Professional Documents
Culture Documents
I Statutory provisions
SECTION 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
"the Code") enlists offences which may be compounded by persons aggrieved,
and some oi these offences may be compounded only with permission of the court
before which prosecution is pending. It is thus clear that only those offences can
be compounded, either with or without permission of a court, which find a specific
mention in the tables given in section 320. The corollary of this situation is that
all those offences which are not mentioned in the tables in section 320 (I) are
beyond the scope of compromise and cannot be compounded.
The offences which may be compounded straightaway by parties, without
permission of court, are given in section 320 (1) of the Code as per Table I below:
Section 320(9) of the Code specifically and unequivocally provides: "No
TABLE I
Uttering words, etc., with deliberate 298 The person whose religious feeling
intent to wound the religious feelings are intended to be wounded
of any person
Causing hurt 323, 334 The person to whom the hurl is caused
Wrongfully restraining or 341, 342 The person restrained or
confining any person confined
Assault or use of criminal 352, 355, 358 . The person assaulted or to
force whom criminal force is used
Mischief, when the only loss of 426, 427 The person to whom the loss
damage caused is loss or damage or damage is caused
to a private person
Criminal trespass 447 The person in possession of
the property trespassed upon
House trespass 448 Ditto
Criminal breach of contract of service 491 The person with whom the
offender has contracted
Section 320(2) of the Code furnishes another table of offences under the IPC.
which may, with the permission of court, be compounded. The offences are set out
in Table II below:
TABLE II
Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous 324 The person to whom hurt is caused
weapons or means
Ditto
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt 325
The person to whom hurt is caused
Voluntarily, causing grievous hurt on 335
grave and sudden provocation
Causing hurt by doing an act so 337
Ditto
rashly and negligently as to endanger
human life or personal safety of others
Causing grievous hurt by doing an 338
Ditto
act so rashly and negligently as to
endanger human life or the personal
safety of others
Wrongfully confining a person for 343 The person confined
three days or more
Ditto
Wrongfully confining for ten or more days 344
Ditto
Wrongfully confining a person in secret 346
The woman assaulted to whom the
Assault or criminal force to woman with 354
criminal force was used
intent to outrage her modesty
Assault or criminal force in attempting 357 The person assaulted or to whom the
wrongfully to confine a person force was used
Theft, where the value of property stolen 379 The owner of the property stolen
does not exceed two hundred and fifty
rupees
Mischief by killing or maiming cattle, 429 The owner of the cattle or animal
etc., of any value or of any other animal
of the value of fifty rupees or upwards
Mischief by injury to work of irrigation by 430 The person to whom the loss or
wrongfully diverting water when the only damage is caused
loss or damage caused is loss or damage
to a private person
House-trespass to commit an offence 451 The person in possession of the house
(other than theft) punishable with trespassed upon
imprisonment
Using a false trade or property mark 482 The person lo whom loss or injury is
caused by such use
Counterfeiting a trade or property mark 483 The person whose trade or property
used by another mark is counterfeited
Knowingly selling, or exposing or 486 Ditto
possessing for sale or for manufacturing
purpose, goods marked with a counterfeit
property mark
Marrying again during the lifetime of a 494 The husband or wife of the person so
husband or wife marrying
Defamation against the President or the 500 The person defamed
Vice-President or the Governor of a
State or the Administrator of a Union
Territory or a Minister in respect of his
conduct in the discharge of his public
functions when instituted upon a
complaint made by the Public
Prosecutor
Uttering words or sounds or making 509 The woman whom it was intended
gestures or exhibiting any object to insult or whose privacy was
intending to insult the modesty of intruded upon
a woman or intruding upon the
privacy of a woman
concerned. The most common cases which come to courts for quashing are those
under sections 498-A and 406, IPC which result due to matrimonial disputes
between spouses. Since the value of dowry property is always much above Rs.
250, section 406, IPC remains non-compoundable as per the table given in
section 320 of the Code. Sections 406 (exceeding Rs. 250 in value) and 498-A,
IPC do not figure in the said tables, so that they cannot be compounded between
parties even with permission of the trial, appellate or revisional court. Quite
often, cases which are registered under sections 498-A and 406, IPC get sorted
out and compromised out of court with intervention of respectable people and
well-wishers, and parties, as a result of compromise, do not want to prosecute
such matters further. However, the trial court cannot grant permission to com-
pound such offences in view of specific provisions contained in section 320 (9)
of the Code. Similar is the helpless situation of a trial court insofar as cases of
hurt under non-compoundable offences punishable under sections 326 and 307
IPC are concerned.
