PAULA CONDE vs.

ROMAN ABAYA
G.R. No. L-4275
March 23, 1909

FACTS:

Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, died on the 6th of
April, 1899. A certain Paula Conde came into the picture, claiming to be the mother of Jose and
Teopista Conde, whom she claims to be natural children of Casiano Abaya. As she moved the
settlement of the said intestate succession, Roman Abaya, brother of Casiano, came forward and
claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the deceased. Paula Conde, in replying to
Roman Abaya, filed a petition stating that she considered her right as superior to his and prayed
that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property and that the same be adjudicated to
her together with the corresponding products thereof.

The trial court ruled in favor of Paula Conde, prompting Roman to advance the arguments that
the court erroneously found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children
might be brought in special probate proceedings as well as incorrectly finding that after the death
of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child, the mother of such presumed natural
child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased
child.

ISSUE:

1. WON an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural children might be brought in
special probate proceedings;
2. WON after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child, the
mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to
enforce the acknowledgment of her deceased child;

HELD:

The first issue is answered in the affirmative, and this is in accordance with section 782 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which states that:

If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful
heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is
entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by
the judge, under oath, and signed by the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive
share is affected by the determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within
the time and in the manner provided in the last preceding section.

The second issue is answered in the negative, citing as basis Art. 137.

ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted only during the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

1. If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which case the
latter may institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its maturity.

2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
 In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the discovery of
such instrument.

Here we see that the right of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his
whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of the presumed
parents, inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of the presumed parents. Unlike the
right of action for legitimacy, the same lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can
always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself.

Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited actions is: (1) That the right of
action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be
transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action
for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted,
for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.

G.R. No. L-44837             November 23, 1938

SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. CONCHITA

MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.

Simeon Bitanga for appellees.

FACTS:

In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco. They
were blessed with a daughter, the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. When their relationship
came to an end, the latter executed a deed acknowledging Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural
daughter and on January 21, 1922, he also issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a
promissory note the completion of the payment of which is stipulated to be two years from its
execution.

Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he
had four children, who are the other defendants. On 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died and, still
later, on 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and personal
properties upon his death, administration proceedings of said properties were instituted in this
court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco," of this court.

Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of the
committee on claims and appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on 1935, filed before said
committee the aforequoted promissory note for payment but was unheeded.

When the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio
Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heirs, Socorro
Ledesma, asked for the reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From the
order denying the said petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed the
complaint which gives rise to this case.

ISSUE:

WON Socorro may enforce the full payment of the promissory note against the heirs of Quitco;

HELD:

No.
According to the promissory note, the last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from
the date of the execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in
the present case was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after the expiration of the
said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, in 1933, in the intestate
of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action
for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the
promissory note should not have been presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said
deceased not being the one who executed the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco,
which should have been instituted by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a creditor to institute said case through the appointment of
an administrator for the purpose of collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed
from the expiration of the period for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its
recovery has prescribed.

Also, while it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children
represents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or
grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the
obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is
received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties
received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their
said father from whom they did not inherit anything.

G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980

CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA

ONTE, petitioners,
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO,
PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA,
PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO,
LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.

FACTS:

Spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega acquired during their marriage adjacent lots Nos.
1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing
781, 544 and 1,021 square meters respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in their
names. Five of their six children died intestate, and eventually, Monica Maniega also died
intestate.

On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega,
Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before
any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed
in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale
covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00.

The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte then constructed their house on the
eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which
he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one meter
from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano
Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the subject matter
of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter in the
deed of sale although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No.
1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.

In 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. A year after, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants
to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery they later constructed on the
ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot as the same belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife. The latter being already dead when the sale was
executed, it was without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica, making it a
ground for the nullification of the deed of sale.

The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold
is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith that
the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.

ISSUE:

WON the defendants have the full ownership over the disputed property;

HELD:

Yes, they have. Since at the time of the sale, the wife Monica Maniega had already been dead for
six years, the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had
already been dissolved. It had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs
nor the necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership instituted by them.
There was also no extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly,
the estate became the property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto,
and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership. Thus, in
line with article 493 of the NCC, he three contiguous lots having a total area of 2,346 sq. meters,
the co-ownership constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since
Flaviano Moreto was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters
as his share, he had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to
the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to
him at the time of the sale.

Also, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as
well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto,
stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the complaint by the private respondents, or a
period of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents lived as neighbors
to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and
ownership of the land purchased by them.

