Heidegger”, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Jour-

nal, Vol. 19, No. 2 – Vol. 20, No. 1 (1997), pp. 3-6.
98 NADER EL-BIZRI

tensio is that the barely apprehended essence of cèra gets overlooked.

Hence, the ontological problem of space has fallen into a historical obliv-
ion that may have even been initiated by Plato’s reduction of being to
the order of idea. Free from all modes of appearance, and in relation
to the way being is set between appearing and the phenomenon of per-
manence, cèra is abstracted from every particular, yet not as what with-
draws. Xèra admits all beings and makes room for them as what stands
in being, whilst itself being resistant to thinking and hardly itself attested
in sense-perception. What we have advanced in this initiatory inquiry
and preparatory questioning shows us that space remains unheimlich and
its ontological status continues to be resolutely problematic and unclear.
This faces us with the formidable ontological challenge to establish a “the-
ory of space” whose absence so far has impeded, if not even interdict-
ed, the significant progress to be made in our strenuous attempts to clarify
the exacting question of being. Based on our endeavour to situate Hei-
degger’s thought between the Sophist and the Timaeus, we draw the in-
eluctable conclusion that we ought to elucidate the question of the being
of space in anticipation of a future unfolding of an ontological clarifi-
cation of the question of being, and that our inquiry herein may act as
a prolegomenon to a future “ontokhorology.”