Similarly, there are many other types of cases like criminal breach of trust and
theft, etc., which section 320 of the Code does not permit to be compounded due
to value of the property involved being more than Rs. 250. The parties may have
amicably settled their disputes and may wish to proceed no further in the matter.
Unless and until prosecutions are dropped/quashed, an accused will continue to
suffer prosecution, and a compromise arrived at between parties outside court will
not come to the rescue of an accused who will continue to face trial till the end.
In all such cases, inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code
are invoked in order to do complete justice between parties and to put a stop to
abuse of criminal proceedings.
The higher judiciary has been taking a very pragmatic approach in sorting out
such matters with a view to seing that justice is done to parties, and unnecessary
harassment, agony and ordeal of prosecution are avoided.
conviction had been recorded was one under section 452, IPC which was non-
compoundable. The court in such circumstances maintained the conviction under
section 452, IPC and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.
In Ramjilal v. State of Haryana* the Supreme Court (D.A. Desai and R.B.
Misra, JJ.) in the Special Leave Petition before it accepted the composition in
respect of the offences (sections 323, 324 and 325 read with 34, IPC) which were
compoundable, keeping in view the chastened attitude of the accused and the
commendable attitude of the injured-complainant. The compromise was accepted
by the Supreme Court during the pendency of the petition, in order to restore
harmony in the society.
In Shakuntala Sawhney v. Kaushlaya Sawhney* the Supreme Court (V.R.
Krishna Iyer and V.D. Tulzapurkar, JJ.(observed:5
The Supreme Court in Ram Pujan v. State of Unar Pradesh^ had the occasion
to consider the compromise in case of a non-compoundable offence. In that case.
the appellants had been convicted under section 326 read with section 34, IPC and
also section 323 read with section 34,IPC. The conviction had been confirmed by
the High Court. However, during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court,
the application for compromise*was filed stating that the appellants and the
injured persons belonged to one family and they had amicably settled their
disputes and wanted to live in pectce. The High Court thereupon referred the matter
to the trial court for verification of the compromise. After the compromise had
been verified, the High Court passed the order stating that as the offence under
section 326, IPC was non-compoundable, permission to compound the offence
could not be granted. The High Court, however, reduced the sentence for the
offence under section 326. IPC from four years to two years.
The Supreme Court (P. Jaganmohan Reddy. H.R. Khanna and V.R. Krishna
Iyer, JJ.) held that the major offence for which the appellants had been convicted
was no doubt non-compoundable, but the fact of compromise could be taken into
account in determining the quantum of sentence. The sentence of imprisonment
was reduced to the period already undergone, and the fine of Rs. 1,500 was added
by the Supreme Court. This was how the court had dealt with the matter of
compromise in a non-compoundable offence.
The Supreme Court (A.P. Sen and B.C. Ray, JJ.) in Y. Suresh Bahu v. State
of A.P.1 allowed compromise in a non-compoundable offence, i.e., section 326,
IPC. The court termed it as a special case and observed that the said case shall not
be treated as a precedent.
The Supreme Court (B.C. Ray and K. Jagannatha Shetty JJ.) in Mahesh Chand
v. State of Rajasthan* allowed compounding of the offence under section 307, IPC
as a special case. In that case, one of the accused was a practising lawyer. The
counter case arising out of the same transaction had already been compromised.
The court, after examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under
which the offence had been committed, directed the trial court to accord permis-
sion to compound the offence after being satisfied with the compromise agreed
upon.
The law is meant to do justice and not to force the parties for a protacted
litigation. This Court has inherent power to compound a non-compound-
able offence when the interest of justice so requires. In this case, since the
complaint had arisen out of matrimonial differences which ultimately
have been settled, I see no reason why they should continue with the
criminal cases after they have settled their differences.11
The Delhi High Court (Anil Dev Singh, J.) in Vinod Kumar v. State12 allowed
the compromise in the case under section 307, IPC, after referring to the decision
of the Supreme Court in Mahesh ChandP In the case before the Delhi High Court,
the parties had compromised the matter and petitioner No. 2 had remarried.