The Court is thus persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by
laches to claim half of the property. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant
from presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long
time to elapse without presenting the same. (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59
Phil. 92)

G.R. No. L-47820            November 28, 1942

GR No. L-47320 November 26, 1945

 Intestate of the late Antonio Jayme Ledesma. FORTUNATO JAYME, applicant,
vs. GENOVEVA GAMBOA AND OTHERS, opponents-appellants.

Mr. Jose Querubin and Messrs. Gullas, Leuterio, Tanner and Laput on behalf of the applicant-
appellant.
Messrs. Spinning and Spinning on behalf of the opponents-appellants.

RESOLUTION 

BRIONES, J .:

The question that arises before us is whether a recognized natural child born before the validity
of the Civil Code in the Philippines (December 8, 1889), has the right to concur in the
inheritance of his natural father, together with legitimate children, some born also before the
validity of said Code and others later. On April 17, 1883 Efigencia Enriquez gave birth to a child
who was baptized with the name of Fortunato Enriquez. But later this child began to bear the
name of Fortunato Jayme, under the pretense of being a recognized natural son of Antonio
Jayme, and from then until now he is known by that name. Antonia Jayme, the supposed natural
father, married Genoveva Gamboa in January 1884, that is, when Fortunato was barely one year
old.chanrob

FACTS:

Efigencia Enriquez gave birth to a child who was baptized with the name of Fortunato Enriquez,
but later began to bear the name of Fortunato Jayme, under the pretense of being a recognized
natural son of Antonio Jayme. Antonio Jayme, the supposed natural father, married Genoveva
Gamboa in January 1884, that is, when Fortunato was barely one year
old.chanrobualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Antonio Jayme died on October 19, 1937. But even before the death of Antonio Jayme,
Fortunato got along with him and his legitimate family. The differences arosewhen the intestate
opened and the widow and her children refused to recognize Fortunato as the natural son of the
deceased, with the right to attend the inheritance. Fortunato came before the Court of First
Instance of Bacolod, province of Negros Occidental, to seek for the recognition of his rights as a
natural son of Antonio Jayme.

It is admitted that Fortunato Jayme is a natural child duly recognized under Toro Law, which
was the law in force prior to the Civil Code regarding the recognition of natural children. It is
also admitted that Jayme would have the right to participate in the inheritance of his late father
under the precepts of said Code if it were not for the circumstance that the deceased left two
legitimate children, the so-called Angela and Antonio Jayme, who like Fortunato also they were
born under the Bull Law, that is, before the validity of the Civil Code was extended to the
Philippines on December 8, 1889. It is argued that, under the last part of the first transitory
provision transcribed above, Jayme's right to inherit no can be made effective because it harms
another right acquired, of equal origin, that is, the right of their legitimate brothers, named
Angela and Antonio Jayme. anroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ISSUE:

WON a recognized natural child born before the validity of the Civil Code in the Philippines
(December 8, 1889), has the right to concur in the inheritance of his natural father, together with
legitimate children, some born also before the validity of said Code and others later;

HELD: chanrobles virtual law library

The circumstance that the claimant and the first two legitimate children of the deceased were
born before the present Civil Code went into effect constitutes no legal obstacle against the
exercise by the claimant of the right recognized by said Code. The decedent died long after it
entered into effect. Both the claimant and the oppositors base their right to inherit upon the
provisions of the Civil Code, but the claimant and the oppositors acquired no vested right to the
decedent’s inheritance until the moment of his death. Rule 12 of the transitory provisions
expressly ordains that the inheritance of those who die after the Civil Code was in force ‘’shall
be allotted and divided in accordance with this code’; even if a decedent made a will under the
prior legislation, the testamentary dispositions should be harmonized with the latter; “the
legitimes, betterments, and legacies shall be respected, but their amounts should be reduced
when it is not possible in any other manner to give each participant in the inheritance the share
pertaining to him according to this code”.

G.R. No. L-48541             January 30, 1943

VALERIANA QUION, ETC., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

VICENTE CLARIDAD, ET AL., defendants.
VICENTE CLARIDAD, GODOFREDO FAMY and EULALIA CLARIDAD, appellants.

FACTS: In the intestate proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the latter

knowingly concealed the fact that the said deceased left a second wife with whom he had two
children, namely, herein appellees.

ISSUE: W/N the appellees is entitled to recover one-half of decedent’s estate. HELD: YES. That
the trial court, in a subsequent action brought by appellees to recover their legal participations in
the deceased’s estate, correctly declared said appellees co-owners of the estate in question to the
extent of one-half thereof, with right to its possession.

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT OF DECEDENT'S

HEIRS BY HIS SECOND MARRIAGE; RIGHT OF SAID HEIRS TO RECOVER ONE-HALF
OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE. — In the intestate proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by
appellants, the latter knowingly concealed the fact that said deceased left a second wife with
whom he had two children, namely, herein appellees. Held: That the trial court, in a subsequent
action brought by appellees to recover their legal participations in the deceased's estate, correctly
declared said appellees coowners of the estate in question to the to the extent of one-half thereof,
with right to its possession.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR RELIEF ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD DISTINGUISHED
FROM REOPENING OF INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS. — There is no merit in appellant's
claim that the intestate proceedings could no longer be reopened after the expiration of the two-
year period fixed in section 597 and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It suffices to state that
this is an action by the heirs of the deceased by his second marriage whose dominion over their
share in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of law vested in them upon the death
of said deceased, subject only to the lien of the latter's creditors, for the purpose of obtaining
relief on the ground of fraud, which action may be brought within four years after the discovery
of the fraud, in accordance with section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-47799             May 21, 1943

Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET

AL., petitioners, vs.
IGNACIA AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN, respondents.
Ozamis and Capistrano for petitioners.
Gullas, Leuterio, Tanner and Laput for respondents.

MORAN, J.:

FACTS:

Herein testator Agripino Chavez made a will and left all his property by universal title to the
children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with preterition of the children by his
first marriage, the herein petitioner. When opposed, the respondents maintained that there is no
preterition as to the children of the first marriage who have received their shares in the property
left by the testator, and that, even assuming that there has been a preterition, the effect would not
be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction of the bequest made to them.

The findings of the trial court and those of the Court of Appeals are contrary to respondents' first
contention. The children of the first marriage are Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia (who died
a little less than eight years before the death of her father Agripino Neri, leaving seven children),
Rosario and Celerina.

As to Eleuterio, the trial court said that "it is not, therefore, clear that Eleuterio has received his
share out of the properties left by his father." It is true that Eleuterio appears to have received, as
a donation from his father, parcel of land No. 4, but the question of whether there has been a
donation or not is apparently left for decision in an independent action, and to that effect Ignacia
Akutin has been appointed special administratrix for the purpose of instituting such action.

With respect to Agripino and Agapita, the parcels of land which they have occupied, according
to the trial Court, "are a part of public land which had been occupied by Agripino Neri Chaves,
and, therefore, were not a part of the estate of the latter."

Concerning Getulia who died about eight years before the death of her father Agripino Neri, the
trial Court found that "neither Getulia nor her heirs received any share of the properties."

And with respect to Rosario and Celerina, the trial Court said that "it does not appear clear,
therefore, that Celerina and Rosario received their shares in the estate left by their father
Agripino Neri Chaves."

This is in connection with the property, real or personal, left by the deceased. As to money
advances, the trial Court found:

It is contented, furthermore, that the children of Agripino Neri Chaves in his first marriage
received money from their father. It appears that Nemesio Chaves is indebted in the amount of
P1,000; Agripino, in the amount of P500 as appears in Exhibits 14 and 15; Getulia, in the amount
of P155 as appears in Exhibit 16, 17, and 18; Celerina in the amount of P120 as appears in
Exhibit 19, 19-A and 19-B.

From these findings of the trial Court it is clear that Agapita, Rosario and the children of Getulia
had received from the testator no property whatsoever, personal, real or in cash.

ISSUE:

WON there is a preterition which warrants the annulment of the instituted heirs;

HELD:

Yes. The testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
and that without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage, he left all his property
by universal title to the children by his second marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some
of them. This is, accordingly, a case of preterition governed by article 814 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should be
declared open.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-8437.  November 28, 1956.]

ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant.

FACTS:

The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity
agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H.
Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s
of having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors.

The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty
bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for
the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest
thereon.

Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady’s estate, the lower
court dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on the ground that whatever losses may occur
after Hemady’s death are not chargeable to his estate because upon his death he ceased to be
guarantor. As also pointed out by the Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and
is not transmissible. Upon the death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or
successors. Whatever loss therefore, may occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his
estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.

ISSUE:

WON the claims may be enforced against the Estate;

HELD:

Yes.Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311) contracts take effect only as between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from
the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles
774 and 776 of the New Civil expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already
quoted.

Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or
guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated
as a principal inducement for the contract. Whatthe creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H.
Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds is nothing but the
reimbursement of the moneys and it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by
Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties.
Being exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily
implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the
provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that
they are non-transferable.

The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are
“not transmissible by operation of law”. The provision makes reference to those cases where the
law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal
support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a
piece of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract,
the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain
no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.

G.R. No. 149926             February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

FACTS:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement in the amount of ₱128,000.00 intended for the payment of the
purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. Efraim and his
son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in
five equal annual amortizations due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May
31, 1985.