Taking into account such circumstances, the court was of the opinion that it will
be in the interest of both the parties if the matter was compounded before the trial
court as that would generate peace and goodwill and would end the litigation
between the parties.
The Delhi High Court (V.B. Bansal, J.) in Sanjay Sandhya v. State14 quashed
the FIR under sections 406, 498-A read with section 34, IPC which was still
pending investigation because the parties had amicably settled their dispute and
agreed for a divorce. Not only the counsel for the parties but the state counsel also
submitted that the parties having already compromised, the petitioner should not
suffer the agony of trial. The court observed that in view of the compromise, it
was unlikely that the case would result in conviction, and therefore, the ends of
justice required quashing the proceedings,
The Delhi High Court (Vijender Jain, J.) in R.S. Arora v. State]r) quashed the
FIR for the offence under sections 452, 506 and 392 read with section 34, IPC (the
parties were landlord and tenant) which were non-compoundable in view of
section 320 of the Code. The court observed:16
It is true that ... offences which are non-compoundable in relation to the
quashing of such offences, the High Court has to act with great caution
and circumspection but to agree with the arguments of learned counsel for
the State that, those offences which are non-compoundable in view of the
section 320 of the Cr.P.C, the High Court will be without power although
parties have settled their matter amicably, would be to make the provi-
sions of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. nugatory and ineffective.
In Arun Kumar Vohra v. Ritu Vohra]1 Dalveer Bhandari, J. of the Delhi High
Court quashed the FIR under sections 498-A and 307, IPC lodged by the wife
against her husband as they had amicably settled their dispute, and also keeping
in view the extremely close relationship between the parties and interest of the
minor children. Reference was made in the said judgment to the number of eases
of the Supreme Court and the High Courts on the subject.
allowed to continue.
In Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab25 the Punjab and Haryana High Court
(V.K. Bali, J.) allowed the petition under section 482 of the Code by quashing the
prosecution under section 477-A, IPC (falsification of accounts — a non-com-
poundable offence). The facts in the said case were that the charges under sections
406, 420, 109, 120-£ and 477-A, IPC were framed against the petitioner. The
petitioner was a partner alongwith the complainant. The partnership firm had an
account with the bank. As a result of dispute between the parties, the business of
the firm was stopped. The petitioner got the crossed bank draft for Rs. 30,873
which could be adjusted only in the accounts of the firm. However, the petitioner
opened the account in another bank by alleging himself to be the sole proprietor
of the firm, and the amount of the bank.draft was withdrawn by him for his
personal use. During the course of the trial, the application was moved before the
trial court praying that the offence under section 477-A, IPC may be allowed to
be compounded. The said application was dismissed by the trial court.
The High Court while quashing the proceedings, observed that the parties had
patched up all their differences, and if they had compromised and the matter still
lingered on, it would not only waste the time of the parties but also of the court
in going through a mock trial. The only other way for the parties in the case would
be that the witnesses do not support the prosecution version, ultimately resulting
in the acquittal of the petitioner. It was observed that in some such exceptional
cases, even though the offence may not be compoundable, the High Court in its
power under section 482 of the Code, can also quash the FIR or complaint as the
case may be. Reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh
Chand v. State of Rajasthan26 wherein an offence under section 307, IPC was
allowed to be compounded.
expressed its surprise as to why the State had at all filed the petition for leave to
appeal when the matter had amicably been settled between the parties. It did not
behove the state to act in too technical a manner in such matter. The court
observed that reopening of the dispute was' bound to create a storm in the calm
waters of domestic felicity between husband and wife, a situation which the state
should like to create. The High Court opined that it was high time that the
legislature should consider whether an offence under section 498-A, IPC should
not be included in the list of offences under section 320 of the Code.