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, this time in
the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of the same Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K.
Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of
the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement
for the loan dated December 13, 1980.

In February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced
before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7 and Edmund was appointed as the special administrator
of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and
his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for
Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their
late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.

Subsequently, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and

between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint 11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150.

ISSUE:

a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid;
b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and

HELD:

The first issue is ruled in the negative. Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered.  The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated. Thus, unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

In addition to that, the holographic will left by Efraim Santibañez contains an all-encompassing
provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent even those which might have escaped
his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter.
Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3)
tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may
have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.

The second issue is likewise ruled in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, the assumption
of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the
validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be
given any force and effect.

G.R. No. 169129             March 28, 2007

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS,

& LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners, vs.
SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate
and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos, who died on 20 October 1985. The other
petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita. Herein
respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-
square meter lot subject property, which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof
and erected thereon a house but up until the present, Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter the
herein petitioners, failed to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate
title in favor of Spouses Lumbao.

Petitioners deny the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the respondents
Spouses Lumbao and that they are not bound of any “Bilihan ng Lupa” because petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the execution of the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa",
contrary to what was stated in said documents.

ISSUE:

WON the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and enforceable, thus, petitioners are
legally bound to comply;
HELD:

Yes.

Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," the
signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. And in petitioners’ Answer and
Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of said
"Bilihan ng Lupa.”

Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were
duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before a
notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and
due execution.

The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest
applies in the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the
said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were
transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs Thus, the
heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-
interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common
ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They
only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
contract which involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the
personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death
of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the
provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently,
they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they
bought from Rita, petitioners’ mother.

G.R. No. L-14074             November 7, 1918

In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.

MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,

Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.

FACTS:

Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in which
he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed in accordance
with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The will was not
executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of said section 618, prescribing certain
additional formalities for the signing and attestation of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916.
In other words, the will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by
three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by
the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation
state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before
the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new
requirements.
ISSUE:

WON the law existing on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of
the testator, controls.

HELD:

Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only
when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally
executed according to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would
unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted,
though before his death.

While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is inapplicable to
such a case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no new law would affect his past
act, and rest satisfied in security on that presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is ambulatory
until the death of the testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually take effect until
then. General words apply to the property of which the testator dies possessed, and he retains the
power of revocation as long as he lives. The act of bequeathing or devising, however, takes place
when the will is executed, though to go into effect at a future time.

Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the
disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a
powerful pleader for the second and third rules on the subject.

It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all statutes are
to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the
restrospective effect. The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective effect.

G.R. No. 4445           September 18, 1909

CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee, vs.

FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.

Rodriguez and Del Rosario for appellants.

Fernando Salas for appellee.

FACTS:

Herein deceased Domingo Ubag executed a last will instituting his wife as the sole heir. Probate
was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased, as they claimed to
be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the
deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.

In addition, they contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of
the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind
and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will.

ISSUE:

WON the will is valid;

HELD:
Yes.

The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of the will and swore
that the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound mind and memory, and in their
presence attached his signature thereto as his last will and testament, and that in his presence and
in the presence of each other, they as well as the third subscribing witness. Despite the searching
and exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for appellants could
point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged contradiction as to a single incident which
occurred at or about the time when the will was executed a contradiction, however, which we
think is more apparent than real. We do not think that a slight lapse of memory on the part of one
or the other witness, as to the precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his attention
may not have been particularly directed, is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these
witnesses, or as to the truth and accuracy of their recollection of the fact of the execution of the
instrument.

That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully established by
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore positively that, at the time of its execution,
he was of sound mind and memory. It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at
that time extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent
attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance
even to rise himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he
was subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes
his mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence of the
subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the will, and his
clear recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various parcels of land set out
therein, taken together with the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will
clear and explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong
evidence of his testamentary capacity.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6801             March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee, vs. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Salas and Kalaw for appellants.

Jose Santiago for appellee.

FACTS:

Herein descedent Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and
five months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the
executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several
grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.

The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the testator was not in the full of
enjoyment and use of his mental faculties to execute a valid will due to the fact that for some
fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death, he suffered from a paralysis of the left side
of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the
power of speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva
ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly
well. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other
members of his family.
Three testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in
which the will was executed. Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes
and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to
Señor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of
paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the
attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the
testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a
whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the
testator and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter,
after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in
turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other.

ISSUE:

WON the executed will is valid;

HELD:

The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If
such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such
exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that the
question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest
degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.

The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which
a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive manner. Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders,
or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will.

Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to
make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create
the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate family or property.