The Rajasthan High Court (V.S. Dave, J.) in Sri Narain v. State of Rajasthan29
held that trial courts have no jurisdiction, express or implied, to record a compro-
mise in a non-compoundable case, but the High Court and Supreme Court have
inherent powers to pass any order under the Code to secure the ends of justice. In
that case the non-compoundable offence was one under section 326, IPC. The
complainant-injured and the accused were close relations living in the same
village and they had patched up all their differences and disputes and filed the
compromise petition. There was the cross case for offences under sections 325 and
323, IPC in which also, compromise had been reached. The magistrate being not
competent to accord permission to compound a non-compoundable offence,
sought guidance and made a reference to the sessions judge who informed him that
a magistrate had no power to accord permission to compound such an offence. The
High Court held that when the parties are very close relations and the offences are
very old or they are matrimonial offences and no grave damage has been caused
and it does not involve a very serious offence like that of murder, dacoity, arson,
rape etc., if the ends of justice so desire, the High Court can always invoke its
jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code. The court further observed that a
compromise should be permitted in a fit case in order to save time, money and
energy of litigants as well as of court. Even otherwise, not to allow compromise
may also result in such circumstances to the same end because a complainant in
that case would not support the prosecution story, and a court, instead of advanc-
ing the cause of justice, would encourage perjury, and if this is not done, a trail
of evil thoughts will again start in minds of parties for having another innings of
battle. Such cases must, therefore, be given a decent burial as it is not purposeful
in continuing a dead horse.
The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court (D.P. Hirenath and K.
Ramachandraiah JJ.) in State of Karnataka v. Basavaraju™ upheld the order of the
trial magistrate granting permission to compound the offence under section 498-
A, IPC and consequent acquittal, and refused leave to appeal sought by the state
against the judgment of acquittal.
The Bombay High Court (B.U. Wahane J.) in Suresh Nathmal Rathi v. State
of Maharashtra^ allowed the petition under article 227 of the Constitution of
India seeking a direction to the judicial magistrate to allow the parties to com-
pound offences under section 498-A read with section 34, IPC. The court observed
that there was no dispute left between the parties and the complainant was leading
a happy married life with her husband-accused. It was observed that if the
29. J1 (J994) Current Criminal Reports 1151.
30. ILR 1990 Karn 774; 1990 (2) Crimes 196.
permission sought for to compound the offence was not considered, there would
be a destruction of the married life and they would not prolong well in the eyes
of the society. If the hanging sword is over the neck of the husband as well as the
old mother and the brothers, the relations may again become strained and there
would be a destruction of the happy life of the spouses. It may be that at one point
of time, the husband and the relations had committed some undescribed act, but
subsequently, the facts reveal that they repented and ultimately, all were happy.
Under these circumstances, it would bot be desirable to reject the prayer made by
the petitioners and to disturb their happy life.
The High Court of Bombay observed that there were some compoundable
offences specified in section 320 of the Code where the quantum of sentence was
much more than under section 498-A, IPC, and inspite of that, the offence under
section 498-A, IPC was not compoundable even with the permission of the
magistrate. The High Court proposed an amendment of section 498-A, IPC to
make it compoundable and bailable, in the interest and welfare of the married
couples and the society. As it was the jurisdiction of the legislature, the Govern-
ment of Maharashtra was required to pursuade the Government of India to
introduce necessary amendments to section 498-A, IPC and section 320 of the
Code.
The Orissa High Court (L. Rath, J.) in Md. Khalilur Rahaman v. State of
Orissa3*2 quashed the proceedings under section 294, IPC (obscene acts and songs.
punishable with imprisonment for 3 months or fine or both) pending against the
husband on the ground that the disputes between the parties had subsided long
back and they had even been divorced and that continuance of prosecution against
the husband would not achieve any beneficial result nor would it be in aid of
achieving any social or public justice which is the main aim of a criminal
prosecution. The court observed that a High Court not could be powerless to stifle
a prosecution at the commencement if a prosecution ex facie appeared to be an
abuse of the process of the court, and continuance thereof degenerated itself to be
a weapon of harassment. The proceedings were quashed as continuance of the
prosecution would not achieve any tangible result.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court (Bhaskar Rao, J.) in Thathapadi
Venkatalakshmi v. State of Andhra Pradesh33 allowed the revision petition and
directed the trial court by exercising its powers under section 482, CrPC to accord
permission to compound the offence under section 498-A, IPC after examining the
parties in court and after being satisfied about the voluntary nature of the
settlement. The court observed that the basic object of any matrimonial law is to
facilitate a happy and harmonious married life between the spouses and, therefore.
keeping in view the larger interest of the parties and to secure the ends of justice,
the parties could be accorded permission to compound the offence in question.
The Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court (Radhakrishna Rao and
S.V. Martuthi, JJ.) in Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. The State34 observed that com-
pounding of the matrimonial offence under section 498-A, IPC was permissible,
and only the High Court in exceptional circumstances can permit compounding of
such a non-compoundable offence under its inherent powers. The High Court
observed that it cannot be said that a court has to exercise its inherent powers and
allow non-compoundable offences to be compounded simply because the parties
have compromised the matter. The relationship between the parties, the back-
ground of the case, the effect of the couple being re-united and the effect on their
children are all matters which have to be taken into consideration while exercising
inherent powers. Where it is proved beyond doubt that compromise is to the
benefit of the couple and compounding the offences would restore normalcy
between the parties, the courts must rise to the occasion of creating a healthy
atmosphere between the couple by exercising inherent powers. However, the
Division Bench, expressing the general view, was of the firm view that in case of
non-compoundable offences in general, a High Court has no power to permit the
parties to compound the same.
VI Contrary view
The Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in State of Karnataka v. H.S.
Ravanasiddappa35 held that subordinate criminal courts or the High Court has no
power to grant permission to compound a non-compoundable offence, i.e., an
offence which does not come within either of the two tables under section 320 (1)
and (2) of the Code. The orders of the trial court permitting the composition of
the offences in two cases, one under section 326, IPC and the other under section
380, IPC were held to be non-sustainable, and consequently, acquittal was set
aside and the matter was remanded for trial in accordance with law. The Division
Bench observed, while referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh
Chand v. State of Rajasthan,36 that the powers of the Supreme Court under article
142 to do complete justice in any matter pending before it, is not restricted by
sections 320. 321, 482 of the Code or all of them put together. The said power
under article 142 was not subject to statutory prohibition and in particular, to
section 320(9) of the Code. The decision in Mahesh Chand by the Supreme Court,
therefore, rested on the plenary jurisdiction under article 142 of the Constitution.
Reference was made by the Karnataka High Court to the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Biswabahan Das v. Gopen Chandra Hazarika31 wherein it was
observed:
[I]f a person is charged with an offence, then unless there is some
provision for composition of it, the law must take its course and the
charge inquired into resulting either in conviction or acquittal. 38
Reference was also made to the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in State
of Karnataka v. Basavaraju.39 The accused therein had been prosecuted for the
offence under section 498-A of the IPC. The parties sought permission to com-
pound the said offence. The trial magistrate found that it was eminently a fit case
to grant permission and hence granted permission to compromise. The State
challenged the correctness of the said order. The Division Bench of the Karnataka
High Court observed that permission to compound a non-compoundable offence
should not be granted as a matter of course unless there were peculiar circum-
stances and the case could be said to be a special one. The High Court observed
that the trial court had kept in its view the welfare of the parties in the matrimonial
home and did not want the feelings between the parties to be strained for the rest
of their life. Keeping in view the larger interest of the couple and its impact on
the society, the trial court had accorded the permission, and the High Court held
that the trial court did not commit any error in doing so.
The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in
Basavaraju was opined to be a decision given per incuriam and, therefore, it was
not binding.
The Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (K.C. Agarwal, C.J.. M.B.
Sharma and N.L. Tibrewal, JJ.) in Mohan Singh v. State,4() held that permission
to compound an offence which was not compoundable under section 32()( 1) or
320(2) of the Code cannot be granted by the High Court in exercise of its inherent
powers under section 482 of the Code. It was observed:41
Though the powers possessed by the High Court under section 482
Cr.P.C. are very wide, but the very plenitude of the power requires from
the court great caution in the exercise of it.
In that case, the petitioner had been convicted by the trial court under section
326, IPC and sentenced. During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of
Sessions, the parties compromised and filed a joint petition but permission to
compromise was declined on the simple ground that the offence was not com-
poundable under section 320, CrPC. The accused and the injured, therefore, filed
the petition under section 482, CrPC before the High Court with a prayer to direct
the lower appellate court to permit them to compound the offence under section
326, IPC. The learned single judge, hearing the petition, disagreeing with the
earlier decision of the Single Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Hari Narain
v. State of Rajasthan,42 referred the matter to a larger Bench, and a Full Bench
of three judges was constituted.
It was held that the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of
the Code should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in
any other provision of the Code. It was held that the High Court has thus no power
under section 482, CrPC to permit the composition of an offence which was a non-
compoundable offence.
43. Forty First Report on the Code of Criminal Procedure IS98 (Sept. 1969).
44. Forty Second Report on the Indian Penal Code (June 1971).
45. S. 427.
46. S. 428,434.
47. Ss. 435-438.
Ala. Ss. 439, 440.
at such low amount as Rs 1048 Rs 5048'1 and Rs 250 49 is completely outdated and
antiquated and out of tune compared to the constantly declining value of money.
Such valuation may have been appropriate in 1860 when IPC was drafted. It is.
therefore, unnecessary to fix any value of any animal or cattle for purposes of
compounding an offence relating to mischief.
So far as offence of cheating punishable under section 420, IPC is concerned,
the same is compoundable by virtue of section 320(2) of the Code irrespective of
the amount involved in cheating. However, the offences of theft,50 criminal breach
of trust,5' receiving stolen property52 are compoundable only when the value of
property involved docs not exceed Rs 250. The amount in the present times is
ridiculously low and needs to be revised. One may not get even a pair of shoes for
the paltry sum of Rs 250 and if that be so, offence of theft of shoes remains non-
compoundable. It may be worthwhile considering whether any upper ceiling needs
to be retained at all, particularly when no limit is prescribed in the offence of
cheating.
When any new offence like the one under section 498-A, IPC is brought on
the statute book, its compoundability ought to be examined, appreciated and
legislated in proper perspective. So far as the matrimonial offences under sections
498-A and 406, IPC are concerned, the practical experience presents a sad
spectacle. It has been agonisingly found that some of the disgruntled ladies, then-
parents and family members resort to misusing these provisions against their in-
laws so much so that even minor members of the family of the husband are roped
in with allegations of making dowry demands and causing harassment and cruelly
to the wife. Often, it is experienced that a wife ropes in all and sundry members
of the family of her husband including those who have been living apart. Viewed
in this context it is absolutely essential, urgent and imperative that the legislature
must hasten lo step in and correct the malady. A preliminary investigation of
^legations made by a wife may be made compulsory before registration of an FIR.
And such offences must be made bailable so that innocent family members are not
put to humiliation and harassment of detention in lock-up and jail.
Such offences need to be made compoundable because quite often, couples
come to terms after some aberrations and they decide to live together and lead a
normal matrimonial life. However, if the offence continues to be non-compound-
able, despite the parties having arrived at a mutual settlement, litigation will go
on, dragging parties to appearances in witness box and dock in courts. This is
neither matrimonially advisable nor socially desirable.
There have been observations and recommendations made by the High Court
of Rajasthan and Bombay53 for bringing about necessary legislative amendments
in section 498-A, IPC and section 320 of the Code. It is hish time that Parliament
passes necessary amendments in sections 498-A and 406, IPC so as to make these
offences bailable, and also section 320 of the Code to make them compoundable
with permission of the court.
The question is what can be done till the law is amended, as at present, parties
have to approach the High Court under section 482 of the Code, for quashing the
proceedings after they have mutually sorted out their differences either by way of
a divorce or reunion. Firstly, approaching the High Court is quite expensive as it
entails a fresh round of litigation. Secondly, quashing takes its own time and
procedural formalities have to be complied with. Thirdly, the High Court may at
times get hyper-technical and decline either permission to compound non-com-
poundable offences or quash the proceedings on the ground that trial will decide
the fate of parties. And in the case of some High Courts like Rajasthan and
Karnataka, a Single Bench will be precedent-bound by its Division Bench and Full
Bench judgments, taking a contrary view to the effect that a non-compoundable
offence cannot be compounded even by exercise of inherent powers by the High
Court.
Under the above scenario, it is expedient and desirable, till the law is suitably
amended by the legislature, that the Supreme Court in an appropriate case may lay
down the guidelines in the matter of compounding of offences, particularly
matrimonial offences. It will be worthwhile considering the grant of such powers
to trial courts as it will save a lot of valuable time of the High Courts and also save
parties from avoidable and unnecessary botheration, expense and anxiety. A trial
court is always well-equipped to decide about voluntariness of settlement between
parties, seized as it is of the matter during trial. With a view to seeing that such
powers granted to trial courts are not abused, the High Court may issue instruc-
tions to send the factual statement of each such case to the court for its apprecia-
tion. In any case, justice must be done to parties who do not want themselves to
be embroiled in further litigation after they have ironed out their differences.
P.R. Thakur*
Advocate, Delhi High Court. Formerly, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Delhi.